Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

Speech to International Democrat Union

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: Reichstag, Berlin
Source: Thatcher Archive: speaking notes
Editorial comments: Between 0900 and 1200. The speech was not published but Conservative sources briefed the press. A "Berlin Declaration" was issued by IDU leaders, MT among them, calling for a worldwide ban on chemical and biological weapons and a reduction of conventional forces in Europe (see The Times, 26 September 1987 - Press Conference after International Democrat Union Conference).
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 1471
Themes: Civil liberties, Defence (general), Defence (arms control), Foreign policy (Central & Eastern Europe), Foreign policy (USSR & successor states)

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Gorbachev 's understanding of the need for change in the Soviet Union.

—there is undoubtedly a climate for change in the Soviet Union. That is very apparent to those of us who have been there recently.

—Gorbachev recognises the extent to which the Soviet Union is lagging behind. This is not just in technology and the inability of the economy to produce the goods and services people want. Despite all the claims about the superiority of the Soviet social system, the USSR still ranks 35th in the world in life expectancy and 50th in infant mortality. And unemployment does exist on a considerable scale, but with no unemployment pay. Gorbachev understands that all this can be put right only if he can invigorate the Russian people and instil a sense of enterprise. His enthusiasm and determination when he speaks of restructuring are plain. [end p1]

…   . but serious obstacles and limitations.

—but the difficulties and obstacles in his path are immense. Arguably the capacity for change is lacking: the Russian people are not used to taking the initiative or to taking responsibility. For seventy years Communism has precluded both. There is no reason to think that they would welcome a more challenging existence. Indeed, they are probably more conscious of the advances which have been made under communism than those which the Soviet system has failed to make. It will be difficult to stir them. There are already signs of resentment and disillusion. And the vested interests of the Soviet bureaucracy will be difficult to counteract. [end p2]

—Moreover, clear limits are being set on the scope of reform. Gorbachev is a dedicated Communist. Fundamental change is not on the agenda, only limited change which fully safeguards the powers and guiding role of the party. Preserving the Communist system will always have priority. Recall Gorbachev's own words: “the purpose of glasnost is to further socialism … it is not intended to undermine socialism” . And the Soviet leaders must be aware that glasnost will encourage nationalist tendencies, for example, in the Baltic republics. [end p3]

Change likely to be limited …

—so there is no prospect that a pluralist society is just round the corner, no likelihood that communist ideology will change fundamentally. At most we are talking about limited improvements in the efficiency of the Soviet economy and smoothing some rough edges off the totalitarian system. Hungary or Yugoslavia as the touchstones of the success which can be achieved under communism, are not very impressive. But it is probably the most that can be envisaged for the Soviet Union—and even then, only over a long period. [end p4]

…especially in the Soviet Union's external policies

—the prospects for change in the Soviet Union's external policies look even less. Indeed, one purpose of Gorbachev's reforms may be to make it possible to pursue traditional Soviet objectives more effectively. People talk about the Soviet Union needing a lull in international affairs, in order to concentrate on domestic reform. That might be logical, but there is no reason to think that the Soviets are prepared to make concessions to secure such a lull. We have to base our judgments not on Soviet statements, or on what we would do in their position, but on their policies and on the reality of Soviet power. [end p5]

—the reality is that the Soviet leaders continue to see socialism as the system which is pre-determined to replace all others. They continue to try to change the world balance of power—what they call “the correlation of forces” —decisively in their favour. All the traditional instruments of Soviet power—military strength, clandestine and subversive activities, propaganda—are being exercised as vigorously as ever. [end p6]

But more skilful and flexible presentation

—but in doing this, they are showing much greater skill and flexibility in dealing with Western opinion. Although Gorbachev is single-minded in his ends, he is very flexible in his means. He understands that the most cost-effective way of dealing with a powerful opponent is to make his weaknesses work for you, rather than try to match his strength. He knows that people in the West want to believe that internal reform will end Soviet Union expansionism. He plays on that hope to get them to put pressure on their own governments to relax and to cut defence budgets. [end p7]

How the West should respond

—so how should we respond to this new and in many ways more dangerous challenge?

We should welcome anything which enlarges liberty …

—we have to recognise that anything which enlarges liberty and discussion, which increases initiative and enterprise in the Soviet Union is of fundamental human importance in human terms. We must welcome and encourage those aspects of Gorbachev's reforms which do this. They are genuinely courageous and deserve our support. It is fundamental to our political philosophy to want to see others enjoy the same benefits that our own people take for granted. Moreover, once change starts, who is to know whether it is containable or not? At least change holds out the prospect of something better in terms of human rights. [end p8]

… but not mistake change in style for substance

—but we should take nothing on trust. Until there are fundamental changes in the Soviet Union, we in the West must be extremely cautious and tough-minded in our approach. We must make sure that our peoples are not so bemused by changes in Soviet style, that they confuse means with ends. We must keep our people aware of the realities. [end p9]

Our aims in diplomacy …

—while welcoming and encouraging what is good about Gorbachev's revolution, our priority must be to preserve Western unity and strength in order to influence the Soviet Union to behave less aggressively in international affairs. This means:

—firmness in negotiation, and ensuring that we always seek an adequate quid pro quo for any concession;

—not allowing attention to be directed exclusively on arms control, but widening the area of discussion to focus on the points on which the Soviet Union is vulnerable, such as Afghanistan, Africa and Soviet concentration on supplying weapons rather than food to developing countries;

—constantly pressing the Russians on human rights issues; [end p10]

—taking every opportunity to get across to Soviet representatives a true picture of Western values and policies;

—keeping on our efforts through broadcasts to reach the ordinary Soviet people, so that they hear our views and get a true picture of world events. glasnost is still very selective, although I pay tribute to the way in which I was able to broadcast totally freely.

—continuing to cultivate the nations of Eastern Europe recognising both the real constraints on their freedom of action and their desire to keep open communication with the free countries as a source of hope in the long term to their people:

—remembering that Russia has been a part of European history for centuries. [end p11]

…   .and in arms control

As regards arms control, a properly verified INF Treaty will be a success for the West. It may also offer hope that other arms control agreements will be achievable. But we must be clear on two things:-

—there is no way you can defend Europe without nuclear weapons. We must constantly bring this home to our people.

—we must insist that future negotiations be pursued on the basis of our agenda and our priorities and not those of the Soviet Union. This means that the next steps should be 50%; reductions in US and Soviet strategic weapons, a ban on chemical weapons and a more stable conventional balance in Europe. [end p12]

What we must not do is to rush into early discussions about short range nuclear systems. Of course the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact's massive superiority in such systems is serious. It affects particularly the Federal Republic of Germany and those of us who maintain forces there. But the small number of such weapons which NATO has are vital for our security: we must not let the Russians think that we could be persuaded to negotiate them away. If the conventional parity is achieved; if chemical weapons are gone; and if US and Soviet strategic weapons can be halved; then by all means let us look at the short range systems again. But in the meantime we must say to the Russians clearly: there will be no further Western reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe until there has been real and concrete progress in these other areas. To do any other could undermine our fundamental defence capability. [end p13]

Conclusion

My conclusion is that we can and should work for improved relations with the Soviet Union. But only when there is evidence of a change in long-term aims as distinct from tactics, only when they show signs of willingness and allow real free movement of people and ideas, will it be possible to accept—and encourage our people to accept—that the Soviet Union is a state in which we can have more trust and confidence.

AND WHEN and IF THAT DAY comes it would be good news for us all.