Prime Minister
… . both of which discussions had started obviously in the margins, and the one on sanctions had started yesterday morning, but we had before us this morning the communiqué that Foreign Ministers had prepared—ten pages, as you know, really in three sections: sanctions; the security; and other measures.
Sanctions: you know our view on sanctions. It has not changed in any way.
Armaments are always different in quality from anything else and of course, there are mandatory sanctions on that which we both supported and fully adhered to. That has been on for some time.
Other sanctions we have put on and will continue. The Commonwealth was very anxious that we should use them, at Nassau, “to send a signal” was the phrase we used, to the South African Government that we felt strongly about apartheid and it was not enough to feel strongly about it—we had to send a signal.
This time, as in London last year, a number of states still wanted to put on comprehensive sanctions. I believe the evidence [end p1] is that they do not work; that they are counter-productive; that they drive the African Government to prolong the very situation we are trying to dismantle and also, insofar as they have an effect, they have an effect only by throwing quite a large number of people—hundreds of thousands of South Africans—out of work, in a country where there is no social security, and that is driving them to deprivation and possibly starvation and something which I believe they realise will take quite a long time.
They, I think, realise these things, and possibly the explanation why you will not find any sanctions in that communique—even on the part of those who believe in them—is that they are beginning to realise the practicalities, the dangers and the downside risk, because through all of that, yes, we believe in comprehensive sanctions with the exception of Britain, not one single extra sanction.
The position is as it was in London last year, except that some of them have not been able to put on the sanctions they then agreed to, the reason being a practical one, and I do not blame them for not putting them on, because I always said the front-line states would find it very difficult to put them on because there is such an interdependence in their economies and the South African, the groups coming in and the groups going out.
So that is the sanction position and therefore I think quite a lot of steam, in practical reality, has gone out of it. There is a greater understanding of what is practical and what is not, and what is its effect. [end p2]
They then go on to the next stage, where they say: “Please! We must help the front-line states, including those, Lesotho and Swaziland, completely surrounded by South Africa, to defend themselves, to uphold their own security against incursions.”
We have been trying to do that for some time. We have been helping through the British Forces in Zimbabwe, who are training both Zimbabwians and training people from Mozambique, so we have already been doing that.
There then is a suggestion that Mozambique needs more help. We have already been doing that and I have committed some £50 million to Mozambique.
Insofar as those are mentioned in the communique, we have already been doing that. We are ahead of the game, as it were.
The third thing is measures to help people in South Africa. We, as you know, already have a £20 million programme to help black South Africans insofar as they cannot get the education they need and deserve in South Africa, to come out and get it with us or elsewhere.
If I might put it this way, I think there is a greater realisation there are other positive measures which you can do which perhaps would have a more practical effect and one I should mention, the other positive measures: they are very conscious one reason why they have not been able to put on sanctions is that sometimes 80%; of their imports or exports may go through South Africa or come from South Africa and they wish, therefore, to have other railways lines or supply lines going out. We had already, before we came here, offered £14 million for the Limpopo railway line in southern [end p3] Mozambique and also something to help reconstruct the port of Maputo, which we are doing through a European grant. So we are already, again, ahead with that one.
That, I think, is the South African position. Nothing like the steam that there was in it, either at London or at the Bahamas.
Fiji: I must say it was a very constructive and interesting discussion. As you know, we made our position rather clear in the opening speech that I made.
I think a number of us feel that Fiji must have time to sort out the situation she is now in; that you simply cannot condemn without giving time to get a more stable constitution and one which seems to be fair to all people concerned.
The technical position is that Fiji, as a monarchy, is a member of the Commonwealth. When Fiji ceases to be a monarchy, her membership comes to an end, except insofar as she applies—as Fiji a Republic—to stay in the Commonwealth, although it is a renewed application.
May I just explain that a little bit more closely?
But for the resignation of the Ratu Sir Penaia GanilauGovernor General and its acceptance, whatever happened in Fiji she would still have been a monarchy and therefore would still have been a member of the Commonwealth. For example, the first Commonwealth Conference that I attended was 1979 when, with regard to Grenada, some four months before, Maurice Bishop had suspended the Grenadian constitution, but had kept on the Sir Paul ScoonGovernor General and, of course, eventually a number of Opposition members were locked up, as you know, and a number of people who opposed him were locked up. Many of us would have [end p4] liked to have said quite a lot about that internal action, but the membership of Grenada did not come into question because it was still Grenada with a Governor General and a monarchy, so one had duly to explain this to some people, that because the Governor General resigned—his resignation had been accepted—Fiji was no longer a monarchy, therefore if she wants to stay in the Commonwealth she has to apply as a republic.
Now, it seemed clear to many of us that the present position is not either stable or satisfactory; that she should have time to work it out, and a number of the states in the Pacific and close to the Pacific—Malaysia and one or two others who know the position very well—said: “Look! We are the Commonwealth. We are not really so much concerned with the legalities and technicalities, but please let us do everything we can to help the Fijians of all kinds, and please let us send a message, please use our good offices, please use the spirit of friendship and it is there ready to help if you would like to use it.” Then, when Fiji has sorted out her position and if it is in accordance with various Commonwealth Declarations, subject to what emerges, if then she makes a new application it will be considered.
One cannot go farther than that, because one does not know what will emerge, but they are the three parts: first, the technical one; second, that you cannot just condemn immediately when it is unstable; a spirit of friendship, offer of help; and then, if that is fruitful and a reasonable result achieved, then would be the time for a due application, and we adjudge the application made on October 7th, [end p5] before the Governor General had resigned, was not a valid application.
I am sorry to go through it, but that is the position which we took a long time to duly explain. One had to explain why it arose now and many people thought that we did not wish to say what we do with an application in this very fluid situation … . the fact that we are an association of friendly states and we have sat with Fiji for a very long time and we do not just wish to sever that friendship if we can do something.
That is my background. Now what would you like to ask?
Question
Prime Minister, can I just ask about the sanctions issue?
Were you not tempted when they seemed to be going ahead with a Foreign Ministers meeting to monitor that, (NOTE: QUESTIONS NOT VERY CLEAR) … . not to allow Britain to become involved in that?
Prime Minister
No. The Commonwealth does not monitor one another. You will find the results in the trade figures. They are all there. You do not need something to monitor it. What they have set up is something not merely to monitor it, but something without any very clear terms of reference, and I really cannot think that the only positive thing is to set up a committee and I must tell you that we have had enough of those. All of the figures will be in the officially published trade figures. You can get them. There is no need for any further monitoring. [end p6]
Question
Were you encouraged by the signs within South Africa that your policies are beginning to work, sanctions … . from inside?
Prime Minister
I do not think that any sanctions that have been put on are leading to the dismantlement of apartheid. I think what is leading to it is something much much more fundamental than that. It is the realisation from within South Africa on the part of most white people that the position cannot hold; that there is a risk in every course of action; that the greatest risk of all is in being unwilling to take any risks, and I think that that is quite a new psychological phenomenon.
I think there is a lot of evidence, probably from your own contacts, the same feeling … if you talk to some of those who took part in the election, talked to Helen Suzman, talked to Seymour … . the last election, I understand from all the best advice I can get, was a reaction to the security position: that they are fearful about security, but at the moment the place is more secure, partly because of the steps which have been taken, but although they know that that gives short-term security and obviously you are always fearful when you have got the ANC dedicated to violence—I am totally against violence as I told the Conference; I have never supported violence, whether it be by the ANC, the PLO, the IRA or any other violent body. So they voted first on short-term security, and then you will find several commentators, several people from inside—Helen [end p7] Suzman has already written about, Alan … . has already written … . it was a vote against external interference, but you will find the long-term position is once again that they know there has to be change, and what they were voting for was change—if might put it this way—in steady fashion.
I think what they are very irritated about also is that they received no credit at all for the changes that have been made. There is, I understand, no apartheid now in sport; the pass laws have gone; the mixed marriages act, which prohibited mixed marriages, has gone; the influx legislation has gone; the enforced removals have been changed so that they are no longer enforced. There is an erosion of the group areas. I had always hoped that the next thing would be that the group areas would go. There is, in practice, an erosion of it. It has not yet gone. And the job reservation has gone, as you know. There are quite a lot of things.
The thing that is bringing apartheid to an end most rapidly in practice are the successful companies and you will find—I looked at the BP Report, the ICI, the Unilever, Harry Oppenheim 's thing. Harry Oppenheim set up and recognised black trade unions. They had the strike. All right. I saw him before I went. He acknowledged the strike. The unions negotiated and they got a better deal.
Job reservation has gone. They are regularly training more people, because they need more skilled people. Every industry needs more skills and therefore they are training far more black South Africans for higher skills and they have got more and more in higher management. [end p8]
A question was put to him—in my presence—when someone said: “Ah, but you do not pay them the same!” He said: “Yes, we do. We pay the rate for the job, and the job goes on merit.” So it is that which is breaking down apartheid faster than anything else. It is industry which is in the forefront.
That is the view which I take which I have expressed in some considerable detail.
Question
The absence of further sanctions in the document is not perhaps so much because you have won the argument with your colleagues in the Commonwealth, but because a programme of Commonwealth sanctions just makes no sense without Britain. Do you really feel that you have won the argument as well as creating practical … .
Prime Minister
At London, some of them undertook more sanctions. When they got back, they looked more closely at them and they have not been able to impose them. I do not blame them for that in any way, because I knew that they would be difficult for them to impose, and indeed, you will find several of them saying now: “Well, we could not have comprehensive sanctions because there are some states that rely so much upon either supplies from or travel through South Africa.” They admit they could not have comprehensive sanctions. We knew that.
I would say it is a dawning of practical reality. That does not alter the fact that when you are made to face reality, that it is very irritating to find that you could not do so, that you could not do [end p9] what you undertook to do, but I am not blaming them for not doing it, because I never thought they could do it and did attempt to say: “Look! You cannot do it.” You have to very careful. You cannot say: “You will find when you look at it very carefully it is difficult!” You just keep silent.
Question
The Canadian and much of the rest of the Commonwealth press have criticised your attitude this week in approaching this Conference, especially the Canadian press.
Did you make a conscious effort to take the battle to your opponents in terms of sanctions? It appeared to us that is what you were doing.
Prime Minister
No, I really do not think … let me put it a different way … it sometimes seemed to me as if they are judging the social conscience barometer by how many people they can throw out of work, because that is what sanctions would do insofar as they worked—throw out of work, without any social security, unable to support their families, giving them deprivation, and some of them starvation. I am trying to avoid that, and I find it especially repugnant, you know, that one should think of doing such things, as I have said before, in pretty luxurious surroundings. [end p10]
Question
You did appear to us to be determined this time not to be ambushed by other points of view, as you might have been in Nassau, for instance, and that you should take the argument to the … .
Prime Minister
We had gone as far as we could. One has been much more relaxed this time, because I believe that our argument actually is gradually winning, and I believe the reason they are not going to put on the sanctions which they could is because they realise that they will not necessarily achieve the result.
In terms of rhetoric, yes. In terms of rhetoric, they make the link if you put on comprehensive sanctions apartheid will be dismantled. That is not how I read the Afrikaaner personality at all.
First, it would drive them into a more oppressive and more determined posture.
Second, there would be the old sanctions-busting runs—they are still there.
Third, look at that coastline!
Fourth, even with mandatory armament sanctions, some are still getting through.
Look at the coastline; look at the practicalities. I was not going through it all again this time. I have been through it all many many times before.
But you cannot ignore practicalities, so really, I was much more [words missing]. [end p11]
Question
Coming back to Fiji, Prime Minister, it would seem that the stumbling block to continued membership of the Commonwealth by Fiji is the racist nature of the proposed new constitution.
Do you see this as an insuperable obstacle and how do you see it being overcome?
Prime Minister
We have the impression that the position in Fiji is not set in concrete—far from it; it has changed already.
First you had the coup, then you did not; then you had another coup, and I do not believe that what they have got now will hold. I think that they will have to come to some different internal arrangements.
You are sensitive about discussing other people's internal arrangements, unless they ask for advice. There are quite a number of people in the Commonwealth who are very friendly towards Fiji and who are known to be friendly, whom they could ask for advice, and it would be given in the best spirit of friendship.
In Commonwealth constitutions there are what I call “reserved seats” . There is nothing unusual about that. [end p12]
It was here the feeling that it was a racist decision, which obviously offended many people if it was going to be set in concrete. We do not believe that it is final. We do believe that before we come to a judgment—if an application is made—that there should be time to sort it out.
May I just point out Grenada. The entire constitution was suspended, opposition put inside. It was not the Commonwealth who actually sorted that out or indeed that I had anything to do with it, but it is back to a democracy.