Prime Minister
I am very pleased to welcome Chancellor Kohl to London for these talks. It is very good of him to have found the time. As you know, he is President of Europe at the moment, and we have a very important meeting next week.
I think some of you do not realise how frequently Chancellor Kohl and I meet. I looked up the record last year and we actually met five times for bilateral discussions and so there are always a great many things to discuss.
This meeting was obviously taken up almost wholly with the Council meeting that we expect in Brussels—and we have in Brussels—next week. I think it is the view of both of us—and Chancellor Kohl will confirm it—that we would like to solve the problem at Brussels next week.
You will recall that we got quite a way in Copenhagen, but in the end we were not able to get the full way. Some people were very depressed about it and I recalled we had had a similar experience over financial matters which resulted in a success at the next meeting at Fontainebleau and said that I thought we could do the same this time. [end p1]
We have discussed, very constructively, many of the details of things that will come before us next week. We have discussed the agricultural stabilisers, particularly on cereals and on proteins and oil, and the other stabilisers which are also important. We have discussed the structural funds; we have discussed the financing of the Community; and we have made some progress.
Obviously, there are still differences between us about how we tackle the surpluses and that is fundamental, not only to the Common Agricultural Policy but fundamental to the level of the budget and the increase of own-resources which are required.
I think there have been some of the most detailed discussions we have ever had and with a wish really to tackle the surpluses and the wish to solve the problems in Brussels next week.
We are, of course, both of us also in touch with other Community partners and later, we began to discuss some East-West problems, but that was very brief because we had to come and see you.
Altogether a very satisfactory meeting and very constructive. Still some way to go—quite a way to go—before we agree, but we have defined those things on which we can take a common position and those things on which we still have to negotiate.
Chancellor Kohl! [end p2]
Chancellor Kohl
Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:
First of all, Prime Minister, I should like to thank you for your open and very friendly discussions that we have had. Indeed, we have regularly again and again had an opportunity to exchange our views and to further cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, which is our common aim.
Today—and everybody will understand this—the main topic of our discussions has been how we can manage the Brussels Summit on Thursday and Friday of next week.
Let me make a general introductory remark first of all:
I myself am firmly resolved to do what is humanly possible to ensure that Brussels should be a success. You have just heard from the Prime Minister that she has a similar opinion. There may be people who believe that problems can be solved by us postponing our decisions from Brussels to Hanover. They will be disappointed! The problems would be not easier, but more difficult in that case.
In Copenhagen, there was not a failure of the Summit but we separated at Copenhagen because we did not have enough time and one or two things were not nature for decision.
I do not think that delaying the problems will help us.
It is our declared aim to make use of every possibility in order to get a result and a compromise in Brussels, because we need our time after that for the next normal Summit in Hanover in the summer in order to prepare other important decisions on our way to the full European Internal Market in 1992, and let me say again [end p3] for the Federal Republic and for my own policy in particular, this is an essential part of our policy which is that we should make vigorous progress in Europe and of course, this means that we must reach our target, which will be very difficult to establish by 1992—the European Internal Market. That is really the decisive issue that we have been working for over the past years.
With regard to our discussions today, they were extremely instructive and I think constructive too. There are a number of points on which we have not been able to obtain agreement, where our opinions differ. We will have contact over the next few days, talk to other people as well, and we have learnt our mutual opinions and that is very important, and as we are still in full progress here you will please understand that we do not go into details of various points here—we want to work on these issues over the next few days. We will talk to other heads of government colleagues whom we will then meet in Brussels; we will have telephone contact. Our aims must be that Brussels could be a success.
Thank you very much for our talks! [end p4]
John Dickie (The “Daily Mail” )
Prime Minister, did you manage to persuade the Chancellor of the need for the Community to have a tighter control on agricultural spending, particularly on cereals? And if you did not manage to persuade him, perhaps the Chancellor could explain how he resisted your formidable powers of persuasion!
Prime Minister
I think the two main groups of agricultural produce on which we still have to agree are cereals and the oils and proteins.
Obviously, on cereals, there are a number of ways in which you can get down the surpluses. They are: the maximum quota, the extent of the price reduction, the extent and distribution of a co-responsibility levy, and the set-aside scheme. Those are the four methods of dealing with cereal production, and obviously, there are differences on those four factors, although we do agree with Chancellor Kohl that set-aside—which was one of his ideas—must play some part, but of course, we believe that price reduction and co-responsibility, though in particular price reductions and the maximum quota are critical. So there are differences there and we have to discuss those further.
Also, on the protein and oilseed, the great problem about the oilseed in particular is the massive increase in quantity that has been grown and the guaranteed prices, which give an enormous extra burden on the budget and that also we shall have still to agree about. [end p5]
We have had long talks about the structural funds and we have had talks about the smaller stabilisers and on those, we have made very considerable progress.
Chancellor Kohl
Perhaps I can add a general comment:
I have been in office now for five years just and when I was elected to be Federal Chancellor I found the situation of which you are all aware, which is that the EEC had run into ever more surplus production.
The Community must be viable and it must progress and we must get out of a position in which EEC discussions are almost exclusively agricultural discussions, and now we—this goes for the Prime Minister just as much as for myself—have a very special responsibility at home for all people, in particular for the farmers, and we both are convinced that the farmers are an important part of our population as a whole. But this is not only a question of figures—I mean, it is about four percent of the population in the Federal Republic only—but their social position in society.
We have discussions on ecology at home and there I know perfectly well that without the farmers and their cooperation we could not hope to have a reasonable ecological development. We need the farmers. [end p6]
Over these five years now, we have worked hard to get surplus production, which is a result of faulty development of EEC policies over the last two years, and we have worked hard to reduce these surpluses. When I tell you that in Germany farmers have accepted price reductions of twenty-five percent over the last few years—wheat, barley, rapeseed are just a few examples—well that is an example of the fact that this is a very difficult road to tread and very difficult decisions to take, but we must reduce surplus production. We must work at this.
We have different situations in our various countries. This begins with the size of the farms—the numbers of hectares which make up a farm—and this is also decisively connected with the goodness of the soil. In the Federal Republic, we have great differences between north and south and throughout Europe that is the case.
We are determined, by way of consolidating the balance with a view to a reasonable reduction of surplus production, to move step-by-step forward, but with vigorous steps.
I have quoted a few figures to you to show how our prices have gone down, but it must be done in a sensible way so that it becomes socially acceptable, and that is the point on which we have to go on working.
I say this in the full knowledge that the Federal Republic is the largest net contributor. I do not complain about this. We have great advantages from the Community. I have always said so. But, [end p7] nevertheless, last year it was 8 billion deutschmarks which we paid into the EEC and in accordance with how we decide in Brussels, it will be a decision which will not be far from 11 billion deutschmarks net. We do this because we are for this European development, because we all benefit from it, the Federal Republic perhaps more than others because it is more than the economic aspects for us—I always say this at home you know—we are a divided country, we are the frontier between East and West, and it is an existential problem for us that everybody should realise that the Federal Republic of Germany is irreversibly tied into the proven community of the West in NATO and in the Community of European countries.
Question
Did the subject of rebates come up today and could you say whether that is one of the areas where there is agreement or which is still open to negotiation?
Prime Minister
We did discuss Britain's rebate. You know the view which I take about it. It took us five years to negotiate one, which I thought was fully justified by the Fontainebleau decision. The Fontainebleau decision lasts as long as the own-resources lasts; we are unlikely to agree to extra own-resources unless the Fontainebleau decision remains. [end p8]
Should there be a change from that to GNP, which would prove advantageous to us through the Fontainebleau mechanism, we would naturally not wish to get extra from the Fontainebleau mechanism, so we want the Fontainebleau mechanism—with the quantities it would give—to continue and to last as long as any new own-resources decision lasts, but not to gain from a change from that to GNP. That factor would be surrendered. Is that clear?
Question
I just wondered whether that was agreed or whether there is any difficulty in …
Prime Minister
I think that there are one or two people who do not yet agree it. I think they will find it very difficult to get much further unless that fully justified mechanism continues.
Chancellor Kohl
This question is one of many out of the overall package.
I said at the beginning that we want to be successful in Brussels, and we shall only be successful if we all try and meet one another and help one another. This goes for me as well, particularly with regard to Britain's particular cause, but we must see that there are many people around the table and many people who have wishes, and all these will have to be packaged-up. But today, I leave London in the certainty that both of us—and this is very [end p9] important because there have been different reports about this—but I leave London in the conviction that we both want Brussels to be a success.
Question
Prime Minister, Chancellor, it was precisely those reports I wanted to pick up on, the question of the nature of your relationship, which the British media and some European newspapers have suggested is far from good.
Now, you portray today an atmosphere of charm, I think the Chancellor characterised it as, but has charm produced practical advance?
Prime Minister
You did not recognise the charm! (laughter)
Yes, I think it has, because what one has been able to define is areas where we agree and obviously, in connection with a large question, I have been able to say what I said a moment ago about the Fontainebleau mechanism.
There are—and we both are very clear about it—substantial areas of disagreement over cereals and oil and proteins. Those are the very expensive surplus commodities and those are the ones which it is vital to tackle, and those differences remain, but equally, Chancellor Kohl has agreed on a number of other things, I think possibly because he has found there is great agreement on them [end p10] throughout the Community and we still have to decide as well the amount of the structural funds and we have not in fact put figures to any increases in own-resources should everything else be agreed.
So yes, progress. Yes, a good atmosphere. Yes, very constructive. Yes, quite hard discussion as you would expect, but yes, constructive. And as I said, we did meet five times last year and so yes, charming may be putting it a little bit high—but goodwill yes!
Chancellor Kohl
I should like to take this matter up once again, because it involves more than just the EEC discussion.
I can only say that the two of us have been working together for a good number of years. We knew each other when we were both leaders of Opposition, that is to say long before we held our present offices. We have been working very closely together. We do work very closely together in the working parties of friendly parties—the Conservative Party of Britain and the CDU of Germany. We have met very often on party occasions and have come closer to one another again and again.
Of course, on practical issues we have different responsibilities in our countries and we have different opinions, but I think we discuss these in a fair, sensible and friendly manner. [end p11]
That is all that I would like to say on this point because sometimes I must say I am a little bit surprised at some of these reports.
Question ( “The Independent” )
I would like to ask if the disagreement on agriculture policy, particularly on cereals, is it a mathematical difference, a question of how large the harvest should be and how big the price cut should be or is it still a philosophical difference on whether the price cuts, if any, should be immediate or delayed for twelve months?
Prime Minister
We have the four factors yet to agree on. That is the maximum guaranteed quantity, the extent to which the stabilisers should be dependent on price, the co-responsibility levy with particular reference to its distribution, and the set-aside scheme which I believe there is substantial agreement on, reached between the Agriculture Ministers. The other three things we still have to sort out. [end p12]
Question ( “The Guardian” )
The Chancellor emphasised the fact that Germany was firmly anchored in the West, both through the EEC and through NATO. I just wondered to what extent you managed to discuss this at all today and Prime Minister, what your view is of Germany, particularly the questions that have arisen recently about Germany's flirtation with the Soviet Union?
Prime Minister
You had better deal with this. I will come in later.
Chancellor Kohl
First of all, we have very different ideas of what a “flirt” is. If I may say this very carefully here in this room, I would say a flirt requires a great deal of emotion, feeling, and not first of all rational calculations. So there can be no flirt at all.
What is happening is that we are now improving our relations, of which there was great need. You know that Soviet propaganda, especially since my decision about the stationing of intermediate-distance weapons in 1983 … I had always been a favoured object of counter-propaganda from the Soviets. Hardly any European political leader has been more attacked than I have by the Soviet Union. [end p13]
Now, we have jointly worked for this INF Treaty and we discussed this briefly this morning. As well, we are working jointly to help this treaty to be ratified by the American Senate—we both wish this—and we are both in favour of further, reasonable negotiations to improve East-West relations. That is our joint policy, without any illusions at all.
For me, disarmament policy must mean that at the end of such a process security must be greater, not less—the first maxim, most important.
Secondly, there are a number of points where we can improve relations, where a lot of leeway has to be made up.
The Soviet Union is our most powerful eastern neighbour. It is of existential importance for the fate of our compatriots in the DDR and our neighbours in Poland and Czechoslovakia and so on, and so it is quite natural that where there is a chance for establishing reasonable relations we do so.
And there is something else which is maybe perhaps not known in this country. In the Soviet Union, there are more than two million citizens of German origin. A lot of them want to return to their old country and to their families. In the last year we have had a positive development there—15,000 were allowed to leave the Soviet Union to go to the Federal Republic—so we have our problems in the field of human improvements. [end p14]
But there is no price, let me add, for which the Federal Republic could change its position as part of NATO and the EEC.
Prime Minister
Could I just say, and be very brief because you will want to ask one or two more questions, Chancellor Kohl has been one of the staunchest, most loyal members of NATO and has always fully appreciated the importance of Europe and the United States and Canada standing firmly together. The freedom of Europe depends upon the strength, the unity, the loyalty, of NATO and we stand absolutely as one in that.
He also has taken a similar view towards the Soviet Union on its internal matters, as I have, that we wish the Russian people well in the new bold adventure—historic adventure—internally upon which they have embarked. We know full well that when Mr Gorbachev set out to change a system, as he is trying to change it, that the difficulties emerge first before the benefits. We believe that any enlargement of freedom that comes about within the Soviet Union will be for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In the meantime, we watch the external affairs of the Soviet Union very closely and we are very much aware that there will be some people in the Soviet Union who would make attempts to divide Europe from the United States and to cause divisions within Europe. We are determined that that shall not happen. [end p15]
Question (German TV)
With disarmament problems, I should like to ask whether there are different views with regard to the short-distance missiles and have these been answered?
Chancellor Kohl
No, we have not discussed this problem because there was no time today, but I do not think there are any differences between us.
We are working in NATO for a further development of the Armel (phon.) Report which is the basis of the strategic considerations of the past decade and nuclear defence has its place in that and the conventional situation also has its place and all that goes with it.
The Prime Minister and I are not amongst those who believe in a denuclearised Europe. Let me add that we in the Federal Government and I myself also think it is right that there should be British and French nuclear arms. I have always considered these to be necessary and I say this again here today emphatically. Nor do I believe in a third zero solution, if that was the background of your question.
Question (German Agency)
Prime Minister, Chancellor Kohl, you hope that Brussels will be a success, but do you expect it to be a success or are the other differences so large that there is an open question whether it will succeed? [end p16]
Chancellor Kohl
My experience over the past few years has been that whenever I had great hopes they were dashed, but it was better to have small hope and now, thinking back to the difficult days before Christmas, when I was a little boy the fulfilment was always better if the expectations were not too big!
Prime Minister
I think it is better to approach things optimistically. Then you do really try. Because if we do not succeed this time, it is difficult to see why we would be the more likely to succeed in Hanover. But we shall try.