Archive

Large scale document archive

1986 Jun 30 Mo
Archive (NSA)

South Africa: Ringdahl email to Poindexter (next steps on South Africa) [declassified 1994 or 1995]

Document type: Declassified documents
Source: ed. Tom Blanton White House e-mail (1995) - accompanying floppy disk
Editorial comments: Precise date of declassification uncertain. The text was created within the NSA by scanning a paper original via OCR. Some typos and/or OCR errors have been silently corrected for this site.
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 835
Themes: Commonwealth (South Africa), Foreign policy (USA)

FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA
06/30/86
10:58:07
To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: South Africa

Florence, please print for JMP. Thanks.
*** Forwarding note from NSPHR --CPUA 06/30/86 09:36 ***

To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER

S E C R E T

NOTE FROM: Phil Ringdahl
Subject: South Africa

Below Prof forwarded FYI, with Walt’s commerts. Thanks.

S E C R E T

*** Forwarding note from NSPHR --CPUA 06/30/86 08:00 ***
To: NSPHR --CPUA

S E C R E T

NOTE FROM: Phil Ringdahl

SUBJECT: South Africa

  1. Walt [Walter Raymond] and I met with Chet Crocker Saturday, and he reviewed generally what State plans (though witholding any decisions until Secretary Shultz has approved). We briefed our London meetings. State’s emphasis is on “crash&lrdquo;, visible program involving the President, Shultz, allies, and Front Line States; process of policy review (which we suggested should be NSC); tactical timing of component parts of overall strategy; and U.S. initiatives toward SAG itself. Given SFRC [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] hearings set to begin July 21 or 22 (which Crocker believes could be advanced) and Shultz’s important appearance there, action both in review process and demonstrating pro-active diplomatic initiatives is crucial in next two weeks. Following is offered for your consideration in advance of your discussions with Shultz and the President this week.
  2. State envisages both positive and and negative measures, designed to keep Congress contained and send signal to SAG that we wish to remain positively engaged (by avoiding destructive, puntitive sanctions) if SAG behaves and continues reform process. Failure on either or both scores will dramatically dilute our influence and presence there, but we will have set the policy foundation for future options in dealing with with issue domestically and abroad.

    Positive:

    • Restatement of U.S. commitment to remain engaged and not walk away;
    • allied consultations and development of positive, collective strategy both political and economic;
    • and some FLS initiative (though State is very pessimistic, backed by historic experience, re energizing the FLS positively).

    Negative:

    • Restriction of movement of people (visas, etc),
    • SAG presence in U.S. (consulates and military offices),
    • landing rights of SAG aircraft, and
    • consideration of U.S. investment and bank loans. (We expressed concern on this latter point that these not enter the punitive zone).
  3. State is approaching ANC issue in form of expanding contact w/o granting “recognition” or legitimacy they have not earned nor deserve as an organization given their commitment to violence. Approach would be to expand and emphasize dialogue with ANC moderate elements in order to strengthen their hand and to enlarge U.S. influence in transition and post-apartheid period within ANC. As you know, there are downsides to this (especially in undercutting moderate blacks such as Buthelezi) so this needs to be studied carefully. It also needs to be combined with parallel approach to all other moderate blacks.
  4. To set action tone, Walt and I believe a meeting of the allied four or give is essential the first half of July. Crocker is suggesting the “senior directors”, but that won’t achieve what is necessary. It must be the foreign ministers -- Shultz, Howe, Genscher, Abe, and perhaps Raimond. In addition to the collective strategy aspects, one result of such a meeting should be a visit to South and southern Africa to see all the parties. This would not only help consolidate any collective action, but also play extremely well to our respective domestic audiences. Whether the SAG would cooperate fully is problematic, but than in itself is an important point to register publicly.
  5. A Presidential speech is also recommended, timed to achieve maximum impact on the process and the SFRC hearings. Both Lugar and Kassembaum have called for such a statement. This would have the greatest single impact on all the key players --Congress, allies, and inside South AFrica.
  6. In sum, the EPG process will have been re-energized -- as you have suggested -- engaging the President personally, bringing together the “friends” of the SAG so as to increase impact of demarche(s) and receptivity in Pretoria, increase FLS and hence African involvement so as to broaden committment (and give at least partial “made in Africa” dimension), and revisiting possible economic and financial leverages. In all of this, it will be important not to prejudge SAG reaction before we get a chance to develop and implement what we are planning. Without top level political involvement on this, we will be overrun by domestic and international political pressures for sanctions.

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