Dutch Prime Minister
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a real pleasure indeed to introduce—I hardly need to introduce you—Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain. It was a pleasure to have her here today, especially here in The Hague, in the Netherlands, to discuss several matters.
Of course, we exchanged views about what we call the “Geneva Process” . I have not much to say about this subject. There is nothing really new here. We agree, and the Prime Minister will say her own words about this, that especially in this stage of the negotiation process, solidarity in NATO is essential. We have to do this job together. In fact, you know, this job has two aspects. We have to be very clear about the necessity of giving a military and political answer to the Soviet Union in relation with their process of building up the SS20 systems. We try to give this answer by negotiating with them, but we have to negotiate on the basis of a real threat to the Soviet Union that if they are not prepared to compromise, then on the side of NATO deployment will be inevitable.
As I said before, this whole process has two aspects. On the one hand, the preparedness in NATO to do whatever is a [end p1] necessity in relation with this process; on the other hand, we try to find ways and means, methods, to come to some result in this negotiation process. That is what I want to say about this subject.
And then, we had a rather long discussion about the preparations of the European Council in Athens. The British position and the Dutch position about Community problems is to a very large extent identical. The two of us think that changes in the agricultural system are a necessity to come to certain restrictions in the expansion of the budget of the Community. The two of us really think it is an essential condition to find solutions for fair systems of contributions to the Community, especially at the moment that we are considering the possibility of enlarging the Community with Spain and Portugal. At the same time, the two of us realise that we are in a very difficult situation in the Community, not so much because of differences of view between our two countries, but because of the fact that in the Community there are differences of views in several countries involved. We discussed this at length because it is very important to find acceptable solutions—and to add a final word on this, one of the essential aspects in the approach, we think is needed, is that we need a Community which has solidarity within the Community, but which is at the same time a non-protective Community; an open Community [end p2] which communicates with other parts of the world, which gives a fair chance to the Third World to … . nations like the United States. At the same time, we think, on the basis of this approach, that we can ask other countries—Japan for example—to be also from their side liberal, so we can increase together economic growth. We restricted ourselves mainly to NATO, INF problems and to the Community problems because the two of us feel a common responsibility on these two main subjects, and this at the same time is a proof that between our two countries we have—bit of a strange situation—rarely specific problems. There is no antagonism to surmount; there are no quarrels between Great Britain and the Netherlands. In fact, although there are differences in approaches, we are working together on the same goals.
I think this is the moment to give the floor to the Prime Minister, Madame Thatcher, and again, I would like to thank her, also here in public, for coming to us.
Mrs Thatcher
Ladies and Gentlemen, can I first thank Mr. Lubbers for the invitation to come here. It is quite some time since I have been for a bilateral talk to discuss the many things that affect us. [end p3]
Mr. Lubbers, I think, has gone over very thoroughly the subjects of our talks and there is very little more to say. May I nevertheless add just that little.
I started the day by visiting the European Space Agency. I understand I am the first Prime Minister to have been there. May I say how very impressive an organization it is. It does both the fundamental research and then, of course, it translates some of its findings into satellites which are very important for the telecommunications both of Europe and Britain and also for television. It does its task excellently and I was very very pleased with everything I saw and the Director was very kind about the contribution made to its science by British people who are there.
After that, I had an audience of the Queen and then had lunch with Mr. Lubbers and Mr. Van den Broek. We started in on discussing the many things which we must talk about today. He has indicated three of them. May I just choose three very quickly:
First, East-West relations and defence. As you know, I have already had something to say about that on Dutch television, so I will not say very much more at the moment, except to point out that after the terrible incident [end p4] of the Korean airliner, we were so concerned and so sincere in our wish to get genuine disarmament, that we refused to have the Geneva negotiations affected in any way. We do, in democracies, genuinely want disarmament. We genuinely want reduction of the amount of money we spend on weaponry. That must be a balanced reduction; it must be a verifiable reduction. We do not posture or talk a great deal in propaganda terms about the details outside the negotiating table; the place to get those disarmament reductions is the negotiating table in Geneva.
Secondly, we discussed the EEC problems that we started to try to resolve at Stuttgart and hope to complete at Athens. The problems are difficult because of their fundamental nature. First, we were determined that if we are to solve those problems we must get control of agricultural spending. That is common ground between us. It is easier said, not very easily done, but we must do that if we are to resolve some of the other problems. And secondly, we must have a lasting solution to the problems of inequitable contributions to the European budget. Our Foreign Ministers will be pursuing those at the several special meetings that have been arranged.
Now, thirdly, we did have a discussion on the situation in the Lebanon. Holland, as you know, is involved in the UNECO force. We are involved in the multi-national force. It is vital that in this very [end p5] difficult situation that we all act together and that we consult together. We are very much aware of the difficult situation that persists in the Lebanon, but we believe that in the multi-national force our forces are playing an important role there at the moment.
I think perhaps it would be better now if we opened up for questions if that is all right by you, Mr. Lubbers. [end p6]
(NOTE: QUESTIONS ARE OFTEN VERY HARD TO PICK OUT)
Question
May I ask the Prime Minister is she can go into a bit more detail of the discussion with Mr. Lubbers about the Budget contributions to the EEC.
Mrs. Thatcher
I do not think I can go into a great deal more detail except to say that I really do not want another temporary solution. I did not want it three or four years ago. I very much wanted a lasting solution then. I said we ought to be able to get a formula which meant that the solution lasted as long as the problem lasted; we were not successful then, and this year we had another ad hoc solution because we realized that we were coming up to a crisis point in that the resources of the Community would not be sufficient for her expenditures, and that therefore meant that there was a chance to get the Budget situation resolved in a way that there had not been before. We have not decided how it shall be resolved. We in Britain have put up a paper—which says—it is called a safety net—that there must be a limit to the net contributions which any country makes if one is to look at it as an equitable contribution. Other people have put up different ideas. Those will continue to be discussed in the meeting [end p7] of Finance Ministers and Foreign Ministers, but we must have some kind of limit to our net contribution to the Community.
Question (not very clear)
I am putting my question to the British Prime Minister. As far as your statement is concerned on the discussions on the CAP how far is it possible to continue the reform of the CAP without the enlargement of the resources of the Community … .
Mrs. Thatcher
The answer is simple, if you give it orally; much more difficult if you translate it into practice! The CAP Budget takes much too big a proportion of the total budget and it does that because we are producing constantly surpluses for which there is not a market in the Community, and we then have to sell them off at cheap subsidised prices. It does not, I think, make sense to go on producing surpluses at the rate we are and taking such a big proportion of the Budget. Now, milk alone takes 40%; of the agricultural budget and really, you know, if you were to translate to other industrial policies the sort of system that you work in the CAP, you would see that it does not really make a lot of sense to go on doing it in this way. [end p8] Now, you can say, therefore, that the answer is to have a system which reduces the surpluses, and that, indeed, is what we must work for. Unfortunately, there are some countries that will not like that, and therefore we get into very very big arguments as to how it is to be done. But nevertheless, that is the path that we have to pursue, because it does not make sense for such a large proportion of our net contribution to go to surpluses which we do not want and cannot eat.
Question
How would you like to finance your new policies?
Mrs. Thatcher
With all due respect—perhaps it is my fault, perhaps I have not explained the point. If you spend less on surpluses which you do not want and cannot eat, you release monies to spend on other policies which might in fact be better in producing jobs and investment in the future, rather than spending quite so much on the Common Agricultural Policy.
Question
Mrs. Thatcher I noted on the television on Saturday that you believe only in a solution … . zero option. Mr. Lubbers said this morning that he believes strongly in the possibility of an in-between solution. How do you react on that? [end p9]
Mrs. Thatcher
No, I did not say quite that, with all due respect. Let me say what I think I said. Perhaps then you can check. First, the Pershings and the Cruise will be deployed on time-table in accordance with the NATO decision, before the end of the year, unless there is agreement on zero option in Geneva. In the absence of agreement on zero option, therefore, you will get some Pershings and Cruise deployed. They are being deployed, of course, as you know, over a period of years. The numbers that are deployed will depend upon whether we can reach agreement at Geneva on a lesser amount—both balance and verifiable—than the full numbers—572—that we should otherwise deploy. But the zero option: in the absence of a zero option, we shall deploy, but that is not the end of the matter. The number that are finally deployed could be less than the 572 which are planned at the moment, if the Soviet Union agrees to take down some of her SS20s and we agree on balanced numbers, and that balance is verifiable, and the figures are genuine. So there is no difference, I think, between Mr. Lubbers and myself, and I think you will find that, perhaps in slightly shorter phrases, that is what I said on Dutch television on Saturday. At any rate, that is what I said on Friday when it was recorded! [end p10]
Question
So that leaves no space for a delay in the deployment?
Mrs. Thatcher
Certainly not! The Soviet Union has got all hers up!
Question (difficult to understand)
Some people believe that the Russians might be more forth-coming in the INF negotiations at Geneva if they could have a guarantee that the British were willing to negotiate about their nuclear armaments, maybe not in the INF but at some other moment in history. Don't you think it could be a help if they could get such a guarantee about it or would it appeal to you?
Mrs. Thatcher
No, I think they are attempting to side-track you. The British independent and the French independent nuclear deterrent existed before there was one single SS20 in place. They existed to deter someone who might in the last resort attack us with nuclear weapons. They are strategic weapons. They are 2½%; of the strategic weapons owned by the Soviet Union, 2½%;. They are totally and utterly irrelevant to the negotiations in Geneva and I would respectfully suggest that if a power is really concerned to get genuine disarmament, they would take up the proposals [end p11] already on the table in the several sets of talks which are in existence and in being and genuinely reduce that enormous quantity of strategic missiles—over 2,000 the Soviet Union has. If then, those are substantially reduced, with of course the United States very substantially, enormously, reduced, then of course we go into another world and then of course, we would come and discuss the British nuclear deterrent, but I stress the British nuclear deterrent is an irreducible minimum. If we are to have a deterrent, we cannot have fewer missiles than it is composed of at the moment.
Question
Would you like to talk about it and start at a much later moment in history?
Mrs. Thatcher
I do not put a gloss upon what I have said. I think you will find it stands up exactly as it is, but do not be sidetracked. We have only got 2½%; of the strategic missiles the Soviet Union has got, and anyone who really wants to get nuclear weapons down, who really wants to get disarmament, would concentrate surely on the 97½%; and not on the 2½%;—anyone who really wants to. [end p12]
Question
Mr. Lubbers, do you agree with Mrs. Thatcher that there should be no delay beyond the point at the end of this year if the Geneva talks are seen to fail?
Dutch Prime Minister
I think the final responsibility of deployment in each country is the responsibility of that country. Point number 2: as concerning the Dutch position, we are preparing ourselves for the possibility of deployment. We have chosen a site and we are making preparations to be able to do so. I think it is very essential that we try to find in NATO as a whole through the negotiations in Geneva a solution, a total or a partial solution, before the end of the year. If not, it is logical that deployments will take place in Western Europe, in Great Britain, in Western Germany and at the beginning of the year in Italy. Even when that is going to happen, and I sincerely hope that we can find a solution to prevent that, even if it happens, we have to go on with negotiations after that, because of the fact, as Madame Thatcher said a few minutes ago, this is a process going on over a number of years. It is a very serious process and we have at any moment—this month, next month, beginning of next year—tried to find a solution, to come if possible to a zero solution; if not [end p13] possible, to a partial solution. That is my answer to the question.
Question
Madame Thatcher, I understood that you agree with the Soviet Union that the shooting down of the Korean airliner should not have any influence on Geneva negotiations.
Mrs. Thatcher
I think that the disarmament negotiations are so important that they must continue on the appointed time on the appointed day.
Question
(in-audible, question to Mr. Lubbers)
Dutch Prime Minister
Yes, we discussed the view of the Dutch Cabinet about French and British systems at lunch this afternoon also. Let me add for my part of the following: we have defined the negotiations called “INF negotiations” in Geneva beside the fact that only a small part of French and British systems are land-based, formally speaking they are not part of those negotiations, point number one.
At this moment we have not a definition about what has to be negotiated at the start, but even if you are going to [end p14] negotiate, you could discuss to include yes or no, this type or these systems.
The third remark is that in our opinion all nuclear arms are fixed in a very long … . to negotiate, even British and French nuclear systems; as Mrs. Thatcher said, let us not be side-tracked. Let us realize that the negotiating now is about large numbers of INF weapons in the first place; as soon as we start to negotiate again, strategic weapons, but it is logical that the main attention is focussed on the systems of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States on the other, but we discussed this at lunch to avoid any misunderstanding, and it is our opinion that at this moment it is not using any purpose to include French and British systems in the INF, but I want not to raise a misunderstanding about the Dutch position. We think that in the long … . we must be able to organize a negotiation process which includes all nuclear arms or to formulate a … . which does not start to exclude certain types of nuclear arms. But let us be very clear: the urgent problem we have is to find a solution in the INF negotiation process and it does not make much sense to start discussions about other systems as long as we cannot solve the relatively easy problem of INF.
Question
(inaudible)
[end p15]Mrs. Thatcher
I am sorry. I do not quite get the import of the question. There is a nuclear non-proliferation treaty which not all countries have signed. I think it would be better if those countries who have not signed that non-proliferation treaty would do so, which would clearly limit the extent to which nuclear weapons were made and make the world a safer place.
Question
Yes, but I was talking about cultural treaties, international cultural treaties.
Mrs. Thatcher
But you know, you do not normally have international cultural treaties; you have bilateral cultural treaties. But you do not have to have treaties to have visits from one group of players in one country to those in another.
Question
Both of you have stressed the importance of solidarity in NATO in relation to East-West relations. How damaging would it be in the British Prime Minister's view to that solidarity if one of the NATO members—including the Netherlands—were not to deploy the Cruise missiles as had been agreed in 1979? How damaging a blow would that be to NATO solidarity? [end p16]
Mrs. Thatcher
I think it would be a damaging blow, because we came to an agreement together about that deployment. Germany and ourselves are the first two to implement it, then I think Italy comes next in the time-table of implementation and I hope that NATO will stick together and may I respectfully suggest that that is the assumption we make, because I see no reason at the moment to make any contrary assumption. NATO is very valuable to each and every member country, and I think if you were to ask the ordinary public in each and every NATO country, they would say that NATO has been their shield, it has in effect kept the peace in Europe for a longer period than we have had for a very long time, and I think if you put the question to them in that way, they would say the things that are required to keep NATO flourishing must in fact be honoured and I think if you put the question that way they would agree that the Cruise and Pershings should be deployed, because they are all for NATO continuing.
Dutch Prime Minister
May I add one thing to this. The question of the gentleman about solidarity is an important one. I used the phrase “solidarity in NATO” myself because I think the essence of such a system as we have in the alliance is to do things as much as possible together, so in fact we are together in the negotiation process of Geneva. I want to add this: [end p17] solidarity does not mean only to deploy, if that is a necessity—it is part of the story—but the necessity of solidarity is present also in a common act to get results in the negotiations leading to arms control. Therefore, I am so happy that the Prime Minister said herself this afternoon that although the two of us are very upset about the incident of the Korean aircraft, as she said herself, these negotiations are that important that anyhow we have to go on in Geneva trying to find a solution; so the solidarity has a double aspect. It has an aspect of a common effort in our defence systems, nuclear systems included, but it also has its consequences for arms control. That is also a task of solidarity.
Question
Mrs. Thatcher, do you share some of the misgivings being reported in some Common Market countries that the Greek Foreign Minister should speak on behalf of the Common Market countries at the United Nations on the Korean airliner incident?
Mrs. Thatcher
I understand the concern, but I feel sure that the Greek Foreign Minister will contain his remarks to those which he knows are acceptable to the Community as a whole and I do not think that he is any doubt about what those remarks would be. We all feel very strongly about it indeed. It [end p18] is a thoroughly inhumane act. It was a complete atrocity against humanity and a number of us tried to have as strong notice about it as we possibly could.
Question
Mr. Lubbers, Mrs. Thatcher said there was no reason to assume there would be a weakening in NATO solidarity next year. Do you think there is any reason to assume that the Netherlands will not deploy its planned 48 Cruise missiles if the Soviet Union fails to make the concessions which you and Mrs. Thatcher would like to see in Geneva?
Dutch Prime Minister
We will take a decision at the right moment about yes or no deployment. At this stage, we are preparing ourselves for deployment and by that we are sustaining the negotiation process in Geneva, by being a part of the common decision of NATO. That is the situation as of now and may I repeat what I just said two minutes before: the question is not of the Netherlands want out of NATO solidarity; the question is of NATO together, based on solidarity, to provoke some results in the arms control process. That is the most and important question for the coming months.
Question
You said also two minutes before that even if the Cruise missiles would be employed at the end of the year, in Germany and Britain, the negotiations will continue. My question is [end p19] do you have any real reason to believe that the Soviet Union will be prepared for continuation after that?
Dutch Prime Minister
No, but they better do! Because they started to install substantial numbers of SS20 systems and they still go on to do so today, and at the moment they fail to put on the table an acceptable solution in Geneva before the end of the year and forcing by that fact alone NATO deployments, they had better go on with negotiations in the beginning of next year if necessary, but if not, what will be the answer? Of course that we have to go on our side to deploy and to deploy and to deploy, and therefore I sincerely hope, and I think it is of their own interest also to negotiate more seriously as they are doing today.
Question
It is not in the sense of what was said up to now by the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Thatcher
Well, that is their fault.
Question
My question only was is there a real basis to believe that the discussions and negotiations could be continued? [end p20]
Mrs. Thatcher
Well, we wish them to continue. We wish, because we genuinely want to see nuclear disarmament on a balanced and verifiable basis. We wish all the fora in which disarmament talks can take place to continue, including also the conventional ones and those on chemical weapons as well. That is an example of our earnest and our good faith and I hope that it will call forth a similar earnest to talk about disarmament on the other side.