Interviewer
Prime Minister, in order to get the compromise on short-range nuclear weapons, have you not had to back down quite a good deal?
Prime Minister
Not really. If you look, we have in fact no negotiations on SMF until we have actually agreed the conventional weapons cuts and implemented some of them and then you have no short-range weapons cuts until all of the conventional weapons agreements have been implemented—and that is an enormous amount.
Interviewer
But it is a fact, is it not, that you would have preferred no negotiations at all?
Prime Minister
I would have preferred no negotiations, but actually they have stopped negotiations for quite a long time to come until all of the conventional agreements have occurred and they have started to implement them. When they have done that, they say no agreements [end p1] on short-range negotiations will be put into effect—that is, no weapons taken out—until all of the conventional weapons have been disposed of and destroyed and then, after that, they go on to say that you cannot obviate the need for short-range nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. So that is three things which made it pretty safe.
Interviewer
So, in effect, what you are really saying is: “Yes, I have agreed reluctantly to the negotiations but it is going to be quite a long time before things get under way!” ?
Prime Minister
I think if you look at the document, that is precisely what it says and it has been very careful.
So yes, it has agreed to negotiations under certain circumstances; it has made it even tougher to implement some of those negotiations for very good reasons—because we must never let an arms control policy undermine our defence.
Interviewer
On the other hand, though, President Bush 's initiative does envisage that the Vienna Talks on Conventional Weapons would perhaps be over within, say, twelve months, so that is quite a short time frame. Are you really saying you do not believe it is going to happen that fast? [end p2]
Prime Minister
I think it is a little optimistic, because you see, George Bushhe is not only proposing increased cuts, that is to say, he is having a look at the aircraft although not nuclear-capable aircraft, but he has also said that the weaponry will have to be destroyed. Now that means that we have got to set up a whole system for monitoring it and seeing that it is destroyed, because it is no good just agreeing cuts if these are just going behind the Urals and not going to be destroyed, so I think there is a formidable programme of agreement—agreement on how you should destroy—and not only agreement on weaponry but a lot of the Soviet soldiers would have to be taken out of action.
Interviewer
Also, of course, in the text it says that the Lance decision will not now be taken until 1992. If you had had your way, that Lance decision to go ahead and fully modernise it would have been taken now, would it not?
Prime Minister
That was originally why Chancellor Kohl wanted an early NATO Summit—to take the decision before the Euro-elections. Things changed and, as you know, we did not take that but we have put in an extra paragraph that although we have not taken the decision to modernise, it is absolutely vital that weapons be kept up-to-date, [end p3] otherwise they do not deter, that we shall need a short-range nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future and in the meantime, so that we keep in that decision to be taken in 1992, we support the United States in the research and development work it is doing on the follow-on weapon to Lance—and that is the first time we have had that in.
Interviewer
But could you not accept that with the fact that Lance is not now going ahead until 1992 and the fact that, on your own admission, you have had to back down a bit on the principle of negotiation, could you not excuse tomorrow morning's headlines which will say: “Mrs. Thatcher climbs down!” ?
Prime Minister
No. I could not excuse that in any way.
First, you say we have done nothing about modernisation. That is not correct. We have in fact made it quite clear that weapons must be brought up-to-date as necessary, absolutely clear.
Second, we have supported the research and development which is going on in the United States on that follow-on weapon.
Thirdly, we have built in conditions before negotiations can begin to start on short-range nuclear weapons, very severe conditions, perhaps much more severe than I had ever hoped were possible. They are severe conditions: highly complicated [end p4] negotiation on conventional, start to implement—only then do you begin to start negotiations and even if you agree for a partial reduction on SNF because that is the only authority you have, not a single one can be taken out until all of that massive conventional agreement is fully implemented.
Really, if I might say so, I think other people have gone much much further towards an agreement than I had to.
Interviewer
What about this question of the so-called “third zero” which is shorthand, really, for the complete elimination of short-range nuclear weapons? Now you are absolutely dead against that.
Is the language here, do you think, sufficiently strong because it is suggested that you wanted rather stronger language in there which made it quite clear there would never be a third zero?
Does this reference to achieving a partial reduction satisfy your demands? Could it not go on from a partial reduction to a complete reduction?
Prime Minister
You have to look at that against the background of the whole document. If you look at other paragraphs, you will find first, that it is absolutely vital that you keep a short-range nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future and second, that it must be modernised and third—I think it is in paragraph 63—that you cannot obviate the need for short-range nuclear weapons. [end p5]
It is all there! The only authority you have is for a partial reduction and, as the Manfred WörnerSecretary-General said, that is not entire and you will find it written very clearly in the other paragraphs of the document—that you cannot obviate the need for short-range nuclear weapons—paragraph 63.
Interviewer
So if other delegations are trying to interpret this as leaving the way open for the third zero, you are saying they are quite wrong, it is not going to happen?
Prime Minister
I will give you the paragraphs to take them through.
It starts with paragraph 27, it goes on to about 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47—it may be 49—and also paragraph 63 and you will find it all written there.
Interviewer
Can I finally ask you about flexible response?
It is quite clear that from here it would seem that flexible response, there are those, as you know, in Britain, in the Labour Party and others, who say that that is quite wrong. Are you satisfied that here there is a clear declaration for flexible response—that means the mix of nuclear weapons—for the foreseeable future as it says, that there can be never any question about that? [end p6]
Prime Minister
I am absolutely satisfied. You have got the mix of conventional and nuclear; you have got the mixture of nuclear, both strategic and short-range; and you have got the mix in relation to land-, sea- and air-based nuclear missiles and you have got it for the foreseeable future. You have got the lot!