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PREM 19/653

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PART 11  
CABINET TWO  
TOP SECRET - CODEWORD

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Confidential File

Handling of the Falklands Crisis  
Defence of the Islands after  
Repossession

ARGENTINA

Part 1: April 1982

Part 11: October 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>1.10.82</del>		23.12.82					
<del>12.10.82</del>		— Ends —					
<del>11.10.82</del>							
<del>27.10.82</del>							
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<del>14.12.82</del>							

PREM 19/653



PART 11 ends:-

FEBB TO MOD

23/12

PART 12 begins:-

Washington tel 4041 27/12/82





SECRET



FILE

27

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

23 December 1982

*Dear Richard,*

FALKLAND ISLANDS: INCREASED  
ARGENTINE AIR ACTIVITY

Thank you for your letter of 22 December to John Coles, which I have shown to the Prime Minister.

Mrs. Thatcher has noted that there is evidence of increased activity at Rio Gallegos and that action has been taken to send an additional Phantom aircraft to the Falkland Islands. She has asked that vigilance should be maintained for any further evidence of activity over the Christmas period and would like to be informed of any further reports on this subject.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely,*

*Robin Butler*

R.P. Craine, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

*RM*



The National Archives

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SECRET

Prime Minister <sup>25A</sup>

A.J.C. <sup>22</sup>/<sub>12</sub>



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/PB/5/1/5

22 December 1982

Dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: INCREASED ARGENTINE AIR ACTIVITY

1. The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that we have received intelligence reports indicating increased activity at the Argentine air base at Rio Gallegos. Although this is most probably associated with the build-up of the 10th Air Brigade, it may signal a greater possibility of provocative action by the Argentine Air Force over the Christmas period or on 3 January, which is the 150th Anniversary of British settlement in the Falklands.

2. The JIC met this afternoon and concluded that there was no significant increase in the threat of direct action against our forces. Nevertheless the Commander, British Forces has requested an additional Phantom aircraft to replace one which is currently unservicable due to an accident on landing, and also that the Harrier force of 6 aircraft should not be reduced over the next few weeks. In the circumstances we have decided it is prudent to meet these requests. Major General Thorne is also bringing his forces to a greater state of readiness. It is possible that the move of the Phantom may attract public attention; if so we intend to take the line that this is a routine deployment to maintain the strength of the Garrison.

3. I am copying this letter to John Holmes and Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever

Peter Craine

R P CRAINE

A J Coles Esq

SECRET  
SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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D/DS5/9/9/18

APS/Minister(AF)

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Head of DS11

MR TAM DALYELL MP: ARTICLE IN THE TIMES OF 14 DECEMBER ABOUT  
THE BELGRANO SINKING

- ...
1. You asked for a line to take on today's attached Times piece in which Mr Tam Dalyell, having received a further written reply yesterday from the Prime Minister asserts that, as the Task Force was some 200 miles from the BELGRANO and that she was on a course of 280°, the Task Force must have been on dry land. 200 nautical miles of 280° from the position of the attack would indeed be in Tierra del Fuego.
  2. Mr Dalyell is relying on the wording both of the Secretary of State's statement on 4 May to the effect that the BELGRANO group "was closing on elements of our task force"; and the wording of yesterday's answer from the Prime Minister to the effect that the group and the task force could have been within mutual striking distance in some 5 to 6 hours "converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles", which itself repeats wording used by the Secretary of State on 13 May. Strictly speaking, the first formulation was inaccurate, implying as it does that the BELGRANO was actually closing on the task force when it was sunk. It is however the case that at various times on the day of the attack the BELGRANO had been heading, albeit briefly, for the task force: she had been changing course many times during the day. The second statement, when it refers to "converging" was talking of a hypothetical rather than actual occasion. A fuller wording would have been "if she had been converging".
  3. My advice would be that we should not seek to defend the 4 May formulation unless pressed on it, given the difficulty of sustaining it. Rather we should continue to hammer home the two points already made more than once that:-
    - a. The BELGRANO and her escorts were known to represent a threat;

and that

/b. ....

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b. They could have changed course and headed direct for the task force at any time; the actual course being steered at any moment is incidental.

.... 4. I attach a line to take with the supplementary framed in these terms, the aide-memoire of the events of 2 May plus relevant Hansard extracts. I understand that APS/S of S was proposing to forward a copy to No 10 in case Mr Dalyell raises the matter in this afternoon's Prime Minister's Questions. APS/S of S is also asking No 10 for an advance sight of Mr Dalyell's latest letter to the Prime Minister. A copy of the letter is now attached.

*Stephan Chaker*

14 December 1982

*pp* N H NICHOLLS  
Head of DS5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE TO TAKE

As has been made clear, both in the House and in the presentation given to many hon Members by the Task Force Commander, the GENERAL BELGRANO and her escorts, in conjunction with other Argentine vessels to the north, represented a serious threat to the Task Force. She was attacked on that account and that account alone: the hon Member [for West Lothian]'s repeated allegations to the contrary have no foundation. The GENERAL BELGRANO had made many changes of course throughout the day and her heading at the moment of attack is merely incidental to the threat she presented to our ships and our men.

If pressed on Mr Nott's statement on 4 May (that BELGRANO was closing on element of the Task Force)

[My rt hon Friend] was speaking then on the basis of our ~~initial understanding and the~~ overall appreciation that the BELGRANO group threatened the Task Force. That appreciation has not changed and, as I have just said, the heading at the particular moment of the attack was incidental.



AIDE MEMOIRE

The Task Force Commander, Admiral Woodward, was concerned by intelligence indications on 2 May that the BELGRANO group would attack the Task Force from the South and the carrier 25 DE MAYO and her escorts from the North. The Carrier group had slipped the SSN barrier to the north and there was a risk that the SSN HMS CONQUEROR might have lost the BELGRANO group as they ran over the shallow waters of the Burdwood Bank. He therefore sought a change to the Rules of Engagement to allow an attack outside the 200 mile exclusion zone; this was consistent with HMG's announcement (on 23 April) that any approach by Argentine warships which threatened air forces would encounter the appropriate response. Ministers agreed; and the BELGRANO was attacked later that day. This was explained in a presentation to opposition MPs attended by Mr Dalyell and again in a written answer on 29 November. Mr Dalyell has already sought to obtain further details of the intelligence then available. This is highly sensitive and cannot be disclosed.

## Replies put Task Force on dry land

By Anthony Bevins  
Political Correspondent

*TIMES 14/12*  
The Prime Minister has been asked to explain an apparent inconsistency in Government replies over the sinking of the Belgrano, placing a group of British warships on dry land due east of the Argentine port of Ushuaia.

Mr Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for West Lothian was told last night by Mrs Margaret Thatcher in a Commons written reply: "The General Belgrano and a group of British Warships could have been within striking distance of each other in a matter of some five to six hours, converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles."


Mr John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence, reported to the Commons on May 4 that the Belgrano which had been escorted by two destroyers, was sunk on May 2 at 8 pm London time. He said: "This heavily armed surface attack group was close to the total exclusion zone and was closing on elements of our task force, which was only hours away."

But in a written Commons reply on November 29, Mr Peter Blaker, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, told Mr Dalyell that the Belgrano, first detected at 8 pm London time, was on a course of 280 degrees, which indicated that the cruiser was making for her home port of Ushuaia.

Mr Dalyell last night used the Ministry of Defence's own position of the sinking - the Belgrano's course, and the convergent distance of the British warships, to plot the position of the threatened task force.

He said in a letter to Mrs Thatcher: "I am puzzled. Your answer tonight seems to be at variance with Peter Blaker's answer on November 29..."





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

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Dear Margaret,

I am puzzled.

Your answer to-night to Question Number 47 W seems to be at variance with Peter Blaker's answer on 29th November.

Peter says that the <sup>B</sup>elgrano was on a 280 degree course - West North West towards Uschaia. You confirm the statement made on 13th May, and refer to "converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles."

If you were both to be right, does this not place the British Fleet on dry land on Argentinian soil? This can hardly have been the case! So, who is less than accurate - you or Peter Blaker?

Do not the facts point inexorably to the conclusion that whatever the reasons for launching a Mark 8 torpedo from Congueror, designed to sink the General Belgrano, they had little to do with military exigencies of proecting the Task Force at 8 pm London time on Sunday 2nd May?

Yours sincerely

*Anna Delgado*

u/11

**"General Belgrano"**

Mr. Dalyell asked the Prime Minister what was the distance from the "General Belgrano" to the nearest British surface vessel at the time the cruiser was torpedoed.

**The Prime Minister:** As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence told the House on 13 May—[Vol. 23, c. 1030]—the "General Belgrano" and a group of British warships could have been within striking distance of each other in a matter of some five to six hours, converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles.



### Merchant Ships (Anti-missile Seducers)

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence what representations he has had from the General Council of British Shipping on proposals to fit certain merchant ships with anti-missile seducers; and what cost estimate he has made.

Mr. Pattie: I refer the hon. Member to my earlier replies on 18 October—[Vol. 29, c. 46-47]—and 10 November—[Vol. 31, c. 163]—which made it plain that matters such as he has raised will be examined in a

working party set up under the auspices of the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee, on which the General Council of British Shipping is represented.

### In-flight Refuelling

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 22 November, *Official Report*, c. 364, what is the maximum speed of a Hercules aircraft; what is the stalling speed of a loaded Victor tanker aircraft; whether the refuelling manoeuvre has to be carried out as the two aircraft are diving, and at what maximum rate of fall; and what is the lowest height above sea level at which any part of this manoeuvre is carried out.

Mr. Blaker: It is not the practice to release operational information of this kind.

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence, in view of the relative performance characteristics of Hercules and Victor aircraft, what assessment he has made of the risks associated with the refuelling of Hercules aircraft by Victor tankers en route to the Falkland Islands.

Mr. Blaker: There were full trials and assessments before operational clearance was given.

### United Kingdom-Port Stanley (Air Journey)

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions Royal Air Force Hercules aircraft en route to the Falkland Islands have had to turn back, and have landed having completed more than 21 hours in the air.

Mr. Blaker: Four.

### "General Belgrano"

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence what course the "General Belgrano" was steering when she was torpedoed.

Mr. Blaker: The "General Belgrano" was attacked under the terms of our warning on 23 April that any approach by Argentine warships or aircraft which threatened our forces would encounter the appropriate response. There were indications on 2 May that the carrier "25 de Mayo" and her escorts would approach the task force from the north, while the "General Belgrano" and her escorts were attempting to complete a pincer movement from the south. Concerned that HMS "Conqueror" might lose the "General Belgrano" as she ran over the shallow water of the Burdwood Bank, the task force commander sought and obtained a change in the rules of engagement to allow an attack outside the 200-mile exclusion zone but within the general principle set out in our warning of 23 April. Throughout 2 May, the cruiser and her escorts had made many changes of course. At the moment she was torpedoed, about 8 pm London time, "General Belgrano" was on a course of 280 deg.

### SS "Uganda"

Mr. Dalyell asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he is satisfied with the availability of resources to protect and escort SS "Uganda" en route to the South Atlantic.

Mr. Wiggin: Yes.



have been consistent only in their inflexibility and insistence. Meanwhile, Argentine troops are still on the Falkland Islands. They persist in their illegal occupation. We have taken no steps to withdraw in accordance with the mandatory resolution of the Security Council.

We cannot allow the present situation on the Falkland Islands to endure. As the right hon. Member for Leeds, East said, we should remember the consequences of allowing the Argentines to get away with this aggression. Our diplomatic efforts are intended to bring it to an end peacefully, but these efforts have been and must continue to be, accompanied by military actions. I was naturally encouraged by the right hon. Gentleman's comment that so far the official Opposition had supported all our military actions.

I want to devote most of my short remarks to the military aspects of the affair, just as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary concentrated on our diplomatic efforts.

**Mr. Healey:** The right hon. Gentleman will recall that I asked him questions about the one action on which we had doubts, but he may be coming to that.

**Mr. Nott:** I will deal with that later.

Our military effort has been calculated to serve two purposes: first, to put increasing pressure on the Argentine garrison on the Falklands, and on the Argentine Government, to recognise our resolve and to accept a peaceful withdrawal; and secondly, to put us into a position from which, if all diplomatic efforts fail, we can take the further military action necessary to end the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands. As the right hon. Member for Leeds, East said, there would have been no purpose in sending the task force unless we were in some circumstances prepared to use it.

From the first, our military actions have been complementary to our diplomatic efforts, and entirely consistent with our inherent right of self-defence under the charter. These actions have comprised a steady progression. The progression has not been dictated wholly by our diplomatic efforts; it has been necessary as a consequence of the time needed for our forces to deploy to the South Atlantic from the United Kingdom, although while this was taking place we have continued to place whatever military and economic pressure we could on the Argentine Government to recognise their misjudgment of our resolve and to withdraw from the islands.

I can therefore give a complete assurance to my right hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Mr. Macmillan) that any period of delay has been caused not by doubts but by the movement of our forces to the area of potential conflict.

Now our forces are deployed to the Falklands area, they will take the action necessary to deny reinforcement and resupply of the Argentine garrison, and to protect themselves against attack from Argentine naval and air forces. The consequent engagements have already led to significant loss of life and casualties on both sides. The whole House regrets that this is so, and mourns those British Service men who have died while performing their duty to this country with conspicuous skill and courage.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East discussed the degree of force which was acceptable in meeting the Government's aims. Our military build-up has been

gradual, graduated and closely controlled. Ministers have never been in any doubt, however, that if it became necessary to use force, force would have to be used.

We do not underestimate the threat posed to our forces by Argentina. The whole House agrees, as the right hon. Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) has just said, that we cannot put our Service men at risk by requiring them to pull punches in the face of that threat. However, I can assure the House that our task group will not employ unnecessary force. It will use only the force necessary to fulfil its mission and to protect itself.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East referred again to the sinking of the cruiser "General Belgrano" and to the fact that she was some 30 miles or so outside the total exclusion zone. That zone was not relevant in this case. The "General Belgrano" was attacked under the terms of our warning to the Argentines some 10 days previously that any Argentine naval vessel or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response.

The "General Belgrano" was in a heavily armed group of warships. The cruiser and two destroyers had been closing on elements of our task force. At the time that she was engaged, the "General Belgrano" and a group of British warships could have been within striking distance of each other in a matter of some five to six hours, converging from a distance of some 200 nautical miles.

Following attacks on our ships the previous day, and given the possible presence of an Argentine submarine and other information in our possession, there was every reason to believe that the "General Belgrano" group was manoeuvring to a position from which to attack our surface vessels. Therefore, under certain rules of engagement that we had already agreed, our submarine attacked the cruiser for reasons of self-defence of our own fleet.

In this connection, I again emphasise that at all times the task force has been under political control. The clearest evidence of that is the political oversight we give and the regular, almost daily, meetings that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister holds with those of her Ministers most closely concerned. At these meetings, political and operational decisions are taken and approved.

I was asked about an announcement that has just been made about the call-out of reservists. It is not expected that any large-scale call-out of reserves will be needed, but we need a small number of skilled personnel mainly in communications. Therefore, it will be a selective call-out of specialists, and the present plans envisage that in due course up to about 300 may be involved.

Our military action so far has inflicted on the Argentine forces a number of serious reversals. South Georgia was retaken with no British casualties. As many as 10 Argentine aircraft have now been lost, whereas our task force has lost only one aircraft, a Harrier, as a direct result of Argentine action.

Argentine losses include one Canberra, two Mirages, three Sky Hawk aircraft and two Puma helicopters. Three further military aircraft, whose presence was in breach of our total exclusion zone, were severely damaged during attacks on airfields on the Falkland Islands. There have also been significant Argentine naval losses, which I shall not outline on this occasion.

I take no pleasure in the loss of life and the waste of resources that these losses represent. Nevertheless, I do take satisfaction from the evidence that they provide that



## Falkland Islands

4.7 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement about recent naval engagements in the South Atlantic, following the operation conducted by our forces to repossess the British sovereign territory of South Georgia.

In the House on 7 April I announced that our first naval action would be to deny the Argentine forces on the Falklands the means of sea reinforcement and resupply from the mainland. British submarines have achieved that objective. With the arrival of our task force on 30 April our next move was to stop reinforcement and resupply from the air, as well as by sea. Since the passing of resolution 502 the Argentines, instead of withdrawing, had continuously reinforced the islands. We gave two days' prior warning to the Argentine Government of the imposition of this total exclusion zone, and our task force is now enforcing it.

The task force was despatched to the South Atlantic with the support of the House and, I believe, of the country. Since its arrival in these waters our overriding duty has been to protect our task force against attack by Argentine forces.

We made it very clear to the Argentine Government and to the United Nations more than a week ago, on 23 April, that the Government would exercise their rights of self-defence to the full, including the use of force under article 51 of the United Nations charter if this proved necessary to protect our fleet.

I shall now describe the military sequence of events. Air attacks by Vulcan and Sea Harrier aircraft against Port Stanley airfield were launched early on 1 May. The runway was cratered and rendered unusable by transport aircraft from the Argentine mainland. A further sortie was made today to render the airstrip unusable for light supply, communications and ground attack aircraft operating within the Falkland Islands themselves. The other main airfield on East Falkland at Goose Green has also effectively been put out of action.

On 1 May the Argentines launched attacks on our ships, during most of the daylight hours. The attacks by Argentine Mirage and Canberra aircraft operating from the mainland were repulsed by British Sea Harriers. Had our Sea Harriers failed to repulse the attacks on the task force, our ships could have been severely damaged or sunk. In fact, one Argentine Canberra and one Mirage were shot down and others were damaged. We believe that another Mirage was brought down by Argentine anti-aircraft fire. One of our frigates suffered splinter damage as a result of the air attacks and there was one British casualty whose condition is now satisfactory. All our aircraft returned safely. On the same day our forces located and attacked what was believed to be an Argentine submarine which was clearly in a position to torpedo our ships. It is not known whether the submarine was hit.

The prolonged air attack on our ships, the presence of an Argentine submarine close by, and all other information available to us, left us in no doubt of the dangers to our task force from hostile action.

The next day, 2 May, at 8 pm London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentine cruiser, "General Belgrano", escorted by two destroyers. This heavily armed surface attack group was close to the total exclusion zone

and was closing on elements of our task force, which was only hours away. We knew that the cruiser itself has substantial fire power, provided by 15 6in guns, with a range of 13 miles, and Seacat anti-aircraft missiles. Together with its escorting destroyers, which we believe were equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 20 miles, the threat to the task force was such that the task force commander could ignore it only at his peril.

The House will know that the attack by our submarine involved the capital ship only and not its escorting destroyers, so that they should have been able to go to the assistance of the damaged cruiser. We do not know whether they did so, but, in so doing, they would not have been engaged.

On 3 May, at about 4 am London time, a Sea King helicopter keeping watch against submarine attack around the task force was fired on by an Argentine ocean-going patrol craft. This vessel was then attacked and sunk by a Lynx helicopter. A second Lynx then came under attack from another Argentine vessel, which was itself attacked and damaged.

It must be a matter of deep concern to the House that there has been loss of life from these engagements including the sinking of the "General Belgrano", but our first duty must be the protection of our own ships and men. There may be further attacks on our forces and they must be allowed to act in self-defence. We cannot deny them that right. Nor must we forget that military action began by an attack on British marines and the forceable seizure of British territory. The way of stopping the fighting forthwith is for the Argentines to withdraw their garrison from the Falkland Islands in compliance with the United Nations resolution 502.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): The right hon. Gentleman rightly said in his press conference last night that his policy was and would always be to use minimum force under strict political control to achieve a diplomatic solution. I confess that it is not always easy to achieve that in the stress of battle. Nevertheless, on the evidence that he has just given, it seems that he has successfully achieved that objective, first, in the reoccupation of South Georgia; secondly, in the attacks on the airfields and military facilities on the Falkland Islands; and, thirdly, in the actions that he has just described within the total exclusion zone.

I shall address my questions entirely to the action against the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano". The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government were concerned about the loss of life that had occurred. I understand that the action took place 36 miles outside the total exclusion zone. Although it appears now that there have not been 1,000 lives lost, as we feared earlier, the number must run into many hundreds. As I said in questions to the Foreign Secretary after his statement, the loss of life is already causing great concern among our friends and allies all over the world.

Almost two days after the event it should be possible for the Secretary of State to give the House more details than were in his statement. It is in both his and the Government's interest to do so if widespread international concern about the incident is to be allayed.

First, will the right hon. Gentleman say how far the Argentine ships were from the task force? He said that they were hours away. I hope that he will forgive me for saving





SUPPLEMENT TO

# The London Gazette

of Monday, 13th December 1982

Published by Authority

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TUESDAY, 14TH DECEMBER 1982

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

**DESPATCH BY ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE, G.C.B., G.B.E.,  
COMMANDER OF THE TASK FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC:  
APRIL TO JUNE 1982**

“Operation CORPORATE” was the name given to the operation I describe in my Despatch. With hindsight, it was well chosen, for like a body, the harmony of the various limbs and supporting organs was vital to its soundness and efficiency. I ask the reader constantly to bear this in mind. The very nature of the events I describe focuses attention first on one limb, then on another; the temporary dominance in the narrative of one does not detract from the performance and achievements of another. I list at the end of my Despatch the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Army and Royal Air Force units which took part in the Operation. I also attach a list of those vessels taken up from trade.

The despatch describes briefly the very short period of preparation for sending Task Force 317 to the South Atlantic and, more fully, the operations from 1 April 1982 when units of the Fleet sailed south until 20 June 1982 when the last Argentine forces remaining on British Territory surrendered.

#### **Background**

On 19 March 1982 it was reported that a party of Argentinian scrap metal workers had landed illegally at Leith in South Georgia, and on 21 March H.M.S. ENDURANCE was sailed towards the island with a detachment of Royal Marines embarked to investigate.

Intense diplomatic activity followed, Her Majesty's Government insisting that the Argentinians had landed illegally and that they should leave either in one of their own ships or in H.M.S. ENDURANCE. On 26 March it was reported to me that although the Argentinian ship BAHIA PARAISO had left Leith, a shore party remained behind. Diplomatic activity continued.

On 25 March when it had appeared that a diplomatic solution to the incident was still likely I had left for Gibraltar to visit ships taking part in Exercise SPRINGTRAIN. By 29 March the situation had worsened to an extent where it was considered sufficiently serious for me to return to my Headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex. Before leaving Gibraltar I ordered Flag Officer First Flotilla, Rear Admiral Sir John WOODWARD, K.C.B., to prepare to detach a suitable group of ships, to store and ammunition and to be ready to proceed to the South Atlantic if required



Also on 29 March the submarine H.M.S. SPARTAN was detached from Exercise SPRINGTRAIN and ordered to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar for deployment to the South Atlantic. Subsequently, on 30 March H.M.S. SPLENDID was ordered to deploy from Faslane. A third nuclear powered submarine, H.M.S. CONQUEROR was subsequently sailed a few days later. All were stored for war within 48 hours of order.

On 31 March I was instructed to make covert preparations for a Task Force for operations in the South Atlantic. On 2 April, after the Argentinian invasion, the preparations were allowed to be conducted openly.

Argentinian forces landed in strength on 2 April at Port Stanley and the very heavily outnumbered Royal Marines of the Garrison resisted, sustaining no casualties but inflicting an unknown number on the invaders. After some four hours fighting His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, Sir Rex HUNT, C.M.G., ordered the Marines and the survey party from H.M.S. ENDURANCE, who had been working on the Islands and who assisted with the defence, to surrender.

The following day Argentinian forces landed at Grytviken in South Georgia. The small Royal Marines detachment on the Island put up a stout resistance in the face of a considerably stronger invading force, damaging the corvette GUERRICO and shooting down a Puma helicopter, before they too surrendered.

Meanwhile, on 2 April the aircraft carriers H.M.S. HERMES, H.M.S. INVINCIBLE with the assault ship H.M.S. FEARLESS, two frigates, two Logistic Landing Ships, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and the necessary logistic support were ordered to be brought to immediate readiness in United Kingdom ports. H.M.S. HERMES with 826, part of 846 and 800 Naval Air Squadrons and H.M.S. INVINCIBLE with 820 and 801 Naval Air Squadrons sailed from Portsmouth on Monday 5 April. Admiral WOODWARD, flying his flag in H.M.S. ANTRIM, was ordered to sail from the Gibraltar area for Ascension Island with six other destroyers and frigates, and with R.F.A. support. The flag was transferred to H.M.S. GLAMORGAN on 4 April.

#### The Aim

I was informed that in the current situation the overall aim of Her Majesty's Government was to bring about the withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies and to re-establish the British Administration there as quickly as possible. My mission was to conduct military deployments and order operations in support of this aim.

#### Command and Control

In my capacity as Commander-in-Chief Fleet I assumed overall command of the operation as Commander Task Force 317 (all surface ships, land and air forces) and Task Force 324 (submarine forces). This tri-service command was exercised from my Headquarters at Northwood and I was responsible direct to the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence LEWIN, G.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.C. The Air Officer Commanding 18 Group RAF, Air Marshal Sir John CURTISS, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.B.I.M., R.A.F. was appointed as my Air Commander, and the Major General Royal Marines Commando Forces, Major General Sir Jeremy MOORE, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C. and Bar, was initially my Land Forces Deputy. When later General MOORE flew south to become the Commander Land Forces, Falkland Islands, he was replaced by the Commander South East District, Lieutenant General Sir Richard TRANT, K.C.B. Submarines were operated under the control of Flag Officer Submarines, Vice Admiral P. G. M. HERBERT, O.B.E. The command team at Northwood was completed by my Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Sir David HALLIFAX, K.B.E., who was responsible for the detailed naval planning and the co-ordination of all staff work. Admiral WOODWARD was appointed Commander of the Task Groups in the South Atlantic and he transferred his flag to H.M.S. HERMES on 15 April.

#### Military and Logistic Considerations

My foremost considerations when planning this operation, were the Argentinian military capabilities and the proximity of their bases and the comparison with our own situation: especially, the difficulties of transporting troops, aircraft and equipment some 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom to a theatre of operations within range of aircraft based in mainland Argentina and more than 3,000 miles from my nearest forward mounting base.

It is always difficult to quantify enemy capabilities. Intelligence and other sources gave the total number of warships at Argentina's disposal as 73. These included one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, 4 submarines, 2 modern "Type 42" destroyers, and other older but well equipped frigates and destroyers. Its aircraft included 65 A-4 Variants, 39 Mirage III/V, 5 Canberra, 60 Pucara, 8 Puma and 2 Lynx helicopters, and 5 Super Etendard equipped with Exocet sea skimming missiles, together with a small but significant air transport force which included 2 C130s (Hercules) with air to air refuelling tanker capability. The number of troops on the Islands was more problematic. Estimates varied from 7,000 to 10,000 well equipped troops. These were supported by more than 30 light attack aircraft (mainly Pucarás) and about 20 helicopters. It was difficult to assess the intended role of Argentina's military and civilian manpower reserve, its Merchant Marine and its civilian air transport. A further factor was the possibility of materiel assistance from other countries.

I did not have within my normal resources the ships necessary for the 7,000 mile transit of the troops, equipment and logistic support for the size of forces which I considered were required to counter the threat and

achieve my mission. It was necessary at an early stage to consider taking up ships from trade. An Order in Council under the Royal Prerogative to requisition ships was given on the evening of 4 April and announced in Parliament the following day.

It must be recorded that this operation could not have been mounted without the wholehearted co-operation of the Department of Trade, the ship owners, the masters and their crews who gave their unstinting support and worked with enormous energy and enthusiasm. The capabilities of these vessels were enhanced by installing additional equipment which included the provision of helicopter flight decks, a refuelling at sea capability, freshwater making plants and communications. These conversions were defined and completed with speed and efficiency that brings great credit to all the agencies involved.

In expectation of a requirement for additional naval air assets, 4 new Naval Air Squadrons were formed. These comprised one squadron of Sea Harriers, 2 squadrons of Wessex 5 helicopters and one squadron of Anti Submarine Sea Kings specially adapted for helicopter support operations. In addition, several new small flights, consisting mainly of Wasp helicopters, were prepared for the ships taken up from trade and warships taken from the Sales/Disposal List. These are noteworthy achievements and reflect well on the Naval Air Command.

The Royal Air Force supported by the British aerospace industry, the Chief Scientist's Department and the Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive was also quickly modifying Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules aircraft. Air to air refuelling capabilities were developed and installed; anti corrosion measures were adopted for normally land based Chinook helicopters and R.A.F. Harriers. Additional equipment and weaponry were fitted to a number of assigned aircraft.

Early on, we established in my Headquarters a Logistic Support Cell. This was a tri-service organisation headed by the Force Logistic Co-ordinator whose task was to co-ordinate replenishment planning and all logistic requirements for the Task Force. I considered it essential that this organisation should be at Northwood to ensure optimum and economical use of sometimes scarce resources and the priority for supply of the most urgent stores. It was a vital asset and a most successful management tool.

The speed with which the operation was mounted did not allow ships and troops to prepare themselves before departure from the United Kingdom as adequately as I would have wished. All ships proceeding south therefore adopted a vigorous training programme at sea. Weapon systems were thoroughly overhauled, tested and fired: in some cases civilian weapons engineering experts sailed with the ships. Tactical and communications procedures were intensively rehearsed. Damage control exercises were constantly practised. Embarked troops carried out fitness and weapon training often in cramped, difficult and, for many, quite unfamiliar conditions. Ships had to prepare themselves for rapid and sometimes unscheduled replenishment from other ships, tankers and helicopters. Equipments were modified at sea without the usual dockyard support and ships and aircraft were painted to obliterate pennant numbers and identification markings. Later, it proved possible to give ships sailed in support of the operation a limited period of specialised sea training directed at South Atlantic operations, under the auspices of Flag Officer Sea Training at Portland.

The modifications to Royal Air Force aircraft to fit them for South Atlantic operations produced a need for an intensive programme for both aircrews and support personnel. Additional air to air refuelling instructors had to be trained so that they, in turn, could train the Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules pilots as these aircraft acquired airborne refuelling capability. Each new weapons system had to be tested and the crews trained in its use. Harrier GR3 pilots were also practised in the use of the ski-jump for carrier operations.

#### Ascension Island

A key factor in this operation was Ascension Island, situated over 3,700 nautical miles from the United Kingdom and 3,300 miles from the Falkland Islands. Ascension Island was essential as a forward mounting base to replenish the ships of the Task Force and to provide them with stores, equipment and men that could not be embarked before their hurried departure from the United Kingdom. Air transport routes to the Island were activated on 2 April.

The Island airfield, Wideawake, was also vital as an airhead for all land based aircraft operating in support of the Fleet and land forces. However, with only limited facilities and totally inadequate technical and domestic back up, previously manned for and accustomed to dealing with only 3 movements each week, it was developed into a fully operational military establishment capable of supporting the permanent detachments of up to 17 Victors, 3 Vulcans, 4 Hercules, 4 Nimrods, 2 air defence aircraft and 2 support helicopters. Additionally, intensive daily air transport movements were accepted. The necessary engineering, freight handling, weapon loading and administrative support brought the establishment from nothing to over 800 officers and men of all three services within 3 weeks.

The fundamental importance of Ascension Island to the timely success of the operation meant that its vulnerability to a clandestine amphibious or audacious air attack, such as the Argentinians later demonstrated with their bomb carrying Hercules transport aircraft, could not be ignored. Air defence radar was installed to support the fighter aircraft, which were initially missile armed GR3 Harriers and later Phantoms. A detachment of the Royal Air Force Regiment provided ground defence. Seaward defences were provided by an R.N. guardship and daily Nimrod patrols of the sea areas out to 400 miles; a number of Argentinian merchantmen were detected close to the Island and these were shadowed by air and surface units until clear of the area.



By the fall of Stanley, a total of 535 air movements into the Islands from the United Kingdom had taken place. These included R.A.F. Hercules and VC10s and some chartered Belfast and Boeing 707 aircraft. They had brought in 23 helicopters, 5,907 tons of freight and 5,242 passengers. In addition to these freight and passenger aircraft, ground support personnel also handled all aircraft operating to the south in support of the Task Force. Nimrods mounted 111 sorties from the Island; the Hercules made 44 airdrops of essential equipment, weapons, personnel and mail to the Fleet and the Victor Tankers flew 375 sorties in support of 67 missions involving long range operations by probe fitted aircraft.

I would wish to record the unstinting support of the residents of Ascension, particularly that of the Island Administrator Mr. B. E. PAUNCEFORT, the United States Air Force Officer-in-Charge at Wideawake, Lieutenant Colonel W. BRYDEN, and the employees of the operating contractor, Pan American Airways. In the last category, Mr. Donald COFFEY is worthy of special mention.

#### Medical Support

The S.S. UGANDA was taken up from trade and designated a Hospital Ship in accordance with Article 22 of the Geneva Convention, having been fitted out in Gibraltar Dockyard. Accommodation to allow for the treatment and holding of up to 300 casualties was provided, together with sufficient medical personnel to cover all major specialities. A number of Q.A.R.N.N.S. officers and ratings were embarked in the ship as part of the medical complement. In order to comply fully with the Convention, the ship was declared to the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) before sailing from Gibraltar, marked as required by the Convention.

Additionally, three survey ships, H.M. Ships HECLA, HERALD and HYDRA, were designated as casualty ferries, fitted out and declared as Hospital Ships under the Geneva Convention.

#### The Maritime Exclusion Zone

On 4 April I recommended that a maritime exclusion zone be established around the Falkland Islands in order to inhibit the Argentinian ability to reinforce their garrison. Her Majesty's Government announced on 7 April the establishment of an exclusion zone, 200 nautical miles in radius from the centre of the Falkland Islands, to be effective for Argentine warships and naval auxiliary ships, from 0400 GMT on 12 April. Initially the exclusion zone was enforced by submarines which were deployed to cover the approaches to Port Stanley and the entrances to Falkland Sound.

#### The Repossession of South Georgia

On 7 April the Chief of Defence Staff ordered me to plan for the repossession of South Georgia and to deploy the necessary forces.

Captain B. G. YOUNG, D.S.O. Royal Navy, the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. ANTRIM, was nominated as the Commander of the Task Group allocated to the task. Other units involved in this phase of the operation included H.M.S. ENDURANCE, H.M.S. PLYMOUTH, later, H.M.S. BRILLIANT, R.F.A. TIDESPRING, M. Company Group of 42 Commando Royal Marines, elements of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron (S.B.S.). In addition H.M.S. CONQUEROR was ordered to patrol off the island to prevent any Argentinian reinforcement. R.A.F. Victor Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft supported by Victor Tankers and Nimrods swept the sea areas from South Georgia to the Argentinian coast between 20 and 25 April to give early warning of hostile naval movements.

The first phase of the operation was to insert S.A.S. and S.B.S. reconnaissance parties by both helicopter and small boats. This was started and achieved on 21 April despite appalling weather conditions of intense cold and winds gusting to 70 knots. Unfortunately after 24 hours of unrelenting blizzard the S.A.S. detachment had to be withdrawn from Fortuna Glacier. Two Wessex helicopters dispatched to effect the withdrawal crashed in "white out" conditions, the pilots having lost all points of reference and orientation. A third radar fitted Wessex by a remarkable feat of airmanship succeeded in recovering the entire detachment and the crews of the crashed helicopters. The S.A.S. were re-inserted on 23 April during a temporary lull in the blizzard.

By 25 April the weather had improved sufficiently for more reconnaissance parties to be landed and helicopter sorties to be flown. A helicopter search located the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE on the surface five miles from Grytviken. She was attacked by helicopters armed with AS 12 missiles and depth charges which caused her to limp back to Grytviken where she was later beached. The attack not only eliminated a potent threat to the Task Group but also revealed our presence in the area and it was therefore decided to press home the advantage without further delay.

Events then moved quickly. Under cover of naval gunfire support directed from ashore by a Royal Artillery forward observation officer, the assault troops landed at Grytviken by helicopter. Later that afternoon the Argentinian forces surrendered and 170 prisoners were taken. British forces sustained no casualties. Following the fall of Grytviken, H.M. Ships PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were detached to recapture Leith where there was a detachment of Argentinian marines. After some initial vacillation, the Argentinian force hoisted the white flag on 26 April.

The surrender document was signed onboard H.M.S. ANTRIM on 26 April and the Union Flag again flew over South Georgia.

#### Extension of the Exclusion Zone

On 23 April the Argentine Government was warned that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with British forces would encounter the appropriate response. Moreover all Argentine aircraft engaging in surveillance of these forces would be regarded as hostile.

The threat posed by the three nuclear submarines had effectively stopped Argentinian reinforcement of the Islands by sea since 12 April but, with the added aim of stopping resupply by air, a Total Exclusion Zone was declared by the Government on 30 April on the arrival of the carrier force. This Zone applied not only to Argentinian warships and naval auxiliaries but also to all other ships and aircraft attempting to support the illegal occupation of the Islands.

The difficulties of maintaining a total blockade are considerable. It is now known that one Argentinian resupply ship arrived in the Islands and the Argentinian Air Force managed to maintain a limited air bridge until shortly before the final surrender. Nevertheless, politically the establishment of the Total Exclusion Zone was consistent with the Government's efforts to ensure the peaceful withdrawal of the Argentinian forces, while militarily it inhibited the Argentinian ability to reinforce and resupply their forces and limited their movement.

Additional measures were also considered appropriate. Accordingly, on 7 May the Government informed the Argentinian Government that any of their warships or military aircraft found more than 12 miles from their own coast would be treated as hostile and the appropriate action taken. This move was necessary because of the threat posed by their carrier-borne aircraft and the ease with which hostile forces could approach the Task Force, under the cover of bad weather, from mainland bases within 450 miles of the Falkland Islands, a significant factor for a force without the benefit of Airborne Early Warning.

Although not an exclusion zone, on 10 May a 100 nautical mile radius Terminal Control Area around Ascension Island was instituted and formally notified to the appropriate international authorities: this measure called for prior notification of flights to and from the island and of overflights, thus aiding the air defence organisation as well as the control of air traffic.

#### The Intensification of Operations

Early on 1 May an R.A.F. Vulcan flying from Ascension Island opened the action against the Argentinian forces on the Falklands with a night bombing attack of Port Stanley airfield which cratered the runway. The 16 hour sortie was supported by Victor Tankers and Nimrod aircraft and was the first of five Vulcan missions directed against the airfield and adjacent radar installations.

Later the same morning Sea Harriers attacked the runway at Port Stanley and also the airstrip at Goose Green. That night Port Stanley airfield was subjected to Naval Gunfire bombardment by H.M. Ships GLAMORGAN, ARROW and ALACRITY. This was to be the pattern for the next few weeks, with raids on the airfields at Port Stanley and elsewhere by Harriers and night bombardments by units of the Fleet. These attacks were designed to deny the use of the airfields to the Argentinian forces and to erode their readiness, morale and state of alertness. At the beginning of May, the first of many S.A.S. and S.B.S. reconnaissance patrols landed on the Falklands. These, and those that followed, were variously landed by helicopter, small boats from surface ships and the submarine, H.M.S. ONYX. During the next 3 weeks, these patrols were able to gather vital intelligence in preparation for the main landing. Throughout the period, in extremely harsh conditions, they remained undetected.

On 2 May the Argentinian cruiser, the GENERAL BELGRANO, with two destroyers, was detected south of the Falklands by H.M.S. CONQUEROR. The enemy force was in a position where it posed a serious threat to a number of our ships engaged in operations off the Falklands while other Argentinian surface units were poised to the north. It was a threat that could not be ignored and therefore H.M.S. CONQUEROR was ordered to attack the GENERAL BELGRANO with torpedoes. Two struck the cruiser which sank some hours later. For over two hours Argentinian destroyers carried out several unsuccessful depth charge attacks against H.M.S. CONQUEROR and then retired. Later they returned to rescue survivors. Throughout the campaign, the cost in human lives was my constant concern and in consequence, I ordered H.M.S. CONQUEROR not to attack ships involved in rescue operations. The sinking of GENERAL BELGRANO was a clear demonstration of the capability of a nuclear powered submarine and proved to have a major salutary effect on the conduct of future Argentinian operations. After this attack, Argentinian naval surface forces remained within 12 nautical miles of their coast for the remainder of the campaign. The nuclear powered submarine's effectiveness was not confined to the removal of this threat; for additionally they patrolled off the coast of mainland Argentina and provided invaluable intelligence to our forces in the T.E.Z. of aircraft movement and likely air attacks.

Later on 3 May, a Sea King helicopter was fired on by an Argentinian patrol craft. Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles subsequently attacked the craft which was hit, blew up and sank. A second patrol craft was also attacked and damaged by helicopter fired missiles.

These successes were marred on 4 May by the loss of H.M.S. SHEFFIELD. While stationed about 60 miles from the south east coast of the Falkland Islands on Anti Air Picket Duty, she was attacked by 2 Exocet missiles released by 2 Super Etendard aircraft. One missile struck her on the starboard side and entered amidships. After 4½ hours during which her Ship's Company fought fierce fires whilst engulfed in thick black



acid smoke, the Commanding Officer reluctantly gave the order to abandon ship. Twenty of her Ship Company were killed in the attack but 236 were safely recovered by other ships and helicopters of the Task Force; the efforts of H.M.S. ARROW in the rescue operation were particularly praiseworthy. H.M.S. SHEFFIELD finally sank in heavy seas while under tow on 10 May.

In the weeks which preceded the main landing, there was constant activity by ships and aircraft of the Task Force and on 4 May a second Vulcan raid was carried out against Port Stanley airfield. 3 Sea Harriers attacked the air strip at Goose Green, inflicting damage but suffering the loss of one aircraft, the first such loss attributable to enemy action. On 6 May, very regrettably, 2 Sea Harriers from H.M.S. INVINCIBLE were lost and both pilots were killed. Enemy action was not responsible.

Admiral WOODWARD energetically continued to enforce the blockade by attacking enemy surface units: on 9 May the fishing vessel NARWAL, indisputably acting as an intelligence gathering vessel in the vicinity of the main part of the Task Force, was strafed by Sea Harriers. She was subsequently abandoned and sank despite the efforts of a boarding party from H.M.S. INVINCIBLE to save her. Survivors were recovered and subsequently repatriated.

On the night of 11 May H.M.S. ALACRITY, whilst transiting Falkland Sound, discovered the ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS off Port Howard. She was illuminated by star shell and, having refused to heave to, was engaged by 4.5 inch gunfire, blew up and sank. She had been carrying fuel to resupply Argentinian garrisons. Five days later on 16 May, 2 transport ships BAHIA BUEN SUCESO and RIO CARCARANA, were attacked by Sea Harriers, damaged and immobilised. The Argentinian patrol craft ISLAS MALVINAS, and the coaster MONSUNEN, which belonged to the Falkland Islands Company, were also attacked, the latter vessel being subsequently salvaged and put to use by British forces.

In the air, a Puma helicopter was shot down by a Sea Dart missile from H.M.S. COVENTRY on 9 May. On 12 May, the first Argentinian air attack on the ships of the Task Force since the sinking of H.M.S. SHEFFIELD took place. Two waves of A4 (Skyhawk) aircraft attacked H.M. Ships BRILLIANT and GLASGOW. Three aircraft were destroyed, 2 by H.M.S. BRILLIANT's Sea Wolf missiles and the third crashing in an attempt to evade. In the second wave, H.M.S. GLASGOW was hit by a bomb which inflicted damage to her engines but did not explode.

At Pebble Island on the night of 14/15 May an SAS raiding party, supported by diversionary gunfire support from H.M.S. GLAMORGAN accurately directed by a Forward Observation Officer of the Royal Artillery, destroyed an ammunition dump, stores and 11 aircraft including 6 Pucara Ground Attack aircraft. The raiding party was recovered, having suffered only minor casualties.

Throughout the period I have just described, diplomatic activity in London, Buenos Aires, Washington and New York continued in an effort to find a solution satisfactory to both the parties. The fundamental issue, that the people of the Falkland Islands had the right to choose under which government they wished to live, proved increasingly intractable. Hopes of a compromise solution flickered briefly only to be extinguished by Argentina's refusal to accept this principle of self determination. It was only as a last resort, when it was clear that a peaceful solution could not be found, that the decision to retake British sovereign territory by force of arms was made and I received my instructions to repossess the Falkland Islands.

#### Land Forces

On 2 April, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines commanded by Brigadier J. H. A. THOMPSON, C.B., O.B.E., A.D.C., was assigned to me for the operation. On 3 April, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment was added as were 8 light armoured reconnaissance vehicles of the Blues and Royals and T Battery 12 Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery, equipped with Rapier missiles.

This force of some 5,500 men sailed from the United Kingdom on 6 April in the assault ship H.M.S. FEARLESS, 4 Logistic Landing Ships, S.S. CANBERRA and M.V. ELK. These ships were later joined at Ascension Island by the assault ship H.M.S. INTREPID, R.F.A. SIR TRISTRAM, M.V. NORLAND and M.V. EUROPIC FERRY, with 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment and 29 Field Battery Royal Artillery embarked. The initial landing forces were complete, and all units exercised together for the first time at Ascension Island.

Due to a steady build up of Argentinian occupation troops, after the main force had sailed, it was decided that additional land forces should be deployed from the United Kingdom. The force chosen, 5th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M. J. A. WILSON, O.B.E., M.C., which had already deployed two of its organic battalions with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines but had retained the 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles, was augmented by 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and numerous supporting arms and services. After a 2 week period of intensive training in South Wales, substantial re-equipping and re-organisation, 3,200 men sailed from Southampton on 12 May in R.M.S. QUEEN ELIZABETH II, the major equipments having sailed on 8 and 9 May in M.V. NORDIC FERRY and M.V. BALTIC FERRY.

Thus, the grand total of land forces assigned to me for the recapture of the Falkland Islands became 10,500 men.

Four Chinook helicopters, to provide vital mobility for troops and equipment in the land battle, were prepared for sea transit and embarked in S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. 6 R.A.F. Harriers of No. 1 Squadron, for close support of group troops, also joined S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR on 6 May. These Harriers transferred to H.M.S. HERMES on 18 May. 8 Sea Harriers of 809 Naval Air Squadron were also embarked and transferred

H.M. Ships INVINCIBLE and HERMES between 18-20 May. No. 63 Squadron R.A.F. Regiment (Rapier) accompanied 5th Infantry Brigade.

#### Selection of Beachhead

It was always accepted that because of its vital role as the seat of government and the only centre of communication, Port Stanley held the key to victory; he who held Port Stanley, held the Falklands. The aim, therefore, was to secure the capital as quickly as possible, around which the Argentinians had concentrated most of their forces.

It was important to select a suitable area for an amphibious assault as near to Port Stanley as possible, because cross-country movement is very difficult and weather conditions do not favour helicopter operations. However, the main danger of selecting an assault area too close to the capital was that it might make it too easy for the Argentinians to launch a counter attack against the beachhead before it could be firmly established. I had not the necessary forces to conduct an opposed landing.

Although it was not possible to select a site which would be completely immune from air attack, the troop carriers and their escorts had to be afforded protection at least from Exocet missiles. The missile's effectiveness is greatly reduced if its intended targets are protected by land. The amphibious force also required deep water. After assessing all the factors, including the anti submarine advantage, San Carlos Water was chosen for the amphibious assault. It is surrounded by hills, with a deep, comparatively sheltered anchorage and with the nearest sizeable enemy force being at Drawin/Goose Green more than 15 miles away.

I was very much aware of the risks which a landing in strength involved. Despite the care with which the landing area had been chosen, the loss of a prestigious target such as S.S. CANBERRA and her embarked troops would have jeopardised the entire amphibious assault plan. My commanders therefore had to plan the assault to reduce the element of risk to the minimum acceptable. This was achieved by a variety of means. The most careful consideration was given to the disposition of embarked troops and equipment. Cross decking, the movement of men and material from one ship to another, had already been an essential feature of preparations at sea during the passage south. This procedure was intensified during the week before the landing to ensure that assets were deployed effectively with as little risk as possible. Despite the intensity of these operations, which were often carried out in very poor weather conditions, there was only one major loss. Tragically, on 19 May, a Sea King helicopter, while engaged in cross decking, struck a large sea bird and immediately crashed into the sea. Eighteen S.A.S. and three Royal Marine officers and men were killed.

Further factors essential to the success of the landing were the weather and the stealth of the ships on passage through the Total Exclusion Zone. Radio silence was imposed throughout this period while, as forecast, the seas remained calm allowing cross decking to continue, but visibility was restricted to 2 to 3 miles, protecting the force from Argentinian air attack. Finally, it was important to attempt to deceive the enemy of our true intentions by concentrating activity in areas away from San Carlos Water.

#### The Landing

Thus, in the early hours of 21 May, H.M. Ships FEARLESS and INTREPID, R.F.A.s STROMNESS, SIR GAI AHAD, SIR GERAIN, SIR TRISTRAM, SIR LANCELOT and SIR PERCIVAL together with S.S. CANBERRA and M.V. EUROPIC FERRY, in whom were embarked 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, steamed stealthily into Falkland Sound. At 0340 local time, the landings began, the troops being ferried ashore in the 16 landing craft from the two assault ships H.M.S. FEARLESS and H.M.S. INTREPID.

Commodore Amphibious Warfare, Commodore M. C. CLAPP, C.B., embarked in H.M.S. FEARLESS, controlled the amphibious operation. Also embarked was Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.

First ashore were 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment and 40 Commando Royal Marines on two beaches in the San Carlos Settlement Area. 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment then turned south and established a defensive position on the Sussex Mountains effectively blocking the route which any counter attack from the Darwin area would have to take. Meanwhile, 40 Commando Royal Marines moved east, up onto the Verde Mountains. Next ashore was 45 Commando Royal Marines, in Ajax Bay, which was to become the main force logistic area throughout the rest of the campaign. The last assault unit, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, went ashore at Port San Carlos to protect the northern flank, leaving 42 Commando Royal Marines afloat as a reserve. The artillery, 4 light gun batteries and one Rapier missile battery then established themselves ashore.

At the same time as the main landing took place, a subsidiary operation was launched by S.B.S. supported by naval gunfire bombardment on Fanning Head and a raid by S.A.S. at Darwin. The aim of these operations was to convince the enemy that we were following the pattern established by the raid on Pebble Island six days earlier and to mask the scale of the landings at San Carlos Water.

At dawn, helicopters from the Naval Task Group joined the shuttle, as a constant flow of men and equipment went ashore. By the end of the day more than 3,000 men and almost 1,000 tons of stores and equipments had been successfully landed. The Medical Squadron of the Commando Logistic Regiment, supported by Naval surgical teams and elements of 16 Field Ambulance R.A.M.C., set up a main Dressing Station in a disused refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay.



The aim of achieving surprise had been achieved and, although still in its infancy, the beachhead had been established virtually unopposed by land or air. 2 Gazelle helicopters were, however, subsequently shot down by enemy ground fire. During the afternoon of 21 May, the anticipated Argentinian air raids began. The warships in the Falkland Sound fought gallantly and took the brunt of the attack in protecting the landing ships. Around 15 aircraft were shot down by Harriers, and by ships' and ground weapons. One R.A.F. Harrier was lost and three of the supporting warships were hit. H.M.S. ANTRIM was struck aft by a bomb which failed to explode: H.M.S. ARGONAUT was hit by 2 bombs which again did not explode but killed 2 of her Ship's Company and inflicted sufficient damage to deprive her of steaming capability. H.M.S. ARDENT was less fortunate; she was repeatedly hit aft by bombs which exploded. The damage sustained subsequently led to her sinking, 22 of her Ship's Company lost their lives; 177 were saved. The ships in San Carlos Water were largely unscathed and after a hectic day unloading, S.S. CANBERRA was sailed after dark.

#### Consolidation

The following day, the build up and reinforcement of the beachhead continued. The Argentinian air raids did not. However, on 23 May, the Argentinians again launched heavy air attacks and more ships were hit, including H.M.S. ANTELOPE. One of the bombs entered her forward, killing one of her Ship's Company instantly, although it did not explode. Subsequent efforts to defuse it failed and the resulting explosion killed one of the disposal team and seriously injured the other. The fires generated by the explosion raged out of control and the ship was abandoned. She later sank but the rest of the Ship's Company survived. A Sea Harrier was also lost when it exploded shortly after take off from H.M.S. HERMES, killing the pilot. But, on this day the Argentinians lost at least ten more attacking aircraft.

The build up of men and material continued. The Royal Engineers had worked tirelessly to improve the access over the beaches and by the end of the third day, 24 May, 5,500 men had been put together with 5,000 tons of ammunition and stores. The supporting role of M.V. ELK deserves particular mention. Throughout this period she ferried large amounts of ammunition to the landing areas sometimes at considerable but necessary risk from air attacks. She was quite literally a floating bomb, sometimes carrying as much as 2,500 tons of ammunition onboard.

25 May was Argentina's National Day and a major effort by her Air Force was anticipated. At first, fears appeared to be groundless; only one raid penetrated to the Falkland Sound area where it inflicted no damage but one of the aircraft was shot down by a Sea Dart missile. Seven more aircraft were also shot down by two Sea Dart missiles of H.M.S. COVENTRY, two by Seacat missiles fired by H.M.S. YARMOUTH, and three by Rapier missiles fired from ashore. In mid afternoon, however, the advanced air defence elements of the Task Group were targets for a very determined low level air attack. H.M.S. BROADSWORD suffered superficial damage and H.M.S. COVENTRY was hit by several bombs which exploded in or near the machinery spaces. She capsized shortly after the attack with the loss of 19 of her Ship's Company. On this day, too, S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR with a cargo of helicopters, support equipment and stores which included materiel needed to establish a forward airstrip for helicopters and Harriers, was in company with the main force to the east of the Falklands en route for San Carlos. One hour before sunset the force received a brief warning of an attack by Argentinian aircraft armed with Exocet missiles. Ships took appropriate counter measures, but S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was hit and set on fire. The fires spread rapidly and one hour after the attack she was abandoned. 3 Naval ratings and 9 Merchant Navy officers and men, including her Master, Captain I. NORTH, D.S.C., were killed.

The Argentine Air Force, despite their losses, persisted with their attacks in the San Carlos area but, by now, the presence of Rapier and Blowpipe missile systems ashore, and effective small arms fire brought to bear from ships and shore, were a potential counter. Similarly, attacks continued against units at sea. On 30 May, the carrier group having moved closer to the Falkland Islands to cover the approach of 5th Infantry Brigade troop ships, was attacked by Super Etendards and Skyhawks. A number of Exocet missiles were launched but were evaded and exploded harmlessly. Three of the Skyhawks were shot down, 2 by Sea Dart missiles, the third by 4.5 inch gunfire.

#### The Breakout

On 26/27 May, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines began to break out from the beachhead. The overall plan was to close up to the Port Stanley area as quickly as possible. There was however a significant Argentinian presence at Darwin and Goose Green. Although not on the direct route to Port Stanley, these troops posed a threat to the flank and to the beachhead. It was therefore decided that it was essential to neutralise the Argentinian presence there before the advance on Stanley could be fully developed.

Late on 26 May, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment started its move south. At dawn on 27 May, 45 Commando Royal Marines and 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment started to advance along the northern route from the beachhead, east towards Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet respectively. Throughout 27 May, while the other two battalions continued their advances, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment laid up at Camilla Creek House 5 miles north of the Argentinian position, while an artillery troop of 3 light guns was flown forward to support the attack which began at 0200 on 28 May.

One of the R.A.F. Harriers flying close air support missions assisting the move forward was shot down on 27 May whilst attacking Argentinian positions at Goose Green. The pilot ejected and was later recovered unharmed by advancing land forces.

By mid-afternoon, Darwin had been captured and the battalion pressed on south down the narrow isthmus towards Goose Green, some two miles on. They had to cross open ground in broad daylight, and were opposed by strong defensive positions which were well dug in and sited in depth. Low cloud, strong winds and driving rain made early air operations in support of the advance impossible.

The battle for Goose Green lasted many hours, frequently at very close quarters, and amongst the casualties was the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. JONES, V.C., O.B.E., who was killed when charging an enemy post which was holding up the advance on the left flank. Throughout the course of the battle 16 officers and men of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment were killed, and one Royal Marines officer was also killed when his Scout helicopter was shot down by enemy aircraft.

By last light the battalion, supported by 2 further R.A.F. Harrier raids, had surrounded the remaining garrison in the Goose Green Settlement where 112 civilians were held, having been confined to the Community Hall for 3 weeks.

During the night the Acting Commanding Officer conducted negotiations with the Argentinians and, by mid morning on 29 May, the surrender was accepted. As a result of their gallant action, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment took over 1,000 prisoners. Subsequently, it was discovered that the original garrison of some 650 had been reinforced on 28 May by an additional regiment. A large quantity of artillery, air defence weapons and ammunition was captured. In addition, all the civilians were released unharmed.

#### Advance on Port Stanley

After a remarkable cross country march of 50 miles over very difficult terrain in appalling weather conditions 45 Commando Royal Marines had reached Teal Inlet, and 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment had reached Estancia House via Teal Inlet. Meanwhile, D Squadron 22 Special Air Service Regiment had established an operations base in the area of Mount Kent and were carrying out an aggressive patrolling and intelligence gathering programme. After 3 days, and several attempts at reinforcement which were prevented by the atrocious weather at night, they were joined by the first half of 42 Commando Royal Marines and a troop of light guns of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, who were flown forward by helicopter on 1 June, the remainder joining on 2 June.

On 30 May, General MOORE assumed command of operations ashore and on 1 June was joined by his Headquarters which was immediately established in H.M.S. FEARLESS at San Carlos Water. Also on 1 June, 5th Infantry Brigade began to disembark at the beachhead. The movements of R.M.S. QUEEN ELIZABETH II in which they had set sail from Southampton were kept strictly secret. I could not risk such a prestigious target and her embarked force to the hazards of the Total Exclusion Zone. She had therefore made her way south well outside the range of Argentinian aircraft to rendezvous with S.S. CANBERRA and M.V. NORLAND in Cumberland Bay, South Georgia. Here 5th Infantry Brigade and accompanying weapons and equipment were disembarked by the small ships of 11 Mine Countermeasures Squadron, H.M. Ships CORDELLA, PICT, NORTHELLA, JUNELLA and FARNELLA. Their transfer to S.S. CANBERRA and M.V. NORLAND was completed with noteworthy speed on 29 May.

After arrival at San Carlos Water on 31 May, M.V. NORLAND disembarked 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles during the morning of 1 June. Later that day, 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards disembarked from S.S. CANBERRA. The 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment was put under the command of 5th Infantry Brigade and moved forward to the Fitzroy and Bluff Cove areas, and was replaced at Darwin and Goose Green by 1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles.

Whilst 5th Infantry Brigade moved forward in the south, other elements of the Task Force were fully employed. On land a build up of stores and ammunition in preparation for the final battles took place. This included the construction of a Harrier Forward Operating Base at Port San Carlos by 11 and 59 Squadrons of the Royal Engineers. This task was completed in difficult conditions and despite the loss of much of their equipment in S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Helicopters operating in very poor weather conditions ferried vast amounts of stores and ammunition to forward positions; this included 18,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. Other stores were moved by Logistic Landing Ships to Teal Inlet. At sea, ships moved close inshore nightly to conduct bombardments of selected targets on the approaches to and around Port Stanley. 1,300 4.5 inch rounds were fired by H.M. Ships CARDIFF, ARROW, YARMOUTH, ACTIVE and AMBUSCADE during the period 5 to 10 June. Argentinian aircraft were also successfully engaged by units of the Fleet. One Canberra was shot down by a Sea Dart missile fired by H.M.S. EXETER. H.M.S. PLYMOUTH shot down 2 attack aircraft with Sea Cat missiles. Sea Harriers from H.M.S. INVINCIBLE attacked and brought down an Argentinian Hercules.

Vulcan attacks against enemy radar installations in the vicinity of Port Stanley were carried out on 31 May and 3 June. These, and the intensified bombing raids by Harriers, complemented the heavy night bombardment by Task Force ships. A forward air base was established at Port San Carlos on 5 June, from which combat air patrols and offensive air support missions, as well as helicopter operations were mounted.



By this time too, the air to air refuelled Hercules were conducting regular air drops of important supplies to ships in the Total Exclusion Zone.

There were losses. A Gazelle helicopter in transit from Darwin to Fitzroy was lost on 6 June with the 2 passengers and the 2 crew. An R.A.F. Harrier crashed into the sea on 30 May after being struck by enemy ground fire over Port Stanley. A Sea Harrier crashed into the sea on 1 June whilst returning from a combat air patrol. An accident at Port San Carlos severely damaged an R.A.F. Harrier on 8 June, bringing the total losses of ground support Harriers to 4. The direct transit of 2 pairs of replacement R.A.F. Harriers from Ascension Island to H.M.S. HERMES using in flight refuelling on 1 and 8 June was a noteworthy achievement and a most welcome reinforcement.

Further reinforcement and resupply forward was severely hampered by bad weather which precluded the use of helicopters for troop movement. It was therefore decided to move 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and some supporting units and equipment by ship to Fitzroy. This move was conducted as follows: on 6 June 2nd Battalion Scots Guards disembarked from landing craft having transferred from H.M.S. INTREPID off Lively Island by night. Due to very bad weather only half the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards landed on a similar operation on 7 June. They had sailed to Lively Island in H.M.S. FEARLESS. During the night 7/8 June the remainder of the Battalion and some other units were embarked in SIR GALAHAD and sailed directly to Fitzroy. The weather on 8 June unexpectedly and unfortunately cleared and whilst SIR GALAHAD and SIR TRISTRAM, the latter having arrived on 7 June, were unloading they were attacked by Argentinian aircraft before the Rapier battery, which had been landed as soon as possible after arrival, was fully operational. Both were hit, caught fire and abandoned. This attack led to the heaviest casualties of the campaign. Forty two Welsh Guardsmen, 3 members of 16 Field Ambulance R.A.M.C. and 5 Royal Fleet Auxiliary crewmen were killed. In a further air raid, a landing craft was bombed and sank in Choiseul Sound. 6 Royal Marines and 1 Naval Rating were killed.

Weather conditions again deteriorated. It was almost mid-winter, with frequent rain and snow storms driven horizontal by high winds, and sub-zero temperatures. The battalions who occupied the most exposed positions were suffering with cases of exposure and trench-foot. General MOORE was thus determined to launch his bid for Port Stanley with the minimum of delay.

#### The Final Battle

The Argentinians had about 7 battalions together with supporting troops in the Port Stanley area. Approximately 3 of these battalions were forward on the important features of Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. In addition, there were about 1,000 troops on West Falkland.

General MOORE planned that the attack on Port Stanley should be conducted in 3 phases. The first phase was scheduled for the night of 11/12 June when 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines was to capture the three features of Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. The second phase, planned to take place 24 hours later, required both brigades to capture the next features to the east; these were Wireless Ridge, Tumbledown Mountain and Mount William. Finally, the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, with 2 companies of 40 Commando Royal Marines under command, were to capture Sapper Hill.

As scheduled, on 11 June a silent night attack was launched. The enemy was outfought and soon after dawn all the brigade objectives were firmly held. In the centre, after a hard fight in very difficult mountain terrain, 45 Commando Royal Marines captured Two Sisters. Further south 42 Commando Royal Marines made an indirect approach, exploiting a gap in the enemy minefields which had been established as a result of extremely detailed, skilled and aggressive patrolling, and captured Mount Harriet from behind, taking over 200 prisoners. Meanwhile in the north 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment had an extremely tough fight against one of the enemy's best battalions to capture Mount Longdon. In this action Staff Sgt. I. J. McKAY, V.C. was killed while leading an advance against a strongly defended and well sited Argentinian position. During the day of 12 June all these positions came under heavy artillery fire, and further casualties were sustained.

For this and subsequent attacks, troop movements and assaults ashore were covered by Harrier attacks, naval gunfire and the support of five field batteries who fired 15,000 rounds. 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery were in continuous action for 12 hours during the first phase, at one point giving supporting fire only 50 metres in front of the advancing infantry. In the second phase 57 missions were fired. The Royal Engineers who had completed the hazardous task of clearing routes through the minefields provided men with each of the assaulting units. In addition they carried out many tasks to improve the mobility of the land forces, including reconstruction of the bridge at Fitzroy.

On 12 June, H.M.S. GLAMORGAN, while leaving her gun support position, was struck aft by a land launched Exocet missile. Despite the resulting fires, she remained able to steam with gun armament intact. The fires were eventually brought under control, but 13 of her Ship's Company had been killed in this attack.

Also on 12 June the final Vulcan raid was made on Port Stanley airfield in an attempt to prevent any further use of the airfield by the Argentinians prior to the final assault.

To allow further time for preparation, Phase 2 was delayed by 24 hours and eventually launched on the night of 13/14 June. 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, once more under command of 3 Commando

Brigade Royal Marines, in a beautifully managed and very skilful attack took Wireless Ridge, whilst on Tumbledown Mountain, 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had a particularly difficult battle before they overcame the regular Argentinian marine battalion. Thereafter 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles passed through 2nd Battalion Scots Guards to secure Mount William.

At this stage it became clear that enemy resistance was collapsing. They could be seen retreating towards Port Stanley from many directions, including Moody Brook and Sapper Hill, neither of which had yet been attacked. Some, ejected from Tumbledown by 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, realised that they must pass Mount William, now firmly in Gurkha hands. They chose instead to retrace their steps and surrender to the Guardsmen.

Phase 3 was never launched. Realising that the Argentinian forces were beaten, General MOORE launched two battalions in pursuit, to close up to the outskirts of Port Stanley as quickly as possible. This was in line with General MOORE's policy throughout the land battle of moving forward energetically and as expeditiously as possible.

During the afternoon of 14 June, with large numbers of enemy standing about, abandoning their arms and surrendering, British troops were ordered to fire only in self-defence, and white flags began to appear over Port Stanley.

That night, after some hours of negotiations, General MOORE flew by helicopter into Port Stanley and took the formal surrender of all Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands from General MENENDEZ.

#### Recapture of South Thule

The final step in the eviction of the illegal presence from the South Atlantic Dependencies was the removal of a small party which the Argentinian Navy had maintained on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands since 1976.

H.M.S. ENDURANCE, commanded by Captain N. J. BARKER, C.B.E., Royal Navy, which had played a vital supporting role in the South Georgia area throughout, led a Task Group which included the frigate H.M.S. YARMOUTH, R.F.A. OLWEN, and the tug SALVAGEMAN. M Company 42 Commando Royal Marines formed the bulk of the landing force. The Argentinian party surrendered without resistance on 20 June. Although it had been claimed that this was a scientific station, ample proof was obtained that it was part of an Argentinian military meteorological network.

#### General Comments

The preceding paragraphs have recorded the major actions and significant phases of operations in the South Atlantic. The chronological record has not allowed proper emphasis of those activities whose importance is characterised by their continuous nature.

Attacks on the Task Force by enemy submarines were a significant and ever present threat, which was recognised by the inclusion of anti-submarine Sea King helicopters in the air order of battle. A number of torpedo attacks were carried out by these aircraft against underwater contacts classified as possible submarines. Results of the actions are not known, but the high intensity flying rates of this helicopter force throughout the operations were an essential part of Fleet anti-submarine warfare defences.

Some of the Harrier operations involving enemy action have already been recorded. However, defence of the Fleet and, later, close air support of the land forces, required these aircraft to spend many hours at high alert states or flying defensive combat air patrols. These protective measures were continuously necessary from the moment the ships entered the Total Exclusion Zone. A total of 23 enemy aircraft were destroyed in air to air combat, with the Sidewinder missile success rate being particularly noteworthy. It became apparent in the last few days of the open action that Admiral WOODWARD's courageously aggressive stance to wreak attrition on the Argentinian Air Force had accomplished the aim, and to all intents and purposes they were beaten.

Nimrod aircraft were the first to be based on Ascension Island, on 6 April. They were immediately involved as communications links for the transiting nuclear submarines and thereafter they continuously provided direct support and area surveillance to every major element of the Task Force to the limit of the aircraft's range. All deployments of small aircraft were provided with airborne search and rescue cover and, after the fitting of refuelling probes, Nimrods converted for air to air refuelling provided long range surveillance of the sea areas between the Falkland Islands and the Argentinian mainland prior to and during the main amphibious landing.

Air support of the Task Force from Ascension Island was completely dependent on air to air refuelling. In performing all refuelling tasks between the United Kingdom and the Total Exclusion Zone, the Victor Tankers provided continuous and timely support.

With the ships of the Task Force operating so far from Dockyard assistance, much major maintenance and repair work had to be carried out afloat in very rough seas. The achievements of the maintenance and repair ship M.V. STENA SEASPREAD were outstanding.

Over the distances involved and in areas so notoriously bad for radio propagation the value of satellite communications cannot be overstated. The Command and Control of Operation CORPORATE would have been immeasurably more difficult without this facility.



Logistics were always to the forefront of my mind. Throughout the events I have described, no ship ran out of fuel, no weapon system of ammunition, despite a supply line of over 7,000 miles and the extreme weather conditions encountered. This is ample testimony to the excellent work of all members of the logistic support ships and units of the Task Force.

Major contributory factors to the survival of the wounded were the supreme physical fitness of our troops and the exemplary medical attention given to casualties of both sides, often under fire and in the most squalid conditions. First aid matched the professional expertise of the field and afloat medical teams. Equally vital was the skill of the helicopter pilots in speedily evacuating casualties. Casualties were transferred to the Hospital Ship S.S. UGANDA. Once fit for further travel, they were transferred to the 3 casualty ferries H.M. Ships HYDRA, HECLA and HECATE and conveyed to Montevideo for onward aeromedical evacuation to the United Kingdom by R.A.F. VC10. These operations were all conducted with great efficiency and great concern for the comfort of the wounded.

#### Concluding Remarks

Operation CORPORATE became necessary because deterrence failed, but in its execution it represented a triumph of military capability backed by resolute political will. The difficulties of short notice, extreme range and appalling weather under which this operation was mounted were all overcome by a single factor, the quality of our people. The fighting men were magnificent when put to the test and the support they received at every level, at sea from the Merchant Navy, at Ascension Island and in the United Kingdom was superb. I could not have been better served.

J. D. E. FIELDHOUSE, Admiral, Commander Task Force 317

#### Commander Task Force 317 and 324

Admiral Sir John FIELDHOUSE, G.C.B., G.B.E.

#### Air Commander

Air Marshal Sir John CURTISS, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.B.I.M., R.A.F.

#### Land Forces Deputy

Major General Sir Jeremy MOORE, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C. and Bar.  
From 21 May: Lieutenant General Sir Richard TRANT, K.C.B.

#### Flag Officer Submarines

Vice Admiral P. G. M. HERBERT, O.B.E.

#### Commander Task Group 317.8

Rear Admiral Sir John WOODWARD, K.C.B.

#### 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines

Brigadier J. H. A. THOMPSON, C.B., O.B.E., A.D.C.

#### 5th Infantry Brigade

Brigadier M. J. A. WILSON, O.B.E., M.C.

#### Commodore Amphibious Warfare

Commodore M. C. CLAPP, C.B.

#### H.M. Ships Which Sailed For "Operation Corporate" Before 20 June 1982

Ship	Commanding Officer	Date Passed 35°S (see note)
H.M.S. ACTIVE	Commander P. C. B. CANTER, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. ALACRITY	Commander C. J. S. CRAIG, D.S.C., R.N.	25 April
H.M.S. AMBUSCADE	Commander P. J. MOSSE, R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. ANDROMEDA	Captain J. L. WEATHERALL, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. ANTELOPE	Commander N. J. TOBIN, D.S.C., R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. ANTRIM	Captain B. G. YOUNG, D.S.O., R.N.	18 April
H.M.S. ARDENT	Commander A. W. J. WEST, D.S.C. R.N.	13 May
H.M.S. ARGONAUT	Captain C. H. LAYMAN, D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N.	13 May
H.M.S. ARROW	Commander P. J. BOOTHERSTONE, D.S.C., R.N.	20 April
H.M.S. AVENGER	Captain H. M. WHITE, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. BRILLIANT	Captain J. F. COWARD, D.S.O., R.N.	20 April
H.M.S. BRISTOL	Captain A. GROSE, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. BROADSWORD	Captain W. R. CANNING, D.S.O., A.D.C., R.N.	25 April
H.M.S. CARDIFF	Captain M. G. T. HARRIS, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. COVENTRY	Captain D. HART-DYKE, M.V.O., R.N.	20 April
H.M.S. DUMBARTON CASTLE	Lieutenant Commander N. D. WOOD, R.N.	13 June
H.M.S. ENDURANCE	Captain N. J. BARKER, C.B.E., R.N.	Not applicable
H.M.S. EXETER	Captain H. M. BALFOUR, M.V.O., R.N.	19 May
H.M.S. FEARLESS	Captain E. J. S. LARKEN, D.S.O., R.N.	13 May



Ship	Commanding Officer	Date Passed 35°S (see note)
H.M.S. GLAMORGAN	Captain M. E. BARROW, D.S.O., A.D.C., R.N.	25 April
H.M.S. GLASGOW	Captain A. P. HODDINOTT, O.B.E., R.N.	20 April
H.M.S. HECLA	Captain G. L. HOPE, R.N.	10 May
H.M.S. HERALD	Captain R. I. C. HALLIDAY, R.N.	15 May
H.M.S. HERMES	Captain L. E. MIDDLETON, D.S.O., R.N.	25 April
—800 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander A. D. AULD, D.S.C., R.N.	—
—826 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander D. J. S. SQUIER, A.F.C., R.N.	—
H.M.S. HYDRA	Commander R. J. CAMPBELL, R.N.	15 May
H.M.S. INTREPID	Captain P. G. V. DINGEMANS, D.S.O., R.N.	13 May
H.M.S. INVINCIBLE	Captain J. J. BLACK., D.S.O., M.B.E., R.N.	25 April
—801 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander N. D. WARD, D.S.C., A.F.C., R.N.	—
—820 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander R. J. S. WYKES-SNEYD, A.F.C., R.N.	—
H.M.S. LEEDS CASTLE	Lieutenant Commander C. F. B. HAMILTON, R.N.	17 May
H.M.S. MINERVA	Commander S. H. G. JOHNSON, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. PENELOPE	Commander P. V. RICKARD, R.N.	23 May
H.M.S. PLYMOUTH	Captain D. PENTREATH, D.S.O., R.N.	18 April
H.M.S. SHEFFIELD	Captain J. F. T. G. SALT, R.N.	25 April
H.M.S. YARMOUTH	Commander A. MORTON, D.S.C., R.N.	25 April
<b>H.M. Submarines</b>		
H.M.S. CONQUEROR	Commander C. L. WREFORD-BROWN, D.S.O., R.N.	
H.M.S. COURAGEOUS	Commander R. T. N. BEST, R.N.	
H.M.S. ONYX	Lieutenant Commander A. P. JOHNSON, R.N.	
H.M.S. SPARTAN	Commander J. B. TAYLOR, R.N.	
H.M.S. SPLENDID	Commander R. C. LANE-NOTT, R.N.	
H.M.S. VALIANT	Commander T. M. le MARCHAND, R.N.	
Minesweeping Trawlers (taken up from Trade and Commissioned)		
H.M.S. CORDELLA	Lieutenant Commander M. C. G. HOLLOWAY, R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. FARNELLA	Lieutenant R. J. BISHOP, R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. JUNELLA	Lieutenant M. ROWLEDGE, R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. NORTHELLA	Lieutenant J. P. S. GREENOP, R.N.	18 May
H.M.S. PICT	Lieutenant Commander D. G. GARWOOD, R.N.	18 May

Note: Latitude 35° South delineates the start of the Argentinian coastline.

**Commander British Forces Support Unit, Ascension Island, until 17 June 1982**

Captain R. McQUEEN, C.B.E., R.N.

**Royal Marine Units**

3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron Royal Marines  
40 Commando Royal Marines  
42 Commando Royal Marines  
45 Commando Royal Marines  
Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines  
3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron Royal Marines  
1st Raiding Squadron Royal Marines  
Special Boat Squadron Royal Marines  
3 Commando Brigade Air Defence Troop Royal Marines  
Y Troop Royal Marines  
Field Records Office Drafting and Records Office Royal Marines  
The Band of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Commando Forces  
The Band of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Flag Officer 3rd Flotilla

**Army Units**

1 Two troops The Blues and Royals  
2 4th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (Less one battery)  
3. 12th Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (Less one battery)  
4 29th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery  
5 Elements 43 Air Defence Battery, 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment Royal Artillery  
6 Elements 49th Field Regiment Royal Artillery  
7 Elements Royal School of Artillery Support Regiment  
8 Elements 33 Engineer Regiment  
9 36 Engineer Regiment (Less one squadron)  
10 Elements of 38 Engineer Regiment  
11 59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers  
12 Elements Military Works Force  
13 Elements 2 Postal and Courier Regiment Royal Engineers  
14 Elements 14th Signal Regiment  
15 Elements 30th Signal Regiment  
16 5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron  
17 Elements 602 Signal Troop  
18 2nd Battalion Scots Guards  
19 1st Battalion Welsh Guards  
20 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles

**Officers Commanding**

Major R. C. DIXON, R.M.  
Lieutenant Colonel M. P. J. HUNT, R.M.  
Lieutenant Colonel N. F. VAUX, D.S.O., R.M.  
Lieutenant Colonel A. F. WHITEHEAD, D.S.O., R.M.  
Lieutenant Colonel I. J. HELLBERG, O.B.E., R.C.T.  
Major C. P. CAMERON, M.C., R.M.  
Captain F. I. J. BAXTER, R.M.  
Major J. J. THOMSON, O.B.E., R.M.  
Lieutenant I. L. DUNN, R.M.  
Captain G. D. CORBETT, R. SIGS.  
Captain J. R. HANCOCK, R.M.  
Captain J. M. WARE, L.R.A.M., R.M.  
W.O. 2(B) T. ATTWOOD, L.R.A.M., A.R.C.M., R.M.  
Captain R. A. K. FIELD, R.H.G/D.  
Lieutenant Colonel G. A. HOLT, R.A.  
Lieutenant Colonel M. C. BOWDEN, R.A.  
Lieutenant Colonel M. J. HOLROYD-SMITH, O.B.E., R.A.  
Captain R. C. DICKEY, R.A.  
Major R. T. GWYN, R.A.  
Major M. H. FALLON, R.A.  
Captain B. LLOYD, R.E.  
Lieutenant Colonel G. W. FIELD, M.B.E. R.E.  
Major R. B. HAWKEN, R.E.  
Major R. MACDONALD, R.E.  
Lieutenant Colonel L. J. KENNEDY, M.B.E., R.E.  
Major I. WINFIELD, R.E.  
Captain G. D. CORBET, R. Signals.  
Major W. K. BUTLER, R. Signals.  
Major M. L. FORGE, R. Signals.  
Warrant Officer II (Yeoman of Signals)  
J. F. CALVERT, R. Signals.  
Lieutenant Colonel M. I. E. SCOTT, D.S.O., S.G.  
Lieutenant Colonel J. F. RICKETT, O.B.E., W.G.  
Lieutenant Colonel D. P. de C. MORGAN, O.B.E., 7G.R.



<i>Army Units</i>	<i>Officers Commanding</i>
21 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment. Commanded in turn by	(a) Lieutenant Colonel H. JONES, V.C. O.B.E., Para. (b) Major C. P. B. KEEBLE, D.S.O., Para. (c) Lieutenant Colonel D. R. CHAUNDLER, Para.
22 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment	Lieutenant Colonel H. W. R. PIKE, D.S.O., M.B.E., Para.
23 Elements 22nd Special Air Service Regiment	Lieutenant Colonel H. M. ROSE, O.B.E., Coldm. Gds.
24 656 Squadron Army Air Corps	Major C. S. SIBUN, A.A.C.
25 Elements 17 Port Regiment Royal Corps of Transport	Lieutenant J. G. D. LOWE, R.C.T.
26 Elements 29 Transport and Movements Regiment Royal Corps of Transport	Lieutenant D. R. BYRNE, R.C.T.
27 Elements 47 Air Despatch Squadron Royal Corps of Transport	Major R. C. GARDNER, R.C.T.
28 407 Troop Royal Corps of Transport	Lieutenant J. P. ASH, R.C.T.
29 Elements of The Joint Helicopter Support Unit	Corporal J. ELLIOT, R.C.T.
30 16 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps	Lieutenant Colonel J. D. A. ROBERTS, R.A.M.C.
31 Elements 19 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps	Captain J. T. GRAHAM, R.A.M.C.
32 Elements 9 Ordnance Battalion Royal Army Ordnance Corps	Major R. B. P. SMITH, R.A.O.C.
33 81 Ordnance Company Royal Army Ordnance Corps	Major G. M. A. THOMAS, R.A.O.C.
34 10 Field Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	Major A. D. BALL, R.E.M.E.
35 Elements 70 Aircraft Workshops Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	Staff Sergeant M. J. EMERY, R.E.M.E.
36 Elements 160 Provost Company Royal Military Police	Captain A. K. BARLEY, R.M.P.
37 6 Field Cash Office Royal Army Pay Corps	Major R. F. CLARK, R.A.P.C.
38 601 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)	Major M. M. HOWES, R.R.W.
39 602 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)	Major A. S. HUGHES, R.W.F.
40 603 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)	Flight Lieutenant G. HAWKINS, R.A.F.

**Royal Air Force**

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Detachment Commander/Commanding Officer</i>
Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Ascension Island, and Commander British Forces Support Unit Ascension Island from 17 June	Group Captain J. S. B. PRICE, C.B.E., A.D.C., R.A.F.

**Flying Squadrons**

1 (F) Squadron Harrier GR3 Wing Commander P. T. SQUIRE, D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.

*Detachments of:*

10 Squadron VC 10	Wing Commander O. G. BUNN, M.B.E., R.A.F.
18 Squadron Chinook HC1	Squadron Leader R. U. LANGWORTHY, D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.
24 Squadron Hercules C1	} Squadron Leader M. J. KEMPSTER, R.A.F. (4-17 Apr 82). Squadron Leader J. R. D. MORLEY, R.A.F. (18 Apr-11 May 82). Squadron Leader N. C. L. HUDSON, B.A., R.A.F. (12 May-23 Jul 82).
30 Squadron Hercules C1	
47 Squadron Hercules C1	
70 Squadron Hercules C1	} Squadron Leader R. W. D. TROTTER, R.A.F.
29 Squadron Phantom FGR2	
42 Squadron Nimrod Mk. 1	Wing Commander D. L. BAUGH, O.B.E., R.A.F.
44 Squadron Vulcan B2	} Squadron Leader A. C. MONTGOMERY, R.A.F.
50 Squadron Vulcan B2	
101 Squadron Vulcan B2	



*Detachments of:*

*Detachment Commander / Commanding Officer*

55 Squadron Victor K2	}	Wing Commander D. W. MAURICE-JONES, R.A.F. (18-21 Apr. 82).	
57 Squadron Victor K2		Wing Commander A. W. BOWMAN, M.B.E., R.A.F. (22 Apr. 82).	
120 Squadron Nimrod Mk. 2		}	Wing Commander D. EMMERSON, A.F.C., R.A.F.
201 Squadron Nimrod Mk. 2			
206 Squadron Nimrod Mk. 2			
202 Squadron SAR Sea King		Flight Lieutenant M. J. CARYLE, R.A.F.	

**Royal Air Force Regiment**

3 (Regiment) Wing Headquarters Unit	}	Wing Commander T. T. WALLIS, R.A.F.
15 (Regiment) Squadron Detachment Field Squadron		Squadron Leader I. P. G. LOUGHBOROUGH, R.A.F.
63 (Regiment) Squadron (Rapier)		

*Support Units*

Tactical Communications Wing  
 Tactical Supply Wing  
 No. 1 E.O.D. Unit

**Royal Fleet Auxiliaries**

*Masters*

R.F.A. APPLELEAF	Captain G. P. A. MacDOUGALL, R.F.A.
R.F.A. BAYLEAF	Captain A. E. T. HUNTER, R.F.A.
R.F.A. BLUE ROVER	Captain J. D. RODDIS, R.F.A.
R.F.A. BRAMBLELEAF	Captain M. S. J. FARLEY, R.F.A.
R.F.A. ENGADINE	Captain D. F. FREEMAN, R.F.A.
R.F.A. FORT AUSTIN	Commodore S. C. DUNLOP, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.F.A.
R.F.A. FORT GRANGE	Captain D. G. M. AVERILL, C.B.E. R.F.A.
R.F.A. RESOURCE	Captain B. A. SEYMOUR, R.F.A.
R.F.A. OLMEDA	Captain A. P. OVERBURY, O.B.E., R.F.A.
R.F.A. OLNÄ	Captain J. A. BAILEY, R.F.A.
R.F.A. PEARLEAF	Captain J. McCULLOCH, R.F.A.
R.F.A. PLUMLEAF	Captain R. W. M. WALLACE, R.F.A.
R.F.A. REGENT	Captain J. LOGAN, R.F.A.
R.F.A. STROMNESS	Captain J. B. DICKINSON, O.B.E., R.F.A.
R.F.A. TIDEPPOOL	Captain J. W. GAFFREY, R.F.A.
R.F.A. TIDESPRING	Captain S. REDMOND, O.B.E., R.F.A.
SIR BEDIVERE	Captain P. J. McCARTHY, O.B.E., R.F.A.
SIR GALAHAD	Captain P. J. G. ROBERTS, D.S.O., R.F.A.
SIR GERAINT	Captain D. E. LAWRENCE, D.S.C. R.F.A.
SIR LANCELOT	Captain C. A. PURTCHER-WYDENBRUCK, O.B.E., R.F.A.
SIR PERCIVALE	Captain A. F. PITT, D.S.C., R.F.A.
SIR TRISTRAM	Captain G. R. GREEN, D.S.C., R.F.A.

**Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service**

*Ship*

R.M.A.S. GOOSANDER  
 R.M.A.S. TYPHOON

*Master*

Captain A. MacGREGOR  
 Captain J. N. MORRIS

**Ships Taken up from Trade**

M.V. ALVEGA

M.V. ANCO CHARGER

M.V. ASTRONOMER

S.S. ATLANTIC CAUSEWAY

S.S. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR

*Masters*

Captain  
 A. LAZENBY  
 Captain  
 B. HATTON  
 Captain  
 H. S. BRADEN  
 Captain  
 M. H. C. TWOMEY  
 Captain  
 I. NORTH, D.S.C.

*Senior Naval Officers*


Lieutenant Commander  
 R. GAINSFORD, R.N.  
 Commander  
 R. P. SEYMOUR, R.N.  
 Captain  
 M. G. LAYARD, C.B.E., R.N.




	<i>Masters</i>	<i>Senior Naval Officers</i>
M.V. AVELONA STAR	Captain H. DYER	
M.V. BALDER LONDON	Captain K. J. WALLACE	
M.V. BALTIC FERRY	Captain E. HARRISON	Lieutenant Commander G. B. WEBB, R.N.
M.V. BRITISH ENTERPRISE III	Captain D. GRANT	Lieutenant Commander B. E. M. REYNELL, R.N.
M.V. BRITISH AVON	Captain J. W. M. GUY	
M.V. BRITISH DART	Captain J. A. N. TAYLOR	
M.V. BRITISH ESK	Captain G. BARBER	
M.V. BRITISH TAMAR	Captain W. H. HARE	
M.V. BRITISH TAY	Captain P. T. MORRIS	
M.V. BRITISH TEST	Captain T. A. OLIPHANT	
M.V. BRITISH TRENT	Captain P. R. WALKER	
M.V. BRITISH WYE	Captain D. M. RUNDELL, O.B.E.	
S.S. CANBERRA	Captain W. SCOTT-MASSON, C.B.E.	Captain C. P. O. BURNE, C.B.E., R.N.
M.V. CONTENDER BEZANT	Captain A. MACKINNON	Lieutenant Commander D. H. N. YATES, R.N.
M.V. ELK	Captain J. P. MORTON, C.B.E.	Commander A. S. RITCHIE, O.B.E., R.N.
M.V. EUROPIC FERRY	Captain C. J. C. CLARK, O.B.E.	Commander A. B. GOUGH, R.N.
M.V. FORT TORONTO	Captain R. I. KINNIER	
M.V. G. A. WALKER	Captain E. C. METHAM	
M.V. GEESTPORT	Captain G. F. FOSTER	
C.S. IRIS	Captain G. FULTON	Lieutenant Commander J. BITHELL, R.N.
M.T. IRISHMAN	Captain W. ALLEN	
M.V. LAERTES	Captain H. T. REID	
M.V. LYCAON	Captain H. R. LAWTON	Lieutenant Commander D. J. STILES, R.N.
M.V. NORLAND	Captain M. ELLERBY, C.B.E.	Commander C. J. ESPLIN-JONES, O.B.E., R.N.
M.V. NORDIC FERRY	Captain R. JENKINS	Lieutenant Commander M. St. J. D. A. THORBURN, R.N.
R.M.S. QUEEN ELIZABETH II	Captain P. JACKSON	Captain N. C. H. JAMES, R.N.
T.E.V. RANGATIRA	Captain P. LIDDELL	Commander D. H. LINES, R.N.
M.V. SAINT EDMUND	Captain M. J. STOCKMAN	Lieutenant Commander A. M. SCOTT, R.N.
R.M.S. SAINT HELENA	Captain M. L. M. SMITH	
M.T. SALVAGEMAN	Captain A. J. STOCKWELL	
M.V. SAXONIA	Captain H. EVANS	

	<i>Masters</i>	<i>Senior Naval Officers</i>
M.V. SCOTTISH EAGLE	Captain A. TERRAS	
M.V. SHELL EBURNA	Captain J. C. BEAUMONT	
M.V. STENA INSPECTOR	Captain D. EDE	Captain P. J. STICKLAND, R.N.
M.V. STENA SEASPREAD	Captain N. WILLIAMS	Captain P. BADCOCK, C.B.E., R.N.
M.V. STRATHEWE	Captain S. T. S. HOUSEHOLD	Lieutenant Commander R. H. HEWLAND, R.N.
M.V. TOR CALEDONIA	Captain A. SCOTT	Lieutenant Commander J. G. DEVINE, R.N.
S.S. UGANDA	Captain J. G. CLARK	Commander A. B. GOUGH, R.N.
		<i>Senior Medical Officer:</i> Surgeon Captain A. J. RINTOUL, R.N.
M.V. WIMPEY SEAHORSE	Captain M. SLACK, O.B.E.	
M.T. YORKSHIREMAN	Captain P. RIMMER	





DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES



SOUTH GEORGIA



SUPPLEMENT TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

WEST BATHING  
The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the European Court of Human Rights in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol. The names are listed in alphabetical order of the State of which they are nationals.

WEST BATHING  
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ARGENTINA



N. B. P. R.

PRIME MINISTER

A. S. C. 7/12

THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN: THE LESSONS

I have seen the Note circulated by the Secretary of State for Defence covering the draft White Paper on the lessons learned from the Falklands campaign.

The Paper brings out very well the remarkable achievement in mounting the force in so short a time, a fact which both our allies and potential adversaries cannot have failed to notice. The proposed action in procuring equipment to make good our losses, remedy shortcomings identified in the conflict and strengthen our capacity for limited action beyond the NATO area should improve our total all round capability and give our forces greater flexibility. The Paper constitutes a remarkable testimony to the quality of the equipment in use by our forces and should provide welcome support to Defence Sales.

My Department's mainrole was in the requisitioning of merchant shipping to supplement the standing RN and RFA forces. It is gratifying that this aspect of the operation worked so well.

I support the publication of the White Paper.

I am copying this to colleagues in OD.

Department of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London, SW1H 0ET

7 December 1982

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Cockfield'.

RP LORD COCKFIELD

Approved by the Secretary  
of State and signed in  
his absence



Argentina 14 31  
Melahor



17 DEC 1932







cc MOD  
FCO  
CO ARGENTINA.

fu

Argentina?

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 December 1982

Thank you for your letter of 2 December containing the Attorney General's views about our possible reactions to various Argentine military options.

The Prime Minister was grateful for the Attorney General's comments. Mrs. Thatcher feels that the correspondence on this subject has been useful but that it is clear that the issues would have to come before a group of Ministers if any of the situations envisaged in the correspondence arise.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Henry Steel, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,  
Law Officers' Department.

SECRET

B



Ref: B06646

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands White Paper  
(OD(82) 72)

## BACKGROUND

You have already seen and commented upon an earlier draft of the White Paper on the lessons of the Falklands campaign which the Defence Secretary has circulated to the Committee for their approval to publish on 14th December. The White Paper is in three parts.

Part I describes the operation, in rather less detail than the Commander-in-Chief's Despatch which will be published as a supplement to the London Gazette on the same day.

Part II assesses the lessons to be drawn from the campaign.

Part III is a statement of policy and action to make good the losses of equipment and improve the capabilities of our forces.

## HANDLING

2. You will wish to invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his paper and then invite other members of the Committee to comment. The Committee might then briefly discuss how the White Paper should be handled, particularly in relation to the Debate in the House of Commons being arranged for shortly before the Christmas Recess.

3. Points to cover on the text are -

a. are there any controversial points in Part I, which will be compared with the Commander-in-Chief's Despatch? (For printing reasons Admiral Fieldhouse's Despatch will already have been finalised by the time of the OD meeting.)

b. Paragraph 119 contains the first official admission that the Exocet missiles which hit the Atlantic Conveyor were decoyed off their intended target: they were decoyed off a large warship and unfortunately "locked on" to a merchant ship which had no defence against them.



c. Are the references to equipment helpful in defence sales terms?

The French Exocet get frequent mention. It might be thought that paragraph 216 could be couched in more positive terms: the reliability of British equipment was indeed remarkable and a tribute to the British engineering skills as well as to the ingenuity of the servicemen who maintained it.

d. On the paragraphs on public relations (255-257) the Defence Secretary is believed to attach importance to saying that we are consulting the press about how to do better in future.

e. Part III is likely to attract most public attention since it announces changes in the defence programme decisions taken in 1981. The statement in paragraph 355 - "unfortunately the defence programme has for several years been under intense and constant pressure" - looks odd against the high priority which the Government has given to defence in public expenditure terms and the real increases which the defence budget has received since 1979.

f. Paragraph 309 does not say how many Type 22 frigates are to be ordered now, nor does paragraph 311 specify the number of tanker aircraft to be bought. The Defence Secretary plans to minute colleagues with his shipbuilding proposals early next week. The choice of tanker aircraft lies between ex-British Airways Tristars and American DC10s. The Secretary of State for Trade minuted the Defence Secretary on 2nd December advocating the purchase of the Tristars: but Ministry of Defence officials are in favour of the DC10 on budgetary and operational grounds. No final decision can yet be taken since bids from industry are not due in until next week. More generally, the Committee will wish to consider whether the proposed purchases of American equipment (Phantoms, Chinooks and possible tankers) could arouse criticism: there are, in fact, no available British alternatives to the Phantom and the Chinook. The Phantoms will be second-hand aircraft from the United States Navy or the United States Marines.

g. The decision to maintain the numbers of destroyers and frigates in the operational fleet at 55 (paragraph 311e) will give the Naval lobby the opportunity to say that the Government has repented of its decision to reduce the number to 50.




4. A wider question which arises on the text is whether it gives sufficient emphasis to the support we received from our Allies. The only reference to this is a very general one in paragraph 26, under the heading Public Relations: but there is no mention, for example, of the logistic and equipment support we received from the United States or the readiness of our European Community partners to agree to the speedy imposition of economic sanctions on Argentina. This is a sensitive area, and it may be that the balance of advantage lies in keeping the reference unspecific. You might however like to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to comment on this aspect.

5. On handling, you will wish to confirm that the business managers are content with publication of the White Paper on 14th December and have made arrangements for a Debate before Christmas.

CONCLUSION

6. The Committee might be guided to agree that the White Paper should be published on 14th December, subject to any amendments agreed in the discussion.

3rd December 1982

  
A D S GOODALL





MO 5/21

Mr Coles ✓ *WJL*  $\frac{L}{12}$   
*To see*  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~930 7000~~ 218 2111/3

2nd December 1982

*Dear Jim,*

OFFICIAL DESPATCH ON THE FALKLANDS OPERATION

We spoke about your letter of the 30th November.

I explained that we had been able to reach agreement on all the points recorded in Richard Hatfield's minute of the 26th November but that Admiral Fieldhouse had had some difficulty with the proposed amendment to the fifth paragraph of the "Background" section of his Despatch. He takes the view that the amendment does not reflect the facts as he understands them.

So far as he is concerned he had been forewarned of the possible need to deploy surface ships to the South Atlantic as early as Monday the 29th March when the first SSN was despatched. This is reflected in the third paragraph of the "Background" section. The informal warning was confirmed on 30th March in a signal to him from MOD asking him to nominate ships on a contingency basis.

Admiral Fieldhouse accepts that a reference to the signal in his despatch could be misunderstood and that a reference to the order he was given, following the Prime Minister's meeting in the House on 31st March, to begin covert preparations for a Task Force would more accurately and clearly describe the sequence of events.

On this basis Admiral Fieldhouse would wish this paragraph to read as follows:

"On 31st March I was instructed to make covert preparations for a Task Force for operations in the South Atlantic. On 2nd April, after the Argentinian invasion the preparations were allowed to be conducted openly."

A J Coles Esq





You subsequently confirmed, via the Duty Clerk, that the Prime Minister would be content with this wording and the despatch will be sent for printing accordingly.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Fall and Richard Hatfield.

*Yours ever*

*NHR/evans*

(N H R EVANS)





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MR. COLES,  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET.

Passed to Nick Evans.

10-00 pm 2/12

Argentina

Board  
Ady Cole

OFFICIAL DESPATCH ON THE FALKLANDS OPERATION

We spoke about your letter of 30 November.

I explained that we had been able to reach agreement on all the points recorded in Richard Hatfield's minute of 26 November but that Admiral Fieldhouse had had some difficulty with the proposed amendment to the 5th paragraph of the "Background" section of his despatch. He takes the view that the amendment does not reflect the facts as he understands them.

So far as he is concerned, he had been forewarned of the possible need to deploy surface ships to the South Atlantic as early as Monday 29 March, when the first SSN was despatched. This is reflected in the third paragraph of the "Background" section. The informal warning was confirmed on 30 March in a signal to him from the Ministry of Defence, referring mainly to SSN deployments but also asking him to nominate ships on a contingency basis.

Admiral Fieldhouse accepts that a reference to the signal in his despatch could be misunderstood and that a reference to the order he was given, following the Prime Minister's meeting in the House on 31 March, to begin covert preparations for a task force would more accurately and clearly describe the sequence of events.

On this basis, Admiral Fieldhouse would wish this paragraph to read as follows:-

"On 31 March I was instructed to make covert preparations for a task force for operations in the South Atlantic. On 2 April, after the Argentine invasion, the preparations were allowed to be conducted openly."

/Unfortunately,



Unfortunately, as I explained on the telephone, the despatch needs to go to printing tomorrow in order to meet the deadline for publication of 14 December. I should therefore be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be content with the form of words set out above.

Nick Evans  
Ministry of Defence

2 December 1982





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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

c HO  
LCO  
FCO  
HMT  
LPO  
LPSO  
TRADE  
CDL  
CO  
30 November 1982

Official Despatch on the Falklands Operation

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 19 November covering a despatch by Admiral Fieldhouse on the conduct of the military operation in the South Atlantic.

I understand from the Cabinet Office (Richard Hatfield's minute of 26 November) that certain amendments are being suggested to Admiral Fieldhouse. On the assumption that he finds these acceptable, the Prime Minister is content that the despatch should be published at the same time as the Falklands White Paper.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

AJC

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.





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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

OFFICIAL DESPATCH ON THE FALKLANDS OPERATION

I attach a minute by Mr. Nott covering a despatch by Admiral Fieldhouse on the Falklands operation. I have held up this minute until now for reasons set out below.

Mr. Nott proposes that the despatch should be published at the same time as the Falklands White Paper. OD will be considering the latter on 7 December.

The despatch was circulated to all members of OD but I have written to all their Private Offices asking that it be circulated no further.

I am told that such a despatch is traditional after a military campaign - and also that we have to be a little careful in suggesting amendments to Sir John Fieldhouse whose right it is to compile such a despatch.

Nevertheless, the media are bound to analyse it in detail and try to detect inconsistencies between it and Ministerial statements. The proceedings of the Franks Committee are also relevant.

I therefore drew attention to certain passages which could cause embarrassment and asked the Cabinet Office to go through the whole document carefully. As a result certain amendments are now being put to Admiral Fieldhouse. The attached despatch is in the form in which it will appear unless Admiral Fieldhouse objects to any of the amendments or unless you wish to propose further ones.

I have highlighted the passages at which I think you will wish to look. In the amended form, I think the only passages which are potentially controversial are:

/ a) Page one.

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- 2 -

a) Page one. Admiral Fieldhouse suggests that by 29 March the situation had worsened to an extent where it was considered sufficiently serious for him to return from Gibraltar to Northwood. He also states that before leaving Gibraltar he ordered preparation of a suitable group of ships to be ready to proceed to the South Atlantic when instructed. Tam Dalyell and others will attempt to show that this must mean that you had knowledge of an invasion before 31 March. The reply would of course be that we had no knowledge of an invasion until 31 March but the situation in South Georgia had clearly deteriorated and normal contingency plans were being made by the military.

b) Page seven and elsewhere. There are various references to the SAS and SBS. The normal convention is that the presence of the SAS and SBS on operations or exercises in peacetime is not acknowledged publicly. But the operations described in the despatch are the normal wartime tasks of reconnaissance and raiding which constitute the overt military role of the SAS and SBS. All concerned therefore think that these references should remain.

Are you content that the despatch should be published at the same time as the Falklands White Paper?

A.J.C.

Yes

29 November 1982

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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MR COLES

Official Despatch on the Falklands Operation

As you asked in your letter of 23 November to Richard Mottram, the Cabinet Office has considered the text of Admiral Fieldhouse's despatch in consultation with the Ministry of Defence in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2. The despatch is essentially a factual account of the operation which will arouse considerable public interest. One area of potential embarrassment to the Government consists in the account, in the section on pages 1 and 2 headed "Background", of some of the events immediately preceding the Argentine invasion. The text of Admiral Fieldhouse's account will need to be consistent with what Ministers have said to the Franks Committee. No doubt you will wish to check the text against your own records. But in any case the present text needs some amendment. The Ministry of Defence are therefore proposing to Admiral Fieldhouse that he makes the following changes:-

- (a) The first paragraph under the heading "Background" should be amended as follows:-

"On 19 March 1982 it was reported that a party of Argentine scrap metal workers had landed illegally ..."

- (b) The fourth paragraph under the heading "Background" should be amended to read:-

"Also on 29 March the submarine HMS SPARTAN was detached from Exercise SPRINGTRAIN to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar, for deployment to the South Atlantic. Subsequently HMS SPLENDID was ordered to deploy from Faslane. A third nuclear powered submarine, HMS CONQUEROR, was sailed a few days later. All were stored for war within 48 hours of order."





(c) The first sentence of the following paragraph should be amended to read:-

"On 31 March I was instructed to nominate suitable surface ships in case a Task Force was ordered to conduct operations in the South Atlantic."

3. On page 5, in the paragraph about the establishment of the original maritime exclusion zone, the words "After further discussion" at the beginning of the second sentence are obscure and ambiguous; what discussion? by whom? and to what end? We think that it might be suggested to Admiral Fieldhouse that these words are unnecessary and uninformative, and should be deleted.

4. The Ministry of Defence have considered whether the explicit references to the SAS and the Royal Marines Special Boat Squadron should remain. The normal convention is, as you know, that the presence of the SAS and SBS on operations or exercises in peacetime, for example in a counter-terrorist role, is not acknowledged publicly. But the operations described in the despatch are the normal wartime tasks of reconnaissance and raiding which constitute the overt military role of the SAS and SBS. It would in particular look odd to make no mention of the unit to which the 21 men belonged who were killed in the helicopter accident described on page 10. We think that this is reasonable; but it might be prudent to avoid giving any indication of the extent of SAS and SBS raids and patrols. In particular, we think that it might be suggested to Admiral Fieldhouse that, in line 29 on page 7, he should delete "many" and substitute "a series of".

5. I am sending copies of this minute to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Brian Fall (FCO).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R P Hatfield', written in a cursive style.

R P HATFIELD

26 November 1982



ARGENTINA: HANDLING P. 11.



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LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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DSG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 November 1982

Dear Richard,

OFFICIAL DESPATCH ON THE FALKLANDS OPERATION

We had a word about this on the telephone this morning (Mr. Nott's minute of 19 November to the Prime Minister refers).

Before submitting the Despatch to the Prime Minister, I should like to be able to reassure her that there was nothing in the text which could cause the Government undue embarrassment. I have therefore asked Richard Hatfield to arrange for the Cabinet Office, in close consultation with the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to consider the Despatch from that point of view and to let me know the outcome as soon as possible.

In the meantime, I should be grateful if the Private Secretaries to other members of OD, to whom the Despatch has been sent, could retain it within Private Offices.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Cole.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

JL





Prime Minister

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTER

You will recall that you have agreed to the publication of Admiral Fieldhouse's despatch, subject to a number of amendments. These have been agreed but the revised version of the despatch has not yet been circulated.

OFFICIAL DESPATCH ON THE FALKLANDS OPERATION

A.F.C. 6/12

In accordance with past precedents, the most recent of which was the Suez campaign of 1956, the Commander of the Falkland Islands Task Force, Admiral Fieldhouse has prepared a despatch which describes the conduct of the military operation. A copy is attached.

2. I intend that this should be published as a supplement to the London Gazette simultaneously with the publication of the Falklands White Paper on the lessons to be drawn from the conflict.

3. I am copying this minute and the attached despatch to the other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

Ministry of Defence  
19th November 1982



DESPATCH BY ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE, GCB, GBE, COMMANDER OF THE TASK FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: APRIL TO JUNE 1982

'Operation CORPORATE' was the name given to the operation I describe in my Despatch. With hindsight, it was well chosen, for like a body, the harmony of the various limbs and supporting organs was vital to its soundness and efficiency. I ask the reader constantly to bear this in mind. The very nature of the events I describe focuses attention first on one limb, then on another; the temporary dominance in the narrative of one does not detract from the performance and achievements of another. I list at the end of my Despatch the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Army and Royal Air Force units which took part in the Operation. I also attach a list of those vessels taken up from trade.

The Despatch describes briefly the very short period of preparation for sending Task Force 317 to the South Atlantic and, more fully, the operations from 1 April 1982 when units of the Fleet sailed south until 20 June 1982 when the last Argentine forces remaining on British territory surrendered.

BACKGROUND

On 19 March 1982 it was reported that a party of Argentinians ~~purporting to be scrap merchants~~ <sup>metal workers</sup> had landed illegally at Leith in South Georgia, and on 21 March HMS ENDURANCE was sailed towards the island with a detachment of Royal Marines embarked to investigate.

Intense diplomatic activity followed, Her Majesty's Government insisting that the Argentinians had landed illegally and that they should leave either in one of their own ships or in HMS ENDURANCE. On 26 March it was reported to me that although the Argentinian ship BAHIA PARAISO had left Leith, a shore party of 12 men remained behind. Diplomatic activity continued.

On 25 March when it had appeared that a diplomatic solution to the incident was still likely I had left for Gibraltar to visit ships taking part in Exercise SPRINGTRAIN. By 29 March the situation had worsened to an extent where it was considered sufficiently serious for me to return to my Headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex. Before leaving Gibraltar I ordered Flag Officer First Flotilla, Rear Admiral Sir John WOODWARD, KCB, to prepare to detach a suitable group of ships, to store and ammunition and to be ready to proceed to the South Atlantic when instructed.

Also on 29 March the submarine HMS SPARTAN was detached from Exercise SPRINGTRAIN to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar, for deployment to the South Atlantic. Similarly, HMS SPLENDID <sup>was ordered to</sup> ~~deployed~~ from Faslane. A third nuclear powered submarine, HMS CONQUEROR was ~~subsequently~~ sailed a few days later. All were stored for war within 48 hours of order.

31  
On 30 March I was instructed to nominate suitable surface ships, <sup>in case</sup> ~~to form~~ a Task Force <sup>was ordered to conduct</sup> for operations in the South Atlantic. At this time my instructions were that any preparations were to be covert. However, on 2 April, after the Argentinian invasion, the preparations were allowed to be conducted openly.

Argentinian forces landed in strength on 2 April at Port Stanley and the very heavily outnumbered Royal Marines of the Garrison resisted, sustaining no casualties but inflicting an unknown number on the invaders.



After some four hours fighting His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, Sir Rex HUNT, KCMG, ordered the Marines and the survey party from HMS ENDURANCE, who had been working on the Islands and who assisted with the defence, to surrender.

The following day Argentinian forces landed at Grytviken in South Georgia. The small Royal Marines detachment on the Island put up a stout resistance in the face of a considerably stronger invading force, damaging the corvette GUERRICO and shooting down a Puma helicopter, before they too surrendered.

Meanwhile, on 2 April the aircraft carriers HMS HERMES, HMS INVINCIBLE with the assault ship HMS FEARLESS, two frigates, two Logistic Landing Ships, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and the necessary logistic support were ordered to be brought to immediate readiness in United Kingdom ports. HMS HERMES with 826, part of 846 and 800 Naval Air Squadrons and HMS INVINCIBLE with 820 and 801 Naval Air Squadrons sailed from Portsmouth on Monday 5 April. Admiral WOODWARD, flying his flag in HMS ANTRIM, was ordered to sail from the Gibraltar area for Ascension Island with six other destroyers and frigates, and with RFA support. The flag was transferred to HMS GLAMORGAN on 4 April.

#### THE AIM

I was informed that in the current situation the overall aim of Her Majesty's Government was to bring about the withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies and to re-establish the British Administration there as quickly as possible. My mission was to conduct military deployments and order operations in support of this aim.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

In my capacity as Commander-in-Chief Fleet I assumed overall command of the operation as Commander Task Force 317 (all surface ships, land and air forces) and Task Force 324 (submarine forces). This tri-service command was exercised from my Headquarters at Northwood and I was responsible direct to the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence LEWIN, GCB, MVO, DSC. The Air Officer Commanding 18 Group RAF, Air Marshal Sir John CURTISS, KCB, KBE, CBIM, RAF was appointed as my Air Commander, and the Major General Royal Marines Commando Forces, Major General Sir Jeremy MOORE, KCB, OBE, MC and Bar, was initially my Land Forces Deputy. When later General MOORE flew south to become the Commander Land Forces, Falkland Islands, he was replaced by the Commander South East District, Lieutenant General Sir Richard TRANT, KCB. Submarines were operated under the control of Flag Officer Submarines Vice Admiral P G M BERBERT, OBE. The command team at Northwood was completed by my Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Sir David HALLIFAX, KBE, who was responsible for the detailed naval planning and the co-ordination of all staff work. Admiral WOODWARD was appointed Commander of the Task Groups in the South Atlantic and he transferred his flag to HMS HERMES on 15 April.

#### MILITARY AND LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

My foremost considerations when planning this operation, were the Argentinian military capabilities and the proximity of their bases and the comparison with our own situation: especially, the difficulties of transporting troops, aircraft and equipment some 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom to a theatre of operations within range of aircraft based in mainland Argentina and more than 3,000 miles from my nearest forward mounting base.



It is always difficult to quantify enemy capabilities. Intelligence and other sources gave the total number of warships at Argentina's disposal as 73. These included one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, 4 submarines, 2 modern 'Type 42' destroyers, and other older but well equipped frigates and destroyers. Its aircraft included 65 A-4 Variants, 39 Mirage III/V, 5 Canberra, 60 Pucara, 8 Puma and 2 Lynx helicopters, and 5 Super Etendard equipped with Exocet sea skimming missiles, together with a small but significant air transport force which included 2 C130s (Hercules) with air to air refuelling tanker capability. The number of troops on the Islands was more problematic. Estimates varied from 7,000 to 10,000 well equipped troops. These were supported by more than 30 light attack aircraft (mainly Pucarás) and about 20 helicopters. It was difficult to assess the intended role of Argentina's military and civilian manpower reserve, its Merchant Marine and its civilian air transport. A further factor was the possibility of material assistance from other countries.

I did not have within my normal resources the ships necessary for the 7,000 mile transit of the troops, equipment and logistic support for the size of forces which I considered were required to counter the threat and achieve my mission. It was necessary at an early stage to consider taking up ships from trade. An Order in Council under the Royal Prerogative to requisition ships was given on the evening of 4 April and announced in Parliament the following day.

It must be recorded that this operation could not have been mounted without the wholehearted co-operation of the Department of Trade, the ship owners, the masters and their crews who gave their unstinting support and worked with enormous energy and enthusiasm. The capabilities of these vessels were enhanced by installing additional equipment which included the provision of helicopter flight decks, a refuelling at sea capability, freshwater making plants and communications. These conversions were defined and completed with speed and efficiency that brings great credit to all the agencies involved.

In expectation of a requirement for additional naval air assets, 4 new Naval Air Squadrons were formed. These comprised one squadron of Sea Harriers, 2 squadrons of Wessex 5 helicopters and one squadron of Anti Submarine Sea Kings specially adapted for helicopter support operations. In addition, several new small flights, consisting mainly of Wasp helicopters, were prepared for the ships taken up from trade and other warships brought out of the Standby Squadron. These are noteworthy achievements and reflect well on the Naval Air Command.

The Royal Air Force supported by the British aerospace industry, the Chief Scientist's Department and the Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive was also quickly modifying Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules aircraft. Air to air refuelling capabilities were developed and installed; anti corrosion measures were adopted for normally land based Chinook helicopters and RAF Harriers. Additional equipment and weaponry were fitted to a number of assigned aircraft.

Early on, we established in my Headquarters a Logistic Support Cell. This was a tri-service organisation headed by the Force Logistic Co-ordinator whose task was to co-ordinate replenishment planning and all logistic requirements for the Task Force. I considered it essential that this organisation should be at Northwood to ensure optimum and economical use of sometimes scarce resources and the priority for supply of the most urgent stores. It was a vital asset and a most successful management tool.



The speed with which the operation was mounted did not allow ships and troops to prepare themselves before departure from the United Kingdom as adequately as I would have wished. All ships proceeding south therefore adopted a vigorous training programme at sea. Weapon systems were thoroughly overhauled, tested and fired: in some cases civilian weapons engineering experts sailed with the ships. Tactical and communications procedures were intensively rehearsed. Damage control exercises were constantly practised. Embarked troops carried out fitness and weapon training often in cramped, difficult and, for many, quite unfamiliar conditions. Ships had to prepare themselves for rapid and sometimes unscheduled replenishment from other ships, tankers and helicopters. Equipments were modified at sea without the usual dockyard support and ships and aircraft were painted to obliterate pennant numbers and identification markings. Later, it proved possible to give ships subsequently sailed in support of the operation, a limited period of specialised sea training directed at South Atlantic operations under the auspices of Flag Officer Sea Training at Portland.

The modifications to Royal Air Force aircraft to fit them for South Atlantic operations produced a need for an intensive training programme for both aircrews and support personnel. Additional air to air refuelling instructors had to be trained so that they, in turn, could train the Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules pilots as these aircraft acquired airborne refuelling capability. Each new weapons system had to be tested and the crews trained in its use. Barrier GR3 pilots were also practised in the use of the ski-jump for carrier operations.

#### ASCENSION ISLAND

A key factor in this operation was Ascension Island, situated over 3,700 nautical miles from the United Kingdom and 3,300 miles from the Falkland Islands. Ascension Island was essential as a forward mounting base to replenish the ships of the Task Force and to provide them with stores, equipment and men that could not be embarked before their hurried departure from the United Kingdom. Air transport routes to the Island were activated on 2 April.

The Island airfield, Wideawake, was also vital as an airhead for all land based aircraft operating in support of the Fleet and land forces. However, with only limited facilities and totally inadequate technical and domestic back up, previously manned for and accustomed to dealing with only 3 movements each week, it was developed into a fully operational military establishment capable of supporting the permanent detachments of up to 17 Victors, 3 Vulcans, 4 Hercules, 4 Nimrods, 2 air defence aircraft and 2 support helicopters. Additionally, intensive daily air transport movements were accepted. The necessary engineering, freight handling, weapon loading and administrative support brought the establishment from nothing to over 800 officers and men of all three services within 3 weeks.

The fundamental importance of Ascension Island to the timely success of the operation meant that its vulnerability to a clandestine amphibious or audacious air attack, such as the Argentinians later demonstrated with their bomb carrying Hercules transport aircraft, could not be ignored. Air defence radar was installed to support the fighter aircraft, which were initially missile armed GR3 Harriers and later Phantoms. A detachment of the Royal Air Force Regiment provided ground defence. Seaward defences were provided by an RN guardship and daily Nimrod patrols of the sea areas out to 400 miles; a number of Argentinian merchantmen were detected close to the Island and these were shadowed by air and surface units until clear of the area.



By the fall of Stanley, a total of 535 air movements into the Island from the United Kingdom had taken place. These included RAF Hercules and VC10s and some chartered Belfast and Boeing 707 aircraft. They had brought in 23 helicopters, 5,907 tons of freight and 5,242 passengers. In addition to these freight and passenger aircraft, ground support personnel also handled all aircraft operating to the south in support of the Task Force. Nimrods mounted 111 sorties from the Island; the Hercules made 44 airdrops of essential equipment, weapons, personnel and mail to the Fleet and the Victor Tankers flew 375 sorties in support of 67 missions involving long range operations by probe fitted aircraft.

I would wish to record the unstinting support of the residents of Ascension, particularly that of the Island Administrator Mr B E PAUNCEFORT, the United States Air Force Officer-in-Charge at Wideawake, Lieutenant Colonel W BRYDEN, and the employees of the operating contractor, Pan American Airways. In the last category, Mr Donald COFFEY is worthy of special mention.

#### MEDICAL SUPPORT

The SS UGANDA was taken up from trade and designated a Hospital Ship in accordance with Article 22 of the Geneva Convention, having been fitted out in Gibraltar Dockyard. Accommodation to allow for the treatment and holding of up to 300 casualties was provided, together with sufficient medical personnel, to cover all major specialities. A number of QARNNS officers and ratings were embarked in the ship as part of the medical complement. In order to comply fully with the Convention, the ship was declared to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) before sailing from Gibraltar, marked as required by the Convention.

Additionally, three survey ships HM Ships HECLA, HERALD and HYDRA, were designated as casualty ferries, fitted out and declared as Hospital Ships under the Geneva Convention.

#### THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE

On 4 April I recommended that a maritime exclusion zone be established around the Falkland Islands in order to inhibit the Argentine ability to reinforce their garrison. [After further discussion] Her Majesty's Government announced on 7 April the establishment of an exclusion zone, 200 nautical miles in radius from the centre of the Falkland Islands, to be effective for <sup>Argentine</sup> submarines, surface warships, military aircraft and certain naval auxiliary ships, from 0400 GMT on 12 April. Initially the exclusion zone was enforced by submarines which were deployed to cover the approaches to Port Stanley and the entrances to Falkland Sound.

#### THE REPOSSESSION OF SOUTH GEORGIA

On 7 April the Chief of Defence Staff ordered me to plan to implement the repossession of South Georgia.

Captain B G YOUNG, DSO, Royal Navy, the Commanding Officer of HMS ANTRIM was nominated as the Commander of the Task Group allocated to the task. Other units involved in this phase of the operation included HMS ENDURANCE, HMS PLYMOUTH, later, HMS BRILLIANT, RFA TIDESPRING, M Company Group of 42 Commando Royal Marines, elements of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS). In addition HMS CONQUEROR was ordered



to patrol off the island to prevent any Argentinian reinforcement. RAF  
or Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft supported by Victor Tankers and  
N~~avy~~ ships swept the sea areas from South Georgia to the Argentinian coast  
between 20 and 25 April to give early warning of hostile naval movements.

The first phase of the operation was to insert SAS and SBS  
reconnaissance parties by both helicopter and small boats. This was started  
and achieved on 21 April despite appalling weather conditions of intense  
cold and winds gusting to 70 knots. Unfortunately after 24 hours of  
unrelenting blizzard the SAS detachment had to be withdrawn from Fortuna  
Glacier. Two Wessex helicopters dispatched to effect the withdrawal  
crashed in 'white out' conditions, the pilots having lost all points of  
reference and orientation. A third radar fitted Wessex by a remarkable feat  
of airmanship succeeded in recovering the entire detachment and the crews  
of the crashed helicopters. The SAS were re-inserted on 23 April during a  
temporary lull in the blizzard.

By 25 April the weather had improved sufficiently for more reconnaissance  
parties to be landed and helicopter sorties to be flown. A helicopter search  
located the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE on the surface five miles from  
Grytviken. She was attacked by helicopters armed with AS 12 missiles and  
depth charges which caused her to limp back to Grytviken where she was later  
beached. This attack not only eliminated a potent threat to the Task Group  
but also revealed our presence in the area and it was therefore decided to  
press home the advantage without further delay.

Events then moved quickly. Under cover of naval gunfire support  
directed from ashore by a Royal Artillery forward observation officer, the  
assault troops landed at Grytviken by helicopter. Later that afternoon the  
Argentinian forces surrendered and 170 prisoners were taken. British forces  
sustained no casualties. Following the fall of Grytviken, HM Ships PLYMOUTH  
and ENDURANCE were detached to recapture Leith where there was a detachment  
of Argentinian marines. After some initial vacillation, the Argentinian  
force hoisted the white flag on 26 April.

The surrender document was signed onboard HMS ANTRIM on 26 April and  
the Union Flag again flew over South Georgia.

#### EXTENSION OF EXCLUSION ZONE

On 23 April the Argentine Government was warned that any approach  
on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval  
auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to  
interfere with British forces would encounter the appropriate response.  
Moreover all Argentine aircraft engaging in surveillance of these  
forces would be regarded as hostile.

/ The threat posed by the three nuclear submarines had effectively  
stopped Argentinian reinforcement of the Islands by sea since 12 April but,  
with the added aim of stopping resupply by air, a Total Exclusion Zone was  
declared by the Government on 30 April on the arrival of the carrier force.  
This Zone applied not only to Argentinian warships and naval auxiliaries  
but also to all other ships and aircraft attempting to support the illegal  
occupation of the Islands.

The difficulties of maintaining a total blockade are considerable. It  
is now known that one Argentinian resupply ship arrived in the Islands and  
the Argentinian Air Force managed to maintain a limited air bridge until  
shortly before the final surrender. Nevertheless, politically the  
establishment of the Total Exclusion Zone was consistent with the Government's  
efforts to ensure the peaceful withdrawal of the Argentinian forces, while  
militarily it inhibited the Argentinian ability to reinforce and resupply  
their forces and limited their movement.



Additional measures were also considered appropriate. Accordingly, on 7 May the Government informed the Argentinian Government that any of their warships or military aircraft found more than 12 miles from their own coast would be treated as hostile and the appropriate action taken. This move was necessary because of the threat posed by their carrier-borne aircraft and the ease with which hostile forces could approach the Task Force under the cover of bad weather, from mainland bases within 450 miles of the Falkland Islands, a significant factor for a force without the benefit of Airborne Early Warning.

Although not an exclusion zone, on 10 May a 100 nautical mile radius Terminal Control Area around Ascension Island was instituted and formally notified to the appropriate international authorities: this measure called for prior notification of flights to and from the island and of overflights, thus aiding the air defence organisation as well as the control of air traffic.

#### THE INTENSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS

Early on 1 May an RAF Vulcan flying from Ascension Island opened the action against the Argentinian forces on the Falklands with a night bombing attack of Port Stanley airfield which cratered the runway. The 16 hour sortie was supported by Victor Tankers and Nimrod aircraft and was the first of five Vulcan missions directed against the airfield and adjacent radar installations.

Later the same morning Sea Harriers attacked the runway at Port Stanley and also the airstrip at Goose Green. That night Port Stanley airfield was subjected to Naval Gunfire bombardment by HM Ships GLAMORGAN, ARROW and ALACRITY. This was to be the pattern for the next few weeks, with raids on the airfields at Port Stanley and elsewhere by Harriers and night bombardments by units of the Fleet. These attacks were designed to deny the use of the airfields to the Argentinian forces and to erode their readiness, morale and state of alertness. At the beginning of May, the first of many SAS and SBS reconnaissance patrols landed by helicopter and small boats on the Falklands. During the next 3 weeks, these patrols were able to gather vital intelligence in preparation for the main landing. Throughout the period, in extremely harsh conditions, they remained undetected.

On 2 May the Argentinian cruiser, the GENERAL BELGRANO, with two destroyers, was detected south of the Falklands by HMS CONQUEROR. The enemy force was in a position where it posed a serious threat to a number of our ships engaged in operations off the Falklands while other Argentinian surface units were poised to the north. It was a threat that could not be ignored and therefore HMS CONQUEROR was ordered to attack the GENERAL BELGRANO with torpedoes. Two struck the cruiser which sank some hours later. The Argentinian destroyers carried out several unsuccessful depth charge attacks against HMS CONQUEROR and then retired. Later they returned to rescue survivors. Throughout the campaign, the cost in human lives was my constant concern and in consequence, I ordered HMS CONQUEROR not to attack ships involved in rescue operations. The sinking of GENERAL BELGRANO was a clear demonstration of the capability of a nuclear powered submarine and proved to have a major salutary effect on the conduct of future Argentinian operations. After this attack, Argentinian naval surface forces remained within 12 nautical miles of their coast for the remainder of the campaign.



The nuclear powered submarine's effectiveness was not confined to the removal of this threat; for additionally they patrolled off the coast of mainland Argentina and provided invaluable intelligence to our forces in the TEZ.

Later on 2 May, a Sea King helicopter was fired on by an Argentinian patrol craft. Lynx helicopters armed with Sea Skua missiles subsequently attacked the craft which was hit, blew up and sank. A second patrol craft was also attacked and damaged by helicopter fired missiles.

These successes were marred on 4 May by the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD. While stationed about 60 miles from the south east coast of the Falkland Islands on Anti Air Picket Duty, she was attacked by 2 Exocet missiles released by 2 Super Etendard aircraft. One missile struck her on the star-board side and entered amidships. After 4½ hours during which her Ship's Company fought fierce fires whilst engulfed in thick black acrid smoke, the Commanding Officer reluctantly gave the order to abandon ship. Twenty of her Ship's Company were killed in the attack but 236 were safely recovered by other ships and helicopters of the Task Force; the efforts of HMS ARROW in the rescue operation were particularly praiseworthy. HMS SHEFFIELD finally sank in heavy seas while under tow on 10 May.

In the weeks which preceded the main landing, there was constant activity by ships and aircraft of the Task Force and on 4 May a second Vulcan raid was carried out against Port Stanley airfield. 3 Sea Harriers attacked the airstrip at Goose Green, inflicting damage but suffering the loss of one aircraft, the first such loss attributable to enemy action. On 6 May, very regrettably, 2 Sea Harriers from HMS INVINCIBLE were lost and both pilots were killed. Enemy action was not responsible.

Admiral WOODWARD energetically continued to enforce the blockade by attacking enemy surface units: on 9 May the fishing vessel NARWAL, indisputably acting as an intelligence gathering vessel in the vicinity of the main part of the Task Force was strafed by Sea Harriers. She was subsequently abandoned and sank despite the efforts of a boarding party from HMS INVINCIBLE to save her. Survivors were recovered and subsequently repatriated.

On the night 11 May HMS ALACRITY, whilst transitting Falkland Sound discovered the ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS off Port Howard. She was illuminated by star shell and, having refused to heave to, was engaged by 4.5 inch gunfire, blew up and sank. She had been carrying fuel to resupply Argentinian garrisons. Five days later on 16 May, 2 transport ships BAHIA BUEN SUCESO and RIO CARCARANA were attacked by Sea Harriers, damaged and immobilised. The Argentinian patrol craft ISLAS MALVINAS, and the coaster MONSUNEN which belonged to the Falkland Islands Company, were similarly attacked, the latter vessel being subsequently salvaged and put to use by British forces.

In the air, a Puma helicopter was shot down by a Sea Dart missile from HMS COVENTRY on 9 May. On 12 May, the first Argentinian air attack on the ships of the Task Force since the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD, took place. Two waves of A4 (Skyhawk) aircraft attacked HM Ships BRILLIANT and GLASGOW. Three of the 4 aircraft in the first wave were destroyed, 2 by HMS BRILLIANT's Sea Wolf missiles and the third crashing in an attempt to evade. In the second wave, HMS GLASGOW was hit by a bomb which inflicted damage to her engines but did not explode. One of the aircraft in the second wave was destroyed.



At Pebble Island on the night of 14/15 May an SAS raiding party supported by diversionary gunfire support from HMS GLAMORGAN accurately directed by a Forward Observation Officer of the Royal Artillery, destroyed an ammunition dump, stores and 11 aircraft including 6 Pucara Ground Attack aircraft. The raiding party was recovered, having suffered only minor casualties.

Throughout the period I have just described, diplomatic activity in London, Buenos Aires, Washington and New York continued in an effort to find a solution satisfactory to both the parties. The fundamental issue; that the people of the Falkland Islands had the right to choose under which government they wished to live, proved increasingly intractable. Hopes of a compromise solution flickered briefly only to be extinguished by Argentina's refusal to accept this principle of self determination. It was only as a last resort when it was clear that a peaceful solution could not be found that the decision to retake British sovereign territory by force of arms was made and I received my instructions to repossess the Falkland Islands.

#### LAND FORCES

On 2 April, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines commanded by Brigadier J E A THOMPSON, CB, OBE, ADC, was assigned to me for the operation. On 3 April, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment was added as were 8 light armoured reconnaissance vehicles of the Blues and Royals and T Air Defence Battery Royal Artillery equipped with Rapier missiles.

This force of some 5,500 men sailed from the United Kingdom on 6 April in the assault ship HMS FEARLESS, 4 Logistic Landing Ships, SS CANBERRA and MV ELK. These ships were later joined at Ascension Island by the assault ship HMS INTREPID, MV NORLAND and MV EUROPIC FERRY with 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment and 29 Field Battery Royal Artillery embarked. The initial landing forces were complete, and all units exercised together for the first time at Ascension Island.

Due to the steady build up of Argentinian occupation troops, after the main force had sailed, it was decided that additional land forces should be deployed from the United Kingdom. The force chosen, 5th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M J A WILSON, OBE, MC, which had already deployed two of its organic battalions with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines but had retained the 1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles, was augmented by 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards, 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards and numerous supporting arms and services. After a 2 week period of intensive training in South Wales, substantial re-equipping and re-organisation, 3,200 men sailed from Southampton on 12 May in RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH II, the major equipments having sailed on 8 and 9 May in MV NORDIC FERRY and MV BALTIC FERRY.

Thus, the grand total of land forces assigned to me for the recapture of the Falkland Islands became 10,500 men.

Four Chinook helicopters to provide vital mobility for troops and equipment in the land battle, were prepared for sea transit and embarked in SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. 6 RAF Harriers of No.1 Squadron for close support of group troops also joined SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR on 6 May. These Harriers transferred to HMS HERMES on 18 May. 8 Sea Harriers of 809 Naval Air Squadron were also embarked and transferred to HM Ships INVINCIBLE and HERMES between 18-20 May. No.63 Squadron RAF Regiment (Rapier) accompanied 5th Infantry Brigade.



## SELECTION OF BEACHHEAD

It was always accepted that because of its vital role as the seat of government and the only centre of communication, Port Stanley held the key to victory; he who held Port Stanley, held the Falklands. The aim, therefore, was to secure the capital as quickly as possible, around which the Argentinians had concentrated most of their forces.

It was important to select a suitable area for an amphibious assault as near to Port Stanley as possible, because cross-country movement is very difficult and weather conditions do not favour helicopter operations. However, the main danger of selecting an assault area too close to the capital was that it might make it too easy for the Argentinians to launch a counter attack against the beachhead before it could be firmly established. I had not the necessary forces to conduct an opposed landing.

Although it was not possible to select a site which would be completely immune from air attack, the troop carriers and their escorts had to be afforded protection at least from Exocet missiles. The missile's effectiveness is greatly reduced if its intended targets are protected by land. The amphibious force also required deep water. After assessing all the factors, including the anti submarine advantage, San Carlos Water was chosen for the amphibious assault. It is surrounded by hills, with a deep, comparatively sheltered anchorage and with the nearest sizeable enemy force being at Darwin/Goose Green more than 15 miles away.

I was very much aware of the risks which a landing in strength involved. Despite the care with which the landing area had been chosen, the loss of a prestigious target such as SS CANBERRA and her embarked troops would have jeopardised the entire amphibious assault plan. My commanders therefore had to plan the assault to reduce the element of risk to the minimum acceptable. This was achieved by a variety of means. The most careful consideration was given to the disposition of embarked troops and equipment. Cross decking, the movement of men and material from one ship to another, had already been an essential feature of preparations at sea during the passage south. This procedure was intensified during the week before the landing to ensure that assets were deployed effectively with as little risk as possible. Despite the intensity of these operations which were often carried out in very poor weather conditions, there was only one major loss. Tragically, on 19 May, a Sea King helicopter, while engaged in cross decking, struck a large sea bird and immediately crashed into the sea. 21 SAS officers and men were killed.

Further factors essential to the success of the landing were the weather and the stealth of the ships on passage through the Total Exclusion Zone. Radio silence was imposed throughout this period, while as forecast, the seas remained calm allowing cross decking to continue but visibility was restricted to 2 to 3 miles, protecting the force from Argentinian air attack. Finally, it was important to attempt to deceive the enemy of our true intentions by concentrating activity in areas away from San Carlos Water.

## THE LANDING

Thus, in the early hours of 21 May, HM Ships FEARLESS and INTREPID, RFAs STROMNESS, SIR GALAHAD, SIR GERAIN, SIR TRISTRAM, SIR LANCELOT and SIR PERCIVAL together with SS CANBERRA and MV EUROPIC FERRY in whom were embarked 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, steamed stealthily into Falkland



ound. At 0340 local time, the landings began, the troops being ferried ashore in the 16 landing craft from the two assault ships HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID.

Commodore Amphibious Warfare, Commodore M C CLAPP, CB, embarked in HMS FEARLESS controlled the amphibious operation. Also embarked was Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.

First ashore were 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment and 40 Commando Royal Marines on two beaches in the San Carlos Settlement area. 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment then turned south and established a defensive position on the Sussex Mountains effectively blocking the route which any counter attack from the Darwin area would have to take. Meanwhile, 40 Commando Royal Marines moved east, up onto the Verde Mountains. Next ashore was 45 Commando Royal Marines, in Ajax Bay, which was to become the main force logistic area throughout the rest of the campaign. The last assault unit 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment went ashore at Port San Carlos, to protect the northern flank, leaving 42 Commando Royal Marines afloat as a reserve. The artillery, 4 light gun batteries and one Rapier missile battery then established themselves ashore.

At the same time as the main landing took place, a subsidiary operation was launched by SBS supported by naval gunfire bombardment on Fanning Head and a raid by SAS at Darwin. The aim of these operations was to convince the enemy that we were following the pattern established by the raid on Pebble Island six days earlier and to mask the scale of the landings at San Carlos Water.

At dawn, helicopters from the Naval Task Group joined the shuttle, as a constant flow of men and equipment went ashore. By the end of the day more than 3,000 men and almost 1,000 tons of stores and equipments had been successfully landed. The Medical Squadron of the Commando Logistic Regiment, supported by Naval surgical teams and elements of 16 Field Ambulance RAMC, set up a main Dressing Station in a disused refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay.

The aim of achieving surprise had been achieved and, although still in its infancy the beachhead had been established virtually unopposed by land or air. During the afternoon of 21 May, the anticipated Argentinian air raids began. The warships in the Falkland Sound fought gallantly and took the brunt of the attack in protecting the landing ships. At least 14 aircraft were shot down by Barriers and ships' weapons, but 2 Gazelle helicopters were shot down by enemy ground fire and an RAF Barrier was lost. Three of the supporting warships were hit. HMS ANTRIM was struck aft by a bomb which failed to explode; HMS ARGONAUT was hit by 2 bombs which again did not explode but killed 2 of her Ship's Company and inflicted sufficient damage to deprive her of steaming capability. HMS ARDENT was less fortunate; she was repeatedly hit aft by bombs which exploded. The damage sustained subsequently led to her sinking, 22 of her Ship's Company losing their lives; 177 were saved. The ships in San Carlos Water were largely unscathed and after a hectic day unloading, SS CANBERRA was sailed after dark.

#### CONSOLIDATION

The following day, the build up and reinforcement of the beachhead continued. The Argentinian air raids did not. However, on 23 May, the Argentinians again launched heavy air attacks and more ships were hit,



including HMS ANTELOPE. One of the bombs entered her forward, killing one of her Ship's Company instantly, although it did not explode. Subsequent efforts to defuse it failed and the resulting explosion killed one of the disposal team and seriously injured the other. The fires generated by the explosion raged out of control and the ship was abandoned. She later sank but the rest of the Ship's Company survived. A Sea Harrier was also lost when it exploded shortly after take off from HMS HERMES, killing the pilot. But, on this day the Argentinians lost a further seven of their attacking aircraft.

The build up of men and material continued. The Royal Engineers had worked tirelessly to improve the access over the beaches and by the end of the third day, 24 May, 5,500 men had been put ashore together with 5,000 tons of ammunition and stores. The supporting role of MV ELK deserves particular mention. Throughout this period she ferried large amounts of ammunition to the landing areas sometimes at considerable but necessary risk from air attacks. She was quite literally a floating bomb, sometimes carrying as much as 2,500 tons of ammunition onboard.

The 25 May was Argentina's National Day and a major effort by her Air Force was anticipated. At first, fears appeared to be groundless; only one raid penetrated to the Falkland Sound area where it inflicted no damage but one of the aircraft was shot down by a Sea Dart missile. Three more aircraft were also shot down by a Sea Dart missiles of HMS COVENTRY, a Seacat missile fired by HMS YARMOUTH and Rapier missile fired from ashore. In mid afternoon, however, the advanced air defence elements of the Task Group were targets for a very determined low level air attack. HMS BROADSWORD suffered superficial damage from an exploding bomb and HMS COVENTRY was hit by several bombs which exploded in or near the machinery spaces. She capsized shortly after the attack with the loss of 19 of her Ship's Company. On this day, too, SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR with a cargo of helicopters, support equipment and stores which included material needed to establish a forward airstrip for helicopters and Harriers, was in company with the main force to the east of the Falklands en route for San Carlos. One hour before sunset the force received a brief warning of an attack by Argentinian aircraft armed with Exocet missiles. Ships took appropriate counter measures, but SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was hit and set on fire. The fires spread rapidly and one hour after the attack she was abandoned. 3 Naval ratings and 9 Merchant Navy officers and men, including her Master, Captain I NORTE, DSO, were killed.

The Argentinian Air Force, despite their losses, persisted with their attacks in the San Carlos area but, by now, the presence of Rapier and Blowpipe missile systems ashore and effective small arms fire brought to bear from ships and shore were a potent counter. Similarly, attacks continued against units at sea. On 30 May, the carrier group having moved closer to the Falkland Islands to cover the approach of 5th Infantry Brigade troop ships, was attacked by Super Etendards and Skyhawks. A number of Exocet missiles were launched but were evaded and exploded harmlessly. Three of the Skyhawks were shot down, 2 by Sea Dart missiles, the third by 4.5 inch gunfire.

#### THE BREAKOUT

On 26/27 May, 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines began to break out from the beachhead. The overall plan was to close up to the Port Stanley area as quickly as possible. There was however a significant Argentinian presence at Darwin and Goose Green. Although not on the direct route to Port Stanley,



These troops posed a threat to the flank and to the beachhead. It was therefore decided that it was essential to neutralise the Argentinian presence there before the advance on Stanley could be fully developed.

Late on 26 May, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment started its move south. At dawn on 27 May, 45 Commando Royal Marines and 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment started to advance along the northern route from the beachhead, east towards Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet respectively. Throughout 27 May, while the other two battalions continued their advances, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment laid up at Camilla Creek House 5 miles north of the Argentinian position, while an artillery troop of 3 light guns was flown forward to support the attack which began at 0200 on 28 May.

One of the RAF Harriers flying close air support missions assisting the move forward was shot down on 27 May whilst attacking Argentinian positions at Goose Green. The pilot ejected and was later recovered unharmed by advancing land forces.

By mid afternoon, Darwin had been captured and the battalion pressed on south down the narrow isthmus towards Goose Green, some two miles on. They had to cross open ground in broad daylight, and were opposed by strong defensive positions which were well dug in and sited in depth. Low cloud, strong winds and driving rain <sup>delayed</sup> air operations in support of the advance.

The battle for Goose Green lasted many hours, frequently at very close quarters, and amongst the casualties was the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel E JONES, VC, OBE, who was killed when charging an enemy post which was holding up the advance on the left flank. Throughout the course of the battle 16 officers and men of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment were killed, and one Royal Marines officer was also killed when his Scout helicopter was shot down by enemy aircraft.

By last light the battalion supported by 2 further RAF Harrier raids had surrounded the remaining garrison in the Goose Green Settlement where 112 civilians were also held, having been confined to the Community Hall for 3 weeks.

During the night the Acting Commanding Officer conducted negotiations with the Argentinians and, by mid morning on 29 May, the surrender was accepted. As a result of their gallant action, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment took over 1,000 prisoners and [50] Argentinians had been killed. Subsequently, it was discovered that the original garrison of some 650 had been reinforced on 28 May by an additional regiment. A large quantity of artillery, air defence weapons and ammunition was captured. In addition, all the civilians were released unharmed.

#### ADVANCE ON PORT STANLEY

After a remarkable cross country march of 50 miles over very difficult terrain in appalling weather conditions 45 Commando Royal Marines had reached Teal Inlet, and 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment had reached Estancia House via Teal Inlet. Meanwhile, D Squadron 22 Special Air Service Regiment had established an operations base in the area of Mount Kent and were carrying out an aggressive patrolling and intelligence gathering programme. After 3 days and several attempts at reinforcement which were prevented by the atrocious weather at night, they were joined by the first half of 42 Commando



Royal Marines and a troop of light guns of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, who were flown forward by helicopter on 1 June, the remainder joining on 2 June.

On 30 May, General MOORE assumed command of operations ashore and on 1 June was joined by his Headquarters which was immediately established in HMS FEARLESS at San Carlos Water. Also on 1 June, 5th Infantry Brigade began to disembark at the beachhead. The movements of RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH II in which they had set sail from Southampton were kept strictly secret. I could not risk such a prestigious target and her embarked force to the hazards of the Total Exclusion Zone. She had therefore made her way south well outside the range of Argentinian aircraft to rendezvous with SS CANBERRA and MV NORLAND in Cumberland Bay, South Georgia. Here 5th Infantry Brigade and accompanying weapons and equipment were disembarked by the small ships of 11 Mine Countermeasures Squadron, HM Ships CORDELLA, PICT, NORTHELLA, JUNELLA and FARNELLA. Their transfer to SS CANBERRA and MV NORLAND was completed with noteworthy speed on 29 May.

After arrival at San Carlos Water on 31 May, MV NORLAND disembarked 1st Battalion 7th <sup>Duke of Edinburgh's Own</sup> Gurkha Rifles during the morning of 1 June. Later that day, 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards and 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards disembarked from SS CANBERRA. The 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment was put under the command of 5th Infantry Brigade and moved forward to the Fitzroy and Bluff Cove areas and was replaced at Darwin and Goose Green by 1st Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles.

Whilst 5th Infantry Brigade moved forward in the south, other elements of the Task Force were fully employed. On land a build up of stores and ammunition in preparation for the final battles took place. This included the construction of a Barrier Forward Operating Base at Port San Carlos by 11 and 59 Squadrons of the Royal Engineers. This task was completed in difficult conditions and despite the loss of much of their equipment in SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Helicopters operating in very poor weather conditions ferried vast amounts of stores and ammunition to forward positions; this included 18,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. Other stores were moved by Logistic Landing Ships to Teal Inlet after the clearance of San Salvador Sound by Mine Countermeasures Forces. At sea, ships moved close inshore nightly to conduct bombardments of selected targets on the approaches to and around Port Stanley. 1,300 4.5 inch rounds were fired by HM Ships CARDIFF, ARROW, YARMOUTH, ACTIVE and AMBUSCADE during the period 5 to 10 June. Argentinian aircraft were also successfully engaged by units of the Fleet. One Canberra was shot down by a Sea Dart missile fired by HMS EXETER. HMS PLYMOUTH shot down 2 Mirage aircraft with Sea Cat missiles. Sea Barriers from HMS INVINCIBLE attacked and brought down an Argentinian Hercules.

Vulcan attacks against enemy radar installations in the vicinity of Port Stanley were carried out on 31 May and 3 June. The final Vulcan bombing raid of the airfield took place on 12 June. These, and the intensified bombing raids by Barriers, complemented the heavy night bombardment by Task Force ships. A forward air base was established at Port San Carlos on 5 June, from which combat air patrols and offensive air support missions, as well as helicopter operations were mounted.

By this time too, the air to air refuelled Hercules were conducting regular air drops of important supplies to ships in the Total Exclusion Zone.

There were losses. A Gazelle helicopter in transit from Darwin to



Fitzroy was lost on 6 June with the 2 passengers and the 2 crew. An RAF Harrier crashed into the sea on 31 May after being struck by enemy ground fire over Port Stanley. A Sea Harrier crashed into the sea on 6 May whilst returning from a combat air patrol; both pilots were rescued unhurt by Task Force search and rescue units. An accident at Port San Carlos severely damaged an RAF Harrier on 8 June, bringing the total losses of ground support Harriers to 4. The direct transit of 2 pairs of replacement RAF Harriers from Ascension Island to EMS HERMES using in flight refuelling on 2 and 8 June was a noteworthy achievement and a most welcome reinforcement.

Further reinforcement and resupply forward was severely hampered by bad weather which precluded the use of helicopters for troop movement. It was therefore decided to move 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards, 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards and some supporting units and equipment by ship to Fitzroy. This move was conducted as follows: on 6 June 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards disembarked from landing craft having transferred from HMS INTREPID off Lively Island by night. Due to very bad weather only half the 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards landed on a similar operation on 7 June. They had sailed to Lively Island in HMS FEARLESS. During the night 7/8 June the remainder of the Battalion and some other units were embarked in SIR GALAHAD and sailed directly to Fitzroy. The weather on 8 June unexpectedly and unfortunately cleared and whilst SIR GALAHAD and SIR TRISTRAM, the latter having arrived on 7 June, were unloading they were attacked by Argentinian aircraft before the Rapier battery which had been landed as soon as possible after arrival was fully operational. Both were hit, caught fire and abandoned. This attack led to the heaviest casualties on the campaign. Forty two Welsh Guardsmen, 3 members of 16 Field Ambulance RAMC and 5 Royal Fleet Auxiliary crewmen were killed. In a further air raid, a landing craft was bombed and sank in Choiseul Sound. 6 Royal Marines and 1 Naval Rating were killed.

Weather conditions again deteriorated. It was almost mid-winter, with frequent rain and snow storms driven horizontal by high winds, and sub-zero temperatures. The battalions who occupied the most exposed positions were suffering with cases of exposure and trench-foot. General MOORE was thus determined to launch his bid for Port Stanley with the minimum of delay.

#### THE FINAL BATTLE

The Argentinians had about 7 battalions together with supporting troops in the Port Stanley area. Approximately 3 of these battalions were forward on the important features of Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. In addition, there were about 1,000 troops on West Falkland.

General MOORE planned that the attack on Port Stanley should be conducted in 3 phases. The first phase was scheduled for the night of 11/12 June when 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines was to capture the three features of Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. The second phase, planned to take place 24 hours later, required both brigades to capture the next features to the east; these were Wireless Ridge, Tumbledown Mountain and Mount William. Finally, the 1st Battalion The Welsh Guards, with 2 companies of 40 Commando Royal Marines under command, were to capture Sapper Hill.

As scheduled, on 11 June a silent night attack was launched. The enemy was outfought and soon after dawn all the brigade objectives were firmly held. In the centre, after a hard fight in very difficult mountain terrain, 45 Commando Royal Marines captured Two Sisters. Further south 42 Commando Royal Marines made an indirect approach, exploiting a gap in the enemy mine-



fields which had been established as a result of extremely detailed, skilled and aggressive patrolling and captured Mount Harriet from behind, taking over 200 prisoners. Meanwhile in the north 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment had an extremely tough fight against one of the enemy's best battalions to capture Mount Longdon, during the course of which Sgt McKay VC was killed while <sup>CINCFLEET TO</sup> DESCRIBE SGT McKay's ACTION. During the day of 12 June all these positions came under heavy artillery fire, and further casualties were sustained.

For this and subsequent attacks, troop movements and assaults ashore were covered by Harrier attacks, naval gunfire and the support of five field batteries who fired 15,000 rounds. 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery were in continuous action for 12 hours during the first phase, at one point giving supporting fire only 50 metres in front of the advancing infantry. In the second phase 57 missions were fired. The Royal Engineers who had completed the hazardous task for clearing routes through the minefields provided men with each of the assaulting units. In addition they carried out many tasks to improve the mobility of the land forces including reconstruction of the bridge at Fitzroy.

On 12 June, HMS GLAMORGAN while leaving her gun support position at dawn, was struck aft by a land launched Exocet missile. Despite the resulting fires, she remained able to steam with gun armament intact. The fires were eventually brought under control, but 13 of her Ship's Company had been killed in this attack.

Also on 12 June the final Vulcan raid was made on Port Stanley airfield, supported by further Harrier attacks, in an attempt to prevent any further use of the airfield by the Argentinians prior to the final assault.

To allow further time for preparation, Phase 2 was delayed by 24 hours and eventually launched on the night of 13/14 June. 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, once more under command of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, in a beautifully managed and very skilful attack took Wireless Ridge, whilst on Tumbledown Mountain, 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards had a particularly difficult battle before they overcame the regular Argentinian marine battalion. Thereafter 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles passed through 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards to secure Mount William.

At this stage it became clear that enemy resistance was collapsing. They could be seen retreating towards Port Stanley from many directions, including Moody Brook and Sapper Hill, neither of which had yet been attacked. Some, ejected from Tumbledown by 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards, realised that they must pass Mount William, now firmly in Gurkha hands. They chose instead to retrace their steps and surrender to the Guardsmen.

Phase 3 was never launched. Realising that the Argentinian forces were beaten, General MOORE launched two battalions in pursuit, to close up to the outskirts of Port Stanley as quickly as possible. This was in line with General MOORE's policy throughout the land battle of moving forward energetically and as expeditiously as possible.

During the afternoon of 14 June with large numbers of enemy standing about, abandoning their arms and surrendering, British troops were ordered to fire only in self-defence, and white flags began to appear over Port Stanley.



That night, after some hours of negotiations, General MOORE flew by helicopter into Port Stanley and took the formal surrender of all Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands from General MENENDEZ.

#### RECAPTURE OF SOUTH THULE

The final step in the eviction of the illegal presence from the South Atlantic Dependencies was the removal of a small party which the Argentinian Navy had maintained on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands since 1976.

HMS ENDURANCE, commanded by Captain N J BARKER, CBE, Royal Navy, which had played a vital supporting role in the South Georgia area throughout, led a Task Group which included the frigate HMS YARMOUTH, RFA OLWEN, and the tug SALVAGEMAN. M Company 42 Commando Royal Marines formed the bulk of the landing force. The Argentinian party surrendered without resistance on 20 June. Although it had been claimed that this was a scientific station, ample proof was obtained that it was part of an Argentinian military meteorological network.

#### GENERAL COMMENTS

The preceding paragraphs have recorded the major actions and significant phases of operations in the South Atlantic. The chronological record has not allowed proper emphasis of those activities whose importance is characterised by their continuous nature.

Attacks on the Task Force by enemy submarines were a significant and ever present threat, which was recognised by the inclusion of anti-submarine Sea King helicopters in the air order of battle. A number of torpedo attacks were carried out by these aircraft against underwater contacts classified as possible submarines. Results of the actions are not known, but the high intensity flying rates of this helicopter force throughout the operations were an essential part of Fleet anti-submarine warfare defences.

Some of the Harrier operations involving enemy action have already been recorded. However, defence of the Fleet and, later, close air support of the land forces, required these aircraft to spend many hours at high alert states or flying defensive combat air patrols. These protective measures were continuously necessary from the moment the ships entered the Total Exclusion Zone. A total of [27] enemy aircraft were destroyed in air to air combat, with the Sidewinder missile success rate being particularly noteworthy. It became apparent in the last few days of the open action that Admiral WOODWARD's courageously aggressive stance to wreak attrition on the Argentinian Air Force had accomplished the aim and to all intents and purposes they were beaten.

Nimrod aircraft were the first to be based on Ascension Island, on 6 April. They were immediately involved as communications links for the transitting nuclear submarines and thereafter they continuously provided direct support and area surveillance to every major element of the Task Force to the limit of the aircrafts' range. All deployments of small aircraft were provided with airborne search and rescue cover and, after the fitting of refuelling probes, Nimrods converted for air to air refuelling provided long range surveillance of the sea areas between the Falkland Islands and the Argentinian mainland prior to and during the main amphibious landing.

Air support of the Task Force from Ascension Island was completely



dependent on air to air refuelling. In performing all refuelling tasks between the United Kingdom and the Total Exclusion Zone, the Victor Tankers provided continuous and timely support.

With the ships of the Task Force operating so far from Dockyard assistance, much major maintenance and repair work had to be carried out afloat in very rough seas. The achievements of the maintenance and repair ships MV STENA SEASPREAD and MV STENA INSPECTOR were outstanding.


Over the distances involved and in areas so notoriously bad for radio propagation the value of satellite communications cannot be overstated. The Command and Control of Operation CORPORATE would have been immeasurably more difficult without this facility.

Logistics were always to the forefront of my mind. Throughout the events I have described, no ship ran out of fuel, no weapon system of ammunition despite a supply line of over 7,000 miles and the extreme weather conditions encountered. This is ample testimony to the excellent work of all members of the logistic support ships and units of the Task Force.

Major contributory factors to the survival of the wounded were the supreme physical fitness of our troops and the exemplary medical attention given to casualties of both sides often under fire and in the most squalid conditions. First aid matched the professional expertise of the field and afloat medical teams. Equally vital was the skill of the helicopter pilots in speedily evacuating casualties. Casualties were transferred to the Hospital Ship SS UGANDA. Once fit for further travel, they were transferred to the 3 casualty ferries HM Ships HYDRA, HECLA and HECATE and conveyed to Montevideo for onward aeromedical evacuation to the United Kingdom by RAF VC10. These operations were all conducted with great efficiency and great concern for the comfort of the wounded.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Operation CORPORATE became necessary because deterrence failed but in its execution it represented a triumph of military capability backed by resolute political will. The difficulties of short notice, extreme range and appalling weather under which this operation was mounted were all overcome by a single factor, the quality of our people. The fighting men were magnificent when put to the test and the support they received at every level, at sea from the Merchant Navy, at Ascension Island and in the United Kingdom was superb. I could not have been better served.



J D E FIELDHOUSE  
Admiral  
Commander Task Force 317



COMMANDER TASK FORCE 317 AND 324

Admiral Sir John FIELDHOUSE, GCB, GBE

AIR COMMANDER

Air Marshal Sir John CURTISS, KCB, KBE, CBIM, RAF

LAND FORCES DEPUTY

Major General Sir Jeremy MOORE, KCB, OBE, MC and Bar

From 21 May: Lieutenant General Sir Richard TRANT, KCE

FLAG OFFICER SUBMARINES

Vice Admiral P G M HERBERT, OBE

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 317.8

Rear Admiral Sir John WOODWARD, KCB

3 COMMANDO BRIGADE ROYAL MARINES

Brigadier J H A THOMPSON, CB, OBE, ADC

5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigadier M J A WILSON, OBE, MC

COMMODORE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Commodore M C CLAPP, CB



SHIPS WHICH SAILED FOR OPERATION CORPORATE BEFORE 20 JUNE 1982

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>COMMANDING OFFICER</u>	<u>DATE PASSED 35°S</u> (see note)
HMS ACTIVE	Commander P C B CANTER, RN	23 May
HMS ALACRITY	Commander C J S CRAIG, DSC, RN	25 April
HMS AMBUSCADE	Commander P J MOSSE, RN	18 May
HMS ANDROMEDA	Captain J L WEATHERALL, RN	23 May
HMS ANTELOPE	Commander N J TOBIN, DSC, RN	18 May
HMS ANTRIM	Captain B G YOUNG, DSO, RN	18 April
HMS ARDENT	Commander A W J WEST, DSC, RN	13 May
HMS ARGONAUT	Captain C H LAYMAN, DSO, MVO, RN	13 May
HMS ARROW	Commander P J BOOTHERSTONE, DSC, RN	20 April
HMS AVENGER	Captain E M WHITE, RN	23 May
HMS BRILLIANT	Captain J F COWARD, DSO, RN	20 April
HMS BRISTOL	Captain A GROSE, RN	23 May
HMS BROADSWORD	Captain W R CANNING, DSO, ADC, RN	25 April



SHIP

COMMANDING OFFICER

DATE PASSED 35°S  
(see note)

HMS CARDIFF	Captain M G T HARRIS, RN	23 May
HMS COVENTRY	Captain D HART-DYKE, MVO, RN	20 April
HMS DUMBARTON CASTLE	Lieutenant Commander N D WOOD, RN	13 June
HMS ENDURANCE	Captain N J BARKER, CBE, RN	Not applicable
HMS EXETER	Captain E M BALFOUR, MVO, RN	19 May
HMS FEARLESS	Captain E J S LARKEN, DSO, RN	13 May
HMS GLAMORGAN	Captain M E BARROW, DSO, ADC, RN	25 April
HMS GLASGOW	Captain A P HODDINOTT, OBE, RN	20 April
HMS HECLA	Captain G L HOPE, RN	10 May
HMS HERALD	Captain R I C HALLIDAY, RN	15 May
HMS HERMES	Captain L E MIDDLETON, DSO, RN	25 April
- 800 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander A D AULD, DSC, RN	-
- 826 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander D J S SQUIER, AFC, RN	-
HMS HYDRA	Commander R J CAMPBELL, RN	15 May
HMS INTREPID	Captain P G V DINGEMANS, DSO, RN	13 May
HMS INVINCIBLE	Captain J J BLACK, DSO, MBE, RN	25 April



SHIP

COMMANDING OFFICER

DATE PASSED 35°S  
(see note)

- 801 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander N D WARD, DSC, AFC, RN	-
- 820 Naval Air Squadron	Lieutenant Commander R J S WYKES-SNEYD, AFC, RN	-
HMS LEEDS CASTLE	Lieutenant Commander C F B HAMILTON, RN	17 May
HMS MINERVA	Commander S H G JOHNSON, RN	23 May
HMS PENELOPE	Commander P V RICKARD, RN	23 May
HMS PLYMOUTH	Captain D PENTREATH, DSO, RN	18 April
HMS SHEFFIELD	Captain J F T G SALT, RN	25 April
HMS YARMOUTH	Commander A MORTON, DSC, RN	25 April
<u>HM SUBMARINES</u>		
HMS CONQUEROR	Commander C L WREFORD-BROWN, DSO, RN	
HMS COURAGEOUS	Commander R T N BEST, RN	
HMS ONYX	Lieutenant Commander A P JOHNSON, RN	
HMS SPARTAN	Commander J B TAYLOR, RN	
HMS SPLENDID	Commander R C LANE-NOTT, RN	
HMS VALIANT	Commander T M le MARCHAND, RN	



SHIP

COMMANDING OFFICER

DATE PASSED 35° S  
(see note)

EDATS TRAWLERS (taken up from Trade and Commissioned)

HMS CORDELLA	Lieutenant Commander M C G HOLLOWAY, RN	18 May
HMS FARNELLA	Lieutenant R J BISHOP, RN	18 May
HMS JUNELLA	Lieutenant M ROWLEDGE, RN	18 May
HMS NORTHELLA	Lieutenant J P S GREENOP, RN	18 May
HMS PICT	Lieutenant Commander D G GARWOOD, RN	18 May

ROYAL MARITIME AUXILIARY SERVICE

SHIP

MASTER

RMAS GOOSANDER	Captain A MacGREGOR
RMAS TYPHOON	Captain J N MORRIS

COMMANDER BRITISH FORCES SUPPORT UNIT, ASCENSION ISLAND

Captain R McQUEEN, CBE, RN

NOTE: Latitude 35° South delineates the start of the Argentinian coastline.



ROYAL MARINE UNITS

40 Commando Royal Marines  
42 Commando Royal Marines  
45 Commando Royal Marines  
Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines  
Headquarters and Signal Squadron 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines  
3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron Royal Marines  
Air Defence Troop Royal Marines  
1st Haiding Squadron Royal Marines  
Special Boat Squadron  
The Band of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Commando Forces  
Y Troop Royal Marines

OFFICERS COMMANDING

Lieutenant Colonel M P J HUNT RM  
Lieutenant Colonel N F VAUX DSO RM  
Lieutenant Colonel A P WHITEHEAD DSO RM  
Lieutenant Colonel I J HELLBERG OBE RCT  
Major R C DIXON RM  
Major C P CAMERON MC RM  
Lieutenant I L DUNN RM  
Captain F I J BAXTER RM  
Major J J THOMSON OBE RM  
Captain J M WARE LRAM RM  
Captain G D CORBETT R SICS



## ARMY UNITS

Two troops The Blues and Royals	Captain R A K FIELD RMC/D
1st Field Regiment Royal Artillery (Less one battery)	Lieutenant Colonel G A HOLT RA
12th Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (Less one battery)	Lieutenant Colonel M C BOWDEN RA
29th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery	Lieutenant Colonel M J HOLROYD-SMITH OBE RA
Elements 43 Air Defence Battery, 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment Royal Artillery	Captain R C DICKEY RA
Elements 49th Field Regiment Royal Artillery	Major R T GWYN RA
Elements Royal School of Artillery Support Regiment	Major M H FALLON RA
Elements 33 Engineer Regiment	Captain B LLOYD RE
36 Engineer Regiment (Less one squadron)	Lieutenant Colonel G W FIELD MBE RE
Elements of 38 Engineer Regiment	Major R B HAWKEN RE
59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers	Major R MACDONALD RE
Elements Military Works Force	Lieutenant Colonel L J KENNEDY MBE RE
Elements 2 Postal and Courier Regiment Royal Engineers	Major I WINFIELD RE
Elements 14th Signal Regiment	Captain G D CORBET R SIGNALS
Elements 30th Signal Regiment	Major W K BUTLER R SIGNALS
5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron	Major M L FORGE R SIGNALS
Elements 602 Signal Troop	Warrant Officer II (Yeoman of Signals) J F CALVERT R SIGNALS
2nd Battalion Scots Guards	Lieutenant Colonel M I E SCOTT DSO SG
1st Battalion Welsh Guards	Lieutenant Colonel J F RICKETT CBE WG
1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles	Lieutenant Colonel D P de C MORGAN OBE 7GR



2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment. Commanded in turn by

3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment

Elements 22nd Special Air Service Regiment

656 Squadron Army Air Corps

Elements 17 Port Regiment Royal Corps of Transport

Elements 29 Transport and Movements Regiment Royal Corps of Transport

Elements 47 Air Despatch Squadron Royal Corps of Transport

407 Troop Royal Corps of Transport

Elements of The Joint Helicopter Support Unit

16 Field Ambulance Royal Medical Corps

Elements 19 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps

Elements 9 Ordnance Battalion Royal Army Ordnance Corps

81 Ordnance Company Royal Army Ordnance Corps

10 Field Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Elements 70 Aircraft Workshops Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Elements 160 Provost Company Royal Military Police

6 Field Cash Office Royal Army Pay Corps

a. Lieutenant Colonel H JONES VC OBE PA

b. Major C P B KEEBLE DSO PARA

c. Lieutenant Colonel D R CHAUNDLER PA

Lieutenant Colonel H W R PIKE DSO MBE PA

Lieutenant Colonel H M ROSE OBE COLDM GDS

Major C S SIDUN AAC

Lieutenant J G D LOWE RCT

Lieutenant D R BYRNE RCT

Major R C GARDNER RCT

Lieutenant J P ASH RCT

Corporal J ELLIOT RCT

Lieutenant Colonel J D A ROBERTS RAMC

Captain J T GRAHAM RAMC

Major R B P SMITH RAOC

Major G M A THOMAS RAOC

Major A D BALL REME

Staff Sergeant M J EMERY REME

Captain A K BARLEY RMP

Major R F CLARK RAPC



38 601 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)  
39 602 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)  
40 603 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)

Major M M HOWES RRW

Major A S HUGHES RWF

Flight Lieutenant G HAWKINS RAF



ROYAL AIR FORCE

UNIT

DETACHMENT COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER

Senior Royal Air Force Officer  
Ascension Island

Group Captain J S B Price CBE ADC RAF

FLYING SQUADRONS

1(F) Squadron Harrier GR3

Wing Commander F T Squire DFC AFC RAF

Detachments of:

10 Squadron VC 10

Wing Commander O G Bunn MBE RAF

18 Squadron Chinook HC1

Squadron Leader R U Langworthy DFC AFC RAF -

24 Squadron Hercules C1 )

Squadron Leader M J Kempster RAF (4-17 Apr 82)

30 Squadron Hercules C1 )

Squadron Leader J R D Morley RAF (18 Apr-11 May 82)

47 Squadron Hercules C1 )

Squadron Leader N C L Hudson BA RAF (12 May -

70 Squadron Hercules C1 )

23 Jul 82)

29 Squadron Phantom FGR2

Squadron Leader R W D Trotter RAF

42 Squadron Nimrod Mk 1

Wing Commander D L Baugh OBE RAF

44 Squadron Vulcan B2 )

50 Squadron Vulcan B2 )

Squadron Leader A C Montgomery RAF

101 Squadron Vulcan B2 )

55 Squadron Victor K2 )

Wing Commander D W Maurice-Jones RAF (18-21 Apr 82)

57 Squadron Victor K2 )

Wing Commander A W Bowman MBE RAF (22 Apr 82)

120 Squadron Nimrod Mk 2 )

201 Squadron Nimrod Mk 2 )

Wing Commander D Emmerson AFC RAF

206 Squadron Nimrod Mk 2 )

202 Squadron SAR Sea King

Flight Lieutenant M J Caryle RAF

ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT

3 (Regiment) Wing Headquarters Unit)

15 (Regiment) Squadron Detachment )

Field Squadron )

Wing Commander T T Wallis RAF

63 (Regiment) Squadron (Rapier)

Squadron Leader I P G Loughborough RAF



ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARIES

RFA APPLELEAF  
RFA BAYLEAF  
RFA BLUE ROVER  
RFA BRAMBLELEAF  
RFA ENGADINE  
RFA FORT AUSTIN  
RFA FORT GRANGE  
RFA RESOURCE  
RFA OLMEDA  
RFA OLNA  
RFA PEARLEAF  
RFA PLUMLEAF  
RFA REGENT  
RFA STROMNESS  
RFA TIDEPPOOL  
RFA TIDESPRING  
SIR BEDIVERE  
SIR GALAHAD  
SIR GERAIN  
SIR LANCELOT  
SIR PERCIVALE  
SIR TRISTRAM

MASTERS

Captain G P A MacDOUGALL, RFA  
Captain A E T HUNTER, RFA  
Captain J D RODDIS, RFA  
Captain M S J FARLEY, RFA  
Captain D F FREEMAN, RFA  
Commodore S C DUNLOP, CBE, DSO, RFA  
Captain D G M AVERILL, CBE, RFA  
Captain B A SEYMOUR, RFA  
Captain A P OVERBURY, OBE, RFA  
Captain J A BAILEY, RFA  
Captain J McCULLOCH, RFA  
Captain R W M WALLACE, RFA  
Captain J LOGAN, RFA  
Captain J B DICKINSON, OBE, RFA  
Captain J W GAFFREY, RFA  
Captain S REDMOND, OBE, RFA  
Captain P J McCARTHY, OBE, RFA  
Captain P J G ROBERTS, DSO, RFA  
Captain D E LAWRENCE, DSC, RFA  
Captain C A PURTCHER-WYDENBRUCK, OBE, RFA  
Captain A F PITT, DSC, RFA  
Captain G R GREEN, DSC, RFA



SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADEMASTERSSENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

MV ALVEGA	Captain A LAZENBY	
MV ANCO CHARGER	Captain B HATTON	
MV ASTRONOMER	Captain H S BRADEN	Lieutenant Commander R GAINSFORD, RN
SS ATLANTIC CAUSEWAY	Captain M H C TWOMEY	Commander F P SEYMOUR, RN
SS ATLANTIC CONVEYOR	Captain I NORTH, DSC	Captain M G LAYARD, CBE, RN
MV AVELONA STAR	Captain H DYER	
MV BALDER LONDON	Captain K J WALLACE	
MV BALTIC FERRY	Captain E HARRISON	Lieutenant Commander G B WEBB, RN
MV BRITISH ENTERPRISE III	Captain D GRANT	Lieutenant Commander B E M REYNELL, RN
MV BRITISH AVON	Captain J W M GUY	
MV BRITISH DART	Captain J A N TAYLOR	
MV BRITISH ESK	Captain G BARBER	
MV BRITISH TAMAR	Captain W H HARE	
MV BRITISH TAY	Captain P T MORRIS	
MV BRITISH TEST	Captain T A OLIPHANT	
MV BRITISH TRENT	Captain P R WALKER	
MV BRITISH WYE	Captain D M RUNDELL, OBE	
SS CANBERRA	Captain W SCOTT-MASSON, CBE	Captain C P O BURNE, CBE, RN



IPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADEMASTERSSENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

MV CEDARBANK	Captain R F WHITEHEAD	
MV CONTENDER BEZANT	Captain A MACKINNON	Lieutenant Commander D H N YATES, RN
MV ELK	Captain J P MORTON, CBE	Commander A S RITCHIE, OBE, RN
MV EUROPIC FERRY	Captain C J C CLARK, OBE	Commander A B GOUGH, RN
MV FORT TORONTO	Captain R I KINNIER	
MV G A WALKER	Captain E C METHAM	
MV GEESTPORT	Captain G F FOSTER	
CS IRIS	Captain G FULTON	Lieutenant Commander J BITHELL, RN
MT IRISHMAN	Captain W ALLEN	
MV LAERTES	Captain H T REID	
MV LYCAON	Captain H R LAWTON	Lieutenant Commander D J STILES, RN
MV MYRMIDON	Captain D MACLACHLAN	Lieutenant R SWAINE, RN
MV NORLAND	Captain M ELLERBY, CBE	Commander C J ESPLIN-JONES, OBE, RN
MV NORDIC FERRY	Captain R JENKINS	Lieutenant Commander M St J D A THORBURN, RN
RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH II	Captain P JACKSON	Captain N C H JAMES, RN
TEV RANGATIRA	Captain P LIDDELL	Commander D H LINES, RN
MV SAINT BRANDAN	Captain J McINTOSH	
MV SAINT EDMUND	Captain M J STOCKMAN	Lieutenant Commander A M SCOTT, RN



SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADEMASTERSSENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

RMS SAINT HELENA

Captain  
M L M SMITH

MT SALVAGEMAN

Captain  
A J STOCKWELL

MV SAPELE

Captain  
A J MILMINE

MV SANDSHORE

Captain  
A BAKE

MV SAXONIA

Captain  
H EVANS

MV SCOTTISH EAGLE

Captain  
A TERRAS

MV SHELL EBURNA

Captain  
J C BEAUMONT

MV STENA INSPECTOR

Captain  
D EDECaptain  
P J STICKLAND, RN

MV STENA SEASPREAD

Captain  
N WILLIAMSCaptain  
P BADCOCK, CBE, RN

MV STRATHEWE

Captain  
S T S HOUSEHOLDLieutenant Commander  
R F HEWLAND, RN

MV TOR CALEDONIA

Captain  
A SCOTTLieutenant Commander  
J G DEVINE, RN

SS UGANDA

Captain  
J G CLARKCommander  
A B GOUGE, RNSenior Medical Officer:  
Surgeon Captain  
A J RINTOUL, RN


MV WIMPEY SEAHORSE

Captain  
M SLACK, OBE

MT YORKSHIREMAN


Captain  
P RIMMER





DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES







27 JULY 1982







16<sup>2</sup>

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 November, 1982.

The Argentine threat to the Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has seen JIC(82)(N)115 of 16 November.

Mrs. Thatcher has noted:-

"We should consider how we should react to the several possibilities of military adventures described in this assessment. Their shipping and bases are now vulnerable, as we have considerable forces in or near the Falklands."

BF1

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the Prime Minister to receive advice as soon as possible on how we should react to the various military options open to Argentina.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.





ls

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 November, 1982.

e

Falklands Garrison

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's minute of 16 November. You will be aware of the outcome of yesterday's meeting of OD(FAF).

A. J. COLES

John Kerr, Esq.,  
HM Treasury.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

JIC(82)(N) 115

COPY NO 1

16 November 1982

UK EYES A

*MT*

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE ARGENTINE THREAT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The attached Note was approved out of Committee on MONDAY 15 NOVEMBER 1982.

Signed A H R YORK  
for Secretary  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office

16 November 1982

DISTRIBUTION

JIC (NOTE)

Telegraphed to -

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*We should consider how we should react to the sword possibilities of military adventure described in this assessment.*

*their shipping bases are now vulnerable as we*

*have considerable forces in or near the Falklands*

*mb*



Ref: BO6635

15

12/11

h.c.

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(FAF): Falklands Garrison

## BACKGROUND

In summing up the discussion after the presentation to the Sub-Committee on 1st November, you said that it was an overriding political imperative that the Falkland Islands garrison should be of sufficient size to deter, and if necessary defeat, an Argentine invasion attempt during the period between now and the completion of the new airfield; and that this pointed to a garrison on the lines of the "core force" of 3,100 men, with related naval and air units, which had been described in the presentation.

2. Proposals for a garrison of this size are contained in Annex A to the Defence Secretary's minute to you dated 12th November, which he suggested might be cleared out of committee. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in his minute to you of 16th November, argues that the implications for our commitment to NATO require discussion. The impact on the defence of the United Kingdom base should also be looked at (paragraph 9(c) below).

3. The Sub-Committee agreed on 1st November that the impact on the United Kingdom's NATO and other defence commitments of maintaining forces in the South Atlantic of the order proposed would need to be taken into account. This impact is analysed in Annex B to the Defence Secretary's minute, which also identifies a number of ways in which, at additional cost, the detriment could be mitigated.

4. The Defence Secretary divides the costs involved on the one hand between the capital and running costs of the garrison and on the other between costs attributable to the garrison itself and those costs which would be incurred if the mitigating measures ("detriment minimisers") involving extra equipment and manpower were implemented. These measures are set out in Annex B. He concludes that the increment to the Defence Budget which the Cabinet has already agreed (a total of £900 million in the 3 years 1983-4 to 1985-6) falls short of the estimated costs by over £100 million a year and does not



even cover the garrison costs themselves. Some detriment to our contribution to NATO therefore appears unavoidable. His estimate of costs includes £220 million for the capital cost of the airfield, although he is not yet able to make firm recommendations on this.

## HANDLING

5. The main questions which the Sub-Committee will wish to address are -

(a) The effects on the United Kingdom's NATO and other defence commitments.

(b) Which of the mitigating measures should have priority.

(c) The timing of any announcement of mitigating measures.

(d) The line to take with our Allies at the NATO Ministerial meetings in early December.

6. You will wish to invite the Defence Secretary to open the discussion. It might be convenient to settle first any problems which arise over the cost estimates: you should ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he agrees with them. You might then invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to comment.

7. The Defence Secretary is not actually seeking approval for any of the measures listed in Annex B. He proposes to consider them item by item in the light of his (or his successor's) preliminary examination of the defence programme which will be completed next Spring. One major equipment purchase, the 4 DC 10 tanker aircraft, is mentioned separately because its cost is attributable to the garrison itself, though it will represent a valuable addition to our general defence capability.

8. It will be seen that some of the men required for the Falklands garrison - the paper does not say how many - would be found from BAOR and RAF Germany, the remainder being taken from troops in the United Kingdom, although the possibility of raising additional manpower for the signal and logistic units is mentioned. The Defence Secretary might be asked to confirm that the proposed deployments will involve no derogation from our commitment under the Modified Brussels Treaty to maintain a specified level of forces on the continent of Europe.



9. The most significant items where there is detriment to our NATO and other defence responsibilities, and the possibility of buying more equipment in mitigation, are -

(a) Destroyers and frigates, where older ships which the Defence Secretary planned in his defence review last year to phase out might be kept on, at a cost of about £30 million a year.

(b) Helicopters, where more could be ordered from Westlands or, in the case of the large Chinook, bought from the United States, at a capital cost of some £49 million.

(c) Phantom air defence aircraft, where the proposal to station 8 in the Falklands would result in a reduction of about 10 per cent in the already small number of aircraft available for the defence of the United Kingdom (it is generally accepted that only 76 aircraft are available for this task, and this was much criticised by the Conservative Party when in Opposition: the Defence Secretary suggests that this could be offset by buying 15 (secondhand) aircraft at a cost of £50 million.

(d) Rapiers surface-to-air missiles, where the consequences would be to remove Rapiers protection from one of the 4 RAF stations in Germany and to cut the allocation to the Army by over 10 per cent: the effects could be offset at a capital cost of £75 million.

10. The question of public presentation and its timing is difficult. The Defence Secretary understandably does not wish to commit himself to major purchases of new equipment until he has been able fully to judge the financial consequences. But opinion both at home and in NATO will be looking for early indications of the measures the Government will take to maintain the United Kingdom's contribution to the Alliance. At home, criticism is already beginning to appear of the Government's apparent determination to maintain large forces in the South Atlantic. The naval lobby is agitating for a reversal of the defence review decision to reduce the destroyer and frigate force. The debate in the House of Commons following the publication next month of the Falklands White Paper will provide a further opportunity to air such criticisms.



SECRET

In NATO, the Ministerial meetings in the first week of December will be occasions for Allied Governments to express their concern and probe our intentions.

11. The Defence Secretary believes that the Falklands war does not alter the United Kingdom's basic defence priorities, and that therefore there is no cause for doubting the wisdom of the decision taken in the defence review to maintain our commitment to the central front of NATO while reducing our surface forces in the Eastern Atlantic. Assuming this is right, there is a case on both domestic and NATO grounds for an early announcement of our intention to compensate for the forces "diverted" to the South Atlantic by purchases of additional equipment. The Defence Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be asked for their views on which items should have priority claim on any additional funds which may be made available.

12. A purchase of additional helicopters and Rapier missiles would be welcome to British industry. But there could be criticism that the proposal to buy DC 10 tankers, Chinooks and Phantoms would mean that most of the extra money will go to American firms.

13. In paragraph 6 of his minute, the Defence Secretary suggests that in presenting our case to NATO we should emphasise that the cost of the garrison will be additional to our 3 per cent NATO commitment; will fund additional equipment of value to NATO; and that other force enhancements are under consideration. Will this be sufficient to hold our position at the December meetings? Are there any specific force enhancements from the list at Annex B which could be decided on now, and hinted at in NATO in December eg operating the Standby Squadron (item 2), replacing the Phantoms (item 11) or acquiring additional Rapier Fire Units (item 14)?

14. The Sub-Committee will also need to bear in mind the consequences for Britain's ability to mount operations outside the NATO area, eg in Belize, or for contributing <sup>to</sup> United Nations forces in the Lebanon or Namibia. Clearly, the need to garrison the Falklands will make it that much harder to meet any new commitments; and it would be important to get this firmly across to the Americans in particular.



CONCLUSIONS

15. Subject to the discussion, the Sub-Committee might be guided to

(a) confirm that the garrison described at Annex A to the Defence Secretary's minute should be stationed in the South Atlantic until the new airfield is established, subject to review in the light of changes in the Argentine threat;

(b) agree that a package of measures to mitigate the detriment to the United Kingdom's contribution to NATO should be announced in the near future, with further measures taken when the Defence Secretary has been able to examine more fully the consequences for the defence programme as a whole;

(c) agree that the line to take at the NATO Ministerial meetings in early December should be that suggested in paragraph 6 of the Defence Secretary's minute, strengthened as appropriate by reference to whatever package of mitigating measures can be announced in the near future.

*A D S Goodall*

16th November 1982

A D S GOODALL





Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

Prime Minute

NOT copied to members of

OD (FAF).

A-J-C. 17.  
11

PRIME MINISTER

FALKLANDS GARRISON

I understand that we are to discuss at OD(FAF) tomorrow John Nott's minute of 12 November.

2. I am concerned that the minute does not report adequately for other OD(FAF) colleagues the decisions taken at your meeting on 18 October. On John Nott's initiative we then reached the following agreement on financing the garrison (Scholar's letter of 21 October): "On the costs of the Falklands garrison the Secretary of State proposed that the interests of control would be best served by allocating fixed sums and including them in the defence budget. If that was accepted, he would be prepared to argue at OD(FAF) that any additional costs should be met from the defence budget." It was on that basis that we arrived at firm figures for the garrison's costs.

3. My strong view is that we should keep to this agreement. Our public expenditure plans for 1983-84 have since been published; and it would make nonsense to contemplate - either now or in the New Year - the possibility of re-opening firm decisions so recently taken. I suspect that John Nott actually agrees with this: the problem for tomorrow is that his minute does not make that plain to those copy addressees who were not present at the meeting on 18 October.

4. I have also seen Francis Pym's minute today. I should myself have thought that any problem with regard to NATO must be largely one of presentation. As John Nott recognises, some of the new equipment currently attributed to the garrison, e.g. the new





strategic tanker aircraft, will help to improve our general defence capability; its cost can be attributed accordingly, not just to the Falklands. This would help NATO to recognise that the Alliance will also benefit from such expenditure.

5. Our 1983-84 defence spending plans provide for real growth in excess of the NATO 3 per cent target; and for £624 million "Falklands" expenditure on top of that. I really do find it very hard to believe that we could be criticised in NATO for this defence effort. If there is some presentational problem, it should be easily soluble.

G.H.

16 November 1982





PM/82/98

THE PRIME MINISTERFalklands Garrison *in 50.*

1. John Nott's minute to you MO5/21 of 12 November outlines the effect and implications of the agreement which we reached on the required levels of a Falklands Garrison and the financial implications. He also describes the detrimental effects to our commitment to NATO arising out of commitment in the South Atlantic and possible measures to minimise these. He suggests that his proposals be agreed out of Committee.
2. The likely damage to our NATO commitment is very considerable and potentially of long duration. You will have noted for example that up to 15% of our destroyers/frigates, 50% of our UK-based Chinooks and over 10% of NATO allocated army Rapier units (including withdrawal of 25% of the RAF's units currently in the FRG) would not be available at the normal notice unless extra funds are allocated; in addition we have no alternative but to accept that up to 25% of our SSN fleet will be unavailable at normal notice to NATO. This kind of shortfall would have a major impact on our capabilities within the Alliance. Although our Allies will not expect us to be precise in the near future on how much we will be able to do to limit the damage, they will expect some indication of the scale of the damage. Now that we have further details of the forces in question I think we need to consider together the effect of what would be involved, and to agree at least a preliminary line to take with our allies in advance of the Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 1 - 2 December and the North Atlantic Council on 9 - 10 December when we shall certainly be expected to say something (and by which time our

/plans

~~Prime Minister~~ 14  
 In the light of this minute I think we shall have to have the OD (FAF) meeting moved to tomorrow. We clearly cannot settle it quickly by correspondence.

A. J. C.  $\frac{16}{11}$ AJ  $\frac{17}{11}$   
 J.C.



SECRET



plans for the future of the Falklands may well have been debated in Parliament). I hope therefore that we can discuss this at the meeting of OD(FAF) planned for 17 November.

3. I am copying this to colleagues in OD(FAF) and to Sir R Armstrong.

7P  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

16 November 1982

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Prime Directive①  
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MO 5/21

1) Agree to the recommendation in para. 8, subject to the views of OD(FAF) colleagues?

2) If so, agree to cancel OD(FAF) on Wednesday, this being the only item on the agenda?

PRIME MINISTERA.J.C. <sup>15</sup>/<sub>11</sub>FALKLANDS GARRISON

At the OD(FAF) meeting on 1 November we discussed a presentation by the Defence Staff which recommended a Falklands garrison in the near term consisting of around 3,100 personnel on the Islands (plus a short term increment for construction and clearing up tasks). We agreed that the military risks inherent in a significantly smaller garrison were unacceptably high in advance of the establishment of a better airfield on the Falklands. The main elements of a 3,100 garrison are set out at Annex A.

COSTS

2. It was agreed at your restricted meeting on 18 October to discuss defence expenditure that the following sums, at 1982/83 prices, should be added to the defence budget to meet garrison costs:

	<u>1983/84</u>	<u>1984/85</u>	<u>1985/86</u>	<u>Three year total</u>
£M	400	300	200	900

It was recognised that these figures assumed a garrison with a more limited capability than that now agreed and a total on-shore strength not exceeding 2000. The larger garrison which we have now chosen is estimated to cost rather more:

£M	528	439	329	1,296
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3. The revised costs - which are broad estimates - can be broken down between capital and running costs: and between those





items related to our force levels in the South Atlantic itself and those which might be implemented to minimise as far as possible the detriment to our NATO commitments by investing in extra equipment and manpower (see Annex B). This breakdown is as follows:

£M at 1982/83 Prices

	<u>1983/84</u>	<u>1984/85</u>	<u>1985/86</u>	<u>Three Year Total</u>
<u>Capital</u>				
Basic garrison	251	136	54	441
Detriment minimisers (to our NATO commitment)	56	79	49	184
<u>Total</u>	307	215	103	625
<u>Running</u>				
Basic garrison	177	158	160	495
Detriment minimisers	44	66	66	176
<u>Total</u>	221	224	226	671

The attribution of capital and running costs combined to the basic garrison and to detriment minimisers is:

Basic garrison	428	294	214	936
Detriment minimisers	100	145	115	360
	<u>528</u>	<u>439</u>	<u>329</u>	<u>1,296</u>

4. The garrison capital costs include provision for a better airfield of £220M - this figure includes a substantial contingency element because of the uncertain but possibly heavy extra cost of building works in the adverse conditions of the Falklands. The remainder of the capital costs cover other works, communications, engineer equipment, ammunition and other war stocks and the





purchase of 4 DC 10 strategic tankers. The capital costs for "detriment minimisers" are described at Annex B.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF THE COSTS

5. The increment to the defence budget (proposed on the basis of the smaller garrison) thus falls short of the estimated costs by over £100M a year and does not fully cover the garrison costs themselves. As a result, it could be necessary to forego some of the extra manpower and equipment (Annex B) intended to compensate for those diverted to the Falklands with corresponding damage to our military capability in the NATO area. Since some of the investment we are proposing to make for the garrison itself (particularly the DC 10 tanker/freighter aircraft) as well as the "detriment minimisers" clearly represent a valuable addition to our general defence capability, I have considered to what extent I can bridge the funding gap by making savings elsewhere in the main defence programme. The extent to which this is possible will not be entirely clear until my Department's annual review of the forward defence programme is available in the spring. Nevertheless my preliminary examination of the 1983/84 programme suggests that I shall at least be able to make a start on doing so and this will help to diminish any criticism that might arise at home or in NATO as a result of the diversion of forces to the South Atlantic.

#### PRESENTATION TO NATO

6. Any weakening of our NATO commitments would inevitably cause concern to NATO. The duration and extent of the detriment which the Falklands deployments will cause, and the way in which we intend to offset it, will therefore require careful presentation to our allies. We shall need to consider the best time to inform them about our decisions, taking account of the NATO Ministerial meetings at the beginning of December. In presenting our case, we should emphasise that the garrison is being paid for in addition to the 3% commitment, that this money will fund additional equipment - particularly new strategic tankers - of value in the NATO role, and that we are looking at other force enhancements





to minimise the detriment to NATO.

#### STRATEGIC AIRFIELD

7. As I explained on 1st November, I am not yet in a position to make firm recommendations on the best means of providing a strategic airfield for the Falklands capable of providing regular peacetime support for the garrison as well as assured and rapid reinforcement of the Islands in an emergency. This must await a new survey of the current site at Port Stanley. We are also looking at the possibility of using the Royal Engineers (assisted by specialist advisers) for this task. If it proved practicable, they would need more men and equipment as a long-term addition to the Army to be funded accordingly: no provision for this is included in the present costing. We shall in due course also need to provide more permanent support facilities at Ascension Island which may involve further costs of around £20M over the years in question.

#### RECOMMENDATION

8. I recommend that we agree to station the garrison described at Annex A (and the necessary short term increment) at the Falklands until such time as a strategic airfield is established on the Islands, subject to six monthly review or as necessary in the light of changes in the threat. When I have completed my review of the forward programme next spring, I shall report on the extent to which I can minimise the detriment to NATO commitments without seeking additional funding: in the meantime, I will consider case by case the specific measures in Annex B on which, in the light of my preliminary examination of my 1983/84 programme, I hope to be able to make a useful start. I shall provide further advice about the airfield when the current studies are completed. Subject to your views, my proposals might be agreed out of committee - given our earlier meeting on this subject.



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9. I am copying this minute to our colleagues on OD(FAF), to the Secretary of State for the Environment, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

SW

Ministry of Defence  
12th November 1982

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ANNEX AUNITSPERSONNEL ASHORECOMMAND

JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS	88
INTELLIGENCE UNIT	27

MARITIME DEFENCE

1 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE (SSN)	-
4 DESTROYERS OR FRIGATES	-
1 ICE PATROL SHIP (SUMMER ONLY)	-
3 ARMED PATROL CRAFT	16
1 FLEET REPLENISHMENT SHIP	-
1 FLEET OILER	-
5 ANTI-SUBMARINE SEA KINGS	-

LAND DEFENCE

1 INFANTRY BATTALION + 1 COMPANY	694
5 CHINOOKS	} 90
3 SEA KINGS	
ARMY AVIATION (6 SCOUT + 3 GAZELLE)	73
1 FIELD TROOP (3 x 105mm GUNS)	60
1 ROYAL ENGINEERS FIELD SQUADRON	178

AIR DEFENCE

8 PHANTOMS	112
2 HERCULES	34
4 HARRIERS	59
20 RAPIER FIRE UNITS (12 WITH BLINDFIRE)	263
8 BLOWPIPE FIRE UNITS	26
3 EARLY WARNING RADARS WITH DATA LINKS	162



SUPPORT

NAVAL SHORE ELEMENT	55
1 FIELD SUPPORT SQUADRON ROYAL ENGINEERS	92
1 SIGNAL SQUADRON	157
1 COMPOSITE LOGISTIC BATTALION	445
MEDICAL UNIT	73
PROVOST	11
RAF OPERATIONS WING	52
RAF ENGINEERING WING	191
RAF ADMINISTRATION WING	184
	<hr/>
TOTAL PERSONNEL ASHORE	3,142
	<hr/>



LIKELY DETRIMENT TO NATO COMMITMENTS AND PLANNED REMEDIES

Some detriment to NATO commitments is unavoidable. In other cases it is possible after a time to mitigate the detriment by investing in more equipment and manpower. The following table lists the major elements of the garrison to be deployed away from the NATO area, the measures to be taken which would partially or wholly remedy the detriment, and their costs where these are identifiable.

SERIAL	UNITS	NATO DETRIMENT (IF NO MITIGATING MEASURES TAKEN)	PLANNED MITIGATING MEASURES	IDENTIFIED COSTS
1	SSN	Up to 25% of SSN fleet would not be available in the NATO area at the normal 2 days notice	None	Nil
2	4 Destroyers/frigates	In the worst case, 6 DD/FF would not be available in the NATO area at the normal 2 days notice (ie 15% of the readily available present UK DD/FF fleet)	Run Standby Squadron Ships	About £30M pa
3	1 Fleet Replenishment Ship	} Reduction in support, } particularly ammunition, } for naval forces } in NATO area	} Partial remedy may } be achieved by } chartering merchant } ships	} About £7M pa
4	1 Fleet Oiler			



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SERIAL	UNITS	NATO DETRIMENT	PLANNED MITIGATING MEASURES	IDENTIFIED COSTS
5	5 ASW Sea Kings	10% of front-line ASW helicopters would not be readily available for use in the NATO area	Buy and operate 5 more	£15M capital cost plus operating cost of £4M pa
6	1 Infantry Battalion + 1 Company	Planned to use UK-based forces, which may include BAOR reinforcing units	None	Nil
7	5 Chinooks and 3 Sea Kings	Detachment of aircraft and roulement penalties in a small force will mean a 50% reduction in the UK based Chinook Squadron's capability, with heavily curtailed support for UKLF in peace and for BAOR in war. No NATO detriment on Sea Kings, but shortfall in UK search and rescue capability.	Buy and operate 3 Chinooks and 3 Sea Kings	£32M capital cost plus £2M pa operating cost
8	Army aviation	Units drawn from UK or BAOR	Buy 3 Gazelles. Scout will be replaced by Lynx in mid-83	£2M capital cost
9	1 Field Troop RA	About 10% regular manpower reduction in BAOR reinforcement forces	Buy 12 more guns	£4M capital cost
10	1 RE Fd Sqn	Unit drawn from UK or BAOR. About 5% reduction in total RE effort	None	Nil

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NATO DETRIMENT

PLANNED  
MITIGATING MEASURES

IDENTIFIED COSTS

SERIAL

UNITS

11

8 Phantoms

With roulement requirements of aircraft and men, there will be a reduction of about 10% in front line, UK based air defence fighters

Buy 15 airframes to maintain 8 operational

£50M capital cost plus £6M pa operating cost

12

2 Hercules

Under 5% reduction in UK-based Air Transport Force, allocated to NATO

None; but DC10 strategic tanker/freighter purchase would offer some compensation as well as providing for reinforcements

Nil

13

4 Harriers

An 8% reduction in Harrier numbers declared to SACEUR

None

Nil

14

20 Rapier fire units

Rapier Protection withdrawn from 1 out of RAF Germany's 4 operational stations. Somewhat over 10% reduction in NATO allocated Army Rapier units

Acquire 8 Fire Units and Blindfire (with no peacetime manning) to make good Rapier on RAF Germany stations, and acquire 12 Fire Units and 4 Blindfire for Army

£75M Capital cost plus £5M pa operating cost

15

8 Blowpipe fire units

Troops drawn from UKLF and BAOR. Reduction of about 5% in regular BLOWPIPE force

Some additional missile purchased

£1M capital cost

16

1 Field Support Sqn RE

Unit drawn from UK. Represents about 10% of RE Field Support effort

None

Nil

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SERIAL	UNITS	NATO DETRIMENT	PLANNED MITIGATING MEASURES	IDENTIFIED COSTS
17	1 Signal Squadron	No significant detriment	Raise additional manpower	£7M pa operating cost
18	Composite Logistic Battalion			
19	Medical and Provost			
20	RAF Station personnel	Increased undermanning in certain key trades	Raise additional manpower	£10M pa operating cost

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Pne Munsie

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Dr

29/10

OD(FAF): Falklands Garrison Presentation

## BACKGROUND

It was agreed at the meeting of OD(FAF) on 6th September that the Defence Secretary should arrange for the Committee to be given a presentation on the problems of garrisoning the Falkland Islands by way of background to the decisions which are needed on the size of the garrison and the proposed new airfield. The presentation has been arranged for 2.30 pm on 1st November in the Cabinet Room.

2. The Defence Secretary will be accompanied by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall, and by Sir Frank Cooper; and the presentation will be given by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Maurice Johnston, assisted by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence), Lieutenant General Sir James Glover, Air Vice Marshal Sutton and Captain Raymond. The presentation will last about half an hour and will be illustrated with viewfoils, leaving about three quarters of an hour for questions and discussion. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be accompanied by Mr Cranley Onslow and (in Sir Antony Acland's absence) by Sir Julian Bullard.
3. The Defence Secretary was accompanied by General Johnston on his recent visit to the Falklands. He intends to circulate a background note in advance of the presentation to serve as an aide memoire, but this is being revised in the light of his visit and is unlikely to be available until the weekend.
4. In the light of Monday's presentation and discussion, it is envisaged that the Defence Secretary will put forward firm proposals on the garrison and the airfield for consideration at a further meeting of OD(FAF), provisionally arranged for 10th November, at which the actual decisions can be taken. The two questions are intimately linked, since reinforcement capability - and hence the size of the resident garrison - depends on the size (and location) of the airfield. The total cost of a new, permanent



full-size airfield capable of taking wide-bodied jets from Ascension and of operating Phantom air defence aircraft, and including the cost of the associated buildings for defensive systems and accommodation for servicemen, is now estimated at £450 million. I understand that the Defence Secretary had already asked for cheaper options to be examined: from his remarks in Cabinet this morning it would seem that, as a result of his visit, he now favours a permanent enlargement of the existing airfield rather than the construction of a new one. The presentation will presumably cover the pros and cons of this as against other options.

## HANDLING

5. Questions you might pursue during the discussion following the presentation include


- a. Is there a minimum size of resident garrison required to deter a further Argentine invasion, irrespective of the extent to which reinforcement capability might be improved by better airfield facilities etc?
- b. How quickly could that garrison be reinforced
  - i. at present;
  - ii. as a result of the different airfield options?
- c. How relevant is the question of warning time? The latest JIC assessment (JIC(82)(IA) 193) of the Argentine threat states that "We receive little information on Argentine air force or army activities". Are there measures we could take to obtain better intelligence and consequently improved warning time?
- d. How far will the different airfield options meet the potential requirements for civil air services?
- e. Is there an upper limit to the size of the garrison beyond which it would totally overshadow the civilian population? From this point of view does it make any difference if the garrison is 2,000, 3,000 or 4,000? Would the impact of the garrison on the civil population be less if it were accommodated away from Stanley? What are the prospects (and cost) of at least part of the garrison being accompanied by wives and families?



- f. What are the relative costs of the different options for both the airfield and the garrison?
- g. What will be the effect on the United Kingdom's contribution to NATO?

CONCLUSION

6. Depending on the answers to these questions, you may be able to guide the discussion towards establishing the optimum mix of airfield size and garrison size in terms of deterrence/defence and cost effectiveness, so as to clear the ground for the decisions to be taken at the meeting on 10th November.



28th October 1982

A D S GOODALL



SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~920 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

28th October 1982

*Dear John*

FALKLAND ISLANDS FORCE LEVELS

At their meeting on Monday, OD(FAF) are to receive a presentation by the Chief of the Defence Staff on Falkland Islands Force Levels. Ministers may find it helpful, in advance of this meeting, to have a background note on some of the factors involved in determining force levels and setting out the proposed levels recommended by the Chiefs of Staff. I attach a note on these lines by MOD Officials.

You will appreciate that the attachment is not intended to seek decisions from OD(FAF) on these matters: further advice will be submitted after next Monday's meeting.

I am copying this letter and its attachment to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours etc,*

*Richard Mottram*

(R C MOTTRAM)

A J Coles Esq

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FALKLAND ISLANDS FORCE LEVELS

Note by MOD Officials

INTRODUCTION

1. OD(FAF) discussed the future garrison for the Falklands and its cost on 6th September. On 1st November, the Chief of the Defence Staff will provide a presentation to the committee which explains the military basis for a future garrison consisting of some 3,100 personnel (excluding temporary construction and other personnel) on the Islands. He will also outline the risks associated with a smaller garrison of some 2,000 personnel. The Defence Secretary intends subsequently to submit recommendations to the committee on force levels and on the requirement for improved airfield facilities in the Falkland Islands.

THE KEY ISSUES

2. The issues on which decisions are needed are:
- a. Garrison force levels in the near term, subject to review in April 1983 or earlier if there is a significant change in the threat;
  - b. Whether to invest in an improved airfield on the Falkland Islands, capable of taking wide-bodied jets, in order to provide for more rapid reinforcement of the garrison. This improved capability would not, however, be available for around two years.



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3. The presentation on 1st November will describe the factors which are critical to the size of our in-place forces: the Argentinian threat, the warning we could expect of a large scale Argentinian assault, and our present reinforcement capability. It will also describe in outline the effects of acquiring additional tankers and of improving the airfield. These and some other relevant factors are described briefly below as background to the presentation. (This note does not consider the possibility of associating other countries with the protection of the Falkland Islands which is under consideration by MISC 82 Officials).

CRITICAL FACTORS

The Argentine Military Threat

4. The latest JIC assessment (1) of the future Argentine threat was made on 2nd July. It concluded that Argentina's armed forces have neither the capability nor the unity to mount a further major invasion at present or in the medium term, but they could harass the Islands and Dependencies and threaten Britain's lines of communication. It considered that the threat of such action was low but might increase. Some provocative action short of military confrontation was more likely. Argentina might attempt in this way to erode the morale of the Falkland Islanders and to make Britain's garrisoning tasks as difficult and expensive as possible. There has been no direct military harassment since this JIC assessment, and Argentina's internal problems remain severe. But nothing has occurred to suggest that the JIC's conclusions about Argentina's longer term aspirations, and capability to pursue them, should be revised. A note on Argentine military capabilities is at Annex A.

(1) JIC(82)(N)65



Warning Time

5. The JIC have also assessed <sup>(2)</sup> that at present two weeks' warning could be expected of a further invasion attempt, but that warning of harassment, particularly if it took the form of unilateral action by one Service, would be likely to be minimal. Moreover, in certain circumstances (eg preparations for action against Chile), it could be difficult to draw the right conclusions from the various political and military indicators.

Requirements for deterrence

6. Our unequivocal demonstration this year that we have both the political resolve and the military capability to regain and defend the Falkland Islands is bound to be a major deterrent to large scale Argentine aggression for some time. In addition, the JIC have assessed <sup>(3)</sup> that future Argentine military action:

"will be deterred first, by the resident British garrison, second by the total response capability of the United Kingdom (including its appreciation of the speed with which that response could be mounted), and third by internal political and international considerations . . . . Argentina will watch the size of the British garrison closely. Once the garrison has been established any significant change in its size or capability, particularly a reduction, may be regarded by Argentina as indicating a change in Britain's will to defend the Islands. Any such change in the garrison might possibly prompt an aggressive response from Argentina."

This suggests that a significant force should be maintained in the Falklands area, but that it should not be so large as to necessitate subsequent reductions in its size unless these were linked to a clear military purpose, such as an improved reinforcement capability.

(2) JIC(82)(N)71  
 (3) JIC(82)(N)65



Requirements for defence

7. The size and composition of the force stationed in the area depends upon the defensive tasks which it is expected to perform. Any force which is requested to protect the Islands must as a minimum be able to ensure that the airfield remains open for long enough to allow sufficient reinforcements to arrive, to counter sea, air or land harassment attacks, and to deal with any illegal occupation of the Dependencies. Clearly, the smaller the force, the more limited must be its defensive objectives. Defence of the outlying settlements against a large scale attack, and the ability to intercept (as opposed to counter) armed raids, are the sort of roles which may have to be foregone with a smaller-scale garrison.

Reinforcement capability

8. The speed and scale of our ability to reinforce is the single most important factor for successful deterrence and defence against major acts of aggression. There seems no likelihood of South American staging facilities becoming available. The ability to achieve rapid reinforcement depends crucially upon aircraft availability and the capability of the airfield on the Falklands. At present to deliver all planned reinforcements would take 4 weeks, by sea and air. With a buy of some larger strategic tanker aircraft, this could be cut to two weeks. The availability of an airfield capable of taking wide-bodied jets could reduce this to 7 days.



Logistic Support

9. The larger the garrison, the greater the resources needed to transport personnel and supplies to the Islands. There is, in addition, a need to maintain in-place logistic forces on the Islands, irrespective of the size of the resident garrison, to maintain the headquarters and communications, provide minimum airfield and port services, and look after stock-piled equipment which reinforcements would require when they arrived on the Islands.

Impact on NATO

10. The need to deploy forces to the South Atlantic inevitably has a continuing impact on our NATO, Home Defence and out of area commitments. These are discussed at Annex B.

Costs

11. The key determinants of cost are:

- a. The size and composition of the garrison and its associated infrastructure (including the air base, accommodation and other works services, equipment stockpiles);
- b. Its assumed length of tenure, which will affect the scale of new investment;
- c. The requirement for roulement, which will determine the scale of shipping and air transport needed;
- d. The degree of detriment to other defence tasks and commitments that is deemed acceptable (see paragraph 10 and Annex B)

Advice on costs of alternative garrison levels and their implications will be provided in the Defence Secretary's subsequent proposals to OD(FAF).



Impact on Islanders

12. Lord Shackleton has drawn attention to the potential social and economic difficulties which could arise from the presence of a large garrison among an island community of 1,800 people. At present civil/military relations are very good. But the security benefits to the Islanders of a large military presence on the Islands must clearly be weighed against its potentially distorting influence on the local infrastructure and way of life. These already include some dependence on the garrison for transport, works services, social activity, health care and communications. There is a need to ensure that the Islanders do not become so heavily dependent on the Garrison that any significant reduction in force levels causes them serious economic difficulty.

FORCE LEVEL RECOMMENDED BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

13. The garrison currently proposed by the Chiefs of Staff is itemised at Annex C.

SUMMARY

14. In sum, the size of the garrison which needs to be maintained on the Falklands depends crucially upon our ability to achieve rapid and reliable reinforcement of the Islands. Until such a capability is established, the level of forces stationed on the Islands must necessarily be substantial. Once an assured rapid reinforcement capability exists, it should prove possible, depending upon the level of the threat then, to reduce these force levels significantly.



KEY ELEMENTS OF ARGENTINE MILITARY CAPABILITY

The key elements of Argentina's current military capability are assessed as follows:

a. Naval Forces

The Argentine surface and submarine capability was little affected by the Falklands conflict. The Argentine Navy retains a capability to mount surface operations against our forces but it is likely to continue to be inhibited from so doing primarily by the UK's submarine threat. However, the Argentine's two modern operational submarines have a significant capability to mount operations against our Naval and Merchant vessels and also to land Special Forces throughout the Falklands and Dependencies. Furthermore, several new frigates and submarines are currently under construction.

b. Air Forces

The Argentine Air Force and Navy Air Arm suffered heavily but they still retain a significant capability to mount offensive operations against land and maritime targets. Their current strength of tactical jet attack aircraft numbers about 60 and could be relatively quickly increased by new purchases which are apparently underway. We must expect, in particular, that France will shortly deliver a further 9 Super-Etendards (bringing the total to 14) and 5 AM-39 (EXOCET) missiles.

c. Ground Forces

The Argentine Army and to a lesser extent the Marines suffered a substantial defeat in the Falklands. Confidence and morale will have taken a hard knock. It will take some time to re-ignite the spirit of the Army. Nevertheless the Army and more especially the Marines retain a considerable capability to mount special operations throughout the area.



IMPACT ON NATO AND OTHER COMMITMENTS

1. The need to deploy forces to the South Atlantic inevitably has a continuing impact on our NATO, Home Defence and out of area commitments. NATO could regard the eventual level of forces as matter for special consultation (C-M(55)82). For our part we would, of course, strongly resist this and argue that the normal Alliance force planning procedures are more than adequate for handling the effects on NATO. All this will need careful presentation to the Alliance at the December NATO Ministerial meetings if we are to continue to reap their evident goodwill.

2. The impact of the Falklands commitment on each of the three Services is summarised below:-

a. All our major warships are declared to NATO and the fleet is fully stretched to meet existing NATO commitments. The South Atlantic commitments will exacerbate these difficulties. Four destroyers/ Frigates on-station would require some 6 destroyers and frigates to be committed to the South Atlantic to allow for transit times to and from the area. A diversion of forces on this scale would be a drastic reduction in the level of NATO commitment since these units would need to be declared to NATO at 15 to 30 days readiness notice rather than the normal 2 days.

b. In general, the Army would expect to meet the Garrison requirement by the deployment of units from BAOR and UKLF on roulement, and to rely on their rapid return to Europe during Transition to War. This would clearly represent a degradation in our most crucial operational capability, and placing the units at reduced states of availability will cause concern in NATO. In some areas, expensive though



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this would be, the operational degradation could be such as to leave little alternative but to raise an additional unit or surrender a capability altogether.

c. As regards the RAF, the aircraft deployed to the South Atlantic would still be declared to NATO although at a lower state of readiness. The deployment of the Rapier units would represent a 25% reduction in the UK Rapier forces under CINCENT's command. In addition, the deployed Chinook helicopters also represent a 25% reduction in the declared force. Both the Rapier units and helicopters would of course take correspondingly longer to return to Europe should the need arise.

3. The effect on NATO commitments could be ameliorated to some extent by, for example, bringing forward and operating the projected Standby squadron, raising new Army units and the purchase of additional aircraft helicopters and Rapiers. But there would, of course, be substantial costs involved.



COMPOSITION AND ROLES OF THE PROPOSED GARRISONa. Maritime Defence

1 nuclear-powered submarine (SSN)	Anti-Surface Ship and submarine operations Deterrent
4 Destroyers or Frigates	Maritime and Air Defence operations
Ice Patrol Ship (Summer only)	Patrol Dependencies
3 Armed Patrol Craft	Coastal operations
1 Fleet Replenishment Ship	Fleet Replenishment and Helicopter Carrier
1 Fleet Oiler	Fleet Replenishment and Helicopter Carrier
5 Sea King Helicopters	Anti-Submarine Warfare and surface surveillance

b. Land Defence

Infantry Battalion and 1 Company	Teeth Arms
5 Chinook Helicopters	Heavy lift
3 Sea Kings	Medium lift and Search & Rescue
1 Field Troop (3 x 105mm guns)	Artillery
Army Air Corps Flight (6 Scout; 3 Gazelle Helicopters)	Reconnaissance
1 Royal Engineer Field Squadron	Essential Combat Support

c. Air Defence

8 Phantoms	Forward Air Defence
4 Harriers	Attack and Air Defence
3 Early Warning Radars	Early Warning
2 Hercules	Air to Air refuelling and maritime surveillance
20 Rapier Missile Fire Units	Point Defence; Port Stanley and San Carlos
8 Blowpipe Fire Units	Point Defence





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E.R.

h.a  
M.G.  
/i

PRIME MINISTER

Falklands

Your questions this morning. The earlier sequence of events was:

- January, 1976: Ambassadors withdrawn (Argentina objected to the implication of the Shackleton Report that the Islands would be developed)
- February, 1976: Shot fired across bows of Shackleton.
- 1977: Talks.
- November, 1977: Ships despatched to area.

LSL = Landing Ship Logistic (e.g. Galahad).

LPD = Landing Platform Dock (e.g. Fearless and Intrepid).

A.J.C.

25 October, 1982





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 190, 19 October 1982 (folio 6)</i>	
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 13 October 1982 (folio 5)</i>	
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Extract/Item details:  <i>M&amp;DUK INTSUM No. 189, 12 October 1982 (folio 4)</i>	
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 188, 5 October 1982 (folio 3)</i>	
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>653</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Hatfield dated 6 October 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Hatfield to Coker dated 4 October 1982 (folio 1)</i>	
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File

055  
Argentina

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Planning for and Timing of the Argentine  
Decision to Invade the Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has noted the contents  
of your minute of 28 September and the  
annexed JIC note.

A. J. COLES

S

1 October 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



PART 10 ends:-

28. 9. 82

PART 11 begins:-

1. 10. 82



