Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

HC I [Devolution (Scotland and Wales)]

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: House of Commons
Source: Hansard HC [903/398-420]
Editorial comments: 1602-1700. MT spoke at cc405 and 407.
Importance ranking: Minor
Word count: 8160
[column 398]

DEVOLUTION (SCOTLAND AND WALES)

[Second Day]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Pendry.]

4.2 p.m.

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Edward Short)

In opening the debate yesterday my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister explained the strategy and reasoning behind the White Paper. In reopening the debate today, I should like to speak in some detail about the content of the White Paper but more especially about the constitutional arrangements and procedures.

I hope that later in the debate my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales and the Paymaster-General will be speaking about the particular problems which face Scotland and Wales and about the economic and financial aspects.

Whatever else may be said about the White Paper—and an awful lot has been said about it—it has at last succeeded in bringing the devolution debate to life throughout the United Kingdom. In Scotland and Wales the debate has been going on for some years, but elsewhere, and notably in this House, there has until recently been very little general interest. For their part the Government have tried throughout to make their intentions clear. A previous Labour Government set up the Royal Commission on the Constitution. When we came back to office in February 1974 we said immediately that we would start discussions. We prepared the consultative document “Devolution within the United Kingdom—some alternatives for discussion” . In the ensuing months in the summer of 1974 my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales held widespread discussions in those two countries on the basis of that document.

On the result of those discussions we prepared and published in September 1974 the White Paper “Democracy and Devolution” setting out a definite commitment to establish Scottish and Welsh Assemblies. This promise was repeated in our three General Election manifestos [column 399]in Scotland, Wales and the United Kingdom in the October 1974 General Election. It is always difficult to say what are the criteria for deciding whether or not a Government have a mandate. Let me tell the House what we put before the electorate—and I can assure my hon. Friends that this was approved by the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party. In our Scottish manifesto we said:

“We shall therefore give high priority in the next Parliament to the setting up of a Legislative Assembly for Scotland with substantial powers over the crucial areas of decision making in Scotland.”

In Scotland we won 41 out of the 71 seats.

“Labour's manifestos at the last two General Elections have included a pledge to set up a directly elected assembly for Wales” ,

and in Wales we won 23 out of 36 seats. Our manifesto for the United Kingdom as a whole said:

“The next Labour Government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales”

and we won a million more votes and 42 more seats than the Conservative Party. If any Government could claim to have a mandate for its proposals, we have a mandate for this one in Scotland, Wales and throughout the United Kingdom. We are now honouring that promise.

Mrs. Margaret Bain (Dunbartonshire, East)

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept, irrespective of the small print in the Labour Party manifesto, that the Labour Party in Scotland fought a campaign which emphasised that the people of Scotland would have a strong Assembly with powers over trade and industry? Statements appeared in the Press in Scotland giving this undertaking and the hon. Members for Berwick and East Lothian (Mr. Mackintosh) and South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) emphasised the point in their party political broadcasts. Does the right hon. Gentleman now accept that the White Paper is a sham?

Mr. Short

No doubt the hon. Lady will catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, but before she does so I invite her to get a copy of the White Paper which was published in September 1974. I hope she will read it before she speaks, because she will see there what we said about trade and industry and that what she said in her intervention was quite inaccurate.

[column 400]

Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness)

rose——

Mr. Short

I cannot keep giving way throughout my speech.

Mr. Johnston

I am grateful to the Leader of the House for giving way. Will he explain why, in United Kingdom terms, he made the point that the Labour Party had won a million votes more than the Conservatives and therefore had a mandate while for Scotland he concentrated on the number of seats won? In Scotland his party secured 36 per cent. of the vote and 57 per cent. of the seats.

Mr. Speaker

Order. I have been given notice that the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) will be seeking to catch my eye to speak in the debate today. That would be the time to make that sort of point.

Mr. Johnston

On a point of order. Surely, Mr. Speaker, the whole point of the nature of this House is that it should be an interchange of discussion and debate. Is it your view that it is wrong for Ministers or speakers to give way to discursive interventions?

Mr. Speaker

If the hon. Member is raising a matter of argument and knows that he has a very good chance of being called to speak in the debate, he has an option. If he chooses to make his argument in an intervention, perhaps he will not catch my eye later.

Mr. Short

After the October 1974 election, after all the promises were made and after the mandate which was secured by the handsome election victories in Scotland and Wales—an election which was, perhaps, less handsomely won in the United Kingdom as a whole—and after two years of very hard work, our detailed proposals have been published in the White Paper we are now discussing. Perhaps I should say to my hon. Friend the Member for Bedwellty (Mr. Kinnock) that the White Paper goes not one inch beyond the White Paper of September 1974 in any single respect. We are honouring our promise to the electorate in exactly the way we made it.

Mr. Neil Kinnock (Bedwellty)

I apologise to my right hon. Friend for intervening, because he has an extremely difficult task to perform. Will he point [column 401]out where, in the manifesto, in the previous White Paper or in Labour Party documents, an undertaking was given to institute an Assembly for Wales which had tax-collecting powers of any description? Does he not recognise that this is where the White Paper, as in other areas, departs from anything we have undertaken to do previously?

Mr. Short

What we undertook to do previously was set out in the White Paper I have just described which was before the electorate at the last General Election. My right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Wales is armed with all the statements made by a great many Welsh Members over the years, including Mr. Deputy Speaker, and he will quote from them when he speaks tomorrow, so I shall not pursue that point today.

A shorter, popular version of the White Paper is this week available in every post office in Scotland, and every household in Scotland can get a copy of that White Paper any time this week or in the ensuing weeks. [Interruption.] I know that the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mrs. Bain) does not want it to be properly understood, but we are making sure that it will be properly understood. I and many of my colleagues are going to Scotland next Sunday and on many Sundays to come, and my hon. Friends intend to make sure that the people of Scotland and Wales understand the proposals properly.

Mr. Dafydd Wigley (Caernarvon)

rose——

Mr. Short

They are available in Wales as well.

Mr. Wigley

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain whether the White Paper available in Wales, but not available last night in the Vote Office, indicates why the Government are not giving economic planning powers to the Assembly for Wales, which was a commitment in their manifesto for Wales in the last General Election?

Mr. Short

That was not a commitment. I am not talking about that at the moment. I cannot talk about everything at once, and I hope that hon Gentlemen will contain themselves.

The way is now clear for increasing understanding and discussion of the Gov[column 402]ernment's proposals. Nearly 400 bodies have been written to individually—the list was published in Hansard yesterday—inviting comments. I hope that the national parties will look at that list. There is a similar general invitation to the public.

I quote paragraph 5 of the White Paper. It is important and it is the purpose of this debate. It is as follows:

“The Government now want to see full public and Parliamentary consideration of the proposals. The issues are extremely important for all the people of the United Kingdom; the arrangements proposed are novel; and in constitutional matters, where frequent change would be harmful, there is need for the widest possible basis of agreement on the essential features before legislation is enacted which will inevitably be very complicated. The main structure of the schemes is clear, but they need not represent the last word in every respect. The Government will therefore be very willing to listen to representations about their proposals that are consistent with the basic approach set out in Part II of this White Paper.”

By “basic approach” we mean that there should be the maximum amount of devolution of subjects of government consistent with preserving the political and economic unity of the United Kingdom. What we mean by “political and economic unity” is set out in some detail in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the White Paper. We are aiming for the greatest possible long-term advantage for the people of Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom.

In paragraph 294, the White Paper points out that our proposals are designed to strike two careful balances. The first is between, on the one hand, allowing the maximum local freedom and initiative and, on the other hand, safeguarding the unity of the United Kingdom. The second balance is between, on the one hand, maximising local democratic control over the allocation of expenditure on the public services and, on the other hand, the continuing responsibility of Parliament here at Westminster for managing the economy and ensuring that all parts of the United Kingdom, especially those whose need is greatest, get a fair share of the resources of the nation as a whole. Any suggestions from this House or otherwise for modifying our proposals we shall listen to, but everything that everyone says must pay regard to those considerations if they are to command widespread [column 403]acceptance. Given that basic approach, and given the two balances I have mentioned, we are willing to listen to and consider any proposals made here or outside.

The consultations now under way—I mentioned the 400 people I have written to—as well as this four-day debate will lead to the publication of a draft Bill in the spring of this year. As I have already explained—and anyone who understands how the House works will know—a Bill of this complexity could not be put through Parliament this Session. Nevertheless, we shall publish the Bill as soon as we can in draft form. It will then be debated and there will be further and more definitive discussions with outside bodies on the basis of the Bill. The next stage will be that a Bill taking into account both the discussions on the White Paper and the more definite discussions on the Bill will be published at the beginning of next Session. I am confident that that Bill will reach the statute book by the end of next Session.

On the assumption that the devolution Bill will go through in the Session 1976–77, it may be possible to hold the first Assembly elections towards the end of 1977, but it would be more realistic to think in terms of spring 1978. The Assemblies will take over responsibility as soon as possible after they are elected, but there are problems—solvable but nevertheless considerable. For one thing, the Assemblies will be completely new institutions and there will be a need for a running-in period. They will not only have to make their own domestic arrangements, draw up standing orders and so on, but will be involved in negotiations for the first block grant.

Also, the transfer of executive powers from the Scottish and Welsh Offices will take some time. This running-in period will be as short as possible, but it is inevitable that there should be a period of this kind between the election of the Assemblies and the full assumption of their powers. They could hardly take over full responsibility on the day they were elected. However, these are practical, soluble problems and, naturally, we are anxious to get the Assemblies fully operative as soon as possible. There will be no avoidable delay.

[column 404]

Mr. William Whitelaw (Penrith and The Border)

The right hon. Gentleman speaks of a draft Bill. Are the Government wedded to the idea of one Bill? The positions of Scotland and Wales are very different. Might it not be wise to have two Bills, one for Scotland and one for Wales?

Mr. Short

That point and anything else which the right hon. Gentleman says I shall consider carefully. Our present intention is one Bill, but I shall certainly consider that aspect.

Mr. George Reid (Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire)

I should like to give the right hon. Gentleman a chance to clear up two apparent hostages to fortune. The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland with responsibility for devolution said in a fully authorised interview in January last year that he hoped that the Scottish Assembly would have trade and industry powers. In view of what the right hon. Gentleman says, does the Under-Secretary of State still have grounds for hope? Secondly, would the right hon. Gentleman care to comment on his own view, expressed to the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party in April, that the major Bill in the next Session—that is, this Session—would be the devolution Bill?

Mr. Short

My right hon. Friend the Paymaster-General will be speaking specifically about the first question raised by the hon. Gentleman. The main problem is that many of the industry powers are a matter of holding the balance between one part of the United Kingdom and another. My right hon. Friend will speak in detail about that, and I hope that other hon. Members will also express their view. The hon. Gentleman is right in his second point. We have proceeded on the exercise and we have met new difficulties all the way along the line. It has taken longer than we expected and I apologise for it, but it is unavoidable.

I turn now to some of the more detailed contents of the White Paper. Some aspects of it have been misunderstood. That is inevitable in a scheme of this complexity. For example, yesterday the right hon. Lady the Leader of the Opposition said:

“I do not believe this scheme will stand the test of time. Its constitutional basis is too [column 405]flimsy.” —[Official Report, 13th January 1976; Vol. 903, c. 240.]

I know that the right hon. Lady has been extremely busy, but I wish that she had studied the White Paper more completely. Whatever may be said about it, that certainly cannot be said. Right hon. and hon. Members may have views about the subjects to be devolved, but no one can say that the constitutional basis is too flimsy. Most critics have said exactly the opposite—that the constitutional basis is too strong for the powers being devolved—but certainly that cannot be said. Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition would care to read it a little more carefully this weekend.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher (Finchley)

I have read everything in it several times. It was because I had read everything in it, and because I had studied several federal systems as well, that I realised that the constitutional basis of what Edward Shortthe right hon. Gentleman is proposing is very flimsy indeed. When he adds to that a political veto I think it is absurd.

Mr. Short

I am coming to the so-called political veto, and I shall show the absurdity of what the right hon. Lady said yesterday, and of what she is saying now, about the so-called political veto.

I turn now to the proposed reserve powers for the United Kingdom Parliament. These have been called by the right hon. Lady, somewhat emotively, political veto powers. The White Paper, rather inelegantly, calls them “override” powers. They are described in paragraphs 71 to 75 and paragraphs 207 to 210 of the White Paper.

Far too much attention has been concentrated on these reserve powers. The considerable powers being devolved are being forgotten and a great deal of the talk is polarising around the reserve powers, which are merely a constitutional convenience to the—[Interruption.] Let me explain what I mean, because hon. Members have missed the essential point here. I want to explain it in terms which they can understand.

These powers would be very very seldom used. My guess is that they would hardly ever be used, because their frequent use would obviously be politically impossible. The essential point in this exercise is that the United Kingdom Par[column 406]liament cannot ever permanently divest itself of its sovereignty over the United Kingdom as a whole.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South)

Except to Brussels.

Mr. Short

That could be undone by an Act of Parliament.

Mr. Powell

And it will be.

Mr. Short

Whatever the future may hold, the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) and I are agreed that it could be undone by an Act of Parliament, so my proposition is correct. This Parliament can never divest itself of its sovereignty, except possibly in one case, and that is if it granted complete independence to part of the United Kingdom. Even then, it is very doubtful as a legal proposition. International law and world public opinion would prevent its ever being taken away. That is the only case in reality in which this Parliament can divest itself of its sovereignty over part of the United Kingdom.

Whether it is written in the devolution Act or not, this Parliament will always have a power of intervention. What we are proposing is a simplified form of intervening when the interests of the United Kingdom as a whole are threatened. That is not by passing an Act of Parliament but by securing the approval of Parliament on an affirmative resolution in both Houses. As I said before, the existence of this simplified power of intervention in the background has enabled us to propose a far greater devolution of powers in individual subjects than would have been possible without it.

I wish that more people would grasp the essentially formal nature of these reserve powers and stop talking as though the Government intend to intervene every five minutes. These powers are simply a reflection of the central constitutional fact about devolution—that this Parliament remains sovereign and the United Kingdom remains a unitary State. These arrangements provide simplified machinery for expressing that. The people who oppose the power of intervention, as did the Leader of the Opposition yesterday—[Interruption.] The right hon. Lady opposed it. I read carefully this morning what she said, and she is not in favour of any power of intervention. [column 407]Those who oppose intervention are not advocating devolution but are advocating something quite different. If there is no power of intervention, either in the way we propose or by Act of Parliament, it will mean either federalism—and that is uncertain—or complete separation.

Mrs. Thatcher

No.

Mr. Short

Of course it does.

Mrs. Thatcher

rose——

Mr. Short

I will give way to the right hon. Lady. Yesterday she opposed the power of intervention. If there is no power of intervention, Scotland and Wales will become independent.

Mrs. Thatcher

By virtue of what the right hon. Gentleman said a few moments ago, that is not correct. Because Parliament is supreme, intervention would come by virtue of another statute.

Mr. Short

That is exactly what I am saying. I was providing only a simplified form of that intervention. But whether or not we have that in the Act—the right hon. Lady understands quite well what I am talking about—there is a power of intervention by Act of Parliament in this Parliament. Parliament can always intervene by Act of Parliament. Therefore the right hon. Lady cannot say that she does not want a power of intervention.

Mr. Henderson

rose——

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (Devon, North)

rose——

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas)

Will the Lord President decide to which hon. Member he is giving way?

Mr. Henderson

I am most grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I sympathise with him in his difficulty in finding some explanation of the Conservative Party's policy on this matter, which may be cleared up later. If, as he is saying, this is a power which is so politically damaging that it would be used only very infrequently, why insult the Scottish people by putting it in at all? Does the right hon. Gentleman really imagine that the people of Scotland will be conned into thinking that they have power to make decisions if the Secretary of State for Scotland is then able to veto them?

[column 408]

Mr. Short

Perhaps I can say something presently which may help the hon. Gentleman. The only way in which the United Kingdom's power of intervention can be removed is by a permanent surrender of sovereignty—that is, by granting independence or by a total reconstruction of the political institutions of the United Kingdom. That is what I meant when I said that I wished that the Leader of the Opposition had thought about this a little more carefully.

Dr. M. S. Miller (East Kilbride)

Will my right hon. Friend make it clear once and for all that the people of Scotland cannot have it both ways? If they want to remain within the United Kingdom, it is absolutely essential that the United Kingdom Parliament must have reserve powers. If these reserve powers are not there, it amounts to what some hon Members opposite are saying—that the Scottish people want complete separation from the rest of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Short

That is precisely what I am trying to point out—that we cannot remove the power of intervention in our constitution without granting independence. As the White Paper points out in paragraph 27, it is very difficult to predict situations which might lead to the use of these reserve powers. It is largely for this reason that the Government propose that they should be provided rather than that we should attempt to deal specifically with every possible eventuality.

A mere difference of opinion between London and Edinburgh or Cardiff would not be a basis for intervention—and I believe, as I said a minute ago, that it would be politically impossible—but an executive act or omission, or a proposed statute which clearly threatened the United Kingdom interest would be such a basis. Between the two, it is almost impossible to predict situations which would trigger off the reserve powers.

It is not helpful to speculate about situations in which the Government might wish to secure parliamentary approval to intervene. What we are aiming at is not intervention but consultation and co-operation. This is abundantly clear at several points in the White Paper. Paragraphs 74 and 209 specifically state that the general procedures for intervening in the business of the Scottish and Welsh [column 409]administrations are not intended for frequent use. Paragraph 25 states:

“Arrangements will be needed for extensive but flexible consultation on many subjects and at all levels, political and official. Through these the Government and the devolved administrations will keep one another informed and will work together as closely as possible. Interests will sometimes differ, and give and take will be needed. But the Government see no reason to fear that the longstanding spirit of partnership within the United Kingdom will be lost; indeed, they believe” ——

and believe profoundly—

“that it will be enhanced. They look forward to working out effective two-way consultation arrangements with the devolved administrations as soon as possible, and to operating them constructively over the years.”

I was very sorry that the greater part of the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) saw nothing ahead but obstruction. I have more faith and confidence in the good sense of his fellow countrymen than he has.

I hope that what I have said has done something to reassure those who feared on a first reading of the White Paper that the reserve powers would undermine the whole concept of devolution. Such fears are completely groundless. However, if a substantial body of opposition appears and if a substantial body of opinion wishes to have these powers removed, certainly we shall consider that. But I make it absolutely clear so that there will be no doubt that, whether or not they are written into the devolution Bill, it is inherent in our constitution that they will still exist, admittedly by Act of Parliament. There will still be the power here to set aside any statute or any executive act of either of the Assemblies.

Mr. Thorpe

This is very important. I do not make a point of this but, for the sake of the record, when the right hon. Gentleman refers to paragraph 58 is he saying “These are the powers that we shall devolve to you in the Scottish Assembly. We reserve the right to veto them if they are ultra vires. We reserve the right to veto them if they are intra vires if we take the view that they are not acceptable on general policy grounds. But we cannot tell you what are those general policy grounds. We hope that they will not arise” ? If that is the position, it is a minimal offer to Scotland.

[column 410]

Mr. Short

If there is opposition to these being included in the Bill, I shall be willing to look at it. But whether they are in or out, the power to intervene is still there, and unless we give complete independence and, maybe, federalism—probably complete independence—the powers of intervention will still remain because they are inherent in our constitution. That is the central fact about devolution.

A misapprehension has arisen over the constitutional duties which are allocated in the White Paper to the Secretary of State. I cannot understand why, but this too has polarised a good deal of opposition. It applies especially to the Secretary of State for Scotland.

The constitutional side of the scheme which we propose involves a hierarchical rôle for some representative of the United Kingdom. Obviously some person must formally appoint the Scottish Executive, present Bills for Royal Assent and so on. It seemed to us that the Secretary of State was the best placed person to perform these duties.

The pattern of this is familiar to us. The Secretary of State for Scotland, like most Ministers, in addition to his executive and political functions also has a wide variety of formal and quasi-judicial functions, I myself, as Lord President of the Council—which is the highest court of appeal for a number of Common-wealth countries—perhaps to a greater extent than any other Minister.

This combination of rôles, formal and sometimes quasi-judicial rôles and, on the other hand executive and political rôles, is a normal part of the political scene in this country. It may seem illogical, but anyone who has been a senior Minister will know that it does not give rise to conflict and that it works extremely well.

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East)

In paragraph 49, the Secretary of State has the power to dismiss the Executive and presumably, following that, to appoint another—a rôle analogous to that of the Sovereign in the United Kingdom situation. Does my right hon. Friend believe that a partisan figure, the Secretary of State, in the highly-charged political atmosphere of the Scottish Assembly, can carry out this function without immense trouble?

[column 411]

Mr. Short

It is exactly about that that I have been talking. All Ministers in this country have varying rôles which in logic may appear to conflict but which in fact do not conflict. I am the head of a body which is the highest court of appeal in the Commonwealth. I am also a politician, and I make no bones about it. But the two rôles do not conflict. We are familiar with this, and, as I say, it works extremely well.

It should be remembered also that the Secretary of State will continue to be a member of the United Kingdom Government. In any circumstances in which the exercise of his constitutional rôle might give rise to controversy—for example, if the rejection of an Assembly Bill or Executive intervention were to be considered—it is clear that the decision would be one for the United Kingdom Cabinet and this Parliament as a whole. My right hon. Friend would be answerable here.

In general, however, the constitutional functions which we propose for the Secretary of State would be routine and formal. He will rely heavily on the advice of the Scottish administration in carrying them out.

Mr. Powell

Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why he said that there must be someone to appoint the Executive responsible to the Scottish Assembly if that does not apply in the case of an elected local government assembly which also has an executive?

Mr. Short

Almost one of the first problems to be resolved in this exercise was where executive power should reside. That was almost the first major question to be resolved. In the case of a local authority, executive power lies in the local authority itself. Here at Westminster, executive power lies in individual Ministers. This is the system which we are proposing in the case of Scotland but not of Wales. In Wales the executive power will reside in the Assembly and its committees. In Scotland it will reside in the individual Ministers. That is the reason why.

If anyone wishes to oppose and change these arrangements, he should suggest who, apart from the Secretary of State, could more appropriately and more effectively perform the constitutional functions allotted to him in the White [column 412]Paper, because clearly they have to be performed by someone. Hon. Members who object to this—it is remarkable to me that they do, because I think that it is eminently sensible—will perhaps be good enough to put forward alternative proposals.

We have to bear in mind also, in view especially of one poll that I saw, that there is a great deal of support in Scotland for preserving the office of Secretary of State.

Mr. Henderson

The right hon. Gentleman issued an invitation. I think that it would befit the dignity of the Scottish Assembly if it was the Sovereign or the Sovereign's representative who carried out these functions.

Mr. Short

I note what the hon. Gentleman has said.

The third feature of the proposals around which criticism has tended to polarise is the arrangements for checking the vires of Scottish Bills. As in the case of the constitutional functions of the Secretary of State, this must be done by someone. In the case of a devolved administration where its powers to legislate are defined in an Act of Parliament of this Parliament, there must be some mechanism for checking whether a statute of that Assembly falls within its devolved powers. Someone must do it. There is no avoiding the need for machinery for this purpose.

The White Paper explains this in paragraph 56 and the paragraphs following it. These paragraphs are presentationally at fault, I think, in treating vires together with the consideration of Bills on policy grounds in the same part of the White Paper. But we have been trying to keep the material as short as possible.

The examination of vires would be a comparatively routine question of whether the provisions of a Bill were within the powers already laid down in the devolution Act. But the checking of the vires is seen more as a matter of law—indeed, as a matter of law and not as a matter of politics. No doubt some awkward points will arise, perhaps on matters not foreseen when the devolution Act was passed—but in the ordinary course no difficulty should arise.

The three-stage checking mechanism which we propose to operate is described [column 413]in paragraph 56 of the White Paper, and perhaps I might quote part of the paragraph:

“The Assembly's presiding officer” —

that is, the clerk to the Assembly—

“on the advice of his counsel, will report to the Assembly on the vires of a Bill (that is, whether it falls within the devolved powers) when it is introduced, and again before the final Assembly stage; if the report is adverse it will not stop the Bill but will serve as a warning to the Assembly and the Executive. The Government will not be formally involved at these stages, but they will be aware of the Bill and the presiding officer's report and may wish to give informal warning of any difficulties about vires which they foresee. The Scottish authorities will be similarly free, if in doubt, to conslt the Government informally.”

The remaining question is what further legal advice is necessary before the Government submit the Bill for Royal Assent. The White Paper proposes that the Government should be advised by the Law Officers, and these include the Lord Advocate. Other suggestions might be made. The Leader of the Liberal Party made one yesterday. For example, it might be thought that advice should be given by a panel of judges or by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. No doubt other ideas will be put forward, and we shall consider them, but I think there must be a third stage.

The Government's own view is that the processing and passing of an Act of Parliament for a statute of the Scottish Assembly is a matter for the parliamentary machine. The introduction of a formal judicial process into that operation might well create constitutional confusion. It is Parliament and politicians who are answerable to the people for the content of Acts passed and not judges. That is why we propose that the final advice on vires should be given to the Secretary of State by the Law Officers. There are different points of view about this, and we shall consider them.

The related and extremely vital question of judicial review of Acts when they reach the statute book is dealt with in paragraphs 62 to 65 of the White Paper. This again applies only to Scotland, and it is an issue left open for public discussion. I want to be quite honest about this. We differ in the Government in our views, and we want to hear the different points of view before coming to a decision. [column 414]

The question is whether, after Royal Assent has been given, an Assembly Act should be open to review in the courts on the grounds of vires—that is, whether the courts should have jurisdiction to declare, at the instance of a litigant, that an Assembly Act goes outside the powers conferred by the devolution Act. I will not go into the Opposition's arguments, which are already summarised in the White Paper, but I was sorry that the Leader of the Liberal Party described this proposal yesterday as the Franco clause. I think that it is a very honest clause.

I must emphasise the distinction between the question of judicial review after the Act is passed and the question, just discussed, of checking the vires of an Assembly Act before it is passed—related though they are.

Judicial review is concerned with the application of an Assembly Act in particular cases which may well come up many years after the Act has been passed. Some litigant may question an Act 20 to 25 years later. There is no doubt that in such circumstances the courts could interpret the words of the Act as they can the words of our Acts, but they could not question the validity of an Act of Parliament. That has been their traditional task.

The question is whether they should have the power to go further and say that an Act of the Scottish Assembly cannot be applied because it is, in effect, invalid. They cannot do that with Acts of Parliament, and it would be a completely new departure for this country, should they, in the rather different circumstances, be able to with Acts of the Scottish Assembly—particularly after the method for checking the vires of Acts before they reach the statute book which I have just described.

This is not a dry legal issue. It is a highly important question not unconnected with the debate which has been going on for some time about checks on the sovereignty of Parliament, entrenched Bills of Rights and so on. One cannot entrench anything in this Parliament. It profoundly affects the rights and freedoms of the individual. The Government have themselves had difficulty with the matter and they would welcome constructive public discussion before reaching a conclusion.

[column 415]

Mr. Nigel Lawson (Blaby)

If there were a procedure for judicial review in determination of vires, whether intra or ultra, before Royal Assent, would this not remove the problem whether there should be a judicial review after Royal Assent?

Mr. Short

That is the point of those opposed to the judicial review. If we have adequate machinery to check the vires of a Bill when it is going through the Assembly, and when it is submitted for Royal Assent, is it necessary to have a judicial review after that? In considering the third stage we are studying the advice of the Law Officers, but we would certainly be willing to look at any other proposals.

I turn to the electoral arrangements because, again, there has been some criticism. Paragraphs 32, 33 and 177 of the White Paper set out the proposed arrangements for the Scottish and Welsh Assembly constituencies. The arrangement for the first elections—that is, two Assembly Members for each parliamentary constituency—is a temporary measure designed to achieve a fair system without delaying the setting up of the Assemblies. For second and subsequent elections we propose a formula for dividing up parliamentary constituencies into Assembly constituencies. Basing the new arrangements on existing parliamentary constituencies is very convenient administratively and for the party organisations. The formula for sub-division reduces as far as possible the large disparities in size of constituency electorates which sometimes arise in Westminster elections. If hon. Members have any other formula to propose instead we would be very happy to look at it.

The Leader of the Liberal Party also raised the question of the electoral system itself. The issue is whether it could be improved by some form of proportional representation instead of the relative majority system. It would make no sense to have one system for these elections and another for local and central elections.

Mr. Thorpe

Northern Ireland?

Mr. Short

Northern Ireland is a different case altogether. Changing our national system would involve detailed [column 416]study and examination. It would be quite wrong to pre-empt such a study by proposing one of variants of proportional representation for elections to the Assemblies. It is important that the public should understand and have confidence in the Assembly elections. That can best be done by using the system which is familiar and which has commanded general support in this country for many years.

There is one further matter, which arises from the White Paper and on which I should say something. It is the question of international relations. Paragraphs 87 and 219 of the White Paper set out the Government's position on this. It has been argued, mainly by Scottish and Welsh nationalists, that the devolution settlement should give Scotland and Wales separate representation in EEC institutions.

Mr. James Dempsey (Coatbridge and Aidrie)

My right hon. Friend has dealt with the question of constituencies for the Assemblies, stating that there will be two candidates per constituency. Would he refer to the question: who will be eligible to stand for election to the Assemblies? We are often asked, now that young people are entitled to vote at the age of 18, whether it is the intention to consider altering the Representation of the People Act to allow all those eligible to vote also to be considered as suitable candidates for election to the Assemblies.

Mr. Short

The Bill will set out the disqualifications for Assembly membership and they will be broadly the same as those for this place, except that peers will be allowed to stand for the Assemblies.

As I was saying, it has been argued by Scottish and Welsh nationalists that the devolution settlement should give Scotland and Wales the right to be represented directly in the Community institutions, but this would be impossible, because it is the United Kingdom as a whole which is a member of the EEC.

All other EEC countries are represented only by their central Governments, and that includes West Germany, which is a Federal Republic. Only full independent sovereign States can be represented on the Council of Ministers. This is one of the points on which the separatist [column 417]argument has been confused, to a large extent quite deliberately, with devolution It is not possible in devolution to have separate representation in Europe.

Mr. William Molloy (Ealing, North)

Is not my right hon. Friend aware that some time ago there was a dispute in Western Germany between the central Government and the North Rhine-West-phalian Land Government? It concerned a fine imposed on West Germany which the central Government in turn tried to impose on North Rhine-West-phalia. It is not quite true to say that West Germany is solely represented by the Federal Government in the EEC and that that has ruled out any conflict within West Germany.

Mr. Short

I am not talking about possible conflicts within a country, although I shall talk about a possible one in a moment. All I am saying is that it is the Federal Republic of Germany itself which is a member of the EEC and which is represented there by the Federal Government. Whatever devolution settlement we had, that would be the case with the United Kingdom. It is inevitable. We have no choice about it. It is clear that in any scheme of devolution such direct representation would not be possible. What the nationalists advocate would necessarily involve either complete independence or a complete recasting of the institutions of the EEC.

Mr. Reid

Like the Prime Minister yesterday, the Leader of the House seems to have based a number of arguments on the Kilbrandon Report. Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in the changed political and social circumstances of Scotland, Lord Kilbrandon has changed his mind? If asked now what method of Government for these islands he favoured, Lord Kilbrandon would say publicly, “A relationship between Edinburgh and Brussels with London withering away” . During the withering away period, would it not be possible for a sessional committee in the Scottish Assembly in Edinburgh to look after secondary legislation?

Mr. Short

I shall come to that point, but I emphasise that only the United Kingdom itself can be a member of the EEC. No devolved Administration can be. I emphasise, however, that there will [column 418]be the closest consultation between Edinburgh, Cardiff and London on all EEC matters affecting the devolved Administrations, and we hope that, in the ordinary course, it will be possible to delegate to those Administrations the task of implementing, within Scotland and Wales, Community provisions in devolved subjects. But I make it clear that it could be done here at Westminster. For example, if there were some Community provision about education, it could be handled here, but I hope that it would be delegated to Edinburgh and Cardiff.

As with other matters of common interest, the emphasis will be on consultation and co-operation, but even if they wanted to—and they do not—the Government could not shed their sole responsibility for representing the United Kingdom as a whole in all international matters.

For the first time, and at the instance of this Government, the whole subject of devolution has been taken past the stage of vague notions and mere assertions. We have provided, for the first time, a detailed and credible set of proposals in which a strong constitutional structure is matched by a detailed, carefully drawn-up, generous and considerable degree of devolution in subjects of government, on which we can concentrate and no doubt improve, as a basis for legislation.

There are those, of course, who are apprehensive about devolution and perhaps would not have it at all. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.” ] Those of my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite who are applauding that statement are not living in the world as it is. Doing nothing is no longer an option. I ask them to consider public opinion in Scotland and Wales and to judge for themselves whether sensible, workable devolution can possibly be denied. I am convinced that it cannot—and that is quite apart from its intrinsic merits, to which I and the Government are dedicated. We believe that it cannot be withheld, We have moved far beyond that stage now. If these sensible proposals are rejected now by the House, I believe that such a vote will be the death warrant of the United Kingdom.

Some people have said that our proposals go too far and will entail the break-up of the United Kingdom. Others, who also wish to avoid breaking up the United [column 419]Kingdom, have said that the proposals do not go far enough. Some cry “Too little” and others “Too much” . It may therefore be that we have got the proposals about right. I do not know. As I have said, we are willing to listen and we are willing to modify them.

I believe that these proposals will assure the future of the United Kingdom. To deny them, greatly to dilute them, or, indeed, greatly to strengthen them, would, I believe, inevitably lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom. We have said repeatedly that we are determined to preserve the political and economic unity of the United Kingdom. For this reason, we have excluded from our proposals any constitutional powers or devolved powers which we think would undermine that unity. That has been the main criterion in deciding the content of the scheme.

To those who think that the Government's proposals themselves do not go far enough, I would say this. Some people have not yet grasped all the implications of the White Paper. To remedy that, however, is one of the purposes of the debate. They do not yet realise the full extent of the powers which we are proposing for Scotland and Wales. They have tended to concentrate on the reservations and on peripheral matters and to overlook the positive aspects. They may also have overlooked—dare I say it?—that there will be no devolution at all without the approval of this Parliament. Any proposals have to be embodied in an Act passed by this Parliament.

Following devolution, the day-to-day situation in Scotland will be that over nearly all domestic services the Scottish Assembly and Executive will do the job which is now being done by the United Kingdom Parliament and Government. Every Scottish measure proposed in this Session, for example, would in future be done by the Scottish Assembly. In Wales, over a similar range of services, the Welsh Assembly will have a substantial number of powers now possessed by the Secretary of State for Wales. But they will not have power to pass new Acts of Parliament.

I would ask impatient devolutionists to look at our proposals with a little more imagination and not to become obsessed with the particular features which they [column 420]do not happen to like. I ask them also please to remember that any proposals must be passed by this Parliament.

The Government now look forward to a period of discussion and consultation, and I appeal to the House not to go back over the old ground. Let us accept the need for some kind of sensible devolution now and resolve to construct a thoroughly satisfying and workable system. If we approach the debate in that spirit, it may well be the first main step of this House towards a statute in the next Session of Parliament which will be a landmark in our constitutional history and the outstanding achievement of this Parliament.