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PREM 19/6/15

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

The position of the Falkland Islands  
PART 4

Pt 1 Sept. 1979  
Pt 4 April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>7-4-82</del> 8-4-82							
<del>ENDS</del>							
PREM 19/615							

PART 4 ends:-

Sue Goodchild to AJC + att of 8/4/82

PART 5 begins:-

AJC to Feo + att of 8/4/82.

## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC (82) 16<sup>th</sup> Meeting, Item 3

Date: 6 April 1982

Signed Wayland Date 21 February 2012

**PREM Records Team**

## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. Cmd. 9810 Treaty Series No. 25 (1956)
2. House of Commons Hansard, 7 April 1982,  
Columns 959-1052

Signed Wayland Date 21 February 2012

**PREM Records Team**

MR. COLES

Dinner for The Hon. Alexander M. Haig  
Thursday, 8 April

I attach the list of guests attending the dinner this evening, together with a draft seating plan.

Could you please let me know if the Prime Minister agrees this seating plan.

Sue Goodchild

8 April 1982

c.c. Mr. Whitmore

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF THE HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, SECRETARY  
OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL 1982  
AT 7.00 PM INFORMAL

---

The Prime Minister

The Hon. Alexander M. Haig

The Hon. Edward J. Streator

General Vernon Walters

Special Assistant to Mr. Haig

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary, Inter-  
American Affairs, State Department

Mr. James Rentschler

Senior Staff in charge of Western  
Europe and North America,  
National Security Council

Mr. David Gompert

State Department

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin

Sir Antony Acland

Mr. Clive Whitmore

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR DINNER ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL

Mr. David Gompert

Sir Antony Acland

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

General Vernon Walters

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

PRIME MINISTER

THE HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG

The Hon. Edward J. Streator

Rt. Hon. John Nott

Admiral of the Fleet  
Sir Terence Lewin

Mr. James Rentschler

Mr. Clive Whitmore

CONQUEROR

ENTRANCE



SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 66/82

cc Mate  
ops

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CONFIDENTIAL

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OO MEXICO CITY DESKBY 081600Z  
GRS 356  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 081600Z  
FM FCO 081529Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 8 APRIL

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 247 AND 248:

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO  
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO:-

'I WANTED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AT A DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS  
MOMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS. I DO SO CONSCIOUS OF THE FRIENDSHIP  
AND UNDERSTANDING WE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US WHEN I VISITED  
MEXICO LAST YEAR.

2. THROUGH AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIRTUALLY UNDEFENDED  
ISLANDS HUNDREDS AND SOMETIMES THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES FROM  
THEIR OWN SHORES, ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE OUTRAGED THE PRINCIPLES  
ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS BASED AND ON WHICH MY COUNTRY,  
AS YOURS, HAS BUILT ITS FOREIGN POLICY: IN PARTICULAR, SELF-  
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.  
AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SINCE PASSED  
A MANDATORY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT SO FAR THE  
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING WILLING TO  
COMPLY WITH THIS RESOLUTION.

3. THIS CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RULE OF  
LAW AFFECTS ALL MEMBERS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND I APPEAL  
FOR YOUR HELP IN BRINGING HOME TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE  
SERIOUSNESS OF ITS ACTIONS AND THE GREAT DANGERS ARISING FROM  
ITS FAILURE SO FAR TO RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL FOR WORLD PEACE. THE GREATER THE WEIGHT OF  
INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, THE MORE  
LIKELY A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

4. AS YOU KNOW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DESPATCHED

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

955 - 1

SUBSTANTIAL FORCES TO THE AREA. WE HOPE IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO USE THEM. WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE ALL PEACEFUL MEANS OF SETTLING THE DISPUTE. BUT FAILURE TO SETTLE IT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY POWERFUL COUNTRIES AGAINST WEAKER OR SMALLER NEIGHBOURS.

5. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE, THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS, TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH THIS UNHAPPY PERIOD AND TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.'

ENDS

PYM

NNNN  
DISTRIBUTION  
STANDARD  
SAMD  
MCAD  
UND

X  
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PS

~~Prime Minister~~

A.J.C.  $\frac{13}{4}$

Cabinet Office,  
70 Whitehall,  
London SW1

8th April, 1982

PS(82) 12

Dear Private Secretary,

South Atlantic Presentation Unit (SAPU)

In accordance with a decision taken by the Cabinet (CC(82) 16th Conclusions, Minute 3) this unit has been set up in the Cabinet Office (Room 322) to work to Mr. Wade-Gery, under the overall direction of Sir Robert Armstrong. It is staffed by Mr. S. W. J. Fuller and Mr. R. P. Hatfield, telephone numbers 233 4926, 233 4991, 233 6170.

The unit is to provide to Ministers, and to the Press Officers of Departments concerned, material for public use to counter errors or inaccurate rumours concerning the Falkland Islands issue - e.g. false and damaging media assessments of the military situation or diplomatic developments.

It is important that Departments should immediately inform the unit of potentially damaging errors which appear in the media or which are the subject of discussion or rumour among opinion formers, journalists, and Members of Parliament. The unit will consult Departments on the facts of issues raised and the line for Ministers and officials to take. It is also most important for the unit's effective operation that Departments give a high priority to answering queries from the unit.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to all members of the Cabinet, to the Chief Whip and the Law Officers, and I should be grateful if it could be brought to the attention of all Ministers within your Department, Parliamentary Private Secretaries and officials who would need to be aware of it.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D. J. WRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

MR 4/4  
F-2Mr Fearn - SAmDFalkland Islands: Visit of Mr Haig

The Secretary of State had an hourstete-a-tete with Mr Haig, with only Mr Streator and myself being present as note-takers. The conversation was almost entirely devoted to the Falkland crisis. Much of the ground will no doubt be gone over again at the meeting at No. 10, and what follows is therefore a highly summarised account of the main points made by Mr Haig. The Secretary of State's interventions were designed primarily to give Mr Haig a first hand account of the political background here, including Lord Carrington's resignation, the two debates in Parliament and the political feeling in the country at the moment.

Following are main points made by Mr Haig:

- i. The US team had come here as friends and allies. There was no other conception in the President's mind and certainly not in Mr Haig's. As he had told Sir N Henderson there would be no repeat of Suez. Argentine withdrawal was the core of the problem and the talks should concentrate on how this might best be achieved.
- ii. The United States had been caught more by surprise than we were by the invasion. Sir N Henderson had called on Mr Haig 'with indications we had not picked up'. Mr Haig went on to explain that this was not so much an intelligence failure on the American part, but a reflection of the fact that our people - being more acutely aware of the problem - had been quicker to integrate the raw intelligence.
- iii. The Argentine action must have been under preparation for months - the use of massive force, which had allowed bloodshed to be avoided, bore witness to this. In Mr Haig's view, Galtieri had at first refused to accept President Reagan's phone call because he knew what he would be asked to do and wanted to make sure that the operation was irretrievably under way before listening to President Reagan.
- iv. The Argentinians had been expecting an easy ride and had been shocked by the UN vote and more particularly by the British military reaction. There were now doubts and internal contradictions and the Argentine position was temporarily weak.

/v.

- v. The British declaration of a Maritime Zone had provoked mixed reactions; on the one hand Mr Haig wished that we had not done it, while on the other he welcomed the extra pressure on the Argentine. But we must be careful not to replace the present uncertainty in Buenos Aires by 'a new wave of macho'. The Argentinians would do everything to avoid a 'confirmation of cowardice'.
- vi. The United States objective was to help Britain. 'You know where we come from.' The Administration recognised the support we had given them and the risks we had taken. They had avoided a 'high profile tilt' for tactical reasons, but had done everything they could to help behind the scenes. (Mr Pym took this opportunity to express thanks for American cooperation in the intelligence field.)
- vii. There was now a window of opportunity, but it was shorter than might appear to us. Mr Haig put it at 72 hrs. If the Argentinians went to the OAS, which they would do when the British fleet reached the 50th parallel, they would get a consensus in their favour whatever the private opinions of many of the countries concerned; if the OAS did not do enough, the Argentinians would turn to the Soviet Union; and if the present Argentine government fell it would be replaced by a worse one. Meanwhile, the greater the British investment (by implications in our present policy) the more difficult it would be.
- viii. Neither the United States nor the UK could be seen to fail to take an opportunity for peaceful settlement if there was one and the 72 hrs must be used intelligently. Mr Haig would be prepared to stay until tomorrow morning if that would help and to return to London from Buenos Aires.
- ix. Mr Haig had explained to the Argentinians beforehand that he would not be prepared to go to Buenos Aires to be faced by 'a priori demands of sovereignty'. The Argentinians had accepted the point.

Finally, Mr Haig sketched out a proposition which he indicated that he would wish to put to the Prime Minister. There were three stages: a. Argentine withdrawal; b. interim administration; and c. the solution for the long term. If the Argentinians were to agree under a. to a fixed time for withdrawal, they would need something. b. might consist of administration under a British and Argentine umbrella (modalities not specified) by an authority which might comprise US and Canadian elements and elements from perhaps two Latin American states acceptable to both sides. It would include suitable guarantees of the rights of the population. This might also help towards stage c. which

/would

would have to deal with the knotty problems of the longer term and in particular with the possible conflict between the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. Haig suggested that a reference to the Charter principles might cover that in the short term, and emphasised that Argentine withdrawal would have to come first.

<sup>also</sup> The Secretary of State agreed that we should have an eye to the longer term. There might be some possibilities in the ideas sketched out by Mr Haig. The discussion could be pursued with the Prime Minister.

The Secretary of State raised the question of the meeting of Air Chiefs of the Americas to be held in Buenos Aires later this month (Washington telno 1184). Mr Haig said that he had decided against cancelling US participation or down-grading its level (the former, by implication, because the Americans wanted to talk about Central America; and the latter because, if they went at all, they wanted to go at the most effective level). He appeared not to have given thought to the idea of postponement and said that he would be 'very comfortable' with such a solution. He did not however undertake to work for it.



(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

8 April 1982

cc: PS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Bullard  
Lord Bridges  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Ure  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Weston - Defence Dept  
News Dept

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

54250 COALTE 08TH APR

TH APRIL 1982

3.45 PM (first leg)

*Sent 4.15 pm*

MR HARRY MILNE FALKLAND ISLAND COMPANY

*8-4-82*

DEAR HARRY,

MANY THANKS YOUR REPLY BTH.

PLEASE EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO ARGENTINE CHIEF SECRETARY FOR AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE SAFETY OF A.E.S. AND CREW.

TELEX HERE OPEN ALL HOURS AND OVER EASTER.

YESTERDAY, CONTRARY TO ADVICE RECEIVED, IN // I INSTRUCTED A.E.S. SHOULD CONTINUE JOURNEY. WITH LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY OWNERS AND INSURERS WILL ALLOW JOURNEY COMPLETION AT PRESENT. IN THAT CASE, WILL HOLD A.E.S. AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE IN THE HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ALLOWED TO BRING IT INTO STANLEY SOON. THE 200 MILES LIMIT HAS GREATLY COMPLICATED A.E.S. POSITION.

OUR VITAL CONCERN IS YOUR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING AND I AM STANDING ASIDE FROM POLITICAL ISSUE. PRESENT INDICATIONS LEAD ME TO HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT COMMON-SENSE WILL PREVAIL AND EASE YOUR ANXIETIES BEFORE LONG.

REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO YOU AND ALL ISLANDERS FOR AS HAPPY AN EASTER AS POSSIBLE.

TED NEEDHAM,

*Sent 4.15 pm*

54250 COALTE G  
21B FALKISCO FK

NOTE FOR PRESS OFFICERS

GUIDANCE AFTER PM/HAIG DINNER, April 8, 1982

The Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Secy, first had a meeting with Secretary Haig and Edward Streater, senior US diplomat in London, for 1 hour 20 minutes.

They then went in to dinner where they were joined by 10 other participants - see list.

The dinner lasted for an hour and was followed by a further 2½ hours of discussion.

This meeting ended with full agreement that the UN resolution must be carried out. That is the position common to both sides.

We discussed how the United States might be helpful in securing implementation of the UN resolution.

The US side heard the British view on the situation and now know how strongly the British feel about the Falkland Islands and their invasion.

Mr Haig now flies off to Buenos Aires after an overnight stop in London. It is far too early to say whether he will return to London.

Background

Mr Haig will not convey any impression that he has made progress in London in the sense of our moving away from our strongly held position that the UN resolution requiring immediate Argentinian withdrawal from the Falklands. No progress was in fact made and he did indocate to the press after leaving No 10 how impressed he was with the strength of British feeling

Mr Haig is anxious not to convey any impression that he is engaged upon shuttle diplomacy.

Additional information

The Argentinian Government has withdrawn from a reciprocal visa waiver agreement. As a result we, the UK, have decided to follow suit. This means that visas will now be required for travel between the UK and Argentina.

*B. Ingham*

B Ingham  
8.2.82.

*The Whitburne*  
*For inf*

*Jan 8, 1/4*



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54250 COALTE GHQPW  
21B FALKISCO FK GFALKISCO FK

*Received  
overnight  
8/9/1 + 182*

B APRIL 1982

MR C E NEEDHAM

DEAR TED,

THANKS YOURS 7TH RECEIVED DURING LUNCH HOUR SO COULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE.

ARGENTINE CHIEF SECRETARY STATES SAFETY OF 'AES' AND CREW GUARANTEED. HOW WILL NEW 200 MILE LIMIT BY BOTH ARGENTINA AND U.K. AFFECT VESSEL. *V*

REGARDS AND HAPPY EASTER,

HARRY

54250 COALTE G  
21B FALKISCO FK

## SPEAKING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG ON THURSDAY 8 APRIL ON FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. Grateful for Haig's visit. Great value of close Anglo-American relationship is that we can discuss difficult issues frankly. We look forward to President Reagan's visit in June.
2. Falklands crisis very serious indeed. Important not only to us, but to the US too, not least because it takes place in the American hemisphere.
3. The issue is simple. The Argentine forces have invaded British territory against the clearly-stated and unanimous wishes of the inhabitants in defiance of a UN Security Council call for restraint. They have refused to withdraw despite a mandatory Security Council Resolution instructing them to do so.
4. The Government have only one objective: an immediate Argentine withdrawal and the restoration of British administration. Neither public nor parliamentary opinion would permit the Government any other course, event if it wanted.
5. We do not want to fight: no country would. But if the military option is the only one left to us we shall have to exercise it.
6. Of course we are willing to resume negotiations about substance. But not under duress and not while the Islands are occupied.
7. Question therefore is how to put continuing and increasing pressure on Argentina to withdraw. We have taken various measures and have encouraged our many friends to do so. Response so far

/quite

- 2 -

quite encouraging, but we hope for much more.

8. Most grateful for US assistance so far, eg. President Reagan's intervention with Galtieri. Continuing US support crucial. US has enormous potential influence with Argentina and US words and deeds will have great effect on other countries too. Surely as much in US interests as our own that illegal and naked aggression of this kind should be firmly countered.

9. Very much hope therefore that US will give urgent and sympathetic consideration to Prime Minister's recent message to President Reagan asking for US economic measures against Argentina. We believe that they may be vulnerable to financial measures. Firm action would bring invaluable pressure on Argentina and would be an example for others to follow.

10. Grateful for ideas on other ways in which pressure might be imposed on Argentina. Have carefully considered, but have discounted, further action at UN. Most unlikely to succeed and serious risk of diluting Security Council Resolution 502.

11. How does Haig think Galtieri will react to clear and unequivocal British position? What are Argentine intentions likely to be? Is there any chance of Galtieri being replaced in the next couple of weeks? If so, would it be by more moderate forces, or as we suspect by more militant ones?

/12.

- 3 -

12. Hope Haig will make absolutely clear to the Argentines, the Government's firm stance and the mood of the country. The Argentine Government and its people must be absolutely clear of the strength of feeling on this issue.

13. We should of course be very grateful for US reports on Argentine views.


Private Secretary

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MR HAIG'S VISIT TO LONDON.

1. Earlier this afternoon I submitted a speaking note for the Secretary of State's use at his meeting with Mr Haig tomorrow. I now attach background notes on the following subjects:

- A i) international reaction following the invasion of the Falkland Islands;
- B ii) action in the United Nations;
- C iii) economic measures against Argentina;
- D iv) Argentina: Vulnerability to US pressure on economic and financial matters and military supplies.

2. After consultation with Departments I recommend that the Secretary of State need not raise any other subjects with Mr Haig on this occasion.



C S R Giffard

7 April 1982

cc: PS/All Ministers  
 PS/PUS  
 Sir A Acland  
 Sir I Sinclair  
 Mr Bullard  
 Mr Wright  
 Lord Bridges  
 Mr Ure  
 Mr Gillmore

Heads Of:

UND  
 Defence Department  
 Planning Staff  
 News Department  
 ERD  
 ECD(E)  
 NAD  
 Mr Fearn, Emergency Unit

INTERNATIONAL REACTION FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Favourable

The UN Resolution has received a wide measure of support both officially from governments and unofficially in the press. In general, the importance of not resorting to force tends to be given greater prominence than the condemnation of the Argentine violation of the principle of self-determination.

The United States have responded helpfully but are attempting to maintain impartiality. President Reagan described the conflict as one between two friendly nations. But both Haig and Weinburger have subsequently made clear that the UK cannot be equated with Argentina as an ally. The Americans have made the point that if they are to exercise influence with the Argentines they cannot come out as clearly on our side as they would wish. The Americans have assured us that no further arms deliveries will be made to Argentina.

Our European partners have issued a statement jointly condemning the invasion. We also have records of individual statements of condemnation by all except the Irish and Greeks (a statement from the Greeks is expected). M Mitterrand has sent a personal message of support. The Belgians are withdrawing their Ambassador from Buenos Aires and they and the Germans have imposed embargos. Our partners are considering sympathetically our request for economic and political measures against Argentina and we hope that decisions will be made soon. Denmark is known to be thinking specifically of

/withdrawal

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withdrawal of ECGD type credits. Of other European states, Austria has suspended a delivery of tanks to Argentina. The Spanish continue to support the Argentinian case though to oppose the use of force.

Support is most widespread in the Commonwealth. The Caribbean and African members are almost unanimous in condemning the violation of the principle of self-determination. New Zealand has broken off diplomatic relations. Australia has recalled its Ambassador for consultations. Canada has also recalled its Ambassador, declared an arms embargo, cancelled official visits to Argentina, and passed a unanimous resolution in Parliament condemning the invasion. India's response has been rather guarded.

Neutral There is little or no support for the Argentinian resort to force: among the countries that have stressed the need for a peaceful solution are Japan, Austria, Finland, Nepal. East European states such as the GDR, Poland and Yugoslavia have also stressed the need to avoid conflict. Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Israel have so far refused to be drawn. China has not gone beyond the explanation of her abstention in the Security Council. The Soviet Union appears to be leaning towards Argentina and has spoken of Britian's illegal occupation of the Islands in 1833.

Unfavourable Latin American support for Argentina's claim is almost total. But there has been little support for her resort to force. Chile has taken an anti-Argentinian stance. Brazil has refused but has offered to mediate as has Colombia in the OAS. Paraguay has remained publicly neutral. Mexico, while privately condemning the

/use

- 3 -

use of force, is not prepared to say so, and Venezuela, bearing in mind her own claim to a large part of Guyana, has reacted predictably unhelpfully, though she has stopped short of outright support for the Argentinian action. Uruguay has declared muted support for Argentina.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

7 April 1982



## ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. The Security Council resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities, immediate Argentine withdrawal and resumption of diplomatic discussions was adopted on 3 April by 10 to 1 (Panama) with 4 abstentions (Spain, China, Soviet Union, Poland). Since the resolution was passed under Chapter 7 of the Charter Argentina is legally bound to comply.
  
2. We now intend to stay away from the Council, despite Argentina's rejection of the resolution. Our effort to mobilise pressure on the Argentines through bilateral contacts is more likely to be successful than a further resolution of the Council. We are sure the Russians would veto a sanctions resolution.
  
3. As the task force moves south pressure is likely to mount for a Security Council call on us to refrain from using force, despite our undoubted right to take action in self-defence. This would be completely unacceptable and we count on the US to help us deflect any such move. We shall not get a peaceful solution if we do not maintain our leverage.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

7 April 1982

## ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

A. Measures Taken by HMG

## 1. Hitherto we have:-

- (a) Frozen Argentine financial assets in London. These may total about \$1.4 billion, one quarter of their holdings in OECD countries.
- (b) Ceased to give export credit cover on new commitments to Argentina.
- (c) Banned all exports of arms and military equipment to Argentina.
- (d) Banned all imports of goods from Argentina, as from midnight 6 April. (Our imports from Argentina in 1980 were £114 million; our exports £173 million.)

2. We can at any time withdraw the operating permit for Argentine Airlines to fly to London (they have two flights per week). We have recommended separately today that this be done.

B. Supporting Measures by our Friends and Partners

3. Economic measures will hurt Argentina much more if they are taken by a wide range of other countries in addition to the UK.

4. The Prime Minister sent messages on 6 April to the Heads of State/Government in Community countries, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand asking them to support us against Argentina by banning arms sales, banning all or some imports, ceasing export credit cover for new commitments and giving no encouragement or incentive to their banks to lend to Argentina.

5. In discussions in the Community on 6 and 7 April, mainly on trade issues, we urged our EC partners to support our actions (the Falkland Islands are associated with the Community under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome). There has been a general positive response, especially on an arms embargo. It is possible that our partners will agree to a total import ban (though we would be content with a selective ban, eg on agricultural products). It is proposed also to exclude Argentina from the Community's generalised preference scheme. The Community will meet again on 9 April, with the aim of taking decisions.

C. Vulnerability of the Argentine Economy

6. The Argentine economy, though basically strong, has been poorly managed in recent years. There was negative GDP growth in 1978 and 1981 and inflation has been around 150% per year. The economy is vulnerable to financial pressure and denial of export earnings.

7. Argentina needs to borrow about \$17 billion during 1982. \$3 billion of this is to finance their current account deficit; the rest is to finance debt repayments falling due. \$4 to 5 billion is long-term debt; \$9 to 10 billion short-term debt, owed 50% to US creditors and 25% to the UK. \$3 to 4 billion will be needed over the next three months.

Economic Relations Department

7 April 1982

ARGENTINA: VULNERABILITY TO US PRESSURE ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS AND MILITARY SUPPLIES

1. The willingness of the US Administration to take measures against Argentina will depend on their political attitude towards the dispute and the role they see themselves playing in possible mediation. Their ultimate judgement may also be influenced by the attitudes of other Latin American countries, by the effect that sanctions might have on their relations with them, by their anxieties over developments in Central America, and by their obligations as a member of the OAS and as a party to the Rio Treaty.
2. But, given a political decision to introduce measures against Argentina, the US could act on visible trade or financial relations. Military supplies (see below) have been banned since 1978.

Trade

3. Of total OECD imports from Argentina in 1980 of \$4.1 billion, the US took some \$744 million (UK \$251 million). The US share represents some 9% of total Argentinian exports but less than 1% of US trade. The most important sectors were:

Meat	\$131 million
Sugar	\$ 97 million
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants, etc	\$106 million
Leather, Leather Manufactures and Dress Furskins	\$ 78 million
Textiles	\$ 12 million
Coffee and Tea	\$ 11 million
Manufactures of Metals	\$7.5 million
Non-Ferrous Metals	\$5.6 million
Miscellaneous Manufactures	\$ 21 million

Measures taken by the US to restrict imports from Argentina would have a significant effect, especially if taken in support of Community measures. The US have a long history of imposing embargoes. Trade measures by the US, as a major trading partner of Argentina, would do economic damage and serve as a shock to the Argentine Government. In the case of a selective

ban, the most telling measure, as with the Community, would be a ban on food and animal imports. This would account for over 3% of total Argentine exports and the US would find it easy to use alternative sources of supply. A ban on US petroleum product imports (around 1% of total Argentine exports) would also have a significant effect.

4. On the export side, the major sectors are commercial aircraft, chemicals and construction equipment. The UK have not asked for US action on exports nor are we taking action ourselves. If we were to do so, the fact that the major export sectors are all suffering in the current recession would probably influence the Administration's decision.

#### Financial

5. Of Argentina's total external debt of \$34 billion at end 1981, some \$7.5 billion was owed to the US. This compares with US liabilities of \$2.4 billion. The US is thus in a broadly similar position to the UK in that a freeze of Argentine assets would not cover possible claims.

6. Direct investment by the US in Argentina at end 1979 totalled \$1.9 billion. However, there has been substantial US investment in the petroleum sector in the last two years and the total would now be near \$3 billion. This compares with UK direct investment of some \$400 million.

7. US export credit exposure totalled \$1.8 billion in September 1980. Our Embassy believe that the Administration might agree to a suspension of new credits, justified on economic grounds. (They may press for general support for their efforts to reduce subsidised export credits both for countries like Brazil and for the Soviet Union.)

8. At present the US authorities neither encourage nor discourage lending to Argentina. If the US Government were prepared to advise banks in the US not to undertake new lending, this could have a serious impact. The Argentine borrowing requirement for 1982 is estimated at \$17.4 billion to finance short and long term loans, mainly from commercial banks. The role of US banks in Argentina's borrowing programme is demonstrated by the fact that, of about \$10 billion of short term loans maturing this year, over one half is owed to the US.

Military

9. Military supplies to Argentina have been banned since 1978 under a Congress Resolution passed on Human Rights grounds. There are contracts in the pipeline for spare parts for US equipment currently held by Argentina (notably helicopters, armed personnel carriers and carrier-borne aircraft). But these have been frozen by the Resolution. Nevertheless, some of these spares are believed to be trickling through. But even if the supply of spares from the US dried up completely, since this is fairly old equipment, it is likely that Argentina could quite easily obtain spares from dealers and possibly from neighbouring countries.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 April 1982



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April 1982

THE FALKLANDS: NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1977

Thank you for your letter of 5 April. I have also seen David Wright's letter of 7 April to you.

I found it helpful to have your letter as background information but am inclined to think that it would not be appropriate to show the material in it to the Prime Minister since, as David Wright points out, this would be close to breaking the rules about disclosure to members of one Administration of the documents and advice given to members of a previous Administration. This letter simply records the fact, therefore, that the correspondence has not been seen by the Prime Minister.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.A. Burns, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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c.c. J. Bullard, Fco.

R. Wade-Gery, CO.



*Lu/ED 12*

*cc. Master alt.*

*SUBJECT.*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1982

*Dear Francis,*

FALKLAND ISLANDS: VISIT OF US SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Haig called on the Prime Minister at 7.00 p.m. today. I enclose a record of the conversation. This should not be copied beyond Private Offices and senior officials with an operational need to know.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours and  
John Halliday*

Francis Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 7.00 P.M.  
THURSDAY 8 APRIL 1982

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The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Haig for his visit to London. She described the background to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The intelligence which we had received last Wednesday of an imminent invasion had, she believed, been as much a surprise to the United States as to us. Mr. Haig said that the Americans had been even more surprised than we. The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the quick action taken by President Reagan. We had thought that his representations to the Argentine <sup>Government</sup> would succeed and were surprised when he was rebuffed.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to explain clearly the mood in Britain. We were deeply wounded that our sovereign territory had been invaded. The only desire of the Falkland Islanders was to be British. There was great anguish that we had been unable to defend them. The House of Commons' debate last Saturday had been the most difficult Parliamentary session she had seen. The charge had been made that the Government had betrayed and humiliated the Falkland Islanders and the nation. Calm could not be expected in these circumstances. If the Government had not been able to announce in that debate that the fleet was to sail, the position could probably not have been held. Feelings ran the more strongly because of the nature of the Argentine regime. A further debate yesterday had been more sombre but there was full support for the action the Government were now taking. We wanted a diplomatic solution. We did not wish to use the fleet. But there was total determination that a dictator should not be appeased. If strength was the only language the Argentine regime understood, it would have to be exercised.

We had been careful, for example in our announcement of an exclusion zone, to observe international law scrupulously.

/ We had been

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We had been greatly heartened by the support received from others. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt had expressed full understanding. The German Chancellor agreed with us that unless this act of unprovoked aggression was reversed, the consequences could be most dangerous for other areas of tension. It was essential that somebody said "enough". Our Community partners were taking practical action. Firm support had been received from Commonwealth countries. It was impossible to be neutral as between unprovoked aggression and a people who just wished to live their lives in their own way. Mr. Haig agreed that neutrality was an impossible position.

The Prime Minister said that we should now have to make our decisions day by day. We hoped for a diplomatic solution. There was no question of negotiation until Argentina withdrew its forces. Their act of aggression did not change the status of the Falkland Islands which remained British Sovereign territory under law. We could not negotiate under duress. We had been rather disturbed by President Reagan's reference to friendship with both the United Kingdom and Argentina, though we understood that this was an "off the cuff" remark. We had always tried to support the United States. We were grateful for the co-operation they were giving over the use of Ascension Island and on intelligence matters.

Mr. Haig said that the Prime Minister would well know where the President really stood. The United States was not impartial. But it had to be cautious about its profile, though not with respect to the violation of international law nor with respect to UN Security Council Resolution 502. On arrival at the airport he had said that he was working for the implementation of that Resolution which required Argentine withdrawal and a diplomatic solution. Wherever international law was violated by an aggressor, whether in Afghanistan, Poland or the Falkland Islands, the principle was the same. The Reagan Administration had had fifteen months' experience

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of Britain's support and the personal backing of the Prime Minister. Whenever the Americans had sought our understanding, we had backed them, sometimes at political risk for ourselves. We now faced a critical, common problem. The United States wished to do everything possible to strengthen the British Government in this hour of trial.

They had analysed the situation carefully. They had had no better intelligence than we had about the invasion. They had been following the South Georgia incident but not with unusual concern. When the invasion was imminent, the United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires had sought an urgent appointment but the Argentines had delayed him until 2 p.m. in the afternoon. His representations having been ineffective, President Reagan had decided to telephone Galtieri. For two-and-a-half hours the latter would not take the call. He had then said that he would be available in fifteen minutes. Later the Argentine Foreign Minister had claimed that the reason for the delay was that it had taken President Galtieri two-and-a-half hours to find out whether it was possible to reverse the military operation. Mr. Haig said that this explanation was "hogwash".

The Americans were watching the situation in Argentina carefully. The Argentines had at first been convinced that the use of force would go unchallenged. Now they had been shocked by the British reaction. Despite their claims to the contrary, they had sought a Soviet veto in the Security Council but failed to get one. We needed to be careful about the Soviet posture. It was clear that doubts were growing in Buenos Aires and that Galtieri's position was in jeopardy. If he fell, his successor would be more intransigent. The Argentine Foreign Minister had recently said that he was prepared to negotiate about everything except sovereignty. Mr. Haig had replied that negotiations were not possible in circumstances where by force the Argentines had brought about a situation which they had been unable to obtain by negotiation.

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He was not prepared to go to Buenos Aires if this kind of language would be used when he arrived. After consultation with his capital, the Argentine Foreign Minister had said that his Government wished Haig to come. Mr. Haig had made it plain that America would only become involved if it was fully understood that they could not accept a change in the status quo brought about by force.

The Argentine character had to be understood. They were less than rational but their greatest subjective fear was that they would appear cowardly. The "macho" instinct would soon develop. For the moment there was a window for negotiation. Now was the optimum time to hold rational discussions with Galtieri. But the agreed American assessment was that when our fleet reached the fiftieth parallel, this would change. The OAS would adopt an anti-colonial stance, whatever the real feelings of the states concerned. This would develop with every passing hour.

The Argentine Foreign Minister had recently said that he saw two options, resort either to the OAS or the Soviet Union. He claimed that they would accept Soviet assistance. Mr. Haig did not wish to overdramatise this point, but neither of us could be comfortable about the prospect. Once the danger of conflict became imminent, the moment for negotiation would have passed. In the United Kingdom, the greater the expenditure of resources, the more difficult the situation would become. He judged that the next 72 hours were the optimum time for negotiation as far as the Argentine was concerned.

He wanted to visit Britain first because we were America's closest friend and ally. He did not wish to go to Buenos Aires without a fundamental understanding of the limits of our possibilities for negotiation, and he wished to be able to portray accurately the vigour of the British approach. It was

/ in the American

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- 5 -

in the American interest that the British Government should succeed in its policies and become stronger. The Reagan Administration agreed with the Government's philosophy. The Prime Minister said that the issue went wider than the United Kingdom. It mattered to Germany because of Berlin, to France because of some of its colonial possessions, to the Caribbean because of the Guyana/Venezuelan dispute. We had experienced before the danger of appeasing dictators. With regard to Mr. Haig's reference to the Soviet Union, she suspected that the Russians feared American involvement as much as the Americans feared the reverse. The West might be stretched, but so were the Soviet Union. She would be surprised if they intervened actively, though they would doubtless fish<sup>in</sup>/troubled waters.

Mr. Haig said that he believed we could succeed in military terms, at least for a limited period. The Argentines had told him that their fleet would go into port and stay there. The Prime Minister said that we believed that the Argentines had used the negotiations earlier this year simply as a cover for their military preparations. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it appeared that the Galtieri regime had been carried away by emotion.

The Prime Minister asked what pressure the Americans could bring upon Galtieri. The reputation of the Western world was at stake. We wished to solve the matter by diplomatic means, but we would not negotiate under duress - withdrawal was a prior condition. Mr. Haig said that he knew Galtieri well. He was very religious and went to Mass every day. He also drank, perhaps too often and too early. He was tough and saw himself as a man of principle and strength. He was also a poker player who doubled when he lost. He would up the ante if he decided force was inevitable. The United Kingdom could damage the Argentine fleet severely and could blockade the Islands fairly easily. But a landing on the Falklands would be very costly and would put the population in jeopardy. It would be very difficult at this time of the year and in high seas. The problems and burden would grow. Questions and

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doubts would appear in the United Kingdom. American opinion was now much in favour of our principled stance. But he was not sure this would last long - he remembered Vietnam.

He thought it necessary to consider some device which reinforced our position, and would strengthen us in our aims. The Prime Minister said that withdrawal must come first. Mr. Haig suggested that the question was how to obtain withdrawal. Some device was necessary so that the Argentines could claim that they had not lost face totally. Something which looked like less than a total victory for us was desirable. There were three issues - withdrawal, administration and future status, but the sovereignty issue was not America's business. The Prime Minister commented that Britain was sovereign in the Falkland Islands. They were British by law and were free a week ago. Mr. Haig said that it was important to avoid a priori judgements about sovereignty. We might envisage a different character of regime. The Prime Minister said that this was very dangerous ground with British public opinion. The Islanders were British by choice and by allegiance. We had negotiated for fifteen years, but had always said that the wishes of the Islanders must be paramount - surely that principle appealed to American opinion. British public opinion would not accept what Mr. Haig was suggesting. Withdrawal must come first. Later it might be possible to resume earlier talks. Mr. Haig commented that this solution would require force. The Prime Minister replied that force had already been used. Further force would be a great tragedy. Our soldiers would be vulnerable. But so would theirs. The Argentines had forced dictatorship on a people who would not be subjugated. Mr. Haig hinted again at a different form of administration. The Prime Minister stated that we were pledged to restore British administration. Mr. Haig suggested that some kind of American or perhaps Canadian presence might be possible while negotiations continued. The Prime Minister reiterated that we were pledged to the House of Commons to restore British administration. What he was suggesting violated the principle that the Argentines

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could not be allowed to achieve by force what they had not been able to achieve without force. Mr. Haig said that he was merely suggesting that some kind of temporary arrangement should be applied. The Prime Minister said that this would mean that the Argentines had gained from the use of force. Mr. Haig said that he saw things differently. They would be asked to withdraw and agree to a new arrangement involving longer-term negotiations and <sup>an</sup> administration which should guarantee the freedom and sovereignty of the Falkland Islanders while those negotiations continued. The longer-term future of the islands would depend on the resumption of the earlier negotiations. The Prime Minister said that we had to be guided by the wishes of the Islanders. Earlier schemes had foundered because the Islanders turned them down. Only when the Argentine force had withdrawn and British administration had returned, could we reopen negotiations. These might conceivably take a different course than previously. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether Mr. Haig envisaged the preservation of the rights of the Islanders. Mr. Haig said that he did. But if we insisted on withdrawal and the return to the status quo ante, conflict was inevitable. The Prime Minister said that the implication of this was that the Russians could move into Berlin and other countries could take similar action. What kind of signal was this to give to the Soviet Union? Mr. Haig said that he accepted that point. But if our principles were preserved and an interim arrangement was made for an authority on the Islands in which the United Kingdom participated, progress could be made. The Prime Minister said that she could not go back to the House of Commons with such a solution. We were pledged to restore British administration. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the conclusion of the process which Mr. Haig had in mind would be the return of British administration. Mr. Haig said that he believed that the ultimate solution would depend on resuming the earlier negotiations. Leasing had been mentioned at an earlier stage. He believed that that was now unacceptable in the wake of the use of force.

/He said

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He said that we must consider where we were going if we did not find a solution and conflict developed. The Prime Minister said that conflict had occurred. It had started with the Argentine invasion. She did not want force to be used, but we had to insist on withdrawal and the restoration of British administration. Mr. Streeter asked whether, if British administration were restored, it could be combined with some kind of international presence, for example from the United States or another country. This would serve as an earnest of our intention to continue negotiations. He did not think this would be an invidious device. The Prime Minister reiterated that British Sovereignty must continue and our administration be restored. Then there could be negotiations in order to make certain that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount. If they wished to continue under British Sovereignty, that was surely unexceptionable.

The discussion ended at 1920 hours, but continued over dinner.

A. J. C.

8 April 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April, 1982.

Falkland Islands: Air Services between UK and  
Argentina

The Prime Minister has seen the minute of 8 April from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this subject, and agrees, subject to the views of colleagues, that we should now suspend the operating rights of Argentina Airlines to London.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Rhodes (Department of Trade), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

27 COLPS

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*Agreed - subject to  
colleagues views.  
M̄  
FICO*

PM/82/27

PRIME MINISTER

Falkland Islands: Air Services between UK and Argentina

1. I wish to recommend that as part of our package of economic measures against Argentina we should now suspend the operating rights of Argentina Airlines (Aerolineas Argentinas) to London.
2. Argentine Airlines have operating rights into London and British Caledonian have operating rights into Buenos Aires. Argentine Airlines earn £7 million pa, British Caledonian £9 million.
3. Neither airline has used these rights since the crisis began and British Caledonian have no intention of doing so while the present situation continues, but it is just possible that the Argentines might seek to embarrass us by sending a flight to London which we could legally not refuse while the operating licence remains in force.
4. We had previously been reluctant to suspend the licence since it was possible that we might have needed to use British Caledonian flights to Buenos Aires for evacuation purposes. This will now be done through Montevideo. We should therefore now suspend the licence as part of our general package of economic measures against Argentina. To do so later, and in isolation, might draw more attention to this use of air service agreements as a political weapon. This could set a damaging precedent for us in our relations with other countries.
5. Our legal right to act in this fashion is covered in international law by the general principle of retaliation.



6. If colleagues see no objection, it would be for the Secretary of State for Trade to take the necessary action. I recommend that this be done as soon as possible, and at the latest by 9 April.

7. I am copying this minute to other members of ODSA and Lord Cockfield.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'FP', written in a cursive style.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, SW1  
8 April 1982



18 APR 1962

18 APR 1962

File

885

8 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS:  
MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

Thank you for your letter of 7 April. As I told you on the telephone earlier today, the Prime Minister is content that a message should be sent to President Lopez Portillo on the lines of the draft which you enclosed. I assume that you will arrange for this to be conveyed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 April 1982

BF.

FALKLAND ISLANDS:  
AUSTRALIAN POSITION

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Australia. I am sure that Mrs. Thatcher will wish to send a message of thanks and I should be grateful for a draft as soon as possible.

A. L. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

288

8 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 8 April enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of Australia.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency The Hon. Sir Victor Garland,  
K.B.E.



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

8 April 1982

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
The Hon. Sir Victor Garland, KBE

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T65/82

*My dear Prime Minister,*

*Mr. Fraser set  
off*

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following message:

Begins -

"My dear Margaret,

Sir John Mason yesterday handed me your letter seeking our help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands.

You mentioned various possible measures - a ban on the supply of arms and other military material, an embargo on all or some imports of goods from Argentina, the ending of export credit guarantees for new commitments to Argentina, and discouragement of further international lending to Argentina.

Not all of these are applicable to us; we are neither an arms supplier nor a lender to Argentina. Nevertheless, I am happy to say that the Australian Cabinet this morning decided that we should make clear our opposition to Argentina's aggressive act in seizing the islands, and our solidarity with you at this critical time.

Accordingly, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tony Street, has announced a ban with effect from today on all imports from Argentina other than those on the water or subject to existing contracts, and that no export credit guarantees will be extended to Argentina.

In your letter you expressed the hope that such measures, taken rapidly, would show Argentina that force does not pay; and you expressed the hope it would bring about withdrawal of their forces and a peaceful solution. I am happy that we have been able to take this action to show in a practical way our support for your Government.

I hope that this in turn will contribute to bringing about a peaceful settlement of this most trying and dangerous situation.

My warmest personal regards,

Malcolm Fraser."

Ends.

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.

*Sincerely,*  
*[Signature]*  
R.V. GARLAND





T65/82

PRIME MINISTER  
CANBERRA

▲ 8 APR 1982

*M, Ben Pughent*

Sir John Mason yesterday handed me your letter seeking our help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands.

You mentioned various possible measures - a ban on the supply of arms and other military material, an embargo on all or some imports of goods from Argentina, the ending of export credit guarantees for new commitments to Argentina, and discouragement of further international lending to Argentina.

Not all of these are applicable to us; we are neither an arms supplier nor a lender to Argentina. Nevertheless, I am happy to say that the Australian Cabinet this morning decided that we should make clear our opposition to Argentina's aggressive act in seizing the Islands, and our solidarity with you at this critical time.

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In your letter you expressed the hope that such measures, taken rapidly, would show Argentina that force does not pay and bring about withdrawal of their forces and a peaceful solution. I am happy that we have been able to take this action to show in a practical way our support for your government.

I hope that this in turn will contribute to bringing about a peaceful settlement of this most trying and dangerous situation.

*M, want formal  
reply*

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
LONDON SW1  
UNITED KINGDOM

APR 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

CABINET : THURSDAY 15 APRIL

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute A08082 of 7 April 1982, and she agrees that the Defence Secretary should brief Cabinet in the Cabinet Room at 10.30 am next Thursday and that the briefing should be followed immediately by Cabinet itself.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr Omand (Ministry of Defence).

AWJ.

8 April 1982

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AH

MR. COLES

Dinner for The Hon. Alexander M. Haig  
Thursday, 8 April

I attach the list of guests attending the dinner this evening, together with a draft seating plan.

Could you please let me know if the Prime Minister agrees this seating plan.

Sue Goodchild

8 April 1982

c.c. Mr. Whitmore

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF THE HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, SECRETARY  
OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL 1982  
AT 7.00 PM INFORMAL

---

The Prime Minister

The Hon. Alexander M. Haig

The Hon. Edward J. Streator

General Vernon Walters

Special Assistant to Mr. Haig

The Hon., Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary, Inter-  
American Affairs, State Department

Mr. James Rentschler

Senior Staff in charge of Western  
Europe and North America,  
National Security Council

Mr. David Gompert

State Department

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin

Sir Antony Acland

Mr. Clive Whitmore

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR DINNER ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL

Mr. David Gompert

Sir Antony Acland

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

General Vernon Walters

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

PRIME MINISTER

THE HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG

The Hon. Edward J. Streater

Rt. Hon. John Nott

Admiral of the Fleet  
Sir Terence Lewin

Mr. James Rentschler

Mr. Clive Whitmore

ENTRANCE

*Mufaxed to Chequer at 2230, 9/4*

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

ED/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
ED/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

*Mr Fuller SPU*

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 200

RESTRICTED

*[TYPISTS]*

(FM BERNE 091700Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 02 OF 08 APRIL  
AND TO WIMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND MONTEVIDEO

ATMOSPHERE IN BUENOS AIRES:

1. THE OVERALL IMPRESSION TODAY IS ONE OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY AND CONCERN. BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FACTORS IN TODAY'S MEDIA NEWS ACCENTUATE THIS ATMOSPHERE.
2. UNDER NEGATIVE I WOULD INCLUDE THE HEADLINE NEWS OF THE BRITISH BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS DECREED FOR NEXT MONDAY MORNING AND SUPPORTED BY THE CONTINUING APPROACH OF THE BRITISH FLEET. THE ARGENTINE REACTION HAS BEEN TO CALL UP THEIR 1962 CLASS OF MILITARY RESERVISTS AND PUT THEM ON ALERT FOR EARLY INCORPORATION INTO THE FORCES.
3. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE TODAY'S PRESS ALSO HEADLINES THE NATO APPEAL TO BRITAIN TO CALL BACK ITS FLEET, AND THE LOCAL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE QUOTE HERALD UNQUOTE REPRODUCES A MESSAGE FROM THE LOCAL BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL TO THE PRIME MINISTER URGING HER TO SEEK

APPEAL TO BRITAIN TO CALL BACK ITS FLEET, AND THE LOCAL ENGLISH-  
LANGUAGE QUOTE HERALD UNQUOTE REPRODUCES A MESSAGE FROM THE LOCAL  
BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL TO THE PRIME MINISTER URGING HER TO SEEK  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE STRONG  
BRITISH PRESCENCE IN ARGENTINA AND THE SIZE OF THE LOCAL BRITISH  
COMMUNITY. HAIG'S JOURNEY TO LONDON AND EXPECTED ARRIVAL IN  
BUENOS AIRES ARE ALSO HEADLINED.

4. MEANWHILE AN ATMOSPHERE OF MILITARY PREPARATION IS BEING FOSTER-  
ED BY TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS APPEALING FOR NATIONAL UNITY  
IN THIS HOUR OF CRISIS. LAST NIGHT TELEVISION CARRIED SHOTS OF  
16 AND 17 YEAR OLDS VOLUNTEERING FOR ACTION - MILITARY, IF  
NECESSARY, IN THE ISLANDS.

5. THE UNDERLYING IMPRESSION IS OF A GOVERNMENT OUTWARDLY STRONG  
BUT WITH A GOOD DEAL OF INNER UNCERTAINTY BEGINNING TO TAKE HOLD.

JOY

LEE

NNNN

SENHAT RECD AT 091742Z JM/ JEG



**SECRET**

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**SECRET**

FM BELMOPAN 082350Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 8 APRIL 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS : BELIZE/GUATEMALA

1. BELIZEANS HAVE BEEN WATCHING THE FALKLANDS DRAMA CLOSELY AND WITH CONCERN FOR ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR OWN POSITION VIS-A-VIS GUATEMALA. THIS CONCERN WILL BE HEIGHTENED BY THE GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTERS DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE ACTION AND HIS ANTICIPATION OF RECIPROCAL ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR GUATEMALA IN THE SUPPOSED PARALLEL CASE OF BELIZE. TO SOME EXTENT PRICE'S PROMPT CONDEMNATION OF THE ARGENTINE ACTION REFLECTS BELIZE'S CLEAR SELF-INTEREST. BUT HE HAS ALSO GENUINELY WISHED TO BE HELPFUL AND HAS CONSULTED ME OVER HIS VARIOUS MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS. I HAVE TRIED TO STEER THESE GENTLY IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITHOUT CREATING THE FEELING THAT THIS WAS EXPECTED AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR BRITISH PROTECTION AGAINST GUATEMALA. FOR HIS PART PRICE HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT HE EXPECTS HIS LOYALTY TO BE REWARDED BY A FAVOURABLE DECISION ON HIS REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF OUR COMMITMENT; HE WOULD BE LESS THAN HUMAN IF HE DOES NOT HOPE THAT IT WILL.
2. WE STILL OWE HIM A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAS NOT PRESSED ME ON THIS. I WOULD GUESS THAT HE INTERPRETS THE DELAY AS INDICATING THAT WE NOT REPEAT NOT HOLD RIGIDLY TO THE PRESENT DEADLINE. THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS MAY HAVE REINFORCED THIS VIEW PARTICULARLY IF HE HAS CALCULATED THAT GIVEN THE CRITICISM THEY HAVE HAD OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BRITISH MINISTERS WOULD NOT WISH TO INCUR THE INEVITABLE ACCUSATIONS THAT WE WERE ABANDONING BELIZE TO A SIMILAR FATE AND THAT THE SHORTER THE LEAD TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL THE MORE OPEN WE WOULD BE TO SUCH CRITICISM. (WE ARE AWARE THAT SOME BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS ARE ALREADY INTERESTED IN THIS ASPECT.) IF EARLY WITHDRAWAL IS NONTHELESS CONFIRMED HE WILL TRY TO ENLIST ALL THE SUPPORT HE CAN MUSTER TO BRING PRESSURE ON US TO RELENT: THE FALKLANDS CASE ASSURES HIM A SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE.
3. THERE HAVE OF COURSE ALREADY BEEN RUMOURS ABOUT THE DATE OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH HAVE NOT GENERATED NOTICEABLE PUBLIC ALARM. THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE BELIZEANS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO SCARE STORIES, BUT THE STATEMENTS WE HAVE ISSUED, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY WORDED NOT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY DEPARTURE, HAVE ALSO BEEN TAKEN AS REASSURING. AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE MOST BELIZEANS PROBABLY THOUGHT THAT THE QUOTE APPROPRIATE PERIOD UNQUOTE WOULD BE MEASURED IN YEARS. THEY MAY NOW REALISE IT WILL NOT BE SO LONG. BUT FEW BELIEVE WITHDRAWAL WILL HAPPEN IN LESS THAN THREE MONTHS TIME: OTHERWISE, SURELY, THE RUN DOWN WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEGUN. IN SOME CASES THERE MAY AN OSTRICH-LIKE RELUCTANCE TO FACT THE ISSUE: IN OTHERS A BELIEF THAT IF WE GO SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THEIR CONTINUED PROTECTION. SINCE THE GUATEMALAN CCUP SEEMS TO HAVE DESTROYED

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ANY CHANCE OF AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THE NEED FOR SUCH PROTECTION IS STILL FELT. THE DEEP-SEATED FEAR OF GUATEMALA REMAINS AND THE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS MUST HAVE INCREASED IT. I HAVE ALWAYS EXPECTED THAT THE REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EARLY DEPARTURE DATE, WOULD BE PANIC AND RECRIMINATION (PERHAPS VIOLENT) AGAINST THE BELIZEAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS: THE FALKLAND CRISIS MAKES THIS EVEN MORE CERTAIN.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW THE JIC NOW ASSESS THE THREAT FROM GUATEMALA. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE SO FAR OF THE POLICY THE NEW REGIME WILL FOLLOW: BUT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE JUNTA APPEARS TO DEPEND ON SUPPORT FROM THE JUNIOR OFFICERS, WHOM WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED TO BE HAWKISH ON BELIZE. IF, AS WE HAVE HEARD REPORTED, THE JUNTA ALREADY FEELS THREATENED BY SUPPORTERS OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, RIOS MONTT MIGHT CONSIDER THAT A FOREIGN ADVENTURE WOULD BE ONE WAY OF RALLYING SUPPORT. THE QUOTE MACHISMO UNQUOTE OF THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY HAS BEEN GIVEN A JOLT AND GUATEMALAN CIVILIANS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO DRAW MALICIOUS COMPARISONS WITH THE MANLINESS OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES TO ADD TO THEIR DISCOMFORTURE. THIS MAY CREASE THE CHANCE OF RASHNESS. SEEN FROM HERE IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SOME ELEMENTS AT LEAST MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO BELIEVE THAT A TIME WHEN MOST OF OUR ATTENTION AND RESCURCES ARE DIRECTED WLSEWHERE COULD BE A PROPITICUS MOMENT FOR SOME MOVE AGAINST BELIZE.

IT IS ALSO A TIME WHEN WE AND NOT THEY MAY BE ISOLATED, AT LEAST WITHIN LATIN AMERICA. MOREOVER, ARGENTINA MAY WELL URGE THE GUATEMALANS TO TAKE SUCH ACTION TO GIVE US ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY PRE-OCCUPATION. DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OF ANY GUATEMALAN PREPARATIONS THESE THOUGHTS MAKE ME UNEASY AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THEM WITH CBF. PENDING ANY FURTHER INDICATORS BRITISH FORCES WILL BE MAINTAINING A HEIGHTENED STATE OF INTELLIGENCE ALERTNESS AND NORMAL ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PATROLLING (IE SIX PATROLS IN THE JUNGLE AT ANY TIME).

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FM WASHINGTON 090115Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 1208 OF 8 APRIL  
INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK  
ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL OECD, TOKYO, OTTAWA,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: EC COOPERATION AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE AGREED AT TODAY'S MEETING  
OF EC AMBASSADORS:

REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
COUNTRIES MET TODAY TO DISCUSS THE CRISIS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
ARISING FROM ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. THE MEETING WAS BRIEFED ON RECENT  
STEPS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND THEY DISCUSSED THE LATEST  
EXCHANGES IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES.

EXCHANGES IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES RECALLED THE EARLIER CONDEMNATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE COMMUNITY ON 2 APRIL OF THE ARMED INTERVENTION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. THEY UNANIMOUSLY AND WARMLY SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502, REQUIRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AGREED TO REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE.

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FM WASHINGTON 090105Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1207 OF 8 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL OECD, TOKYO, OTTAWA,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

FALKLANDS : EC COOPERATION.

1. AT MY SUGGESTION, THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR SUMMONED A MEETING TODAY OF EC COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS THE FALKLAND CRISIS. I BRIEFED THEM ON OUR LATEST STEPS AND ON THE RESPONSES TO OUR REQUESTS FOR SIMILAR ACTION (YOUR TELNO 72 TO BRUSSELS). I EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES, WELCOMED THE VERY HELPFUL REACTIONS FROM OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS AND SUGGESTED A PRESS RELEASE TO SHOW SOLIDARITY.

2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE DEMAND FOR FULL AND IMMEDIA-

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2. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE DEMAND FOR FULL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. APART FROM SOME HESITATION FROM THE IRISH AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE PRECEDENT BEING SET, THERE WAS SUPPORT FOR THIS STEP FROM MY COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES. I AM ENSURING THAT THE STATEMENT IS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U S AND BRITISH PRESS HERE.

3. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MAKING A STRONG DEMARCHE TODAY IN BUENOS AIRES, CONDEMNING THE INVASION, INSISTING ON A PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, AND EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR RESOLUTION 502 TO FORM THE BASIS OF ANY SOLUTION.

4. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED, ESPECIALLY BY THE FRENCH, IN THE U S ATTITUDE TO THE CRISIS AND HAIG'S DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. I NOTED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT (AS REPORTED BY GELB IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES - MY TELNO 1193). BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DEMONSTRATED HIS STRONG FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT, AND HAIG RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE. THE UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FROM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS FOR OUR RESPONSE HAD BEEN STRIKING, AND THE REACTION OF U S PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION HAD BEEN MORE THAN FAVOURABLE. I SAID THAT HAIG WOULD FIND CONFIRMATION IN LONDON THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT COULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND WOULD ONLY BE READY TO NEGOTIATE IF THE ARGENTINIANS WITHDREW. WE HOPED THAT HE WOULD IMPRESS ON B A THE NEED FOR THEM TO ACCEPT THE U N RESOLUTION, AND WOULD BRING HOME TO THEM THE RESULTS OF THEIR MISCALCULATIONS AND THE FORCE OF OUR OWN DETERMINATION.

5. SOME COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES SPECULATED ABOUT ARGENTINA TURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ASSISTANCE IF SHE FELT LET DOWN BY THE U S. HOWEVER THEY NOTED THE HEAVY DEPENDENCE OF ARGENTINA ON TRADE AND CREDIT FROM THE WEST, AND AGREED THAT OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO FOLLOW HER LEAD IF SHE DID MOVE TOWARDS MOSCOW.

6. WE SHALL BE HAVING ANOTHER COMMUNITY MEETING HERE AFTER HAIG'S RETURN FROM BUENOS AIRES.

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FM WASHINGTON 090042Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1206 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA,  
PANAMA CITY, BOGOTA, CARACAS, QUITO, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO,  
MONTEVIDEO, ASUNCION, KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN

OAS: RIO TREATY

1. THERE IS AN INTENSE DEBATE AMONG THE OAS DELEGATIONS HERE, INCLUDING THE AMERICAN ONE, ABOUT THE LEGAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN INVOKING THE RIO TREATY. SOME CONTEND THAT THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE FALLS OUTSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE (NOT THE GEOGRAPHIC) SCOPE OF THE TREATY BECAUSE THE U.N., AS A SUPERIOR BODY, IS SEIZED OF THE QUESTION AND HAS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (THE ARGUMENT WE HAVE OURSELVES BEEN DEPLOYING). OTHERS ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE THE TREATY INVOKED LEST IT BE USED BY ARGENTINA TO LEGITIMIZE ITS INVASION. MORE ARE PROBABLY WORRIED BY THE FACT THAT A DETERMINATION TO TAKE MEASURES UNDER THE TREATY (NEEDING A 2/3 MAJORITY OF THE SIGNATORIES) IS MANDATORY ON ALL

ARGENTINA TO LEGITIMIZE THE  
BY THE FACT THAT A DETERMINATION TO TAKE MEASURES UNDER THE TREATY  
(NEEDING A 2/3 MAJORITY OF THE SIGNATORIES) IS MANDATORY ON ALL  
SIGNATORIES.

2. THESE PROBLEMS ARE COMPOUNDED BY THE ANGLOPHONE MEMBERS' INSISTENCE THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO VOTE ON WHETHER TO CONVENE THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL, EVEN THOUGH THEY COULD NOT VOTE ON ANY RESOLUTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY ITSELF.

3. THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION IS OF COURSE LOOKING FOR WAYS OF OVERCOMING THESE PROBLEMS. TO CONVENE THE OAS UNDER THE RIO TREATY AND TO PASS A RESOLUTION REQUIRING ACTION WOULD NEED 15 TO 16 VOTES WHICH IT IS NOT AT PRESENT FINDING IT EASY TO OBTAIN. WHILE SOME MORE ACTIVE DISPLAY OF LATIN SOLIDARITY LOOKS LIKELY WHEN OUR FLEET ENTERS THE TREATY AREA. OR NAVAL HOSTILITIES BEGIN. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESUMED OAS MEETING ON MONDAY WILL ON PRESENT PLANS BE TO DISCUSS THE COLOMBIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

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MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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For Typists - 1x100x

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FM WASHINGTON 090035Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1204 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE ASCENSION ISLAND (FOR ADMINISTRATOR)

YOUR TELNO 680: USE OF US FACILITIES ON ASCENSION ISLAND

1. WE HAVE PASSED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OUR FURTHER REQUIREMENT FOR USE OF THE AIRFIELD ON ASCENSION, AS SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT ACCEPT THAT OUR REQUESTS TO THEM MAY BE PHRASED IN GENERAL TERMS, LEAVING DETAILS TO BE ARRANGED ON THE SPOT. HOWEVER, THEY HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO LET THEM HAVE AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE.

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FM WASHINGTON 082252Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1197 OF 8 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, SANTIAGO, TOKYO, BONN, OSLO,  
BRUSSELS, PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE MOSCOW, WARSAW, PRETORIA

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 665:

FALKLANDS: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY.

1. MINISTER RAISED THIS WITH EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING WHEN SEEING HIM ON OTHER MATTERS. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE BEST OPPORTUNITY THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO PUT THIS ACROSS IN BUENOS AIRES WOULD BE WHEN HAIG WAS THERE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE POINT HAD BEEN RAISED WITH HAIG IN LONDON.

2. IF THIS POINT WAS DISCUSSED WITH HAIG, THERE IS NO NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION HERE. IF NOT, HOWEVER, PLEASE LET US KNOW AT ONCE AND WE WILL TRY TO ENSURE THAT HAIG IS MADE AWARE OF IT BEFORE HE GETS TO BUENOS AIRES.

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FM WASHINGTON 082250Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1196 OF 8 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY SAN JOSE, BOGOTA, QUITO, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. TEXT OF COLOMBIAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEARING IN MIND:

THE EVENTS THAT RECENTLY TRANSPIRED ON THE MALVINA ISLANDS WHICH OCCASIONED THE RESOLUTION APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON SATURDAY, APRIL 3:

CONSIDERING:

THAT IT IS THE ORGANIZATION'S DUTY TO FOSTER THE CREATION OF A CLIMATE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, SO AS TO AVERT ANY ADVER CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THOSE TWO NATIONS



CLIMATE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, SO AS TO AVERT ANY ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THOSE TWO NATIONS AND

THAT A RAPID, PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISAGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE ANTICOLONIALIST POLICY THAT BOTH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES HAVE DEFENDED AND PRACTICED,

RESOLVES:

1. TO EXPRESS ITS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE GRAVE SITUATION THAT THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND NOW FACE.
2. TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO HELP FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONTROVERSY THEY NOW FACE.
3. TO AUTHORIZE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL TO SET UP A COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION TO HELP, IF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE SO AGREE, TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT ELIMINATES, ONCE AND FOR ALL, THE DANGER OF A WAR BETWEEN COUNTRIES THAT DESERVE THE RESPECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
4. TO AUTHORIZE THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO FORWARD THE TEXT OF THIS RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, FOR THE CORRESPONDING PURPOSES.

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FM WASHINGTON 082245Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1195 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE, BOGOTA, QUITO, UKMIS NEW YORK

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BOGOTA TEL NO 69: COLOMBIAN OAS INITIATIVE ON FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. ACTING ON A COLOMBIAN REQUEST, THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE OAS MET TODAY IN WASHINGTON. AT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INVITATION, CRABBIE ATTENDED AS AN UNOFFICIAL OBSERVER.

2. THE MEETING OPENED WITH A BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL THAT IT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE ADJOURNED. THERE FOLLOWED A PROCEDURAL WRANGLE AFTER WHICH IT WAS AGREED THAT THE THREE SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION (COLOMBIA, EQUADOR AND COSTA RICA) SHOULD MAKE PREPARED STATEMENTS AND THAT SUBSEQUENTLY A VOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THE BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL.

3. COLOMBIA INTRODUCED ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM - IT DIFFERS IN DETAIL FROM THAT CONTAINED IN SAN JOSE TEL NO 102). COLOMBIA CLAIMED THAT WAR THREATENED THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THAT THE OAS COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY IN FACE OF SUCH A DANGER. COLOMBIA'S BASIC POSITION WAS THAT DISPUTES SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY PEACEFUL AND LEGAL MEANS, AND THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION BEFORE THE PERMANENT COUNCIL.

4. EQUADOR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, IT WAS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. THE EMANCIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA

4. EQUADOR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH IT SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, IT WAS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. THE EMANCIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA WOULD REMAIN INCOMPLETE AS LONG AS THERE WERE COLONIES IN THE REGION. EQUADOR SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION AS A MEANS OF PEACEFULLY RESOLVING THE ANACHRONISM OF A COLONIAL PRESENCE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

5. COSTA RICA EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT A QUOTE WARLIKE FLEET UNQUOTE SHOULD BE HEADING FOR LATIN AMERICA. THE CONTINENT COULD NOT SIT WITH ITS ARMS FOLDED IN FACE OF SUCH A THREAT. TWO NOBLE NATIONS HAD AN UNDERSTANDABLE DISPUTE, AND THE OAS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO AVERT THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD WORLD WAR. COSTA RICA PROPOSED THAT A PEACE KEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED TO REPLACE THE ARGENTINES.

6. THE THREE SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION THEN AGREED TO REMIT THE ACTUAL TEXT TO A WORKING GROUP: THIS WAS DESIGNED TO HEAD OFF THE CONTINUING BOLIVIAN INSISTENCE ON IMMEDIATELY ADJOURNING THE PERMANENT COUNCIL. BOLIVIA CLAIMED THAT AN OAS INITIATIVE NOW WOULD CUT ACROSS THE QUOTE MEDIATION UNQUOTE EFFORTS OF HAIG IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. BOLIVIA THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE ADJOURNED UNTIL MONDAY, WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS MR HAIG WAS MAKING WITH HIS INITIATIVE.

7. AFTER FURTHER PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION, THIS ADJOURNMENT WAS AGREED BY A HEAVY MAJORITY. AMONG THOSE SUPPORTING THE ADJOURNMENT WERE THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL, CHILE AND PARAGUAY.

8. IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING, WE NOTED THAT THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT WAS ALREADY IN PLACE IN THE TERMS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502. IT WAS NOT FOR US TO COMMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THE OAS DEBATE. HOWEVER WE HOPED THAT ARGENTINA'S FRIENDS WOULD PERSUADE HER THAT BRITAIN WAS SERIOUSLY AND UNFLINCHINGLY COMMITTED TO REASSERTING HER SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AND THAT ACCORDINGLY ARGENTINA SHOULD WITHDRAW HER TROOPS IMMEDIATELY.

9. COMMENT: THIS WAS A MOST SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. WE DID WHAT WE COULD BEHIND THE SCENES TO ENCOURAGE ADJOURNMENT.

HENDERSON

PS  
PS/LPS

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/LOPD TREFGARNE

PS/FUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR UPE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAED (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/HQGD

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

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MR MCINTYRE

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FM WASHINGTON 090100Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1193 OF 8 APRIL 1982

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS; US PRESS.

1. TWO OF THE MOST REVEALING STORIES IN TODAY'S AMERICAN PRESS ARE ONE BY LESLIE GELB IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ABOUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND ANOTHER, ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE POST AND THE SUBJECT OF COMMENT BY ANTHONY LEWIS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, ABOUT THE FACT THAT JEANE KIRKPATRICK AND STOESSEL BOTH ATTENDED A DINNER AT THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY ON THE EVENING OF FRIDAY 2 APRIL, IE THE DAY OF THE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS.

2. GELB WRITES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS APPLYING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO PROVIDE LONDON WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH FLOTILLA HEADING FOR THE FALKLANDS. FACED WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT BRITISH FAILURE COULD LEAD TO THE FALL OF MRS THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY ONE LESS AGREEABLE TO REAGAN, GELB DESCRIBES A POINTED DEBATE WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT BETWEEN EAGLEBURGER AND ENDERS, WITH EAGLEBURGER ARGUING THAT FAILURE TO SUPPORT BRITAIN MIGHT LEAD TO ANOTHER SUEZ-TYPE CRISIS IN BRITISH/AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND ENDERS MAINTAINING THAT OUTRIGHT SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN WOULD ENDANGER US EFFORTS IN LATIN AMERICA. HAIG IS REPORTED AS LEANING TOWARD EAGLEBURGER.

3. GELB REFERS TO MY DISCUSSIONS WITH HAIG AND SAYS THAT IMPLICIT

3. GELB REFERS TO MY DISCUSSIONS WITH HAIG AND SAYS THAT IMPLICIT IN THEM, WAS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WHOLE FABRIC OF BRITISH /AMERICAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION COULD COME UNDER QUESTION IF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO SIT ON THE FENCE. EAGLEBURGER REPORTEDLY STRESSED TO HAIG THE CRITICAL NEED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO STAND BEHIND THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND NON-USE OF FORCE. GELB CONCLUDES THAT THE GENERAL OFFICIAL APPRAISAL OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WAS BLEAK AND IT WAS FELT THAT AT SOME POINT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE SIDES.

4. THE WASHINGTON POST'S REPORT ON THE DINNER AT THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY LAST FRIDAY SAID THAT IT WAS HELD IN HONOUR OF MRS KIRKPATRICK AND THAT IN ADDITION TO STOESSEL, ENDERS AND MIDDENDORF (US AMBASSADOR TO THE OAS) WERE PRESENT.

5. ANTHONY LEWIS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES SAYS THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK DID NOT LET A LITTLE THING LIKE AN ACT OF ARMED AGGRESSION KEEP HER AWAY FROM THE DINNER, AND THAT HER PARTICIPATION AND THAT OF STOESSEL REFLECTS THE RESPONSE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S RECKLESS MOOD: QUOTE EVEN BY TODAY'S DEGRADED STANDARDS, IT IS SHOCKING TO THINK OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS ATTENDING AN AGGRESSOR'S DINNER PART ON THE NIGHT OF THE AGGRESSION. BUT THERE IS MORE TO IT THAN ONE'S DISGUST AT SUCH BEHAVIOUR. THERE IS THE PRACTICAL POINT THAT THE REAGAN POLICY OF CUDDLING UP TO ARGENTINA HAS BEEN AGAINST THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE NOTION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT WE COULD NUDGE THE ARGENTINE RULERS TOWARD DECENCY IF WE TREATED THEM WITH RESPECT. BUT THAT IS NOT THE KIND OF PEOPLE THEY ARE. THEY ARE COLD-BLOODED OPPORTUNISTS WHO HARBOUR AMONG THEM MURDERERS AND PLAIN FASCISTS... THE RESULT IS DEVASTATING FOR OUR CLOSEST FRIEND IN THE WORLD, BRITAIN UNQUOTE. LEWIS CONCLUDES THAT FOR THE WEST AS A WHOLE THERE IS PARTICULAR LOSS IN THE FALKLANDS AFFAIR, NAMELY THE RESIGNATION OF LORD CARRINGTON. THE WORLD WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE WITHOUT HIM. (I MIGHT ADD THAT IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL PRESS ENQUIRIES ABOUT WHAT I THOUGHT OF MRS KIRKPATRICK'S AND STOESSELS ATTENDANCE AT THE ARGENTINE DINNER, I HAVE SAID ON THE RECORD QUOTE DEPLORABLE UNQUOTE)

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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LPS  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

*Typists  
N.A.J.*

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MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
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FM WASHINGTON 090055Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192 OF 8 APRIL 1982  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK

*ms.*

MY TELNO 1180: FALKLANDS: US PRESS.

1. THE LEAD STORY IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE NEW YORK TIMES IS OUR DECLARATION OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE. THE TONE OF PRESS COVERAGE AND COMMENT REMAINS FAVOURABLE TO US WITH MOST ATTENTION NOW FOCUSED ON HAIG'S VISIT TO LONDON.
2. THERE ARE IMPORTANT STORIES ABOUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE US ADMINISTRATION (SEE MIFT).
3. A NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL SAYS THAT EVEN IF THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN THE US AND UK ARE SET ASIDE AND EVEN FORGETTING ARGENTINA'S SUPPORT OF NAZI GERMANY OVER WORLD WAR II AND HER CYNICAL COURTSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION NOW, THERE IS NO CASE FOR THE CRUDE SYMMETRY PRESIDENT REAGAN IS TRYING TO MAKE IN HANDLING THE DISPUTE: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT IS SURELY RIGHT TO OFFER HIS GOOD OFFICES TO HELP AVOID A VIOLENT CONFLICT. HE IS WRONG EVEN TO IMPLY THAT THERE WAS NO MUGGING OR THAT DEMOCRATIC BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA'S MILITARY JUNTA HAVE AN EQUAL CLAIM ON AMERICAN ESTEEM AND AFFECTION UNQUOTE.

JUNTA HAVE AN EQUAL CLAIM ON AMERICAN ESTEEM AND AFFECTION UNQUOTE.

4. THE NEW YORK POST (MURDOCH-OWNED) TAKES A SIMILAR LINE: QUOTE THERE ARE OF COURSE A NUMBER OF US VITAL INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA BUT THE FOREMOST IS TO ENSURE THAT AGGRESSION IS NEITHER REWARDED NOR ENCOURAGED. ...THE ADMINISTRATION IS ENTITLED TO CALL HAIG'S JOURNEY ONE OF MEDIATION. IT CANNOT AND MUST NOT FUDGE THE BASIC FACT THAT AGGRESSION HAS TAKEN PLACE. WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED IS ARGENTINA'S WITHDRAWAL. IN DIPLOMATIC TERMS, IT MUST VACATE ITS AGGRESSION. BRITISH ADMINISTRATION MUST RETURN TO THE FALKLANDS. ONLY THEN, CAN THERE BE A RESUMPTION OF TALKS ON THE ISLANDS' FUTURE WHICH THE ARGENTINE JUNTA SO FOOLISHLY SOUGHT TO OVERWHELM UNQUOTE.

5. THE WASHINGTON POST CARRIES TWO ARTICLES BY LEADING COMMENTATORS, THE FIRST BY GEORGE WILL, WHO WRITES QUOTE COUNT THE NUMBER OF BORDERS AND OTHER POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED MERELY PROVISIONAL, PENDING ARBITRATION OF FORCE IF ARGENTINA'S ACTION IS NOT REVERSED. ARGENTINA HAS DECLARED, IN EFFECT, THAT THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES, ...SO DUST OFF A 19TH CENTURY GLOBE AND LET'S REOPEN EVERY DISPUTE, FROM SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN THROUGH TEXAS UNQUOTE.

6. IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED ARGENTINA WILL HAVE TO GIVE FIRST ED YODER WRITES: QUOTE ARGENTINA WILL HAVE TO GIVE FIRST, FOR BRITAIN IS DETERMINED, AS IT MUST BE, THAT THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING FALKLANDERS CHOOSE THEIR OWN FATE AND AFFILIATION. AT ISSUE IS NOT SO MUCH A DISPUTED CLAIM TO ABSTRACT SOVEREIGNTY AS THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATED SELF-DETERMINATION ON WHICH BRITAIN'S PEACEFUL DISSOLUTION OF THE EMPIRE HAS BEEN BASED SINCE WORLD WAR II UNQUOTE.

7. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL CARRIES AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS SAYING THAT BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC SALVOS AT ARGENTINA COULD BE AS EFFECTIVE AS ITS NAVAL VOLLEYS. THE ARTICLE CONTINUES THAT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN BANKERS BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT ARGENTINA WILL BE ABLE TO RAISE NEW MONEY ABROAD UNTIL THE DISPUTE IS RESOLVED AND THAT THE MEASURES TAKEN BY BRITAIN HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO BITE. THE POSSIBILITY THAT BANKS MIGHT CALL A DEFAULT ON ARGENTINE DEBT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. ACCORDING TO THE PAPER, SOME EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT WHILE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONTEMPLATE A FIGHT WITH THE BRITISH NAVY, IT WOULD THINK TWICE ABOUT PLACING THE NATION'S ECONOMY IN JEOPARDY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF CREDIT.

8. TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERAGE ALSO CONTINUES TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN OUR FAVOUR. MR NOTT'S INTERVIEW ON ABC'S QUOTE GOOD MORNING AMERICA UNQUOTE REACHED A LARGE AUDIENCE; EXTRACTS HAVE ALSO BEEN

IN OUR FAVOUR. MR NOTT'S INTERVIEW ON ABC'S QUOTE GOOD MORNING AMERICA UNQUOTE REACHED A LARGE AUDIENCE: EXTRACTS HAVE ALSO BEEN BROADCAST BY A NUMBER OF RADIO NETWORKS AND PUT OUT ON THE WIRE SERVICES. YOUR SPEECH IN THE HOUSE WAS WIDELY REPORTED (MOST OF THE MAIN RADIO NETWORKS TOOK AND USED LIVE FEED FROM BIS), AND YOUR INTERVIEW WITH COI RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE USAGE - AS A LEAD ITEM, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE CBS NETWORK. THERE WAS ALSO USE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE TODAY AS A RESULT OF FEED FROM BIS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/LPS  
~~PS~~  
PS/LOPD TREFGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ED/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
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PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
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MR HAWTIN  
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*Typhoons*

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SECRET

FM BRITNAVAT BRASILIA 8:2210Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH CGRM

AND TO FLASH CINC FLEET

SECRET

SIC 19F

OP CORPORATE

REF A 19F 081550Z APR 82 (NOTAL)

B MY 13F/19F 081940Z APR 82 ( NOTAL)

PARA 1. REF A RECEIVED AFTER DESPATCH REF B.

PARA 2. SUBSEQUENTLY BRAZILIAN VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF TELEPHONED HMA INDICATING DIPCLEAR MUST BE REQUESTED FOR AES TO DOCK RIO DE JANEIRO.

PARA 3. GRATEFUL REPLY DESKBY 091200Z APR 82 GIVING NAME OF SHIP, NAME OF CAPTAIN, CREW COMPOSITION, ETA, ETD, CALLSIGN, RADIO FREQUENCIES AND POWER OF EMISSION, IF TO PROCEED.

HARDING  
BT

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(28)

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S  
PS/LPS  
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

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MR PERETZ  
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T. J. D. I. S. K.

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FM PORT OF SPAIN 082225Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 058 OF 8 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO KINGSTON, BRIDGETOWN AND GEORGETOWN

MY TELS NO 56, AND NO 1 TO WASHINGTON; FALKLAND ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AT 2300Z TODAY.

BEGINS

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND MORE SPECIFICALLY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2734 OF 16TH DECEMBER 1970, REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AND FURTHER REITERATES ITS ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SANCTITY OF HISTORIC BOUNDARIES.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUBSCRIBES TO THE VIEW THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATES MUST BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION OR ARBITRATION AND STRESSES ITS ABHORRENCE OF THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SUPPORTS THE PROVISIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND IN PARTICULAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2065 OF 16TH DECEMBER 1965 WHICH UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF

DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND IN PARTICULAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
RESOLUTION 2065 OF 16TH DECEMBER 1965 WHICH UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF  
SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
CONSEQUENTLY THE GOVERNMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO LENDS ITS FULL  
SUPPORT TO ALL EFFORTS LEADING TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE  
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND  
ARGENTINA.

ENDS

LANE

NNNN

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919272 PRDRME G

.....9

[SOUTHERN AFRICA]

[ADVANCE COPIES]

17

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR DAY~~

*SIR J. Leahy*

MR WRIGHT

SIR L ALLINSON

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

ED/S AF D

ED/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

MR COLLINS DOT

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

*ms*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090800Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 082346Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 432 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MIPT: CONDEMNED ANC MEMBERS.

DRAFT UK STATEMENT:

I DO NOT NEED TO REMIND THE COUNCIL OF MY GOVERNMENT'S DEEP CONCERN AT THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND OF OUR EFFORTS OVER MANY YEARS TO ASSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM, LIKE OTHER DELEGATIONS, GAVE ITS SUPPORT TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 5 FEBRUARY 1981, IN WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL EXPRESSED THEIR GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE DEATH SENTENCES PASSED ON JOHNSON LUBISI, PETRUS MASHIGO AND NAPHTHALI MANANA.

I WOULD ALSO REMIND THE COUNCIL OF THE CONCERN WHICH WE EXPRESSED ON 27 AUGUST 1981 OVER THE CASE OF MR TSOTSOBE, MR SHABANGU AND MR MOISE, AND OF OUR VIEW THAT ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS CLEMENCY SHOULD THEN HAVE BEEN EXERCISED.

SHOULD THEN HAVE BEEN EXERCISED.

LOI. *The British Govt*

-FGQXKBQGOVERNMENT THEREFORE GIVES ITS FULL SUPPORT TO THE PROPOSED APPEAL ON BEHALF OF THIS COUNCIL THAT CLEMENCY SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE CASES NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. WE WOULD VERY MUCH HOPE, ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, THAT THE DEATH SENTENCES WILL NOT BE CARRIED OUT. AND WE BELIEVE THAT A MERCIFUL DECISION WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE LOWERING OF TENSION IN THE REGION.

WHYTE

NNNN

TV



Dis 090Y002

[SOUTHERN AFRICA]

[ADVANCE COPIES]

17

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR DAY~~

*Sir J Leahy*

MR WRIGHT

SIR L ALLINSON

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

MR COLLINS DOT

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

*mf*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090800Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 082345Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 431 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

CAPE TOWN TELNO 249 (NOT TO ALL): CONDEMNED ANC MEMBERS.

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICAN GROUP HAS REQUESTED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE CONFIRMATION OF THE DEATH SENTENCES ON LUBISI, MASHIGO AND MANANA. THE COUNCIL WILL MEET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 1600Z ON 9 APRIL.

2. THE AFRICAN GROUP MET ON THE AFTERNOON OF 8 APRIL TO CONSIDER THEIR TACTICS. WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING. BUT AS YOU KNOW, THE LAST TWOCOMPARABLE OCCASIONS (DEATH SENTENCES PASSED AGAINST TSOTSOBE, SHABANGU AND MOISE IN AUGUST 1981 (UKMIS TELNOS 766 AND 767) AND THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE SILVERTON CASE IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY 1982) HAVE LED TO PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TERMS OF A DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. THE AFRICANS ARE UNLIKELY TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION ONCE AGAIN TO FLOAT A DRAFT CONTAINING LANGUAGE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND PERHAPS TO THE UK.

3. AS SEEN FROM HERE, OUR INTEREST LIES IN OBTAINING THE FASTEST POSSIBLE RESULT WITH THE MINIMUM DISCORD BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE

3. AS SEEN FROM HERE, OUR INTEREST LIES IN OBTAINING THE FASTEST POSSIBLE RESULT WITH THE MINIMUM DISCORD BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE AFRICAN GROUP. IF THE COUNCIL'S PROCEEDINGS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE PROLONGED, THERE WILL BE AN INCREASING DANGER THAT SOMEONE WILL RAISE OUR NAVAL PREPARATIONS OVER THE FALKLANDS. WE HAVE HAD GOOD SUPPORT SO FAR FROM THE AFRICANS ON THE FALKLANDS. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO RISK DILUTING THIS BY BEING DIFFICULT OVER THE TERMS OF A STATEMENT ON THE DEATH SENTENCES. ON THIS OCCASION THE RISK OF IRRITATING THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE MUCH THE LESSER EVIL.
4. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO:
- (A) PERSUADE THE AFRICANS THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY A SHORT AND EARLY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOCUSSED ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS - IE ESSENTIALLY A PLEA FOR CLEMENCY. WE WOULD ARGUE THAT, ON PAST FORM, THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAY CARRY OUT THE SENTENCES QUICKLY. WE COULD ADD THAT, IF THE AFRICANS' OBJECTIVE IS TO SAVE LIVES, THEY WOULD BE UNWISE TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD PRODUCE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
  - (B) EXPLAIN FRANKLY TO THE US MISSION WHY WE WANT A QUICK MEETING, AND PRESS THEM TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO AVOID A REPLAY OF LAST YEAR'S ARGUMENTS. (AT DESK LEVEL, THE US MISSION HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE MORE FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS THAN LAST YEAR):
  - (C) WORK FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT WHICH THERE ARE NO SPEAKERS, BUT SIMPLY A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT (AS OCCURRED ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982). IF ALL OR MOST MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SPEAK, WE WOULD MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT CONCENTRATING ON THE HUMANITARIAN ANGLE. THIS OUGHT TO SOUND RATHER MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE AFRICAN CASE THAN OUR STATEMENT ON 27 AUGUST 1981. MIFT CONTAINS A SUGGESTED DRAFT.
5. THE US EMBASSY AT CAPE TOWN HAVE REPORTED THAT (PACE CAPE TOWN TELNO 173, PARA 4) THE EXECUTIONS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE SOON. THE DEFENCE LAWYERS APPARENTLY INTEND TO FILE A PLEA FOR CLEMENCY WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT, WHICH COULD TAKE MONTHS TO RESOLVE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF THE AFRICAN GROUP HERE SHARE THE US ASSESSMENT, OUR CHANCES OF A QUICK RESULT IN THE COUNCIL ARE POOR.
6. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 091300Z ON 9 APRIL.

WHYTE

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(28) Valid 8/4)

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Kiss DICKSON (BIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

*Mrs S. Fuller S.A.O.  
Cabinet Office*

RESIDENT CLERK

*+ 4 MSKs*

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

*ms*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090800Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 082254Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 8 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA.

YOUR TELNO 95 TO WELLINGTON AND HEAP'S TELELETTER TO ANDERSON (NOT REPEATED): FALKLANDS AND BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY.

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO MARTIN (NZ), MS COURATIER (FRANCE LOS DEL) AND AMB BRENNAN (AUSTRALIA, LOS DEL) AS REQUESTED IN HEAP'S TELELETTER. ALL SAID THEY WOULD REPORT OUR REQUEST AND ADDED THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL COMMENTS. MARTIN THOUGHT WELLINGTON WOULD PROBABLY BE GUIDED BY OUR WISHES. MS COURATIER AND AMB BRENNAN BOTH THOUGHT THE LAST WEEK OF APRIL WOULD BE DESPERATELY INCONVENIENT FOR REASONS TO DO WITH THE LOS NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BE RELIEVED WERE THE CLAIMANTS' MEETINGS NOT TO TAKE PLACE.

WHYTE

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

**FLASH**

PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
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FM PANAMA CITY 082200Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 35 OF 8 APRIL

INFO FLASH MODUK (DS 5) AND WASHINGTON.

*Handwritten mark*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 25 AND MY TELEGRAM NO. 32: TIDEPOOL.

1. US EMBASSY HERE INFORM US THAT THEY HAVE HEARD FROM WASHINGTON THAT TIDEPOOL WILL BE BERTHING AT US NAVAL BASE RODMAN AND HAVE SOUGHT OUR CONFIRMATION. THEY POINT OUT THAT UNDER THEIR NAVAL REGULATIONS CLEARANCE OF PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES IS REQUIRED FOR FOREIGN VESSELS ENTERING RODMAN WHICH, FOR THIS PURPOSE, IS TREATED AS A PORT UNDER PANAMANIAN JURISDICTION.

2. STRONGLY URGE THAT TIDEPOOL PASS STRAIGHT THROUGH THE CANAL REFUELLING ELSEWHERE, EG CURACAO, IF NECESSARY. WITH ALL PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICES CLOSED UNTIL MONDAY PERMISSION WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN EVEN IF PANAMANIAN WERE PREPARED TO GIVE IT.

FCO PSE PASS INFO ADDRESSEES.

STEPHENSON

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMOREPS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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FM LIMA 081630Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED ON THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAST NIGHT TO COMMUNICATE TO HIM THE TEXT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRESS STATEMENT ON 6 APRIL AND TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE REFERENCE TO THE OAS. IN THE CONVERSATION THAT FOLLOWED, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR HAD STATED EITHER ON TV OR IN A PRESS BRIEFING THAT ARGENTINA WAS DISPOSED IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS. DR ARIAS ASKED IF I KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS SUGGESTION, ADDING THAT THE PERUVIANS WERE MUCH CONCERNED BY THE PROSPECT OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH FLEET IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFRONTATION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST LEFT A MEETING OF OFFICIALS IN WHICH THE SITUATION HAD BEEN ASSESSED WITH ALL THE IMPLICATIONS THIS MIGHT HAVE FOR PERU, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF THE OAS WHICH HAD BEEN CALLED FOR BY ARGENTINA, AS WELL AS ON THE NATURE OF THE PERUVIAN RESPONSE TO AN EVENTUAL ARGENTINE APPEAL UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1947 INTERAMERICAN MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY. WHEN I INTERJECTED THAT I WAS CONCERNED BY THE MANNER IN WHICH LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESS COMMENT HAD BECOME MORE BIASED IN RECENT DAYS, HE REFERRED TO THE TRADITIONAL BONDS WITH ARGENTINA

WHICH LOCAL PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESS COMMENT HAD BECOME MORE BIASED. IN RECENT DAYS, HE REFERRED TO THE TRADITIONAL BONDS WITH ARGENTINA BUT ADDED THAT IN SPITE OF SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF ISSUING A FURTHER GOVERNMENT STATEMENT, THE VIEW HAD PREVAILED TO ALLOW THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE (MY TEL NO 65) TO CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE FORMAL PERUVIAN POSITION.

2. DR ARIAS THEN SAID THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS WITHOUT LOSING FACE AND THUS PERMIT THE TERMS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (TO WHICH HE KNEW WE ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE) TO BE IMPLEMENTED. IF THE TWO SIDES COULD BE KEPT APART AND THE PROSPECT OF SHOOTING AVERTED, THE TALKING AND THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE RESUMED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN RESOLUTION. BUT HE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT AGREE TO ALLOW THE BRITISH SIMPLY TO REPLACE THEM AGAIN IN THE FALKLANDS AND THAT A SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BY CREATING A TEMPORARY THIRD PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS, PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF THE OAS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT (HE REPEATED) LOSING FACE. HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN KEEPING THE TEMPERATURES DOWN HE HAD DECIDED NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO ATTEND THE OAS MINISTERIAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON AND LEAVE PERUVIAN REPRESENTATION TO THEIR PERMANENT AMBASSADOR. BUT IF WE THOUGHT HIS IDEAS HAD ANY MERIT AT ALL OR OFFERED ANY HOPE OF A WAY OUT, HE WOULD GLADLY GO TO WASHINGTON TO PUT THEM FORWARD.

3. I REMINDED DR ARIAS THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WAS THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS AND I EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF AN OAS FORCE OR PRESENCE IN THE ISLANDS BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE OAS COUNTRIES WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARGENTINE CLAIM. DR ARIAS ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID THAT IN THAT CASE SOME SORT OF QUOTE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE UNQUOTE COULD BE CREATED, INCLUDING OAS REPRESENTATION, WHICH WOULD AT LEAST SAVE FACE ON BOTH SIDES SEMICOLON ENABLE THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW AND THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE AND, ABOVE ALL, ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEBODY WOULD START SHOOTING, IN WHICH CASE THE FULL CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS WERE UNPREDICTABLE.

4. WHEN I TOLD DR ARIAS THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REMARKS TO YOU, HE SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH ALSO WITH THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND REPEATED THAT HE WAS READY TO GO TO WASHINGTON TO PUT FORWARD HIS PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS IF WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD HELP.

5. DR. ARIAS DID NOT SAY THAT THESE IDEAS WERE BEING PROPOSED AS A FORMAL GOVERNMENT APPROACH AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL INITIATIVE. AS SEEN FROM LIMA, THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR KEEPING IN PLAY AT THE OAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A WELL-DISPOSED PERUVIAN INITIATIVE PROVIDED THIS IS NOT IN

WAS A PERSONAL INITIATIVE. AS SEEN FROM LIMA, THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR KEEPING IN PLAY AT THE OAS THE POSSIBILITY OF A WELL-DISPOSED PERUVIAN INITIATIVE PROVIDED THIS IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND PARTICULARLY AS THE UNITED STATES ARE REGARDED BY MUCH OF PERUVIAN PUBLIC OPINION AS NOT (REPEAT NOT) BEING WHOLLY IMPARTIAL AS EVINCED BY THEIR SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU WISH TO RESPOND IN ANY WAY TO DR. ARIAS'S REMARKS.

WALLACE

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

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PS/LPS

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

~~PS/~~  
PS/LORD TREGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

ED/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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ED/REGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

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Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM PARIS 081823Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATED FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 8 APRIL 1982

FALKLANDS: FRENCH PRESS COMMENT, 8 APRIL

1. THE FALKLANDS HAVE NOW LEFT THE FRONT PAGES. SUBSTANTIAL FACTUAL REPORTS CONTINUE HOWEVER, CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY THE HAIG MISSION AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EMBARGO ON THE SUPPLY OF FRENCH ARMS TO ARGENTINA.

2. SEVERAL PAPERS DRAW PARALLELS BETWEEN THE FALKLANDS AND THE FRENCH OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS. ISNARD WRITES IN LE MONDE OF 8 APRIL THAT "NO MORE THAN GREAT BRITAIN TODAY, FRANCE TOMORROW, CAN NOT BE SHELTERED FROM SUCH DANGERS" AND POINTS OUT THAT CERTAIN FRENCH TERRITORIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE CLAIMED BY OTHER COUNTRIES. HE EMPHASISES THE INCREASED ATTENTION THAT ALL SUCH ISLANDS WILL DRAW THROUGH THEIR POTENTIAL IN NATURAL RESOURCES.

\* IN AN ARTICLE IN LE MONDE DATED 98 APRIL ISNARD REPORTS THAT THE NOTION OF WHAT HE CALLS, IN QUOTES, A "WAR ZONE" INTRIGUES OBSERVERS SINCE IT APPEARS TO CORRESPOND TO AN ECONOMIC ZONE OF 200 MILES RATHER THAN TO TERRITORIAL WATERS FOR WHICH BRITAIN CLAIMS ONLY 3 MILES. HE WRITES THAT THE CONCEPT OF A "WAR ZONE" IS NOT COVERED BY INTERNATIONAL MARRITIME LAW. LE FIGARO (RIGHT - WING) STRESSES THE VALUE OF A NAVAL BATTLE AS A SPECTACLE MUCH GREATER THAN EVEN THE WORLD CUP) AND COMMENTS THAT HOWEVER EVOLVED THE HUMAN RACE MAY BE. "WE HAVE NOT YET



LE FIGARO (PARIS) STRESSES THE VALUE OF A NAVAL BATTLE  
AS A SPECTACLE MUCH GREATER THAN EVEN THE WORLD CUP) AND COMMENTS  
THAT HOWEVER EVOLVED THE HUMAN RACE MAY BE, "WE HAVE NOT YET  
FOUND A BETTER WAY (THAN COMBAT) OF FULLY SETTling OUR DIFFERENCES."  
LES ECHOS (BUSINESS DAILY), STRESSING THE COHESION OF EUROPE,  
ARGUES THAT FRANCE IS RIGHT TO HELP BRITAIN NOW " BECAUSE THE  
DAY IS NOT VERY DISTANT WHEN FRANCE HERSELF WILL HAVE TO APPEAL  
TO HER ALLIES TO DEFEND THE FEW TERRITORIES SHE STILL CONTROLS  
IN THE WORLD"..... "FRANCE IS PART OF A COHERENT WHOLE WHICH  
IS CALLED EUROPE: AS SHE DRAWS MULTIPLE ADVANTAGES FROM IT,  
IT IS RIGHT THAT SHE SHOULD RECOGNISE IN IT SOME DUTIES."

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 081911Z PJC/

\* CNN 98 APRIL SHOULD READ 9 APRIL .

*Mufaxed to Cheques  
at 2000 2/4*

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ANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

~~PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.~~

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE  
} H.M.Tsy

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Cabinet Office*

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*44/15/82*

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FM MONTEVIDEO 082036Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 OF 8 APRIL  
AND TO MOD FOR DI 4

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WHEN THE CONSUL INTERVIEWED THE FOUR BSCUKCS WHO HAD LEFT THE FALKLANDS (MY TELNO 84), HE WAS TOLD THAT A COPY OF A LETTER SIGNED BY HEADS OF DEPARTMENT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT AND ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD BEEN SMUGGLED OUT HIDDEN IN MRS FELTON'S BRASSIERE. THIS COPY HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE BRITISH DAILY MAIL CORRESPONDENT HERE BUT ON MRS FELTON'S LEAVING THE EMBASSY THE CORRESPONDENT RETURNED THIS COPY TO HER. SHE THEN HANDED THE COPY TO THE CONSUL. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE ORIGINAL IS UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WHICH IS DATED 6 APRIL, PORT STANLEY:

BEGINS

'DEAR SIR,

ON BEHALF OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WE, THE UNDERSIGNED CIVIL SERVANTS AND ADMINISTRATORS, REQUEST THAT A PROTECTING POWER BE APPOINTED TO HELP TO ARRANGE THE TEMPORARY EVACUATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THESE

ISLANDS, WE, THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATORS,  
REQUEST THAT A PROTECTING POWER BE APPOINTED TO HELP TO ARRANGE  
THE TEMPORARY EVACUATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THESE  
ISLANDS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

WE FURTHER REQUEST THE IMMEDIATE DISPATCH TO PORT  
STANLEY OF AN OBSERVER FROM THAT POWER.

ENDS

2. AMONGST OTHERS THE LETTER IS SIGNED BY THE CHIEF CONSTABLE,  
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT MEDICAL OFFICER, THE  
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, THE HARBOURMASTER, THE MASTER FORRESTER  
AND THE MECHANICAL SUPERINTENDENT.

3. THE COPY WE RECEIVED IS BEING FORWARDED BY BAG.

HUTCHINSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/FJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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FM MONTEVIDEO 032115Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 03 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK  
MY TELNO 73 (NOT REPEATED)

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON  
BY THE URUGUAYAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.

BEGINS

THE COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AT ITS EXTRAORDINARY MEETING  
TODAY AFTER ANALYSING THE SITUATION STEMMING FROM THE EVENTS  
IN THE ISLAS MALVINAS STATES THE FOLLOWING:

GIVEN: 1. THAT OUR COUNTRY HAS GIVEN ITS VIEWS REPEATEDLY IN  
DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL FORA WITH REGARD TO THE TITLE  
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ARGENTINE  
REPUBLIC OVER THESE TERRITORIES, A POSITION WHICH  
FURTHERMORE WAS STATED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS ON 2 APRIL.

2. THAT ON 3 APRIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ADOPTED A RESOLUTION STATING .... QUOTE THAT  
THERE IS A BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION OF THE  
ISLAS MALVINAS UNQUOTE, SEMI-COLON

*M*

NATIONS ADOPTED A RESOLUTION STATING . . . . QUOTE THAT  
THERE IS A BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION OF THE  
ISLAS MALVINAS UNQUOTE, SEMI-COLON

3. THAT IN THE SAME RESOLUTION THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.
4. THAT IT IS A TRADITIONAL BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN POLICY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATES, AS WELL AS A CONSTANT AND UNHALTING SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

HAS RESOLVED TO RECOMMEND TO THE EXECUTIVE POWER:

1. THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH REGULATE THE RELATIONSHIP OF STATES WHICH MAKE UP THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BOTH NATIONS INVOLVED SHOULD BE EXHORTED TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE THE DISAGREEMENT TO BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY.
2. THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES SUSTAINED OVER THE YEARS, AND BEARING IN MIND ITS EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN A SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, FACILITIES BE OFFERED TO BOTH NATIONS AND TO THOSE WHO UNDERTAKE THE OUTSTANDING MISSION OF MEDIATION, SO THAT THEY MAY BE RECEIVED IN OUR TRADITIONAL PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERE, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE HIGH GOALS PUT FORWARD ABOVE.
3. THAT GIVEN THE WAR PREPARATIONS BY BOTH NATIONS, THE EXECUTION OF ACTS WHICH MAY IMPLY DIRECT OR INDIRECT CO-OPERATION BE FORBIDDEN, WHETHER THEY BE NECESSARY OR NOT, IN THE PREPARATION OR EXECUTION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH CONTRAVENE THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH IS REFERRED TO IN THE EXPLANATORY PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION.

ENDS

HUTCHINSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

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SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

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*M Wade - Gery Cab Office*

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GRS 73

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FM MONTEVIDEO 081912Z APR 82.

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 78 OF 8 APRIL

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNOS 76 AND 77: ROYAL MARINES

1. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY CONFIRMATION OF MARINES ARRIVAL IN MONTEVIDEO ON 9 APRIL.

2. DFUSS CHARGE D'AFFAIRS HERE HAS INFORMED ME THAT SWISS AMBASSADOR TODAY HAS MADE THREE SEPERATE ENQUIRIES TO THE ARGENTINE MFA ABOUT THE MFA ANNOUNCEMENT BUT HAS RECEIVED NO REPLY.

3. I SHALL RAISE QUESTION OF A FURTHER RAF VC 10 WHEN I SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT 2100Z TODAY.

HUTCHINSON

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
LORD TREFGARNE  
PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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MR PERETZ  
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GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 081150Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 163 OF 08 APRIL 1982

INFO ROUTINE MODUK SITCEN

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

*mt* TYPING  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 79 : FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC (*And Cross*)

1. AS REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE, WE TOOK ACTION WITH HOCKE OF ICRC AT NOON LOCAL TIME ON 6 APRIL. HE TOOK NOTE, MADE NO COMMENT, AND UNDERTOOK TO MAKE ENQUIRIES. HE CONFIRMED TO US ON THE MORNING OF 8 APRIL THAT ENQUIRIES HAD BEEN INITIATED.
2. HOCKE ADDED THAT AT A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE THIS MORNING ICRC HAD TAKEN THE DECISION TO PROCEED FORTHWITH WITH A FORMAL APPROACH TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES TO ASK FOR THEIR AGREEMENT TO ICRC REPRESENTATIVES TRAVELLING URGENTLY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THEIR COOPERATION TO THIS END. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS APPROACH, HOCKE SAID THAT IT WAS COMPLEX AND DID NOT (NOT) REST SOLELY ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE ICRC STATUTES. HE UNDERTOOK TO EXPLAIN IT TO US IN DETAIL LATER TODAY.
3. MEANWHILE HOCKE WAS PERTURBED TO HEAR BOTH FROM US AND THROUGH THE BRITISH RED CROSS THAT AIR COMMODORE BRIAN FROW INTENDED IN A RADIO BROADCAST ON THE WORLD AT ONE TODAY TO CALL PUBLICLY FOR AN EARLY ICRC APPROACH TO THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE LINES INDICATED ABOVE. HOCKE SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO DO THIS, AND THAT IF THEIR DEMARCHE TO THE ARGENTINIANS COINCIDED WITH NEWS OF SUCH A BROADCAST BY FROW IT MIGHT WELL BE TURNED DOWN FLAT. HE STRONGLY URGED US TO INTERVENE WITH FROW TO PERSUADE HIM NOT (NOT) TO MENTION THIS ASPECT, AND IF IT

BE TURNED DOWN FLAT. HE STRONGLY URGED US TO INTERVENE WITH FROW  
TO PERSUADE HIM NOT (NOT) TO MENTION THIS ASPECT, AND IF IT  
POSSIBLE NOT TO HIGHLIGHT RED CROSS ASPECTS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK

MARSHALL

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SENT AT 08/1221228Z MAF/JJJJJJ~~and~~MAD



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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H.M.Tsy

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST. + A/D F/I)  
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HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

RESIDENT CLERK

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GRS 180

RESTRICTED

FM BRIDGETOWN 081615Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 8 APRIL

INFO WASHINGTON PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON

SAVING COPIES PASSED LOCALLY TO ST VINCENT AND ANTIGUA

**IMMEDIATE**  
**ADVANCE COPY**

MY TELNO 100: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING OF CARIBBEAN LEADERS.09

1. SONNY RAMPHAL RANG ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS, EXCEPT CATO OF ST VINCENT, AND URGED THEM TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE PRESIDENT THAT MORE THAN AN 'EVEN HANDED' ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARGENTINA AND OURSELVES WAS DESIRABLE, AND TO INSIST THAT THE OBJECTIVE MUST BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES.

2. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO CATO TO THANK HIM FOR HIS ROBUST MESSAGE (ANTIGUA TELNO 006) AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT IF THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRONGLY HELD VIEWS OF THE ISLAND LEADERS.

3. IN A TELEVISED INTERVIEW YESTERDAY EVENING WITH AMERICAN CBS PRIME MINISTER ADAMS SAID QUOTE I WOULD THINK IT UNFORTUNATE IF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA, FOR WHAT PERHAPS MAY BE A TEMPORARY AND JUDICIOUS REASON, WAS ALLOWED TO

FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA, FOR WHAT  
PERHAPS MAY BE A TEMPORARY AND JUDICIOUS REASON, WAS ALLOWED TO  
STAND IN THE WAY OF RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-VIOLENT  
SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE

4. I HOPE TO HEAR THIS EVENING AT A RECEPTION FOR THE PRESIDENT  
ABOUT THE TALKS AT LUNCH TODAY AND WILL REPORT.

ARTHUR

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/L)

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

\* for Typing - 1x60x

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mr. S. Fuller, S.A.P.W., CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 080528Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 146 OF 8 APRIL

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 665 TO WASHINGTON : FALKLAND ISLANDS AND  
'ANTARCTICA

1. I SAW THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY  
INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TODAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 145). I  
SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED ABOUT ANTARCTICA. MR STREET EXPRESSED HIS  
PROFOUND PLEASURE AND RELIEF THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SIT AT THE  
SAME MEETINGS AS ARGENTINA: SUCH A MEETING WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN  
AUSTRALIA SHORTLY, AND THEY HAD BEEN MUCH EXERCISED AS TO HOW TO  
PROCEED.

MASON

NNNN

**IMMEDIATE**

D/B 080900Z

(Valid 7/4)

*26/27*

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/*Mr Luce*  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ ) H M TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR ILETT )  
MR J D MCINTYRE )

*Fco*

DIO CABINET OFFICE

HD/S AM D (~~STANDARD~~ DIST.+ A.D. "F/I")  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/EESD

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

SITCEN

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff, MOD ~~DITCHEN~~ AND CINC FLEET)

Hd/EKGD  
Hd/Plan S.  
Hd/SPD

*Prime Minister*

*You said you would wish to*

*send a personal thank you letter.*

*AR 9/4*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKEY 080900Z

FM CANBERRA 080515Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 145 OF 8 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS TOKYO WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAM NO 141 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLAND ISLANDS : ECONOMIC MEASURES

1. THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 0330 YOUR TIME TODAY 8 APRIL, AS SOON AS CABINET HAD ADJOURNED. I MADE THE INFORMAL EXPRESSION OF MRS THATCHER'S PLEASURE FORESHADOWED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF TUR. THIS WENT DOWN EXTREMELY WELL, AND I WAS ASKED THAT HIS APPRECIATION SHOULD BE INFORMALLY RETURNED.
2. MR FRASER SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD DECIDED TO ACCEDE FULLY TO ALL OUR SUGGESTIONS. IN CONSEQUENCE, FROM MIDNIGHT TONIGHT 8 APRIL, ALL IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA WOULD BE BANNED, EXCEPT THOSE UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS. SIMILARLY, NO NEW EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES WOULD BE GIVEN. THE QUESTION OF THE SALE OF ARMS DID NOT ARISE.
3. MR FRASER SAID THAT INITIALLY, THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT

3. MR FRASER SAID THAT INITIALLY, THERE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION IN CABINET TO AN IMPORT EMBARGO, BECAUSE OF THE RISKS ATTACHING TO AUSTRALIAN ALUMINIUM EXPORT CONTRACTS (PARAGRAPH 2 OF TUR). THESE AMOUNTED OVER TEN YEARS TO SOME POUNDS 260 MILLION, AND THEIR LOSS WOULD BE SERIOUS, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. HOWEVER, IN THE END MISGIVINGS WERE PUT ASIDE, AND THE CABINET VOTED ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY IN FAVOUR OF THE IMPORT EMBARGO.

4. MR FRASER SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT HAVE DONE THIS FOR ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD: THEY HAD DONE SO BECAUSE IT WAS BRITAIN AND MRS THATCHER WHO WERE CONCERNED. I EXPRESSED OUR WARM GRATITUDE FOR THIS HELPFUL ACTION, WHICH I WAS SURE WOULD HELP TO SWAY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WE HAD APPROACHED: AND FOR AUSTRALIA'S STAUNCH AND SPEEDY SUPPORT SINCE THE CRISIS AROSE.

5. A STATEMENT OF THE CABINET'S DECISION WILL BE ISSUED IN A FEW HOURS, AND BEFORE CLOSE OF PLAY HERE I SHALL BE ASKED TO TRANSMIT A LETTER FROM MR FRASER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD SEND A PARTICULARLY WARM ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

MASON

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

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Valid 8/4  
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SERIAL No. PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

*cc. transfer set*  
*ops*  
H.M. Tsy

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office  
MRS. FULLER S.A.P.U.  
Cabinet Office

ED/SAED (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
ED/REGD

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

*M*  
*TURISTS*

RESTRICTED

FM GEORGETOWN 081900Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 8 APRIL  
RFI ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN

MY TELNO 60(NOT TO ALL): FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. MFA HAVE REQUESTED TRANSMISSION OF FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM BURNHAM TO PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 99 TO CANBERRA):

QUOTE:

I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE OF APRIL 2, 1982 ON THE ISSUE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAD, QUITE NATURALLY, STRONGLY CONDEMNED SUCH AGGRESSION AND CALLED FOR AN URGENT RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. SINCE THEN, AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WE FULLY SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT SPONSORED AND WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY SUCH AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY ON APRIL 3, 1982.

IT IS ONLY HOPED THAT, AT THIS TIME OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TENSIONS AND TURBULENCES, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING

TENSIONS AND TURBULENCES, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THAT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WILL BE UNIVERSALLY RESPECTED.

THE MOST PRUDENT COURSE IN THE CASE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND THE EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS- IN SHORT, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

PLEASE BE ASSURED OF MY FULL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT.

UNQUOTE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

GRS. 221

MALLET

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RESTRICTED

ds

8 April 1982

Argentina

I enclose a copy of the telegram which the Prime Minister has received from the British Community Council in Buenos Aires. This received some publicity in the media today.

I think it desirable that an early reply should be sent. Could you kindly let us have a draft either late today or, if that is not possible, through our Duty Clerk tomorrow. We would then arrange for the Prime Minister to see it at Chequers.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

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COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

cc CCD  
SAND.

T 65/82

See Tel  
underline

No. \_\_\_\_\_  
IN REPLYING PLEASE  
QUOTE THIS NUMBER

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
P. O. BOX N7147  
NASSAU, N. P. BAHAMAS

8th April, 1982

*My Dear Sirs Ministers:*

I wish to thank you for the personal message conveyed to me on 3rd April by your High Commissioner, here in Nassau.

I and my Government learnt with great astonishment and deep regret of Argentina's military invasion of the Falkland Islands. It is deeply disquieting that despite personal appeals for restraint by the UN Secretary General, the President of the Security Council, President Reagan, and your own offer to continue the diplomatic dialogue, Argentina rejected all attempts to persuade it to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute.

My Government has therefore transmitted a Note to the Government of the Argentine Republic, indicating its concern over the situation in the Falkland Islands and reaffirmed its belief in the inviolability and territorial integrity of states and the unequivocal rejection of the use of force as a means of settling disputes among States.

My Government also restated its commitment to the principle of self-determination and to the right of the Falkland Island people to decide their own political destiny.

And finally the Government of The Bahamas urged the Government of Argentina to comply with the Security Council's resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of its forces from the Falkland Islands and together with the United Kingdom Government seek a diplomatic solution to their dispute.

*Yours very sincerely*  
*Lynden O. Pindling*

Lynden O. Pindling  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London  
ENGLAND

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/LPS  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PJS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

HD/SAED (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

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ED/UND

ED/PLANNING STAFF

ED/REGD

RESIDENT CLERK

*T. Mills*

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

*Mrs S. Fuller SA/O*

*Cabinet Office*

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. *T 658/82*

GRS 290

RESTRICTED

FM NASSAU 081908Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 36 OF 8 APRIL

MY TELNO 34: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER PINDLING TO THE PM DELIVERED

1830Z 8 APRIL READS:

BEGINS

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE PERSONAL MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME ON 3RD APRIL BY YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER, HERE IN NASSAU.

I AND MY GOVERNMENT LEARNT WITH GREAT ASTONISHMENT AND DEEP REGRET OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

IT IS DEEPLY DISQUIETING THAT DESPITE PERSONAL APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT BY THE UN SECURITY GENERAL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND YOUR OWN OFFER TO CONTINUE THE DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA REJECTED ALL ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE IT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.

MY GOVERNMENT HAS THEREFORE TRANSMITTED A NOTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, INDICATING ITS CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND REAFFIRMED ITS BELIEF IN THE INVIOABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AND THE UNEQUIVOCAL REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING

*M*

*gc. Master ack*

INVIOLABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AND THE  
UNEQUIVOCAL REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING  
DISPUTES AMONG STATES.

MY GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTATED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE  
OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLAND  
PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL DESTINY.

AND FINALLY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS URGED THE GOVERNMENT  
OF ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION  
DEMANDING THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS AND TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT  
SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DISPUTE.

YOURS VERY SINCERELY

LYNDEN O PINDLING

PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

3. UNDERSTAND FROM MEA THAT TEXT IS NOT (NOT) TO BE RELEASED HERE  
BUT THAT REFERENCE TO THE LETTER WILL BE MADE IN A BAHAMAS  
GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED EITHER TODAY OR ON 10 APRIL.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 082221Z MT/MBI

14P1575

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS  
PS/LPS  
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

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HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GROUPS 350  
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DUBLIN 081700Z APRIL 1982.  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 08 APRIL.  
AND TO PRIORITY INFO UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

YOUR TELNO 57 (NOT TO UKMIS): IRISH REPUBLIC AND THE FALKLANDS.

1. I HAD A SIMILAR CONVERSATION WITH DFA (MACKERNAN) YESTERDAY. AN ASSESSMENT OF IRISH ATTITUDES TO THE CRISIS MAY BE TIMELY.
2. THE IRISH SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 502, BUT CONSCIOUSLY RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. THEY ARE CLEARLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RESTRICTING THEIR TRADE WITH ARGENTINA OR TAKING THE OTHER MEASURES (APART FROM AN ARMS EMBARGO) IN YOUR TELNO 63 TO ANKARA FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:
  - (A) THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS: THEY HAVE A SMALL, FAVOURABLE TRADE BALANCE WITH ARGENTINA. WHILE THEY COULD DO WITHOUT ARGENTINE IMPORTS, THEIR OWN EXPORTS WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO RETALIATION AND 3 FIRMS ACCOUNT FOR THE BULK OF THESE.
  - (B) THEY STILL CHERISH THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR. SO THEY WANT TO KEEP AN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES AND LEAVE THEIR LINES OPEN TO THE ARGENTINES.
  - (C) THERE IS A LARGE IRISH/ARGENTINE COMMUNITY (ESTIMATED AT 300,000) WHICH IS ALREADY CRITICISING THEIR SUPPORT OF RESOLUTION 502.

500, 500) WHICH IS ALREADY CRITICISING THEIR SUPPORT OF RESOLUTION 502.

(D) THE IRISH FACTOR: THE WHOLE QUESTION HAS TOO MANY ECHOES OF ULSTER AND PRECISELY THOSE FACTORS WHICH MOST STIR BRITISH SYMPATHY FOR THE ISLANDERS SET THE IRISH TEETH ON EDGE. IRISH MINISTERS DO NOT WISH TO BE ACCUSED OF PLAYING BRITAIN'S GAME, ALTHOUGH IN FACT SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY LITTLE ATAVISTIC CRITICISM OF OUR POLICY.

3. THESE PREOCCUPATIONS ACCOUNT FOR SOME NEGATIVE PRESS BRIEFING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO YESTERDAY MORNING'S (7 APRIL) IRISH PAPERS. BUT THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT THE REPUBLIC CANNOT OPT OUT OF THE COMMUNITY'S MEASURES NOR CAN THEY EXPECT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO EMERGE UNLESS THE ARGENTINES ARE MADE AWARE THAT THE GAME IS NOT OVER AND IS GOING TO GET ROUGHER. AN INTERVIEW BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAST NIGHT LEFT IRISH POLICY VERY OPEN AND THE WAY CLEAR TO CONFORM WITH ANY COMMUNITY DECISION. SO I BELIEVE THE IRISH SHIP WILL KEEP WITHIN THE COMMUNITY CONVOY AND WE WILL DO BEST BY STRESSING RESOLUTION 502 (RATHER THAN SOVEREIGNTY) AND THE NEED FOR COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY. THE CLOSER THE IRISH SEE THE CRISIS MOVING TO FURTHER USE OF FORCE, THE MORE NERVOUS THEY WILL BECOME AND IT WILL BECOME IMPORTANT TO PLACE OUR ACTIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

TATHAM.

NNNN

SENT/RECDAT 081845Z HMT/FHG

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(Valid 7/4).

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
Mr GIFFARD  
Mr WRIGHT  
Mr ADAMS  
Mr URE  
Mr GILLMORE

**FLASH**  
ADVANCE COPY

P/S No.10, DOWNING St.  
PS/CHANCELLOR  
Sir K COUZENS  
Mr. LITTLER  
Mr. PERETZ  
Mr. HAWTIN  
Mr. ILETT  
DIO CABINET OFFICE

H.M.TREASURY

(22x). ~~24~~ 25

MR. J.P. MCINTYRE, HM Treasury

Hd/SAmD. (Standard Dist. + A.D. "F/I")

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RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff, MOD SITCEN and CINC FLEET).

HD/EEED

ZZ FCO

ZZ MOD (DIS)

GRS 62

SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 071305Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 7 APRIL

INFOFLASH MOD (DIS)

MY TELEGRAM 70: FL FALKLANDS/CHILE

1. COMBINED COMMANDERS IN CHIEF DULY MET LAST NIGHT AND I UNDERSTAND FROM ADMIRAL POISSON THAT CONCLUSIONS WHICH COULD AFFECT US WILL BE PASSED TO YOU VIA CAPTAIN CABEZAS AT CHILEAN EMBASSY. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE SPECIFIC BUT SAID THAT HE WAS 'RATHER DISAPPOINTED BY OUTCOME.

HEATH

NNNN

SENT AT//RECD AT 071555Z PLN//IA

[TYPISTS]

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(Valid 7/4) (26)

PS  
PS/LPS  
~~PS/~~  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ ) H M TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR ILETT )  
MR J D MCINTYRE )

DIO CABINET OFFICE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+ A.D. "F/I")  
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HD/NEWS D  
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HD/EESD  
RESIDENT CLERK

W.A.D.

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(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff, MOD DITCHEN AND CINC FLEET)

Hd HKGD

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PORT OF SPAIN 071900Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 057 OF 7 APRIL

*Handwritten signature*

MIPT: COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

1. AT HIS TELEVISED MEETING WITH THE PRESS IN PORT OF SPAIN ON 6 APRIL, MR RAMPHAL DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AS QUOTE A GROSS, UNPROVOKED AND UTTERLY UNWARRANTED SETBACK IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THE COMMONWEALTH HAD TAKEN A POSITIVE POSITION ON THE ISSUE AND HAD BEEN QUOTE UNEQUIVOCAL ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABLE NATURE OF SEIZURE OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND ANY ATTEMPT TO ALTER ESTABLISHED BOUNDARIES OTHER THAN BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THE INVASION HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR TRINIDAD AS WELL AS OTHER TERRITORIES IN THE REGION, IN ASIA AND AFRICA. HE CALLED ON COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS TO STAND WITH BRITAIN ON THIS MATTER QUOTE NOT ON THE BASIS OF SENTIMENT, BUT ON THE GROUNDS OF HONOUR AND PRINCIPLE. I AM HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE FROM ALL OVER THE COMMONWEALTH. I HOPE TO HEAR A UNITED VOICE FROM THE CARIBBEAN SAYING THIS ACTION IS UNACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT THE CARICOM FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TAKEN A UNITED STAND IN THIS. HE REFERRED TO ARGENTINA'S LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SIMILARITY OF ARGENTINA'S ACTION AGAINST THE FALKLANDS TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ACTION AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. QUOTE IT IS A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT AND THAT

REFERRED TO ARGENTINA'S LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND THE  
OF ARGENTINA'S ACTION AGAINST THE FALKLANDS TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ACTION  
AGAINST MOZAMBIQUE. QUOTE IT IS A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT AND THAT  
IS HOW IT IS BEING SEEN BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

3. MR RAMPHAL SAID THAT DR INCE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO MINISTER OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, HAD LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT TRINIDAD SHARED HIS  
CONCERN AND ANXIETY AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE  
INVASION. HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO TRINIDAD'S ROLE IN COMMONWEALTH  
AFFAIRS.

4. PRESS EXTRACTS FOLLOW BY BAG.

LANE

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(Valid 7/4)

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PS  
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ ) H M TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR ILETT )  
MR J D MCINTYRE )

DIO CABINET OFFICE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+ A.D. "F/I")  
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HD/NEWS D  
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HD/EESD  
RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff, MOD <sup>C</sup>ITCHEN AND CINC FLEET)  
Ha HKGD

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

51607 To  
TYPISTS

OO BONN

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 750

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKDEL NATO 071655Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 7 APRIL 1982  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN AND WASHINGTON

THE FALKLANDS

1. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT UNLESS THE FRG HAVE TAKEN SIMILAR ACTION IN BONN) HAS PASSED TO ME A TRANSLATION OF A REPORT FROM THE FRG MILITARY ATTACHE IN BUENOS AIRES WHICH HE SAID APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN TELEGRAPHED ONLY TO HIMSELF AND BONN. THE REPORT SEEMS TO BE OF SOME INTEREST (ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINE ADMIRAL MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SPEAKING WITH AN EYE TO HIS WORDS BEING PASSED ON TO US). THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS  
BEGINS:

BEGINS:

1. THE A2 OF THE ARGENTINE ADMIRALTY, REAR-ADMIRAL GIRLING ASKED THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN RIO DE JANEIRO TO MEET HIM FOR A TALK ON 4 APRIL 1982 AT 1700 HRS. HE TOLD HIM OF THE VISIT OF THE US NAVAL ATTACHE ON 3 APRIL 1982 WHERE THE LATTER HAD INFORMED HIM, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTED THE BRITISH POSITION. THE UNITED STATES DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HE ALSO SAID THAT ALL COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA WOULD BE ENDED. THE US NAVAL ATTACHE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE THE US BASE ON THE BRITISH ASCENSION ISLAND TO THE UK AS A LOGISTICAL BASE FOR HER UNITS AND WOULD GIVE THEM ALL ASSISTANCE. HE HAD THEN DEPARTED IN AN UNUSUALLY FORMAL MANNER AND WITHOUT SHAKING HANDS.

2. ADMIRAL GIRLING SAID THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOW ALSO STOP ALL COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HE CLEARLY POINTED OUT THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD BE DEFENDED WITH ALL AVAILABLE MEANS AND FORCES AND THAT SOVIET ASSISTANCE WOULD BE ACCEPTED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE NORMALLY IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USSR AND ARGENTINA HAD TO BE IGNORED. IN VIEW OF THE DISPATCH OF STRONG BRITISH NAVAL FORCES, A SPECIAL SITUATION HAD ARISEN WHICH LEFT NO ALTERNATIVE TO ARGENTINA. ADMIRAL GIRLING CONFIRMED THAT THE US ATTACHES WOULD BE GIVEN SPECIAL PROTECTION BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO PREVENT POSSIBLE ACTION AGAINST US FACILITIES AND ACCOMODATION.

3. ADMIRAL GIRLING SAID THAT ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UK AS LONG AS SUCH NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT CONCERN ARGENTINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FORCES. ADMIRAL GIRLING POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT FOLLOWING REPORTS OF THE SAILING OF BRITISH FORCES, STRONG FORCES WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO DEFEND THEM TO THE LAST.

4. ADMIRAL GIRLING SAID THAT THE MAKING AVAILABLE OF THE US BASE ON THE ASCENSION ISLAND TO THE UK WAS CLEARLY IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY ON MUTUAL AID IN THE CASE OF ATTACKS FROM OUTSIDE TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES WAS A PARTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS ACTION WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE PART OF THE REMAINING PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THE UNITED STATES WERE FACING CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WHERE PANAMA HAD ALSO OPENLY SUPPORTED ARGENTINA AND BECAUSE OF HER ATTITUDE WOULD BE VIS

PARTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS ACTION WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE PART OF THE REMAINING PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THE UNITED STATES WERE FACING CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WHERE PANAMA HAD ALSO OPENLY SUPPORTED ARGENTINA AND, BECAUSE OF HER ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS ARGENTINA, THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO BE FACING AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA. BY SIDING WITH THE UK, THE UNITED STATES HAD ALSO DEPRIVED ITSELF OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTING AS A MEDIATOR. ARGENTINA WAS PREPARING FOR THE DEFENCE OF HER ISLANDS AND HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM EUROPE AND THE LACK OF BASES FOR THE BRITISH FORCES.

5. SINCE MONTEVIDEO WAS NOT AVAILABLE AS A STAGING POST, A RETURN OF THE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN CASE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE FORCES. BRITISH NAVAL FORCES WITH TROOP CARRIERS COULD ONLY REACH THE THEATRE IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS IN WHICH THE SEASONAL WEATHER CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED MILITARY OPERATIONS, THIS NEGATIVE TIME FACTOR FOR THE BRITISH SIDE WOULD BE EXPLOITED TO PREPARE THE DEFENCES.

6. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THE DEPUTY TO THE A2 AGAIN EXPRESSLY REPEATED TO THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD ACCEPT AID FROM ANYONE OFFERING IT AND THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE USSR.

7. IN THE VIEW OF THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN RIO DE JANEIRO ARGENTINA IS ENTIRELY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE BUT WILL NOT RETREAT ONE STEP AS FAR AS THE ISLANDS' SOVEREIGNTY IS CONCERNED. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IS BEING RECOGNISED, AND ALL PREPARATIONS FOR AN EMERGENCY ARE BEING TAKEN. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION AND THE EMOTIONS OF THE POPULATION ARE BEING FURTHER HEATED UP BY THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION. THE SITUATION MIGHT BECOME DIFFICULT FOR MEMBERS OF THE US EMBASSY BUT ALSO FOR US.  
ENDS.

GRAHAM

NNNN

TYPISTS

DESKBY 080800Z

27

(Valid 7/4) (25)

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

MR DONALD

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST ✓  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ ) H M TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR ILETT )  
MR J D MCINTYRE )

DIO CABINET OFFICE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+ A.D. "F/I")  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/EESD  
RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff, MOD DITCHEN AND CINC FLEET)

Hd FKGD

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 480 CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 080800Z

DESKBY UKREP BRUSSELS 080700Z

FM THE HAGUE 071750Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 080 OF 07 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (DESKBY 080700Z) BONN,

PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS WASHINGTON

ROUTINE TOKYO OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister.

*You said you wanted to send a thank you letter. but it might be better to await the Joint Cabinet's decision.*

*AM 9/4*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 71 TO BRUSSELS: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. VAN AGT HAS BEEN FULLY OCCUPIED THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S INCREASINGLY URGENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ON WHICH THERE ARE STRONG DIFFERENCES IN CABINET. I SAW HIM THIS AFTERNOON. MEANWHILE I SPOKE TO VAN DER STOEL, DEN UYL, VAN DER STEE, DIK (DEPUTY TO TERLOUW) AND VAN MIERLO STRESSING THE NEED FOR URGENT DECISIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE ARGENTINES AND MAKE THEM COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL

STEE, DIK (DEPUTY TO TERLOUW) AND VAN MIERLO STRESSING THE NEED FOR URGENT DECISIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE ARGENTINES AND MAKE THEM COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATORY RESOLUTION. THESE ARE THE KEY MINISTERS IN THE CABINET WHICH WILL MEET TOMORROW MORNING. THE FALKLANDS WILL BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA. ALL THOSE I SPOKE TO APPRECIATED THE IMPORTANCE OF A RAPID AND POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REQUESTS.

2. DIK SIGNED THE ORDER THIS MORNING FORBIDDING THE SALE OF ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA.
3. AFTER VAN AGT HAD READ THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH I GAVE HIM THIS AFTERNOON, I SPELLED OUT THE REASONS WHY URGENT DECISIONS WERE SO VITAL. VAN AGT SAID THAT THE FALKLANDS SITUATION WAS FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES HE FACED. THE DUTCH HAD OFTEN CLAIMED TO BE BRITAIN'S BEST FRIEND IN EUROPE. NOW WAS THE TIME TO SHOW THAT THE CLAIM WAS WELL-FOUNDED. HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO GET THE CABINET TO TAKE DECISIONS AT TOMORROW'S MEETING. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF A STATEMENT COULD BE ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING. IT COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE ARGENTINES AND COULD ALSO INFLUENCE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY.
4. VAN AGT THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A HELPFUL DECISION ON (C) OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 72 TO BRUSSELS. IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, AS DIK HAD EXPLAINED TO ME EARLIER WERE MORE DIFFICULT. A MAJORITY OF THESE IMPORTS THROUGH ROTTERDAM WERE FOR THE FRG. VAN AGT SAID THERE WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BAN ALL OF THESE. I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD ALREADY TAKEN DRASTIC STEPS OURSELVES AND THAT THESE WOULD COST US DEAR. IF THE ARGENTINES WERE SEEN TO GET AWAY WITH THEIR AGGRESSION, OTHERS IN LATIN AMERICA WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO BEHAVE LIKEWISE. THERE WAS BELIZE AND THERE WAS ARUBA. VAN AGT AGREED.
5. THE FIRST REACTIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REQUESTS HAVE THEREFORE BEEN POSITIVE. TOMORROW'S CABINET MEETING WILL BE CRUCIAL. VAN AGT SAID IT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER CABINET ON GOOD FRIDAY.

MANSFIELD

NNNN

MT  
0042

ADVANCE COPY

WONFO 005/08  
00 F C O (DESKBY 080600Z)

Ps  
Ps LPS

GR 700 Dis 050600Z

Ps. Had Time for me. (Had VAD)  
Ps 6/1/82 (Had NA)  
for A ALLAND (No 10 DSt.)  
Mr Giffard (Mo Cab Office)  
Mr VAG.  
(Had SA M) R C

DE T I P

SECRET

DESKBY 080600Z

FM WASHINGTON 072142Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1174 OF 7 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE).

FALKLANDS.

1. BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU SEE SECRETARY HAIG TOMORROW YOU MAY LIKE ME TO TRY TO PULL TOGETHER AMERICAN VIEWS.

2. THE AMERICANS THOUGH PERHAPS LEAVING IT TOO LATE, MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO DISSUADE THE ARGENTINIANS FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE INVASION AND IN DOING SO MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE WOULD BE LIKELY TO REGARD IT AS A CASUS BELLI. IF IN RESPONSE WE HAD NOT PROCEEDED TO SEND SHIPS TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WE WOULD HAVE LOST ALL AUTHORITY HERE.

3. NEVERTHELESS THE AMERICANS NOW FACE A DILEMMA. AS EXPECTED, THEY ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO SUPPORT US, REALIZING WHAT IS AT STAKE IN LONDON (WITH HAIG TELLING ME IN THE CLEAREST TERMS THAT THERE QUOTE CANNOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE) AND THEIR EXTREME CURRENT SENSITIVITY TO THE DANGERS FOR THEM OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AMERICA, AND TO THE RISKS OF A SPREAD OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE IN THE EVENT OF A FURTHER DECLINE OF U S STANDING IN THE REGION. THE PRESENT U S ADMINISTRATION HAS DEVOTED OVER THE PAST YEAR GREAT EFFORTS TO IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, TO TRY TO DRAW THEM CLOSER TO THE UNITED STATES AND GET SOME (VERY RELATIVE) IMPROVEMENT IN THE APPALLING RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ENDERS HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT OF THE POLICY OF TRYING TO GET ACTIVE ARGENTINIAN SUPPORT IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

4. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS THE FEAR THAT IF THERE IS A NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE OAS STATES, MANY OF THEM AT PRESENT BELIEVE IN THE NEUTRALITY OF ARGENTINA WILL BE PULLED THROUGH

4. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS THE FEAR THAT IF THERE IS A NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE OAS STATES, MANY OF THEM AT PRESENT PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF ARGENTINA, WILL BE DRIVEN THROUGH LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY TO SIDE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THE AMERICANS WOULD THEN FIND THEMSELVES PULLED PAINFULLY IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

5. SO FAR AS OUR OWN POSITION IS CONCERNED I HAVE LEFT NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT WITH THE U S ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SINE QUA NON FOR US IS THE ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. HAIG IS WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS OUR QUOTE BOTTOM LINE UNQUOTE. I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF HE SOUGHT TO PRESS IDEAS FOR JOINT ADMINISTRATION.

6. BUT THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH WILL BE LEADING THE AMERICANS TO TRY FOR A LONGER TERM SOLUTION. SO FAR AS THE MILITARY SITUATION IS CONCERNED, THE U S ADMINISTRATION DO NOT DOUBT OUR NAVAL SUPERIORITY. THEY DO, HOWEVER, SEE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US, OPERATING FAR FROM HOME AND WITH LIMITED AIR SUPPORT, IN GETTING THE ARGENTINIAN GROUND TROOPS OFF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE CASUALTIES.

7. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AFTER WE SUCCEEDED IN RECAPTURING THE ISLANDS BY FORCE. GALTIERI'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT FALL; BUT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR CLAIM. WE SHOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE TO DEPLOY CONSIDERABLE FORCES IN THE AREA TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS AND THE ISSUE WOULD REMAIN A RUNNING SORE UNLESS ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL IS ACCOMPANIED BY SOME LONGER TERM SOLUTION.

8. I HAVE NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT THE AMERICANS ARE HANKERING AFTER SOME KIND OF SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENTAIL ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS AND THEIR RETURN TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION; BUT WHICH WOULD OFFER THEM THE PROSPECT OF SOME SATISFACTION IN TERMS OF AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION ON SOVEREIGNTY.

9. ALL THESE FACTORS, PLUS THE HABITUAL DEGREE OF INCOHERENCE WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE U S ADMINISTRATION, HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE HERE OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO SOME MEASURE OF QUOTE NEUTRALITY UNQUOTE IS RELATED TO THEIR DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION AND MUST THEREFORE RETAIN SOME INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES. IT HAS ALSO BEEN RELATED TO THE USUAL FACTIONAL STRUGGLES HERE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND ENDERS ESPOUSING A PRO-ARGENTINE LINE.

ADMINISTRATION, WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND ENDERS ESPOUSING A  
PRO-ARGENTINE LINE.

10. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELEGRAMS, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HAIG AND WEIMBERGER ARE SOUND, THOUGH THEY WILL REMAIN ANXIOUS TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PROMOTE AN HONOURABLE SOLUTION AVOIDING THE NECESSITY FOR A FULL-SCALE NAVAL ACTION. I HAVE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO NOT NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS.

11. I THINK YOU WILL FIND HAIG FULLY CONSCIOUS OF OUR ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS OFF THE ISLANDS BUT ANXIOUS TO EXPLORE WHETHER THIS COULD NOT BE COUPLED WITH SOME PROPOSAL WHICH COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, WHILE MEETING OUR FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



1) B.A. - 12-17<sup>th</sup> April

Principles of American

U.S not join.

2) German. - Obj. - Sov. assistance would  
be accepted.

3) Falklands. - None important to van Agt.

4)

---

Thatcher. -

Timing.

Flavour of political situation

Today. — Diplomatic means.  
15 years.

Brit. admini.<sup>tion</sup>

---

Sovereign attitude.

---



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1982

Dear John,

ML 5/4

h.c.

Mr Haig's Visit, Thursday 8 April

The following is the provisional programme for Mr Haig's visit to London as it stands at 2100 today, after consultations with the US Embassy:

1600 Approx	Arrive at Heathrow southside. Met by Sir David Muirhead.
	Accommodation at Churchill Hotel.
1700	Talks with Secretary of State.
1800	Talks with Prime Minister
1900	Dinner at No 10 (12 guests, 6 from each side)
2030 Approx	Mr Haig leaves

Mr Haig will be accompanied by the following:

Thomas O Enders, Assistant Secretary Inter-American Affairs, State Department

David Gompert, State Department

Robert Funseth, Deputy Assistant-Secretary in charge of Western Europe, State Department


General Vernon Walters, Special Assistant to Mr Haig

James Rentschler, Senior Staff in charge of Western Europe and North America, National Security Council

Dean Fischer, State Department Spokesman

A member of the US Embassy will be attached to the team. The Americans have been asked to let us know which of the above will accompany Mr Haig to the Prime Minister's dinner.

I attach a copy of the text of the White House press announcement of Mr Haig's visit, as supplied by the US Embassy.

Yours ever,  
  
(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Menu for Dinner for  
Mr. Alexander Haig on 8 April

I attach the menu which  
Government Hospitality Fund  
have suggested for your dinner  
tomorrow. This takes into  
account Mr. Haig's dietary  
requirements.

*Sue Goodchild*  
—

7 April 1982

MENU FOR DINNER ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL

Seafood Platter (a selection of prawns,  
smoked salmon, smoked trout, etc.)

Grilled Fillet Steak  
Mixed Salad  
New Potatoes

Selection of Sorbets

Cheese

Coffee

SECRET



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO*

Ref: A08068

7th April 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong has seen my copy of the letter which you sent to John Coles on 5th April about naval deployments in the area of the Falkland Isles in November and December 1977.

He recognises that former Ministers in Opposition have now publicly referred to those events, and it is understandable that Ministers should wish to know the facts lying behind those public statements. But he is concerned that your letter goes beyond a recital of facts and discloses information about the assessments available to those former Ministers. This would in other circumstances be regarded as at least stretching, if not breaking, the rules about disclosure to members of one Administration the documents of and advice given to members of a previous Administration. For this reason extreme caution would need to be exercised in making any public use of the material in your letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Coles.

**D. J. WRIGHT**

D. J. Wright

R. A. Burns, Esq

SECRET

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>FLASH</b>
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ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
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FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 071300Z APRIL 1982  
7 FLASH WASHINGTON  
8 TELEGRAM NO

*Mr Haig (No 10)  
Being submitted to  
Mr Lygon  
JF 7/4*

9 YOUR TELNO 1154. Falklands  
10 1. Please tell Haig that the Prime Minister and I would  
11 greatly welcome a visit by him to London for talks on the  
12 Falklands. We hope that he will be able to come tomorrow.  
13 2. It is not for us to say whether he will wish to go on to  
14 Buenos Aires. But it is very important that his visit here  
15 should be seen in the context of our efforts to secure Argentine  
16 withdrawal from the Falklands. We should therefore wish to take  
17 the line with the press that Haig was coming as a friend and ally  
18 to discuss ways in which the United States might most effectively  
19 support us <sup>in this</sup> and not (not) as a mediator.  
20 3. Please express the urgent hope that the Americans will take  
21 the same line as this in public.

/// 22  
// 23 PYM  
/ 24 NNNN  
25

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Sofs	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) B J P Fall		
Telephone number 233 5791		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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4



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 April 1982

You asked me if we could let your Secretary of State have a copy of any paper which the Prime Minister used as a basis for answering Questions about the timetable of recent events in relation to the Falkland Islands.

I enclose a copy of the paper we prepared for the Prime Minister and which she used as a basis for replying to Questions on these matters in the House yesterday.

May I re-emphasise what I told you on the phone. This is a chronology of events as seen from the Prime Minister's office. Because it was prepared as a background for Questions and speeches, the classification has been limited to secret, and it is therefore not necessarily fully comprehensive. Nevertheless, we hope that it will help those involved in this afternoon's debate to be starting from a common point in respect of public comment on the sequence of events.

The paper should not be treated as a complete chronology of Government information on events, and it would therefore be sensible if you could return it to me after today's debate. I should be grateful if you could ensure that no copies are taken, and that it remains in the Private Office.

I am sending a copy to Brian Fall on the same basis. John Coles has already been in touch with him about his Secretary of State's speech, and we hope to be able to compare notes on timings with him before the text of Mr. Pym's speech is finalised.

M. A. PATTISON

S

Derek Piper, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

ILLEGAL LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

FRIDAY 19 MARCH: A BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY FIELD PARTY REPORT THAT AN ARGENTINE NAVY CARGO VESSEL IS ANCHORED IN LEITH HARBOUR. A PARTY OF ABOUT 60 ARGENTINES HAVE SET UP CAMP AND AN ARGENTINE FLAG HAS BEEN HOISTED.

SATURDAY 20 MARCH: THE BAS FIELD PARTY INFORMS THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY HAVE LANDED ILLEGALLY AND THAT THEY MUST LEAVE.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INSTRUCT HMS ENDURANCE TO PREPARE TO SAIL TO SOUTH GEORGIA WITH A DETACHMENT OF MARINES FROM PORT STANLEY.

HM AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES INFORMS THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WE ARE TREATING THE INFRINGEMENT OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY VERY SERIOUSLY. THE ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS CALLED IN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND TOLD THE SAME. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PROFESS IGNORANCE BUT AGREE TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY.

SUNDAY 21 MARCH: HMS ENDURANCE DEPARTS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA. ARGENTINE MFA INFORM US THAT THE SHIP WILL LEAVE SOUTH GEORGIA SHORTLY AND THAT NO SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED.

MONDAY 22 MARCH: WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE SHIP HAS LEFT BUT THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER ALL THE MEN HAVE GONE.

IN THE EVENING, BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY CONFIRM THAT ABOUT SIX MEN AND SOME EQUIPMENT REMAIN.

/ TUESDAY 23 MARCH



TUESDAY 23 MARCH: HMS ENDURANCE IS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL ON FOR SOUTH GEORGIA AND REMOVE THE MEN, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT USING FORCE.

MR. LUCE MAKES A STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LATER WARNS THAT USE OF HMS ENDURANCE WOULD BE GRAVELY PROVOCATIVE. THEY ARE TOLD WE WISH TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE: IF THEY CAN PROPOSE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF REMOVING THE MEN, WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THEM DO SO.

WEDNESDAY 24 MARCH: HMS ENDURANCE ORDERED TO ANCHOR IN GRYTVIKEN HARBOUR, BUT NOT TO PROCEED TO LEITH.

ARGENTINE MFA SAY THEY WISH TO PREVENT THE SITUATION ESCALATING IF POSSIBLE, BUT NEED TIME TO CONSIDER.

THURSDAY 25 MARCH: ARGENTINE NAVAL VESSEL IS SIGHTED AT LEITH DELIVERING FURTHER SUPPLIES.

WE ASK THE ARGENTINES FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THEY REMOVE THE MEN.

ARGENTINE MFA THEN SAY THAT BY DEPLOYING HMS ENDURANCE WE HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CONTAIN THEIR POSITION.

WE REPLY THAT WE WISH TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND PROPOSE THAT IF THE PARTY REQUEST THE PROPER AUTHORISATION FROM GRYTVIKEN, IT WILL BE GIVEN.

FRIDAY 26 /  
SATURDAY 27 MARCH:

NO FORMAL REPLY FROM THE ARGENTINE MFA. BUT THEY ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT THE MEN WILL BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION AND THE PRESS REPORTS THAT SEVERAL ARGENTINE NAVY VESSELS HAVE BEEN ORDERED INTO THE AREA.

/ SUNDAY 28 MARCH

SUNDAY 28 MARCH:

ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER SENDS A MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NO INTENTION OF AGREEING TO OUR PROPOSAL.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE SENDS A MESSAGE TO MR. HAIG, ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE AND URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ARGENTINES.

MONDAY 29 MARCH:

CONVERSATION AT NORTHOLT.

TUESDAY 30 MARCH:

SECRETARY OF STATE MAKES STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF LORDS.

ARGENTINES REJECT US PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON REGULARISING THE MEN'S PRESENCE.

WEDNESDAY 31 MARCH:

SECRETARY OF STATE SENDS MESSAGE TO COSTA MENDEZ PROPOSING THE DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY.

WE RECEIVE INFORMATION \* ~~~~~ \* THAT ARGENTINE FLEET WILL BE GROUPING FOR PORT STANLEY ON 2 APRIL. PRIME MINISTER SENDS MESSAGE TO MR. REAGAN ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE.

THURSDAY 1 APRIL:

COSTA MENDEZ REJECTS PROPOSAL TO SEND EMISSARY AND SAYS DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL IS NOW CLOSED. ONLY REMAINING POINT OF DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT REAGAN REBUFFED BY GALTIERI.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMONS BRITISH AND ARGENTINE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO APPEAL TO BOTH TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

AFTER RECEIVING FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT AN ARGENTINE ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, WE SEEK AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH RESULTS IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CALLING ON BOTH SIDES

/ TO REFRAIN

\* ~\* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland  
21 February 2012

SECRET AND PERSONAL

TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AREA,  
THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AGREES; THE  
ARGENTINE SAYS NOTHING.

WE UNDERTAKE INTENSIVE LOBBYING OF US AND EC  
COUNTRIES ASKING THEM TO INTERVENE ON OUR BEHALF.  
THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN ACTION AT THE HIGHEST  
LEVEL BUT THE ARGENTINES REMAIN UNRESPONSIVE.

LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM FALKLANDS (2155 HRS.  
OUR TIME).

FRIDAY 2 APRIL:

*ALL BST*

0833 - TELEGRAM SENT TO FALKLANDS.

0845 - COMMUNICATIONS CEASE.

0945 - CABINET INFORMED THAT ARGENTINE INVASION  
IMMINENT. DECIDE THAT NAVAL AND MILITARY  
PREPARATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AS PLANNED.

1100 - THE LORD PRIVY SEAL MAKES STATEMENT IN *Humphrey*  
THE HOUSE EXPRESSING HMG'S GRAVE CONCERN AT *Monte*  
SITUATION.

*Passage deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4). O'Wayland  
21 February 2012*

*7.30pm* FOLLOWING FURTHER REPORTS FROM MEDIA AND OTHERS,  
CABINET DECIDES THAT NAVAL TASK FORCE SHOULD  
SAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND  
ARGENTINA BROKEN OFF.

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES FLOWN FROM FALKLANDS  
TO MONTEVIDEO.

MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO  
ALL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT URGING  
CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE ACTION.

/ MESSAGES

MESSAGES ALSO FROM PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY TO WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS.

UK CALLS IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

SATURDAY 3 APRIL:

DEBATE IN BOTH HOUSES. PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCES THAT TASK FORCE WILL SAIL, ARGENTINE BALANCES IN THE UK HAVE BEEN FROZEN, AND ECGD COVER SUSPENDED.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TELEPHONES PRIME MINISTER. UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS BY 10 VOTES TO 1 WITH 4 ABSTENTIONS FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

SUNDAY 4 APRIL:

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES EXPELLED FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS LEAVE MONTEVIDEO FOR UK.

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT SOUTH GEORGIA HAS ALSO BEEN ATTACKED AND IS NOW IN ARGENTINE HANDS.

REPORTS THAT THE MARINES DEFENDING GRYTVIKEN HAVE INFLICTED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE ON THE ARGENTINES.

WIDE RANGING DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO SECURE CONDEMNATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINE ACTION AND ALSO TO DISSUADE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ECONOMIC ACTION SIMILAR TO OUR OWN.

ORDER IN COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR REQUISITIONING OF SHIPPING.

MONDAY 5 APRIL:

GOVERNOR, STAFF AND MARINES ARRIVE BACK IN THE UK. DEBRIEFINGS AND PRESS CONFERENCE.

TASK FORCE DEPARTS FROM THE UK.

WIDE RANGING TRADE SANCTIONS ANNOUNCED.

BRITISH CITIZENS ADVISED TO CONSIDER LEAVING ARGENTINA (BBC WORLD SERVICE BROADCAST).

ILLEGAL LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 19 March: A British Antarctic Survey field party report that an Argentine Navy cargo vessel is anchored in Leith harbour. A party of about 60 Argentines have set up camp and an Argentine flag has been hoisted.
- 20 March: The BAS field party informs the Argentines that they have landed illegally and that they must leave.
- The Ministry of Defence instruct HMS Endurance to prepare to sail to South Georgia with a detachment of Marines from Port Stanley.
- HM Ambassador Buenos Aires informs the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs that we are treating the infringement of our sovereignty very seriously. The Argentine Charge d'Affaires is called in to the Foreign Office and told the same. The Argentine Government profess ignorance but agree to look into the matter urgently.
- 21 March: HMS Endurance departs for South Georgia.
- Argentine MFA inform us that the ship will leave South Georgia shortly and that no service personnel are involved.
- 22 March: We receive confirmation that the ship has left but there are doubts about whether all the men have gone.
- News Department issue statement on incident.
- In the evening, BAS confirm that about six men and some equipment remain.
- 23 March: HMS Endurance is instructed to sail on for South Georgia and remove the men, if possible without using force.
- Mr Luce makes a statement to the House of Commons.
- Argentine Government later warns that use of HMS Endurance would be gravely provocative. They are told we wish to avoid this if possible: if they can propose an acceptable alternative method of removing the men, we are prepared to let them do so.

24 March:

HMS Endurance ordered to anchor in Grytviken harbour, but not to proceed to Leith.

Argentine MFA say they wish to prevent the situation escalating if possible, but need time to consider.

25 March:

Argentine naval vessel is sighted at Leith delivering further supplies.

We ask the Argentines for an early response to our request that they remove the men.

Argentine MFA then say that by deploying HMS Endurance we have made it impossible for them to contain their position.

We reply that we wish to do everything possible to avoid confrontation and propose that if the party request the proper authorisation from Grytviken, it will be given.

26-27 March:

No formal reply from the Argentine MFA. But they issue a press statement announcing that the men will be given all necessary protection and the press reports that several Argentine Navy vessels have been ordered into the area.

28 March:

Argentine Foreign Minister sends a message to the Secretary of State making it clear that the Argentines have no intention of agreeing to our proposal.

The Secretary of State sends a message to Mr Haig, asking him to intervene and urge restraint on the Argentines.

30 March:

Secretary of State makes statement in House of Lords.

Argentines reject US proposal for a solution based on regularising the men's presence.

31 March: Secretary of State sends message to Costa Mendez proposing the despatch of an emissary.

We receive information\* ~~~~~\* that Argentine fleet will be grouping for Port Stanley on 2 April. Prime Minister sends message to Mr Reagan asking him to intervene.

1 April: Costa Mendez rejects proposal to send emissary and says diplomatic channel is now closed. Only remaining point of discussion would be the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

UN Secretary General summons British and Argentine Permanent Representatives to appeal to both to refrain from the threat or use of force in the South Atlantic.

After receiving further evidence that an Argentine attack was imminent, we seek an Emergency meeting of the Security Council, which results in a presidential statement calling on both sides to refrain from the use of force in the area. The UK Permanent Representative agrees; the Argentine says nothing.

We undertake intensive lobbying of US and EC countries asking them to intervene on our behalf. The Americans have taken action at the highest level but the Argentines remain unresponsive.

2 April: The Lord Privy Seal makes statement in the House of Commons at 1100 expressing HMG's grave concern at the situation.

\* ~~~~~ \*

\* ~\* Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland  
21 February 2012



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
2111/3  
Telephone 01-218 ..... (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

7th April 1982

*✓* ~~Press~~ CAW  
AJC  
✓ BI

*John Holm* *MD*

FALKLAND ISLANDS DEBATE

My Secretary of State has told me that he will wish to dictate the outline of his closing speech tonight, and he will do this on return from this morning's OD(SA). We had yesterday evening prepared for him some notes - and these I enclose. Any comments on the general balance of these notes would be very welcome, since we may wish to draw upon them as we amend the closing speech in the light of points made during the debate.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO).

*John and*  
*D B Omand*  
(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq



Mr Speaker,

Before I wind-up this debate I should like to make a few personal remarks.

The brutal seizure by force of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies has been a ~~humiliating~~<sup>deep</sup> blow for this country, <sup>and</sup> for the Government: I feel it deeply.

2. There will be a time for inquests on what went wrong. That time is after we have returned the Falkland Islands to British administration.

3. I would only say this: that I believe that almost any reasonable man with experience of Government from whatever part of the House would have drawn the conclusions we did. <sup>We were not alone in our assessment - amongst ourselves and friends</sup> But we were wrong. We were not faced with reasonable people or a reasonable situation and our assessment of the situation was at fault. The responsibility for policy towards the Falklands Islands is carried out by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Lord Carrington and his colleagues have shown by their action that they accept the consequences of this responsibility.

4. Responsibility is not something which can be excused away and it cannot be devolved to others. I too accept my share of responsibility and I informed the Prime Minister last weekend that I placed my office at her disposal.

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*Ms. Anne Nichols made it clear to me that she believed*  
5. My Rt Hon Friend *(* that it is my duty to stay  
at my post and concentrate all my efforts to achieve the  
Government's objective of the restoration of the Falkland  
Islands to British administration. This I will do. I will  
do it to the very best of my ability.

6. But before leaving the events of the past I would like to  
deal conclusively with one accusation which has been made,  
and that is that the Royal Navy, indeed the Armed Services  
as a whole, were caught on the hop and were not ready to go to  
war. If it were true I would admit it. But such a charge is  
completely false. That we have assembled a task force of the  
size and composition which we have should be convincing proof  
of that.

7.

We were

only able to assemble such military might in such a short time because we had our plans ready, both in terms of fighting units and their essential logistic support. In the days preceding the sailing of the main elements of the task force there was a great deal of preparatory work. This involved the movement of troops, of weapons and stores of every kind. The checking in each ship of the task force of all the essential systems to ensure sea worthiness and operational readiness for a prolonged operation in the harsh weather conditions of the South Atlantic with long lines of communication. At the Royal Dockyards and naval stores depots and establishments there was a splendid response from the civilians of the Ministry of Defence who worked long hours, often throughout the night to get the Fleet ready. We are immensely grateful to them.

8. Another example of the readiness of our plans was the speed with which we were able to charter transport aircraft and acquire civilian ships by a variety of means by implementing existing plans: which had been practised in exercises against such a contingency. I myself flew from Portsmouth to Windsor on Sunday afternoon and there, with my Rt Hon Friends now Foreign Secretary and Lord President sought Her Majesty's approval for the Order in Council. I would like to express my thanks to the officials in my old Department, the Department of Trade, and to those concerned in the Shipping Industry for their co-operation. I will return later in my speech to the role of these ships.

the Governor, at his press conference, on his return to this country, praise the Royal Marines for (and I use his words) "their bravery and skill". Can anyone ever really have doubted that for one moment

9 Finally, before starting the main part of my speech, I would also like to clear away another misconception which may have arisen during the confusion immediately surrounding the invasion of the Falkland Islands and which was referred to last Saturday by the <sup>Member for</sup> Member for Down, South, and which was quite disgracefully carried as a story in a major National newspaper that the Royal Marines on the Falkland Islands had surrendered without firing a shot. I talked myself on Monday to Major Noot and Major Newman of the Royal Marines shortly after their arrival at Brize Norton. I learned from them at first hand of their spirited defence, of the way in which they had conducted themselves so as to inflict casualties on the enemy and even at one point take prisoners until called upon by the Governor, as was his duty, to cease resistance to avoid unnecessary loss of life to the Islanders and themselves in the face of overwhelming odds. A few days later there was an equally spirited defence of South Georgia in which the Royal Marines inflicted many casualties, including <sup>several</sup> killed, damaged an Argentine corvette, and destroyed a large Argentine helicopter.

10 These actions must have shown to those who may sometimes doubt the will and resolve of the British people that we will fight for what is ours; let there be no doubt about that.

11 I would also remind the House that the military preparations which we have seen being put into effect over the last few days must have demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt to the Soviet Union and her satellites, and to any potential aggressor throughout the world that we have armed forces of the highest possible professional skills maintained at a high standard of readiness.

12. I do not believe that there can be a single Member of this House, indeed scarcely a citizen of these Islands who could have failed to have been moved by the sight of the Fleet putting to sea. I visited Portsmouth on Sunday to see for myself with the Port Admiral the final stage of preparation, and visited HMS HERMES, the Flag Ship of the task force. I talked to many of her crew and to the aircrew who are sailing with her, many of them from the Royal Naval Air Station, Culdrose in my own constituency. Together they represent a formidable fighting force. I asked them - did they have the weapons they needed - did they have the spares they needed; and yes, Mr Speaker, they did.

13. Mr Speaker, they were not indulging in mock-heroics or jingoistic sentiments. They were level headed young men, thoroughly professional in their approach, who were going to do their duty. Naturally, they asked me whether I thought they would see action. I replied to them, as I had said publicly on television earlier in the day, that we were not putting the largest task force available in the world outside the two major super powers, to sea, without the intention, if we have to, of using them. I told them that we had no wish to take human life and that we would seek to achieve the return of British Administration to the Islands by peaceful means. But

if we could not do so then they would have to fight. I could see that in those circumstances they would fight to win.

I should like the House to know just how formidable a force is now on the high seas heading for the South Atlantic. The carriers INVINCIBLE and HERMES, with augmented complements of Sea Harriers and Sea King helicopters, will be capable of launching a powerful attack against enemy surface ships and submarines. The Type 42 destroyers SHEFFIELD, GLASGOW and COVENTRY possess an effective anti capability in the Seadart missile which can also be engaged against surface warships. The County Class destroyers ANTRIM and GLAMORGAN, fitted with Seaslug, are also primarily equipped for anti-air warfare. But these destroyers can be used also to detect and destroy enemy submarines.

The Type 21 general purpose frigates ARROW, ALACRITY and ANTELOPE are fitted with the Exocet surface to surface missile system but can also attack submarines with their helicopters as can the Type 22 frigates BRILLIANT and BROADSWORD. These frigates are also fitted with Exocet and possess a good self defence in their Sea Wolf systems. Finally, the Type 12 frigates PLYMOUTH and YARMOUTH with their sonar and helicopters will add to the anti-submarine capability of the force. Mr Speaker, this is a well balanced force capable of taking on any maritime threat, be it airborne, surface or sub-surface. In addition, the force contains a sizeable amphibious lift capability in the assault ship HMS FEARLESS and the 5 landing ships.

So far I have concentrated on the warships which make up the striking edge of this Fleet. I must remind the House that the deployment and maintenance of this force will pose vast logistic problems, though ones that are not insuperable. The Fleet auxiliaries APPLELEAF, TIDESPING, PEARLEAF and OLMEDA

will provide tanker support; and the FORT AUSTIN which was already on her way to the Falklands when the Argentines invaded last Friday, RESOURCE and STROMNESS stores support. These vessels are manned by members of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, who are, like their surface counterparts, professionals in their specialist field with long experience of operating with the Royal Navy.

The House will also know that, as has been done so often in the past in time of national emergency, we have invoked the resources of the merchant marine to help sustain an undertaking on this scale. My Rt Hon Friend, the then Secretary of State for Trade informed the House on 5th April that arrangements were to be made to requisition or charter any vessels that might be necessary. The CANBERRA is to be used, like the Queens in the last war, as a troop transport; she will also provide hospital facilities should they be needed as well as rest and recuperation facilities for the members of the task force. Tankers and other support ships are also being chartered or requisitioned.

It would not be right for me to give precise details of the Royal Marines and soldiers who will be sailing with the task force. But I can tell the House that they include Royal Marine Commandos and soldiers of the Parachute Regiment, together with Signals, Artillery and supporting arms. Should it be necessary to carry out an amphibious assault, sufficient manpower will be available for the purpose. The Royal Marines who fought so gallantly against overwhelming odds last week at Port Stanley and Grytviken have already showed that they are more than a match for the Argentine forces.

Mr Speaker, we have heard in the House today the voices of some who doubt the wisdom of preparing to use force, should peaceful means fail. I cannot share that view. When you stop a dictator there are always risks, but as my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister said recently, there are great risks in not stopping a dictator - a lesson this nation has learnt before.

There are also those who doubt our military capability to mount or to sustain the level of operations that may - also - be needed in the end. There are those who suggest that we should now reconsider the plans for the defence programme we announced last June.

Our defence programme is shaped round the response to the Soviet threat. In terms of the sea/air battle our plans give emphasis to our maritime air and submarine effort - and it is right that they should.

Nevertheless, as we said in Cmnd 8288, there will remain a wide range of tasks in peace and war for which surface ships are uniquely suited; and we must therefore retain a large and versatile ocean going surface fleet.

Mr Speaker, we have a large and versatile surface fleet. And a significant element of it is now at sea.

Nothing in our recent review will prevent us from retaining such a capability in future years. We intend to sustain a strong and effective Navy. A major ship construction programme is currently in train - £400m worth of orders placed last year - and many aspects of its fighting capability are being greatly improved. This financial year we will be spending £ $\frac{1}{2}$ bn more



in real terms on the Navy than was spent in the year before we came to office. As to the future we will still be spending more on the conventional Navy, even when expenditure on modernising the strategic deterrent is at its peak, than we were in 1978/79. In the late 80s and beyond our capability for out-of-area emergencies will be performed by the new carriers HMS ILLUSTRIOUS now on sea trials and HMS ARK ROYAL now building. I make no apologies to the House for saying once again that, after the two super-powers, our naval capability will remain second to none.

Hon Members will realise that the <sup>task</sup> force is well equipped, balanced, powerful and above all flexible. Its flexibility is important. There are a range of military options open to us. We will select the right one as the situation demands. I recognise of course that simply saying that there is a range of options open to us does not tell Hon Members much but I hope they will understand that I cannot divulge what our plans are. Security must be uppermost in our minds.

Mr Speaker I would like to urge the House to say nothing in public that gives comfort or assistance to Argentina.

We are taking steps to remind newspaper editors and others concerned of their responsibility to the nation at a time like this. It is not helpful to have fireside strategists speculating about the operations which the Task Force might undertake. The old phrase "Careless talk costs lives" is as valid now as ever it was. Mr Speaker, there is one point I should make very clear: the deployment of a formidable Task Force does not mean that this Government has abandoned diplomacy in seeking to recover the Falkland Islands from Argentine military occupation.

As my Rt Hon Friend, the Foreign Secretary, has said, we were greatly encouraged by the mandatory resolution endorsed by the UN Security Council condemning the Argentine invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of all their forces. A call that Argentina has rejected. Yesterday's communique by the European Commission is another indication of the growing international revulsion at Argentine's actions.

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My Rt Hon Friend has said that he will continue to urge our friends and allies to take measures to increase the pressure on Argentina.

For our part my Rt Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Trade announced yesterday the imposition of a ban on imports from Argentina. This measure is in addition to the freezing of assets, the denial of export credit and the embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment already announced. These measures, combined with the despatch of a powerful Task Force, can leave Argentina in no doubt about our intention to return British Administration to the Falkland Island.

We hope to be able to find a peaceful solution.

But if diplomatic efforts fail, a military solution will be necessary. That means fighting if we have to rid the Falkland Islands of Argentine military occupation. We are not thirsting for Argentine blood, some of which has already been spilled by our Royal Marines, but there is no question of acquiescing in the isolation of international law and the rights of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands. To this end we have sent a Task Force capable of taking whatever action is required.

The Argentine Government should be under no illusion. We are in earnest. And we shall have no hesitation in making use of the resources at our disposal should it be necessary. I know that the House will join me in paying tribute to all those involved in this enterprise and wish them God speed.



# Briefing Note

No: 13  
7.4.82

## THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Despite repeated assurances by the Argentine government that they were committed to a negotiated settlement, Argentine forces invaded and took control of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982. During the debate in the House of Commons the following day, the Prime Minister declared:

"It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment." (Hansard, 3rd April 1982, p.5)

The Government's Handling of the Crisis. While there were a number of references in recent months in the Argentine press to the possibility of an invasion, many were the work of just one journalist. Government statements reflected a harder line than that taken by the previous administration; but the British Government considered that overall evidence showed that the Argentinians remained committed, at least for the coming months, to finding a solution. The Argentinians also made repeated assurances to the United States as well as to Britain that they continued to give priority to a negotiated settlement on sovereignty. Bellicose statements have often been made by the Argentine press, and to some extent by the Argentine government, but in the end the crisis passed over. The British Government therefore concluded that there was no immediate threat to the Falkland Islands, especially as the latest round of talks between the two governments in New York at the end of February appeared to have established a basis for further negotiations. Even when scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia on 19th March, there was no sudden heightening of tension, and first reports were that the Argentinians were willing to settle that problem by diplomatic means. Later sifting of information at Ministerial instigation confirmed that the decision to invade the Falkland Islands was not taken before 28th March, and possibly one or two days later, and that it might have been an unpremeditated seizing of the opportunity provided by the South Georgia incident. Certainly senior members of the American administration have told the British Government since the invasion that they were taken completely by surprise.

Criticism has been expressed of the Government's lack of military preparedness. As the Prime Minister said on 3rd April: "First, even if ships had been instructed to sail the day that the Argentines landed on South Georgia to clear the whaling station, the ships could not possibly have got to Port Stanley before the invasion. Secondly, there have been several occasions in the past when an invasion has been threatened. The only way of being certain to prevent an invasion would have been to keep a very large fleet close to the Falkland Islands, when we are some 8,000 miles away from base. No government has ever been able to do that, and the cost would be enormous." (Hansard, p.8)

Argentina's Motives. As Mr. Francis Pym, the new Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons on 7th April: "Why did Argentina's ruler suddenly decide in the last days of March to resort to arbitrary and brutal aggression? I suggest that part of the answer lies in the very brutality and unpopularity of the Argentine regime itself..... Only a few days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands there had been riots in Buenos Aires and many people had been arrested. Harassed by political unrest at home, and beset by mounting economic difficulties, the regime turned desperately to a cynical attempt to arouse jingoism among its people. The Falkland Islanders have thus become the victims of the unprincipled opportunism of a morally bankrupt regime."

Government Action since the Invasion. Since the 2nd April, the Government has:

- \* obtained the passage of a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion, and calling for an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces and a diplomatic solution.
- \* broken off diplomatic relations with Argentina.
- \* frozen Argentine assets in this country.
- \* stopped export credits and banned the exports of arms to Argentina.
- \* imposed an embargo on the import of all goods from Argentina.
- \* urged a large number of friendly countries to take measures of their own.
- \* has despatched a large naval task force towards the South Atlantic, the most powerful force Britain has ever put to sea in peacetime and fully adequate for any action that may be required in exercise of our undoubted right of self-defence under the U.N. Charter.

Britain's Naval Strength. Any suggestion that our capacity to respond to the crisis has been weakened by a run-down in the strength of the Navy is nonsense. Equally, it is quite untrue that the Trident decision would inhibit Britain from mounting a similar naval task force in the years to come. The fact that the fleet has been able to put to sea, prepared for action in 4 days, reflects great credit on the Royal Navy.

There will be more ships and submarines operational in 1985 than there are today. It is the Government's intention to keep two aircraft carriers into the 1990s. 'Illustrious' will join the fleet later this year and will replace 'Invincible', when it is sold to Australia next year. 'Ark Royal' will replace the old carrier 'Hermes' in 1985. A massive modernization programme for the fleet is in hand. The principal threat to our peace and freedom will continue to come from the Soviet Union and we are increasing the numbers of our nuclear submarines - the main threat to the Soviet fleet - from 12 to 17.

This financial year we will be spending £½ billion more in real terms on the Navy than in the year before we came into office. Trident has had a minimal effect on the Defence budget so far, and it will only be taking an average of 3% of the budget over the next 18 years. In the future, we will still be spending more on the conventional Navy, even when expenditure on Trident is at its peak.

The Government's Objective. In the days ahead, the government will seek a diplomatic solution that will ensure a withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. But should this prove impossible, the choice is clear. As Mr. John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence said:

"We are going to restore British administration to the Falkland Islands ..... we mean to stick to it even if we have to fight."  
("Weekend World" 4th April 1982)

And as Mr. Pym later said:

"We would much prefer a peaceful settlement. We will do all we can to get one. And we shall welcome and support all serious efforts to that end ..... But if our efforts fail, the Argentine regime will know what to expect: Britain does not appease dictators.....If the world does not oblige Argentina to restore their rights tomorrow it will be someone else's turn to suffer aggression and occupation. The world will become an even more dangerous place."  
(House of Commons, 7th April 1982)

CONFIDENTIAL



De MFJ.  
cc Martin

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Conversation with  
Chancellor Schmidt

The German Chancellor rang the Prime Minister at 1210 hours today. He said he had interrupted his Easter break to preside over a Cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister's message of 6 April requesting support on a range of economic measures had reached him just in time.

Herr Schmidt said that he had emphasised to the Cabinet the vital German interest in assisting Great Britain in obtaining a peaceful solution of the conflict. The Argentine action was a gross violation of international law. Such aggression, against a friend and an ally, was more important than similar cases elsewhere in the world. He had asked his Ministers not to be influenced by the German press who had not yet understood the gravity of the matter.

The German Government would announce the Cabinet's decisions at about 2.30 p.m. today. In summary:-

- (a) The Cabinet condemned the Argentinian invasion as a flagrant violation of international law and of the obligation to settle international disputes peacefully.
- (b) It endorsed the Declaration of the Ten of 2 April and the UN Security Council Resolution of the same day.
- (c) It decided that, in conjunction with its European partners, the Federal Republic would assist the United Kingdom as an ally and a friend in an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution.
- (d) The Cabinet decided that no licences would be issued henceforth for the export of military weapons, ammunition or other equipment to the Argentine.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(e)

- (e) Finally, Germany would contribute constructively to discussion and decisions within the Economic Community on economic matters.

The Prime Minister said that she was most grateful to the Chancellor. We were facing a case of naked aggression. If we did not resist then similar aggression could take place elsewhere. It was vital to us that our European partners should show solidarity both on the principles at stake and with regard to the practical measures against the Argentine which were required.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he would contact France today to explain his position. The Prime Minister said that President Mitterrand had been very helpful, especially in connection with the UN Security Council Resolution.

Finally, Chancellor Schmidt said that he thought it would be useful for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to meet his EC opposite numbers soon.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*your own  
file later.*

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AUSTRALIA BANS ARGENTINE

7.4.82

AUSTRALIA BANS ARGENTINE IMPORTS

CANBERRA, THURSDAY - AUSTRALIA HAS BANNED IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA IN RETALIATION FOR ITS SEIZURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, FOREIGN MINISTER TONY STREET SAID TODAY.

HE TOLD REPORTERS AFTER A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING THAT THE MEASURE WAS IN RESPONSE TO "ARGENTINA'S ARMED AGGRESSION."

HE ALSO SAID GOVERNMENT EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES WOULD NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE FOR CONTRACTS WITH ARGENTINA.



for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

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*Press Office*



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BUENOS AIRES/TLX 251/243 7 0903

*Prime Minister 2  
We will let you  
have a reply.*

*lm  
7/4*

LT  
BUENOS AIRES, APRIL 7TH, 1982  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:  
ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL, WHICH CENTRALIZES THE CULTURAL, PHILANTHROPIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES OF NATIVE BORN BRITONS AND PEOPLES OF BRITISH DESCENT LIVING IN ARGENTINA, WHO NUMBER IN EXCESS OF 100.000 PEOPLE, WE RESPECTFULLY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT WE DO NOT FEEL THAT OUR SITUATION HAS BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED OR TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH HAS ARISEN BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN. ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS SHOWN EVERY CONSIDERATION TOWARDS THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ALLOWING IT TO RUN ITS OWN SCHOOLS, CHURCHES HOSPITALS, OLD PEOPLE'S HOMES, ETC. IN ADDITION MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE INTEGRATE THEMSELVES INTO ALL ASPECTS OF ARGENTINE LIFE, PLAYING A PROMINENT ROLE ESPECIALLY IN BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL CIRCLES. IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULT MOMENTS WE ARE LIVING THROUGH, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAS CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED AND NO ANIMOSITY HAS BEEN SHOWN TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY BY THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY URGE YOU TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION AND GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE STRONG BRITISH PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA AND THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY LIVING HERE. WE PRAY THAT THE LORD WILL GUIDE YOU IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES AND BLESS YOU AS A PEACEMAKER.  
G. T. MURCHISON CHAIRMAN BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

COL LT 10 100.000

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READ NUMBER LINE LFT220 DLF4100 LBG116 ELB1488 AUK010 TX313  
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TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
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7.4.82

### Introduction

I come to the House to open this debate less than two days after becoming Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I am deeply conscious of the heavy responsibilities that have been placed upon me. I shall discharge them to the best of my abilities. My predecessor lifted high the reputation of Britain and British foreign policy. He made full use of his great skills and gifts and his especial flair. He registered some important achievements. He was a very fine Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and the nation owes him its gratitude.

He had under him a very fine diplomatic service, which has served us and continues to serve us well. I look forward to working with it.

/The circumstances

The circumstances of my predecessor's departure were most unfortunate and I come to my new post at a critical time in the history of the Falkland Islands. I shall bring to this task all the determination I can command, and I approach it in a spirit of realism and, I hope, of calm.

Determination, because we intend to show Argentina and the whole world that Britain is resolved to succeed in this crisis. Realism, because I shall proceed in full recognition of the major difficulties that lie ahead. And calm, because we must give the most careful consideration to the practical options open to us and reach the right decisions as we advance towards our objectives.

The House knows what these objectives are. They were stated by my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister on Saturday. We intend to see that the Falkland Islands are freed from occupation and returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment. To do this we must look forward in confidence, and not backwards in anger.

/Argentina's

## Argentina's Aggression

The whole House and the country is struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed. As recently as the end of February, as the House is aware, we had held talks with Argentina about the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Government were fully aware of Britain's position: that is to say, total firmness on the right of the Islanders to determine their own future; but subject to that, willingness - ~~even~~ <sup>indeed</sup> desire - to deal with the Falkland Islands problem by means of fair negotiation.

Why did Argentina's ruler suddenly decide in the last days of March to resort to arbitrary and brutal aggression? I suggest that part of the answer lies in the very brutality and unpopularity of the Argentine regime itself. Inflation is raging in Argentina, at the rate of 140% a year. The regime is notorious for its systematic contempt of all human rights. <sup>Since 1976,</sup> there

/have been

47

have been thousands of arrests and killings, often described in a tragic and disgraceful euphemism as "disappearances". Only a few days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands there had been riots in Buenos Aires and many people had been arrested. Harassed by political unrest at home, and beset by mounting economic difficulties, the regime turned desperately to a cynical attempt to arouse jingoism among its people. The Falkland Islanders have thus become the victims of the unprincipled opportunism of a morally bankrupt regime. Our purpose is to restore their rights.

#### Recent Developments

Since the debate on Saturday there have been a number of developments and I should bring the House up-to-date. The Governor of the Falkland Islands and the marines from Port Stanley have been evacuated to this country. I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in paying tribute to them.

/The Governor,

The Governor, Mr Rex Hunt, conducted himself with courage and dignity amid the danger and confusion. He proved himself worthy of the trust which the British Government had placed in him and of the manifest respect which he had inspired among the islanders. The Royal Marines proved equally and characteristically trustworthy. They did all that could possibly have been expected of them. They gave the invaders a sharp taste of what even a very small detachment from the British armed services can do when attacked by overwhelming force.

On Saturday, the Argentines occupied South Georgia. The small detachment of Royal Marines on that island put up a gallant and spirited resistance. But of course they could not stand up against overwhelming strength.

/The Argentines

The Argentines have also been consolidating their presence in the Falkland Islands themselves. Our estimate is that they may now have an occupation force of something over 3,000 men, and that the number ~~is~~ <sup>may</sup> still <sup>be</sup> rising. While we have no reports of direct maltreatment of the islanders, it is quite obvious that the occupation force has no intention of treating them other than as a conquered population. Tight restrictions have been placed on their activities. It is essential, at the very least, that the Argentine authorities respect their international obligations to the civilian population under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with the behaviour and responsibilities of occupying powers.

/Current Actions

## Current Actions

The House is aware that we have despatched a large task force towards the South Atlantic. We are confident that it will be fully adequate for any action that may be required in exercise of our undoubted right of self-defence under the United Nations Charter. This task force is an essential part of the means for attaining our objectives. It gives us the strength from which to urge a settlement, and in the end it may only be strength that the regime in Argentina will understand.

There will be time before the task force reaches the area to do everything possible to solve the problem without further fighting. We would much prefer a peaceful settlement. We will do all we can to get one. And we shall welcome and support all serious efforts to that end. The House and the country should be in no doubt about that. But if our efforts fail, the Argentine regime will know what to expect: Britain does not appease dictators.

/This is a



8

This is a tense and difficult period. We are using the interval immediately ahead for maximum diplomatic activity. The need is for all the world to bring pressure on Argentina to withdraw her armed forces from the Falkland Islands. Britain herself has already taken various measures. We have broken diplomatic relations with Argentina. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires and most of his staff are being withdrawn. We have informed Argentina that their Consulates in Liverpool and Hong Kong must now be closed. We have increased our broadcasts in Spanish to Argentina and in English to the Falkland Islands.

A small British Interests Section will continue to work in the Swiss Embassy, and we are most grateful to the government of Switzerland, who are most expert in these matters, for agreeing to this arrangement. We have been advising the many British subjects living in Argentina to depart unless they have special reasons for remaining. We have frozen Argentine assets in this country. We have stopped

/official

official credits for exports to Argentina. We have banned the export of arms to Argentina. And, as the House was informed yesterday, we have imposed an embargo on the import of all goods from Argentina from midnight last night.

The despatch of our naval force and the economic measures we have taken should show the Argentine regime quite clearly that we mean business. Yet, if we are to convince them that aggression does not pay, we shall also need the support of the world community and all who believe in freedom.

The Security Council of the United Nations promptly and decisively endorsed the British view of the invasion of the Falkland Islands. It adopted - the day after the invasion - a Resolution put forward by Britain. That Resolution demands an immediate cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces. And it calls on the governments

/of Argentina

of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect the United Nations Charter. Britain immediately accepted the injunction to seek a diplomatic solution and observe the Charter.

But Argentina displayed her contempt for world opinion by coldly declaring that she would not comply with the Resolution. This Resolution is mandatory. It represents the expression of world opinion. It is binding in international law. I hope that the Argentine regime will be brought by the pressure of world opinion to fulfil its legal obligations.

The whole world has an interest in the fulfilment of this Resolution. There are many such territories across the world which are vulnerable to aggression from more powerful neighbours. The preservation of peace depends on the exercise of responsibility and restraint.

/It depends

It depends on the strong not taking the law into their own hands and imposing their rule on the weak. It depends on the international community supporting the principle of self-determination and punishing those who wilfully and forcibly violate that principle. It is the Falkland Islanders who today are being deprived of their right to live in accordance with their wishes.

If the world does not oblige Argentina to restore their rights, tomorrow it will be someone else's turn to suffer aggression and occupation. The world will become an even more dangerous place.

Since 4 April, the government have been making these views known to a large number of countries across the world. We have urged them to take measures, similar to those that Britain has taken, to bring Argentina to her senses. Yesterday, my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister (added her personal weight to our efforts by) sending a personal message

/to our

to our partners in the European Community and also to other very friendly countries.

Active discussion is now under way about measures by the European Community against Argentina. We have also been in close contact with the members of the Commonwealth, many of whom have responded with support which bears witness to the strength and value of our Commonwealth links. All this diplomatic activity will continue.

The case for other countries to follow Britain in taking economic measures is very strong. The Argentine economy depends greatly on export earnings and on raising finance to pay for imports and cover the external deficit. The scope for measures by our friends is extensive. About 40% of Argentina's exports go to our major partners, including the members of the Community. Argentina frequently tries to raise funds in the leading financial centres of the Western world.

We are

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We are asking our friends to do everything they can to help us. They may not be able to take exactly the same measures as Britain herself - unison is rarely the answer in this kind of situation. But the supply of arms and military equipment to Argentina must be stopped in present circumstances. And I hope that our friends and partners will encourage their banks to make no new loans to Argentina. I hope, too, that they will follow us in terminating official export credits. Above all, we are asking friendly countries to take measures against imports from Argentina. I ask also that they should announce what they are doing. This will impress Argentina, and encourage others to follow suit.

We are confident of the support of the world community and in particular of our friends. With this support, we hope to make it clear to Argentina that withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and a negotiated settlement constitute the only legal and acceptable approach in the dispute and the only one which is in Argentina's own interests.

/The first

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The first responses to our approaches to friendly countries have been encouraging. Many countries across the world have condemned Argentina's aggression. Our friends in Europe and the United States were among the very first. Moreover, New Zealand has severed diplomatic relations with Argentina. Canada has placed an immediate ban on military supplies to Argentina, Canada and Australia have withdrawn their Ambassadors from Buenos Aires. The Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany have taken action on arms sales. We hope that this list will soon grow much longer.

Meanwhile our naval task force is on its way to the South Atlantic. It is a formidable demonstration of our strength of will. The challenges which they may be called upon to face may also be formidable. I have no doubt that they will be equal to it. I know the House will join me in offering full support to those who are now embarked in defence of British territory and to protect the rights which we and the Falkland Islanders hold equally dear.

/Conclusion

Conclusion

It is intolerable that the peaceful people of the Falkland Islands, who are British by choice and by inheritance, should be the victims of unprovoked invasion by a powerful and covetous neighbour. It will be far from easy to reverse this situation. The difficulties speak for themselves. We shall spare no effort to reach a peaceful solution. The Falkland Islanders have reacted with courage and dignity to the rape of their Islands. I assure them now that Britain will stand by them. We have always said that their wishes are paramount. We shall do all in our power to show that their confidence in us is justified.

I know that our objective of liberating the Falkland Islands is shared in all parts of this House. If we in this country are to achieve our objective as swiftly and as peacefully as possible, then we must all unite in our resolve to succeed. Of course there has been criticism of the government's handling of the matter before the invasion. We are acutely conscious of that.

Yet I believe



Yet I believe that I judge the mood of the House and the country rightly when I say that the Government have their support in the determined course we have taken to solve the problem. What we in Britain must now do, with the support and backing of all freedom-loving countries right across the world, is to see to it that Argentina's intolerable defiance of the international community and of the rule of law is not allowed to stand.

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

London, 7th April 1982.

SUBJECT.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T64/82

Text of message from Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen  
to  
Prime Minister The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher.

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In reply to your message which I received yesterday, I am glad to be able to refer to a press statement which Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen issued on behalf of the Danish Government yesterday. It contains a clear condemnation of the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and calls for a pressure upon Argentina from all the world to seek a political solution to the problems.

We intend to play our full part in the continued deliberations in the E.C. about this matter.

7 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I enclose copies of messages received  
by the Prime Minister from:

- (a) the Prime Minister of Denmark
- (b) the President of Nigeria
- (c) the Commonwealth Secretary General.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

7 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 7 April enclosing a message from President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

AJC

His Excellency Alhaji Shehu Awak



TELEPHONE: 01-839 1244

**SUBJECT.**

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR NIGERIA

9 NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE  
LONDON, WC2N 5BX

7th April, 1982.

The Right Honourable  
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP.,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
LONDON

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T64B/82**

Dear Prime Minister,

*Mr. Hawker act  
off.*

I have been asked by my President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria to transmit the following message to your goodself. Message begins:

"I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 3RD APRIL CONCERNING THE INVASION AND MILITARY TAKEOVER OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINA. AS YOU KNOW, MY ADMINISTRATION AND PREVIOUS NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALWAYS ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, ITS RESOLUTIONS WHICH AIM AT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CRISIS. WE ARE ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT TODAY IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND IN IT WE APPEAL TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS."

Message ends.

(Shehu Awak)  
High Commissioner.



THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
MRS. MAGARET THATCHER MP,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
10 DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON.

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 3RD APRIL CONCERNING THE INVASION AND MILITARY TAKEOVER OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINA. AS YOU KNOW, MY ADMINISTRATION AND PREVIOUS NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALWAYS ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, ITS RESOLUTIONS WHICH AIM AT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CRISIS. WE ARE ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT TODAY IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND IN IT WE APPEAL TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS.

SGD.  
(ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI)  
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA  
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF  
NIGERIA.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1982

ADL  $\frac{8}{4}$   
h-a-

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Broadcasting

In your letter of 4 April you asked how many hours the BBC External Service broadcasts to Argentina and the Falkland Islands, how good reception is and whether any steps need to be taken to improve the services.

The BBC's Spanish Service for Latin America has been operating 28 hours a week (four hours a day) from 0015 GMT to 0415 GMT. The last hour has been beamed more towards the north of the area, so in effect only three hours a day have been fully audible in Argentina. The BBC are now increasing daily broadcasts in Latin-American Spanish by one hour (to be from 2315 to 0015 GMT - a good listening time in Argentina) for about three weeks at no extra cost. The continuation after that of the extra hour would require additional finance.

The BBC's 24-hour a day World Service in English is relayed to South America and the Falklands via the Ascension Island relay station for seven and a half hours each day from 2000 GMT to 0330 GMT. Audibility is adequate. At other times of the day it is possible to pick up some World Service broadcasts aimed at Africa. A major improvement in reception could only be achieved in the long term by expanding the Ascension relay station, but in the short term the BBC are trying to improve reception by re-arranging the frequencies.

The BBC World Service has for many years relayed from Ascension a special 35-minute programme on Sunday evenings designed for Falklands' listeners. The BBC will now run this service three times a week by broadcasting on Tuesday and Thursday evenings as well. The programme carries messages from relations and other items of Falklands Islands news.

We are considering urgently what more can be done.

/We are

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We are considering separately the Prime Minister's question about the scope for increasing internal opposition to the Argentine regime and will reply shortly.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



MOM  
LDN SWBD P20

54250 COALTE G

CUD YOU PSE TRY FALKLAND ISLANDS 21B

MOMPL

21B FALKISCO F  
54250 COALTE G  
7TH APRIL 1982

MR HARRY MILNE

DEAR HARRY,

MARVELLOUS TO KNOW ALL SAFE AND SOUND AND TO HAVE THIS DIRECT LINK.

APPRECIATE NEED TO KEEP TO A// ESSENTIALS.

THANKS FOR PROMPT INDICATION OF GUARANTEE FROM ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES REGARDING SAFE ENTRY AND EXIT OF A.E.S. I AM NOW TRYING TO PERSUADE DANISH OWNERS TO CO-OPERATE. THEY ARE MOST WORRIED ABOUT SAFETY OF THEIR DANISH CREW. IF YOU COULD GET ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES TO HELP ANY FURTHER ON THAT IT WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. I WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE TO GET THESE SUPPLIES IN TO YOU.

REGARDS AND BEST WISHES.

TED NEEDHAM

HAVE YOU RECEIVED ALL RIGHT

LONDON HERE PE PLEASE TAKE ANSER BACKK

54250 COALTE G

21B FALKISCO FK

7/4/82

Tried to send from 12.0 MB. Finally succeeded about 4.20/4.30.

SECRET

Prime Minister

3

Ref. A08082

MR WHITMORE

Agree a briefing at 10.30 am  
next Thursday in the Cabinet Room,  
followed by Cabinet meeting?

Yes not 7.4.

Cabinet: Thursday, 15 April

It was agreed at Cabinet yesterday that there should be a meeting of the Cabinet on Thursday, 15 April. It was also agreed that the Secretary of State for Defence should brief the Cabinet after Easter on the detailed capability of the British task force now on its way to the South Atlantic.

2. We have informed Ministers' offices that there will be a Cabinet on 15 April. At the present moment there is no substantive business for the agenda apart from the Falkland Islands. Parliament reassembles on Monday, 19 April, however, and the new Lord President of the Council might wish to confirm the business of the House for the forthcoming week. We could therefore also include a Parliamentary Affairs item.

3. Since Ministers will be returning early from their Easter break to attend the Cabinet on 15 April, I think there is good reason for arranging the briefing by the Secretary of State for Defence to take place in the Cabinet Room either before or after - I think preferably before - that Cabinet. By 15 April, the task force will be well on its way to the Falkland Islands and OD(SA) will have had a number of meetings to discuss contingency plans for action after its arrival. The only alternative to the Secretary of State for Defence briefing his colleagues before or after Cabinet on 15 April would be to arrange a special briefing session in the Ministry of Defence itself similar to that which was organised about the Trident programme. This would require Ministers to make themselves available for a second meeting at a time when they might otherwise not have been in London; and a special event such as that in the Ministry of Defence would, in the present climate, run the risk of attracting unwelcome press and public attention.

4. I should be grateful, therefore, if you could consult the Prime Minister about this and let me know whether she would like Mr Nott's briefing to take place before the Cabinet meeting next Thursday, 15 April. The briefing might then be at 10.30 am, to be followed immediately by the Cabinet.

Approved not

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr Omand in the Ministry of Defence.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

7 April 1982

SECRET

PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER



My staff and I send you our warmest wishes for a good outcome to the present troubles. Please be assured of our support and of our hope that the Government's efforts to restore the right of the Falklanders to peace and freedom will be rewarded with a good success.

Derek Rayner

7 April 1982



AT 4

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to despatch a  
message on these lines?

M 7/4

Yes not

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Messages to Other Governments

HM Ambassador in Mexico City has asked to see President Lopez Portillo in the next day or two to press our case and has suggested that the Prime Minister should send a message to the President, which he thinks could make a considerable impression. We agree. The Mexicans are very important in the balance of South American opinion. I enclose a draft message based largely on a proposal by the Ambassador.

Yours ever,  
*Francis Richards*  
for (J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Registry  
No.

DRAFT MESSAGE

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO  
OF MEXICO

I wanted to be in touch with you at a difficult and dangerous moment in world affairs. I do so conscious of the friendship and understanding we established between us when I visited Mexico last year.

Through an act of aggression against virtually undefended islands hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometres from their own shores, Argentine forces have outraged the principles on which the international order is based and on which my country, as yours, has built its foreign policy: in particular, self-determination of peoples and peaceful settlement of disputes. As you know the United Nations Security Council has since passed a Mandatory Resolution calling for Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands. I very much regret that so far the Argentine Government has shown no sign of being willing to comply with this Resolution.

This challenge to the international order and rule of law affects all members of the world community, and I appeal for your help in bringing home to the Argentine Government the seriousness of its actions and the great dangers arising from its failure so far to respect the decisions of the Security Council for world peace. The greater the weight of international disapproval of Argentine aggression, the more likely a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means.

/As

As you know, the British Government has despatched substantial forces to the area. We hope it will not be necessary to use them. We are determined to pursue all peaceful means of settling the dispute. But failure to settle it by one means or another will make it increasingly difficult to prevent further acts of aggression by powerful countries against weaker or small neighbours.

I hope very much that we shall be able, through our Ambassadors, to remain in close touch through this unhappy period and to work closely together.

7 APR 1952



Handwritten red scribbles and markings, possibly initials or a signature, located below the circular stamp.

AT Coles



ms

*With the compliments of*

J. Holmes

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

544 - 1

ZZ BRUSSELS

GRS 1426

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 061846Z APR 82

TO FLASH BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 6 APRIL,

AND TO FLASH ALL OTHER EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, TOKYO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA AND UKDEL OECD.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

BEGINS. I AM SEEKING YOUR URGENT HELP IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ARGENTINA HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT WILL DEFY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON 3 APRIL, CALLING FOR ITS IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE: ALL OUR EFFORTS MUST BE DEVOTED TO BRINGING ARGENTINA TO RESPECT THE WILL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO ACT ACCORDING TO THIS RESOLUTION. IN THIS CONTEXT WE SHOULD USE ALL AVAILABLE MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THEM. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE A PARTICULARLY POWERFUL IMPACT.

(TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ONLY)

I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE STRONG SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME IN THIS SITUATION AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT YOU GAVE ME WHEN WE SPOKE ON THE TELEPHONE. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTERVENTION WAS DECISIVE IN ACHIEVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

(TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ONLY)

I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR OWN ENERGETIC INTERVENTION WITH THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT AND THE HELP WHICH YOU GAVE US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHAT YOU DID WAS WIDELY NOTED AND APPLAUDED HERE. THE UNITED STATES IS A SUBSTANTIAL TRADING AND FINANCIAL PARTNER WITH ARGENTINA. IF YOU CAN SUPPORT US WITH ECONOMIC MEASURES, THIS WILL BE VITAL TO THEIR SUCCESS. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH AN UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION IN FLAGRANT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES WHICH YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE HAVE DONE SO MUCH TO DEFEND.

(TO RR FRASER ONLY)

1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

524 - 1

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PROMPT AND FORTHRIGHT  
CONDENNATION OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND FOR YOUR RAPID ACTION  
IN RECALLING YOUR AMBASSADOR

(TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI)

I MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S BACKING OVER THIS  
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. JAPAN HAS SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC  
RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. IF YOU CAN JOIN US AND OUR OTHER  
PARTNERS IN TAKING THE ECONOMIC MEASURES I PROPOSE, THIS WILL  
GREATLY INCREASE THEIR EFFECT.

(TO MR TRUDEAU ONLY)

I WOULD THANK YOU MOST WARMLY FOR YOUR SWIFT ACTION IN  
RECALLING YOUR AMBASSADOR FROM ARGENTINA AND BANNING ALL ARMS  
SUPPLIES. I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH OUR HIGH  
COMMISSIONER.

(TO MR MULDOON ONLY)

I WAS VERY MOVED BY YOUR WHOLEHEARTED AND VIGOROUS  
RESPONSE TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND I  
KNOW THAT NEW ZEALAND SHARES OUR FAMILY TIES WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE  
ISLANDS. I ASK FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD TOO,  
THOUGH I KNOW THAT HERE YOUR LINKS WITH ARGENTINA ARE SLIGHT.

(TO ALL COMMUNITY LEADERS)

YOU WILL KNOW THAT WE EXPLAINED IN BRUSSELS EARLIER  
TODAY, TO ALL OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL  
MEASURES WE ARE OURSELVES TAKING AGAINST ARGENTINA. WE ASKED  
OUR PARTNERS TO TAKE SIMILAR MEASURES, TO SUPPORT US IN SEEKING  
TO REVERSE THIS BLATANT ATTACK ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, A  
TERRITORY ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER PART IV OF THE  
TREATY OF ROME. IN THE TRADE FIELD WE ARE ASKING FOR ALL  
MEASURES TO BE TREATED UNDER ARTICLE 224 OF THE TREATY: AND  
WE ARE PRESSING FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DECISIONS, WITH FURTHER  
MEETINGS IN THE COMMUNITY BEFORE EASTER AND IMMEDIATELY THERE-  
AFTER. I NOW SEEK YOUR PERSONAL HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE URGENT  
INTRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES AGAINST  
ARGENTINA, BY NATIONAL ACTION COORDINATED AMONG US. I AM  
MAKING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

544 - 1

(TO PRIME MINISTERS OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG)

I AM TOLD THAT AT TODAY'S COREPER YOUR REPRESENTATIVE TENDED TO THE VIEW THAT, WHILE ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 224 WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE UK, ACTION BY THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY SHOULD BE ON A PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION UNDER ARTICLE 113. I RECOGNISE THAT ACTION BY ALL MEMBER STATES COULD BE SEEN AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY UNDER ARTICLE 113. BUT WE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY WHICH COURSE TO FOLLOW AND DECIDED THAT NATIONAL ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 224 OFFERED DECISIVE ADVANTAGES. THE COMMUNITY TOOK ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 224 OVER IRAN. WE KNOW THE DIFFICULTIES ARTICLE 113 CAUSES FOR DENMARK AND PERHAPS FRANCE, ESPECIALLY IN A CASE SO CLEARLY FALLING WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ARTICLE 224'S REFERENCE TO QUOTE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL TENSION CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF WAR UNQUOTE: THE FALKLANDS ARE A DEPENDENT TERRITORY ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER PART IV OF THE TREATY OF ROME. THE SITUATION IS FAR TOO SERIOUS AND URGENT FOR US TO BE HELD UP BY TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES IN COREPER ABOUT THE ARTICLE TO BE USED. I URGE YOU TO INSTRUCT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TO GO ALONG WITH NATIONAL ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 224, OF COURSE IN CONSULTATION TOGETHER.

(TO ALL NON-COMMUNITY RECIPIENTS)

I SEEK YOUR PERSONAL BACKING FOR THE URGENT INTRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. I AM ALREADY APPROACHING OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS ON THIS, SINCE WE ARE BOUND TO CONSULT TOGETHER ON MANY ECONOMIC MATTERS. BUT I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US TOO. COORDINATED ACTION BY THE COMMUNITY, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD BRING HOME TO ARGENTINA THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ILLEGAL ACTIONS.

(TO ALL)

THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES OVER THE YEARS AND IS NOW IN A FRAGILE AND VULNERABLE CONDITION. THE ARGENTINES DEPEND CRITICALLY ON MAINTAINING THEIR EXPORT EARNINGS AND IN RAISING FINANCE BOTH TO PAY FOR THEIR IMPORTS AND TO COVER THEIR EXTERNAL DEFICIT. MEASURES TO LIMIT THEIR ACCESS TO MARKETS AND TO CREDIT WILL HIT THEM HARD. WE IN

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CONFIDENTIAL

BRITAIN ARE ALREADY TAKING ACTION. BUT SUCH ACTION WILL BE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE IF OUR CLOSE FRIENDS AND TRADING PARTNERS WILL SUPPORT US AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE. ABOUT 40 PER CENT OF ARGENTINA'S EXPORTS GO TO THESE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY. ARGENTINA SEEKS TO RAISE FUNDS AT THE LEADING WORLD FINANCIAL CENTRES. THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO BE CUT OFF FROM TRADE AND FINANCE ON THIS SCALE.

A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON ARGENTINA WOULD BRING UNIVERSAL ECONOMIC ACTION. BUT THE EXPERIENCE OVER IRAN IN 1980 SHOWS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE BOUND TO VETO THIS: AND TIME IS SHORT. I MUST THEREFORE TURN TO YOU, TOGETHER WITH OUR OTHER FRIENDS, TO ASK YOU TO TAKE NATIONAL ACTION IN SOLIDARITY WITH US IN INTRODUCING ECONOMIC MEASURES.

THE MEASURES I PROPOSE ARE THESE:

(A) A COMPLETE BAN ON THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY MATERIAL TO ARGENTINA. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE THIS. I URGE THAT YOU WILL ALSO BAN ARMS SUPPLIES, MAINTAIN THIS BAN IN FORCE AND ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE.

(B) A EMBARGO ON ALL OR SOME IMPORTS OF GOODS FROM ARGENTINA. WE ARE ANNOUNCING A COMPLETE EMBARGO WITH EFFECT FROM MIDNIGHT TONIGHT - 6 APRIL. I URGE YOU TO TAKE SUPPORTING ACTION AND TO BE READY TO ANNOUNCE IT AND INTRODUCE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(C) THE ENDING OF EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR NEW COMMITMENTS TO ARGENTINA, AND DISCOURAGEMENT OF FURTHER INTERNATIONAL LENDING TO ARGENTINA. WE HAVE OURSELVES CEASED TO ENTER INTO NEW GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS AND FROZEN ALL ARGENTINE FINANCIAL ASSETS IN LONDON, AND WE EXPECT BRITISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO BE VERY RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE NEW COMMITMENTS TOWARDS ARGENTINA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BY THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF THEIR OUTCOME, AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY, HAVE ALREADY UNDERMINED CONFIDENCE IN THAT COUNTRY'S CREDITWORTHINESS. THE FURTHER ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN WILL DIRECTLY CREATE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY FOR ARGENTINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

544 - 1

PRUDENCE ALONE SHOULD DETER THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING COMMUNITY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS FROM UNDERTAKING FURTHER CREDITS AND LOANS TO ARGENTINA. I ASK YOU TO PROVIDE NO INCENTIVE AND NO ENCOURAGEMENT.

I KNOW THAT THESE MEASURES WILL AFFECT YOUR OWN ECONOMIC INTERESTS. BUT IF THEY ARE TAKEN RAPIDLY, WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SOLIDARITY AMONG OUR PARTNERS, THEY SHOULD BRING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO THEIR SENSES. THEY WOULD SHOW ARGENTINA THAT FORCE DOES NOT PAY AND LEAD US TOWARDS WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES AND THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WE WANT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. THE QUICKER THESE MEASURES CAN BE AGREED, ANNOUNCED AND PUT INTO EFFECT, THE STRONGER THEIR IMPACT ON ARGENTINA AND THE BETTER THE PROSPECT THAT THEY CAN AS QUICKLY BE REVERSED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESPONSE. ENDS.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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CONFIDENTIAL

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070048Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1147 OF 6 APRIL

FALKLANDS: MIPT

1. WHEN WE WERE DISCUSSING THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARGENTINIANS, HAIG SAID, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM ENDERS WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING, HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE AMERICANS NOT TO TILT TOO OPENLY TOWARDS OUR SIDE BECAUSE IF THEY DID THIS THEY WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. HAIG BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICANS ALONE COULD EXERT INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES.

2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT AMERICAN INFLUENCE COULD BE PARAMOUNT THERE. IT WAS TRUE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO AVERT THE ARGENTINE INVASION, BUT HE HAD GOT INTO TOUCH WITH GALTIERI ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE LANDINGS AND THERE WAS NO CHANCE AT THAT STAGE OF STOPPING THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION. BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AMERICAN PRESSURE. THE ARGENTINE REGIME WAS IN DIRE ECONOMIC

**FLASH**

FALKLAND ISLANDS

ADVANCE COPIES

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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR ILETT )

Typhits

HANAS

MT

See para 3

~~DID NOT MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO~~  
AMERICAN PRESSURE. THE ARGENTINE REGIME WAS IN DIRE ECONOMIC  
STRAITS AND VULNERABLE TO ALL MANNER OF PRESSURES THAT THE  
AMERICANS COULD BRING TO BEAR ON THEM.

I SAID THAT I PRESUMED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT BE LETTING ANY  
FURTHER ARMS DELIVERIES GO TO ARGENTINA AND HAIG CONFIRMED  
CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WAS SO.

3. I SAID THAT I HAD LISTENED TO THE ARGUMENT ABOUT CREDIBILITY WITH  
THE ARGENTINIANS BUT, ON THE BASIS OF MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUTH  
AMERICANS, I HELD THE VIEW THAT WHAT WOULD MAKE AN IMPACT UPON  
THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT BE NICENESS ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS  
BUT PRESSURE FROM THEM BACKED BY THE FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF  
BRITISH MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. ALTHOUGH, THEREFORE I UNDERSTOOD  
WHY THE AMERICANS WANTED TO AVOID TAKING SIDES ON THE ISSUE OF  
SOVEREIGNTY, I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD HELP TO EXERT  
INFLUENCE ON THE ARGENTINIANS IN TRYING TO BRING THEM TO A  
NEGOTIATION, WHICH WAS WHAT HAIG WANTED, BY SIMPLY BEING  
NEUTRAL.

4. HAIG SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH MY VIEW ABOUT HUMAN NATURE.  
RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF HOW TO HEAD OFF A BATTLE HAIG SAID  
THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE NOW ALREADY WORRIED.  
THE DILEMMA WAS THAT IF WE SUNK THE ARGENTINE NAVY THAT WOULD BE  
THE END OF GALTIERI: BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE THE END OF GALTIERI IF  
HE WAS OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ISLANDS WITHOUT ANY PROMISE  
OF A NEGOTIATION THAT CONTAINED PROMISE FOR ARGENTINE IN THE  
FUTURE. HE ASKED ME FOR ANY IDEAS WE MIGHT HAVE OF WHAT SORT  
OF APPROACH MIGHT SQUARE THE CIRCLE. I REPEATED OUR VIEW ABOUT  
THE NEED AT THIS STAGE TO PUT PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW  
AND EMPHASISED THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT THE AMERICANS COULD PLAY  
IN THIS.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY SAW OUR POINT THAT WE COULD NOT BE  
PARTIES TO ANY DISCUSSIONS SO LONG AS THE ARGENTINE PRESENCE  
REMAINED ON THE ISLANDS. BUT PERHAPS THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES  
COULD DO SOMETHING BY SUGGESTING THAT IF THE ARGENTINIANS WITHDREW  
THE AMERICANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THERE COULD BE FURTHER TALKS.  
I SAID THAT THAT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. I WOULD CERTAINLY BE IN TOUCH  
WITH HIM AGAIN BUT I ASKED THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR HIM  
TO LET US KNOW HOW HE GOT ON WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. IT DID NOT  
LOOK TO ME AS THOUGH THEY WOULD SHOW MUCH SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY AT  
THIS STAGE UNTIL THE YEAST OF THE APPROACHING BRITISH NAVAL  
PRESENCE HAD HAD TIME TO WORK UPON THEM. TO WHICH HAIG REVERTED  
TO THE ARGUMENT THAT HE MADE THROUGHOUT THAT HE WAS REALLY WORRIED  
BY THE NARROWNESS OF THE WINDOW AND THE NEED THEREFORE TO GET

PRESENCE HAD HAD TIME TO WORK UPON THEM. TO WHICH HAIG REVERTED  
TO THE ARGUMENT THAT HE MADE THROUGHOUT THAT HE WAS REALLY WORRIED  
BY THE NARROWNESS OF THE WINDOW AND THE NEED THEREFORE TO GET  
SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATION GOING.

6. IT WAS LEFT THEREFORE THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH AGAIN AFTER HE  
HAD TALKED WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. HE WAS DUE TO GO WITH THE  
PRESIDENT TO THE WEST INDIES ON 7 APRIL BUT HE WAS READY TO RETURN  
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY, AND EVEN NOT GO AT ALL IF HIS PRESENCE WAS  
NEEDED ELSEWHERE TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER WHICH WAS OF THE HIGHEST  
PRIORITY.

7. IN REPORTING ALL THIS TO YOU IN THIS SOMEWHAT DISCURSIVE WAY  
I SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT HAIG ADMITTED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ALOUD.  
HE ASKED THAT NO NOTES SHOULD BE TAKEN. HE DID NOT CLAIM TO BE  
PUTTING FORWARD ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS. HE WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO TEST  
INITIAL REACTIONS. I DID NOT THINK THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THAT MUCH  
OF WHAT HE SAID WAS ILL-FORMED. IT WOULD I THINK BE WRONG TO  
CRITICISE THE SOMEWHAT RANDOM NATURE OF THIS REMARKS OR TO ANALYZE  
THEM IN DETAIL.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070220Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1155 OF 6 APRIL 1982,

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO AND OTHER  
NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, KINGSTON, SAN JOSE.

MY TELNO 1123 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLANDS

1. CONGRESS HAS NOW GONE INTO RECESS BUT I WAS TODAY ABLE TO SEE  
SPEAKER O'NEILL, JIM WRIGHT (HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER) AND  
CONGRESSMAN BARNES (CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTER-  
AMERICAN AFFAIRS). A MEMBER OF MY STAFF HAS TALKED TO SENATOR  
HELMS' FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER (CARBAUGH).

2. BOTH O'NEILL AND WRIGHT WERE ROBUSTLY ON OUR SIDE, O'NEILL  
SAYING THAT, DESPITE HIS IRISH ROOTS, HE WAS 100% WITH  
MRS THATCHER. WRIGHT USED SOME VERY TEXAN LANGUAGE TO DISMISS  
ARGENTINA'S CLAIMS. HE WILL BE VISITING COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA,  
EL SALVADOR AND JAMAICA DURING THE RECESS AND PROMISED TO PUT  
ACROSS OUR VIEW THAT THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BY AGGRESSION  
WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

3. BARNES, WHO IS A LIBERAL DEMOCRAT AND CARRIES SOME INFLUENCE  
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR LATIN  
AMERICAN ISSUES, AGREED WITH ME THAT THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION  
OF THE FALKLANDS WAS UNACCEPTABLE BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE  
HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED TO HAIG THAT ONE WAY OF AVOIDING ARMED  
CONFLICT MIGHT BE FOR ARGENTINE FORCES TO WITHDRAW AND FOR THE



HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED TO HAIG THAT ONE WAY OF AVOIDING ARMED CONFLICT MIGHT BE FOR ARGENTINE FORCES TO WITHDRAW AND FOR THE OAS OR THE UN TO PUT IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE PENDING NEGOTIATION I SAID THAT WE WERE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT HE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR DETERMINATION TO RESTORE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION TO THE FALKLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE. IF CUBAN FORCES TOOK OVER PUERTO RICO WOULD THE UNITED STATES ACCEPT ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL RESTORATION? BARNES REPLIED THAT WHAT HE WAS PROPOSING WAS NOT IDEAL BUT HE BELIEVED IT TO BE PREFERABLE TO ARMED CONFLICT.

4. THE DISCUSSION WITH CARBAUGH WAS A GREAT DEAL LESS SATISFACTORY. CARBAUGH, SAID THAT HELMS' VIEW WAS THAT, DEPLORABLE AS THE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS WAS, IT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH US INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE ARGENTINIANS WERE WILLING TO PROVIDE ARMED FORCES TO HELP IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HELMS WAS PLANNING TO MAKE A STATEMENT INVOKING THE MUNROE DOCTRINE AGAINST BRITISH INTERVENTION. CARBAUGH CLAIMED TO HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES THAT, IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS, SOME KIND OF OAS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE SHOULD GO IN WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS CONTINUED. WE MADE VERY CLEAR TO CARBAUGH OUR POSITION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

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FM WASHINGTON 070240Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 1160 OF 6 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 1153: FALKLANDS.

1. WEINBERGER HAS JUST PHONE ME TO EXPRESS GREAT CONCERN ABOUT QUOTE TOTALLY FALSE UNQUOTE NEWSPAPER STORY ON THE SR715S. HE HAS ISSUED AN EMPHATIC DENIAL.

2. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE AND HAIG HAD HAD A MOST USEFUL TALK TODAY. THEY WERE DETERMINED TO STOP THE TALK ABOUT THE USA BEING NEUTRAL. IT WAS MONSTROUS TO PUT A LONG-STANDING ALLY ONTO THE SAME LEVEL AS ARGENTINA. THERE WERE WAYS OF HELPING WITHOUT ANY PUBLICITY THAT HE WOULD UNDERTAKE. I HAD ONLY TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH HIM IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE WANTED HIM TO DO. IT WAS NONSENSE TO TALK ABOUT NEUTRALITY WHEN BRITAIN WAS CONCERNED, AND ARGENTINA HAD COMMITTED AGRSSION.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

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(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff and MOD SITCEN).

HD NAD

Typists.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070230Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1157 OF 6 APRIL 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 1118: FALKLANDS

1. US PRESS COVERAGE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS REMAINS VERY FAVOURABLE AND WELL AHEAD OF THE ADMINISTRATION. BOTH THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST CARRY HELPFUL EDITORIAL. (NEW YORK TIMES: AMERICAN CREDIBILITY WITH BOTH SIDES CAN HELP, BUT THERE IS NO SENSE PRETENDING THAT WASHINGTON'S RELATIONS WITH THE TWO PROTAGONISTS ARE SYMMETRICAL. WASHINGTON POST: THE UNITED STATES HAS A LARGE AND STRONG INTEREST IN SEEING BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS RESTORED. SO DO MANY OTHER NATIONS SOME OF WHICH RECOGNISE THAT INTEREST AND SOME OF WHICH DO NOT.) FULL TEXTS IN MIFT. IN ITS EDITORIAL THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ATTRIBUTES THE ARGENTINE ACTION TO A MISREADING OF BRITAIN'S WILL TO RESIST. IN THE WASHINGTON POST MARY MCGRORY CRITICIZES THE PRESIDENT FOR NOT DECLARING HIMSELF MORE CLEARLY AGAINST ARGENTINA IN HIS REMARKS YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 1119).

2. ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE AN ARTICLE IN THE WASHINGTON POST, REPORTING REAGAN'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP FIND A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION, SAYS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS ARE STRIVING TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL POSITION BELIEVING THAT ARGENTINIAN OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLANDS APPEARS TO BE AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT THAT CANNOT BE REVERSED UNLESS BRITAIN IS REDUCED TO FORCE ON A SCALE THAT WOULD CAUSE TENSIONS FOR YEARS. US OFFICIALS ARE SAID

~~THAT CANNOT BE REVERSED UNLESS BRITAIN IS REDUCED TO FORCE ON A SCALE THAT WOULD CAUSE TENSIONS FOR YEARS.~~ US OFFICIALS ARE SAID TO BELIEVE THAT WHILE BRITAIN COULD DISLodge THE ARGENTINIAN TROOPS, A BRITISH VICTORY WOULD CAUSE BITTERNESS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA AND STRAIN BRITAIN'S MILITARY RESOURCES IN THE LONGER TERM. US GOVERNMENT SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THEY HOPE TO FIND A FORMULA THAT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AND STILL BE SUFFICIENTLY ACCEPTABLE TO MRS THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT BRITAIN TO PULL AWAY FROM ARMED CONFRONTATION. THE IDEA SAID TO BE MOST TALKED OF IN THE ADMINISTRATION IS ONE WHEREBY ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS WHICH WOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD.

3. THE POST ALSO CARRIES COMMENTS FROM RETIRED US ADMIRALS SUCH AS ZUMWALT WHO CONTEND THAT, WHILE BRITISH NAVAL FORCES ARE TACTICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY SUPERIOR, THEY WILL BE OPERATING SO FAR FROM THEIR BASES AS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME KIND OF STRESSES WHICH THE US IS TRYING TO BRING TO BEAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF. (AS I HAVE REPORTED, THIS DOES NOT REFLECT WEINBERGER'S VIEWS OR THE ADVICE BEING SUBMITTED TO HIM AND TO HAIG, WHICH IS THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE NAVAL SUPERIORITY, BUT ARE LIABLE TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTY IN DISLODGING ARGENTINIAN TROOPS DUG IN ON THE ISLANDS.)

4. AN ARTICLE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES BY A CORRESPONDENT WHO LIVED FOR SOME TIME ON THE FALKLANDS NOTES THAT OF ALL THE CLAIMS MADE BY THE ARGENTINIANS, NONE CAN BE MORE CYNICAL THAN ITS PLEDGE TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THE FALKLANDERS WHOSE ISLANDS IT HAS INVADED.

5. I HAVE EXPLAINED OUR CASE AND MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR U.S. SUPPORT ON MOST OF THE MAJOR TELEVISION AND RADIO NETWORKS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. TELEVISION COVERAGE HAS BEEN VERY FAVOURABLE TO US AND UNFAVOURABLE TO THE ARGENTINIANS. US OPINION HAS ALSO BEEN REFLECTED IN THE LARGE NUMBER OF CALLS AND TELEGRAMS WE AND HM CONSULATES HAVE BEEN RECEIVING EXPRESSING SUPPORT.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070215Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1154 OF 6 APRIL

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TEL NO 658: FALKLANDS

1. SINCE RECEIVING YOUR TELEGRAM I HAVE HAD A CALL FROM HAIG WHO HAS SPOKEN TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HAD A REPORT FROM THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES. THE MINISTER HAD BEEN COMPLETELY INTRANSIGENT.

2. HAIG NOW BELIEVES THAT THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IS EVEN NARROWER THAN HE HAD THOUGHT. IN HAIG'S WORDS THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THINKS THAT THERE ARE SIGNS OF QUOTE SOFTENING UP AND CONSIDERABLE BACKFIRE UNQUOTE: IN BUENOS AIRES BUT IT IS QUOTE PERISHABLE UNQUOTE AND COULD WELL SHIFT TO BEING QUOTE MACHO UNQUOTE AS THE THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION GROWS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR WAS REPORTING THAT THERE WAS TALK OF A COUP IN BUENOS AIRES OF YOUNG OFFICERS IN THE EVENT OF ANY MOVE BY GALTIERI TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM THE FALKLANDS.

4. HAIG REGARDED ALL THIS AS EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR THE JOURNEYS HE WANTED TO MAKE TO LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD HEARD OF THIS PROPOSED VISIT FROM MR PYM. MY OWN IMMEDIATE THOUGHT WAS TO WONDER WHETHER IT MIGHT BE MORE SUITABLE FOR HAIG TO GO TO BUENOS AIRES FIRST. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD MADE THEIR POINT OF VIEW PERFECTLY CLEAR. THERE MUST BE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE NEGOTIATION. HAIG SAID THAT SUCH A JOURNEY WOULD POSE A GREAT RISK FOR HIM. ONCE HE HAD EMBARKED ON IT HE WOULD HAVE TO BRING HOME THE BACON BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO OTHER CHANCE. HE WAS NOT WEDDED TO GOING TO LONDON BEFORE BUENOS AIRES BUT HE FAVOURED DOING SO BECAUSE IF HE WENT TO BUENOS AIRES FIRST IT MIGHT BE SEEN IN THE UK AS COLLUSION BETWEEN THE ARGENTINIANS AND THE AMERICANS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SENSIBLE THING WAS TO QUOTE GO TO YOUR ALLY FIRST UNQUOTE. HAIG SAID THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN CONDEMNED AS THE VILLIANS. HE SAW HIS PROPOSAL NOT AS TWO SEPARATE JOURNEYS BUT AS ONE ROUND TRIP. AND IF HE COULD COME TO LONDON FIRST HE WOULD HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE QUOTE ART OF THE POSSIBLE UNQUOTE.

6. I TOLD HIM THAT MR PYM WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM AN ANSWER BEFORE TOMORROW. HE SAID THAT THAT WAS QUITE ALL RIGHT. HE WAS KEEPING TOMORROW OPEN TO DO WHATEVER WAS BEST. HE SAID HOW IMPRESSED HE HAD BEEN BY MR PYM'S LETTER AND HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR IT. HE REALISED THAT GREAT THOUGHT HAD GONE INTO IT.

7. HAIG REPEATED HIS CONVICTION THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE FOR MR PYM TO FLY TO WASHINGTON AT THIS STAGE.

8. MY OWN COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS. I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO COME HERE AT THIS STAGE. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF ANXIETY ON OUR PART. I KNOW TOO THAT HAIG BELIEVES THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD SEE IN IT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHARGE OF COLLUSION WHICH WOULD NOT OCCUR IF HE, HAIG, SHOULD DO THE VISITING.

9. WHATEVER WE MAY THINK HAIG IS CONVINCED THAT HE HAS GOT TO DO SOMETHING: WE WILL NOT STOP HIM AND PERSONALLY I DO NOT THINK IT NEED NECESSARILY HARM US. I THINK ON BALANCE IT WOULD BE BEST IF HAIG WERE TO GO TO BUENOS AIRES FIRST. AFTER ALL HE KNOWS OUR STANCE. WHAT WE WANT HIM TO DO IS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINIANS.

10. BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT ONE SET OF VISITS IS GOING TO SUFFICE. HAIG MAY WELL BE EMBARKING ON A SHUTTLE: SURELY WE WANT TO START BY HIM FINDING OUT WHAT GIVE, IF ANY, THERE IS IN HIS ARGENTINE POSITION.

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PS

S/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

HD/DEFENCE D

<sup>hd sed</sup>  
HD/NEWS D

~~HD/NEWS D~~

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/CONS DEPT

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCHEM).

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 070045Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1146 OF 6 APRIL

FALKLANDS

FALKLAND ISLANDS

ADVANCE COPIES

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR PERETZ )

MR HAWTIN )

MR ILETT )

TREASURY

Ty Mills

Hd WAG

1. I SAW HAIG TODAY AT HIS REQUEST AND CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE AND SUPPORTING POINTS (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 653).

2. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR LATER TODAY AS WELL AS THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT, IT WAS GALTIERI WHO MATTERED, BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN WITH THEM. LATER, OTHER CHANNELS MIGHT HAVE TO BE FOUND.

3. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD FIRST THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE EXPEDIENT TO WAIT A LITTLE TIME BEFORE TRYING TO SET SOME NEGOTIATION IN TRAIN SO AS TO LET THE IMPACT OF OUR NAVAL DEPLOYMENT AND EVIDENT MILITARY DETERMINATION SINK IN ON THE ARGENTINIANS. BE HE WAS NOW COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WINDOW WITHIN WHICH IT WOULD BE

MILITARY DETERMINATION STRIKE IN ORDER TO BE HEARD NOW  
COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WINDOW WITHIN WHICH IT WOULD BE  
POSSIBLE FOR USEFUL ACTION TO BE TAKEN WAS A VERY NARROW ONE AND  
THAT THEREFORE SOME ACTION MUST BE TAKEN SOON. HE WAS THINKING IN  
TERMS OF SOME SORT OF MEDIATION AND, APPARENTLY THINKING OUT  
ALoud, SURMISED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO THINK OF  
NEGOTIATING WITH US AND THE ARGENTINIANS SOME MIXED ADMINISTRATION  
TO RUN THE ISLAND.

4. I SAID THAT I MUST CLARIFY OUR ATTITUDE TO AVOID ANY RISK OF  
MISUNDERSTANDING. HMG COULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT  
THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNTIL ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD BEEN  
WITHDRAWN. THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE OF THE US ADMINISTRATION MUTATIS  
MUTANDIS IF US TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CUBANS  
WITH SOVIET SUPPORT OCCUPIED PUERTO RICO, THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT  
BE READY TO ENTER INTO A NEGOTIATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLAND  
WHILE CUBAN TROOPS WERE STILL IN OCCUPATION.

5. IT SEEMED TO ME INAPPROPRIATE TO THINK IN TERMS OF SOME  
MULTILATERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND. WE WERE PREPARED TO  
TALK ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLAND AND ITS RELATIONS WITH  
ARGENTINA ONCE ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN AND OUR ADMINISTRATION  
HAD BEEN RESTORED.

6. HAIG SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HOW GALTIERI COULD SURVIVE IF  
HE SIMPLY HAD TO TAKE AWAY ARGENTINE TROOPS WITHOUT GETTING  
ANYTHING IN RETURN. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT OUR PURPOSE TO HELP  
GALTIERI SURVIVE. IT WAS HE WHO HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE PRESENT  
OCCUPATION IN ORDER TO DETRACT PUBLIC OPINION FROM ECONOMIC AND  
POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.

7. I ASKED HAIG TO UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH OPINION.  
THERE CAN SCARCELY HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE SINCE 1939 UPON WHICH THE  
BRITISH FELT SO STRONGLY, AND THIS FEELING RAN ACROSS PARTY LINES.  
NO GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN COULD POSSIBLY CONTEMPLATE A NEGOTIATION  
INVOLVING THE ARGENTINIANS WHILE THEY REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF  
THE ISLAND. IF THE QUESTION WAS ASKED WHY WE BOTHERED SO MUCH ABOUT  
2000 PEOPLE THE OTHER END OF THE WORLD, A POINT THAT HAD BEEN MADE  
TO ME IN MANY PUBLIC INTERVIEWS, THE ANSWER WAS THAT THE AMERICANS  
SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HOW STRONGLY THEY FELT ABOUT 52 HOSTAGES IN  
IRAN: WHAT WAS AT ISSUE HERE WAS WHETHER IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE  
DIFFERENCES WERE GOING TO BE SETTLED BY FORCE AND WHETHER THE  
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH THE US HAD PIONEERED WAS  
GOING TO BE OVERTHROWN. HAIG THEREFORE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR  
DETERMINATION TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS OPERATION AND OUR ABILITY  
TO DO SO. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD. HE WAS COMPLETELY



GOING TO BE OVERTHROWN. HAIG THEREFORE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT  
DETERMINATION TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS OPERATION AND OUR ABILITY  
TO DO SO. HAIG SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD. HE WAS COMPLETELY  
AWARE OF THE STATE OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE. HE WAS  
DETERMINED, AS WAS THE PRESIDENT, TO DO EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE TO  
HELP THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE PERSONAL  
INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT IN THIS MATTER. HE WAS TOTALLY AWARE  
OF THE PROBLEMS AND VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS ISSUE. QUOTE  
WE ARE DETERMINED THERE SHALL NOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE, HE  
SAID.

8. BUT THE DIFFICULTY WAS HOW TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS OUT. HE  
ACCEPTED IT NOW AS A FACT THAT THEY MUST BE GOT OUT BEFORE THE  
BRITISH COULD ENTER A NEGOTIATION. BUT, AGAIN THINKING ALOUD, HE  
WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO APPOINT A  
COMMISSION COMPRISING SAY, SOME DISTINGUISHED BUT IMPARTIAL  
AMERICAN FIGURE, A CANADIAN, SOME LATIN AMERICAN AND ONE OR TWO  
OTHERS WHO MIGHT ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES AND SERVE AS SOME KIND OF  
INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

9. I SUGGESTED THAT TWO MATTERS SEEMED TO BE AT ISSUE IN WHAT HAIG  
WAS SUGGESTING. THE QUESTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND  
WAS A PERFECTLY STRAIGHTFORWARD ONE. THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE  
RETURNED TO US. THERE WERE AFTER ALL NO ARGENTINIANS TO SPEAK OF  
ON THE ISLAND. THE QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION RAISED NO PROBLEMS.  
THE OTHER MATTER WAS THAT OF THE FUTURE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLAND.  
IT MIGHT BE THAT A GROUP OF WISE MEN COULD COME UP WITH  
SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THIS, BUT THE KEY NEED AT THE MOMENT WAS FOR  
THE AMERICANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINIANS LEAVING THEM  
IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY MUST WITHDRAW IF THEY WERE TO AVOID A BLOODY  
BATTLE; ONCE THEY HAD WITHDRAWN THERE MIGHT BE METHODS BY WHICH  
THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLAND COULD BE DISCUSSED.

10. HAIG THEN OFFERED IDEAS ABOUT INVOLVING THE OAS. I SAID THAT  
THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY DEPLORABLE. THE AMERICANS, SCARCELY LESS  
THAN WE, WERE REGARDED AS ANGLO-SAXON GRINGOS BY THAT ORGANISATION  
AND WE WOULD GET NOWHERE BY INVOLVING THEM. NOR, I SAID, WOULD  
THERE BE ANY POINT IN BRINGING IN THE UNITED NATIONS AGAIN. WE  
HAD GOT A VERY SATISFACTORY VOTE WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND  
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BASE OURSELVES ON THIS RESOUNDING DEMAND FOR  
ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. TO TRY TO INVOLVE THE UNITED NATIONS FURTHER  
WOULD ONLY BE LIKELY TO INCURE A SOVIET VETO.  
PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

HENDERSON

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

HD/DEFENCE D

<sup>hd sed</sup>  
HD/NEWS D

~~HD/...~~  
HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/CONS DEPT

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCHEN).

FALKLAND ISLANDS

26

ADVANCE COPIES

(25)

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR PERETZ )

MR HAWTIN )

MR ILETT )

TREASURY

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

GRS 390

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 061615Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 06 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, ROUTINE BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN  
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MADRID, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 317 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLANDS

1. I ASKED TO SEE CHEYSSON THIS AFTERNOON TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 129 TO BONN. HE GAVE ME A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS I HAD PUT TO GUTMANN YESTERDAY.

2. CHEYSSON SAID THAT ALL DELIVERIES OF ARMS AND OF MILITARY SUPPLIES HAD BEEN BANNED. THIS INCLUDED A STOP ON THE DELIVERY

2. CHEYSSON SAID THAT ALL DELIVERIES OF ARMS AND OF MILITARY SUPPLIES HAD BEEN BANNED. THIS INCLUDED A STOP ON THE DELIVERY OF AN IMPORTANT CONSIGNMENT WHICH HAD BEEN DUE ON 15 APRIL. HE REITERATED THAT FRANCE WAS ABSOLUTELY AT ONE WITH THE UK IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS, BUT ON OUR OTHER REQUESTS THERE WOULD BE VARIOUS TECHNICAL QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE ACTION WE PROPOSED ON THE GSP OR OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO GATT WOULD BE JURIDICALLY POSSIBLE. FRANCE WAS NOT SAYING NO, BUT NEEDED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A WAY OF DOING WHAT WE WANTED. THIS WAS A MATTER FOR EXCHANGES BETWEEN EXPERTS AND SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE SENT TO THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN 48 HOURS.

3. CHEYSSON SAID THAT OUR OTHER REQUESTS, WHICH CALLED FOR NATIONAL ACTION, WERE BEING STUDIED URGENTLY. HE ASKED US TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH HIS ECONOMIC DIRECTOR, M. PAYE, TO WHOM WE HAD GIVEN A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF OUR PROPOSALS THIS MORNING. WE WILL PERSUE THIS WITH PAYE TOMORROW.

4. CHEYSSON ENQUIRED HOW OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS WERE RESPONDING. I SAID THAT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL THERE WAS A VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT YET HAVE DETAILS ON HOW PARTICULAR REQUESTS HAD BEEN RECEIVED. I ASKED ABOUT RECALLING AMBASSADORS. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS STILL REFLECTING ON THIS. AS ITS ACTIONS HAD SHOWN, FRANCE HAD NO DESIRE TO PLAY ANY SORT OF INTERMEDIARY ROLE, BUT THERE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS NOT HOWEVER AN ANSWER: HE WOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER. I REPEATED THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE URGENTLY TO SHAKE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

5. CHEYSSON REFERRED TO THE EFFORTS HE HAD MADE OVER THE WEEKEND IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE VOTES OF TOGO AND ZAIRE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID HE HAD ALSO TRIED WITH THE SPANIARDS, BUT FOUND THAT THEY WERE INCAPABLE OF LIFTING THEIR EYES FURTHER THAN GIBRALTAR. I AGAIN EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION OF FRENCH EFFORTS.

6. I SPOKE SIMILARLY BUT BRIEFLY TO BEREGOVY, SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE ELYSEE. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS DOING WHAT WAS TO BE EXPECTED OF A GOOD ALLY. I CONFIRMED IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT IF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES FAILED TO SECURE ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL THE USE OF FORCE WAS NOT EXCLUDED. FRETWELL.

Tuesday 6 April  
c 2135 hrs

CHILE DENIES RUMOURS ON USE OF PORTS

SANTIAGO, TUESDAY - CHILE TODAY DENIED IT HAD OFFERED REFUELLING FACILITIES TO THE BRITISH FLEET SAILING TO THE FALKLANDS (MALVINAS) ISLANDS.

CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH IN REPORTS FROM LONDON THAT FORMER FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON HAD OBTAINED PERMISSION FOR THE BRITISH TASK FORCE TO USE CHILEAN PORTS BEFORE HIS RESIGNATION YESTERDAY.

2110

CONFIDENTIAL

*uff*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 6 April proposing texts for the Prime Minister's messages to her colleagues in the Community countries and in the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand about economic measures.

As I told you on the telephone earlier, the Prime Minister considers it unrealistic and tactically unwise to ask our allies to place an embargo on all imports of goods from Argentina. Paragraph (b) on the penultimate page of the main message should therefore read:-

"An embargo on all or some imports of goods from Argentina. We are announcing a complete embargo with effect from midnight tonight, 6 April. I urge you to take supporting action and to be ready to announce it and introduce it as soon as possible."

I also conveyed to you two minor amendments on the telephone.

With these changes, the Prime Minister is content for the messages to be sent. Perhaps you could kindly arrange for this to be done.

I am copying this letter to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), John Kerr (HM Treasury), Jonathan Spencer (Department of Industry), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*John Kerr  
John Kerr*

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*ds*

Ref: A08056

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. COLES

There was a brief discussion in Cabinet this morning about the false reports circulating in the Press and elsewhere to the effect that we had intelligence reports of a decision to invade the Falkland Islands much earlier than we did.

2. For all the usual reasons - source protection and so on - the Prime Minister will want to be extremely careful about what she says in Parliament or to the Press on this. She will not want to say anything which might imply a readiness to release intelligence reports to a Select Committee, if it was investigating the affair, or otherwise to make intelligence material available. Nor, I suggest, should she indicate that there is any special review of the intelligence coverage of Argentina and the Falkland Islands although if pressed she could say <sup>that</sup> of course the scope, accuracy and timeliness of intelligence is always kept under review as a matter of routine.

3. On the other hand, she will no doubt want to knock the stories that have been appearing in the Press. I attach a form of words which she could use for this purpose in answer to supplementary questions.

RTA

Robert Armstrong

6th April 1982

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For reasons which the House will understand I must be very careful about what I say about what intelligence may or may not have been available to us - and I certainly have no intention of commenting in any way on intelligence methods. I must say, however, that most of the stories appearing in the Press are without foundation. There is no truth in reports that we knew weeks ago that there was to be an invasion of the Falkland Islands. Indeed, although the Argentine media had been taking an increasing bellicose line, we have reason to think that it is unlikely that a decision was taken before 28th or 29th March.

MFJ

T

6 April 1982

Falkland Islands

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Sri Lanka High Commissioner which contains a message to the Prime Minister from President Jayewardene.

JC

S

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office





FCS/82/58

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS

*We must give  
the required assurance  
not.*

*This is being done.*

Prime Minister

*The 300 to 400 are those who at  
present do not have the right of abode.*

*A-J-C. 6/4.*

*Ad 3/4*

*p-a.*

Falkland Islanders: Entry into the UK

1. I consider it highly likely that we shall be pressed in the debate on the Falklands on Wednesday to give an assurance that any Falkland Islander who wishes to settle in the UK should be allowed to do so, regardless of whether or not he or she has the formal right of abode in the United Kingdom. In my view, our position will be totally untenable if we fail to give that assurance. Only 300-400 people are concerned and we have made it clear throughout the present crisis that we consider ourselves responsible for the safety and wellbeing of the Islanders. MPs would refer to the assurance you gave during the second reading debate of the Nationality Bill on 28 January 1981 and insist that it now be fulfilled. In giving any assurance we should of course need to be careful not to suggest in any way that we might be encouraging the Argentines to expel the Islanders.

2. I should be grateful if you could let me know your views as soon as possible on 7 April so that we may have a line for the Parliamentary debate.

3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and John Nott.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, SW1

MFJ

6 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 5 April containing a message from the President of Sri Lanka.

JC

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy.

54250 COALTE G  
21B FALKISCO FK

APRIL 1962

DEAR T.D.

MANY THANKS YOUR TELEX. NICE TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN.

NO CIVILIANS HURT ALL SAFE AND SOUND.

ALL TELEX MESSAGES MONITORED SO SUGGEST COMMUNICATIONS KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND RELATE ESSENTIALS ONLY.

ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES GUARANTEE ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF ALL AT OUR REQUEST. DUE TO STAFF VISITING IN CAMP ANTICIPATED TURN AROUND WILL TAKE LONGER THAN USUAL.

RECEIVED TELEX FROM PETER HOUNAM. THE STANDARD, BUT AS QUESTIONS PUT ARE OF POLITICAL NATURE WILL NOT REPLY.

REGARDS MILNE

ANYONE THERE PLS.

54250 COALTE G  
21B FALKISCO FK



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands

/ As requested, I am sending you two brief papers on the various measures we have taken against Argentina and reactions to the crisis in other countries.

Enclosure given  
to P. N. for  
question

102 5/4.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

54250 COALTE G

COULD YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLAND  
COMPANY PORT STANLEY NO 21B

OK RUMPSE  
21B FALKISCO FK  
54250 COALTE G

*Stat*  
*4.30 p*  
*6/5/82*

6YH\_SPTIL 1982

FOR THE ATTENTION OF HARRY MILNE

DEAR HARRY

JUST RECEIVED COPY OF ROSEMARY'S TELEX TO DAVID BRITTON.  
HE IS HERE TODAY.

HOW MARVELLOUS TO BE IN CONTACT AGAIN AND TO HEAR ALL  
STAFF SAFE AND SOUND. HOPE THAT IS TRUE FOR ALL OTHER  
ISLANDERS. APPRECIATE THAT FAMILIES WILL BE VISITING  
CAMP.

OUR VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU ALL.

CAN IT BE ASSUMED THAT AS LONG AS WE AVOID POLITICAL  
MATTERS WE CAN COMMUNICATE REGULARLY ON NORMAL BASIS?

A.E.S. STILL ON COURSE THOUGH A FEW DAYS LATE. SEEKING  
ADVICE THIS END BUT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BE ADVISED  
WHETHER IT WILL BE ALLOWED IN TO UNLOAD AND THEN ALLOWED  
TO LEAVE. OTHER ITEMS NOTED AND WILL BE IN TOUCH.

HAVE SEEN REPORTS ON TELEVISION, INCLUDING INTERVIEW WITH  
THE MONSEIGNOR.

HOPE YOU ARE BEING TREATED PROPERLY. YOUR WELL-BEING IS  
UPPERMOST IN ALL OUR MINDS.

EVERY GOOD WISH FROM DAVID BRITTON, ALAN BEASLEY AND MYSELF.

TED NEEDHAM.

ANY MESS AGE FOR US YET

DO YOU WISH ME TO HANG ON FOR ANY REPLY/

HAVE YOU RECEIVED THIS TELEX

21B FALKISCO FK  
54250 COALTE G MRS B STEVENSON

*Judy - Stevenson*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1982

Dear John,


Falkland Islands

It was agreed this morning that the Prime Minister should send messages to her colleagues in Community countries and in the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, informing them of the economic measures which we are taking against Argentina and urging them to take similar action in support.

I enclose a draft of such a message which has been approved by Mr Pym. We have already explained our intentions to our Community partners in Coreper this morning. The opening paragraphs of the message seek to differentiate between the different recipients, according to the help they have given us so far. A further short draft message is provided for the President of the Commission, covering a copy of the main message for his information.

I am copying this to John Rhodes (Trade), John Kerr (Treasury), Jonathan Spencer (Industry), David Omand (Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO: HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT IN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES,  
UNITED STATES, JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

[To All]

I am seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands. Argentina has made clear that it will defy the Security Council Resolution adopted on 3 April. This is unacceptable; all our efforts must be devoted to bringing Argentina to respect the will of the Security Council and to act according to this Resolution. In this context we should use all available means of pressure on them. Economic and financial measures would have a particularly powerful impact.

[To President Mitterrand only]

I am deeply grateful for the strong support you have given me <sup>in</sup> ~~over~~ <sup>in this</sup> situation, and the encouragement you gave me when we spoke on the telephone. Your Government's intervention was decisive in achieving the Security Council Resolution.

[To President Reagan only]

I am deeply grateful for your own energetic intervention with the Argentine President and the help which you gave us in the Security Council. What you did was widely noted and applauded here. The United States is a substantial trading and financial partner with Argentina. If you can support us with economic measures, this will be vital to their success. We must not forget that we are dealing with an unprovoked aggression in flagrant breach of international law and of all the principles which your country and mine have done so much to defend.

/To Mr Fraser

calling for its  
immediate withdrawal

[To Mr Fraser only]

I am very grateful for your prompt and forthright condemnation of the Argentine invasion and for your rapid action in recalling your Ambassador.

[To Prime Minister Suzuki]

I much appreciate your Government's backing over this in the Security Council. Japan has substantial economic relations with Argentina. If you can join us and our other partners in taking the economic measures I propose, this will greatly increase their effect.

[To Mr Trudeau only]

I would thank you most warmly for your swift action in recalling your Ambassador from Argentina and banning all arms supplies. I know you have been in close contact with our High Commissioner.

[To Mr Muldoon only]

I was very moved by your wholehearted and vigorous response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and I know that New Zealand shares our family ties with the people of the Islands. I ask for your support in the economic field too, though I know that here your links with Argentina are slight.

[To all Community Leaders]

You will know that we explained in Brussels earlier today, to all our Community partners, the economic and financial measures we are ourselves taking against Argentina. We asked our partners to take similar measures, to support us in seeking to reverse this blatant attack on the Falkland Islands, a territory associated with the Community under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. In the trade field we are

/asking for



asking for all measures to be treated under Article 224 of the Treaty: and we are pressing for the earliest possible decisions, with further meetings in the Community before Easter and immediately thereafter. I now seek your personal help to bring about the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina, by national action co-ordinated among us. I am making a similar approach to the leaders of the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

[To all Non-Community Recipients ]

I seek your personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina. I am already approaching our Community partners on this, since we are bound to consult together on many economic matters. But I very much hope that you will join us too. Co-ordinated action by the Community, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would bring home to Argentina the consequences of their illegal actions.

[ To All ]

The Argentine economy has suffered serious difficulties over the years and is now in a fragile and vulnerable condition. The Argentines depend critically on maintaining their export earnings and in raising finance both to pay for their imports and to cover their external deficit. Measures to limit their access to markets and to credit will hit them hard. We in Britain are already taking action. But such action will be far more effective if our close friends and trading partners will support us as fully as possible. About 40% of Argentina's exports go to these countries, including the countries of the Community. Argentina seeks to raise funds at the leading world financial centres. They cannot afford to be cut off from trade and finance on this scale.

*know how  
passage at  
Play*

A Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions on Argentina would bring universal economic action. But the experience over Iran in 1980 shows that the Soviet Union would be bound to veto this: and time is short. I must therefore turn to you, together with our other friends, to ask you to take national action in solidarity with us in introducing economic measures.

The measures I propose are these :-

- (a) A complete ban on the supply of arms and other military material to Argentina. We have already done this. I urge that you will also ban arms supplies, maintain this ban in force and encourage others to do likewise.
- (b) A embargo on all <sup>or some</sup> imports of goods from Argentina. We are announcing <sup>h a complete embargo</sup> ~~this measure~~ with effect from midnight tonight, 6 April. I urge you to <sup>take supporting action</sup> ~~do the same~~ and to be ready to announce it and introduce it as soon as possible.
- (c) The ending of export credit guarantees for new commitments to Argentina, and discouragement of further international lending to Argentina. We have ourselves ceased to enter into new guarantee commitments and frozen all Argentine financial assets in London, and we expect British financial institutions to be very reluctant to undertake new commitments towards Argentina in present circumstances. The aggressive actions by the Argentine authorities and the uncertainty of their outcome, against a background of considerable domestic economic difficulty, have already undermined confidence in that country's creditworthiness. The further actions we have taken will directly create financial difficulty for Argentina. Prudence alone should deter the international banking community and other governments from undertaking further credits and loans to Argentina. I ask you to provide no incentive and no encouragement.

all of said  
beh



I know that these measures will affect your own economic interests. But if they are taken rapidly, with the widest possible solidarity among our partners, they should bring the Argentine Government to their senses. They would show Argentina that force does not pay and lead us towards withdrawal of their forces and the peaceful solution which we want if at all possible. The quicker these measures can be agreed, announced and put into effect, the stronger their impact on Argentina and the better the prospect that they can as quickly be reversed.

I look forward to your earliest possible response.





INSERTION FOR MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
OF BELGIUM, ~~NETHERLANDS~~ AND LUXEMBOURG

I am told that at today's COREPER your representative tended to the view that, while action under Article 224 was appropriate for the UK, action by the rest of the Community should be on a proposal of the Commission under Article 113. I recognise that action by all Member States could be seen as an exception to the Common Commercial Policy under Article 113. But we considered carefully which course to follow and decided that national action under Article 224 offered decisive advantages. The Community took action under Article 224 over Iran. We know the difficulties Article 113 causes for Denmark and perhaps France, especially in a case so clearly falling within the ambit of Article 224's reference to 'serious international tension constituting a threat of war'; the Falklands are a dependent territory associated with the Community under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The situation is far too serious <sup>and urgent</sup> for us to be held up by technical differences in COREPER about the Article to be used. I urge you to instruct your representatives to go along with national action under Article 224, of course in consultation together.

---

Received at Base  
about 2.30 pm 6/4/82.

54250 COALTE G  
888551 BROKA G  
6.4.82

GOOD AFTERNOON

FOR MR DAVID BRITTON - PLS HAND TO MRS JUNE MILES

TEXT OF TELEX RECD FROM STANLEY

' HELLO THERE WE HAVE COMMUNICATION WITH YOU WHICH OF COURSE IS MONITORED - I'VE A MESSAGE FROM MR MILNE SO SHALL GO AHEAD

- 1)  
ALL STAFF IN ISLANDS SAFE AND SOUND. MANY STANLEY EMPLOYEES AND FAMILIES ARE VISITING IN CAMP
- 2)  
FIC ANNUAL ACCOUNTS COMPLETED BUT NO AIRMAIL LINK
- 3)  
WEST STORE AND SPARES OPERATING
- 4)  
BUTCHERY ON TEMPORARY STAFF
- 5)  
MCNSUNEN PREPARING TO SAIL COASTWISE UNDER GUARANTEES BUT HAVE CEASED WOOL COLLECTION. STORES AND DIESEL CAMP AND MUTTON STANLEY ONLY.
- 6)  
NO CHANCE FITC 31.3.82 DURING CURRENT SITUATION
- 7)  
FARMS TRYING TO OPERATE NORMALLY
- 8)  
PLS ADVISE RELATIVES OF CONTRACT-STAFF IF POSSIBLE
- 9)  
HANDOVER 10.4.82 POSTPONED INDEFINITELY

REGARDS MILNE  
ROSEMARIE CONTINUED WITH PHONE NUMBERS OF RELATIVES AND PERSONAL MESSAGES AND SAID LIFE IS ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL SAID SEND SPECIAL LOVE TO MR BRITTON FROM FEMALE STAFF  
MR MITCHELL AND I ARE PHONING RELATIVES

// See.

REGARDS MARGARET  
888551 BROKA G

54250 COALTE G

MFJ

file

6 April 1982

Thank you for your letter of 5 April conveying a message from the Commonwealth Secretary General to the Prime Minister. I shall place it before the Prime Minister at once.

JC

M.N.F. Robinson, Esq.

for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM

for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions

NNNN

06 APR 1982/1905

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PARIS 66/65 6 1828 PAGE1/50

*We must  
reply  
m*  
27/4

(4)

MME THATCHER PREMIER MINISTRE DE SA MAJESTE 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDONSW1

MADAME J ETIENS A VOUS ASSURER DANS L EPREUVE QUI EST IMPOSEE  
A VOTRE PAYS DE MA SOLIDARITE ET DE MES VOEUX TRES FERVENTS  
POUR LE SUCCES DU BON DROIT DONT LE ROYAUME UNI PEUT A JUSTE  
TITRE SE

COL 10

LBJ316 PAGE2/15

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T63A/82

*cc Maslo  
ops*

PREVALOIR STOP AVEC MES HOMMAGES RESPECTUEUX VOUS ASSURE  
ANDAME DE MON FIDELE SOUVENIR

JACQUES CHIRAC

for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions

British





f.a.  
M  $\frac{22}{4}$

f.a.

(Fullhand).

*With the compliments of*

*F. N. Richards*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

186

M. G. ...  
D. Wright  
2nd Lt. ... DS II)

### AMERICAN BASE ON ASCENSION

1. The United States forces constructed Wideawake airfield on Ascension in 1942 under an informal agreement between the British and American Governments. On 25 June 1956 an Agreement was signed to give the United States the right to establish certain installations on Ascension in connection with the extension of the Bahamas Long Range Missile Proving Ground. The Agreement ran until 20 July 1975 but remains in force thereafter on a year by year basis until either Government gives one year's notice of its intention to terminate the Agreement. m 1/5

2. The Americans do not have any form of sovereignty on Ascension which remains under British rule. Accordingly, the United Kingdom Government is entitled to exercise all rights as a sovereign in Ascension, including the right to operate its military aircraft, except in so far as this exercise would derogate from the rights specifically granted to the United States under the Agreement. There is nothing in the Agreement which gives the United States any exclusive rights over the areas, which we assume includes the airfield, which are the subject of the Agreement. Access to the sites is permitted to unauthorised persons only by consent of the British Administrator and the American Base Commander, but this provision, which is intended to deal with security, is not considered relevant to the use of the airfield by United Kingdom forces.

3. Article XXI requires the United Kingdom Administrator to liaise with the United States Base Commander on the execution of the Agreement in its application to specific situations, but this would not give the Americans the right to veto any operation where we wished to use the airfield.

West Indian and Atlantic Department  
6 April 1982



SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTERThe Falkland Isles

A note by the Ministry of Defence on the military options that seem likely to be open to us has been sent to you by the Secretary of State.

2. The first moment at which any such option becomes available is when the first SSN arrives in the area; that is scheduled for Sunday, 11th April. Instructions will need to be given to it as to what it should do.

3. It will also be necessary to decide whether the task force should proceed at the pace of the slowest vessels, in which case it would not reach the area until the first week in May; or whether the faster warships should proceed more rapidly, leaving the slower vessels - mainly those carrying the Marines and landing equipment - to arrive later. In that case the first ships could be on station in the area by about 24th April.

4. What military options are then open will depend on the disposition of Argentine forces and on logistic and other operational conditions. What options are chosen will depend upon the strategic and political objectives, both short and long term. The logistic difficulties of keeping so large a task force supplied will increase, the longer the force is on station; and weather conditions in the area will deteriorate in the Antarctic winter months of June, July and August. Our international political position may weaken with the passage of time and deteriorate when we take military action.

5. It would be a help in narrowing and refining the military options if the South Atlantic Sub-Committee could define the strategic and political objectives, by giving the answers to various questions which are set out below. I recognise that the questions may not be capable, at any rate at this stage, of "black and white" answers, because the situation can and no doubt will change in the time between now and the time when the task force arrives on station; but it would nonetheless be useful to have some preliminary indications of Ministerial thinking.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

6. Ministers will wish to be as clear as possible about the relation between their immediate and longer term strategic objectives.

7. In the short term, I take it that the strategic objectives are:-

- (a) to maximise diplomatic and other pressures on the Argentines for the departure of the Argentinian authorities and troops now occupying the Falkland Isles and their dependencies, and the restoration of British Administration;
- (b) to put ourselves in the best political and military position to use military force should this be necessary for the purpose.

8. To help in the process of refining military options a number of questions need to be considered:-

- (a) Are Ministers prepared to contemplate attacks on the Argentine mainland?

There might be good military arguments for seeking to take out military targets - e.g. sinking ships in harbour (or close inshore) and attacking aircraft on the ground, destroying oil installations; but this could well involve us in formally acknowledging the existence of a state of war between the United Kingdom and Argentina, with all the consequences which would follow from that; and attacks on the mainland might tilt otherwise friendly international opinion, and countries whose logistic support will be valuable, against us.

- (b) Is it a political objective to minimise casualties, on the Argentine side as well as on the British side?
- (c) Are Ministers prepared to contemplate significant loss of life among the Falklanders either in an attack or in penal action by the Argentine garrisons?

If the islands are strongly garrisoned, and if the Islanders are allowed to remain (or prevented from leaving, so that in effect they are hostages), such an objective could make it difficult to contemplate an assault landing in a populated part of the Falklands.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

- (d) Should we or, say, the Swiss seek permission to evacuate the Falklanders?
- (e) How crucial will be the effect on this country of world opinion, particularly the United States, our EEC partners, and at the United Nations?
- (f) What political importance do Ministers attach to the timing and sequence of any military operations? Are they prepared to see a significant interval between, say, individual SSN operations and main task force operations?
- (g) During the period when the SSNs are on station ahead of the main force, should they be confined to a reconnaissance role; should they be authorised to attack Argentinian naval (and, if so, within an announced area or wherever they may be?)

There will be an interval of nearly a fortnight between the arrival (we hope secret) on station of the first SSN and the arrival, inevitably public, of the task force. If early in that period the SSN were to sink an Argentine warship, that could have military advantages, and would be seen as a success by domestic public opinion. On the other hand it could lead to reprisals against the Falkland Islanders; and it could turn international opinion against us, leading to resolutions in the Security Council (which we should have to veto) calling upon us not to use force, and possibly to the withdrawal of logistic support by some of those countries now providing it. These consequences could have implications for the use of the task force even before it arrived on station.

- (h) Is it desirable to concentrate on the main Falkland Isles, or would it be sensible to recover South Georgia first?

South Georgia, 800 miles to the South East of the Falklands themselves and out of range for Argentinian Air Force aircraft, could be taken by a detachment from the task force on its way to the main islands: a party of Marines could be landed, South

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Georgia reclaimed for the Crown, and the small Argentinian garrison now on the island cut off from the Argentine mainland and beaten or blockaded into surrender. There could be political attractions about proceeding to retake South Georgia en route in this way.

- (j) If it were decided in effect to seal off the Falkland Isles when the main force had arrived (e.g. by issuing a warning that any ship entering an area within, say, 200 miles of the Falkland Isles would be required to turn back) would the Royal Navy be empowered if necessary to fire upon:-
- (i) Argentine naval vessels?
  - (ii) Argentine merchant vessels?
  - (iii) Vessels of other nationalities?

Once the British task force has arrived on station, the Argentine Navy might well withdraw to its harbours, and the Argentines might seek to use merchant vessels, of their own or of friendly South American countries, to maintain supplies to the garrison on the Falklands.

- (k) Similar questions could arise in relation to Argentine (or other) air transport (military or civil) to the Falkland Isles.
- (l) Sealing off the Falklands could create considerable hardships for the Islanders (which the Argentinians would no doubt seek to maximise): is that a politically acceptable contingency?
- (m) *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).  
©Wayland, 11 September 2012*

9. For the longer term:

- (a) Do Ministers wish to address now what our objectives should be?
- (b) Is a return to the old status quo achievable and desirable? If so, are we prepared to sustain it in terms of forces required, logistic support of the Islands as a whole, and cash?



SECRET AND PERSONAL

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Paymaster General (the members of the Sub-Committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands).

RA

Robert Armstrong

CONQUEROR

6th April 1982

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PART ..... 3 ..... ends:-


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PART ..... 4 ..... begins:-

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