Prime Minister
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Press:
This has been the most fascinating and invigorating visit I have ever made abroad as Prime Minister and at the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet Government and the Russian people, for making me so obviously and warmly welcome. I shall never forget the monastery at Zagorsk or the enthusiasm of the Russian people to meet me or the delights of the Bolshoi—all this, and Georgia still to come!
I clearly could not have come to the Soviet Union at a more interesting and crucial time. I have been rewarded with a remarkable insight from Mr. Gorbachev in our very extensive talks. Indeed, I cannot remember ever having spent so much time in discussion with another world leader. Some seven hours of formal talks yesterday, with a further two hours over dinner—and we also have the privilege of meeting again this evening for a private occasion, where we shall be able to talk more. [end p1]
When I met Mr. Gorbachev in December 1984, I said that he was someone I could do business with, but we were able to do a lot of business yesterday. I do not think that you can be with someone for that long without having a very much better idea what he wants and believes and of his objectives. I hope that he has found the same.
We both believe in frank speaking and we had plenty of opportunity for that yesterday. Our talks ranged very widely indeed. We discussed the advantages of our respective political and economic systems. Mr. Gorbachev gave me a very full account of the policy of restructuring in the Soviet Union, and I warmly welcome this process. Anything which makes the Soviet Union a more open society will help to strengthen trust and confidence.
We had very full exchanges on arms control. We agreed that priority should be given to an intermediate agreement with strict verification, with constraints on shorter-range systems and with immediate follow-on negotiations to deal more fully with those systems.
Our remaining disagreements were over our belief that the West should have a right to match Soviet shorter-range systems and over what systems should be included in negotiations on short-range weapons. I made it clear that we were not prepared to accept the denuclearisation of Europe. [end p2]
We also agreed that priority should be given to a ban on all chemical weapons. The United Kingdom has made important proposals in this field and Mr. Gorbachev made clear that the Soviet Union will broadly accept our approach.
We both wanted to see early negotiations on the reductions in conventional forces.
On the proposal for 50%; reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union see a link with the limits on American SDI. I made a number of proposals for establishing greater predictability in this field, which Mr. Gorbachev will consider.
So while I do not want to underestimate the differences which will remain, we do in practice agree that progress on arms control will only be made by a stage-by-stage approach with clearly-identified priorities and we have identified the priorities together.
I regard this as a useful and a positive step. Indeed, I would say that I am generally encouraged by my talks with Mr. Gorbachev that we can make progress on arms control.
We also discussed the whole field of world affairs, including of course Afghanistan. I told Mr. Gorbachev that I would support a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, but of course this could only come about through early withdrawal of Soviet forces. [end p3]
We also dealt with human rights problems and I welcome what has been done. Mr. Gorbachev said that individual cases would be continue to be dealt with with care and attention and with positive results where possible. I regard this as a key to achieving greater trust and confidence.
Today, we had turned to bilateral matters and in particular trade. I have agreed with Prime Minister Ryzhkov this morning that we should work together to achieve by 1990 a volume of 2.5 billion roubles in our bilateral trade. This will entail each side achieving an increase of £350–£400 million over their present export level. To this end, Mr. Ryzhkov handed me a list of export and import opportunities. As you know, British companies have signed some important contracts and letters of intent in recent days.
Finally, I would say that I am very well satisfied indeed with my visit so far.
I think that Mr. Gorbachev and I have achieved a very good relationship and been able to continue the same frank dialogue which we began two years ago. We understand better what the other is trying to accomplish and I have been able to say how very much we welcome the policies of openness, restructuring and democratisation. They point the way to the greater trust and confidence which will be needed for arms control agreements. I am particularly pleased we have been able to clarify some of my questions on arms control and to agree on the [end p4] need to make early progress on intermediate nuclear weapon agreements and a ban on chemical weapons.
That concludes what I have to say as an opening statement. I would now welcome your questions. [end p5]
Question
During Soviet-British negotiations you were discussing the problems of regional conflicts, including Middle East.
Could you tell us what you both achieved with regard to the Middle East problems, particularly did you raise the question of Soviet Jews emigration to Israel, human rights protection? Does it not mean the infringement upon the Palestinian people's rights to live on its national territory?
Prime Minister
We had a discussion on the Middle East and, of course, during the discussion, on the Helsinki Accords. We raised the rights of the Jewish people, whether it be to emigrate or whether their right to freedom of worship and instruction in things like Hebrew in this country.
We did not go into great detail on the solution for the Middle East. We had a very brief discussion and Foreign Secretary and Mr. Shevardnadze discussed more widely the proposal for an international conference as a framework for negotiations—a proposal with which we agree.
Martin Walker (The Guardian)
Mrs. Thatcher, you say you welcome the policies of Glasnost, Perestroika, democratisation. They are aimed at improving the efficiency of the Soviet Union [end p6] as an economic super-power. Is that in the West's long-term interest in your view?
Prime Minister
I believe that it is in the interest not only of the people of the Soviet Union, but in the interests of the wider world, including ourselves, that there is a much much more open society in the Soviet Union; that things are much much more widely discussed, which is obviously an important part of an open society, and that freedoms are enlarged.
I believe it is in the interests of the West to have a higher standard of living in the Soviet Union and for that to be based on a system of incentives.
Democratisation, of course, means something very different in our structure from what it means in the Soviet structure because in the Soviet structure it is based constitutionally on the communist structure only, whereas ours of course is based on a plural structure. But I think a more open society with more open discussion and wider freedoms and an economic system based more on incentives and a wider dispersal of responsibility is in the long-term interest not only of the Soviet Union, but of the West.
Question
Today, we have only forty-eight hours before the fifth anniversary of the conflict between Great Britain and [end p7] Argentina. What is the present status of relations between your country and Latin-American countries and what solution does your Government see in this regard, taking into [account] the present position of Buenos Aires?
Prime Minister
We wish, with the Argentine, to restore ordinary trading and diplomatic relations.
Our people can import goods from the Argentine. We enabled them to do that comparatively shortly after the end of the conflict.
We have not yet opened diplomatic relations. We are willing at any time to discuss the ordinary commercial and diplomatic matters with the Argentine. We will not discuss the sovereignty of the Falklands.
Question (Spanish)
… maybe this is the result of nuclear weapons present on the Maldive Islands …(note: not much translated).
Prime Minister
Were you talking about nuclear weapons present on the Falklands? There are no such weapons. We signed the Tlatelolco Treaty a long time ago, which would preclude the presence of nuclear weapons on the islands or within the three-mile territorial limit. [end p8]
Walter Rodgers (American Broadcasting Company)
You said you were encouraged by your talks on arms control, specifically INF.
In the context of the upcoming visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow, would you please tell us what specific differences were narrowed in the intermediate range nuclear missile disagreements?
Prime Minister
I indicated that, with respect, in the opening statement, as you know there is something of a difference between the nature of the follow-on negotiations.
I understand that at Reykjavik part of the agreement on the intermediate nuclear weapons, namely zero-zero in Europe, one hundred in the East of the Soviet Union and one hundred either in Alaska or elsewhere in the United States, were linked to constraints on the shorter-range weapons which, of course, can hit Germany, France and the United Kingdom and therefore are very important to us.
The Western side believes that those constraints should be not only a freeze on the Soviet side but the right to equal limits on both sides. It is on that latter point that there is some dispute. We still believe in the right to equal limits on both sides and it is clear that in the main intermediate nuclear weapon treaty that there must be a reference not only to constraints but to immediate follow-on negotiations. [end p9]
Question
Prime Minister, you say that the Soviet Union has to improve its record on human rights before its offers on arms control can be trusted by the West.
How long a period will it take to judge any improvement before you could consider such trust established?
Prime Minister
Well, as I indicated, we do welcome what has already been done but there is still a great deal, as you know, to do in accordance with the Helsinki Accords, to which the Soviet Union was a contributory signatory.
I do not know how long it will take. I hope that with the open society there will naturally be a greater and greater freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of movement, freedom of information, freedom of ideas.
I have always believed that if one wants the trust and confidence which is necessary when you wish to reach arms control negotiations, you judge whether people will honour their arms control agreements by how they honour the other treaties, including the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and it will take, I think, a time. I think it will take a time for this to work through the Soviet society. I think it would be unwise to expect everything to happen immediately. Change is afoot. That change is going in the direction of more [end p10] openness and we want it to go in the direction of resolving the personal cases and those who wish to join their families and those who wish to leave the Soviet Union, and we are assured that each case will be looked at, hopefully with a positive result.
Question (Pravda Newspaper)
Mrs. Prime Minister, how does the Government of Great Britain plan to resolve the bleeding wound of Ulster?
Prime Minister
I wish I could give you an easy, ready answer to what you call the bleeding wound of Ulster.
We have a border poll to enquire from the people whether they wish still to continue to be a part of the United Kingdom. We get a good majority saying: yes, they wish to continue to be a part of the United Kingdom.
There are two communities there—the Unionists and the Republicans. We have an Anglo-Irish Agreement now which we hoped would improve matters.
It is problematic, because what one part of the community wants, the other does not welcome, and what the other part welcomes the one part does not want, and so we can only in fact go on steadily having a fair system of justice, seeing that everyone has equal rights. It means that we are not able to get the parliament [end p11] at Stormont going again, because although we had an election I am afraid some of the parties refused to take their seats.
So, in face of this, we shall just have to go on trying in the same way as we always have and I would be the first one to wish that I could find a ready-made solution. It is very difficult.
Question
Mrs. Prime Minister, your Government favours the agreement on elimination of Soviet and US medium-range missiles in Europe.
In this connection, may I ask you there could be clear-cut guarantees on the part of the United Kingdom for Soviet inspectors to verify the compliance of such an agreement to the bases on the territory of Great Britain.
Another question: what is the position of Great Britain with regard to chemical weapons, because there are certain indications that the position of the …
Prime Minister
Now, before I take the intermediate nuclear weapons first, as you know, intermediate nuclear weapons were first deployed by the Soviet Union. The SS20 appeared without warning on Soviet soil. We saw it. We saw mounting deployment. [end p12]
We asked you not to station it. We decided that if you continued not only to station it, but to increase it, that we in NATO would have to deploy Cruise and Pershing as an answer to intermediate nuclear weapons.
For four years we waited for you to take it down. After four years you had not. You had increased the number of warheads. At that time—and only at that time—did we station Cruise and Pershing. Britain was the first. We stationed our Cruise. Germany followed, Italy followed, and there are preparations in Belgium and in Holland.
Now, as far as Britain is concerned, when the negotiations are complete, it will mean that all of the Cruise missiles come out. That is very easy to verify.
The problem about the verification on the Soviet side will be that they are keeping a hundred. Frankly, that makes verification much more difficult.
If you were going to get rid of the whole lot throughout all of your territory, verification would be much easier for obvious reasons. If you are going to keep a hundred, then it means it is more difficult to say whether there are a hundred and twenty, a hundred and thirty.
But there will be no difficulty about verification of Cruise missiles from Britain. If you do not know where they are, the CND does! So there will be no difficulty about ours, but verification, we are very happy to have open verification. That is necessary for trust. [end p13]
On chemical weapons, let me make clear again, Britain destroyed all her chemical weapons at the end of the 1950s. We have none.
The United States had some, but did not modernise them at all, and only recently, in the face of substantial modernisation, new chemical weapons and heavy stockpiling in the Soviet Union, did the United States start to ask for money for more research on chemical weapons.
We believe that chemical weapons should be destroyed. As a matter of fact, there is a treaty forbidding their use. Unfortunately, there is no treaty for forbidding their manufacture. We believe that chemical weapons should be destroyed.
The verification problem, let me warn you, is difficult, because it is quite easy to make them in very modest buildings and therefore we have proposed a system on behalf of my country of challenge inspection, which we understand Mr. Gorbachev accepts.
The negotiations have been complicated. They always get a lot of jargon associated with these arms control negotiations. It has got tied up with something called a multilateral filter, which we disagree with, but it has got also other methods of proving compliance with the treaty.
We are quite prepared ourselves to have that method of verification which we expect others to have, but it is not very easy on chemical weapons and a [end p14] little bit more trust and confidence would help. I do think it would be a very good thing if the Soviet Union were prepared to abandon all hers and then the United States could do the same thing, because until that happens our only response to chemical is nuclear, and that has been a cause of considerable concern for some time.
Question (Israel)
Regarding the international conference for the Middle East, do you intend to take some steps in order to bring about a change in the attitude in the opposition of the United States Government and of the Israeli Government to the convening of such a conference?
And a second question if possible: how do you view the violations of human rights against the Palestinian people by the Israeli Government, which is detrimental to the interests of the State of Israel itself and of peace in the Middle East?
Prime Minister
May I answer the first question? The international conference, not as a mediator but as a framework against which direct negotiations could take place between Israel and King Hussein, together with a group of representative Palestinians.
I understand that the United States accepts the [end p15] principle of an international conference. A great deal of work has still to be done in working out precisely how it would operate. That work needs to be pursued.
With regard to the Palestinian people, one has and does indeed point out that they are not and could not be full citizens of Israel. The West Bank is occupied territory. We are trying to work as hard as we can to encourage the sides to work for a solution.
There are the two factors, both of which you have identified. One, how the international conference would work but second, which we have all come at many times, who should be the group of Palestinians who should negotiate with King Hussein?
I think it is generally agreed that any group, to be acceptable, must in fact accept Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist, and so far the parties to the negotiations and the United States have never come up with an agreed list of names, and that is a great stumbling block.
Question (Moscow Radio & Television)
Excuse me, Madam Prime Minister, Britain is one of the countries which signed the documents at the Hitler coalition. Why are you refusing to extradite to the Soviet Union Nazi war criminals now in Britain? [end p16]
Prime Minister
First, I believe we have no effective extradition treaty with the Soviet Union.
Secondly, we have a list of names. We do not have evidence—strict evidence—against those names. Any question of extradition could only arise on the basis of evidence and not on accusation.
Question (Nigeria)
Did you discuss the question of South Africa with Mr. Gorbachev and is there any hope that Britain … Conservative Government … will ever stop the indirect support given to the apartheid regime?
Prime Minister
We did discuss South African matters. I do not accept that we are giving indirect support to that regime. We have condemned apartheid as strongly as anyone in the world has condemned it. We do not believe, however, that you would solve the problem by having mandatory economic sanctions. We do not believe they would work. We believe that they would add great hardship to the other problems already suffered by South Africa.
We had a Commonwealth Conference about this. Various other countries said, yes, they were going to put on various mandatory sanctions. None has yet done so. [end p17]
We have limited sanctions. We have not supplied weapons to South Africa for over ten years and we have a very limited number of sanctions. We do not go to mandatory sanctions.
Question
Prime Minister, obviously you had a certain image of the Soviet Union before you came here. What is the main correct [sic] you put into this picture after seeing things on the spot?
Prime Minister
This is the fourth time I have been to the Soviet Union.
I think obviously the exciting thing now is the much wider discussion of the future arising from Mr. Gorbachev 's speech to the Central Committee Plenum, which I read in full, and seeing how that system works out.
There does seem to be much much more discussion, much much more activity in pursuit of that objective, and we most earnestly hope that it will be successful.
George Jones (Daily Telegraph)
Prime Minister, after the talks yesterday, you were supposed to have said that you had put a lot in the bank during the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. Do you expect to see an arms agreement or a chemical weapons agreement later this year? [end p18]
Prime Minister
I think when you have talks of that length it is what I call “investment in the bank” . You know and begin to understand how another person's mind works; you know and begin to understand their objectives; they begin to understand yours; and it makes for very much better relations in the future.
I hope for an intermediate nuclear weapons agreement by the end of the year and I hope that there will be a chemical weapons agreement. I think that might take longer, because there are still many things to be negotiated on verification, particularly with other members of the Alliance.
Question (Kuwaitan Newspaper)
How do you assess the relations of Great Britain with the countries of the Gulf and how specifically do you view the war between Iraq and Iran?
Prime Minister
Relations between Britain and countries of the Gulf, including Kuwait, are good.
We cannot give you any revealing words about the war between Iran and Iraq. I wish we could. Everyone wants it to end. No-one has been able to find a way and until that time, we can only leave it in the hands of the United Nations and do all we can to protect the rights of shipping up and down the Gulf. We have there [end p19] what is called the “Armilla Patrol” and of course the Soviet Union has a much bigger force of ships there. It is absolutely vital to keep that free passage in that seaway.
Question (Lady, Possibly American)
Prime Minister, I wonder if you could just clarify a few things on short-range missiles and an INF agreement.
In your conversations with Mr. Gorbachev, did the Soviet confirm that they are willing to include a freeze on their short-range system in a treaty and is it the Western position that the right to match current Soviet levels be explicitly stated in such a treaty and finally, on the follow-on short-range systems negotiations, if there are such negotiations, what would be negotiated on the Western side? In other words, if there was a 9–1 superiority on the Soviet side, what would the West have to offer in those negotiations?
Prime Minister
Look! We cannot answer your questions, because apart from the fact that there must be constraints on short-range weapons, it is shorter-range and short—there must be constraints on shorter-range weapons and that there must be immediate follow-on negotiations … the precise nature of the constraints is not agreed. [end p20]
We would like—speaking as a European nation in the Alliance—the right to match equal limits. That has not been agreed. So that is still to work and negotiate for and that will be something that might hold up the particular agreement because of course, as I say, most of Europe, except Spain but including ourselves, are within range of the shorter-range weapons.