Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

HL S Scott Report

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: House of Lords
Source: Hansard HL [569/1258-60]
Editorial comments: 1711-1720.
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 1201
Themes: Executive, Judiciary, Parliament, Defence (arms control), Trade, Foreign policy (Middle East), Law & order, Security services & intelligence
[column 1258]

5.11 p.m.

Baroness Thatcher

My Lords, in order to keep to my 10 minutes, which I had understood to be the maximum time that we had, I shall not honour the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield; I shall get on with what I had intended to say. For some time now a great deal has been said about what has been misleadingly called “Arms to Iraq” . Indeed, some of the Opposition and the media seemed to have made up their minds in advance that the Scott Report would attribute deliberate intent to the Government, both in breaking their own guidelines which prohibited the sale of lethal equipment to Iraq and Iran and in conspiring to send innocent men to prison. I never believed that Sir Richard Scott would make any such findings, and he does not do so. Indeed, he makes it absolutely clear that the Government did not authorise the sale of any lethal equipment to Iran and Iraq. By contrast, some of our competitors, particularly our fellow European Union members, showed no such restraint.

Nevertheless, the report raises important issues, many of which have been mentioned this afternoon, which merit full discussion and examination. I am sure that the Government will give both to them. As my noble and learned friend said, in that category are improved arrangements for the control of sensitive exports and improved handling of intelligence material in Whitehall—though I personally will always be on the side of those who wish to see the greatest care exercised in dealing with intelligence, remembering that carelessness can very easily put lives at risk. I believe that the Government have already taken action to deal with failure to ensure that Ministers responsible for decisions have access to all relevant intelligence and information.

On the question of public interest immunity certificates, there seems to be a divergence of view between lawyers, with many eminent judges, including the Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Bingham, and eminent and learned barristers, including my noble friend Lord Alexander of Weedon, supporting the view taken by Sir Nicholas Lyellthe Attorney-General, as, indeed, I do. It is difficult when judges take different views. You might expect that of politicians and, of course, you would expect it in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords. But it is difficult when they take apparently different views on the subject.

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for the clearest and most authoritative exposition that I have heard on all the law to date. If I had been in No. 10 I would have said, [column 1259] “Well, that's that; put it into the pipeline and abide by it” . I am not quite sure what the pipeline is, but I hope that that will be the case and that we can accept that fact. I have always believed that a public interest immunity certificate could not be final; a judge had to have the ability to disclose documents to the defence. Indeed, you could not have justice otherwise. That does in fact turn out to be the case, as I hope will be made clear.

The most contentious area of Sir Richard 's report, as far as it concerns my time as Prime Minister, is his conclusion that the guidelines for the sale of defence equipment to Iraq and Iran were surreptitiously changed in 1988–89 and that this was not reported to Parliament. On that matter, I differ from Sir Richard. The original guidelines came to me for approval in 1984, approval which I readily gave.

Thereafter, no proposal to amend them was put to me until 1990. Then it came in the quite different context of the worldwide relaxation of COCOM controls. When such a change was being considered in 1990, it was explicitly and rightly envisaged that Parliament should be informed. In the event, the change was not made because the Gulf War intervened.

Sir Richard 's report shows that there were discussions among junior Ministers and officials about possible evolution of the guidelines in 1988–89. I was not aware of those discussions at the time, but I would not expect to be told every detail of the handling of the guidelines in the light of changing circumstances. You must take account of changing circumstances when applying guidelines. In any event, the report indicates that the discussions were not conclusive and no recommendations for a change were brought forward to me or senior Ministers.

Equally, it must be remembered that the guidelines were precisely what their title implies: a guide to officials on how to handle applications for the export of certain sorts of equipment. Their core was the firm injunction against selling lethal equipment and that was scrupulously observed. But they retained an element of flexibility for dealing with non-lethal equipment.

That flexibility naturally took account of changing events, including the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran in 1988, as well as a number of other developments. The interpretation of the guidelines evolved to keep pace with those developments, without any need to change the guidelines themselves.

For example, on the big issues, the proposed sale of the Hawk trainer aircraft was rejected out of hand, while on the borderline cases, the Scott Report clearly shows Ministers and officials exercising enormous care in trying to reach decisions. Indeed, I believe that all fair-minded people would agree that the civil servants handling those difficult matters acted conscientiously and in good faith and should not be stigmatised.

If there was no change in the guidelines—and there was not—then the question of deliberately misleading the House does not arise. I am sure that there was never any intent to mislead on the part of Mr. Waldegrave or any other Ministers—and Sir Richard Scott himself concludes that there was not duplicitous intent. [column 1260]

As Lord Callaghanmy predecessor in No. 10 indicated, there will always be issues upon which Parliament cannot be as fully informed as might otherwise be desirable. I believe that he will remember that Parliament was not informed about the upgrading of Polaris to Chevaline. Doubtless there were good reasons for that, and I do not criticise that decision. Both Conservative and Labour Governments have found it necessary on occasion to be reticent with the House. I accept that the presumption should always be in favour of informing Parliament unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary. But we should recognise that it will not always be possible, and that has been accepted by previous governments of both parties.

In summary, we should thank Sir Richard for the immense amount of detailed work which he put into the report and study very carefully all the lessons which arise from it. We should bear in mind that government does not always lend itself to the exactitude rightly sought by the law. I come from a period at the tax Bar, so I know what exactitude means; it is quite different from government—we make the law; we do not apply the law.

Finally, amidst the mass of detail we should remember that at the end of the war to liberate Kuwait—in which the British Government and Armed Forces played such a proud role—no British lethal equipment was found among Iraqi supplies on the battlefield.