How I plan to govern

Mrs Thatcher is on the crest of an electoral triumph, frustrated only by the clinging together of the Labour and Liberal Parties which denies her the General Election she would be bound, at present, to win.

But whenever it comes, she is confident of winning. If she does, it is then that the real problems for the Conservatives will come. Above all, could a Conservative government, putting its emphasis on individualism, really feel confident about keeping the support of all classes in an age so imbued with collectivist attitudes as ours?

I applied this question to the whole range of domestic policies but Mrs Thatcher's strongest general response came when we were discussing the steady advance of the public sector, particularly into industry. “For good or ill,” I said, “post-war politics have seen a steady advance towards systematic socialism, punctuated by periods of Tory government which have done no more than put a brake on the process. Is it really feasible for a Conservative government to roll back the proportion of our national life engrossed by the State?”

“Yes, it is! We rolled it back once before. The real parallel for the future is the Conservative Parliaments of 1951–64. By 1951, we were in a highly controlled, detailed, regulated, high tax—and high inflation—society. People were even more afraid to come out of it then than now. Now at least they can see other nations thriving and flourishing outside this kind of system. But before 1951, they had thought: we have had an experiment in a new form of government, and if central planning could work in wartime, why shouldn't it work in peace? They forgot that everyone is prepared to subordinate their objectives in wartime, but not in peace.”

But even if prices and regulations are today as unpopular as rationing and other restrictions were in 1951, there is a much tougher union problem. Certainly, individual trade unionists are currently driven by discontent with the Labour government to vote Tory. But what will their support really be worth if they have to choose between the policies of a Conservative government and the collective demands of their unions and the collective provision of their welfare?

Mrs Thatcher did not underestimate the problems for the individual trade unionist who, as she put it, “steps out of line.” But neither does she believe that the trade union movement is as collectivist as it looks. Its present attitude to pay policy, she considered, showed that.

“The trade unions have to decide what their function is. Is it to look after their differing members' interests—and you see what is happening with differentials now? Or is it to move towards an age in which you don't have unions representing different interests? I'm certain that the differing interests will soon reassert themselves; otherwise the whole reason for different trade unions ceases.”

Her view of a valid “collective” approach to pay, was that the Government, talking to industry and the unions would have to estimate at the beginning of each year what could be afforded for wages. If, at the end of the year, too high wages had been taken out, because economic expectations had not been fulfilled, the supply of money would have to be used as a corrective.

I suggested it was in the public sector that the “general understanding” of which Mrs. Thatcher spoke will be tested.

“The only thing we have to decide for the public sector industries is whether there's going to be any subsidy arising from wage claims,” she answered. There would be some cases (as with subsidies for certain uneconomic railway lines) where social reasons might justify a specific subsidy. She then added rather cryptically: “You can't find an absolute answer to everything. You will not win every battle.”

But I put it to her again: what about resistance from the big unions (as with the miners during Mr Heath 's Government) to which the economy and society are highly vulnerable. “If,” she replied, “they refuse to be responsible, and you have a power struggle, you may have to invoke the help of other people—the TUC included. But don't forget that it was Len Murray who said, during a collectivist wages period: ‘We will see that the miners are a special case—and I must say, I've always thought that was a rather courageous thing to have said.

“If you're asking whether it's going to be a power battle in the end, supposing someone was trying to hold the nation to ransom, I can't say what would happen. I can only say that if anyone makes unjustified demands simply because they've got industrial muscle, then I think you have to stand up to it—because it isn't governments that pay; it's citizens.

“But I think it's wrong to assume you'll have a trial of strength. … They're pretty reasonable people. Normally the troubles are where there's a genuine grievance and other people are out of touch with that genuine grievance and don't take steps to deal with it. That, I think, is the much greater danger.”

We talked about the public vis-a-vis the private sectors more generally. I asked whether she really thought she could turn back the proportion of the public sector? She said: “If we do not, I see no prospect of prosperity in this country. There will not be sufficient resources to provide incentives for companies or individuals.”

She admitted, however, that at the beginning, it wouldn't be possible to reverse state ownership as such, except with industry that had just been taken over—as with community land. “That we can stop.”

But what about State intervention outside the nationalised industries? Mrs Thatcher thought that the function of government here was simply to mitigate the consequences of decline in an industry to relieve hardship and possibly to give grants where these could not be obtained from a bank.

“I don't think anyone in politics could stand by and see [end p1] a whole community collapse without work. You must mitigate it—but you can't do the industrialists' job for them. You decide whether to back a company but you don't do it indefinitely.” Nationalisation was no solution for decline because even nationalised industries were “not immune from the market.”

Government involvement in other countries did not take the form that it took here. She dismissed Whitehall planning by saying: “It's not an industry that responds to the market but a company—and this is the weakness of sector planning.”

Would she keep the National Enterprise Board? She answered: “Not with a role where it can buy shares in private industry. But you'll have to have some organisation for keeping the shares held by the State: that's better done in a central organisation than in a sponsoring department. But I want to sell a lot of them back.”

But what about the non-industrial public sector and, for instance, public discontent with education and health? Mrs Thatcher said that parents hadn't got enough power over schools. But, equally, governors and local authorities didn't realise the extent of their powers over the curriculum, but delegated the whole of it, with the method of teaching, to the teaching profession. “Some of them are now having doubts about the results.”

She agreed that the trouble with the health service was the rising proportion spent on administration rather than on teaching or health care. She was also frank about past Tory error. “If people say: ‘Well, you Tories did the health service reorganisation,’ then, all right! If we didn't get it right, we'll have to look at it again.” She discussed at length and with feeling the increase of the proportion of NHS spending on administration, and said she would like to see more people having the chance to provide for themselves independently, though it couldn't be done quickly.

She agreed, however, that expensive independent education and health care provided an escape route only for a very few—until there was a much bigger income in the pay packet. That was why she supported mixed public-private features such as the Direct Grant schools (the Conservatives would bring them back), and amenity beds. She said she believed the Health Service would be “in considerable financial difficulties very soon and it would be better if we moved in a direction which encouraged people to take out their own insurance.” Only a few could, but at least it brought more money into medicine as a whole.

Mrs Thatcher relies much on reducing bureaucracy to save public money. This meant looking at the complexity of legislation, particularly for tax and national insurance, to remove anomalies and complexity. “It may mean a greater element of rough justice.” A lot of work was done which wasn't a basis for real decisions and this had to be corrected—but it had to be done from inside the Civil Service since bringing in outsiders would simply cause resentment.

I then brought her to a topic close to my heart. What about saving money on the proliferation of quasi-Government authorities, abolishing in particular the Equal Opportunities Commission. After all, she hadn't needed it. Mrs Thatcher's long pause indicated the difficulty she was finding in synthesising her convictions with diplomatic need. “I really think you can do anything it does with a smaller staff—a very much smaller staff.”

When pressed on the principle of this kind of intervention she paused again. She thought people ought to be alerted to the fact that there are more opportunities for young men than young women, in industry, for instance.

“It may have done a good job in that respect—but I'm sorry, I'm against running an organisation of that size. I don't think it does the cause any good either.”

“What about all these advertisements like maths person able to teach rugger to get a master for a boys' school?” I asked. “Absolutely ridiculous” she said, with feeling. “Absolutely ridiculous!”

We talked about immigration, and I put it to her that, in view of the public concern (expressed partly in the National Front vote) whatever the Tories promise, they must do. But some people still insisted that the numbers coming in were small and the problem overstated.

“That,” she said, “Is not so and not what the figures show.” The most important thing was to keep good relations among the people living here. That meant allaying fears of the numbers to come—which according to the Franks report would be 3.8 million by the end of the century from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan on present trends. Apart from compassionate and asylum cases, and our duty to those in East Africa, there must be a severe reduction. Such problems as the relatives of illegal entrants who had been given an amnesty, the relatives of fiances and second wives (which was wholly against our traditions) had to be measured. “Then we'll know what to do.”

The whole of our interview illustrated Mrs Thatcher's characteristic balance of conviction and caution. In her, the two are never so fused, as they are with many other politicians, as to leave you uncertain about whether belief itself has been changed by the limitations of the possible. You know clearly what she believes: you see equally her appreciation of the limits of the possible in a real world. Her caution governs her convictions: it does not, clearly, neuter them.