Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

Radio Interview for BBC (NATO Summit)

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: NATO Headquarters, Brussels
Source: Thatcher Archive: COI transcript
Journalist: Graham Leach, BBC
Editorial comments:

Between 1230 and 1315.

Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 1239
Themes: Foreign policy (USA), Foreign policy (Western Europe - non-EU), Foreign policy (Central & Eastern Europe), Defence (general), Defence (arms control), Civil liberties

Interviewer

Prime Minister, you have always expressed extreme scepticism about entering talks with the Soviet Union on short-range missiles. Now, NATO is locked into a process which could lead to such talks. Have you given way on this?

Prime Minister

No, because it has put very careful conditions on when such negotiations can take place and even more careful conditions on when any reductions could take place.

First, negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons could only take place after a conventional agreement has been reached and you know the massive amount of proposals that are on the table and not only after it had been reached, but after they had started to implement it. So you have first got a block on negotiations until then. Then, even if those negotiations are successful, we only have authority, quite rightly, for partial reductions because the document makes it clear that you can obviate the need for short- [end p1] range nuclear weapons. But even if the negotiations are successful for partial reduction, you cannot take a single one out until the entire conventional agreement has been implemented.

Now, you look at that, of course, and it is colossal. It covers almost everything and it covers a proposal which says that they must be destroyed and not merely moved behind the Urals - and so all of that would have to be verified.

So it is very carefully geared and there are very heavy conditions put around both the negotiations and even heavier around the implementation.

Interviewer

But President Bush is hoping for a completion of the Conventional Force Talks in Vienna as early as 1992 or 1993, so theoretically the situation could be changed by then?

Prime Minister

Ah, but that does not mean that you could take out short-range nuclear weapons even if you start to negotiate. First, you have got to start to negotiate. Secondly, if those negotiations are successful partially to reduce, you cannot take out any of the weapons until all of your tanks, armoured personnel carriers and so on and the change in your force dispositions - all of those - have been implemented and the agreement on the aircraft and helicopters had been implemented. So it is quite a time. [end p2]

Interviewer

Prime Minister, what is to stop the West Germans coming back in 1992 or 1993, if Mr. Bush's plan goes ahead, and saying: &oqq;Right! Let us talk again about the third zero or the complete abolition of land-based missiles!&cqq;?

Prime Minister

They have signed up to this document which says that for the foreseeable future we shall need short-range nuclear weapons and also to the paragraph which says that although we can have reductions, those would not obviate the need for such forces. They have signed up to that completely.

Interviewer

They might argue that circumstances change!

Prime Minister

Well, circumstances may change, but the position we are in now is that they have signed up to this document, which refers to these weapons being needed for the foreseeable future, including the land-based missiles of shorter range.

Interviewer

Are you happy about the degree of commitment to replace the Lance missile? I mean, the language of the Declaration does not really go much beyond that at the last Summit - an expression of hope to keep missiles up-to-date. It is no firmer than that, is it? [end p3]

Prime Minister

It also has a reference to the United States programme and that was necessary.

At first, we thought that Congress would not go ahead with the research and development on the follow on to Lance unless NATO agreed that those weapons would be deployed if they were produced. It became apparent that Congress was prepared to put in two years research and development money - this year and next - without such a total commitment, but therefore, NATO thought it right that we should fully agree and realise the importance of what the United States is doing and say so in spending that money on research and development because it is that which keeps the option open when we come to consider deployment in 1992. Unless they spent that money now, then we should not have an option of deciding in 1992, so we do refer to that, and that is an advance.

Interviewer

Do you think you have pushed the Germans too hard on this issue, given the domestic difficulties experienced by Chancellor Kohl? [end p4]

Prime Minister

This is a very good, whole, comprehensive statement of defence, how arms control fits in, how conventional weapons fit in and how they can be reduced, never getting an imbalance in defence; how the strategic weapons and the smaller nuclear weapons fit it and the fact that you need land-based missiles in Europe as well. It is a very very good statement and it applies for the foreseeable future and you cannot obviate the need for short-range nuclear weapons.

All in all, it is an excellent, well-balanced statement which everyone of us can be very pleased with and was right to sign up on and it shows the Alliance's total unity - and that is very important.

Interviewer

According to British sources, when you were addressing the Plenary Session yesterday, you said that Mr. Bush's new proposals transformed the Summit. Could you evoke a little of the impact that that initiative had on yourself and on your fellow leaders?

Prime Minister

I think they did and most of us realise that our main role is defence. Whatever happens, our task as governments is to see that our defence of freedom and justice is secure and sometimes it seems that therefore so much of the publicity goes to arms control [end p5] reductions. What we have to watch is that the arms control reductions do not undermine the defence in any way, but nevertheless, quite a lot of the presentation does go to the arms control reductions.

I think that President Bush realised that the talks in Vienna are going well, that we should soon come up to discussing the question of aircraft and helicopters and it would be far better to take that initiative now and you could feel, you know, it lifted the whole thing because people felt that not only was defence secure, but we could do the other thing which we wanted to do: make it secure at lower levels of weaponry without undermining the security of our countries.

Interviewer

In the wake of this Summit, does NATO now have a convincing vision of the way ahead for Europe in response to Mr. Gorbachev? Can you foresee a Europe now without the Iron Curtain?

Prime Minister

There is a very convincing vision in the Declaration which accompanies the Comprehensive Concept and it is very positive indeed. [end p6]

I am not quite certain that I can see that Europe which you depict. I can see us trying to work for it and the document talks about a proper law beyond the Iron Curtain under which people have full human rights which they can enforce against their own governments. Now that is quite revolutionary for Iron Curtain countries. It talks about not having those controls on the border in which people shoot at those people crossing - that those should go; not having walls which restrict the passage and much freer movement in and out. All of that is in this accompanying document and it is very very exciting and it says that we shall use the Helsinki Process to try to bring those things into effect.