Q1
Could I begin on a regional note by asking you to characterise British policy in Southern Africa, especially in terms of London's positive approach to the Frontline States and passive stance on South Africa?
A
I do not accept your description. Our policy is a positive one both towards the Frontline States and towards South Africa.
In the case of South Africa, no one can be in doubt about our attitude towards apartheid which is one of total condemnation. I am constantly explaining to the South Africans, through every available channel, the need to release Nelson Mandela and begin negotiations with representatives of black South Africans against the background of suspension of violence. That to my mind is the crucial step. What I have never believed is that this aim will be advanced in any way by imposing sanctions against South Africa. The effect of sanctions would be to damage black South Africans and deprive many of them of the means to earn their living. Instead we prefer the positive approach of assisting black South Africans with education and housing. By next year we shall be giving some £10 million a year, either directly or through the European Community, to help with education for black South Africans; and there will be some thousand black South Africans studying on scholarships financed by Britain. We are also talking to organisations like the Urban Foundation about ways in which we can help black people to buy their own homes. That is a much more constructive approach than hitting out with sanctions.
You are of course right that our approach to the Front Line States is also a very positive one. We have given over £1 billion in aid to the countries of Southern Africa since 1980, money which has been used in particular to develop alternative transport routes in the region and reduce the dependence of African countries on South Africa. As I am sure [end p1] you know we are also providing help with military training for Mozambique. All in all, it is a record of which we can be proud.
Exciting and important changes are taking place in Southern Africa: the settlement in Namibia, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the ever more widespread recognition in South Africa that apartheid is wrong and must go. My visit will be an opportunity to assess these developments and see how Britain can help keep up the momentum of change for the better.
Q2
On the eve of your first visit to Zimbabwe, would you agree that bilateral relations have improved and that there is a greater degree of mutual understanding and acceptance?
A
Yes, I think relations are very good. We are proud to have played a part, indeed a significant part, in Zimbabwe's economic development since Independence and the visit is a chance for me to see for myself the tremendous progress which you have made. President Mugabe and I try to meet regularly and I always find our discussions particularly constructive.
Q3
Britain provided Zimbabwe with aid totalling £12 million in 1987, and when President Mugabe saw you in London last October you offered another £15 million. Could some of this new money be used for land settlement, bearing in mind that much of the £30 million allocated for this purpose since Independence has already been earmarked for specific schemes?
A
We have given over £200 million in bilateral development assistance since independence and it has been used for a wide variety of purposes. It is of course your Government which sets the priorities for aid, and assistance for resettlement has been high among them. I am told that the programme has been very successful in helping to develop the country's agricultural potential and that over half the maize sold in Zimbabwe now comes from the small farms. I shall be able to [end p2] see for myself how the money is used when I visit the Mount Darwin Project. We are certainly ready to consider further support for this programme from the additional assistance which I pledged to President Mugabe last October.
Q4
Would your Government's much advertised support for the Frontline States stretch to military assistance, other than training? There have been press reports of Britain's willingness to sell Harrier Jump Jets to Zimbabwe in a £100 million deal.
A
I think that training is quite rightly the main role that we see for our military assistance to the countries of Southern Africa. But we do also provide a certain amount of non-lethal equipment, for instance for Mozambican troops, and we are always ready to discuss the sale of defence equipment where this is required. The reputation of British defence equipment stands very high in the world.
Q5
I was intrigued to hear (at a recent CBI Conference on Trade with Africa) Mr. Christopher Patten extolling privatisation and private capital, that what it has done for British economy it could do for the ailing African economies. Will you, Prime Minister, be raising the capitalist banner in Socialist Zimbabwe? Is Thatcherism for export, a new component in British Aid Programme?
A
It is not for me to tell anyone else how to run their economy. I can only say what has been successful for us. We have restored enterprise and reduced the role of the state, and the result has been visible in much higher standards of living for everyone. I understand that some thirty African countries are implementing economic reform programmes with the help of the World Bank and the IMF which encourage private enterprise and investment. The countries which are applying these remedies are generally doing better than those which are not.
My information is that the private sector has an important [end p3] part in Zimbabwe and I am sure that will continue.
Q6
Will you be taking up with President Mugabe the vexed question of greater incentives for foreign investors, including improved repatriation of post-tax profits?
A
There is a very simple answer to this: people will not put money in unless they know they can get it out.
Q7
The issue of economic sanctions against South Africa remains very much in the public arena, particularly in Africa. In private, is it any longer an impediment to bilateral business? President Mugabe said in London recently that if sanctions were raised during your visit it ought not to lead to fisticuffs. Do you consider the African leaders in general now accept, however grudgingly, Britain's refusal to adopt further sanctions or to participate in the post-Vancouver initiatives adopted by all other Commonwealth countries? Would you expect the heat aroused on this subject at the Canadian Conference to be repeated in Malaysia later in the year?
A
I think there is a much wider understanding of these arguments and people realise that it is better to have a constructive policy than one of hitting out with sanctions. They know that we are totally opposed to apartheid and are working very hard to persuade the South African Government to end it. Indeed almost all the South Africans I see agree that it must go.
Particularly as we approach the elections in Namibia, which will take place on 1 November immediately after the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, it is particularly important to avoid ill-considered measures which would risk upsetting the delicate process of securing Namibia's independence. That is an objective which we have long shared [end p4] and is now at last close to being realised.
Q8
There has been much speculation that you want to visit South Africa. Is this the case? There has also been speculation that a visit would depend upon Pretoria making a major concession, such as the release of Nelson Mandela. Would I be right in thinking that, whatever the timing of a visit, you would not lay down preconditions? Is it true that you are keen to promote the idea of a South African Constitutional Conference on the lines of the Rhodesia Conference at Lancaster House?
A
I do not have any plans to visit South Africa at present, and indeed I think it would not be right for me to go under present circumstances, because a visit would be misinterpreted as endorsement of the present situation. Were Nelson Mandela to be released as a prelude to opening negotiations on South Africa's future with representatives of all races, the situation would be very different. Equally I do not think it makes sense to isolate South Africa as she approaches these very difficult decisions. Indeed I think the need for tact and persuasion is greater than ever.
There is no question of Lancaster House-type negotiations because South Africa is an independent country. It is for South Africans themselves to work out their future. I continue to believe that the formula worked out by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group illustrated a positive way forward.
Q9
Mrs. Lynda Chalker recently paid a highly successful visit to Lusaka. Yet relations continue to remain strained with Zambia. And, it is said, you are no longer on Christian name terms with your former dancing partner in Lusaka, that you both communicate in formal terms - “Mr. President” or “Prime Minister”. Can you say why you chose not to approach Dr. Kaunda, the Elder Statesman of the Frontline States, to see whether you could include Zambia in your tour? [end p5]
A
We all admire and respect President Kaunda who is one of the Commonwealth's Elder Statesman and a man of great sincerity and compassion. Obviously I could not visit all the countries of Southern Africa during this brief tour. Since Zambia is the one country which I have already visited in the area, it would hardly be sensible to go there again.
Q10
Could we touch on Mozambique. You have gone out of your way to support the Machel and Chissano Governments. Is there anything Britain can do diplomatically to bring about the end of the fighting in Mozambique, which is straining Zimbabwe's and Mozambique's modest resources?
A
Yes, we have enjoyed good relations both with President Chissano and with his predecessor President Machel, who played such a tremendously helpful role during the Lancaster House negotiations. They have both adopted a very realistic attitude towards South Africa. It is only through direct contacts and discussions that the problems of Southern Africa will be resolved. I shall be meeting President Chissano during my visit and look forward to hearing from him how he sees the situation in Mozambique and the prospects for ending the conflict in his country as part of the wider goal of bringing peace to Southern Africa as a whole. Britain has of course provided substantial help to Mozambique, both emergency aid and military training.
Q11
Britain played a low-profile role in the American-led negotiations for a settlement in South-West Africa. What is your assessment of the settlement, and would you support a fall-back plan to reinforce the United Nations should their numbers prove inadequate - as the Frontline leaders fear they would be?
A
The Namibia Agreement is a very important step forward and reflects credit on all those concerned. I would pay particular tribute to the role played by the United States in the negotiations, and their persistence despite all the difficulties. Britain played a helpful part throughout and we [end p6] are now making a practical contribution to implementing the settlement by providing a contingent for the UN forces. If we can make a success of the Namibia Agreement it could have a very positive and beneficial effect on the prospects of resolving other problems in the region.
If Javier Perez de Cuellarthe United Nations Secretary General asks for reinforcements for the UN Force up to the 7500 ceiling already agreed, we would be ready in principle to respond to that.