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THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS: 19-21 MAY 1971

SUMMARY OF PARIS DESPATCH EP6/79 OF 9 JUNE 1971

1. The Prime Minister visited Paris, as the guest of President Pompidou, from 19-21 May. The bulk of his full programme was spent in tête-à-tête talks with the President. The Prime Minister and the President discussed the future of Europe in all its aspects and established the closeness of their thinking on many points (paragraph 1).
2. The preparations for the meeting. By an early stage in the resumed negotiations for Britain's entry to the Communities, it had come to seem very likely that a meeting between the Prime Minister and the President offered the best hope of achieving both success in Brussels and a broader reconciliation between Britain and France. But the failure of such a meeting would have been disastrous. Detailed preparation was needed. There were the problems of strategic and tactical timing. On the substance, President Pompidou wished to be sure about our attitude on the broader European issues. The Prime Minister wished to expound his whole concept of united Europe; and it would also be unthinkable not to have a discussion of the detailed problems outstanding in Brussels (paragraph 2-3). The President entrusted the preparations exclusively to his own personal staff at the Elysée. The Quai d'Orsay were kept in ignorance. There were, and are, risks for us in this method of work. Nevertheless the discussion led to the decision that a meeting was timely and would have every chance of success (paragraph 4).
3. The reasons for the President's decision. He had agreed at The Hague summit to the opening of negotiations with Britain. At that time he was probably already coming to the conclusion that the negotiations ought to succeed, provided French interests were adequately protected. It was clear from the start that he did not want to be blamed for the negotiations' failure (paragraph 5). The arguments for success were reinforced by outside developments, such as the failure of France's negotiations with Algeria, and the ructions within the Community over economic and monetary union (paragraph 6).
4. Physical arrangements for the meeting. The French could not have been more co-operative. The President, exceptionally, arranged to entertain the Prime Minister twice at the Elysée and accepted an invitation to a meal at the Embassy. We reciprocated, emphasizing the "European" spirit of the visit (paragraph 7).
5. The Prime Minister's programme. 19 May. Welcome at Orly by the French Prime Minister. Statements by the two Prime Ministers (paragraph 8). 20 May. First two sessions of talks between the Prime Minister and the President. The Prime Minister

lays a wreath on the tomb of the French Unknown Soldier, followed by a talk at the Matignon with Monsieur Chaban-Delmas (paragraphs 9-11). Formal dinner at the Elysée, with toasts by the President and the Prime Minister (paragraph 12). 21 May. Third session of talks. Luncheon at the Embassy, with toasts by Her Majesty's Ambassador and the President. Fourth session of the talks. Joint press conference at the Elysée by the President and the Prime Minister. Monsieur Pompidou's carefully chosen words designed both to reassure Britain as to France's intentions, and to warn his own diehards that the President did not share their interpretation of Britain's intentions (paragraphs 13-14). The Prime Minister's departure (paragraph 15).

6. Conclusions. On the negotiations it would be superfluous and inappropriate to add to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of 24 May, except to say that by the way he handled the talks the Prime Minister dispelled Monsieur Pompidou's doubt and disbelief about Britain. The latter's expressed desire to proceed with the building of a united Europe on the basis of an enlarged Community has already begun to be translated into practice at the Luxembourg meeting of 7 June. Her Majesty's Ambassador believes that the President intends these meetings to succeed, and that enough was said during the Elysée conversations to enable agreement to be reached in Brussels before the end of the summer. As regards Anglo-French relations, the improvement since December 1967 has established the necessary infrastructure for the closest degree of co-operation between our two countries. This co-operation will be an indispensable condition of the future progress of Europe which can follow success in the negotiations. The Prime Minister's visit to Paris has ensured that this co-operation can be fruitfully developed (paragraphs 16-18).

BRITISH EMBASSY

PARIS

EP 6/79

9 June 1971

The Right Honourable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT MP
etc etc etc

Sir

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS: 19-21 MAY 1971

1. The Prime Minister paid an official visit to Paris, as the guest of the President of the French Republic, from 19-21 May. He was accompanied by members of his personal staff and by a team of senior advisers concerned with European questions (their names are recorded at Annex A). He carried out a full programme, the bulk of which was devoted to four sessions of talks with President Pompidou. During these four meetings, which lasted about eleven hours and were almost entirely tête-à-tête, apart from the presence of interpreters, the two Heads of government discussed the future of Europe in all its aspects and established the closeness of their thinking on many points. I have the honour in this despatch to recall briefly the preparations for this meeting; to describe the Prime Minister's programme while he was here (the detailed timetable is at Annex B); and to offer some comment, tentative as this must necessarily be while we are still negotiating in Brussels, on the results which the Prime Minister's visit has achieved.
2. "The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister," said the communiqué announcing the visit on 8 May, "consider that a meeting to discuss matters of common interest would now be useful" - a delightfully bland formula to describe so momentous

a decision. Ever since the French decision at The Hague summit meeting in December 1969 to agree to the opening of negotiations with Britain, it had, I think, been clear - to informed opinion among the Five no less than in Britain and France - that success in Brussels was likely to depend finally on agreement between Britain and France; and for such agreement to become possible, this had to form part of a broader reconciliation of the two countries, based on the mutual acknowledgement that our future interests lay in working together both in the fields covered by an enlarged community, and in those where broader co-operation on a European scale is still in the future. Given the link between our entry and a broader Anglo/French reconciliation, and adding to the equation the last decade's history of Anglo/French differences, it had come to seem very likely, by an early stage in the resumed negotiations, that the best hope of achieving the twin objectives lay in a meeting between the French President and the British Prime Minister. But first the success of such a meeting had to be assured, for failure would have been disastrous.

3. It was in February that, during a talk with President Pompidou's Secretary-General at the Elysée, it became clear that the President foresaw a meeting with the Prime Minister which, if successful, would pave the way for agreement in Brussels. It remained to be seen whether the ingredients of success were there, and to this end detailed discussions were begun. It was necessary to deal with the problems both of timing and of substance. There was the question of strategic timing - for

how long should our two negotiating teams be obliged to conduct their war of attrition in Brussels, so as to show public opinion that the utmost had been done to defend each country's special interests? This was particularly important for President Pompidou as General de Gaulle's successor. Then there was the question of tactical timing - once the choice of date had been narrowed, which particular negotiating meeting should it precede or follow, and when exactly should it be announced? On the substance, it was clear that the two heads of government would not wish to concern themselves solely with particular aspects of the negotiations, for this would be both to pre-empt the proper function of the Ministers negotiating in Brussels and to miss the opportunity for a real meeting of minds across a wider spectrum. It became clear that President Pompidou wished to be sure in his mind about our attitude on such broader issues as the future of European institutions, majority voting, the place of the French language in the enlarged community, the provisions for France's former colonies when the time came to renegotiate the Yaoundé convention - and the handling of sterling. On our side, the Prime Minister wished to expound to the President, and engage his interest in, the whole concept of united Europe and the role it should rightfully play in the world which has been cardinal to the Prime Minister's own thinking for the past twenty years. But it would also be unthinkable for the Prime Minister to spend two days at the Elysée without a discussion in depth leading to a meeting of minds on the detailed problems which remained to be resolved in the negotiations.

4. Patient discussion of these and other aspects of the meeting was needed before agreement could be reached, both on the timing and on the agenda for a meeting between the two heads of government. With a secretiveness which is characteristic, but also because he believed, rightly, that he could not rely on some elements in the Quai d'Orsay not to disrupt the careful preparations if they knew about them, the President decided that the preliminary and preparatory contacts should be handled exclusively by his own personal staff at the Elysée. It has now become common knowledge that the Quai d'Orsay were kept in ignorance and that Monsieur Schumann only learned of the impending meeting when he returned from a visit to Moscow a few hours before the announcement was to be made. Even the French Prime Minister was only informed the day before. There were, and must still remain, risks for us in this method of work, if only because of the bitterness it has undoubtedly engendered among certain of the senior French officials engaged in the negotiations, whose goodwill towards us has in any case always been questionable. But be that as it may, these discussions led both Her Majesty's Government and President Pompidou to decide that a meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was timely and that it would have every chance of success.

5. Monsieur Pompidou had taken his time over this critical decision. By the end of 1969 he had calculated that it was necessary to allow negotiations to open with the United Kingdom in order to secure the final stage of the Community's agricultural

policy: and it was so agreed at The Hague summit. I am less certain how convinced he was at that time that it was in France's interest that the negotiations should succeed. But I believe his mind was already moving along the lines that, provided vital French negotiating objectives were adequately protected, then on balance success would be advantageous to France. What was quite certain from the start was that, if the negotiations should fail, Monsieur Pompidou did not want to be blamed for this; and it became increasingly clear, as the negotiations went on, that if they did break down he would be hard put to it to avoid being cast as the man responsible for failure.

6. Developments outside the negotiating room reinforced the arguments in favour of allowing the negotiations to succeed. Monsieur Pompidou was widely blamed for the fiasco of France's negotiations with Algeria, on the grounds that he should have intervened personally at a much earlier stage. Many commentators asked whether he might be going to make the same mistake over the Community's negotiations with Britain: this sort of criticism could only be answered by a "positive" result in Brussels. Within the Community itself, the ructions over monetary and economic union reminded those few in France who have ever forgotten it, that their neighbour across the Rhine could not be content for ever to adopt the complaisant attitude towards France's pretensions within the Six which had satisfied Dr Adenauer, under the spell of General de Gaulle. France's perennial mistrust of Germany was undoubtedly (however regrettable its consequences in other contexts) one of the more compelling factors which decided Monsieur Pompidou to disregard the misgivings of the orthodox Gaullists and invite Mr Heath to visit him

in Paris.

7. In making the physical arrangements for the visit, the French authorities, under instructions from the Elysée, could not have been more co-operative. The President not only decided to entertain the Prime Minister to two meals at the Elysée, but intimated that, "if invited", he would be glad to come to a meal at the Embassy. It is most unusual for a visiting head of government to be entertained directly by the President to more than one meal; and it is exceptional, except during a State Visit, for the President himself to go out for a meal to an Embassy. These arrangements were quickly noted by the press of a country which, despite its claims of civil egalitarianism, in fact observes the nuances of protocol and social relations with an attention which recalls Byzantium. The cynic might have seen them as all part of a French contingency plan for ensuring that, if the talks should go awry, the French could not be blamed for not having bent over backwards to ensure their success. I myself never shared this cynical view; and with the talks turning out in the satisfactory way that they did, the social arrangements played their part in emphasizing the unique nature of the visit and helped to highlight its success. In small ways it proved possible for us to reciprocate and to emphasize in return the "European" spirit in which the visit was being undertaken; for example, in the Prime Minister's gesture in making his first speech on arrival in French, and in the menu for the luncheon at the Embassy, which was not only French but specifically designed to appeal to the Auvergnat.

8. The Prime Minister, accompanied by four senior members of his party, arrived at Orly in an HS125 at 6.15.p.m. on the afternoon of 19 May. He was welcomed by the French Prime Minister (Monsieur Jacques Chaban-Delmas), the Secretary of State at the Quai d'Orsay (Monsieur Jean de Lipkowski) and the appropriate military and civil French officials. I was present with members of my staff to greet the Prime Minister as he stepped on to French soil and to present Monsieur Chaban-Delmas to him. Monsieur Chaban-Delmas' speech of welcome was cordiality personified. He referred to the imperishable links formed, notably on the field of battle, between France and the United Kingdom; he told Mr Heath that "your coming to Paris to make Europe represents a very real and great hope"; and he expressed the desire that the Prime Minister's conversations with Monsieur Pompidou would be fruitful. The Prime Minister in reply said he was convinced that Europe was now at a moment as historic as that of twenty years ago. The decisions to be taken in the weeks to come would be of determining significance for the political future of Europe: it was in this spirit that he came to his talks with the President of the French Republic. For him, these talks would be inspired by the desire to establish between them the closest understanding on the great problems which now faced the whole of Europe. The two Prime Ministers, the text of whose statements at Orly is at Annex C, then drove together to the British Embassy, where Monsieur Chaban-Delmas came in for a drink before taking his leave. Later in the evening we had a working dinner for the Prime Minister and several of his senior advisers.

9. On the following morning (20 May), the Prime Minister left the Embassy for the Elysée at 9.55.am., accompanied only by his interpreter (Mr Michael Palliser, Minister at this Embassy), one of his private secretaries and myself. At the Elysée Mr Heath was greeted by the Chief of Protocol (Monsieur Senard), and was escorted by the Secretary-General to the Presidency (Monsieur Jobert) to the President's office on the first floor, where Monsieur Pompidou was waiting to receive him at the head of the staircase. Photographs were taken and the talks began with no one else present but interpreters. The four sessions were to take a total of some eleven hours.
10. The first session, which had been expected to finish at 12.30.pm., in fact ran on until the working lunch, for which Monsieur Pompidou was joined by Monsieur Chaban-Delmas, Monsieur Schumann and senior French officials, and the Prime Minister by his senior officials and by myself with two senior members of my staff. It had been the Prime Minister's intention to return to the Embassy between the first session of the talks and the luncheon: as it was, he did this instead before the afternoon session - though not before the two heads of government had been temporarily lost to view inside a crowd of press photographers who interrupted their post-prandial coffee in an arbour in the Elysée garden, reminding Monsieur Chaban-Delmas (a former rugby international) of the last encounter between France and Wales at Colombes.
11. After the second session of the talks in the afternoon the Prime Minister returned to the Embassy. He left again twenty minutes later with the French Prime Minister for the Arc de Triomphe, where Mr Heath laid a wreath on the tomb of the French

Unknown Soldier. This gesture was much appreciated and like all the Prime Minister's public appearances received excellent press and television coverage. From the Arc de Triomphe the Prime Minister drove directly to the Matignon for a talk, at which I accompanied him, with Monsieur Chaban-Delmas.

12. The day concluded with the President and Madame Pompidou's formal dinner at the Elysée. This furnished the familiar combination of outward glitter and of hard work behind the scenes, for the guests had no sooner risen from the dinner table than Mr Heath found himself involved in a detailed discussion on certain monetary questions with M Schumann. Before then, both the President and the Prime Minister had in their exchange of toasts lifted enough of the blanket of silence, which they had by mutual consent imposed on the results of their conversations until these were concluded, to reassure the assembled company that good progress was being made. While both were careful to stress it was not their aim to pre-empt the negotiations in Brussels, Monsieur Pompidou felt able to say that on many of the essential points, and notably the general conception of Europe, including its organization and objectives, his and Mr Heath's views were "sufficiently close for us to be able to continue without pessimism". The Prime Minister for his part said he believed that the negotiating problems could be settled to the satisfaction of all the partners concerned. This would leave clear the way to make a momentous step towards European unity. The best hope for that movement forward was for France and Britain to advance together in partnership with each other, as they had so often

done in the past. The Prime Minister concluded by quoting the words he had spoken at Aachen (a reference which, as we have subsequently seen reported, was not lost on German opinion) on another Ascension Day eight years before, when he received the Charlemagne Prize. The text of the two toasts is at Annex D. 13. The next day (21 May) began, as arranged, with the third session of tête-à-tête talks between the Prime Minister and the President. They were joined at noon by Monsieur Chaban-Delmas. The President and Madame Pompidou were then the guests of my wife and myself at the luncheon given at this Embassy in honour of the Prime Minister. Monsieur and Madame Pompidou were accompanied to this, for us at least, memorable occasion by the French Prime Minister with the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice, and by Madame Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (her husband, the Minister of Finance, being absent in the United States). In my toast to the President of the French Republic, I had no hesitation in describing the visit we were witnessing as "a historic event for Europe and the world". The President in his response spoke of "this mark of the renewal of confidence and warm feeling between our two countries".

14. The remainder of the day had been left flexible. The Prime Minister had provisionally arranged to leave in the late afternoon, but further commitments intervened - and I am confident the Prime Minister would agree that what may have proved Morning Cloud's loss was at least, and emphatically, Europe's gain! The Prime Minister returned to the Elysée for a fourth and final session of talks with the President. We then had the unique experience of seeing the President of the French Republic and the

British Prime Minister seated together at a table in the Salle des Fêtes at the Elysée (the same room in which eight years before General de Gaulle had pronounced his first veto on Britain's application), proclaiming the harmony of their views on the future of Europe, and their belief, to use President Pompidou's words, that "it would be unreasonable to think that agreement between Britain and the EEC will not be reached in June". The Prime Minister in turn referred to the "very clear understanding of each other's points of view" which he and Monsieur Pompidou had reached, and to his belief that the talks would prove "of real and lasting benefit not only to Britain and France but to Europe as a whole". And their joint achievement was epitomized in the final sentences of President Pompidou's statement (which the Prime Minister quoted on 24 May in the House of Commons): "Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or to divert it from its objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to use every pretext to place in the end a fresh veto on Britain's entry. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the contrary." With these carefully chosen words the French President both offered to Britain the reassurance as to France's intentions about which we have so long been sceptical; and served notice on his own diehards that the received Gaullist doctrine regarding Britain's intentions (resurrected so recently on British and French television by Monsieur Couve de Murville) was not a doctrine to which the President subscribes. The text of the communiqué issued at the end of the talks is at Annex E;

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the text of the statements made by Monsieur Pompidou and Mr Heath at their joint press conference is at Annex F.

15. After taking leave of President Pompidou and Monsieur Chaban-Delmas at the end of the press conference, the Prime Minister returned once more to the Embassy. Here there was time for a quiet dinner before Monsieur Schumann arrived to accompany Mr Heath to Orly. As it was by now after sundown, there was no special military ceremony at the airport. The Prime Minister's aeroplane took off at 10.15.p.m. He was going straight from London Airport to Chequers, where he intended to spend the weekend preparing the statement about his visit which he was to make to the House of Commons the following Monday, 24 May.

16. That statement, which has been very well received in Paris, makes it superfluous and indeed inappropriate to attempt any further comment on the Prime Minister's talks with Monsieur Pompidou in respect of the prospects for success in our negotiations with the Community. All I might perhaps add is that, when the Prime Minister referred in the House to the long and careful preparation which had been needed before his visit, adding that he believed that this was the key to its success, he was, of course, only telling half the story. The other and the master key was the way in which the Prime Minister handled the talks themselves. This was something which no one else could have done for him, and without which no amount of careful preparation could have served its purpose. Mr Heath succeeded in dispelling the doubt and disbelief about Britain which Monsieur Pompidou inherited from the General and which was kept alive by the naturally suspicious

temperament of this crafty Auvergnat. And what the two men had to say to each other should, I hope and believe, prove enough to enable agreement to be reached in Brussels before the summer is out.

17. The spotlight labelled Enlargement has already shifted from Paris back to Luxembourg, Brussels - and Westminster. I therefore conclude this despatch with a reference to the subject which remains for this post our paramount preoccupation. It is a truism to say that, since the withdrawal from power of General de Gaulle and perhaps even before it, there has been an improvement in Anglo/French relations from the nadir of December 1967. This, grudging at first and almost fatally undermined by the "Soames affair", has since acquired an encouraging momentum as the months have passed. It has been illustrated by, but by no means confined to, the increasing direct contacts which have been made between officials and ministers of our two governments, beginning as was natural with officials of the two foreign ministries but soon extending to other departments of Whitehall and of the French administration. Now that this process of rapprochement has received the seal of approval at the highest level, we can again talk about the entente cordiale without embarrassment.

18. The "renewal of friendship and co-operation between Britain and France", of which the Prime Minister spoke in the House on 24 May, is a young although vigorous plant. President Pompidou's expressed desire to proceed with the building of a united Europe on the basis of an enlarged community has already begun to be

translated into practice at the first of this month's two meetings between Britain and the Six. I firmly believe that Monsieur Pompidou intends these meetings to be a success. For the future progress of Europe which will thereby become possible, an indispensable condition will be the closest degree of co-operation between Britain and France. As a result of the improvement in our relations over the past three years, the infrastructure to support such co-operation is already in place. The Prime Minister's visit has ensured that it can be fruitfully developed.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bonn, Brussels, CODEL Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Luxembourg, Moscow, UKDEL NATO, Oslo, Rome and Washington.

I have the honour to be
Sir
Your obedient Servant

Christopher Soame

MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY AND SENIOR OFFICIALS
ACCOMPANYING HIM TO PARIS: 19-21 MAY, 1971

Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Sir William Nield, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office

The Hon Sir Con O'Neill, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (leader of the United Kingdom delegation to the Brussels negotiations at official level)

Mr P E Thornton, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office.

Mr R T Armstrong, principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

Mr D J D Maitland, Chief Press Secretary

Mr Timothy Kitson MP, Parliamentary Private Secretary

The Hon Douglas Hurd, Political Secretary

Mr P J S Moon, Private Secretary

Miss B N Hosking, Press Secretary

Dr B Warren, Personal Physician

Detective Inspector P Radford

Mr G R Bell, Third Secretary, HM Treasury

Mr F M Kearns, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

Mr M D M Franklin, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

Mr G R Denman, Under-Secretary, Department of Trade and Industry

Mr J A Robinson, Counsellor, Foreign & Commonwealth Office
(special assistant to Sir Con O'Neill)

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS: 19-21 MAY 1971

PROGRAMME

Wednesday, 19 May

- 1700 hrs The Prime Minister's party leave Northolt in an HS125 of the Civil Aviation Flying Unit.
- 1815 hrs Prime Minister's party arrive Orly Airport (Pavillon d'Honneur).
- 1815-1830 hrs Arrival ceremony. Welcome by M Chaban-Delmas. Military honours. Statements by the two Prime Ministers.
- 1830 hrs The two Prime Ministers leave Orly Airport by car for the British Embassy (arriving 1850 hrs), where M Chaban-Delmas takes leave of the Prime Minister.
- 2030 hrs Working dinner in the Embassy.

Thursday, 20 May

- 0955 hrs The Prime Minister leaves the Embassy by car for the Elysée, accompanied by HM Ambassador, his interpreter and his private secretary.
- 1000 hrs Arrival at the Elysée. Military honours (no inspection). Welcome by Chief of Protocol (M Senard) and Secretary-General to the Presidency (M Jobert).
- 1000-1300 hrs The Prime Minister has his first session of talks with President Pompidou (accompanied by interpreters only).
- 1330 hrs Luncheon at the Elysée (served in the Salon Murat at 1345). The President, M Chaban-Delmas, M Schumann and senior French officials; the Prime Minister, HM Ambassador and senior British officials.
- 1530 hrs HM Ambassador and advisers return to the Embassy.
- 1530-1730 hrs Second session of talks between the Prime Minister and President Pompidou (accompanied by interpreters only).

Thursday, 20 May (cont)

1730 hrs Prime Minister returns to the Embassy.

1750 hrs M Chaban-Delmas arrives at the Embassy
(accompanied by the Chief of Protocol)

M Chaban-Delmas leaves the Embassy with Prime Minister (accompanied by HM Ambassador and Chief of Protocol) for the Arc de Triomphe.

1755 hrs The two Prime Ministers arrive at Arc de Triomphe. Mr Heath lays a wreath on the tomb of the French Unknown Soldier.

1815 hrs M Chaban-Delmas leaves for the Matignon.

The Prime Minister follows in a separate car with HM Ambassador for talk with M Chaban-Delmas at the Matignon.

1900 hrs The Prime Minister returns to the Embassy.

1930 hrs British guests for the Elysée dinner (other than the Prime Minister, HM Ambassador and Mrs Soames) leave the Embassy for the Elysée.

1955 hrs The Prime Minister, accompanied by HM Ambassador and Mrs Soames, leave the Embassy for Elysée.

2000 hrs Dinner at the Elysée (served in the Salle des Fêtes at 2030). Speeches by the President and the Prime Minister.

2300 hrs The Prime Minister returns to the Embassy.

Friday, 21 May

0955 hrs The Prime Minister, accompanied by HM Ambassador, and his interpreter, leaves the Embassy for the Elysée.

1000-1245 hrs Third session of talks between the Prime Minister and President Pompidou.

1200 hrs M Chaban-Delmas joins the talks.

1245 hrs The Prime Minister returns to the Embassy.

1250 hrs British guests for the Embassy luncheon assemble in the Ionian room.

1315 hrs President and Madame Pompidou arrive at the Embassy (other French guests arrive by 1305 hrs).

Friday, 21 May (cont)

1330 hrs	Luncheon at the Embassy. Toasts proposed by HM Ambassador and by President Pompidou.
1530 hrs	President and Madame Pompidou leave the Embassy.
1600-1815 hrs	Fourth session of talks between the Prime Minister and President Pompidou.
1900-1930 hrs	Joint press conference at the Elysée. Statements by the President and the Prime Minister.
1930 hrs	The Prime Minister takes leave of the President and of M Chaban-Delmas, and returns to the Embassy.
1945 hrs	Informal dinner.
2115 hrs	M Schumann arrives at the Embassy to accompany the Prime Minister to Orly Airport.
2145 hrs	Departure for Orly.
2215 hrs	The Prime Minister's HSL25 leaves Orly for London Airport.

STATEMENTS MADE ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL
AT ORLY AIRPORT ON 19 MAY, 1971

A. THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER (MONSIEUR JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS)

Je suis heureux de vous accueillir sur le sol de la France au nom du chef de l'Etat et du gouvernement. J'accueille en vous un ami fidèle et de longue date. Ne disiez-vous pas récemment que vous ne sauriez compter le nombre de fois que vous avez visité la France et Paris, et le nombre de séjours que vous y avez faits? J'accueille en vous le représentant d'une nation avec laquelle, depuis un siècle, se sont noués des liens d'amitié impérissables, notamment sur les champs de batailles des deux guerres mondiales. J'accueille aussi le chef du gouvernement d'un des Etats les plus anciens, les plus solides et les plus glorieux de l'Europe.

Que vous veniez parler avec nous de l'Europe de demain, en toute amitié et en toute franchise, est un grand sujet de satisfaction. Que vous veniez faire l'Europe est pour tous les Européens plus qu'un sujet de satisfaction, une grande espérance.

B. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (THE RT. HON. EDWARD HEATH, MBE, MP)

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

C'est avec le plus vif plaisir que je me retrouve aujourd'hui en France à la veille de ma rencontre avec le Président de la République Française. Il y a vingt ans les six pays qui constituent actuellement la Communauté Européenne ont fait le premier pas vers la création d'une Europe nouvelle. De leur foi, de leur sagesse, est née la Communauté telle que nous la voyons aujourd'hui même. Je suis convaincu que nous vivons un moment historique comparable à celui d'il y a vingt ans. Car il est certain que les décisions que nous prendrons tous dans les semaines à venir seront déterminantes pour l'avenir politique de l'Europe. Il est dans cet esprit que j'aborde les entretiens que j'aurai avec le Président de la République.

Il est incontestable qu'une entente amicale entre la France et la Grande Bretagne est d'une importance primordiale pour l'avenir de notre continent.

En vous remerciant, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, pour votre accueil chaleureux je tiens à vous assurer que dans notre esprit les entretiens qui se dérouleront au cours des deux journées à venir seront inspirés du désir d'établir entre nous l'entente la plus étroite sur les grands problèmes qui se posent actuellement à l'Europe toute entière.

SPEECHES BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AT DINNER AT THE
ELYSEE ON 20 MAY, 1971

A. THE PRESIDENT

Le premier ministre britannique en visite à Paris est reçu avec amitié et sympathie, quoi de plus normal? Et pourtant aujourd'hui quoi de plus spectaculaire?

Nos pays sont à l'écoute parce qu'ils savent qu'à travers deux hommes qui se parlent ce sont deux peuples qui cherchent à se retrouver. Se retrouver pour participer à une grande oeuvre commune, qui est la construction d'une Europe groupant des nations décidées à concilier la sauvegarde de leurs identités nationales avec les contraintes d'une action communautaire.

Représentant une puissance économique comparable à celle des plus grands, ayant par leur situation géographique et la parenté de leurs civilisations des intérêts politiques et humains en grande partie communs, gardant de leur passé un égal souci d'aide aux pays en voie de développement, particulièrement à ceux dont le destin fut, au siècle dernier, étroitement lié au nôtre, les nations d'Europe occidentale trouveraient dans leur cohésion organisée le moyen de rendre à l'Europe la maîtrise de son destin et un rôle mondial à la mesure de ses capacités.

Plus encore peut-être, notre association nous permettrait-elle de retrouver une conception proprement européenne de la civilisation, je veux dire une conception qui assure la primauté de l'homme.

C'est dans cet esprit, monsieur le premier ministre, que nous nous sommes entretenus l'un et l'autre. Demain, nous reprendrons nos conversations et je ne veux pas préjuger leur issue, d'autant moins que notre objet n'est pas de conclure une négociation qui se poursuit ailleurs et avec tous nos partenaires. Mais je crois pouvoir dire que sur bien des points essentiels, et notamment sur la conception générale de l'Europe, de son organisation et de ses objectifs, nos vues sont suffisamment proches pour que nous puissions poursuivre sans pessimisme.

Mesdames, messieurs, je vous demande de lever votre verre en l'honneur de Sa Majesté la reine Elizabeth II, à laquelle je vous prie, monsieur le premier ministre, de transmettre mes respectueux hommages.

/B.

B. THE PRIME MINISTER

Monsieur le Président de la République,

I would first of all like to thank you for the splendid welcome you have given to my Colleagues and myself here today and for the very eloquent way in which you have just described the purpose of our talks and the way in which we have carried them on. I would like to thank you for the generous hospitality which you have given to us in these lovely surroundings and with this distinguished company. It is for the British always an especial joy to come to Paris, but at no time more than at this season of the year and to see Paris in all the beauty of spring-time.

Monsieur le Président, when you were asked the other day how you saw Britain and France in this modern world, you gave an answer which interested me very much. You said that one could find no precedent in the past for the situation in which we find ourselves today. And with this, I wholeheartedly agree.

Of course to say that Britain and France are friends is to say nothing new. But today our entente, though cordial, is not directed against a common adversary. It is directed towards something. It is constructive. It is directed towards building a united Europe: a city that is at unity in itself, that has peace within its walls and plenteousness within its palaces.

Throughout my political life I have believed in and worked for the ideal of a united Europe, and of that I wanted my own country to be part. You will understand therefore, Ladies and Gentlemen, how heartening it has been for me to discover today in my talks with the President how close together are our ideas and aspirations.

I have been greatly encouraged by the informal atmosphere in which we have been able to talk together today, and by the good progress which we have been able to make.

As you have indicated, Monsieur le Président, on the immediate question of the negotiations for British entry into the European Community there are issues which still remain to be resolved. It is not the immediate purpose of our meeting to settle these issues. They are ones to be discussed and settled with all the members of the Community in Brussels and Luxembourg.

But, if (as I believe) these issues can be settled to the satisfaction of all the partners concerned, then the way will be clear for a momentous step forward in the movement towards European unity.

The best hope for that movement forward is that France and Britain should advance together, in partnership with each other, as we have so often done in the past." You have yourself summed the matter up, Monsieur le Président, in words which I will not spoil by translation, however much I may injure them by pronunciation:

"Quelle force pour l'Europe, quel avenir, si nous nous entendons, si nous travaillons ensemble, et si nous sommes décidés à faire ensemble, de l'Europe, une réalité!"

Today is Ascension Day. It was on Ascension Day eight years ago that I received the Charlemagne prize in the city of Aachen for the work which I had tried to contribute towards a greater European unity; this gave me great pride. Aachen is historically the first city of Europe, and a thousand years ago we had a unity of purpose and language which we have since lost. I used then words which I should like to repeat tonight because they are fully in harmony with your own:

"If Europeans have confidence in their own beliefs, if they hold to them and act upon them, then Europe cannot fail in the end to find that true unity which is our own real destiny."

My hope, and I am sure it is yours too, is that the talks which we are having today and shall have tomorrow will contribute, not only to understanding between our two countries but above all, to the unity of Europe which we both believe is her real destiny.

JOINT ANGLO-FRENCH COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 21 MAY 1971
AT THE END OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE U.K. AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom held discussions en tête à tête in Paris on 20 and 21 May 1971. Mr Heath also called upon Monsieur Chaban-Delmas on 20 May.

On the role of Europe following the enlargement of the European Economic Community the President of the Republic and the British Prime Minister had a thorough exchange which showed that their views were very close. They expressed in particular their determination to contribute through the enlarged and deepened Community to increasing European co-operation and to the development of distinctively European policies, in the first instance principally in economic matters and progressively in other fields.

The discussion led to a complete identity of view on the working and the development of the Community.

The President of the Republic and the British Prime Minister considered the range of economic, financial and monetary problems which could arise as a result of enlargement. They also discussed the progress of the European Community towards economic and monetary union, and its implications for existing financial relationships. The Prime Minister reaffirmed the readiness of Britain to participate fully and in a European spirit in this development. These discussions produced a useful clarification of views which will provide a firm basis for the future.

The President of the Republic and the British Prime Minister took note with satisfaction of the agreements recently reached at the ministerial meeting between the Community and the United Kingdom on 11 and 12 May on agricultural and industrial matters, and particularly on the application of Community preference in the agricultural field.

The President of the Republic and the British Prime Minister considered that it was desirable and possible to reach early agreement on the main outstanding issues in the negotiations for British entry, particularly the problems relating to New Zealand and the British contribution to the Community budget.

The President of the Republic and the British Prime Minister expressed their joint desire to resolve the problems which will arise from the renewal of the Yaoundé Convention in a positive spirit and having regard to existing rights. It would equally be necessary to take account of the need to safeguard the interests of the countries who are, or will have the opportunity to become, signatories of that Convention and who are largely dependent upon the markets of the enlarged Community for their exports of sugar or other primary products.

STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THEIR JOINT
PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE ELYSEE, 21 MAY, 1971

A. THE PRESIDENT

Je veux tout d'abord saluer la présence à Paris du premier ministre britannique. Cette rencontre avait été souhaitée par tous nos partenaires de la Communauté économique européenne qui n'avaient pas manqué de nous le faire savoir. Elle répondait d'ailleurs, je crois aussi le savoir, au désir du gouvernement britannique, et c'est de grand coeur et avec grand plaisir que j'ai donc invité le Premier britannique à venir. Durant deux jours, vous avez beaucoup patienté et nous avons beaucoup travaillé. Nous avons eu près de douze heures d'entretiens, c'est vous dire que tous les sujets ont été abordés et qu'ils ont tous été traités en profondeur.

Le but de ces entretiens n'était pas et ne pouvait pas être de résoudre toutes les questions qui sont en discussion à Bruxelles. Depuis le début des négociations sur l'adhésion des autres candidats, la France a toujours eu pour position que c'était la Communauté qui négociait, que par conséquent la Communauté devait se mettre d'accord d'abord sur les propositions qu'elle faisait aux négociateurs britanniques.

C'est pourquoi nous n'avons pas réglé ces problèmes que nous n'étions pas qualifiés pour régler.

Vous ne me croirez pas si je vous disais que nous n'en avons pas parlé. Nous en avons donc parlé, nous avons confronté nos points de vues, nous avons surtout essayé de comprendre mutuellement les raisons profondes, économiques ou politiques qu'avait chacun des deux gouvernements pour déterminer sa position. Comme vous le verrez par le communiqué qui va être distribué, ces questions ont été mentionnées et sont mentionnées pour l'essentiel dans le communiqué.

Tout ce que je puis dire, c'est qu'il serait à l'heure actuelle déraisonnable de penser qu'on ne parviendra pas à un accord entre la Grande Bretagne et la Communauté au cours des négociations du mois de juin prochain et que, en tout cas, l'esprit de nos conversations d'aujourd'hui et d'hier me permet de penser que ces négociations devraient aboutir.

Ne concluez pas cependant que Monsieur Schumann et ses collègues de la Communauté, ainsi que Mr. Rippon, n'auront pas encore de longs moments à discuter. Ils en ont l'habitude et, vu de Paris, j'ai même l'impression qu'ils aiment cela.

Mais l'essentiel de nos conversations a été sur la conception générale de l'Europe, sur son organisation, sur son fonctionnement, sur ses perspectives et cela dans le cadre de tous les grands problèmes qui se posent dans le monde, entre les pays européens et les autres, et à l'intérieur de ces pays européens.

Sur un certain nombre de grands problèmes, nous avons constaté que nos points de vue étaient analogues, et même identiques.

Sur d'autres, nous avons pu également constater que si certaines différences, divergences, pouvaient subsister, elles ne faisaient aucunement obstacle à une coopération, l'identité de nos vues sur le but à atteindre étant complète.

Je crois pouvoir dire que nous avons eu conscience, le premier britannique et moi-même, qu'il s'agissait là d'un moment important dans l'histoire de nos deux nations et dans l'histoire des pays d'Europe occidentale. Nos entretiens, par leur longueur même, témoignent que nous avons voulu aller jusqu'au fond du problème. Commencés et poursuivis d'un bout à l'autre, dans la plus grande franchise et dans la plus grande liberté, ils se terminent dans la confiance. Cette confiance c'est celle, et ce doit être celle, que se font deux peuples et qu'ils font à leurs partenaires, actuels et futurs, au sein de la Communauté, pour construire une Europe composée de nations soucieuses de maintenir leur identité, mais décidées à travailler ensemble pour atteindre à une unité véritable, d'abord dans le domaine économique et progressivement dans tous les autres, y compris, bien entendu, dans le domaine politique.

Beaucoup de gens croyaient que la Grande Bretagne n'était pas et ne voulait pas devenir européenne, et qu'elle ne souhaitait entrer dans la Communauté que pour la détruire ou pour la détourner de ses fins. Beaucoup aussi croyaient que la France était prête à utiliser tous les prétextes pour opposer finalement un nouveau veto à l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne.

Eh bien, Mesdames et Messieurs, vous voyez devant vous ce soir des hommes qui sont convaincus du contraire.

B. THE PRIME MINISTER

We have been carrying on our talks during these last two days in an atmosphere that has been outstandingly warm and friendly. And I want to begin by thanking you for the welcome you have given me here in Paris.

Our talks have been very full and wide-ranging, but we have not carried them on in the way of Monsieur Schumann and Mr Rippon in Brussels by debating all night. But this has not in any way derogated from their effectiveness.

Mr President, I share your satisfaction with the outcome of these talks. You have said we have been able to consider the future of Europe, its nature, institutions, its place and its influence in the world, and we find ourselves in very close agreement in our views about these aspects of our own continent.

As a result of our talks I believe that we now have a very clear understanding of each other's points of view and a sympathetic knowledge of each other's problems. For my part I have no doubt at all that the discussions which we have had will prove of real and lasting benefit, not only to Britain and France but to Europe as a whole.

You have described the way in which we have examined the outstanding problems in the negotiations in Brussels. I share your satisfaction; as a result of this examination we both agree that it is not only desirable but also possible for our negotiators there to find acceptable solutions to these remaining problems and be able to do so during the month of June. The way is now open to them to do so.

Mr President, I have long believed that Europe must grow steadily together in unity, and that Britain should be a part of that wider entity. I believe that only in this way can we secure the future peace of our continent and end for ever the quarrels which have brought such suffering upon our countries in the past.

Secondly, I believe that we can in this way advance the prosperity of all our peoples and take full advantage of the greater economic opportunities which lie before us.

And finally, I believe that only by working together can we play a full and worthy part in the outside world.

You and I, Mr President, in these talks, have been very conscious of the responsibilities which France and Britain have both inherited in that outside world and both of us mean to go on fulfilling them. These are the beliefs which I personally have held throughout my political life. These are the beliefs, Mr President, which have brought us together this week. These are the beliefs which, I am now convinced, after these talks, will carry us through to the conclusion of this great enterprise.