


FCO 7/4123





SECUR  
N.B.  
UPGR

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

DSR 12  
Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) [Signature]

Date 24/8/84

**SECRET**

YEAR  
STAMP

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

SCOTLAND  
AMERICA

FILE No. ALB 0020/3 (Part A) <sup>(1-71)</sup>

TITLE: Brazilian Attitude to the  
Falkland Islands Dispute.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

R

FC07/4123

R 217  
B2

Registry Address

Room No. 266  
King Charles Street.

SECUR  
N.B. TH  
UPGRA

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

**SECRET**

YEAR STAMP

1982

AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY  
REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PAR A (A-71)

Bc20/3

File No.



SECUR  
N.B. TH  
UPGR

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

DSR 12  
Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) SM

Date 24/8/84

UNCLASSIFIED

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

SCOTLAND  
AMERICA

FILE No. ALB 020/3 (Part A) <sup>(1-71)</sup>

TITLE: Brazilian Attitude to the  
Falkland Islands Dispute.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE: DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE: DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE: DATE

R

FC07/4123

R 217  
B1

Registry Address

Room No. 266  
King Charles Street.

SECUR  
N.B. TH  
UPGR

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

YEAR STAMP

1982

SECRET

D4: 330721



End of Part A now see part B.



RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233-3273

71

ARB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
11 JUN 1982	
INDEX	PA
DEPT. NUMBER	REGISTRY
Action Taken	

Miss J M Leiper  
British Embassy  
Brasilia

Your reference

Our reference

Date

10 June 1982

Dear Jean,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: CUTTINGS FROM THE BRAZILIAN PRESS

1. Thank you for your letter of 1 June enclosing further copies of cuttings from the Brazilian press. In this you asked whether you should continue to send cuttings or whether you should report press reaction by telegram only.
2. I have discussed this with Information Department, who agreed that the cuttings we have received have been most useful, but that at this stage we would be content to start receiving press reports by telegram only. We should be particularly grateful if these telegram summaries of the press could contain quotations from particularly significant passages.
3. We were most interested in the translation, sent with your letter, of Alexandre Garcia's radio broadcast. This was a particularly good and helpful article.

H D MacPherson  
South America Department

cc: Miss D Symes, Information Department





# BRITISH EMBASSY

Brasilia

UNCLASSIFIED

H D MacPherson Esq  
South America Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Your reference

Our reference

Date

70

A1B020/3		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.		
11 JUN 1982		
INUS 4	PA	W/11/6

1 June 1982

Dear Hugh,

Reps sent  
pa 12 11/6

## FAULKLAND ISLANDS: CUTTINGS FROM BRAZILIAN PRESS

1. I am enclosing copies of some of the week's editorials from the "Jornal do Brasil" which shows continuing sympathy to Britain's position. I should be grateful for your confirmation (and particularly that of Information Department to whom I am copying this) that they are of some use to you in this form as a supplement to our reporting by telegram. If not, we shall stop sending them.
2. You may also be interested to see the enclosed translation of an example of the sort of thing Alexandre Garcia (of "Manchete" fame) is putting out during his morning broadcasts on the local radio station, Radio Manchete. This helps to balance some of the Argentine propaganda (see Garcia's last paragraph).

Yours ever,  
Jean

Miss J M Leiper

cc Ms D Syme  
Information Department, FCO

20000  
13 June 1982



# JORNAL DO BRASIL

25/1/72  
Diretora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro

Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Bernard da Costa Campos

Diretor: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Walter Fontoura

Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Exaltação da Guerra

A guerra pelas Falklands atrai, no momento, todas as atenções. Trata-se, afinal, da primeira guerra a que o continente assiste neste século.

Convém lembrar, entretanto, que não há nada de particular na reivindicação argentina sobre essas ilhas. Semelhantes a ela, há muitíssimas outras, neste e em outros continentes, apoiadas em razões históricas que são mais ou menos claras, mais ou menos obscuras, dependendo de cada caso (e o caso das Falklands está longe de ser dos mais fáceis).

A prova disso é a velocidade com que a Venezuela passou a apoiar incondicionalmente a Argentina ao mesmo tempo que apresenta à ONU sua reivindicação sobre o território de Essequibo, na Guiana. Pretende a Venezuela repetir o que fez a Argentina? Segundo o Chanceler venezuelano, ela está apresentando o caso à ONU "para evitar isto". E se a decisão da ONU for demorada, ou contrariar os interesses venezuelanos? Uma Resolução da ONU pede a retirada argentina das Falklands. A Argentina não se retirou. Mas a Venezuela não cobrou dos argentinos o atendimento à Resolução nº 502. Para que servem, então, as resoluções da ONU?

Não faz muito tempo, Juan D. Perón ressuscitava o sonho da Grande Argentina, sucessora do Vice-Reinado do Prata, cujo território abrangeia o Uruguai, o Paraguai, a Bolívia e uma parte do antigo Território das Missões, que fica hoje para dentro das fronteiras brasileiras, por força de uma sentença arbitral defendida pelo Barão do Rio Branco. Se a Argentina pode tentar decidir pela força a questão das Falklands, qual o princípio que a impediria de agir da mesma forma face às suas outras aspirações históricas? O caso das Falklands pode ser mais limitado que o da Grande Argentina. Mas o princípio que impede a agressão é um só, nos dois casos.

Nesse contexto, a suposta invocação do TIAR contra os ingleses envolve um grande sofisma. Se se invoca o TIAR para dar respaldo a uma agressão argentina, que tratado será invocado, em seguida, para impedir os países deste continente de se dilacerarem uns aos outros? Que tratado foi possível invocar para impedir a guerra entre Argentina e Chile que esteve para reventar devido à questão de Beagle?

Os tratados, neste caso, têm muito menos valor que as tradições consolidadas — pois um Hitler sul-americano sempre poderia fazer com os tratados o que fez o seu congêneres europeu.

Sabiam disto sucessivas gerações de diplomatas brasileiros quando transformaram em princípio inabalável a prática da solução negociada para as soluções de fronteira. O Brasil tem uma longa e gloriosa tradição a esse respeito. Fecharemos os olhos às suas implicações apenas porque uma violenta perturbação sacode o continente em seguida ao ato impensado e belicoso do Governo militar de Buenos Aires?

Para os períodos difíceis é que servem os princípios — e o Brasil não tem a sombra de um motivo para abandonar os seus.

A aventura argentina transformou-se num drama sangüinolento. Muito sangue já correu, e deverá continuar a correr; pois a Inglaterra, depois de ser iludida durante semanas com supostas propostas de paz de Buenos Aires, verificou que nada havia a ser feito neste sentido.

O Brasil e os brasileiros sentem-se solidários com as famílias argentinas que choram os seus mortos. Sempre há um dever de solidariedade imediata para com quem vive ao nosso lado. Mas trata-se de solidariedade humana — e não de um pacto emocional. Não temos por que ser solidários com os erros sucessivos cometidos pelo Governo de Buenos Aires, que arrastou o seu país para um impasse político, econômico — e agora, certamente, militar.

Nossa formação cultural não é exatamente a dos povos de língua espanhola deste continente — e é por isso que a idéia de uma América Latina só faz sentido, realmente, vista de uma América saxônica. Numa primeira comparação de temperamentos, é fácil ver que nos deixamos levar menos facilmente pela retórica florida ou exaltada: ao brasileiro não se negará uma forma peculiar de humor, que desconfia do exagero.

É contra o exagero e o passionalismo que o Brasil deve advertir, sempre que possível, os seus vizinhos hispânicos.

É triste que este continente esteja assistindo à sua primeira guerra do século. É triste que vidas humanas estejam sendo ceifadas. Mas onde buscar respaldo, entre tantas tristezas, para uma "declaração de guerra" contra o mundo desenvolvido? Os generais peruanos, que há pouco tempo iam levando seu país à falência, não têm muito a perder quando incitam a uma beligerância continental. Difícilmente serão demitidos por causa disso.

Mas o Brasil já não tem condições de estimular aventuras. Menos pelos laços econômicos e financeiros que o ligam aos principais centros internacionais, do que pelo fato de que é um país que amadurece em diversos setores, e conhece o preço da imaturidade ou da simples incompetência.

Os generais argentinos não pensaram no futuro do seu país quando deram início a uma guerra fútil. Pensaram, no máximo, nas suas carreiras pessoais. Num panorama agitado por essas ambições primárias, cabe aos representantes do Governo brasileiro, por temperamento, por convicção ou por simples reflexão, fazer soar uma nota de equilíbrio. A crise das Falklands já provocou enormes prejuízos. Tudo o que resta a fazer é circunscrever na medida do possível esses prejuízos — e começar a pensar em como se poderá restabelecer um mínimo de tranquilidade no futuro relacionamento continental.

Está  
carioca  
sionaria  
tem cau  
transm  
até agor  
sentido  
ção. Por  
moeda  
ninguem  
da lei, o  
pois at  
valor m  
tanto, p  
atitude  
providê  
prejudic  
fica o al  
tentes,  
pública

Com  
reth M.  
no dia  
sinistro  
teve su  
por ter  
do o p  
Condiç  
Danos  
bitaclic  
nal da  
Em  
nance  
sarcin  
recup  
ta seg  
celo  
para  
proce  
lbor e  
traria  
Banc  
Er  
tes d



Directora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro  
Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Directori: R. da Costa Campos  
Directori: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Directori: Walter Fontoura  
Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Solução Civilizadora

Há uma fatalidade no Atlântico Sul com a qual, todos nós, em qualquer das latitudes, teremos que conviver: já existem alguns vencidos daquela guerra, ainda que não proclamados decisevamente pela força das armas.

Intencionalmente, na Argentina, deixou de funcionar racionalmente a busca de um denominador comum que ordenasse a confusa sociedade nacional pelo consenso civilizador, derrotando-se essa procura pelo fatalismo mais obsediado. Quer dizer, comprovou-se, lamentavelmente, no país amigo, mais uma vez, ser impossível aplacar as repercussões de um comando político submetido a qualquer espécie de paranóia. Na verdade, as tentativas nesse sentido somente farão aumentar as suspeitas dessa liderança paranóica que já procura, até mesmo entre solidariedades tradicionais, encontrar bodes expiatórios.

A única solução será retirar-lhe o poder de liderança. Mas, convenhamos, isso é tarefa para os argentinos, e ninguém mais.

Universalmente, uma verificação já potencializa os riscos para a civilização, tal como concebida pelo pelotão das democracias ocidentais: a União Soviética pode vir a ser beneficiária privilegiada do conflito no Atlântico Sul, qualquer que seja o resultado final daquela insensatez.

A Argentina, de fato, não luta com a Inglaterra pelo extermínio do colonialismo. Seu povo terá percebido a esta altura, não sem grande sofrimento, que o objetivo acenado pela Junta Militar como instrumento para manter-se no Poder não era sequer, por infinitamente remoto, um objetivo mas uma cruel armadilha.

O contrário seria imaginar que o colonialismo nas Falklands era exercido pelos ilhéus, felizes súditos britânicos que, afinal, surpreendidos pelas armas, se viram ameaçados de viver sob a proteção da constituição argentina que, ainda hoje, mantém os cidadãos do continente prisioneiros da sua própria nacionalidade.

A Rússia é, na realidade, o único império do século XIX que ainda sobrevive. E sobrevive, basicamente, sustentado por uma duplicidade

doutrinária que, por um lado, submete os fracos pela força das armas, como no Afeganistão, e, por outro, acumplicia os que têm sede de poder. Assim, os patriotas argentinos que se deixaram levar pelo fanatismo nacionalista, endossando moralmente posição internacional de força que internamente repudiavam, investiram na perigosa aposta segundo a qual os donos do poder em seu país nada tinham a perder, a não ser os seus grilhões. Hoje, correm o risco, ainda maior, de caminhar para regime igualmente despótico que nada tem a lhes oferecer senão os grilhões como os do gulag soviético.

É exatamente esse risco, o do surgimento de mais um vasto campo de concentração, ao estilo cubano, no chamado Cone Sul das Américas, que explica a reação, entre nós imaginada como desproporcional, das democracias do hemisfério Norte à agressão argentina. Nessa reação está embutida ainda clara advertência do Ocidente, sobre a qual é preciso meditar, isto é, guerras regionais comprovam apenas a emergência de um mundo caótico e desordenado mas não necessariamente o caminho da tragédia de uma terceira guerra mundial.

O jogo, portanto, do conflito final não intimida mais o Ocidente lúcido que, por isso, insiste, tanto do lado inglês, como do argentino, em que é preciso buscar as soluções civilizadoras da negociação, com humildade mas sem humilhação para as partes.

O que compromissa o Ocidente no conflito do Atlântico Sul é a intermediação da mais expressiva entidade jurídica mundial, a ONU, acionando-se seus instrumentos mais adequados para esse momento vertiginoso que são os princípios consagrados na Resolução 502 do seu Conselho de Segurança.

O ódio e a intolerância têm feito desaparecer a zona intermediária entre os dois extremos. O Ocidente sabe disso e ao reconhecer que é ainda injusta a sociedade que a ONU representa, como foro maior do direito universal, reconhece também que é precisamente esta sociedade que traz, nela mesma, a única possibilidade civilizadora de retificar as injustiças.

## Nova Esperança

A Tijuca inteira saiu à rua, debruçou-se à janela, subiu às marquises e terraços de edifícios à procura de espaço capaz de garantir a visão do espetáculo com o gosto de sonho realizado: a entrada de suas três estações ao percurso do metrô.

São raros, na vida das grandes cidades, os momentos em que povo e governantes podem-se encontrar sem formalidades: a inauguração das obras que deram por terminada a Linha 1 do metrô, com a entrada em funcionamento das estações da Praça Afonso Pena, São Francisco Xavier e Saens Peña, foi uma festa. E, como festa, uma explosão de todos os aspectos que

mereciam; como contribuintes e moradores atropelados pela prepotência administrativa.

O Presidente João Figueiredo também cedeu à alta tensão emocional que a Tijuca viveu na manhã de ontem. Falou aos tijucanos como um antigo morador do bairro — menino, adolescente e homem com ela identificado — e pôde medir a escala da popularidade que se pôe ao alcance dos governantes, sem a necessidade de concessões demagógicas. É o caso de obras de interesse social indiscutível, como o metrô, que reuniu o empenho federal e estadual para devolver ao Rio um pouco do que o crescimento urbano lhe retirou: a locomoção entre a casa e o trabalho não deveria

Inop

O árduo empenho dos países mediadores Sul, agindo indepedentemente, sem coordenação inter-sentida apenas, pela romântica inspiração das operações, um sentimento, também, a cidade da ONU e o armamento denunciado de antecedença.

E lastimável que dos pela imprensa sentem uma realidade figura como um gatilho, altamente burocrático, alheio à ameaça dial.

Os resultados podem ser sentidos em três aspectos: 1) A economia dos países envolvidos; 2) O despotismo territorialista americano, agora e das armas para a cova; 3) Desconfiança dos países mediadores de ideais opostos, antes latente, agora, a forma mental, a consequência humana perdida, não declarada, onde (que não é argentino inglês) não teve nem ser ouvido.

Já é tempo de Nações Unidas estarem mais sereno e utica perante os conflitos mesmo que isso signifique a criação de instâncias, a criação militar multinacional em qualquer parte, o comando do território, territórios sob tutela, a Assembleia-Geral, os definidos, juridicamente.



# JORNAL DO BRASIL

Directora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro

Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Director: Bernard da Costa Campos

Director: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Director: Walter Fontoura

Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Desvio de Rota

A notícia de uma importante venda de armas da Líbia para a Argentina, através do Peru e da Venezuela, a se confirmar, seria das mais inacreditáveis de uma guerra que desafiou todas as regras do bom senso. Mísseis *Exocet* comprados no câmbio negro, vindos do Coronel Khadafi — até onde irá a reconstituição das alianças argentinas? Até onde levará a lógica mecânica do belicismo?

Haverá quem argumente que isto se deve, em última análise, ao apoio norte-americano à Inglaterra. Pode-se não gostar da posição norte-americana; e é provável que ela venha a custar muito aos EUA em termos de política continental. Mas esta era uma aliança que se podia quase prever; pois Estados Unidos e Inglaterra são mais do que antigos aliados: formam um eixo cultural e lingüístico muito mais antigo e mais sólido que as tentativas de forjar-se um sistema interamericano (e só por este fato a Argentina deveria ter levado mais a sério a desesperada tentativa do Secretário de Estado Alexander Haig de obter um acordo). Pesou igualmente no apoio norte-americano à Londres o abandono, pela Argentina, do princípio da não agressão para o encaminhamento de conflitos territoriais no continente. A Argentina colocou-se intencionalmente à margem do código de conduta que deve presidir à relação entre países civilizados.

Em que princípio ou em que código estará baseando-se o Coronel Khadafi para enriquecer um pouco mais à custa desta guerra? E apoiados em que raciocínio o Peru e a Venezuela estão trazendo este indesejável parceiro para o cenário continental?

Peru e Venezuela podem estar agindo por passionalismo ou por cálculo; em qualquer hipótese, entretanto, estão assumindo algumas premissas básicas das esquerdas internacionais. O episódio é daqueles que comportam uma dúvida: não será também o caso de se invocar o TIAR, tão lembrado a propósito das Falklands?

As esquerdas exercem quase o monopólio da retórica da paz. Autodenominam-se "amantes da paz" contra as "forças do imperialismo". Em todas as suas manifestações levanta-se a bandeira do pacifismo. Em nome da paz, a União Soviética alimenta o novo neutralismo europeu.

Essas convicções pacifistas não foram capazes de impedir a invasão do Afeganistão — como não impediram a invasão da Tcheco-Eslováquia. Invadido o Afeganistão, não houve manifestações pela paz neste distante país enquanto a URSS metralhava impiedosamente a resistência nas montanhas e ateara fogo aos campos cultivados. A julgar pela inércia das esquerdas, a causa do Afeganistão nada tem a ver com a causa da paz: tratar-se-ia, no máximo, de uma renitente "oposição política" a um regime legítimo — mesmo se imposto e sustentado por Moscou.

A causa argentina, entretanto, mobiliza a solidariedade que se negou ao Afeganistão; mesmo se o que está em questão é um desolado arquipélago habitado por ingleses — e não por argentinos.

Seria um pouco difícil às esquerdas justificar o seu apoio à Junta de Buenos Aires através de alguma misteriosa afinidade ideológica. O regime de Buenos Aires efetuou uma caçada sistemática aos diversos matizes da esquerda argentina, aprisionando-os, perseguindo-os ou, na melhor das hipóteses, expurgando-os de qualquer atividade política.

As esquerdas, entretanto, foram para as ruas em Buenos Aires aclamar a tomada das Falklands; e a esquerda internacional — sob supervisão soviética — trata agora, segundo todos os indícios, de realimentar o brasileiro das Falklands, para que ele não se apague tão cedo.

Os *Exocets* da Líbia provavelmente não alterarão o resultado final do conflito: a Argentina não tem mostrado condições de resistir, nas ilhas, à superioridade militar da Inglaterra. Mas, com mais armas, o conflito cobrará um preço muitíssimo mais alto em vidas inocentes; e provocará feridas muito mais profundas no já combalido sistema interamericano.

Com o fornecimento de armas que se anuncia, o regime de Buenos Aires talvez não escape da sua própria derrocada — pois deu início a uma guerra insensata; mas seja o que for que vier a acontecer à Argentina em termos políticos, as esquerdas que agora oferecem um apoio necessariamente insincero ao General Galtieri estarão em condições de atuar mais intensamente no novo cenário; à falácia do interamericanismo retórico se substituirá a falácia de um internacionalismo perfeitamente indefinível que serve para encobrir os altos interesses do império soviético.

A essas desorientadas especulações prestou-se a Argentina apostando tudo numa guerra sem sentido. É uma trágica farsa a preparação de uma "cruzada latino-americana" contra o mundo desenvolvido; pois assim se fecham portas ao destino natural — político, econômico, cultural — deste continente — sendo impertinente a alegação de que o continente está "vingando uma afronta": quem tinha o direito de se sentir afrontado, desde o início desta crise, era a Inglaterra, a partir da agressão sem disfarces e sem justificativas da Argentina.

É a última etapa do desvio, para a Argentina, acreditar que os mísseis do Coronel Khadafi podem trazer-lhe algum benefício real. Esse despropósito só pode ter aparecido nos desvãos de um regime que, com a guerra, joga também a sua sobrevivência. Um regime que avançou tão depressa, e com tanta imprudência, que agora já não pode recuar, e vai mandando jovens argentinos para um sacrifício inútil.

## No Bom Caminho

Há indicações de considerável progresso no velho e tantas vezes crispado, diálogo entre o Congresso e o Governo em torno da questão das prerrogativas parlamentares. O primeiro sinal de

transacional, agora reconhecida como legítima entre as duas partes. Pelo que se divulga, fragmentariamente, das negociações encaminhadas ainda no âmbito do próprio Congresso, já existe uma fórmula

A r  
deu di  
tos tor  
Paralb  
ma pa  
A onda  
des rll  
destru  
região,  
trias l  
ralba.

A l  
revista  
institu  
dos à p  
falou a  
povo r  
do me

Acr  
deverá  
até o p  
cima i  
nacion  
ros, na  
dade,  
mau, i  
contin  
menor,  
povo l  
educac  
sando d  
peza d  
chega  
de sau  
que as  
rar e t  
to ten  
Cubat  
vidas e  
trofe e  
cam a  
de cri  
autorie  
precise  
princí  
causa  
do sac  
Rosali



# JORNAL DO BRASIL

Diretora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro

Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Bernard da Costa Campos

Diretor: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Walter Fontoura

Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Caminhos Trocados

A fachada triunfalista da visão argentina sobre a guerra nas Falklands começa a romper-se pela própria evolução dos fatos. A rede oficial de informações dá sinais de estar preparando o terreno para notícias más; e na Buenos Aires iludida até agora por um imaginoso "romance de guerra", vê-se de novo um velho espectro da política argentina: os rumores de golpe.

A verdade é que o regime que partiu imprudentemente para uma guerra inesperada e injustificável só tinha de seu lado a grande quantidade de armas acumuladas nos últimos anos. A parte este arsenal, trata-se de regime profundamente fraco, que não dispõe de base política, e que por causa disto deve recorrer sistematicamente à mentira, à dissimulação — e já agora à chantagem ideológica: o General Galtieri anuncia a disposição argentina de buscar apoio em países "de outra latitude" (leia-se: União Soviética).

Mudamos nós ou mudou a Argentina? Não era este o mesmo Governo que ia ajudar os norte-americanos a combater a "invasão russa" na América Central? Não haveria, então, um mínimo de coerência nas aventuras externas do Governo Galtieri?

Chega a ser dramático, nesse contexto, verificar até que ponto países como a Argentina deixaram-se levar por uma política que preconizava a criação de "regimes fortes" para combater o "perigo vermelho". O resultado dessa política, insuflada de Washington, costuma ser — como na Argentina — a transformação das Forças Armadas em polícia doméstica, para descreditar dessas mesmas forças, que ao abandonarem o leito constitucional, alienam o respeito da população e desviam-se das suas verdadeiras funções. A medida que todo o processo político passa a fluir pelo interior dos canais militares, estes perdem a sua consistência, perdem a sua capacidade profissional, e passam a ser afetados pelo germe da dúvida e da divergência que é inerente à ação política.

A Argentina ilustrou de maneira patética este processo de desintegração. O General Galtieri, que pretendia arrastar atrás de si todos os argentinos, é o mesmo chefe militar que, no início do ano, punha fim ao Governo do seu colega de armas, o General Viola. Que se pode esperar de um regime que não consegue estabelecer a unidade nem mesmo das suas Forças Armadas?

A Argentina seguiu, com outros países, a sugestão norte-americana de que se criasse, militarmente,

uma "barreira contra o comunismo". De um dia para o outro, os EUA fazem uma opção importante, em termos de política externa. Está no direito dos norte-americanos optar desta ou daquela maneira, já que podem responsabilizar-se por suas decisões. Mas o regime argentino ficou assombrado porque esta opção contrariava os seus planos; e eis a Argentina disposta a ancorar no outro extremo da dependência política e ideológica. Como não ver que nesta ciclotimia leva-se um país à loucura e à ruína?

A América do Sul talvez esteja em vigésimo ou trigésimo lugar na lista de interesses soviéticos. Um simples olhar ao mapa revela que nenhum império suportaria uma dilatação tão grande. Mas a Argentina quis servir de dique ao "avanço bolchevista". Nessa missão de escoteiros, não ficou pedra sobre pedra. A vida institucional e constitucional da Argentina foi subvertida até os seus fundamentos. Não sobrou uma liderança que fizesse a intermediação entre as Forças Armadas e o cidadão comum.

Só assim, talvez, se explique a guerra inútil que a Argentina decidiu travar quando dispunha de uma infinidade de problemas mais sérios para resolver. Como essa guerra nasceu e tomou corpo num ambiente de Estado-Maior, como não se perdeu tempo em consultar os argentinos a esse respeito, era preciso dar alguma coisa em troca a esses mesmos argentinos. Daí a manipulação de notícias, contando com o entusiasmo que costuma surgir das vitórias militares.

Mas a manipulação tem limites. Muitas vidas já foram ceifadas; e muitíssimas outras podem desaparecer nos sobressaltos finais da guerra pelas Falkland.

O regime argentino parece ter dado ordens para que comece a preparação dos espíritos no sentido de um resultado menos favorável. Mas isto não resolve o seu problema político. A febre nacionalista, artificialmente alimentada, tende a voltar-se contra ele. A Argentina poderá descobrir, assim, a um custo muito elevado, que as baionetas não substituem uma ordem constitucional; que a atividade política não faz bem às Forças Armadas nem ao país; e que a melhor maneira de combater a "ameaça bolchevista" é criar uma sociedade diferente da que existe na URSS. A militarização argentina, pelos mais estranhos caminhos, levou-a para mais perto do que era visto antes como a suprema ameaça.

## Privilégio Injusto

O princípio do ensino superior pago nas universidades federais emerge com destaque da zona de silêncio em que se refugiou: reapresenta-se em maior grau de convicção e numa nova disposição por parte do Governo. O Presidente da República deu atualidade decisiva ao princípio ao declarar que "está em exame, e profundamente". Ao responder, durante o programa de televisão que estreou no domingo, *O Povo e o Presidente*, sobre as versões de privatização do ensino universitário, João Figueiredo atacou frontalmente a "gratuidade indiscriminada".

É a primeira vez que o Governo se identifica abertamente com o princípio do ensino universitário pago por quem puder pagar e grátis apenas para o estudante que não tiver condições de custeá-lo. Mais de um Ministro da Educação já abriu o debate mas recuou ao ver a reação da questão às consequências práticas.

rios. O ex-Ministro Eduardo Portella sempre lembrava que o ensino superior particular soma maior número de alunos do que o ensino universitário federal. Se a maioria paga, a injustiça social aloja-se nas universidades federais. Por falta de eco oficial o ex-Ministro recolheu a bandeira do ensino pago. Estudar neste país continua a ser um privilégio que se comprova na assustadora evasão escolar. Dentre mil crianças que entram para a escola pública, menos da metade chega ao segundo ano, apenas 249 terminam o primário e só 180 concluem o ginasial. Ensino superior gratuito é, pois, a garantia de um privilégio extra a quem já teve um favoritismo social que só 18% alcançam neste país.

O Ministro Rubem Ludwig também projetou o ângulo crítico social sobre o assunto, mas, como seu antecessor, congelou o debate por falta de repercussão oficial. Pois agora o Presidente Figueiredo, a despeito



TEXT OF BROADCAST BY ALEXANDRE GARCIA, RADIO MANCHETTE  
ON 26 MAY 1982.

When I went to Argentina soon after the invasion of the Falklands I confess that I left Brazil with a feeling of solidarity with our Latin American brothers. The friends with whom I talked before my departure, question me now as to why I changed position. I could not remain consistent to that position for more than three days in Argentina. What I saw, heard and read, made me understand what was really happening. I would be irrational if I had not surrendered to reason, to truth and to logic. Because what I saw there was an aggressive nation full of dreams of expansionism and hegemony. I am going to transmit to you all a small part of the experience of one who has followed the conflict for a month. Let's consider some of the Argentinian arguments:-

The Argentines say that they are fighting against colonialism. It is not true. It is exactly the opposite. They had the misfortune to encounter Britain embarked upon decolonisation. Britain is today an anti-colonial power, as she is handing her (all) ex-colonies back to their people in accordance with the requirements of the UN. Argentina on the contrary is a colonial power: she invaded a territory and wants to impose upon its inhabitants her dictatorial form of government, her state of siege, her inflated currency, her language and customs. The colonialist par excellence is therefore Argentina.

Argentina says that she is suffering aggression on the part of Britain. This is not true. Argentina was the one who fired first, who invaded a British Territory, who put to shame Her Majesty's marines and who brought their weapons and tanks to a peaceful Island inhabited by shepherds.

/Argentina



Argentina used as an excuse her status as a country of South America and of the Third World in order to request solidarity from other countries. In fact, Argentina has always regarded herself as a superior, European country, way above the "macaquitos" (little monkeys).

Chancellor Costa Mendez himself, said here in Brasilia three weeks before the invasion that Argentina does not belong to the Third World, but to the developed world.

Argentina alleges that she was betrayed by the United States. On the contrary, President Reagan telephoned General Galtieri the day before the invasion, asking him to bring to a halt the plans of aggression. Galtieri assured Reagan that there would be no invasion. To the Secretary of State, Haig, the Junta always said that they wanted to negociate, but in fact, never about the essential point which is possession of the Islands.

Argentina accuses Britain of intransigence. On the contrary, Argentina has always quibbled that she is willing to negotiate as long as her sovereignty over the Islands was recognised. That is to say: 'I will negotiate as long as you recognise beforehand that the objective of the negotiation is mine.'

For these and many other reasons it is difficult to trust the Argentine Government. One radio station in Brasilia broadcasts news prepared by the Junta for internal propaganda. I don't know if they are funny or ludicrous. In Brasilia they are comic programmes. For instance, British planes fire upon shipwrecked men on boats; aircraft carriers are sunk; Admiral Sandy Woodward has already been killed several times; there have been more Harriers shot down than the British in fact have; in short, the fleet that took possession of the Islands is a ghost fleet. After all this, it remains for us Brazilians to help our Argentinian brothers to come out of this mess and regain their senses.





## BRITISH EMBASSY

Brasilia

Ms D Syme  
Information Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Your reference

Our reference 014/17

Date 7 June 1982

*Dear Dorothy*

## INFORMATION: BRAZIL

1. I refer to our telegram No 231 of 2 June and FCO telegram No 156 of 3 June on the subject of access to the Falklands by foreign journalists. We made the case for Alexandre Garcia of the mass circulation magazine, Manchete. In addition to his strongly anti-Argentine piece referred to in paragraph 7 of my letter of 25 May on the so-called 'Operation Rosario' and his splendid radio piece sent to you by Jean Leiper on 1 June, I enclose a further hard-hitting piece by Garcia which described the frontier disputes in Latin America which could have been exacerbated had the Argentine Junta got away scot-free with their aggression in the Falklands.

2. I fear I have to send you the original Portuguese because there is no chance of our translating it before today's bag closes. However, the map is self-explanatory.

3. It will be greatly to our advantage in Brazil if Garcia can be one of the first foreign journalists ashore in the Falklands. The same goes for Brazilian television. My view is that we must try to get copy and film into the Brazilian and if possible Hispano-American media showing the absolute Britishness of the Falklanders and their islands. I believe that this will open eyes and show up the Argentine invasion for the monstrous abhorration that it was.

*Yours Ever*  
*M Perceval*

M Perceval

cc (without encs)

News Department, FCO

H McPherson Esq  
SAmD, FCO



Mr Chase ~~g. 1~~ <sup>112</sup>

Dr. P. S. D. W. B. 11/6

Sr Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro,  
Foreign Minister of Brazil

Sr Rubens Ricupero,  
Head of Americas Division,  
Itamaraty

Sr R Sardenberg  
Cabinet of the Foreign  
Minister

1. HM Ambassador said that the Brazilian reversal of its earlier decision to release the Vulcan aircraft at Rio airport once disarmed, had caused surprise and dismay in London. He handed over a bout de papier which the Foreign Minister read through in silence.

2. Sr Saraiva Guerreiro said that the situation was a difficult one: was there a state of war or not, irrespective of formal declarations to that effect? No conventions or precedents had initially seemed applicable in the case of the Vulcan, and when his concurrence had first been sought by the Air Ministry for its release, once disarmed, he had agreed, because this seemed the commonsensical thing to do. However, the démarche upon instructions of the Argentine Ambassador on Friday morning created a new situation, and it would have seemed arbitrary to have dismissed the Argentine démarche out of hand. The decision to release the aircraft had thus been "suspended" pending study of the legal aspect by the Itamaraty and Air Ministry lawyers. This would resume on Monday. It was impossible to estimate precisely how long it would take, or what its conclusive recommendations would be. It might be necessary to hold the plane until the end of hostilities, but he was not adamant about it. Circumstances changed day by day. Monday might bring illumination on the legal aspect.

3. HM Ambassador asked what was meant by the "end of hostilities"? What if we stopped fighting but the Argentines did not? Sr Guerreiro said that he understood hostilities to mean the military action in progress on land in the Falkland Islands. After that phase, a different situation would prevail, with political and diplomatic action tending to replace military.

4. Sr Guerreiro said that the Vulcan crew could of course stay or depart as they chose. Itamaraty had cleared that with the Argentines, who had not objected. HIM Ambassador asked whether Brazil would have restrained the crew if Argentina had objected. Sr Guerreiro said that Brazil had been confident of the efficacy of the arguments it had deployed, so the question had not arisen.



5. HM Ambassador asked about the fate of the aircraft's missile. Sr Guerreiro replied firmly that this could certainly not leave Brazil until the end of hostilities. It was being held under secure conditions at the military airbase. HM Ambassador described the place where the missile was held, and said that his US colleague had been instructed to reinforce his representation on the security of the missile. Sr Guerreiro said that, if it would help, the missile could be "sealed" in the presence of the Air Attaché. HM Ambassador emphasised the necessity for at least one member of the Vulcan crew to remain permanently on board the aircraft. There seemed to be an impression at the airbase that this was no longer appropriate. It was however essential. Sr Guerreiro said he had thought the aircraft to have been sealed, but if this was not so, he would ensure that the Air Ministry was made aware of the Ambassador's concern on this point. HM Ambassador asked if it would be possible to send out a replacement crew. Sr Guerreiro said no: this would cause too much of a publicity splash.

#### Brazilian-Argentine Relations

6. Sr Guerreiro said that this was a difficult time for Brazil, and she was bound to lose in various ways, as she sought to retain good relations with Argentina (while not giving that nation all it wanted) at the same time as Brazil preserved its diplomatic framework with the United Kingdom. Itamaraty's concern was that the good relationship with Argentina which had been achieved over the last few years, and to which President Figueiredo had himself contributed, should remain relations of trust, not resentment. The public saw only the tip of the iceberg. Thus, the problem of Itaipu had been resolved in 1979 - this was a false problem, but false problems could sometimes be the worst ones to deal with.

7. Sr Guerreiro said that Argentina had launched into the Malvinas action without saying anything to Brazil. At that point the Argentines had been very difficult to talk to. Thereafter, they became more tractable; but once again in recent days they had become more difficult to deal with. On his stopover in Brasilia on his way to Havana, Nicanor (Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister) had asked Brazil for nothing; the discussion had been rather about the future. Despite the line taken by papers like O Estado de Sao Paulo, Itamaraty regarded Argentina as a bomb to be defused rather than kicked.

8. Sr Guerreiro said that he hoped Britain understood the difficult position Brazil found herself in, and would continue to understand it. Brazil had ruled out the use of Brazil for triangular arms sale (not only from Arab suppliers) ie sales to Argentina via Brazilian entities; but, by the same token, she felt bound to compensate by allowing Argentina to purchase armaments made in Brazil. HM Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister of the undertaking he had given at the start of the conflict that such sales would never be of "decisive" equipment. Britain would take the strongest exception to the provision, say, of a submarine, which had at one time been rumoured. Sr Guerreiro said that Brazil had only the barest minimum of such major items and could not spare them for others. They had sold some Bandeirante maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and Argentina might put in a bid for Xavante trainers,



which could be adapted to a ground support role. Brazil spent only 0.9% of her GNP on arms, 16th position in Latin America.

### Anglo-Brazilian Relations

9. HM Ambassador said that we understood Brazil's concerns for its southern neighbour; but this was not the only element in the equation. Brazil should be in no doubt as to the strength of feeling aroused in Britain at this critical time by its handling of the Vulcan. This was regarded as a litmus-test of Brazilian even-handedness. What had particularly caused a shockwave in London, was the Brazilian volte-face on the issue at Argentine behest after the Note issued by the Air Minister on Thursday, which had led everyone to believe that the aircraft would be able to proceed on its way once it had been disarmed. As the Permanent Under Secretary made clear to the Brazilian Ambassador, this was a matter on which the Secretary of State and Prime Minister had strong feelings. We trusted that the British representations already made would redress the balance. Sr Guerreiro said that they would indeed be accorded their full weight.

### Argentine Airbridge through Recife

10. Sr Saraiva Guerreiro said that he had secured information only that afternoon on the matter the Ambassador had raised previously with the Itamaraty on possible use of Brazilian airports for staging of Argentine arms supply flights. The case had been handed over to the appropriate services, who had actually checked the flight referred to in the Embassy's most recent démarche, but had found nothing untoward about the cargo. HM Ambassador expressed considerable surprise, and referred to the reports in Brazilian newspapers to the contrary, which supported our own very specific information from outside Brazil. Sr Guerreiro and Sr Ricupero maintained that nothing to substantiate our suspicions had been discovered. HM Ambassador asked what the Brazilian authorities would have done if they had found weapons. Would they have impounded them and the aircraft? After a pause, Sr Saraiva Guerreiro said that he doubted they would have done anything so dramatic as to impound, but they would probably have tried to discourage the traffic. HM Ambassador enquired whether the Hague Rules, on the issue of carrying arms, could not be invoked to impound, in this instance? Sr Guerreiro avoided giving a direct answer.

### Argentina and the Falklands

11. HM Ambassador asked whether Brazil had tried to persuade Argentina to withdraw its forces from the islands. Sr Guerreiro said that Brazil had never tried to persuade Argentina to adopt the solution preferred by the British Government, ie, simply departing. The suggestion now put forward by Britain that the Argentines should give an undertaking to withdraw in 10-15 days, would not achieve that result; it amounted to surrender without fighting. Brazil had put forward ideas, perhaps too late to achieve anything, in the letter he had sent to the President of the Security Council. A figleaf was needed for Argentina, perhaps in the form of a UN presence on the islands. The military phase



appeared now to be approaching its end. It was hard to forecast the nature of the next stage. Nobody knew what might happen. On the question of Soviet arms for Argentina, or a possible realignment of Argentina to become a parallel associate of the Socialist Bloc, he had not, from his talks with Costa Mendes, gained the impression of a major change of position. Argentine membership of the OAS might become formal rather than substantive, and its role in the NAM might be enhanced. All this was subject, however, to there being no major upheaval in Argentina. A US base in the Falklands, for instance, would fatally attract Soviet attention, while a UN presence there could well be helpful in soothing the aftermath of the dispute.

### Final Points

12. HM Ambassador reiterated HMG's concern to secure the prompt release of the Vulcan and its missile. He said that, had he been kept informed of Itamaraty's thinking in the course of Friday (he had made contact with Baena's office at midday, but the first we knew of the hitch was Ricupero's call at 1700, the time the press was informed) he could have explained the nature of Brazil's dilemma to London. The volte-face might then have caused less profound irritation. The Foreign Minister said that he had intended that a member of his staff should telephone me earlier to keep me informed. He undertook to keep the Embassy more fully in the picture in future.

British Embassy  
BRASILIA

7 June 1982

cc:

PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Wright  
Emergency Unit  
SAND



ALB 68

OUT TELEGRAM

ALB 020/3		
- 2 M 1982		
INDEX	PA	ALB 9/6

Mr Giffard

Private Secretary

## BRAZIL'S ROLE AFTER FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES

1. Brasilia telegram No 255 (below) suggests that we should concert tactics with the Americans during President Reagan's visit about deploying the Brazilians in helping to sort out the aftermath of the present conflict.
2. I submit a self-explanatory telegram, which I understand is broadly in line with the Secretary of State's initial reaction to this proposal.

*J B Ure*

J B Ure

8 June 1982

cc:

PS/Mr Onslow

PS/PUS

Mr Wright

Emergency Unit

SAMD

ALB 020/3	ALB 020/3	Catchwords
telegram	ALB 020/3	ALB 020/3
File number	Dept	Distribution
Reported by (Block capitals)	J B URE	FALKLAND ISLANDS -
Telephone number	233-4268	
Authorised for signature		



# OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
ZC	1 ZCZC	
GRS	2 GRS	
CLASS	3 CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6 FM FCO 08 JUNE 82	
PRE/ADD	7 TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA	
TEL NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON	
	10 Your telno 255: BRAZIL'S ROLE AFTER FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES	
	11 1. We are grateful to you for this constructive suggestion	
	12 and we share the view expressed in your paragraph 7(a). Looking	
	13 to the future there may well be a role for Brazil, the US and	
	14 possibly others to play in developing a secure, outward-looking	
	15 and economically-viable future for the Islands.	
	16 2. However we have doubts about the wisdom of broaching this	
	17 with President Reagan this week. As you know, the Americans	
	18 have been indefatigable in suggesting solutions for the immediate	
	19 future of the Islands which involve contact groups or other	
	20 international participation. Some such idea might have been	
///	21 acceptable as a price for an early Argentine withdrawal before we	
//	22 had incurred the loss of life and other penalties involved in	
/	23 military re-possession. But the moment for this has now passed and	
	24 we are committed to restoring a British administration and	
	25 allowing the Islanders a breathing space in which to work out	
	NNNN ends telegram	Catchword their
	File number	Dept
	Drafted by (Block capitals) J B URE	Distribution
	Telephone number 233-4269	FALKLAND ISLANDS -
	Authorised for despatch	
	Comcen reference	Time of despatch



# OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page  
2

>>>>

their longer term objectives.

3. We would therefore prefer that you did not pursue this with your American colleague for the moment, and we would hope that you could head him off by stressing the longer term possibilities rather than emphasising the short-term constraints.

PYM

NNNN

RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE AIR FORCE AIR MINISTRY ON 10/10/73 BETWEEN AIR CONTROL CENTRES IN AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND. THE MINISTRY PROPOSES:

- (A) AN INFREQUENT BE ALERTED BETWEEN THE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRES ON AUSTRIAN ISLAND AND SWITZERLAND FOR RECEPTION OF INFORMATION ON TRAFFIC IN THE DIRECTION SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIAN/GERMANY
- (B) A HIGH FREQUENCY FOR CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND THE AUSTRIAN CONTROL CENTRE.

C. IF THE ABOVE IS ACCEPTABLE, REQUEST FOR DETAILS OF FREQUENCIES FOR AIR ATTACH TO PASS ON TO AIR MINISTRY.

WAFINS

WINKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

POC

3 10 1

CANTINE OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



*Christie*  
*Julie*  
*233 - 4477*

AUB 020/31		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.		
4 JUN 1982		
DESK OFFICER	PA	RECEIVED
INDEX		W 4/6

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GRS 105  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BRASILIA 01:1853Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 1 JUNE  
REPEATED INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, UKREP ICAO

*Rehby*  
*R. P. A.*  
*3/6*

FROM LONGRIGG  
OUR TELNO 203 OF 24 MAY: ACENSION ISLAND: CONTROL OF AIR SPACE

1. AS FORESHADOWED IN PARA 3 OF TUR, THE AIR ATTACHE HAS NOW RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE BRAZILIAN AIR MINISTRY ON CONTACTS BETWEEN AIR CONTROL CENTRES IN RECIFE AND ACENSION. SPECIFICALLY, THE MINISTRY PROPOSE :

- (A) AN HF FREQUENCY BE AGREED BETWEEN THE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRES ON ACENSION ISLAND AND RECIFE FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TRAFFIC IN THE DIRECTION RECIFE/ACENSION AND ACENSION/RECIFE:
- (B) A VHF FREQUENCY FOR CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND THE ACENSION CONTROL CENTRE.

2. IF THE ABOVE IS ACCEPTABLE, GRATEFUL FOR DETAILS OF FREQUENCIES FOR AIR ATTACHE TO PASS ON TO AIR MINISTRY.

HARDING

*demanded control*  
*100 miles radius*

COPIES SENT TO  
CAIR/DOT

*ICRU*  
*Brazilian 4th*  
*reates change*

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAULKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAULKLAND ISLANDS

*2579*  
*218-2299*  
*Duty Officer*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*John Peter*  
*218-7543*

*Bulham*  
*DS8*  
*218-2579*



ALB02013.		
RECEIVED IN MINISTRY OF		
1 MAY 1982		
DESK OFFICER	PRECEDENCE	
INDEX	PA	Non Take
	<i>[Signature]</i>	


66  
S. Am D  
 SPS  
 PS/m onken  
 on lifted  
 put H 26/5

No. 87 /210(F27)(B29)

*[Signature]*

The Ambassador of Brazil presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to attach hereto the text of a message delivered to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, on behalf of the Brazilian Government.

The Ambassador of Brazil avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.



London, May 25th , 1982.

Encl: 1

TV/mam



"New York, 24th May 1982.

His Excellency  
Ambassador Ling Qing,  
President of the Security Council,  
United Nations.

Excellency,

Ever since the Malvinas crisis began, Brazil has accompanied developments with profound interest and ever increasing preoccupation.

This crisis deeply affects Brazil and the Brazilian people, not only because it is taking place in the South Atlantic, an area which is of paramount importance to Brazil, but also because it involves two of our traditional friends, both of them countries we care deeply about.

The Brazilian Government has made untiring representations to the two parties and to the Governments of third parties, to seek for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement for this question. We maintained formal and informal contacts, up to the highest level, with the countries that, in our opinion, could make the most direct contribution to an understanding. We decidedly supported the mediation efforts of the Secretary of State of the United States of America. Once this initiative had been thwarted, we vigorously supported the negotiations conducted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as his peace proposals.



President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo made a personal appeal to the Heads of Government of the Republic of Argentina and of the United Kingdom for a negotiated settlement. He also requested the Heads of Government of other countries to help in achieving this objective.

Even sacrificing the discussion of important and pressing bi-lateral questions, President Figueiredo devoted the greater part of the time he spent conversing with the President of the United States, during his recent visit to that country, exploring avenues for the restoration of peace and the solution of the Malvinas question.

In international fora, at the United Nations Security Council itself, as well as in the meeting of the organ of consultation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Brazil, throughout the whole crisis, has been a voice for moderation, understanding and peace.

Now that all voluntary efforts seem to have failed, now that hundreds of lives of young Argentines and British subjects have been lost, now that we face the prospect of the most serious consequences for Latin America and for the whole international community, Brazil believes that the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking a firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security.

In the same spirit that has guided Brazil throughout the crisis, and speaking for the Government of a country that has given proof of its unconditional adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, I believe there is no alternative but that the Security



Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem.

In the light of the discussions held by the parties, the Brazilian Government wishes to submit to the Security Council the following points, which I firmly believe can be the bases for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace, without winners or losers:

- 1) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
- 2) Simultaneous withdrawal of Argentine forces to continental Argentine territory and of British forces in the northeast direction to a distance equivalent to that between Argentine continental territory and the Malvina Islands;
  - a) the withdrawal of the British and Argentine forces should be initiated 48 hours after the adoption of the Resolution;
  - b) all Argentine and British forces should have been withdrawn from the area within 21 days, one-third of the forces of each party being withdrawn at seven-day intervals, in accordance with criteria established by the Secretary General;
- 3) Appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of a provisional administration for the Islands, with exclusive competence, which will hold consultations with the representatives of the inhabitants, to be designated by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom;
  - a) the Administration of the United Nations will be established simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of Argentine and British forces;



b) all United Nations member States will grant the Secretary General the support required for the establishment of the provisional administration and for the supervision of the implementation of the provisions of the present Resolution.

- 4) Establishment, under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, of a Committee presided over by the Secretary General of the United Nations and composed of the two parties and of four other member States, two of which are to be appointed by each of the parties, with the mandate of conducting urgent negotiations leading to a permanent settlement of the question. The Committee will begin its work the day following the completion of the withdrawal of the forces from the area and will submit its report to the Security Council not later than 31 January 1983.

Brazil is convinced that these elements, as a whole, constitute an honest, just and equitable basis for the cessation of the shedding of blood and tragic loss of lives. The Brazilian Government fervently appeals to the Government of Argentina and to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to, placing the interests of peace and humanity above all else, determine to cease hostilities forthwith and enter into negotiations.

The Brazilian Government likewise appeals to all States, members of the Security Council to support, by their words, by their actions and by their votes, a solution along the lines herewith presented.



Let us renew our dedication to the purposes and principles of the Charter and demonstrate in an effective manner that our words were not empty words when we all promised, at the moment this Organization was created, that:

"We, the peoples of the United Nations, determine to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war..."

With highest consideration,

Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro  
Minister for External Relations of the  
Federative Republic of Brazil"

the honour to attach hereto the text of a message delivered to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, on behalf of the Brazilian Government.

The Ambassador of Brazil avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.


 London, May 29th, 1982.



No. 87 /210(F27)(B29)

The Ambassador of Brazil presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to attach hereto the text of a message delivered to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, on behalf of the Brazilian Government.

The Ambassador of Brazil avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.



London, May 25th , 1982.

Encl: 1



"New York, 24th May 1982.

His Excellency  
Ambassador Ling Qing,  
President of the Security Council,  
United Nations.

Excellency,

Ever since the Malvinas crisis began, Brazil has accompanied developments with profound interest and ever increasing preoccupation.

This crisis deeply affects Brazil and the Brazilian people, not only because it is taking place in the South Atlantic, an area which is of paramount importance to Brazil, but also because it involves two of our traditional friends, both of them countries we care deeply about.

The Brazilian Government has made untiring representations to the two parties and to the Governments of third parties, to seek for a peaceful, just and lasting settlement for this question. We maintained formal and informal contacts, up to the highest level, with the countries that, in our opinion, could make the most direct contribution to an understanding. We decidedly supported the mediation efforts of the Secretary of State of the United States of America. Once this initiative had been thwarted, we vigorously supported the negotiations conducted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as his peace proposals.



President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo made a personal appeal to the Heads of Government of the Republic of Argentina and of the United Kingdom for a negotiated settlement. He also requested the Heads of Government of other countries to help in achieving this objective.

Even sacrificing the discussion of important and pressing bi-lateral questions, President Figueiredo devoted the greater part of the time he spent conversing with the President of the United States, during his recent visit to that country, exploring avenues for the restoration of peace and the solution of the Malvinas question.

In international fora, at the United Nations Security Council itself, as well as in the meeting of the organ of consultation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Brazil, throughout the whole crisis, has been a voice for moderation, understanding and peace.

Now that all voluntary efforts seem to have failed, now that hundreds of lives of young Argentines and British subjects have been lost, now that we face the prospect of the most serious consequences for Latin America and for the whole international community, Brazil believes that the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking a firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security.

In the same spirit that has guided Brazil throughout the crisis, and speaking for the Government of a country that has given proof of its unconditional adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, I believe there is no alternative but that the Security



Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem.

In the light of the discussions held by the parties, the Brazilian Government wishes to submit to the Security Council the following points, which I firmly believe can be the bases for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace, without winners or losers:

- 1) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
- 2) Simultaneous withdrawal of Argentine forces to continental Argentine territory and of British forces in the northeast direction to a distance equivalent to that between Argentine continental territory and the Malvina Islands;
  - a) the withdrawal of the British and Argentine forces should be initiated 48 hours after the adoption of the Resolution;
  - b) all Argentine and British forces should have been withdrawn from the area within 21 days, one-third of the forces of each party being withdrawn at seven-day intervals, in accordance with criteria established by the Secretary General;
- 3) Appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of a provisional administration for the Islands, with exclusive competence, which will hold consultations with the representatives of the inhabitants, to be designated by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom;
  - a) the Administration of the United Nations will be established simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of Argentine and British forces;



- b) all United Nations member States will grant the Secretary General the support required for the establishment of the provisional administration and for the supervision of the implementation of the provisions of the present Resolution.
- 4) Establishment, under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, of a Committee presided over by the Secretary General of the United Nations and composed of the two parties and of four other member States, two of which are to be appointed by each of the parties, with the mandate of conducting urgent negotiations leading to a permanent settlement of the question. The Committee will begin its work the day following the completion of the withdrawal of the forces from the area and will submit its report to the Security Council not later than 31 January 1983.

Brazil is convinced that these elements, as a whole, constitute an honest, just and equitable basis for the cessation of the shedding of blood and tragic loss of lives. The Brazilian Government fervently appeals to the Government of Argentina and to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to, placing the interests of peace and humanity above all else, determine to cease hostilities forthwith and enter into negotiations.

The Brazilian Government likewise appeals to all States, members of the Security Council to support, by their words, by their actions and by their votes, a solution along the lines herewith presented.



Let us renew our dedication to the purposes and principles of the Charter and demonstrate in an effective manner that our words were not empty words when we all promised, at the moment this Organization was created, that:

"We, the peoples of the United Nations,  
determine to save succeeding generations  
from the scourge of war..."

With highest consideration,

Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro  
Minister for External Relations of the  
Federative Republic of Brazil"



(14 May)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

65

ARB 020/3

RECEIVED

24 MAY 1982

INDEX

Mr. [unclear] 19/5  
Mr. Williams

Emergency Unit

I have not seen this letter and it has presumably been overlooked (the PM has also decided not to send the parcel messages to Figueiredo / Lopez Portillo).

Dear John,

Further Message from the President of Brazil to the Prime Minister

Minister

62A

2) [unclear] - [unclear] + [unclear]

The President of Brazil has sent a further message to the Prime Minister about his fears that military confrontation might demolish the diplomatic efforts of the UN Secretary-General. I enclose the text.

There is no point in prolonging, for the sake of politeness, exchanges of messages between the President and the Prime Minister. But the Prime Minister will know that President Figueiredo spoke on 13 May to President Reagan and has decided to send an emissary to Buenos Aires (Washington telno 1745 to FCO). He is known to be particularly concerned about the possibility of mainland operations against Argentina.

I enclose a telegram containing a draft reply from the Prime Minister which might be delivered, like her previous message, through Brasilia.

Yours ever  
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

London, May 12th, 1982.



MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE  
REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, SENHOR JOÃO BAPTISTA FIGUEIREDO  
TO THE RT HON. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN  
IRELAND

"I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your  
kind telegram of yesterday's date, May 11th.

It is encouraging to have a reaffirmation of the  
endeavour of the British Government to find a negotiated solution  
for the question.

Bearing in mind, however, the growing military  
activity in the South Atlantic, which increases the risks of an  
armed confrontation of serious proportions, I wish to reiterate  
to Your Excellency the concern of my country, its Government and  
public opinion, that such risks might mar the diplomatic efforts  
now being made by the Secretary General of the United Nations,  
Mr Perez de Cuellar. Such occurrence, as Your Excellency can  
well imagine, could have serious and deep repercussions both in  
the American Continental picture as well as in the world.

I trust, therefore, that the parties to the  
question, in no moment should fail to adopt a flexible and  
constructive attitude within the present negotiations in the  
United Nations, and I once again reaffirm the wishes of my  
country for a successful end for such efforts in the shortest  
possible period of time.

With my highest consideration."

London, May 12th, 1982.

RESTRICTED



64

TO COPY

RESTRICTED

A LB 620/3.	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
24 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICE	1
INDEX	1
P	

GRS 40  
RESTRICTED  
FM BRASILIA 191943Z MAY  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 19 MAY  
INFO DOT (FOR OT5)

ALY  
020/1(7)

YOUR TELNO 47 TO ASUNCION: BRITISH BUSINESS VISITORS

1. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO REASON WHY BUSINESSMEN AND ORDINARY TRAVELLERS SHOULD NOT PROCEED NORMALLY WITH VISITS TO BRAZIL.
2. IF THE SITUATION CHANGES, WE SHALL INFORM YOU.

HARDING

MINIMAL  
SAND  
CONS.D  
TREC D  
EM UNIT

RESTRICTED



x12.



My  
19/5

63

S. And  
v. PS  
De Liffard

for H  
18/5.

10 DOWNING STREET

ALB 020/3

From the Private Secretary

17 May 1982

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.

24 MAY 1982

DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Take
	R	

See John,

Further message from the President of Brazil to  
the Prime Minister

Thank you for your undated letter proposing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the latest message received from the President of Brazil. We agreed on the telephone that this has been overtaken by this morning's discussion at OD(SA) when it was decided that consideration should be given to an approach to Brazil and Mexico in the context of the latest round of negotiations in New York.

You are

John Colan.

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



ALB02013

24 MAY 1982

INDEXED

7

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE  
REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, SENHOR JOÃO BAPTISTA FIGUEIREDO  
TO THE RT HON. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN  
IRELAND

"I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your  
kind telegram of yesterday's date, May 11th.

It is encouraging to have a reaffirmation of the  
endeavour of the British Government to find a negotiated solution  
for the question.

Bearing in mind, however, the growing military  
activity in the South Atlantic, which increases the risks of an  
armed confrontation of serious proportions, I wish to reiterate  
to Your Excellency the concern of my country, its Government and  
public opinion, that such risks might mar the diplomatic efforts  
now being made by the Secretary General of the United Nations,  
Mr Perez de Cuellar. Such occurrence, as Your Excellency can  
well imagine, could have serious and deep repercussions both in  
the American Continental picture as well as in the world.

I trust, therefore, that the parties to the  
question, in no moment should fail to adopt a flexible and  
constructive attitude within the present negotiations in the  
United Nations, and I once again reaffirm the wishes of my  
country for a successful end for such efforts in the shortest  
possible period of time.

With my highest consideration."

London, May 12th, 1982.



(62)

Mr Giffard  
PS

Issue per

M44/5.

ALB 02013	
RECEIVED IN 2005 MAY 1982	
24 MAY 1982	
INDEX	FILE

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Problem

A

1. The President of Brazil, Senhor Figueiredo, has sent a message to the Prime Minister in reply to her message of 11 May. Senhor Figueiredo's message was delivered by the Brazilian Embassy in London on 13 May. Should the Prime Minister reply?

Recommendation

B

2. I recommend that the Prime Minister should send a reply, via HM Embassy in Brasília. I submit a draft, together with a draft covering Private Secretary letter to No.10.

Argument

C

DB

3. The present exchange of messages began with President Figueiredo's expression of sympathy of 6 May at the loss of life following the attack on HMS Sheffield. The Prime Minister replied on 9 May, re-emphasising British resolve but stressing the Government's determination to seek an acceptable settlement through negotiation. President Figueiredo's latest message is in reply to this.

4. There is no point in prolonging this series of exchanges for the sake of politeness. But the latest Brazilian message expresses renewed concern at the risks to the present diplomatic efforts of further military confrontation, and the wider repercussions which it might have. It is desirable that the British position should be presented effectively and positively. With Brazil, as with Mexico, it would be unfortunate to give the impression of having lost interest

/in further



- 2 -

E in further appeals. Moreover, there is new evidence of Brazilian concern and activity in Washington telno 1745 which makes it more important to do what we can to influence the Brazilian President's opinion of developments.

F 5. According to Mr Haig (Washington telno 1731), the Brazilian President is in no way hostile to the British position.

6. A short reply seems on balance desirable.

*A Payne.*

14 May 1982

A J Payne  
Emergency Unit

*President Figueiredo's message has been telegraphed for information to Brasilia.*

*Mpu  
for A.J. Payne*

cc: PS/Mr Onslow  
Mr Ure  
SAmD  
Emergency Unit

*I have amended the draft message to make it rather tougher and to remind the Brazilian what it is all about - he is aware that we have a strong case.*

*Arcliff  
14/5*



SECRET

61

AB 020/3

TOP COPY 1982

DESK OFFICER	PA	REGISTRY
INDEX		Action Taken

GR 130

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 141825Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1759 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY BRASILIA

MY TELEGRAM NO 1745 (NOT TO BRASILIA): FALKLANDS: US/BRAZIL

1. WHEN I SAW STOESEL THIS MORNING, HE TOLD ME THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO WAS NO LONGER PLANNING, AS CLARK HAD TOLD ME YESTERDAY, TO SEND HIS CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE AS A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO BUENOS AIRES. STOESEL HAD SEEN FIGUEIREDO OFF AT THE AIRPORT LAST NIGHT AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT FIGUEIREDO NOW THOUGHT THAT BRAZIL COULD NOT PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE UNLESS AN AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRAZIL MIGHT INFLUENCE ARGENTINA TO BE REASONABLE BUT AT PRESENT FIGUEIREDO THOUGHT THAT BOTH SIDES WERE TOO FAR APART.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

LIMITED

HD/S AM D

HD/DEF D

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

HD/ERD

HD/PUSD HD/EC(D)(E)

DEP HD/PUSD

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

MR BARRETT

COPIES TO:

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF

LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR O'NEILL HD/ASSESSMENTS

DIO STAFF

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

CABINET

OFFICE

SECRET



RESTRICTED

FM FCO 140915Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON: UKMIS NEW YORK

60

AUB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
1 MAY 1982	
IN	PA
REG	STATION

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED ON 12 MAY THROUGH  
BRAZILIAN EMBASSY:

'I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR KIND TELEGRAM  
OF YESTERDAY'S DATE, MAY 11TH.

IT IS ENCOURAGING TO HAVE A REAFFIRMATION OF THE ENDEAVOUR  
OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION  
FOR THE QUESTION.

BEARING IN MIND, HOWEVER, THE GROWING MILITARY ACTIVITY IN  
THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WHICH INCREASES THE RISKS OF AN ARMED  
CONFRONTATION OF SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, I WISH TO REITERATE  
TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE CONCERN OF MY COUNTRY, ITS GOVERNMENT  
AND PUBLIC OPINION, THAT SUCH RISKS MIGHT MAR THE DIPLOMATIC  
EFFORTS NOW BEING MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS, MR PEREZ DE CUELLAR. SUCH OCCURRENCE, AS  
YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN WELL IMAGINE, COULD HAVE SERIOUS AND  
DEEP REPERCUSSIONS BOTH IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENTAL PICTURE  
AS WELL AS IN THE WORLD.

I TRUST, THEREFORE, THAT THE PARTIES TO THE QUESTION, IN  
NO MOMENT SHOULD FAIL TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
ATTITUDE WITHIN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS  
AND I ONCE AGAIN REAFFIRM THE WISHES OF MY COUNTRY FOR A  
SUCCESSFUL END FOR SUCH EFFORTS IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE  
PERIOD OF TIME.

WITH MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.'

2. WE ARE CONSIDERING QUESTION OF A REPLY.

PYM

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

LIMITED

HD/S AM D

→ HD/DEF D EM UNIT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

→ HD/ERD HD/EC(D)

HD/PUSD

DEP HD/PUSD

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

MR BARRETT

COPIES TO:

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF  
LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR O'NEILL HD/ASSESSMENTS  
STAFF

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MO

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

CABIN  
OFFIC

RESTRICTED



GRS 355

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141730Z

FM BRASILIA 141600Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN

CONFIDENTIAL

59

ALB 020/3	
TOP COPY	
17 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	PA
INDEX	PA

54 YOUR TELNO 107 (NOT TO BONN): MESSAGE FROM BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

1. THIS MESSAGE MUST HAVE BEEN RELAYED TO THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY DIRECT FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S PARTY WHILE THEY WERE IN WASHINGTON. INDEED, I WOULD GUESS THAT IT OWES SOMETHING TO FIGUEIREDO'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WHICH, AS FORESHADOWED IN PAARA 4 OF MY TELNO 162, HE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE SPOKEN VERY PLAINLY OF HIS FEARS OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS GETTING OUT OF HAND.
2. THIS MORNING'S JORNAL DO BRASIL REPORTS UNDER A WASHINGTON DATELINE THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO SENT A LETTER YESTERDAY TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT REQUESTING THAT HE SHOULD INTERCEDE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO INDUCE BRITAIN TO SHOW MODERATION IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY ROUNDABOUT WAY FOR FIGUEIREDO TO PUT HIS VIEWS TO THE PRIME MINISTER, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIRECT MESSAGE IN TUR. THE BRAZILIAN PRESS MAY, AS USUAL, MERELY HAVE GOT HOLD OF THE WRONG END OF THE STICK.
3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE CONCERN IT VOICES IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO THE REPERCUSSIONS OF A FULL SCALE, AND PROBABLY BLOODY, BRITISH ONSLAUGHT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WHICH IS NOW SEEN HERE AS IN IMMINENT PROSPECT. GIVEN THAT THE BRAZILIANS ARE, GIVEN THEIR PORTUGUESE ORIGINS, MUCH LESS PRONE TO BE SUBMERGED BY WAVES OF HISPANO-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY THAN THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA, I SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S VIEW DESERVES TO BE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT. I NOTE FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 1731 THAT MR HAIG'S FRIENDLY WARNING, APPARENTLY ENDORSED BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, REFERRED TO THE REPERCUSSIONS OF AN ATTACK ON THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND AND NOT OF ONE ON THE ISLANDS THEMSELVES. OBVIOUSLY, AN ATTACK ON THE MAINLAND WOULD BE SEEN HERE, AS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, AS QUITE DIFFERENT IN KIND, AND MUCH MORE SERIOUS IN IMPORT, THAN AN ATTACK ON THE FALKLANDS.
4. AS TO A REPLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER BE ADVISED TO HOLD OFF REPLYING UNTIL NEW DEVELOPMENTS MAKE A FRESH MESSAGE OPPORTUNE.

HARDING

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

(58)

**TOP COPY**

ACB 02019

RECEIVED BY REGISTRY NO.	
14 MAY 1982	
DESK COPIES	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
	Action Taken

GPS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 122317Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1732 OF 12 MAY 1982,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA.

FALKLANDS: US/BRAZIL

1. ENDERS GAVE JOURNALISTS AN UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING THIS EVENING ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. FIGUEIREDO HOPED FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION MEETING THE JUST REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES. BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES WERE SUPPORTING DIFFERENT SIDES IN THE DISPUTE. BUT THEY SHARED A COMMON CONCERN FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. ENDERS' CONCERN AT THE REACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA TO US SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN, ACCORDING TO BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WHO WERE PRESENT, WAS APPARENT AND HIS REMARKS HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY SOME OF THE MEDIA AS A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IN FACT, WE ARE ASSURED THAT HE EMPHASISED THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502.

HENDERSON

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



Confidential

57


In Charge (H.M.)	
✓ A.C. 02013	
To see + enter	
INDEX	PA
Fearn 11/r	

Mr Fearn, Emergency Unit

FALKLANDS: CONTACTS WITH THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY

1. Mr Hugueney, Political Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy, has for some months been in the habit of calling on me to discuss international, usually East/West, matters. He has been asking me fairly frequently since the Falklands crisis began for indications of the state of play in negotiations. Up to now, I have been extremely cagey, confining myself to Ministers' statements in Parliament. Today Mr Hugueney rang and, after explaining that the Brazilian President was about to visit the US, said that he understood that Argentina had changed its position on sovereignty and in particular was no longer insisting on any mention of the word in an interim agreement to end the crisis.

2. I said, in reply, that the public remarks by Mr Costa Mendez two days ago were ambiguous; on the one hand, he seemed to be claiming that recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands was no longer a pre-condition for long term negotiations, but on the other he was saying that Argentine sovereignty was the only outcome that could be considered. This seemed to be a claim of a change of position rather than an actual change of position. I also said that Argentina, in the New York negotiations, had not accepted language which would state that negotiations about the future of the Islands would be without prejudice to the outcome. Asked about the general prospects in the New York negotiations, I said that Argentina was not demonstrating serious flexibility but that we would continue to leave no stone unturned in our efforts for a negotiated settlement. I implied that the next several days might be crucial.

  
C L G Mallaby  
Planning Staff

11 May 1982

cc: Mr Giffard  
Mr Ure



GPS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

56

TOP COPY		
ACB 0203		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.		
13 MAY 1982		
DISC. OFFICER	PA	REGISTRY
INDEX		Action Taken

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 121710Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1716 OF 12 MAY 1982,

INFO BRASILIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS: VISIT OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

1. HAIG HAD A SESSION THIS MORNING WITH THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, GUERREIRO, AND ENDERS HAS GIVEN US A BRIEF READ-OUT. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS, WHILE BASICALLY MAINTAINING THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA, WAS RATHER HELPFUL TO US. GUERREIRO SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO URGE THE ARGENTINIANS TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE COVERED IN ANY UN SETTLEMENT. THEY BELIEVED THIS WAS PREJUDICIAL TO ARGENTINA'S CASE.

2. THE BRAZILIANS WOULD ALSO TELL THEM THAT THEY THOUGHT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD INCLUDE SOME REPRESENTATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. THIS WAS DESIRABLE ON GROUNDS OF SIMPLE HUMANITY.

3. ON THE DISTANCE TO WHICH THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW, THEY WOULD URGE THE ARGENTINIANS TO BE FLEXIBLE.

4. GUERREIRO WOULD ALSO PUT IT TO THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT INSIST ON OBTAINING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE ISLANDS FOR ARGENTINIAN CITIZENS AS PART OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE BRAZILIAN VIEW WAS THAT THIS WAS A REASONABLE OBJECTIVE FOR THE FINAL OUTCOME, BUT THE ARGENTINIANS SHOULD NOT TRY TO SECURE IT BEFOREHAND.

5. ENDERS UNDERSTOOD THAT GUERREIRO WOULD TRY TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ROS IN NEW YORK TODAY TO PUT THESE BRAZILIAN VIEWS ACROSS TO HIM.

HENDERSON

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

55

100 B 2243		
RECEIVED		
13 MAY 1982		
DESK OF	PA	MINISTRY
INDEX		Action Taken

GRS 190  
RESTRICTED  
DESKBY 120800Z  
FM BRASILIA 112110Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 11 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

54 YOUR TELNO 107: PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO

1. I HANDED THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO  
PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO IN YOUR TUR (RECEIVED HERE AT 111241Z)  
TO THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER AT 4.30 P.M. TODAY.  
BAENA SOARES UNDERTOOK TO TELEGRAPH IT AT ONCE TO THE BRAZILIAN  
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT, WHO  
IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE THERE THIS EVENING TO BEGIN HIS  
ABBREVIATED OFFICIAL VISIT.

HARDING

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

54

ALB 002013	
13 MAY 1982	
DESK OFF	RY
INDEX	4529 - 1

OO BRASILIA

GRS 307

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 091830Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 107 OF 11 MAY,

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 100: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO BEGINS.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY ON THE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD.

THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HAS OCCURRED ON BOTH SIDES MAKES IT ALL THE MORE URGENT TO FIND A BASIS FOR ENDING THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THIS HAS THROUGHOUT BEEN OUR OBJECTIVE: AND IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN EXTREMELY DISHEARTENING THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAVE REJECTED BOTH THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD EARLIER BY MR HAIG AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT BASED ON THE HELPFUL INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. WE ARE NOW ACTIVELY PURSUING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS THE CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS WHICH HE HAS MADE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE RESPONSE REFLECTS OUR WISH TO SEE AN EARLY CEASEFIRE LINKED TO THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AS CALLED FOR IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NUMBER 502. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL RESPOND EQUALLY POSITIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, SO THAT CONFLICT CAN END, FORCES CAN BE WITHDRAWN, AND GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS TO RESOLVE THE FALKLANDS ISSUE CAN GET UNDER WAY. BUT IF THEY DO NOT SO RESPOND, THEY SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR RESOLVE.

YOUR EXCELLENCY MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE FOR OUR PART WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DISPUTE.

WITH THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

4529 - 1

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS.

2. IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, PLEASE HAND OVER THE TEXT  
OF MY STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE ON 7 MAY (MY TELNO 362) WHEN  
DELIVERING THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY.

PYM

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

FALKLAND ISLANDS





pa  
S. A. D. (52)  
Tel sent.  
cc PS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 May 1982

JH 11/5.

AIRB 020/3.	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
12 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICE	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
	WBS

See John.

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL

Thank you for your letter of 10 May.

The Prime Minister is content that the proposed message to President Figueiredo should be despatched.

You see

John Colman.

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



RESTRICTED

Tel on hold 10/5  
Present W/S



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

SAND  
52

10 May 1982

ALBc20/3	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
12 MAY 1982	
DEPT. OF DEF.	1. 2. 3. 4.
INDE	PA

Dear John,

President Figueiredo of Brazil has sent a message to the Prime Minister expressing sympathy for the casualties resulting from the attack on HMS Sheffield. We know that President Figueiredo has also sent a message to the Argentine Government following the sinking of the Belgrano. But it will nonetheless be helpful to send a fairly full reply to President Figueiredo, which would provide an opportunity to set out the positive efforts which we are making to secure a peaceful solution to the present crisis. Although the position of the Brazilian Government inevitably tilts towards Argentina, it has sought throughout the crisis to maintain a reasonable balance and Brazil's influence on Argentina could yet be valuable. We therefore need to ensure that our relations with the Brazilian Government are kept in as good order as possible.

/ I enclose a draft telegram to our Embassy in Brasilia which contains a message from the Prime Minister to President Figueiredo.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



# OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats <b>RESTRICTED</b>		Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>	
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 091830Z MAY 82	
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK	
	10	MY TELNO 100: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO	
	11	PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO	
	12	PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO. <i>Begins</i>	
	13	I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your thoughtful	
	14	message of sympathy on the casualties resulting from the attack	
	15	on HMS Sheffield.	
	16	The tragic loss of life which has occurred on both sides	
	17	makes it all the more urgent to find a basis for ending the	
	18	present conflict in the South Atlantic. This has throughout	
	19	been our objective; and it has therefore been extremely	
	20	disheartening that the Argentine Government have rejected both <del>the</del>	
	21	proposals put forward earlier by Mr Haig and the subsequent	
///	22	proposals for an interim agreement based on the helpful initia-	
//	23	tive of the President of Peru. We are now actively pursuing with	
/	24	the Secretary-General of the United Nations the constructive	
	25	suggestions which he has made. The British Government's	
	26		
	27		
	28	NNNN ends	Catchword
	29	telegram	positive
	30	BLANK	
	31	File number	Distribution
	32	Dept	<i>Falklands General</i>
	33	Drafted by (Block capitals)	
	34	Telephone number	
	35	Authorised for despatch	
	36	Comcen reference	
	37	Time of despatch	



Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Page

2

1 &lt;&lt;&lt;&lt;

2 positive response reflects our wish to see an early ceasefire  
 3 linked to the prompt withdrawal of Argentine forces as called for  
 4 in Security Council Resolution Number 502. It is our hope that  
 5 the Argentine Government will respond equally positively to the  
 6 Secretary-General, so that conflict can end, forces can be  
 7 withdrawn, and genuine negotiations to resolve the Falklands  
 8 issue can get under way. *But if they do not so respond, they*  
 9 *should be in no doubt of our resolve.*  
 10 3. Your Excellency may be assured that we for our part will  
 11 spare no effort to achieve a peaceful negotiated solution to the  
 12 present dispute.

12 With the assurances of my highest consideration  
 13 Margaret Thatcher  
 14 Ends.

15 4. If you have not already done so, please hand over the text  
 16 of my statement to the House on 7 May (my telno 362) when  
 17 delivering the Prime Minister's reply.

19 PYM

20 NNNN

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



ArB020/3.

FD-36 (REV. 5-22-64)

11 MAY 1982

SEARCHED	INDEXED	SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI - NEW YORK		FBI - NEW YORK	

TOP COPY

GRS 60  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DESKBY 080800Z  
FM BRASILIA 072220Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 7 MAY

YOUR TELNO 91 TO BERNE: MOD STATEMENT ON FALKLANDS

1. I HANDED THE TEXT OF THIS AFTERNOON'S MOD STATEMENT TO THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT AT THE ITAMARATY AT 7 P.M. (= 072200Z).

HARDING

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS



RESTRICTED

50

GRS 360

RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 071305Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 6 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

ALB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE	
11 MAY 1982	
TOP COPY	
IN-4	

40 MY TELNO 156: FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN POSITION

1. AS FORECAST IN PARA 3 OF TUR, FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY DEFENDED IN THE SENATE THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.

2. GUERREIRO ENDURED THREE HOURS OF POLITE GRILLING BY THE ASSEMBLED SENATORS, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE MADE THE FOLLOWING SALIENT POINTS:

- (A) SINCE 1833, WHEN BRITAIN OCCUPIED THE MALVINAS (SIC) BY FORCE, EXPELLING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNOR, BRAZIL HAD CONSTANTLY SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CLAIM. SINCE THAT DATE, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY ARBITRATION, JUDICIAL SENTENCE OR INTERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH GAVE JURIDICAL VALIDITY TO THE BRITISH OCCUPATION.
- (B) BRAZIL'S PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATION WAS TO REVERSE THE PRESENT ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND TRY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING IN A SPIRIT OF CONCILIATION AND JUSTICE. SHE HAD NEVER HAD ANY ASPIRATION TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR IN THIS CONFLICT OR TO SEEK TO EXERCISE ANY KIND OF CONTINENTAL LEADERSHIP. SHE WOULD TRY TO MAKE HERSELF USEFUL, BUT NO MORE THAN THAT.
- (C) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE UNITED NATIONS THE BEST INSTRUMENT FOR SECURING A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SCR 502 (VIZ CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS) MUST ALL BE FULFILLED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
- (D) BRAZIL'S POSITION SHOULD BE SEEN IN A LONG TERM CONTEXT AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXCEPTIONAL DEGREE OF DIALOGUE WHICH SHE HAD REACHED WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, BY dint OF OVERCOMING LONG-STANDING RESENTMENTS. HER POSITION HAD TO BE ONE WHICH REFLECTED HER PREOCCUPATION WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION OF WHICH SHE FORMED A PART, AS WELL AS HER EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS ALSO A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHOM BRAZIL HAD NOT THE SLIGHTEST POINT OF DIFFERENCE, RATHER THE CONTRARY.

RESTRICTED

/ (E) ON THE



RESTRICTED

- (E) ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES, IT WAS ITAMARATY'S PRACTICE NOT TO MAKE STATEMENTS ABOUT THEM. BUT HE COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE GUIDELINE ADOPTED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS THAT ANY SALES SHOULD NOT CREATE DISEQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE CONFLICTING PARTIES.
- (F) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES' DECISION TO SUPPORT BRITAIN AND ADOPT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. IT HAD UNDOUBTEDLY DAMAGED THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, WHICH COULD NEVER BE QUITE THE SAME AGAIN, THOUGH IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE THAT IT WOULD FALL APART.

3. THOUGH SUBJECTED TO SOME FAIRLY TRENCANT QUESTIONING, PARTICULARLY ON THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S EVIDENT TILT TOWARDS ARGENTINA, GUERREIRO GAVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF AND BY THE END OF THE SESSION APPEARED TO HAVE WON THE UNDERSTANDING, IF NOT THE SUPPORT, OF MOST SENATORS.

4. THIS WAS A CAUTIOUS VENTURE IN THE DIRECTION OF MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF A KIND WHICH BRAZIL HAS SCARCELY SEEN SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1964. INsofar AS IT IS LIKELY TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT MORE SENSITIVE TO PARLIAMENTARY OPINION, WHICH SEEMS marginally FAVOURABLE TO US IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT, THE OUTCOME WAS SATISFACTORY.

HARDING

FAULKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAULKLAND ISLANDS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

- 2 -  
RESTRICTED



Mr Giffard ✓

*MS led amended after  
discussion with Mr Giffard:  
+ counsel. pla*

A.B.02013	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
11 MAY 1982	
REGISTRY	SECRETARY
cc: PS	PS/PUS
Mr Ure	Mr Mallaby
SAMD	

*W.B. 11/5*

FALKLAND ISLANDS : PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PROBLEM

1. Following a discussion with the Brazilian Foreign Minister,  
A our Ambassador has suggested that the Secretary of State should send Sr Guerreiro a message outlining our views.

RECOMMENDATION

2. I recommend against any such message at this stage. I submit a draft telegram to Brasilia.

ARGUMENT

3. It is in our interest to keep our lines open to the Brazilians. It is an important market and Brazilian views carry weight in Latin America. We should also do what we can to dilute Brazilian support for Argentina. Brazil has already agreed to provide the Argentines with some military equipment and training; and as military operations develop, it will come under increasing pressure to get firmly off the fence on Argentina's side.
4. There is, however, little that the Secretary of State could say to Sr Guerreiro at the present moment which would help matters. A message would need to refer to that sent by Sr Guerreiro on 30 April to the UN Secretary-General, which  
B Mr Harding describes as misguided. With the Haig negotiations broken down and following news of the bombing of Port Stanley airport, there are few positive points to make, to which the Brazilians would be receptive. It would therefore seem best

/best



1982  
YEAR  
STAMP

SECUR  
N.B. Th  
UPGRA

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

SECRET

DSR 12  
Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.

(Sgd.) DM

Date 24/1/84

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.  
or POST

SCOTLAND  
ERICA

FILE No. ALB 020/3 (Part B)

TITLE: Brazilian Attitude to the Falkland Islands Dispute

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY  
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
SEE:

DATE

R.

Mr Macpherson

R

Mr Macpherson

R

Mr Macpherson

L

MR CAMPBELL.

26/8

75

76

19/9 (to PC)

85

14/9

86

6/12

89

28

FCO 7/4/24

S  
361

Registry Address

Room No. 266  
King Charles Street

SEC  
N.B.  
UPG

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

SECRET

YEAR STAMP

1982

FILE No.

Dd: 330



148

Mr Fearn *has been*  
*and approved.*  
*Mr. 29/4*  
~~Mr Giffard~~

ALB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN DEPT OF DEFENCE	
19 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	RECEIVED
INDEX	PA
	W/S 9/5

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

Problem

1. How to respond to a message from the Brazilian Government urging that no military action should be taken which might impede the negotiating process.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that our Ambassador should be instructed to speak to the Brazilians as in the attached draft telegram.

Argument

3. The message from the Brazilian Government was not a formal one, and Mr Harding was able to respond effectively. However, since he undertook to convey the message to London, we need to consider whether a reply should be sent.

4. The Brazilian message implies that they believe Britain to be abandoning the negotiating process. We should correct this impression: and a reply would be an opportunity once again to state the British case about the need for compliance with SCR 502 and to demonstrate our determination to ensure that Argentina is brought to withdraw its forces from the Falkland Islands. It is still uncertain how Brazil will tilt in the event of conflict and it would be helpful to show that we are ready to listen to and respond to their preoccupations.

*M J Williams*

M J Williams  
Emergency Unit

29 April 1982

- cc PS/Mr Onslow
- Mr Ure
- SAMD
- Planning Staff
- Defence Dept
- Emergency Unit

*Done*

ALB 020/3	
11 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	RECEIVED
INDEX	PA
	W/S 11/5



File No. ....

Department.....Emergency Unit

Drafted by.....M J Williams  
(Block Capitals).....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification

Precedence  
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 291300 Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USEDespatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

## PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.).....

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby) 291300 Z

TO.....IMMEDIATE DESKBY BRASILIA  
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. ....of.....

AND TO (precedence/post).....IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

unnumbered  
YOUR TEL OF 27 APRIL 2045Z: FALKLANDS MESSAGE  
FROM BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

1. Please speak to Soares as follows, in response to the message from the Brazilian Government in your TUR.
2. The British Government remain determined to pursue any opening for vigorously the negotiating process in which they have been fully cooperating, with the efforts of Mr Haig.

Any settlement must be on the basis of the mandatory resolution of the UN Security Council, which called for the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands Islands. Meanwhile, The British Government find that

/it

which is consistent with the principles underlying their approach

Copies to:-  
to the crisis, let us as explained by the Prime Minister and myself in Parliament.



military pressure

it is necessary to maintain ~~pressure~~ <sup>including that</sup> on Argentina, ~~by means of the threat of military action~~, since it appears that this is the only way in which the Argentine junta might be persuaded to comply with SCR 502.

3. You should of course refuse to give credit to Costa Mendez's rumours of an ~~announcement~~ of an imminent invasion. <sup>At the same time,</sup> ~~However,~~ the <sup>on 29 April</sup> British Govt's announcement ~~today~~ of a total exclusion zone ~~in 48 hours time~~, can be regarded as an indication of our determination to bring to an end Argentina's occupation of the Falkland Islands, and our readiness, by giving fair warning, to allow Argentina ample time to ~~comply~~ <sup>with it</sup> ~~and~~ recognise the need for ~~this~~ withdrawal.

While you should not

Bob Storey  
Sec. Officer  
Hq. 1st Div

Richard Johnson  
our  
sheep  
farm

the  
on Argentines.  
The choice of  
whether they give  
up the whole thing

have  
unintentionally  
seized, or  
peaceful

whether  
other  
means must be  
used, it  
entirely  
depends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Should not  
be available  
for re-consider  
until now.



Mr ~~Huckle~~  
You may wish to  
ask ~~SAID~~ to consider  
whether we should  
acknowledge the ~~...~~  
Brazilian message

169

BSB/FCO 012/27

RE 28/4

2 APR 1982

OO FCO DESKBY 272200Z

ACTION

OO WASHINGTON

~~SAID~~

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

in ~~London~~

11 12 1  
10 2  
9 3  
8 4  
7 5  
6 6

GRS395

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 27:2045Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 272200Z

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: RIO TREATY MEETING

1. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 4.30 PM (271930Z) TO SAY THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAD JUST LEARNED OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WARNING TO THE RIO TREATY MEETING IN WASHINGTON THAT AN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY BRITISH FORCES WAS "IMMINENT". AMBASSADOR BAENA SOARES SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO TRANSMIT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THEIR PREOCCUPATION AT THIS PROSPECT AND THEIR HOPE THAT NO MOVE WOULD BE MADE WHICH MIGHT IMPEDE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.
2. I UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO LONDON. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I HAD NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT AN IMMINENT INVASION WAS LIKELY AND I THOUGHT IT AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ATTEMPTING TO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING BY TAKING THIS ALARMIST LINE. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES BY THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE, SINCE THE ARGENTINES DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ACCESSIBLE TO ANY OTHER KIND OF PERSUASION. BAENA DID NOT DEMUR.



3. I THEN ASKED BAENA WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE HAIG NEGOTIATION STILL HAD SOME STEAM LEFT IN IT, GIVEN THE ARGENTINES' REFUSAL TO RECEIVE HIM IN BUENOS AIRES. HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT IT HAD, THOUGH THIS MAY HAVE BEEN ONLY BRAZILIAN WISHFUL THINKING. I ASKED IF THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES HAD ANY ALTERNATIVE IDEAS AS TO HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE PURSUED. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT AT THE MOMENT.

COMMENT

4. BRAZILIAN CONCERN AT THE MENACING TURN OF EVENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS NO DOUBT GENUINE. IT WAS EXPRESSED YESTERDAY BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND TO ME BY THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF CIVIL HOUSEHOLD. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SOME SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S AMBIGUOUS POSITION AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE A FIRMER STAND IN SUPPORT OF SPECIFICALLY BRAZILIAN INTERESTS INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT UNSEEMLY PREOCCUPATION WITH PLACATING ARGENTINA. THIS LINE IS ECHOED IN ONE OR TWO POWERFUL EDITORIALS IN THE PRESS (SEE MYTEL NO 135)/: AND PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HIMSELF IMPLIED TO CARLUCCI THAT THE TIME MIGHT COME WHEN BRAZIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER TAKING A HAND. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS MOMENT HAS YET ARRIVED: NOR IS IT EASY TO SEE WHAT ROLE IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BRAZIL MIGHT BE FITTED TO PLAY.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD 27:2205Z K//HK



CÓPIA.

SERVIÇO NO EXTERIOR



BRITISH EMBASSY  
Brasília

*Mr Smith PAA*  
*Copied to Mr Jones (47)*  
*Pass and CP*  
*for action*  
*and to Emergency Unit*

Nº 42 /921.5(B29)(F27)

ALB02d3	
RECEIVED IN DEPT. OF STATE	
11 MAY 1982	
DEPT. OF STATE	RECEIVED
100-100000	100-100000
WLS 11/5	

The Brazilian Embassy present their compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and further to the Embassy's Note nº 31, of April 5th, 1982, have the honour to inform that the Argentine Government have requested the Brazilian Government to undertake the protection of the Argentine consular interests in Brunei.

2. The Brazilian Embassy would be most grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could inform if Her Majesty's Government has any objections to the compliance of the above request.

3. Should Her Majesty's Government grant its approval the Brazilian Embassy would appreciate being instructed as to the correct procedure to be followed.

The Brazilian Embassy avail themselves of the opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of their highest consideration.

London, April 21<sup>st</sup>, 1982.





## BRITISH EMBASSY

Brasilia

H D MacPherson Esq  
South America Department  
FCO

ALB 000/B	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.	
11 MAY 1982	
Your reference	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
Our reference	Action Taken
Date	4 May 1982
	WS 11/5

Dear Hugh

PS  
10/5

## BRAZILIAN PRESS COMMENT

1. Although there is a fair amount of Latin American solidarity rhetoric swilling around the Brazilian press, some hard-hitting editorial comment of a strongly pro-British variety can be found in some of the serious papers, notably the Jornal do Brasil.
2. Our telegram number 150 of 2 May quoted excerpts from these pieces. I enclose here copies of some of the originals, together with a couple of splendid cartoons from the Jornal do Brasil. This current of serious comment cannot be ignored by Itamaraty in its balancing act.
3. I am copying the originals also to Information Department for possible use in translation in the worldwide information effort over the crisis. I regret that we here do not have capacity to do this translation, and certainly not in time for tomorrow's bag!
4. The information war is an important one, certainly not foreseen in the guidelines for recent inspections. We have asked PSD for authority to engage a good Portuguese translator for the duration of the crisis to speed up our distribution of British information to the Brazilian media. Some of the radio stations, for instance, will carry verbatim whatever is put in front of them. At the moment the Argentines are able to put more than we. I hope, therefore, that you and Information Department will support our request for speedy authorisation of this necessary extra translation capacity.

Yours ever  
Michael

M Perceval

cc: Information Department, FCO



# As Falklands e o colonialismo

A questão surgida entre a Grã-Bretanha e a Argentina a propósito das Falklands já tem despertado debates eruditos nas colunas dos jornais. O prof. José Honório Rodrigues brincha-nos, no Jornal do Brasil de domingo 11, com uma exaustiva análise dos antecedentes históricos da questão, provando, a meu ver corretamente, que as ilhas são inglesas porque foram descobertas por marinheiros ingleses, ponto. Duas outras opiniões abalizadas merecem discussão: as dos professores Hélio Jaguaribe e Celso Lafer, ambos juristas. Ambos argumentam contra a Grã-Bretanha, acusada de "colonialismo" anacrônico. Deter-me-ei sobre esse tema para ajudar a passar interessadamente o tempo, enquanto aguardamos a chegada da esquadra inglesa à área em disputa...

A posição argentina é "juridicamente correta", segundo Lafer, por força de certas resoluções da Assembleia Geral da ONU. Surpreende-me a alegação! Se as Resoluções da Assembleia Geral da ONU criassem direitos e tivessem força de execução, receio que não teria eu mais oportunidade de me encontrar com o prof. Lafer em Israel onde, para meu prazer e honra, o conheci há alguns anos: Israel já teria desaparecido do mapa. Mas felizmente não é isso o que ocorre. As maiorias demagógicas que controlam aquele cenáculo constituem talvez uma das mais flagrantes demonstrações do desatino humano em nossa época, e ninguém, em sã consciência, deveria trocar decisões daquele órgão por uma solução pacífica de contendas

territoriais. Já quanto a Resoluções do Conselho de Segurança, elitista como é esse órgão, não diríamos o mesmo, graças à saudável instituição do veto que ali impõe consenso: o consenso de que a Argentina deve retirar suas forças das Falklands...

Durante os quatro anos em que servi na missão brasileira junto à ONU, tive a satisfação de conhecer vários professores da augusta Faculdade de Direito do Largo S. Francisco, sendo chanceler o prof. Vicente Ráo: Sampaio Dória, Caruto Mendes de Almeida, Ernesto Leme. Deste me tornaria amigo e admirador, esperando que não me leve a mal se escrevo que professores de Direito encontram às vezes certa dificuldade em entender exatamente e que se passa na ONU. As Nações Unidas não são uma organização jurídica, são uma organização política. O próprio Direito Internacional é um direito sui generis, evadido de imperfeições. Qualquer argumento sobre ele baseado é passível de contaminação por interesses políticos e ideológicos suspeitos. O que digo deve ser interpretado como um elogio àqueles mestres que, austera e convencidos do caráter sagrado do Direito, mal interpretam as questões de política internacional. A política é uma arte: a arte do possível — a arte da negociação, da propaganda, da mentira, do compromisso, do acordo secreto e da trágica desonestidade.

Os 160 membros da ONU, a maioria formada de ex-colônias politicamente imaturas, culturalmente subdesenvolvidas e economicamente

inviáveis, estão ideologicamente contaminados pelo "não-alinhamento" marxista-leninista que Fidel Castro preside. Vivem obcecados com o problema colonial. Vivem cegos também ao único colonialismo sobrevivente em nosso final de século: o que submete a Moscou 250 milhões de siberianos, turcos, mongóis, caucásios, armênios, baltas, judeus, alemães, poloneses, checos, húngaros, tchecoslovacos, afegãos, etc., etc.

Pergunto: quem são os colonialistas, os dois mil pescadores e pastores de carneiros, ingleses, que vivem bucolicamente em ilhas por eles descobertas e habitadas há 150 anos, ou os 5.000 soldados argentinos, com seus tanques e helicópteros, obedientes a uma manobra maquiavélica de um ditador míliar? Desde quando o fato de as ilhas terem sido ocupadas, durante algum tempo e por sua própria conta, pelo navegador francês Louis Antoine de Bougainville (1764), o qual lhes deu o nome de Malouines ou Malvinas, em honra dos marinheiros de St. Maló, na França, cria direitos para a Argentina? Estou como uma mosca presa no labirinto jurídico que criou o prof. Celso Lafer...

Se, como ele ainda alega, o uso-capitão (ou o princípio do utipossidetis) constitui "uma etiqueta destinada a cobrir uma posse evadida de irregularidades" — receio que o Brasil estaria diplomaticamente em maus lençóis. Pois como foi que Alexandre de Gusmão e Rio Branco conseguiram para o Brasil a posse de metade de nosso território, a oeste da

linha de Tordesilhas, senão invocando precisamente essa "etiqueta"?

Se o colonialismo português estava "evadido de irregularidades", não sei — mas foi graças a esse nosso bemaumentado colonialismo que possuíamos hoje, sem problemas, um dos maiores territórios do planeta. E Rio Branco sempre teve a habilidade diplomática (e de novo "a política como arte do possível...") de utilizar os argumentos jurídicos ou as técnicas de negociação para resolver as pendências criadas pela posse "de fato" do território, em outras palavras, pelo uso-capitão. Nossa crença no "direito de herança" do patrimônio colonial nunca foi muito rígida. Aconselharia aos professores Jaguaribe e Lafer a leitura um pouco mais profunda da história diplomática do Brasil...

A comparação com o episódio da ilha da Trindade em 1895 também não procede. Ao contrário das Falkland, a ilha da Trindade, como bem repara o próprio dr. Celso Lafer, não foi descoberta pelos ingleses, mas pelos portugueses, que a ocuparam (1797). A prova de que o caso dessa ilha era diferente do das Falkland é que, na época, era a Inglaterra senhora dos mares, dona de um poder incontrolável, ao passo que o Brasil, havendo sofrido os distúrbios anárquicos da Presidência Floriano, enfrentava a calamidade da Guerra de Canudos. E, no entanto, modéstia à parte, com um talento que contrasta supinamente com a insensatez da Casa Rosada, conseguimos a restituição da ilha

em boa paz. Diz que os recursos de que utilizamos, além de diplomáticos, foram tipicamente "eróticos": era embaixador de Portugal em Londres o marquês de Soveral, amigo e companheiro de farras do príncipe de Gales, futuro Eduardo VII, sempre muito interessado em política externa. Soveral tinha um aspecto físico, moreno e peludo, que seduzia as damas da corte e essas foram intermediárias da transação. O Brasil, ao recorrer aos bons ofícios do rei de Portugal, dom Carlos, valeu-se de tais circunstâncias.

O prof. Celso Lafer, pelo que se depreende de sua entrevista ao Jornal do Brasil, não parece seguro de sua semântica. Afirma que as Falkland "não constituem um caso de colonização clássica". O emaranhado ideológico continua: não é "colonização", mas por que é "colonialismo"? O arquipélago das Canárias é habitado por espanhóis, mas está próximo do litoral da Mauritânia, a cuja plataforma continental pertence. Foi um caso de colonialismo ou de colonização? A ilha da Madeira pertence a Portugal, mas está no litoral do Marrocos: colonialismo ou colonização? A Groenlândia é geograficamente parte do Canadá, mas pertence à Dinamarca. Colonialismo? Mais perto de nós está a Guiana Francesa: por um raciocínio semelhante ao da Casa Rosada, o presidente Jânio Quadros teria sido justificado em reivindicá-la como brasileira...

Com esses exemplos quero apenas salientar o extremo perigo de argumentar juridicamente em casos

de "colonialismo" tão bizantinos como esses. Afinal de contas, até o Chile do general Pinochet poderia encontrar argumentos, se quisesse complicar ainda mais os arrazoados dos professores de Direito, para reivindicar as Falkland como parte da plataforma continental chilena, incluída na linha mediana perpendicular que parte do canal de Beagle.

Em conclusão, se os kelpers de Port Stanley são colonialistas detestáveis e os soldados do general Galtieri grandes democratas libertadores, entrego os pontos! Aceito também que o Afeganistão foi libertado pelos russos para impedir uma intervenção do imperialismo americano. Que o general Jaruzelski impôs uma ditadura (anti) proletariada para preencher a entrega da Polónia ao capitalismo internacional, representado pelo sr. Walesa. E que a Frente Farabundo Martí defende a paz e a democracia contra a grande maioria de terroristas de direita que votaram recentemente nas eleições de El Salvador. Admitirei até que os russos apelem para o Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca, do Rio de Janeiro, para defenderem a segurança deste continente, notadamente escarmentado pelo imperialismo anglo-sarônico. Afinal de contas, o Tiar não foi invocado quando os russos libertaram Cuba, os cubanos libertaram a Nicarágua, e os nicaragüenses tentaram libertar El Salvador...

Era Kafka que dizia: "A mentira se tornou a ordem universal". E viva o Direito Internacional!



# JORNAL DO BRASIL

Diretora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro  
Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Bernard da Costa Campos  
Diretor: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Walter Fontoura  
Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Golpe sobre Golpe

A ofensiva britânica ontem desencadeada contra as posições argentinas nas Ilhas Falkland inaugura a etapa final de um conflito armado que se vinha esboçando desde a invasão das ilhas, há um mês, e a decisão da Inglaterra de despachar para o Atlântico Sul uma poderosa esquadra.

Sobre o golpe que isto representa para o sistema interamericano, a partir da decisão dos Estados Unidos de apoiar oficialmente a Inglaterra, muito se pode especular. Quanto aos fatos propriamente ditos, são bastante claros, e desaconselham interpretações rebuscadas. Com a tomada das Geórgias e o bombardeio iniciado ontem, a Inglaterra responde à humilhação que lhe foi imposta com a conquista das Falklands decretada pela Junta Militar de Buenos Aires. Resta apenas indagar se Buenos Aires terá levado suficientemente a sério, desde o início, a possibilidade desta resposta. O orgulho nacional não é privilégio deste ou daquele país. Uma nação ofendida frontalmente só não reage na mesma medida quando não tem condições para isso. Foi o caso da Polônia, atacada pelos nazistas em 1939; foi o caso da Tcheco-Eslôvaquia em 1968.

A Inglaterra tinha condições de reagir; e seria ingênuo acreditar que ela teria enviado uma esquadra em missão tão longa e tão dispendiosa para dedicar-se, depois disso, a uma interminável disputa verbal com a Argentina — que, aliás, não prometia nada, já que a Argentina não se afastou da exigência da soberania imediata e incontestável sobre as Falklands.

A posição adotada por Washington nesta última fase do conflito abalou até a raiz o sistema interamericano. Mas também era ingênuo duvidar de que entre os Estados Unidos e a Inglaterra exista uma relação especial. Este era um teste que não poderia ter sido feito. O sistema interamericano, por toda uma série de razões, não tinha saído ainda da condição de um projeto que se deseja amadurecer e concretizar. Mas a ligação entre Washington e Londres sempre foi visceral, traduzindo afinidades de língua, de raça, de cultura, de ideal e prática política — o que não é o mesmo que uma aliança de ricos contra pobres, de países do Norte contra países do Sul.

A Junta argentina, que desrespeitou a tranquilidade do continente e os princípios básicos de convivência internacional ao atacar as Falklands, também não tem respeito pelo

seu próprio povo: a partir de agora, os argentinos que não foram consultados sobre uma decisão insana não podem sequer saber o que está acontecendo depois das normas participadas pelo Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas aos órgãos de informação. Passa a ser crime contra a segurança nacional "difundir informação que tire credibilidade ou contradiga a informação oficial", ou que "abale a convicção a respeito dos direitos argentinos". Isto significa que, num momento crucial para a vida do país, só pode haver uma opinião: a do Governo. Mais que isso: só o Governo pode saber do que está acontecendo. Com base nesta premissa, o regime nazista, na última guerra mundial, levou a Alemanha de etapa em etapa a caminho do holocausto, enquanto a população acreditava — até bem perto do fim — que a guerra estava sendo ganha. Vendar desta maneira os olhos e os ouvidos de uma população, em pleno ano da graça de 1982, é um procedimento monstruoso, sobretudo se tratando de um povo participante e culto como o argentino. É o retrato da fragilidade do regime, da sua tendência à megalomania, de germes de nazismo incubados desde a última grande guerra, quando a Argentina ganhava divisas numa neutralidade que escondia mal as simpatias pelo Eixo — enquanto o Brasil perdia vidas e navios pelo seu engajamento ao lado das forças democráticas.

Tragicamente abalado pelo conflito, o continente deve ainda assistir à defesa do regime de Buenos Aires feita por Havana, que conclama os povos da América a "cerrarem fileiras" contra os "inimigos externos". É o quanto basta para concluir-se que o conflito já está sendo submergido pela retórica, pelas falsas alianças, pelos interesses mais cínicos. É esse tipo de retórica que seria preciso evitar. O continente está pagando um preço demasiado elevado pela impulsividade infantil dos militares argentinos. O sistema interamericano jaz por terra. E não será a retórica que salvará das cinzas o que ainda pode ser salvo.

Num conflito certamente trágico para as Américas, só há até agora um país agressor: a Argentina. A ação inglesa ontem iniciada tem todas as características de uma retaliação. Até que um laudo arbitral ou uma corte internacional decidam em contrário, a Inglaterra está lutando pelo restabelecimento de uma jurisdição que os habitantes das Falklands nunca puseram em dúvida.

Ziraldo





3/5/82

# JORNAL DO BRASIL

Diretora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro  
Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Bernard da Costa Campos  
Diretor: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Walter Fontoura  
Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Princípios em Jogo

Ao lado das ações bélicas desenvolve-se no Atlântico Sul a guerra da contra-informação. Esta é uma disciplina de que as escolas militares também tratam. Sua aplicação, entretanto, varia de acordo com as circunstâncias. Do lado argentino, nessa disputa pelas Falklands, a contra-informação está sendo usada para iludir os próprios argentinos; e neste caso, ela se torna inócua e iníqua. É apenas o corolário da censura total aplicada à imprensa pelo Governo de Buenos Aires; e desempenha o mesmo papel do "romance de guerra" fornecido pelos meios de comunicação nazistas ao povo alemão. O objetivo, no caso, é muito menos confundir o inimigo do que preservar o regime, que de outra maneira poderia caminhar para um rápido fim.

Do mesmo gênero é a ofensiva orquestrada em Moscou e em Havana, onde as ações inglesas aparecem como um novo capítulo da história do colonialismo. A esse respeito, não deveria ser esquecido que a Inglaterra efetuou, a partir da última guerra mundial, uma política extremamente consistente de descolonização de que surgiram, entre outros, diversos novos países africanos — países que, uma vez independentes, optaram por permanecer no âmbito da Commonwealth. A Rodésia foi o último exemplo dessa política, tremendamente dificultado pela resistência da população branca liderada por Ian Smith.

A independência não foi concedida às Falklands porque essas ilhas nunca manifestaram, por sua população, este desejo. Afirmaram, sim, e expressamente, que não queriam tornar-se dependentes da Argentina. O Governo do General Galtieri, portanto, não pode afirmar que agiu, ao ocupar as Falklands, em defesa de uma população oprimida: agiu pensando (e mal) apenas em si mesmo, nos lucros políticos que se poderia obter nesta aventura.

O fracasso já palpável dessa estratégia não pode deixar de preocupar o Brasil e os brasileiros, solidários até se não o quisessem no destino de um país tão próximo e tão importante para o equilíbrio regional. Dentro desta preocupação, é perfeitamente natural que o Brasil não se desinteresse pela sorte da Argentina, e até que ofereça os seus préstimos se isto não implicar o envolvimento num conflito que não é nosso.

Essa disposição, entretanto, não deve equivaler a uma postura invertebrada da diplomacia brasileira, ou a uma postura tingida de sentimentalismo. O que se pode chamar de *solidariedade regional* é um dado da maior importância a ser levado em conta. Mas não é apenas isto o que está em jogo na questão das Falklands. Uma suposta solidariedade regional que feche os olhos a alguns princípios fundamentais não fará nenhum bem ao continente, e preparará fatalmente novas desgraças.

Um desses princípios, mola mestra da diplomacia brasileira, é o da resolução pacífica das contendas entre países. Abandoná-lo equivaleria a abandonar a nossa tradição — e os interesses nacionais, pois as nossas fronteiras foram desenhadas pela negociação. Ajudar a Argentina no que for possível não é o mesmo que compactuar com uma ação agressiva, ou dar a impressão de que concordamos com ela.

A ação agressiva, no caso, foi a *conquista* das Falklands decretada por Buenos Aires. Não passa de sofisma sustentar que a retaliação inglesa transformou a Inglaterra de agredida em agressora. Aceitar esse sofisma é aceitar a lógica da violência, e dar aos militares argentinos a convicção de que podem agir impunemente, sem consultar ninguém — nem mesmo o seu próprio povo.



# JORNAL DO BRASIL

Diretora-Presidente: Condessa Pereira Carneiro

Vice-Presidente Executivo: M. F. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Bernard da Costa Campos  
Diretor: J. A. do Nascimento Brito

Diretor: Walter Fontoura  
Editor: Paulo Henrique Amorim

## Lastro Continental

No estado de insegurança e desorientação em que mergulharam os assuntos desta parte do mundo, avulta a importância de um bom relacionamento entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos — duas nações adultas, dois tradicionais aliados.

O Brasil encontra-se hoje numa posição sobranceira para notar essa realidade, porque a fase de "alinhamento automático" já passou. O Brasil diversificou o seu relacionamento internacional, sem se fastar propriamente dos Estados Unidos.

O sistema interamericano, enquanto isso, atravessa a que é talvez a mais grave crise da sua história. E declarações retóricas de solidariedade são de pouca valia quando os fatos trabalham consistentemente contra esta solidariedade.

Que satisfação deu a Argentina a seus vizinhos quanto à ação armada que ia empreender? Que consulta houve a esse respeito, formal ou informal? Que atenção real se deu às aflitas viagens do Secretário de Estado Alexander Haig? Ainda agora, a Argentina parece ter recusado a hipótese de uma última viagem de Haig a Buenos Aires, levando proposta do Presidente Reagan.

Ora, é preciso ter um mínimo de bom senso para saber que um sistema interamericano que marginalize de alguma forma os Estados Unidos é uma abstração e uma utopia. Uma ação armada realizada intempestivamente contra um tradicional aliado dos EUA, ignorando um apelo reiterado do Governo de Washington, equivale a um atestado de inutilidade passado ao sistema interamericano; e então, seria melhor abandonar a retórica e a hipocrisia. De que vale um apelo à OEA se está em vigor uma recomendação expressa da ONU para que a Argentina retire as suas tropas?

Estas são as realidades a que o Brasil não pode fechar os olhos. Mais que as exterioridades do sistema interamericano, o que vale preservar é o seu eixo essencial; e este eixo parece repousar atualmente numa relação serena e firme entre Brasil e Estados Unidos.

Esses dois países têm responsabilidades suficientemente grandes para perceberem que a "rota de colisão" adotada pela Argentina pode aniquilar a possibilidade de uma defesa real do cenário atlântico, e de uma boa convivência nesse âmbito.

É neste sentido que importa valorizar a insistente ação parlamentar do Secretário

Haig. E nesse mesmo sentido, o Brasil tem tanto interesse no Atlântico Sul quanto os próprios norte-americanos.

A América do Sul está profundamente atingida por tudo o que aconteceu depois do desembarque argentino nas ilhas Falklands. Quis-se invocar o TIAR em circunstâncias totalmente arbitrárias; e a esse respeito, foram desenvolvidos raciocínios desprovidos do senso das realidades. A divisão que logo se instalou no interior da OEA é a melhor demonstração da fragilidade de todos esses raciocínios.

O Brasil não pode deixar-se hipnotizar pela crise. Se é que ainda nos louvamos do nosso *pragmatismo*, é hora de adotar uma postura que seja realista, e que se situe num plano superior ao da pura ambiguidade.

As relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos podem ter atravessado períodos pouco brilhantes. Houve, como sempre acontece, erros de interpretação de lado a lado. Mas o relacionamento mútuo superou esses percalços, porque estava longe de ser apenas accidental. Corresponde, em vez disso, a um imperativo político e geográfico.

A posição brasileira, neste cenário, é certamente especial, pois não temos laços lingüísticos com o Norte anglo-saxão e não podemos identificar-nos totalmente com a América espanhola. A necessidade de desenvolver o continente como um todo resultou, ultimamente, em grandes progressos no que se refere ao entendimento com os nossos vizinhos diretos. Esses progressos têm o seu valor, no seu devido contexto. Mas o Brasil é chamado, agora, a ampliar ao máximo seu horizonte de visão e de perspectiva histórica.

Não por acaso, tornamo-nos um dos interlocutores significativos do diálogo ocidental — e não apenas ocidental. O próprio crescimento amplia as responsabilidades. E essa visão ampliada traz de volta o tema incontornável da amizade tradicional entre Brasil e Estados Unidos. Amizade que pode ser defendida agora sem complexos, na própria medida em que o Brasil diversificou as suas áreas de ação e de interesse.

As considerações sentimentais não podem revogar — se se trata de fazer política séria — o plano da razão. Um sistema interamericano que exclua a participação e o peso específico dos Estados Unidos não passa de uma rematada utopia. É o que a Argentina parece ter-se recusado a entender na crise absurda de agora.

Ziraldo



tralha-  
e docu-  
táveis.  
indica-  
que se  
uperiori-  
ral Gal-  
a diplo-  
espreza-  
a?

ou, mes-  
Malvinas,  
Argentina  
entral, a  
idos de-  
avelmen-  
gesto cal-  
d Galtieri  
não era  
resse dos  
rvar a sua  
Não creio  
em idioma  
ção de po-  
que, com a  
indos pro-  
brio ameri-  
les de uma

ral, na sua  
do que pru-  
i apenas da  
a pouco. Há  
fluência e o  
los, na medi-  
nais amisto-  
os da União  
ada no reco-  
ta argentina  
Será que o  
argentino es-  
tensão desse  
esfazem no ar  
riedade, num  
mente reto-



# Pilatos e as Ilhas Malvinas

Barbosa Lima Sobrinho

**C**ONFESSO que admiro as pessoas que tomam partido de estalo, como está acontecendo agora, em torno do episódio das Ilhas Malvinas. Uns alistando-se entre os voluntários argentinos, outros considerando fora de dúvida o direito da Inglaterra. Talvez seja tudo isso uma questão de temperamento, pois que há os impulsivos e os relutantes, os arrebatados e os reticentes. Por isso mesmo, acabo compreendendo as reações de Pilatos, e percebendo o alcance de sua pergunta: *Quid est veritas?* O que é realmente a verdade?

Não faltam, no caso das Malvinas, os que invocam o argumento geográfico, vendo nessas ilhas uma extensão do território argentino, aflorando a 600 ou 700 quilômetros do seu litoral, enquanto as ilhas britânicas ficam a 13 mil quilômetros, e não sei quantos dias de viagem. Será isso uma explicação suficiente? Não esqueçamos que razões dessa ordem podem ser o fundamento da tal geopolítica, que vinha sempre no bojo do imperialismo germânico, como de quase todos os imperialismos, mesmo daqueles que já possuem territórios de mais, e não contam com população suficiente para a sua ocupação.

Já se imaginou quantos casus belli surgiriam, se fôssemos rever os limites de todos os países, em busca de fronteiras naturais, abençoadas pela geografia? Cuba, por exemplo, está mais perto da Flórida do que as Ilhas Malvinas da Argentina. A Coreia não fica longe do Japão, e Havaí está distanciado dos Estados Unidos. Vamos, pois, arquivar o argumento geográfico, com medo de que nos leve a outras guerras, num mundo que vive à procura de pretextos para o emprego dos armamentos adquiridos.

Já no domínio da história, a disputa é mais acirrada, no pleito em torno das Ilhas Malvinas ou Falklands. Não vamos dizer que faltem títulos à Argentina ou à Inglaterra. O problema está no peso que se atribua aos documentos exibidos, o que depende menos da significação deles do que da subjetividade dos que os examinam ou avaliam. Não se ignora que a Espanha adquiriu as Ilhas Malvinas do Conde de Bougainville, que lhes deu o nome de Malouines, para recordação eterna dos marinheiros de Saint-Malo que o acompanhavam nas suas aventuras marítimas. Mas já não sei dizer se a Espanha se interessou realmente pelo destino das ilhas. Contando o tempo em que esse arquipélago esteve de posse da Espanha, da França, da Argentina ou da Inglaterra, creio que foi com a Inglaterra que ele atravessou a maior parte de sua existência, a partir da época dos descobrimentos. Com a Argentina, propriamente, talvez não tenha ficado mais de 14 ou 15 anos, entre a vitória na batalha de Malpu, com que se consagrou a sua independência, e a invasão das Malvinas pela Inglaterra, ponto a investigar se as ilhas se apossaram de povoadas,

permanecer e, na verdade, por lá ficando até agora, somando 149 anos de ocupação efetiva. O argumento da posse lhe é favorável. Nenhum país a superou, no tempo do domínio, como no trabalho do povoamento.

Embora seja também certo que a Argentina não se resignou com a perda das Malvinas, desde os tempos de seu caudilho, Juan Manuel Rosas. Creio que essa oposição obstinada significa mais do que a opinião ou o parecer da OEA, quando reconhece e proclama a soberania argentina, pois que este pronunciamento resulta mais de uma atitude política do que de um julgamento de títulos. Tanto mais quando não se pode deixar de considerar que existem dois princípios do Direito das Gentes que não servem de apoio à reivindicação argentina, como sejam a doutrina do *uti possidetis*, isto é, o direito fundado na posse prolongada, e o preceito da autodeterminação dos povos, a que se dera tanta importância como fundamento de uma paz duradoura, depois da Primeira Guerra Mundial. Não se pode deixar de considerar que o pleito das Malvinas não se resolveria com a realização de um plebiscito, entre os que contassem mais de cinco anos de permanência no arquipélago, em face de um eleitorado quase totalmente britânico.

Talvez todas essas divergências pudessem ser contornadas, não fosse a presença ou a influência de alguns fatores que precisam ser lembrados. O primeiro seria a presença do petróleo, que a Inglaterra se dispôs a explorar, aproveitando o know-how adquirido no Mar do Norte. O segundo é o temor de entrar em entendimentos com um governo essencialmente totalitário, e que não leva em consideração os deveres constantes da observância da Declaração Universal dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana. Como justificar que uma população de quase dois mil habitantes de descendência inglesa fosse entregue à soberania de um Governo que vem tendo conflitos constantes com a Anistia Internacional? Não estará aí um obstáculo difícil de remover? Talvez em outros tempos, quando a Argentina podia dar exemplos de prática democrática, fosse mais fácil entrar em entendimentos, quando não podia haver dúvida de que os direitos dos habitantes das ilhas podiam contar com o respeito das autoridades platinas. As mulheres da Praça de Malo não chegam a ser uma fantasia do noticiário quotidiano.

Tanto mais quando o acusar a Inglaterra de pirataria acaba soando como um anacronismo. Ela não foi outra coisa no passado. Mas é difícil repetir agora a acusação, quando a Inglaterra vem dando exemplos de boa vontade, na libertação de suas antigas colônias. Creio que a partir do encerramento da Segunda Guerra Mundial, a Inglaterra concordou com a emancipação de mais de trinta de suas antigas colônias ou de seus numerosos protetorados.

Haja vista a emancipação da Índia, a mais importante de suas colônias asiáticas e que servia de testemunha das inumeráveis violências de sua política imperialista. O Mahatma Gandhi usou, para a conquista da liberdade de sua pátria, a força irresistível da não-violência. Dai por diante, o império britânico se foi desfazendo, num espetáculo de striptease. Lá se foram quase todas as suas colônias, como num desquite amigável que pudesse permitir a adoção do inglês como idioma nacional das colônias libertadas. Aí estão, por exemplo, Antigua e Dominica, emancipadas há poucos anos. E antes uma lista enorme de novas pátrias, quase todas presentes agora na Organização das Nações Unidas.

Como explicar, diante dessas manifestações de renúncia ou da aceitação pacífica da emancipação de tantas colônias e protetorados, a reação atual, com a força-tarefa enviada para a recuperação das Ilhas Falkland? É que, em primeiro lugar, ninguém falou em emancipação. Ao contrário, o que se pretendia apenas era uma transferência de soberania, num território povoado por ingleses e não pelos argentinos. E quando a não violência, de que se utilizava Gandhi, transformava-se numa expedição conquistadora, que usava armas e não argumentos, valendo-se de metralhadoras, e não da exibição de documentos ou de provas irrefutáveis. Nada mais do que uma reivindicação à mão armada, com que se procurava demonstrar a superioridade do Governo do General Galtieri. Como recorrer agora à diplomacia, depois de a haver desprezado de maneira tão acintosa?

Na verdade, tudo começou, mesmo antes da invasão das Malvinas, com os oferecimentos da Argentina para fazer, na América Central, a política que os Estados Unidos desejassem. Mas havia provavelmente outras intenções nesse gesto calculado. Apenas o General Galtieri não cuidou de saber se não era infinitamente maior o interesse dos Estados Unidos em conservar a sua união com a Inglaterra. Não creio que se chegasse a pensar em idioma comum e em identificação de povos. Bastaria cogitar de que, com a Inglaterra, os Estados Unidos procuram afastar do território americano os efeitos e os males de uma guerra nuclear.

Não esqueça o General, na sua política mais estouvada do que prudente, que não se trata apenas da Inglaterra, e já não seria pouco. Há que levar em conta a influência e o poder dos Estados Unidos, na medida em que se fizerem mais amistosos os pronunciamentos da União Soviética, tão interessada no reconhecimento da soberania argentina nas Ilhas Malvinas. Será que o grande e nobre povo argentino estará consciente da extensão desse desafio e de como se desfazem no ar os protestos de solidariedade, num continente essencialmente retórico?



CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

GRS 540  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 071800Z  
FM BRASILIA 071705Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 7 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

A.B. 02013

RECEIVED	
10 MAY 1982	
DISPATCH	REPLY
INDEX	FILE

FALKLANDS: PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT NOON TODAY AND HANDED HIM A COPY OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE THIS MORNING.
2. GUERREIRO READ THE TEXT IN SILENCE. HE THEN SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OFFERED THE BEST ROUTE TO A SOLUTION, THOUGH IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE A VERY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT BUSINESS. HE HAD PERSONALLY URGED ON THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER (WITH WHOM HE KEEPS IN SPORADIC CONTACT BY TELEPHONE) THE NEED TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION UNDER UN AUSPICES. HE HAD GATHERED FROM COSTA MENDEZ THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT WELCOME A FURTHER FORMAL SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SINCE THEY ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE AN AUTOMATIC BRITISH VETO ON ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNFAVOURABLE TO OUR INTERESTS. BUT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE QUITE WILLING TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, THOUGH THEY SEEMED IN NO MOOD YET TO ABANDON THEIR PREREQUISITE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN HAD ALSO RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND WISHED TO AVOID FORMAL DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NO DOUBT THIS ATTITUDE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE CHINESE PRESIDENCY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MONTH.
3. I SAID THAT, THOUGH I WAS NOT PRIVY TO MY GOVERNMENT'S INNERMOST THOUGHTS ON THE QUESTION, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ANY PRIOR CONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, SO LONG AS NO SUCH CONDITIONS (EG ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY) WERE IMPOSED ON US AND NO ARGENTINE TROOPS WERE LEFT ON THE ISLANDS. EVERYTHING ELSE COULD BE DISCUSSED, THOUGH OF COURSE WE WOULD MAINTAIN OUR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY AND TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS AND OUR FIRM DETERMINATION TO GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS. ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS, AS I SAW IT, WAS THAT, WHEREAS YOU WERE ALWAYS ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH CABINET, COSTA MENDEZ DID NOT SEEM TO BE ENTIRELY TRUSTED BY THE JUNTA AND COULD NOT ALWAYS BE RELIED

CONFIDENTIAL

/ UPON



CONFIDENTIAL

UPON TO REFLECT THEIR VIEWS ACCURATELY - IF INDEED THEY COULD BE SAID TO HAVE COHERENT VIEWS AT ALL. GUERREIRO DID NOT DEMUR, THOUGH HE HAD NOTED IN THE COURSE OF THE OAS MEETINGS ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD BEEN IN VERY FREQUENT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH BUENOS AIRES. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO PROVE MY POINT RATHER THAN OTHERWISE.

COMMENT.

4. GUERREIRO SEEMED TO TAKE A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW THAN BEFORE OF THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I NOTED THAT HE MADE NO ATTEMPT WHATSOEVER TO OFFER ADVICE OR EXHORTATION AS TO HOW WE SHOULD PLAY OUR HAND. I WOULD JUDGE THAT HIS FEELING OF IMPOTENCE IN THE FACE OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE VERY DAMAGING TO BRAZILIAN INTERESTS IS SHARED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, HOWEVER, WHO IS OF A MORE EMOTIONAL DISPOSITION, MAY WELL GIVE VENT TO HIS FRUSTRATION WHEN HE SEES PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT WEEK. SIR N HENDERSON MAY THUS BE ABLE TO GLEAN SOMETHING OF INTEREST FROM EITHER HAIG OR GUERREIRO AFTER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

HARDING

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FCO

FALKLAND ISLANDS

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

2  
CONFIDENTIAL





AAB 020/3.	
10 12 1982	
FILE	PA
cc: PS	

44

Mr Giffard

PS/PUS  
Mr Ure  
Mr Mallaby  
SAmD

FALKLAND ISLANDS : PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PROBLEM

1. Following a discussion with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, our Ambassador has suggested that the Secretary of State should send Sr Guerreiro a message outlining our views.

RECOMMENDATION

2. I recommend against any such message at this stage. I submit a draft telegram to Brasilia.

ARGUMENT

3. It is in our interest to keep our lines open to the Brazilians. It is an important market and Brazilian views carry weight in Latin America. We should also do what we can to dilute Brazilian support for Argentina. Brazil has already agreed to provide the Argentines with some military equipment and training; and as military operations develop, it will come under increasing pressure to get firmly off the fence on Argentina's side.
4. There is, however, little that the Secretary of State could say to Sr Guerreiro at the present moment which would help matters. A message would need to refer to that sent by Sr Guerreiro on 30 April to the UN Secretary-General, which Mr Harding describes as misguided. With the Haig negotiations broken down and following news of the bombing of Port Stanley airport, there are few positive points to make, to which the Brazilians would be receptive. It would therefore seem best

/best



- 2 -

best to keep any such message in reserve: the right time to send one would be to seek support for any new diplomatic initiative following the Secretary of State's visit to Washington.

5. If you agree, it would seem best to give Mr Harding a reply now, in the absence of the Secretary of State.

1 May 1982

P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit



# OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
CZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	REPEATED FOR INFORMATION : <i>Priority</i> <del>IMMEDIATE</del> WASHINGTON, <del>IMMEDIATE</del>	
	10	UKMIS NEW YORK	
	11	YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS.144 AND 145 : FALKLANDS : PROPOSED MESSAGE	
	12	TO BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER	
	13	1. We have considered this proposal carefully. We accept the	
	14	need to keep the Brazilians in play and to prevent an increasing	
	15	Brazilian tilt towards Argentina.	
	16	2. The problem is that we have little to say to the Brazilians	
	17	at this stage which would justify a personal message. It would	
	18	need to refer to Sr Guerreiro's message to the UN Secretary-	
	19	General, which, as you say, is well-meant but not helpful.	
	20	Also, following the breakdown of the Haig negotiations and <i>with a</i>	
	21	growing focus on the military aspects, it would be hard to <del>link</del> <i>smile</i>	
///	22	a line to which the Brazilians could respond. It would therefore	
//	23	seem best to keep such a message in reserve in case we need to	
/	24	seek their support for any diplomatic initiative, following my	
	25	visit to Washington and New York.	
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword  /PYM
File number		Dept	Distribution  FALKLAND ISLANDS STANDARD
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R FEARN			
Telephone number EMERGENCY UNIT			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		



# OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

2

1 <<<<

2 PYM

3 NNNN

4 UNHIS NEW YORK (REMBY 302200Z)

5

6 470

7 CONFIDENTIAL

8 REMY 302200Z

9 BRASILIA 30:2220Z APR 82

10 IMMEDIATE FOO

11 REATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UNHIS NEW YORK

12 TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 9 OF 30 APRIL

13

14 KLANDS UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

15

16 FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 5.30 PM (302030Z) AND HANDED  
17 ME COPIES IN ENGLISH AND PORTUGUESE OF AN URGENT MESSAGE WHICH  
18 HAD JUST SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN NEW YORK (TEXT IN  
19 FT).

20 GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE, WHICH  
21 PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED, WAS TO GIVE SUPPORT  
22 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE  
23 KLANDS DISPUTE, NOW THAT THE NAIG MEDIATION WAS EFFECTIVELY AT  
24 END. GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE HAD CONTEMPLATED ADDRESSING A  
25 TABLY PHRASED MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
26 THE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS  
27 SOLUTION NO 502. BUT HE HAD OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SENDING ONE TO  
28 THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO I GATHER HAD SOLICITED MESSAGES OF  
29 HIS KIND), ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS BEST PLACED TO DECIDE HOW  
30 PLAY THE UN HAND AND THAT IT MIGHT ANYWAY BE PREFERABLE TO  
31 DO INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE TWO PARTIES BEFORE THE SECURITY  
32 COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.

///

//

/

34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

XY 48 A



227

X 23

ER

BSE/FCO 012/30

CO FCO (DESKBY 302200Z)

CO WASHINGTON (DESKBY 302200Z)

CO UKMIS NEW YORK (DESKBY 302200Z)

GRS 670

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 302200Z

FM BRASILIA 30:220Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 4 OF 30 APRIL

12  
11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 5.30 PM (302030Z) AND HANDED TO ME COPIES IN ENGLISH AND PORTUGUESE OF AN URGENT MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD JUST SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN NEW YORK (TEXT IN MIFT).
2. GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE, WHICH PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED, WAS TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, NOW THAT THE HAIG MEDIATION WAS EFFECTIVELY AT AN END. GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE HAD CONTEMPLATED ADDRESSING A SUITABLY PHRASED MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION NO 502. BUT HE HAD OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SENDING ONE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO I GATHER HAD SOLICITED MESSAGES OF THIS KIND), ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS BEST PLACED TO DECIDE HOW TO PLAY THE UN HAND AND THAT IT MIGHT ANYWAY BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE TWO PARTIES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.
3. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, BRAZIL WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD EVEN THE MOST CRACKPOT IDEAS IF THEY SEEMED TO OFFER ANY WAY OUT. ONE SUCH IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN, WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF UN



COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.

3. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, BRAZIL WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD EVEN THE MOST CRACKPOT IDEAS IF THEY SEEMED TO OFFER ANY WAY OUT. ONE SUCH IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN, WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF UN BODY SPECIALLY CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY OF REPEATING THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR OWN POSITION AND EMPHASISING THAT THE MINDS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE NOT CLOSED TO ANY SOLUTION SO LONG AS (A) IT WAS SEEN NOT TO REWARD THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION: (B) IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ISLANDERS' OWN WISHES: AND (C) IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

4. IN PASSING, I ASKED GUERREIRO HOW HE VIEWED MR HAIG'S STRONG STATEMENT TODAY IN FAVOUR OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CREATE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH WERE MOST EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE. BUT HE IMPLIED THAT, THOUGH IT WOULD NOT EXACTLY HELP, IT WOULD CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY IN BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

#### COMMENT

5. THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RECEIVE WIDE PUBLICITY HERE, SEEMS TO BE A CAUTIOUS, IF MISGUIDED, EFFORT BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE SEEN TO BE MAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STICKING THEIR NECKS OUT. I WOULD GUESS THAT THE MESSAGE OWES MORE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAN TO GUERREIRO, WHO TOLD ME ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE THOUGHT RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD OFFER LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ACCORD BOTH WITH THE INDICATIONS FIGUEIREDO GAVE TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS WEEK (MY UNNUMBERED TEL DATED 272045Z PARAGRAPH 4, REFERS) AND WITH HIS PUBLIC REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A VISIT TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 26 APRIL, WHEN HE CAREFULLY PROFESSED EQUALLY FRIENDLY FEELINGS FOR BOTH THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PEOPLES AND EXPRESSED THE PIOUS HOPE THAT THE LATTER WOULD USE THEIR WELL-KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY. 16

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MESSAGE CALLS FOR ANY DIRECT COMMENT FROM US AT THIS STAGE. BUT I GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT GUERREIRO WOULD LIKE TO KEEP A BILATERAL DIALOGUE GOING WITH US ON THIS QUESTION.



IN THE DIRECTION OF A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STICKING THEIR NECKS OUT. I WOULD GUESS THAT THE MESSAGE OWES MORE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAN TO GUERREIRO, WHO TOLD ME ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE THOUGHT RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD OFFER LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ACCORD BOTH WITH THE INDICATIONS FIGUEIREDO GAVE TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS WEEK (MY UNNUMBERED TEL DATED 272045Z PARAGRAPH 4, REFERS) AND WITH HIS PUBLIC REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A VISIT TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 20 APRIL, WHEN HE CAREFULLY PROFESSED EQUALLY FRIENDLY FEELINGS FOR BOTH THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PEOPLES AND EXPRESSED THE PIOUS HOPE THAT THE LATTER WOULD USE THEIR WELL-KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY.

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MESSAGE CALLS FOR ANY DIRECT COMMENT FROM US AT THIS STAGE. BUT I GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT GUERREIRO WOULD LIKE TO KEEP A BILATERAL DIALOGUE GOING WITH US ON THIS QUESTION, AS I BELIEVE HE DOES WITH THE ARGENTINES. INDEED, I THINK HE SHARES PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S VIEW THAT WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO COME UP WITH A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO THE SOVEREIGNTY CONUNDRUM THAN ARE OUR OPPONENTS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT HE SAW A GOOD DEAL OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THIS WEEK'S OAS MEETING, YOU MAY THINK THE TIME IS RIPE FOR YOU YOURSELF TO SEND HIM A MESSAGE OUTLINING YOUR VIEWS. EVEN IF THIS DOES NO MORE THAN REPEAT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID IN PARLIAMENT, I THINK THAT THE EFFECT OF THE GESTURE BOTH ON GUERREIRO AND ON FIGUEIREDO WOULD BE POSITIVE. IT MAY HELP WHEN WE NEED THEIR SUPPORT, AS WE SURELY WILL EVENTUALLY.

7. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 30:2305Z AD/JW



OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 302200Z

OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 302200Z

OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 302200Z

X 23 30 APR 1982  
X 23 30 APR 1982

ONE 200

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 302200Z

DESKBY 302200Z

FM BRASILIA 302230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMUNICATED BY TELEPHONE TO THE BRAZILIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK AT 302000Z.

BEGINS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING WORSENING OF THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THAT THE ~~OUT~~<sup>T</sup>BREAK OF AN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS IMMINENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL BELIEVES IT IS IMPERATIVE TO IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE THE MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING THOSE OF A PREVENTIVE NATURE, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION, RAMIRAO SARAIVA GUERREIRO,  
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC  
OF BRAZIL. ENDS.

HARDING

PARA 1 LINE SEVEN SHD READ QUOTE AND THAT THE OUTBREAK OF UNQUOTE

NNNN



RESTRICTED

Secretary of State

ALB 02013	
12 MAY 1982	
RECEIVED	RECEIVED
UNITED STATES	UNITED STATES
AMEMB	AMEMB
BRASILIA	BRASILIA
12/5	12/5

PS (43)  
12/5

PS

Issue per  
ditto

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO THE PRIME MINISTER

A

1. President Figueiredo has sent a message of sympathy to the Prime Minister over the loss of life from the sinking of HMS Sheffield. I recommend that a reply should be sent and submit a draft telegram to the Embassy in Brasilia.
2. Following concern over the escalation of the conflict in the South Atlantic there is increasing pressure in Brazil both in the media and Congress for the Government to adopt a more active role. A reply to President Figueiredo would provide a valuable opportunity to put across our case at a time when we need their understanding.

R. J. Chase

R J Chase  
South America Department  
233 4970

7 May 1982

cc: PS/Mr Onslow  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Fearn, Emergency Unit  
Mr Ure

PS

1. We spoke and I have amended the draft message to President Figueiredo covered by Mr Chase's submission. I also attach a draft letter to the Private Secretary, No 10.

P. R. Fearn

P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

9 May 1982

cc: PS/Mr Onslow  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Chase, SAMD  
Mr Ure

RESTRICTED



(42)

TOP COPY 500  
54

ALB 000/3.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.

10 MAY 1982

DESK OFFICER		REGISTER
INDEX	PA	Action taken

RESTRICTED

3728 - 2

OO BRASILIA DESKBY 061600Z  
GRS 110  
RESTRICTED  
FM FCO 060930Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 6 MAY  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
YOUR TELNO 156: BRAZILIAN REACTIONS

(40) 1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAS ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT AS FOLLOWS.  
QUOTE. DISTRESSED BY THE SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIVES, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY FELT WHEN IT AFFECTS TWO FRIENDLY PEOPLES. I BEG YOU TO ACCEPT THE EXPRESSION OF MY SYMPATHY FOR THE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK ON 'SHEFFIELD' AS WELL AS MY FERVENT WISHES THAT THE PARTIES SHALL SUCCEED IN FINDING A WAY OF HONOURABLY PUTTING AN END TO VIOLENCE. HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS.  
UNQUOTE.

PYM

DISTRIBUTION  
STANDARD  
SAMD  
EMERGENCY UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

RESTRICTED



(4) 500  
43

MB 020/3.

10		
DATE	PA	AMOUNT
INDEX		

SANJ.

263563 PRDRME G  
611311MNRED BR

ZCZC

TRE/04 BRASILIA DF 05 21000HS BRAZGOVT

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET  
THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND LONDON

104G/SG DISTRESSED BY THE SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIVES, WHICH IS  
PARTICULARLY FELT WHEN IT AFFECTS TWO FRIENDLY PEOPLES, I BEG YOU  
TO ACCEPT THE EXPRESSION OF MY SYMPATHY FOR THE CASUALTIES RESULTING  
FROM THE ATTACK ON THE DESTROYER "SHEFFIELD" AS WELL AS MY  
FERVENT WISHES THAT THE PARTIES SHALL SUCCEED IN FINDING A WAY OF  
HONOURABLY PUTTING AN END TO VIOLENCE.  
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

JOAO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO  
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF  
BRAZIL

mp 07 4/5.

263563 PRDRME G  
611311MNRED BR

Advances ER



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 051855Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 052300Z MAY 82

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

(40)

ALB020/3.

RECEIVED IN AMBASSY NO.

**TOP-COPY 82**

DATE	TIME	BY	REMARKS

## FALKLANDS: LATEST BRAZILIAN REACTIONS

1. NEWS OF THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO OUTSIDE THE TEZ, AND THE GREAT LOSS OF LIFE WHICH WAS AT FIRST FEARED, WAS RECEIVED WITH ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN BRAZIL. FEARS OF A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT WERE REFLECTED WIDELY IN PRESS COMMENT. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO SENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI EXPRESSING HIS DEEP CONCERN AT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE MOST SINCERE SYMPATHY OF THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE FOR THE ARGENTINE FAMILIES THUS BEREAVED. HIS MESSAGE ENDED WITH FERVENT EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE THAT PEACE AND CONCORD SHOULD SOON BE RE-ESTABLISHED.
2. THE SUBSEQUENT NEWS YESTERDAY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF HMS SHEFFIELD CAME AS NO LESS OF A SURPRISE AND APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED CONCERN THAT THE CONFLICT IS GETTING OUT OF HAND. THIS VIEW IS REFLECTED IN SEVERAL RESPONSIBLE EDITORIALS, INCLUDING THAT OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE LATIN AMERICAN DAILY POST, WHO HITHERTO HAVE BEEN AMONG THE STAUCHEST SUPPORTERS OF THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW (FULL TEXT IN MIFT).
3. PRESSURE ON THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A MORE PRINCIPLED POSITION AND PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS BEGINNING TO INTENSIFY, BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN CONGRESS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS BEEN SUMMONED TO APPEAR TODAY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WHO ARE KNOWN TO BE UNHAPPY WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S OPPORTUNIST LINE SO FAR AND THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO PUBLIC OPINION OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES.
4. ATTENTION IS BEGINNING TO BE FOCUSED ON PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS DUE TO START ON 11 MAY AND WHICH IS NOW SEEN INTER ALIA AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BRAZIL TO MAKE ITS PRESENCE FELT IN INTERNATIONAL DELIBERATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

## COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR	}	TREASURY
SIR K COUZENS		
MR LITTLER		
MR HAWTIN		
MR PERETZ		
MR ILETT		

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

AlB02013.  
TOP COPY  
- 6 MAY 1982

DESK 3361001 1	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
	Action Taken

OO BRASILIA

GRS 230

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 041615Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 OF 4 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNOS 144 AND 145: FALKLANDS: PROPOSED MESSAGE TO  
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS PROPOSAL CAREFULLY. WE ACCEPT THE  
NEED TO KEEP THE BRAZILIANS IN PLAY AND TO PREVENT AN INCREASING  
BRAZILIAN TILT TOWARDS ARGENTINA.

2. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE LITTLE TO SAY TO THE BRAZILIANS  
AT THIS STATE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A PERSONAL MESSAGE. IT WOULD  
NEED TO REFER TO SR GUERREIRO'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-  
GENERAL, WHICH, AS YOU SAY, IS WELL-MEANT BUT NOT HELPFUL. ALSO,  
FOLLOWING THE BREAKDOWN OF THE HAIG NEGOTIATIONS AND WITH A  
SHARPER FOCUS ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS, IT WOULD BE HARD TO STRIKE  
A LINE TO WHICH THE BRAZILIANS COULD RESPOND. IT WOULD  
THEREFORE SEEM BEST TO KEEP SUCH A MESSAGE IN RESERVE IN CASE WE  
NEED TO SEEK THEIR SUPPORT FOR ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE,  
FOLLOWING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

3. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, BRAZIL'S NAME HAS COME UP  
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECENT PERUVIAN PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE NOW  
RECEIVED PUBLICITY. WERE THESE PROPOSALS, TO WHICH I REFERRED IN  
THE HOUSE TODAY, TO DEVELOP, WE MIGHT THEN HAVE SOMETHING MORE  
CONSTRUCTIVE TO PUT TO THE BRAZILIANS. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM  
BEST TO HOLD OUR HAND ON MESSAGES AT THIS STAGE UNTIL DECISIONS  
ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ARE TAKEN.

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLE }  
MR HAWTHIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 140  
DESKBY 021700Z MAY 82  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM BRASILIA 021503Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 147 OF 2 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

TOP COPY  
AuB020/31  
- 6 MAY 1982  
RECEIVED  
- 6 MAY 1982  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
ACTION TAKEN

SEE MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON THE BRITISH AIR ATTACK ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:

BEGINS

BRAZIL CANNOT FAIL TO DISAGREE WITH THE ARMED ATTACK CARRIED OUT THIS MORNING, WHICH REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502, CALLING FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

THE ADOPTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND MEASURES FOR THE FULFILMENT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS OF RESOLUTION NO 502 IS A MATTER FOR THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF.

BRAZIL REPEATS THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ACT WITHOUT DELAY TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION.

ENDS

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR F COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT

} TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60



GRS 320

DESKBY 021700Z MAY 82

CONFIDENTIAL

37

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 021550Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 146 OF 2 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

Alb0203  
TOP COPY  
- 6 MAY 1982  
DESK OFFICE  
INDEX PA

FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN OFFICIAL POSITION

1. THE ITAMARATY ISSUED A SHORT STATEMENT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON COMMENTING ON THE BRITISH AIR ATTACKS CARRIED OUT EARLIER IN THE DAY AGAINST TARGETS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (TEXT IN MY IFT).
2. THIS STATEMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED IN MOST BRAZILIAN NEWSPAPERS TODAY UNDER HEADLINES SUCH AS QUOTE BRAZIL CONDEMNS BRITISH ATTACK AND SEEKS URGENT UN ACTION UNQUOTE. THE BEC HAS ALSO CITED IT AS AN EXAMPLE OF LATIN AMERICAN CONDEMNATION OF OUR MILITARY ACTION YESTERDAY. THE STATEMENT ITSELF, HOWEVER, CAREFULLY ESCHEWS THE WORD QUOTE CONDEMN UNQUOTE, AND DOES NOT MENTION THE BRITISH AUTHORSHIP OF THE ATTACKS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE BRAZILIANS FELT THEY HAD TO SAY SOMETHING, THE LANGUAGE THEY CHOSE SEEMS TO ME TO BE ABOUT AS INNOCUOUS AS WE COULD POSSIBLY HAVE WISHED. THE ITAMARATY SPOKESMANN IN COMMENTING ON THE STATEMENT, REFERRED YET AGAIN TO THE FACT THAT BRAZIL MAINTAINS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND THAT SHE REGRETTED THAT TWO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT.
3. IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TELNO 114 OF 20 APRIL I SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA, OPINION WOULD HARDEN SOMEWHAT AND THAT THE BRAZILIANS WOULD PROBABLY CHOOSE TO VIEW THE UK AS THE AGGRESSOR AND MIGHT TAKE US TO TASK PUBLICLY. IN THE EVENT, OUR MILITARY ACTION HAS SO FAR CAUSED RIPPLES RATHER THAN WAVES AMONG BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION: AND THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT, WHILE CONTINUING TO PAY SOMEWHAT MUTED LIP-SERVICE TO THE SOUNDNESS OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM, SEEMS TO BE AT PAINS NOT TO BE KNOCKED OFF ITS NEUTRALIST PERCH. RESPONSIBLE EDITORIAL COMMENT (EG IN THE JORNAL DO BRASIL AND THE ESTADO DE SAO PAULO) DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE DANGER FOR BRAZIL OF BEING DRAWN INTO THE VORTEX OF LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY IN WHICH HER INTERESTS IN AND RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD MIGHT BECOME SUBMERGED.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 222  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

36

TOP COPY	
- 6 MAY 1982	
IN	OUT
FILE	FILE
INDEX	INDEX
SEARCHED	SEARCHED
SERIALIZED	SERIALIZED
FILED	FILED
Action Taken	

FM FCO 301749Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 093 OF 30 APRIL 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 272045Z: BRAZILIAN MESSAGE ON  
FALKLANDS

1. PLEASE THANK BAENA SOARES FOR THE MESSAGE FROM THE  
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN SO DOING.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REMAIN DETERMINED TO PURSUE ANY  
OPENING FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH  
THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THEIR APPROACH TO THE CRISIS, AS SET  
OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF IN PARLIAMENT. WE HAVE  
COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE EFFORTS OF MR HAIG. ANY SETTLEMENT  
MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF THE MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 502 WHICH CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE  
FORCES. MEANWHILE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FIND THAT IT IS  
NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. THE  
CHOICE OF WHETHER THEY GIVE UP PEACEFULLY WHAT THEY HAVE  
UNLAWFULLY SEIZED, OR WHETHER OTHER MEANS MUST BE USED, IS  
ENTIRELY THEIRS.

3. YOU WERE RIGHT NOT TO ADD TO THE SPECULATION ABOUT AN  
IMMINENT INVASION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A  
TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE IS BOTH AN INDICATION OF OUR SERIOUSNESS OF  
PURPOSE AND OF OUR DESIRE TO AVOID UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES. IT  
IS IN NO WAY INCONSISTENT WITH OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO SEEK  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

PYM

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR	}	TREASURY
SIR E COUZENS		
MR LITTLER		
MR HAWTIN		
MR PERETZ		
MR ILETT		

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

ALB 0203		35A
16 11 1982		
DESK OFFICER	PA	HY
INDEX		

Mr Fearn, SAMD

Falkland Islands: Brazil

I should record that Mr Maxwell-Hyslop MP telephoned this morning. He said that in his capacity as the Chairman of the Anglo/Brazilian Parliamentary Group he had attended on 26 April a Brazilian reception. It had been quite clear from his conversation with the Brazilian Ambassador here that Sr Campos no longer saw himself as an Ambassador but as a candidate for the forthcoming elections at Matto Grosso. He had taken a violently pro-Argentine line on the Falklands. Mr Maxwell-Hyslop said that he had also talked to the Economic Counsellor at the Embassy, Sr Valentino, who was very unhappy about the Ambassador's attitude and clearly wanted to talk to somebody about it. He had accepted an invitation from Mr Maxwell-Hyslop to dinner either on 27 or 28 April. Mr Maxwell-Hyslop said in passing that he was a very close friend of the previous Brazilian Ambassador who was now in New York. Mr Maxwell-Hyslop made it clear that he did not expect any action from us but was simply passing this on for what it was worth.

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)

27 April 1982

copies to:

PS  
PS/Mr Onslow  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Ure

RESTRICTED



(35)

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 240

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 251800Z APR 82

FM BRASILIA 251625Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 25 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMISNEW YORK

TOP COPY

MB-20/3

RECEIVED IN AMEMBRY NO

29 APR 1982

INDEX	FILE	SEARCHED	SERIALIZED

YOUR TELNO 296 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: FALKLANDS

1. COUNSELLOR INFORMED HEAD OF AMERICAS DEPARTMENT BY TELEPHONE OF MOD STATEMENT AT 11 AM (251400Z) TODAY.
2. COUNSELLOR AND I CALLED SUBSEQUENTLY ON RICUPERO TO DELIVER TEXT. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE SENT IMMEDIATELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN WASHINGTON.
3. COMMENTING ON THE INCIDENT ITSELF, RICUPERO AGREED EMPHATICALLY THAT THE TASK FORCE MUST DEFEND ITSELF AND TOOK NOTE OF THE WARNING GIVEN TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON 23 APRIL. HE SAID THAT THE PROXIMITY OF THE TWO FLEETS MADE FURTHER INCIDENTS ALL TOO PROBABLE. HE GAVE ME THE TEXT OF A REPLY TO THE WARNING WHICH ITAMARATY HAD RECEIVED LAST NIGHT FROM BUENOS AIRES (TEXT IN IFT) FOR ONPASSING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. HE REMARKED ON THE GREAT DISTANCE SEPARATING SOUTH GEORGIA FROM THE FALKLANDS AND THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND AND EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THE BASIS OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM, WHICH I NATURALLY REINFORCED.
4. I SHOWED RICUPERO THE TEXT OF THE PRESS RELEASE WHICH WE ARE PUTTING OUT TODAY (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT). HE REMARKED THAT THE BRAZILIAN PRESS WAS IN GENERAL HIGHLY FAVOURABLE TO THE BRITISH POSITION. HE HAD ALREADY NOTED A GALLUP POLL PUBLISHED IN YESTERDAY'S NEWSPAPERS SHOWING THAT OPINION IN SAO PAULO IS ALMOST EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE CLAIMS TO THE FALKLANDS, WITH 58 PER CENT OF SOCIAL CLASS A TAKING OUR SIDE AND ONLY 29 PER CENT TAKING THAT OF ARGENTINA.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLE }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



4  
GRS 695

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 202145Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 114 OF 20 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

34

A/B 220/3	
RECEIVED IN A/FCO	
107 APR 2002	
COPY	

17 MY TELNO 094: BRAZIL'S ATTITUDE TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE

1. IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINA'S MOVE TO CONVENE A CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE RIO TREATY, YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT OF BRAZILIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.
2. THE OFFICIAL BRAZILIAN POSTURE IN RELATION TO OUR DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA REMAINS COLOURED BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S PERSONAL PREDILECTION FOR ARGENTINA, WHICH IS SHARED STRONGLY BY GENERAL WALTER PIRES, THE ARMY MINISTER. NEVERTHELESS, I AND MY STAFF DISCERN A CONTINUING OFFICIAL ANXIETY ABOUT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS NO MATTER WHICH SIDE WINS. AMONG THE SENIOR MILITARY THERE IS NO LOVE FOR THE ARGENTINES. THE RECENT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA IS STILL TOO NEW TO HAVE TAKEN DEEP ROOT: AND WE CONSIDER THAT MANY SENIOR OFFICERS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ARGENTINES TAKEN DOWN A PEG. AT THE LOWER MILITARY LEVELS OPINION IS NEUTRAL. THE SERIOUS PRESS IS CRITICAL OF ARGENTINE IRRESPONSIBILITY. THE MORE POPULAR PAPERS HAVE TENDED TO REPORT SENSATIONALLY BUT HAVE SHOWN NO SPECIAL BIAS EITHER WAY.
3. A FEATURE OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER IS A RELUCTANCE TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. THE PRAGMATIC, LOW-PROFILE AND NON-CONTROVERSIAL FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ITAMARATY HAS HITHERTO ENJOYED WIDESPREAD APPROVAL FOR THIS REASON. THE CURRENT CRISIS CAUSES SERIOUS DISCOMFORT TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, THEY SEE IT AS BEING LIKELY TO BE TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE. IF THE ARGENTINES ARE DEFEATED, THEY FEEL BRAZIL WILL BE BLAMED BY A RESENTFUL ARGENTINA FOR NOT HAVING ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED HER. THIS WOULD RUIN THE CAREFULLY-NURTURED POLICY OF ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN RAPPROCHEMENT WHICH IS THE KEYSTONE OF BRAZIL'S LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND WHICH PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO APPEARS TO REGARD AS HIS OWN PERSONAL ACHIEVEMENT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, GALTIERI COMES OUT ON TOP, THE BRAZILIANS FEAR THE CHAIN REACTION OF EXAMPLE IN OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS IN LATIN AMERICA, PARTICULARLY VENEZUELA-GUYANA. THEY ARE ALSO APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ARGENTINE ADVENTURES. MANIFESTATIONS OF SPANISH-AMERICAN VISCERAL SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA ONLY SERVE TO INCREASE THEIR ALARM. THEIR POSITION AT THE MOMENT IS, IN CONSEQUENCE, ONE OF ANGUISHED NON-INVOLVEMENT AND A PIOUS HOPE THAT MR HAIG'S EFFORTS MAY BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

4



## CONFIDENTIAL

4. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY (MY TELNO 115) ON POSSIBLE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CRISIS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THESE CONSIDERATIONS, PLUS THEIR NATURAL CAUTION, ARE LIKELY TO DISSUADE THE BRAZILIANS FROM ADOPTING AN OUTRIGHT POSITION OF ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA IF THE LATTER SUCCEEDS, AS SEEMS PROBABLE, IN CONVENING A CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE RIO TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE. AT ANY SUCH MEETING THE BRAZILIANS WILL MANOEUVRE TO PREVENT THE ADOPTION OF A MANDATORY RESOLUTION. BUT THEIR LEGALISTIC APPROACH TO TREATY OBLIGATIONS, REINFORCED BY THEIR DESIRE NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE TURNING THEIR BACKS ON ARGENTINA, WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THEM FEEL OBLIGED TO COMPLY, AT LEAST OSTENSIBLY, WITH A MANDATORY RESOLUTION, IF ONE IS ADOPTED. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, PROBABLY INTERPRET THEIR OBLIGATIONS LOOSELY; AND TAKING REFUGE UNDER ARTICLE 20, THEY WOULD REFUSE OVERT MILITARY ASSISTANCE IF THIS WERE REQUESTED BY THE ARGENTINES.

5. IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA, OPINION WOULD HARDEN SOMEWHAT. THE BRAZILIANS WOULD PROBABLY CHOOSE TO VIEW THE UK AS THE AGGRESSOR AND MIGHT TAKE US TO TASK PUBLICLY. DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY MIGHT ALSO FEEL OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW THEIR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. BUT THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY STOP SHORT OF A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, WHICH THEY WOULD SEE AS PUTTING AT RISK THEIR ALL-IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL BORROWING PROGRAMME. ANY MEASURES THEY FELT THEY SHOULD TAKE WOULD BE DESIGNED TO OBTAIN ARGENTINE GRATITUDE AT MINIMUM COST TO THEMSELVES AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO DIRECT ACTION IN THE DISPUTE ITSELF.

6. IN SHORT, THE BRAZILIANS WILL CONTINUE TO USE ALL THEIR INGENUITY TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISPUTE. IF THEY DO DECIDE TO GIVE ANY SUPPORT TO THE ARGENTINES, IT WILL BE AS INEXPENSIVE AND INSUBSTANTIAL AS THEY CAN MAKE IT.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

2

## CONFIDENTIAL



4  
ARB 020/3



29/4

10 DOWNING STREET

SAND  
Advice ple  
x PS

(33)

PS/Anonlan

PS/PUS

Whiffard

Wine

Det - Dept

Planning Staff  
News Dept.

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1982

Dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: POSITION OF BRAZIL

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of Brazil. I should be grateful if you could consider whether a reply is desirable.

MH  
16/4

Yours ever

John Holmes.

Mr Williams

Reply has been

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Tel No. 68 to Brazil

Sent

17/4

SAN Dept




11/4/82  
T 69/02

Message from His Excellency Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, to the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Deeply concerned with the grave risks that weigh upon the prospects for peace, I reiterate the warm appeal made by Brazil to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Argentina to find, for the present crisis, a solution in accordance with the interests of peace and of the two countries. With the same purpose, I am sending a message to President Leopoldo Galtieri, in which I renew Brazil's disposition to contribute to a peaceful solution for the present crisis.

Bearing in mind the efforts under way and the will shown by the Brazilian Government to do all within its power to find a satisfactory solution for the present problem I stress that it is particularly important that the parties concerned show effective restraint so that sufficient time is left for conciliatory avenues to be explored.

Brasilia, April 10th, 1982.






Mensagem do Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, à Excelentíssima Senhora Margaret Thatcher, Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte.

Com profunda preocupação pelos graves riscos que pesam sobre a paz, renovo o veemente apelo feito pelo Brasil aos Governos do Reino Unido e da República da Argentina no sentido de que se encontre, para a presente crise, solução de acordo com os interesses da paz e dos dois países. Dirigi, nesse sentido, mensagem ao Presidente Leopoldo Galtieri, na qual reafirmo a disposição do Brasil de contribuir para a resolução pacífica das atuais divergências.

Tendo em vista os esforços ora em curso e a disposição que o Governo brasileiro já manifestou de fazer o que estiver ao seu alcance para a busca de uma solução satisfatória, assinalo ser particularmente importante a efetiva moderação das partes envolvidas a fim de assegurar tempo suficiente a que se explorem os caminhos da conciliação.

Brasília, em 10 de abril de 1982.





C

E of C

Mr Dearlove

FAKLANDS

ArB020/3	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO	
29 APR 1987	
DATE RECEIVED	TIME
INDEX	FILE

Emergency Unit

Mr Freely

Mr Muffin

Mr Close

32 Mott  
23/4

1. The French Ambassador called this morning to report to me the gist of a long conversation he had had with the Head of the Department of the Americas at Itamaraty yesterday. Ambassador Richard said that Minister Ricupero had made the following main points, some of which were not much more than confirmation of suggestions made by Richard himself.
- (a) The message which President Figueiredo sent to the President of Argentina reflected the personal friendship between the two men and President Figueiredo's personal connections with Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, the President had been careful to express his feelings of friendship for the Argentine people rather than for their present Government. In the case of the message to Mrs Thatcher, Ricupero confirmed that the term "effective moderation" was particularly directed to the impending British blockade of Falkland Islands waters.
- (b) When Ambassador Richard pressed him on the Brazilian offer of good offices, Ricupero seemed rather loth to make any commitment in this sense for the moment. He said that we must first wait and see whether Mr Haig's simultaneous negotiation with both sides produced a satisfactory result. So far as Brazil was concerned, the later she was asked to intervene, the better.
- (c) Ricupero explained that there were three main reasons for Brazil ruling herself out as a mediator in the technical sense:
  - (i) her consistent support for the Argentine claim to the Falklands since 1833;
  - (ii) her undertaking to protect Argentine interests in Britain; and
  - (iii) - most importantly - Brazil's feeling of solidarity with her neighbour and her concern for the maintenance of friendly relations with Argentina in the future.

When Ambassador Richard asked whether this explained Brazil's reluctance to condemn the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, Ricupero agreed. He claimed, however, that Brazil had been careful not to support the Argentine action, even if she did not condemn it.

/(d)



(d) Ricupero agreed with Richard that there was a risk that the initial aggression by Argentina would be lost to sight if and when battle was joined between the Argentine and British fleets. Opinion throughout South America was likely to be hostile to the presence of a large British naval force in South Atlantic waters so close to the mainland. This, said Richard, must be seen as a kind of "Monroe reflex". It would undoubtedly colour the debate at the OAS Council meeting which Argentina was now trying to promote. According to Ricupero, the Argentines did not consider that the UN Security Council Resolution No 502 will be viewed by the OAS as constraining their freedom of discussion or resolution, since the first phrase of Resolution No 502 specifically calls for the cessation of hostilities and Britain is now ignoring that call. Both Ricupero and Richard were agreed that there was a strong possibility that Argentina would get the necessary 14 votes in support of a resolution favourable to her in the OAS Council, particularly as only Trinidad and Tobago have a vote in the Council (this was news to me).

2. I thanked Ambassador Richard for this information and promised to continue to compare notes with him. I gave him copies of the Brazilian Imperial Government's notes of March 1833 expressing Brazil's support for the Argentine position on the Falklands. He said that he thought they were some of the feeblest notes he had ever seen and agreed with me that the complete absence of any mention of juridical considerations was significant.

12 April 1982

G W Harding

cc: SAmD, FCO



ALB02013	
29 APR 1984	
PA	W/S 29/4

POINTS TO MAKE ON THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE'S USE AT PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL FROM 9-18 APRIL

1. Purpose of visit is bilateral trade. We are determined that present crisis over the Falklands should not affect our trading relations with Brazil.
2. The invasion was unprovoked aggression in flagrant disregard of the UN. The Argentines totally disregarded the appeal made by both the Secretary General of the UN and by the President of the Security Council for both sides to refrain from the use of force and to resolve present tensions by diplomatic means.
3. For us the wishes of the Islanders themselves have always been paramount. They utterly reject the Argentine takeover and are determined to remain British.
4. The Falkland Islands remain British territory. The invasion changes nothing. The people are British, as is their whole way of life. We have never had any doubts about our sovereignty over both the Islands and our Dependencies and are determined to secure Argentine withdrawal.
5. We have UN support for Argentine withdrawal. The Security Council passed a mandatory Resolution on 3 April calling for the Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands. The whole thrust of our current effort, in which we hope for assistance from all our friends is to bring maximum pressure on the Argentines to comply with this Resolution and to withdraw immediately.
6. (Only for use if the task force is raised) Our aim and hope is that this dispute will still be settled by negotiations but in accordance with our rights of every state UN Charter to defend our sovereign territory, we are sending a task force to the South Atlantic as a precautionary measure.



## BACKGROUND

1. Traditionally the Brazilians have supported the Argentines' territorial claim to the Falkland Islands, but they will have had little sympathy with the Argentines' action in seeking to resolve the dispute by force. For the moment Brazilian press sympathy and public opinion following the Security Council's resolution are on our side. The Brazilian press have condemned the Argentines' resort to force as a dangerous precedent for the South American continent. Their sympathy, however, is likely to be forfeit once we take military action as there will be antipathy to armed intervention against a fellow South American country, and concern about how it might affect Brazil's own relations with Argentina.
2. The Brazilian Government have already agreed that the Argentine interest section should be lodged at the Brazilian Embassy in London. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has issued a statement in New York saying that Brazil has always supported the Argentine position and now that Argentina has taken direct action to occupy the territory, the only thing to do is to hope that relations between two friendly nations do not deteriorate further. While the Brazilian military and many other sections of the population distrust the Argentines, they would not wish to be seen taking sides against a fellow Latin America country. Furthermore President Figueireido who spent part of his youth in Buenos Aires has a personal liking for Argentina.
3. It is important that Secretary of State for Trade's visit be used to emphasise the importance we attach to further developing our trade relations with Brazil. The visit will underline our determination that the present crisis over the Falklands should not affect our trading relations with our friends in South America. While it will not be possible to avoid comment altogether on the Falklands issue, we would wish to concentrate attention of the press and public on the substance of Mr Biffen's talks with Brazilian Ministers on the further development of Anglo-Brazilian trade.



ARB 020/3

30

29 APR 1982

TOP COPY

GRS 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRASILIA 162030Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 16 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS A FREE TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF A REPLY FROM  
PRESIDENT GALTIERI TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO AS PUBLISHED IN  
TODAY'S PRESS (16 APRIL).

BEGINS

MR PRESIDENT

PEACE, THE SUPREME GOOD OF PEOPLE AND NATIONS, HAS BEEN PUT AT  
SERIOUS RISK BY THE ANACHRONISTIC ATTITUDE OF AN EXTRA-  
CONTINENTAL POWER. IT IS TIMES SUCH AS THESE WHICH DEMONSTRATE  
THE GENUINENESS OF FRIENDSHIPS. THEY ARE EASY TO PROCLAIM IN  
PERIODS OF CALM: BUT WHEN THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO THE TEST OF  
CRITICAL MOMENTS EITHER ALL THEIR DEEP HUMAN AND NATIONAL CONTENT  
IS LAID BARE OR THEY DISAPPEAR IN A MIRAGE OF EMPTY RHETORIC.

YOUR EXCELLENCY'S MESSAGE MOVED ME TO THE DEPTHS OF MY SOUL,  
BECAUSE WITH A SIMPLE GRANDEUR IT EXPRESSES THE UNSHAKEABLE  
FRIENDSHIP OF THE BRAZILIAN NATION AND ITS GOVERNMENT WHICH IS  
WELL KNOWN FOR ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE. I AM ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN  
THAT THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE FEEL THAT THE DEEP SEATED AFFECTION THAT  
THEY HAVE SHOWN TO YOUR EXCELLENCY IN YOUR VISITS TO THE  
REPUBLIC HAVE BEEN GENEROUSLY REPAID WITH THE ATTITUDE THAT HAS  
BEEN ADOPTED.

/IN



IN ADDITION, I WISH TO BEAR WITNESS TO THE EMOTIONAL AND INSPIRATIONAL EFFECT WHICH THE SPONTANEOUS SOLIDARITY EXPRESSED BY MILLIONS OF BRAZILIANS HAS HAD IN RECENT DAYS. WITH HOPE PLACED IN OUR LORD, I TRUST THAT THIS CAUSE, WHICH IS NOT ONLY OURS, WILL BE DECIDED BY THE WEIGHT OF JUSTICE - POSTPONED FOR SO MANY YEARS - EFFECTIVELY BACKED UP BY THE CAUTION AND MODERATION WE ARE SHOWING. OUR HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME IS REAFFIRMED BY THE PROOF THAT STATESMEN OF THE VIRTUES OF YOUR EXCELLENCY ARE COMMITTED TO IT.

ENDS

2. THE MESSAGE IS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESS AS DELIBERATELY DRAFTED IN SENTIMENTAL TERMS TO CONTRAST WITH THE PARALLEL REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY



29

MB 020/3.  
TOP SECRET  
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO.  
29 APR 1982  
OFFICE  
PA  
A/101 Tokyo

GRS 160  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM BRASILIA 16:1943Z APRIL 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
REPEATED INFO DOT  
SAVING INFO RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAO PAULO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 16 APRIL

FROM FLYNN : FALKLANDS

1. BRAZILIAN PRESS REPORTS A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE ITAMARATY AND CLOSE ADVISER TO FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO AS REFERRING TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ARGENTINA AS 'COLONIALIST'. STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, MINISTER ABDENUR TOLD AN ACADEMIC AUDIENCE IN A DEBATE IN RIO HELD BY THE BRAZILIAN COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THAT WHEN SOUTH AFRICA INVADED ANGOLA AND THE SOVIET UNION INVADED AFGHANISTAN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TOOK NO CONCRETE ACTION, BUT IN THE CASE OF ARGENTINA, A POOR COUNTRY, IT TOOK A STANCE IN 72 HOURS.
2. ABDENUR IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE COMPLAINED THAT SOME SECTORS OF BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION DID NOT LOOK AT THE INTRINSIC REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM: THE ARGENTINE RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF THE FALKLANDS; NEITHER DID THESE SECTORS CONSIDER FULLY THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA. THERE WOULD, FOR INSTANCE, BE NO REASON NOT TO SEE ARMS TO ARGENTINA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A COURSE WOULD AFFECT RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.
3. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER ) TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY



RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

GRS 190

RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 16:1932Z APRIL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

REPEATED INFO DOT

SAVING INFO RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAO PAULO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 16 APRIL

28

ARB 22/3	
RECEIVED IN SECRETARY NO. 1	
29 APR 1982	
INDEX	PA

FROM FLYNN: FALKLANDS

1. ABDENUR WILL NOT BE BACK IN BRASILIA UNTIL MONDAY, BUT I SPOKE TODAY TO THE HEAD OF THE COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT IN THE ITAMARATY TO ASK HIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE PRESS REPORTS. PROENCA ROSA'S FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE NEWSPAPERS HAD TREATED WHAT WERE PROBABLY ABDENUR'S OFF-THE-CUFF REMARKS IN A SENSATIONAL MANNER. HE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN CAUSED SOME PERSONAL ANXIETY BY THE COMMUNITY DECISION. IT MEANT AN EXPANSION OF THE CRISIS AND IT WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON OTHER COUNTRIES, EG BRAZIL, NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED. EMPHASISING THAT THIS WAS HIS PERSONAL OPINION, HE FELT THAT JURIDICALLY, IF ARGENTINA WERE TO COMPLAIN TO GATT, THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE TAKEN TO TASK. FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA WAS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT IT WAS NOT VALID FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO DO SO.

2. COMMENT

ALTHOUGH ABDENUR AND PROENCA ROSA BOTH STRESSED THAT THE OPINIONS THEY EXPRESSED WERE PERSONAL, I SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THEY REFLECT A DEEP CONCERN IN THE ITAMARATY AND ELSEWHERE IN THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE POSSIBLE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. WE SHALL BE TALKING FURTHER WITH ITAMARATY AND OTHER MINISTRIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

HARDING

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

RESTRICTED



TOP COPY

27

ArB 220/3.

RECEIVED IN ACCOUNT NO.	
29 APR 1982	
OFFICE	PA

GRS 120

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRASILIA 15:2055Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
REPEATED INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 15 APRIL

FROM LONGRIGG

FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, DR GUERREIRO, IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS AS HAVING SAID TO JOURNALISTS AT BRASILIA AIRPORT LAST NIGHT, THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE UP THE SUGGESTION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAT BRAZIL SHOULD USE HER INFLUENCE WITH ARGENTINA TO OBTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. DR GUERREIRO ALSO SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THE TERMS OF THE NOTE 'NORMAL', THUS DISMISSING PRESS SPECULATION THAT IT HAD BEEN THOUGHT 'TOUGH'.

2. THE BRAZILIAN MFA IS ALSO REPORTED AS HAVING SAID THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO REPLY OFFICIALLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR E COUZENS

MR LITTLE

MR HAWTHIN

MR PEREZ

MR HERRN

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (BIP DIVN) D/ENERGY



GRS 215

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRASILIA 14:1952Z APRIL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

REPEATED PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 14 APRIL

TOP COPY

AB 020/3.

20 APR 1982

PRESS RELEASE

PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO

1. ATTACHED IS THE TEXT (TOGETHER WITH A PORTUGUESE TRANSLATION) OF THE REPLY FROM THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, MRS MARGARET THATCHER, TO PRESIDENT JOAO FIGUEIREDO, WHICH WAS HANDED YESTERDAY BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO.

THE EMBASSY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN A PRESS REPORT, PUBLISHED IN A BRASILIA NEWS-PAPER TODAY, TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A THREAT, VEILED OR OTHERWISE, AGAINST BRAZILIAN INTERESTS. IN HER MESSAGE, MRS THATCHER DOES NO MORE THAN RESPOND TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S OFFER OF HELP, WHICH IN THE BRITISH VIEW COULD MOST EFFECTIVELY BE MATERIALISED BY EXHORTING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION AND WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (THE MALVINAS). THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE ALWAYS RESPECTED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO RESPECT, BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENT POINT OF VIEW AND HER COMMITMENT TO PEACE, WHICH IT CONSIDERS TO BE A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE. MEANWHILE, BRITAIN CONTINUES TO ATTACH A VERY HIGH PRIORITY TO THE MAINTAINING AND FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF HER EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL IN ALL FIELDS: SHE HAS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS DESIRE IS FULLY RECIPROCATED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWLEY }  
MR PEREZ }  
MR TILLY }  
}

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EMP DIVN) D/ENERGY



MB 020/3.  
RECEIVED IN A...  
29 APR 1982  
TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

1189 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
GRS 156  
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 13 APRIL 1982  
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S  
MESSAGE

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE USEFUL ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN MOTIVES IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE AND OF THE BASIS FOR THEIR LEANING TOWARDS ARGENTINA CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE.
2. WE AGREE WITH YOUR JUDGEMENT THAT WE CANNOT ENDORSE ANY SUGGESTED ROLE FOR BRAZIL IN A MEDIATION EXERCISE: AND WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SPECULATE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MR HAIG'S MISSION ENDING IN FAILURE.
3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY A DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIRDO HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO 10 DOWNING STREET, WITH A PROPOSAL THAT IT SHOULD BE SENT TO YOU. IT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED AS SOON AS IT IS APPROVED.
4. IN THE MEANTIME IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR YOU TO COMMENT, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS.
- PYM

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

- COPIES TO
- |               |            |                |
|---------------|------------|----------------|
| PS/CHANCELLOR | }          | TREASURY       |
| SIR K COUZENS |            |                |
| MR LITTLE     |            |                |
| MR HAWTHIN    |            |                |
| MR PERETZ     |            |                |
| MR ILETT      |            |                |
| MR FULLER     | SAFU       | CABINET OFFICE |
| MISS DICKSON  | (BIP DIVN) | D/ENERGY       |

CONFIDENTIAL





Emergency (24)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

17 B 000/3

RECEIVED	
29 APR 1982	
DEPT. OF STATE	RECEIVED
INBOX	MAILBOX

Dear John,

// You will have seen the messages addressed by the President of Brazil to the Prime Minister and, in markedly warmer terms, to the President of Argentina, copies of which I enclose. I enclose a suggested draft reply, which I have not yet had time to show to Mr Pym. As the Brazilian message was released to the press after delivery, it would seem appropriate for us to do the same.

Yours ever  
John Holmes  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



ALB 020/3	
RECEIVED	
29	
DEPT. OF DEFENSE	
INBOX	

Mr Fearn, Emergency Unit

BRAZILIAN NAVAL MANOEUVRES

1. The Brazilian Chargé telephoned me at 1620 hours today, to say, on instructions, that the Brazilian Government had been much concerned to see reports in the British press today of Brazilian naval exercises, with the implication that these were supportive of the Argentine action in the Falklands.
2. The Chargé was instructed to say to me that these manoeuvres were entirely routine. They had been planned 10 months ago and were in no way connected with recent events in the South-West Atlantic.
3. I thanked the Chargé for this communication and said I would draw it to the attention of all concerned.

*J B Ure*

J B Ure

13 April 1982

cc:

Private Secretary  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Weston  
MOD (Mr Moray Stewart)  
SAMD  
News Department



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS540

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 13:2140Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 132300Z FCO  
REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 13 APRIL  
CONFIDENTIAL

MIPT: FALKLANDS

22

Arb 22013  
RECEIVED COPY  
29 APR 1982  
THIS IS A COPY  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN  
CLOSED FOR  
40 YEARS UNDER FOI  
EXEMPTION NO. 27(1)(a)(d)

1. WHEN I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HE READ IT WITHOUT COMMENT AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS IT AT ONCE TO THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT PRESIDENT GALTIERI WOULD REPLY IN RATHER SIMILAR TERMS. WHEN I PRESSED HIM AS TO WHETHER SUCH A REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, HE SAID THAT NO FORMAL REPLY HAD YET ARRIVED. WE HAVE DISCOVERED INDEPENDENTLY, HOWEVER, THAT AN IMMENSELY WORDY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL GALTIERI HAS ALREADY BEEN ISSUED BY THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY TO THE PRESS. THIS UNORTHODOX PROCEDURE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ANNOY THE BRAZILIANS CONSIDERABLY.
2. I FOUND SR GUERREIRO IN PESSIMISTIC MOOD, THOUGH HE WAS IF ANYTHING FRIENDLIER THAN EVER. HE SEES WAR APPROACHING AND GREATLY FEARS THAT BRAZIL MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO IT. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT BRAZIL COULD DO MUCH TO HELP, THOUGH THEIR OFFER REMAINED OPEN. I ASKED HIM OUTRIGHT WHETHER HE SAW UK/BRAZIL RELATIONS BEING HARMED BY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE FALKLANDS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT, IF THE MATTER WERE REFERRED AGAIN TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND POSITIONS WERE ADOPTED THERE WHICH MIGHT BE CONFLICTING. I ALSO ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD INVOKE THE RIO TREATY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HOLD OFF AT LEAST UNTIL MR HAIG'S NEGOTIATION HAD EXHAUSTED ITSELF.
3. IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS INTERVIEW I HAD SPENT THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR WITH GENERAL MEDEIROS, THE MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND RIGHT-HAND MAN OF PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO.

[REDACTED] HE  
DID NOT SEE ANY EASY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE. SO FAR  
AS THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS CONCERNED, HIS  
TENTATIVE VIEW WAS THAT IF WE CONFINED OURSELVES TO BLOCKADING

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THE FALKLANDS



CONFIDENTIAL

THE FALKLANDS AND HELD OFF DIRECT HOSTILITIES WITH THE ARGENTINE FLEET, THE PRESSURE WE HAD MOBILISED AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY WOULD BEGIN TO TELL VERY SOON. HE SAID THAT HE WAS KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINE EXAMPLE MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES WHO WISHED TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL SCORES WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. HE ALSO SAW THE RISK OF SOVIET ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR INTERESTS, THOUGH HE WAS INCLINED TO DOUBT WHETHER THEY WOULD VENTURE ANY OF THEIR NAVAL FORCES ANYWHERE NEAR THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY OFFER MINIMAL AND INEXPENSIVE HELP TO THE ARGENTINES, WHICH WOULD REAP THEM MAXIMUM ARGENTINE GRATITUDE IN THE FUTURE. I ASKED WHETHER THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT DISCOVERED ON THE CUBAN AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS FORCED TO LAND AT BRASILIA ON 9 APRIL (MY TELNO C89) HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS JUST THE SORT OF ASSISTANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IN MIND.

4. MEDEIROS MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WISHED TO STEER WELL CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT IN POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. BRAZIL HAD NO REASON TO GET INVOLVED AND FEW MEANS TO DEFEND HER INTERESTS. NEVER THE LESS, SHE WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IF THE HAIG MISSION FAILED AND NO OTHER AVENUE WAS ON OFFER. THE GOVERNMENT WERE QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT WISH THE RIO TREATY TO BE INVOKED. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE ADMITTED THAT BRAZIL WAS SEEN TO BE LEANING TO THE SIDE OF ARGENTINA: BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT SHE MIGHT STILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY AS AN UNCOMMITTED INTERMEDIARY IF IT CAME TO A FIGHT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, HE REPEATED WITH EMPHASIS THAT BRAZIL WANTED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AS WELL AS WITH ARGENTINA: WHAT WAS MORE, THEY NEEDED THEM.

HARDING

ZCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLE }  
MR HAWTHIN }  
MR PEREZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL



TOP COPY

(21)

ALB 020/3.

REC'D VLD

29 APR 62

DISK

INFO

RESTRICTED

GRS50

RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 13:2100Z APRIL 62

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 132200Z FCO

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 099 OF 13 APRIL

RESTRICTED

FALKLANDS

(19) YOUR TELNO 66

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT 5.00PM (132000Z) TODAY. SR GUERREIRO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT BY 6.00 PM.
2. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS THEN.
3. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLE )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED MISS DICKSON (EIF DIVN) D/ENERGY



SECRET

(20)

A/B 020/3		
TOP COPY NO. 1		
29 APR 1982		
DEK 100	PA	RECEIVED
INDEX	PA	ACRIS T-80

GRS 180

SECRET

FM BRASILIA 13:1900Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATEFCO

REPEATED IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK, MOSCOW AND HAVANA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 098 OF 13 APRIL

SECRET

CUBAN AIRCRAFT

14 MY TELNO 089

1. MY AIR ATTACHE HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE DECISION TO INTERCEPT THE AIRCRAFT WAS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HIMSELF, WHO SAID IT SHOULD BE FORCED TO LAND.
2. AFTER LANDING AT BRAZILIA, AND WHILE THE CREW AND PASSENGERS WERE HELD AT THE AIR FORCE BASE THE INTERIOR OF THE AIRCRAFT ITSELF WAS EXAMINED, ALTHOUGH THERE IS DOUBT WHETHER THERE WERE ANY ELECTRONICS EXPERTS AMONG THOSE EXAMINING. GIVEN MORE TIME ON THE GROUND, WHICH THE AIR FORCE WOULD CLEARLY HAVE LIKED, SUCH EXPERTS COULD HAVE BEEN FLOWN UP TO BRASILIA (EG FROM CTA IN SAO PAULO) AND THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE COULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE EXTRACTED MORE INFORMATION FROM THE INCIDENT. THE ORDER TO RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT AFTER ONLY 5 HOURS ON THE GROUND IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY THE AIR FORCE BUT RATHER BY ITAMARATY. THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT NO EQUIPMENT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT OR IMPOUNDED.
3. AS REGARDS THE NATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT ON BOARD, THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AS THERE IS, A RELUCTANCE ON THE BRAZILIANS' PART TO PASS ANY INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT TO FAVOUR EITHER ARGENTINA OR THE UK.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLE }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

SECRET



19  
500  
21  
ARB 020/3  
22 APR 1982  
TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

1192 - 2

OO BRASILIA DESKBY 131600Z  
GRS 200  
RESTRICTED  
DESKBY 131600Z  
FM FCO 131300Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 13 APRIL  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
FALKLANDS: YOUR TELNO 87

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO  
PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, IN REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE CONTAINED IN TUR.  
BEGINS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 10 APRIL APPEALING  
TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA TO FIND A  
PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR  
OFFER TO HELP. WE WANT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IF AT ALL POSSIBLE  
AND ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO PURSUE THIS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC  
MEANS.

\* HOWEVER IT WAS NOT BRITAIN WHO BROKE THE PEACE, BUT  
ARGENTINA, WITH ITS UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR ANY SOLUTION IS THAT THE  
ARGENTINE FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND  
THEIR DEPENDENCIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION NO 502 OF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. I HOPE YOU WILL USE  
YOUR INFLUENCE WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO IMPRESS ON THEM  
THE NEED TO FULFIL THEIR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS IN  
THIS RESPECT. ENDS.

2. PLEASE TELEGRAPH WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. WE  
INTEND THEN TO RELEASE IT TO THE PRESS.

PYM

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER } TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }  
MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (BIP DIVN) D/ENERGY



ALCOZOB.		
J. A. G. G. G. G. G.		
29 APR 1982		
Mr. Giffard	Mr. Ure	Mr. Mallaby

Mr Giffard  
Private Secretary

FALKLANDS - MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL.

1. The President of Brazil has addressed messages to the Prime Minister, and in markedly warmer terms to the President of Argentina, calling for a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis.
2. I submit a draft Private Secretary letter to No 10, covering a draft message from the Prime Minister in reply.
3. The Brazilian message was released to the press after it had been delivered. I recommend that the same procedure should be followed with the reply, after it has been delivered in Brasilia.

*M. Giffard*

*The Brazilians did work  
with the Cuban aircraft: but  
they do not deserve a  
warmer message.*

12 April 1982

cc: PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Ure  
Mr Mallaby  
SAmD  
News Department  
Information Department  
Emergency Unit

*G. Giffard*  
12/4



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 12:1900Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 122100Z APRIL 82

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 094 OF 12 APRIL

17  
500  
34  
500  
25

Arb020/3  
TOP COPY  
29 APR 1982

INDEX		

MY TELS NOS 087 AND 088: FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE

(12/13)  
1. THE CONTRAST IN THE LANGUAGE USED BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO IN HIS MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI UNDERLINES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PUBLIC THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S PREDISPOSITION TO LEAN TOWARDS ARGENTINA IN THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE.

2. I ANALYSE THE REASONS FOR THIS BIAS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA ARE CONDEMNED BY GEOGRAPHY TO BE CLOSE NEIGHBOURS AND WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO LIVE TOGETHER LONG AFTER THE PRESENT CRISIS IS PAST. ARGENTINA HAS GIVEN BRAZIL A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE FROM TIME TO TIME; AND BRAZIL HAS INVESTED A LOT OF DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER EFFORT IN PUTTING RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA ON A SOUND FOOTING.

(B) ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA ARE MORE SUBSTANTIAL, AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO REMAIN SO, THAN THOSE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND BRITAIN.

(C) PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH GENERAL GALTIERI AND HIS FONDLY-REMEMBERED EXPERIENCE OF HIS YOUTH IN BUENOS AIRES COLOURS HIS VIEW OF THE QUESTION.

(D) THE BRAZILIANS FEAR THAT, IF GALTIERI FALLS, CHAOS MAY ENSUE IN ARGENTINA. THAT COULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE WHOLE SOUTH AMERICAN SUB-CONTINENT.

(E) THEY ALSO FEAR THAT, IF ARGENTINA FEELS HERSELF DESERTED BY MOST OF HER TRADITIONAL FRIENDS AND IS OFFERED PRACTICAL HELP BY THE SOVIET UNION, THIS COULD LEAD TO A RECIPROCAL OFFER OF ARGENTINE FACILITIES TO THE RUSSIANS, WITH CONSEQUENT PREJUDICE TO BRAZIL'S OWN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. (THE INCIDENT OF THE CUBAN AIRLINER FORCED TO LAND AT BRASILIA EN ROUTE FOR ARGENTINA, REPORTED IN MY TELNO 089 WILL HAVE REINFORCED THESE FEARS).

(F) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY ASSERT THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS HAVE NEVER WAVED IN THEIR SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS SINCE THE BRITISH TAKEOVER BY FORCE IN 1833. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THEIR PRIVATE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IDIOTCY OF THE ARGENTINES' RECKLESS AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLANDS, BRAZILIAN MINISTERS ARE UNLIKELY TO VIEW WITH EQUANIMITY THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE BRITISH FLEET IN SOUTH ATLANTIC WATERS CLOSE TO THE MAINLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. THERE ARE,



3. THERE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERATIONS WHICH PULL THE BRAZILIANS IN A CONTRARY DIRECTION:

(A) THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE ARGENTINA EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH A CLEAR VICTORY. THEY SEE IN GALTIERI A CLASSIC ARGENTINE CAUDILLO WHO MIGHT HAVE AMBITIONS TO BECOME A LATTER-DAY PERON. THEY WOULD REGARD THE ADVENT OF AN OUTRIGHT FASCIST REGIME IN ARGENTINA WITH ALAR.

(B) THEY ARE GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THE RESOLUTE MANIFESTATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH US ON THE PART OF OUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS. THEY HAVE ALSO TAKEN NOTE OF OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR US.

(C) THEY SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN ON BOARD MR HAIG'S MESSAGE THAT THE BRITISH CABINET MEANS BUSINESS AND WILL NOT BE DETERRED FROM ITS MAIN OBJECTIVE.

(D) THEY ARE NEEDLED BY REPEATED EDITORIALS IN THE JORNAL DO BRASIL AND FORTHRIGHT ARTICLES IN OTHER NEWSPAPERS CASTIGATING THE ARGENTINES AND DEFENDING THE BRITISH CASE. THEY MUST ALSO BE PEEVED BY THE JOINT DECLARATIONS PUT OUT BY THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES (PMDB AND PT) CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND SUPPORTING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS - MORE ESPECIALLY AS THE FOREIGN POLICY PURVEYED BY THE ITAMARATY HAS HITHERTO BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR PRAISE BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

(E) ALTHOUGH DR GUERREIRO DISMISSED THE NOTION WHEN I PUT IT TO HIM, THEY MUST BE SERIOUSLY WORRIED BY THE PROSPECT OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BEING RECOGNISED OVER THE SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS SINCE THEY MIGHT EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO BE MORE TROUBLESOME THAN US IN FRUSTRATING THEIR PLANS TO PROJECT THEIR OWN INFLUENCE INTO THE ANTARCTIC AREA, OF WHICH WE HAVE AMPLE RECENT EVIDENCE.

4. WHILE I SEE NO CHANCE OF PERSUADING THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO MODIFY THEIR PRESENT STANCE, FOR THE REASONS SPELLED OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, THE CONTRARY ARGUMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 GIVE US A CERTAIN LEVERAGE.

5. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE BRAZILIANS MAY ALREADY BE PREPARING TO SIDE WITH ARGENTINA IN ANY OAS DEBATE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RIO TREATY TO THE PRESENT DISPUTE. THE ITAMARATY HAVE ALREADY TOLD MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502 WILL NOT BE VIEWED BY THE OAS AS CONSTRAINING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION, SINCE THE FIRST OPERATIVE PHRASE OF THE RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY CALLS FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; AND BRITAIN IS NOW SEEN TO BE IGNORING, OR THREATENING TO IGNORE, THAT CALL. GUERREIRO HAS TOLD MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TODAY THAT THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION ARE TRYING TO DELAY THE



CONFIDENTIAL

CONVENING OF AN OAS MEETING SINCE THEY FEAR A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LATIN AND CARIBBEAN MEMBERS AND CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE ORGANISATION ITSELF. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT THE TIMING OF SUCH A MEETING WAS NOT YET RIPE: BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT WE SHOULD BELIEVE THIS STATEMENT.

6. FOR THE MOMENT, THE BRAZILIANS ARE PINNING MUCH FAITH ON MR HAIG'S MISSION. IF IT FAILS, THEY MAY VERY RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY MUST NERVE THEMSELVES TO PLAY A ROLE. BUT I HAVE LEFT THEM IN NO DOUBT WHATEVER THAT MEDIATION BY BRAZIL COULD NOT BE ENDORSED BY THE BRITISH SIDE. I HOPE I AM RIGHT IN THIS.

7. AS NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY HAS SO FAR BEEN SENT TO GUERREIRO'S PUBLISHED NOTE TO ME ( MY TELS NOS 077 AND 078 ), I SUGGEST THAT A REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, PREFERABLY IN TERMS SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION, SHOULD BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS I HAVE HAD NO FORMAL COMMUNICATION TO MAKE TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT SINCE YOU TOOK OFFICE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, IT WOULD HELP MY OWN POSITION IF THE REPLY COULD BE SENT THROUGH ME.

HARDING

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR	}	TREASURY
SIR K COUZENS		
MR LITTLE		
MR HAWTIN		
MR PERETZ		
MR ILETT		

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

- 3 - MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL



16

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ArB 020/3	
29 APR 1982	
DISK	FILE
INDEX	FILE

GR 50  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 121539Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1235 OF 12 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, ROUTINE HAVANA, MOSCOW

14

BRASILIA TELNO 89: FALKLANDS

1. AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE ARGENTINIANS WITH THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS I HOPE THAT THIS STORY CAN BE PUBLICISED QUICKLY.

HENDERSON

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER ) TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Illman  
Emergency Unit

Falkland Islands: Brazil

1. John Flynn telephoned from Brasilia at 23.30. He had had from Sardenberg (adviser to the Foreign Minister) the text of a message President Figueiredo is sending to both the Prime Minister and President Galtieri tonight via Brazilian Embassies in London and Buenos Aires:

'With deep anxiety at the grave risk to peace I renew the vigorous appeal made by Brazil to the Governments of the UK and Argentina to find for the present crisis a solution in accordance with the interests of peace and of both countries.

I am sending in this sense a message to President Galtieri in which I reaffirm the readiness of Brazil to contribute towards a peaceful resolution of the present differences.

In the light of the current efforts and readiness which the Brazilian Government has already expressed to do anything within its reach in the search for a satisfactory solution. I would stress that it is particularly important to have the effective moderation of the parties concerned in order to ensure that there is sufficient time in which to explore the paths of conciliation'.

2. This is Flynn's own immediate translation. The Brazilian Embassy in London will no doubt produce their own version but possibly not before tomorrow morning.

\* PS This has not arrived  
as has defined L.N. 10

*Chyga*

C M J Segar  
Emergency Unit

11 April 1982

cc:

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/Mr Onslow

PS/PUS

Sir Antony Acland Captain Todd,

Sir Ian Sinclair Assessments Staff

Mr Bullard Cabinet Office

Mr Wright Heads of:-

Mr Giffard UND

Lord Bridges Defence Dept

Heads of:-

Planning Staff

News Dept

ERD

CCD

ECD(E)

Information Dept

Consular Dept

POD

SAMd



CONFIDENTIAL

ALB 02013  
TOP COPY  
29 APR 1962

NAME	SURNAME
PAGE	TOTAL PAGES
DATE	TIME

HAVANA

See  
16

29 APR 1982

**J & J'S** **POLISHNY**

INFO IMMEDIATE MOD UK WASHINGTON PRIORITY MOSCOW HAVANA

1. TODAY'S PRESS ANNOUNCED THAT ON FRIDAY EVENING (3 APRIL) TWO BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE MIRAGE JETS FORCED A CUBAN ILYUSHIN 62 AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT BRASILIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ON BOARD WAS THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO BUENOS AIRES, WHO WAS APPARENTLY REJOINING HIS POST AFTER A LONG ABSENCE. THE CUBANS HAD REQUESTED OVERFLYING RIGHTS IN NEW YORK BUT HAD BEEN REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT BRAZIL AND CUBA DO NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE ANNOUNCED THEY WILL SEND A GENERAL NOTE OF PROTEST TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT VIA THE SWISS EMBASSY IN HAVANA, WHICH REPRESENTS BRAZILIAN INTERESTS IN CUBA.
2. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM A WELL-PLACED SOURCE IN THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE TRAFFIC CONTROL THAT WHEN THE BRAZILIANS SEARCHED THE AIRCRAFT THEY FOUND 17 CREW MEMBERS AND A SOPHISTICATED ARRAY OF ELECTRONIC DETECTOR, PHOTOGRAPHIC AND SURVEY EQUIPMENT ON BOARD. IN THE EARLY HOURS OF SATURDAY MORNING THE AIRCRAFT WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO BUENOS AIRES. BUT FIRST THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BRASILIA WAS CALLED IN TO MEDIATE AND OBLIGED TO SIGN A DOCUMENT ADMITTING THAT THE CUBANS HAD VIOLATED BRAZILIAN AIR SPACE.
3. THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE BELIEVE THAT THE AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT WILL PROCEED FROM BUENOS AIRES TO THE FALKLANDS.
4. MY AIR ATTACHE WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THIS SINISTER INCIDENT. THE AMERICANS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE FOLLOWING IT UP CLOSELY.

IR ATTACHE WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THIS SINISTER  
THE AMERICANS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE FOLLOWING IT UP

COPIES TO:

P/S CHANCELLOR )  
SIR & COUZANS )  
MR LITTLE )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR HAWTHY )  
MR ILETT )  
MISS DICKSON (BIP DIV) D/ENERGY  
MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 220  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DESKBY 111530Z  
FM BRASILIA 11:1444Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
REPEATED INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 088 OF 11 APRIL

TOP COPY  
13  
59  
17  
ALB 020/3  
29 APR 82  
INDEX PA

FALKLANDS: OUR TELNO 087 AND TELECON FLYNN-BRIGHT  
PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE

1. CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY SARDENBERG ON THE TELEPHONE THE MESSAGE SENT BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI IS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT AS PUBLISHED IN PRESS OF 11 APRIL IS AS FOLLOWS IN FREE TRANSLATION. BEGINS. AT THIS MOMENT OF SERIOUS RISK TO PEACE I AM DIRECTING MY THOUGHTS, WITH EMOTION, TO THE SISTER PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, TO WHICH THE BRAZILIAN NATION FEELS FOREVER LINKED BY TIES OF THE DEEPEST AND UNBREAKABLE FRIENDSHIP. I RENEW TO YOUR EXCELLENCY YET AGAIN THE SOLEMN COMMITMENT OF BRAZIL TO DO EVERYTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION WHICH PRESERVES THE SUPREME VALUE OF PEACE AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF ARGENTINA, THE AMERICAS, AND THE WHOLE WORLD. IN THIS SENSE I AM SENDING SIMILARLY TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AN APPEAL IN FAVOUR OF CONCILIATION AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. RECALLING THE GREAT HISTORIC MOMENTS OF BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE FRIENDSHIP AND THE PLEASANT TIMES I SPENT IN YOUR COUNTRY, IN THE NAME OF THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE I WISH ALL ARGENTINES PEACE, CONCORD, AND FRATERNITY. ENDS.

2. A REPORT IN TODAY'S JORNAL DO BRASIL, QUOTING A SENIOR DIPLOMATIC SOURCE IN BRASILIA LAYS STRESS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WARM TERMS USED IN THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND THE FORMAL LANGUAGE USED IN THE MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

HARDING

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO:

F/S CHANCELLOR  
SIR I COUZENS  
MR LITTLE  
MR PERBETZ  
MR HAWTIN  
MR ILETT  
MISS DICKSON (SIP DIV) D/ENERGY  
MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

TREASURY

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE



RESTRICTED

GRS 225

RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 102330Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 110100Z

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 087 OF 10 APRIL 82

FROM FLYNN

(12)

300  
17

TOP COPY

ArB 020/B

28 APR 82

INFO.	RECEIVED	RECEIVED

FALKLANDS

TELECON: FLYNN-SEGAR EMERGENCY UNIT.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO'S ADVISER SARDENBERG TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO WAS MAKING A PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT AND THAT THE MESSAGE, TRANSMITTED TO THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY AT APPROXIMATELY 102130Z, WOULD BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS TONIGHT.

2. FOLLOWING IS FREE TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF MESSAGE AS READ OVER THE PHONE BY SARDENBERG:

BEGINS: WITH DEEP ANXIETY AT THE SERIOUS RISKS FOR PEACE I RENEW THE VIGOROUS APPEAL MADE BY BRAZIL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA TO FIND IN THE PRESENT CRISIS A SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND BOTH COUNTRIES. I AM SENDING IN THIS SAME SENSE A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI IN WHICH I REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF BRAZIL TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES. IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT EFFORTS AND THE READINESS WHICH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED TO DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER IN THE SEARCH FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION I WOULD STRESS THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFECTIVE MODERATION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT TIME IN WHICH TO EXPLORE THE PATHS OF CONCILIATION.

HARDING

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

P/S CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLE

MR PERETZ

MR HAWTIN

MR ILETT

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/ENERGY

MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

TEASURY

RESTRICTED



ALB 020/13

29 APR 1982	
INDEX	PA

SECRET

TOP COPY

GRS 150  
SECRET  
DESKBY 071630Z  
FM BRASILIA 071610Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 080 OF 7 APRIL

YOUR TELNO 62: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. MY AIR ATTACHE TELEPHONED AOC 18 GROUP THIS MORNING TO CONVEY THE BRAZILIAN AIR MINISTER'S DECISION TO ASK US TO POSTPONE THE NIMROD VISIT.
2. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 77 REPORTING MY MEETING ON 6 APRIL WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. MINISTER DELIO IS CLEARLY TRYING TO FOLLOW THE SAME LINE OF STRICT IMPARTIALITY AND NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEEPENING DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND OURSELVES AND I SEE NO PROSPECT WHATEVER OF OUR BEING ABLE TO BUDGE HIM FROM THIS STANCE AT PRESENT. NOT EVEN A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE CAS TO THE BRAZILIAN CAS WOULD DO THE TRICK.
3. WE ARE AWARE THAT THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE VERY MUCH REGRET THE NEED TO POSTPONE THIS VISIT, AS DO I AND MY STAFF. THE PROSPECTS FOR RESCHEDULING IT ONCE THE DUST HAS SETTLED APPEAR VERY GOOD.

HARDING

(COPY PASSED)  
EM ROOM

STANDARD  
S AM D  
DEFENCE D

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

SECRET



(10)

CONFIDENTIAL

72B 0020/3.  
**TOP COPY**  
RECEIVED IN NEW  
29 APR 82  
DEPT. OF DEFENSE  
INBOX

GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 062100Z

FM BRASILIA 06:2015Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

AND REPEATED TO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS

UKDEL NATO

TELEGRAM NUMBER C078 OF 6 APRIL

MY IPT

FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE LETTER HANDED TO ME BY THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON.  
QUOTE MR AMBASSADOR, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE PROFOUND ANXIETY OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF THE INCREASING TENSION AND THE SERIOUS RISK OF ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. FAITHFUL TO HER TRADITIONAL DEFENCE OF PEACE AND CONCORD BETWEEN NATIONS, AND INSPIRED BY THE SOLID FRIENDSHIP WHICH BINDS HER TO BOTH PARTIES, BRAZIL APPEALS STRONGLY TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC TO EXERT ALL THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT DISPUTE. BRAZIL TRUSTS IN THE WISDOM OF THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AND FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THEY WILL FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH DIVIDES THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THEIR PEOPLES AND OF PEACE. UNQUOTE.

HARDING

STANDARD

S AM D  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
UND  
ECD (E)  
ERD

MAED  
ESID  
SED  
WAD  
CONSULAR D

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO:  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR PERETZ } TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR ILETT }

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 480

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 062300Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 077 OF 6 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 072: FALKLANDS


1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO HAND TO ME A FIRST PERSON NOTE (TRANSLATION IN MIFT) WHICH CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC APPEAL BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BOTH PARTIES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DISPUTE. A NOTE IN SIMILAR TERMS IS BEING DELIVERED TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND BOTH WILL BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS LATER TODAY.

2. GUERREIRO THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT INFORMAL CONTACTS HAD BEEN MADE IN NEW YORK BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER, SIR A PARSONS AND - ON THE TELEPHONE - THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN ROME. IF THE TWO PARTIES BOTH THOUGHT THAT BRAZIL COULD PROVIDE USEFUL GOOD OFFICES FOR A SIMILAR PURPOSE, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY READY TO OFFER THE NECESSARY FACILITIES. I ASKED WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS AN OFFER OF MEDIATION. AFTER HEDGING A BIT, HE SAID THAT STRICTLY SPEAKING IT WAS NOT SUCH AN OFFER AND HE WAS AWARE THAT OTHER CHANNELS, SUCH AS NEW YORK, WERE AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. I SAID THAT, IN THE VIEW OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THE QUESTION OF MEDIATION DID NOT ARISE. OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE AT PRESENT WAS TO MOBILISE PRESSURE ON THE ARG ARGENTINES TO COMPLY IN FULL WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION. IF THE QUESTION OF MEDIATION WERE TO ARISE IN THE FUTURE, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT BRAZIL TO OFFER HERSELF, IN VIEW OF HER SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS AND OF HER UNDERTAKING TO PROTECT ARGENTINE INTERESTS IN BRITAIN. GUERREIRO AGREED. HE REPEATED THAT BRAZIL WOULD OFFER HER GOOD OFFICES ONLY IF THEY WERE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.

3. I THEN SAID THAT, WHILE BRAZIL'S EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PCESENT CRISIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED IN LONDON, I WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT THE TERMS OF THE NOTE WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD. IT WAS ONE THING FOR BRAZIL TO SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE CASE FOR SOVERIEGNTY, AS SHE HAD DONESINCE 1933:

CONFIDENTIAL

/ BUT





# CONFIDENTIAL

BUT IT WAS QUITE ANOTHER TO REFRAIN FROM CONDEMNING ARGENTINA'S RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE TO ASSERT HER CLAIM. GUERREIRO WAS RELUCTANT TO COMMENT ON THIS POINT, EVEN WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON IT. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS ALL VERY WELL FOR BRAZIL TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO ANNOY THE ARGENTINES, BUT HER FAILURE TO CONDEMN SUCH AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS THE ARGENTINES HAD COMMITTED IN FORCEFULLY OCCUPYING THE FALKLANDS WOULD BE TAKEN IN LONDON AS EVIDENCE THAT BRAZIL WAS LEANING TOWARDS ARGENTINA. GUERREIRO REPLIED THAT BRAZIL'S CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE ARGENTINA WAS STRICTLY LIMITED, GIVEN ARGENTINA'S STRONG EMOTIONS. BUT BRAZIL'S APPEAL TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, ADMITTEDLY IN VERY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE THREATENED TO BLOW UP IN DECEMBER 1978, HAD BORNE FRUIT. HE HOPED THAT THE PRESENT APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES WOULD BE LISTENED TO IN ARGENTINA.

HARDING

## STANDARD

S AM D  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
UND  
ECD (E)  
ERD

MAED  
ESID  
SED  
WAD  
CONSULAR D

## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAKLAND ISLANDS

### COPIES TO:

SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR PERETZ  
MR HAWTIN  
MR ILETT

}} TREASURY

2

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060800Z APRIL 82

FM BRASILIA 05:2055Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

AND IMMEDIATE MODUK

REPEATED INFO ROUTINE BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 067 OF 5 APRIL

CONFIDENTIAL

RB 02013  
NOTED  
29 APR 1982  
DESK OFFICE  
INDEX PA  
RECEIVED  
100

YOUR TELNOS 62 AND 63: FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TURS.
2. IN ANSWER TO MY REQUEST FOR BRAZILIAN SUPPORT IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA, GUERREIRO SAID THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE DISPUTE. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IT COULD ONLY BE IRRELEVANT AND UNHELPFUL. IN PRIVATE, HOWEVER, THE BRAZILIANS WOULD TRY TO GET ACROSS TO THE ARGENTINES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT. THEY WOULD ALSO, IN REPRESENTING ARGENTINE INTERESTS IN LONDON, ACT STRICTLY ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. HE IMPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NOT SHOW BIAS TOWARDS ARGENTINA, ANY MORE THAN THE SWISS WOULD SHOW BIAS TOWARDS THE UK (IN FACT MY SWISS COLLEAGUE IS UNABASHED IN SHOWING A MOST AGREEABLE BIAS IN OUR DIRECTION).
3. GUERREIRO WENT ON TO SAY THAT BRAZIL'S ONLY STRONG POINT LAY IN HER ABILITY TO SPEAK TO BOTH SIDES WITHOUT INHIBITION. IF ANY IDEA FOR A SOLUTION, HOWEVER CRACKPOT OR ILL-INFORMED, OCCURRED TO HIM OR HIS COLLEAGUES, HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO COMMUNICATE IT TO US AND TO THE ARGENTINES.
4. GUERREIRO MADE NO COMMENT ON MY EXPLANATION OF HM GOVERNMENT'S ACTION IN FREEZING ARGENTINE ASSETS. HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE REFUELLING OF BRITISH SHIPS ARE REPORTED IN MY IFT.

COMMENT

5. GUERREIRO RECEIVED ME WITH HIS CUSTOMARY LOW-KEY CORDIALITY AND GOOD HUMOUR - AS NO DOUBT HE WILL MY ARGENTINE COLLEAGUE. HE APPEARED STILL WEARY AFTER HIS ARDUOUS TRAVELS IN CHINA AND JAPAN. HIS REPLIES TO MY QUESTIONS (DETAILED RECORD BY BAG) WERE, AS USUAL, EXCESSIVELY PRUDENT AND SOMETIMES INTENTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS. BUT HE DID NOT, AS I FEARED HE MIGHT, UTTER ANY CAUTIONARY WORDS ABOUT OUR OWN PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE. I THINK HE IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO DO NOTHING TO SPOIL BRAZIL'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND, PERHAPS SLIGHTLY LESS SO, WITH BRITAIN. WITHIN THAT OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION, I JUDGE THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HELP BOTH SIDES IF HE COULD.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

6. ONE MUST CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE OVER BRAZIL AND EVEN LESS PROSPECT OF GETTING THEM TO LEAN TO OUR SIDE IN OUR CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA. BUT I STILL THINK THAT TAKING THE BRAZILIANS INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AS FAR AS WE PRUDENTLY CAN WILL PAY OFF IN THE END.

HARDING

STANDARD  
S AM D  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
UND  
ECD (E)  
ERD  
MAED  
ESID  
SED  
CONSULAR D

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

2

CONFIDENTIAL



GRS 430

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 3:2120Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 064 OF 3 APRIL

REPEATED TO PRIORITY NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

7

AUB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY	
29 APR 1982	
INDEXED	FILED
SEARCHED	SERIALIZED

FALKLANDS

OUR TELNO 062

1. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT IS SURPRISINGLY PUSILLANIMOUS. IT CAN BE CHARITABLY EXPLAINED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION WITH MENDING THEIR FENCES WITH ARGENTINA, WHOSE FRIENDSHIP IS OF CAPITAL IMPORTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF BRAZIL'S PRIME AIM OF FORMENTING LATIN AMERICAN GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS.
2. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAS A PERSONAL BIAS IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA, STEMMING FROM HIS YOUTHFUL YEARS SPENT IN BUENOS AIRES. GUERREIRO HIMSELF BY TEMPERAMENT ALWAYS FOLLOWS A NONCOMMITTAL LINE WHERE POSSIBLE, EVEN IN CIRCUMSTANCES (E.G. THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT) WHICH CRY OUT FOR CONDEMNATION.
3. BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION, HOWEVER, AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESS COMMENT SUMMARISED IN MY TUR, REGARDS THE ARGENTINES WITH SUSPICION AND DISDAIN. BRAZILIANS PARTICULARLY DISLIKE THE GALTIERI REGIME, WHICH THEY REGARD AS UNPOPULAR, OPPRESSIVE AND INCOMPETENT. EVEN THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES, WHILE ACCEPTING THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR ARGENTINE OPPOSITE NUMBERS, DISAPPROVE STRONGLY OF THE ARGENTINES' EMOTIONALISM AND OF THEIR PROPENSITY TO HISTRIONIC AND VAINGLORIOUS ATTITUDES.
4. BRAZIL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE ARGENTINE REQUEST TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS VIS A VIS THE UK IS A BLOW. IT MEANS THAT THE NATURAL CAUTION OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE REINFORCED BY STRONG JURIDICAL ARGUMENTS. AS A RESULT, ANY ROLE THEY PLAY IN OUR DISPUTE IS LIKELY TO BE AN EMASCULATED ONE. MOREOVER, IF WE PROCEED WITH OUR MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS, AND ASSUMING THAT THESE INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE, WE MUST EXPECT THE BRAZILIANS TO ABANDON THEIR PIOUS EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND JOIN WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES IN CONDEMNING US IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.
5. THAT SAID, WE HERE WILL LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY OF PUTTING THE UK VIEW TO THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE (HE RETURNED FROM TOKYO VIA NEW YORK TODAY): HE WILL ALREADY HAVE SEEN YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN TELNO 174 TO BANGKOK. I HOPE ALSO TO SEE OTHER MINISTERS WHO MAY HAVE A MORE INDEPENDENT VIEW. MY ATTACHES WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE SAME PURPOSES.

HARDING

[COPY ADVANCED TO EMERGENCY STAFF & MOD SITCEN]

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



ALB 020/3  
29 APR 1982  
DESK OFFICE  
INDEXED  
FILED  
TOP COPY

GRS 180

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRASILIA 2:2245Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 062 OF 2 APRIL

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE NEW YORK , WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO IN NEW YORK ON 2 APRIL.
2. WHEN GREAT BRITAIN OCCUPIED THE ISLANDS ARGENTINA PROTESTED IN 1833 OUR MINISTER IN LONDON WAS INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE PROTEST. ARGENTINA NEVER ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE ISLANDS. FOR ARGENTINA IT WAS ALWAYS MERELY A DE FACTO OCCUPATION. BRAZIL ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CAUSE. BRAZIL ALSO ALWAYS SAID THAT IT HOPED THAT THE PARTIES MIGHT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS. NOW THAT ARGENTINA HAS CARRIED OUT A DIRECT ACTION TO OCCUPY THE TERRITORY, THE ONLY THING WE CAN DO IS HOPE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS DO NOT DETERIORATE FURTHER.

HARDING

[COPIES SENT TO EMERGENCY STAFF]

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



5

ArB 020/3	
RECEIVED REGISTRY NO.	
29 APR 1982	
OFFICE	REGISTRY
IN	PA
• Copy Taken	

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS  
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 2:1605Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 021745Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 060 OF 2 APRIL

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, WASHINGTON, NEW YORK

FALKLANDS ISLANDS

FROM FLYNN

1. I CALLED ON THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPT IN THE ITAMARATY THIS MORNING. RICUPERO SAID THAT FOLLOWING HM AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE ACTING MINISTER YESTERDAY (OUR TELNO 059 NOT TO ALL) THE ITAMARATY HAD INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS IN NEW YORK, AND PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO. A DECISION WAS STILL AWAITED ON POSSIBLE ACTION, IF ANY, THAT BRAZIL MIGHT TAKE WITH ARGENTINA IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST.
2. RICUPERO WENT ON TO SAY THAT RADIO REPORTS THAT ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD LANDED IN THE FALKLANDS HAD CHANGED THE SITUATION RADICALLY. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT AFFECT ANY BRAZILIAN INTERVENTION WITH THE ARGENTINES. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD STILL HOPE THAT BRAZIL WOULD SPEAK FIRMLY TO THE ARGENTINES.
3. RICUPERO EMPHASISED THAT BRAZIL HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF ARGENTINE INTENTIONS TO INVADE THE ISLANDS AND SAID THAT PRESS REPORTS FROM BUENOS AIRES CLAIMING THAT BRAZIL HAD GIVEN ITS SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA WERE UNTRUE. BRAZIL INDEED HAD SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CASE FROM 1833 ONWARDS BUT ONLY WITH REGARD TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THE BRAZILIANS WOULD CLARIFY THIS DISTINCTION WITH THE ARGENTINES PUBLICLY.

HARDING

FCO  
SAm  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN:  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PP BRASILIA  
GRS 43  
CONFIDENTIAL

4

ARB 080/3	
RECEIVED 31053 1 M	
29 APR 1982	
1. [ ]	2. [ ]
3. [ ]	4. [ ]

FM FCO 020700Z APRIL 82  
TO PRIORITY BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 50 OF 2 APRIL.  
FALKLAND ISLANDS  
YOUR TEL 059

1. MANY THANKS.
2. WE ARE NOT CONFIRMING PRESSREPORTS ON SUBMARINES BUT ASSUMPTION IN YOUR PARA 3 ON TYPE OF PROPULSION IS CORRECT.

CARRINGTON

NNNN X  
STANDARD  
SAMD  
CON EMER UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS



CONFIDENTIAL

ALB 000/3	
29 APR 1982	
TOP COPY	

GRS 740

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 1:2300Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 020900Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 059 OF 1 APRIL

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS/SOUTH GEORGIA

YOUR TELNO 46

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN JAPAN I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ITAMARATY AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED.
2. AMBASSADOR BAENA SOARES LISTENED ATTENTIVELY, NODDING IN AGREEMENT AT THE MAIN POINTS. AT THE END, HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM AND FOR THE EARLIER INFORMATION WE HAD GIVEN RICUPERO. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION WITH THE ARGENTINES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WITH OTHER AUTHORITIES CONCERNED. HE WOULD GIVE US AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. BAENA THEN REFERRED TO BRAZILIAN AND OTHER (PROBABLY BRITISH) PRESS REPORTS REGARDING THE SENDING OF ROYAL NAVY REINFORCEMENTS, INCLUDING A QUOTE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE UNQUOTE TO THE AREA. THIS HAD CAUSED CONCERN TO THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES WHO, DESPITE BRAZIL'S NON-RATIFICATION HITHERTO, SET STORE ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF TLATLELOLCO WHICH BANNED BOTH THE PRESENCE AND THE TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE TREATY AREA. HE ASKED IF WE COULD CLARIFY URGENTLY THE PRESS REPORTS IN QUESTION. I SAID THAT I HAD NO DIRECT INFORMATION ON THIS POINT AND WOULD SEEK IT AT ONCE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAID THAT THE REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR SUBMARINES MUST SURELY REFER TO THE TYPE OF PROPULSION, NOT THAT OF WEAPONS.
4. BAENA THEN TURNED TO RICUPERO WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ITAMARATY ACCORDED WITH WHAT I HAD SAID.
5. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I THEN SAID THAT THE THREATENING STATEMENTS MADE BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NEW YORK TALKS HAD TAKEN US BY SURPRISE. WE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE TALKS HAD MADE REAL PROGRESS AND THAT WE WERE ON THE WAY TO AGREEMENT AS TO HOW TO HANDLE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN FUTURE. THE MENACING TONE SUBSEQUENTLY ADOPTED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN BUENOS AIRES CAUSED US CONCERN AS REVEALING A DISQUIETING STATE OF MIND AMONG CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE ARGENTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

/ GOVERNMENT,



CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT, WHO APPEARED , AS ON PAST OCCASIONS TO BE DIVIDED. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND HIGH COMMAND HAD CONNIVED AT THE UNAUTHORISED EXPEDITION TO SOUTH GEORGIA, IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE USE OF AN ARGENTINE NAVY TRANSPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO SOME ELEMENTS IN THE NAVAL COMMAND. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CRISIS OF DECEMBER 1978 SHOWED, MOREOVER, THAT WHEN THE ARGENTINE HIGH COMMAND SPOKE WITH DIFFERENT VOICES CONFUSION ENSUED AND THE RISK OF ESCALATION WAS ENHANCED. THAT WAS WHY THE CURRENT EVIDENCE OF ARGENTINE NAVAL MANOEUVRES CAUSED US GREAT DISQUIET. ALL WE WANTED WAS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, USING WELL-TRIED DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURES. WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT OUR BRAZILIAN FRIENDS WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO SPEAK QUICKLY TO THE ARGENTINES AND URGE ON THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

6. IN CONCLUSION BAENA THANKED ME AGAIN AND SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING CLARIFICATION ON THE QUESTION OF A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER LADE FLIGHTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE ISLANDS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED.

7. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE SENSITIVITY OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE BULLYING OF SMALL DEFENCELESS GROUPS BY BIG NATIONS RICUPERO REMARKED ON MR HEALEY'S CRITICAL REMARKS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ABOUT THE ROYAL NAVY'S PRESENCE OR LACK OF IT IN THE AREA AND COMMENTED THAT IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THE OPPOSITION SHOULD BE GETTING WORKED UP ABOUT THE SITUATION.

8. THE BRAZILIANS ARE OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS THAT THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE FALKLANDS SHOULD BE DAMPED DOWN. I THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THEY WILL DECIDE TO SAY SOMETHING TO THE ARGENTINES, THOUGH THEY MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO APPEAL TO US TOO FOR RESTRAINT, IF ONLY FOR FORM'S SAKE. THE MORE WE CAN TAKE THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE THE MORE FORTHCOMING WE MAY EXPECT THEM TO BE.

HARDING

[PASSED TO EMERGENCY STAFF]

STANDARD  
S AM D  
SED  
UND  
ES & SD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAIKLAND ISLANDS

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr MacPherson  
SAmD  
K266

*I have given him your clearance the draft  
He will copy the letter to you*

(2)

A/B 02013 D	
RECEIVED A	
28 28/4/82	
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY	MINISTRY
INDEXED	FILED
	Stamp Taken

# ROLLS ROYCE IN BRAZIL/ARGENTINA

1. As I mentioned to you on the telephone this morning, the enclosed papers have been overlooked here and the case is now extremely urgent. DOI officials want to put up today a draft letter from their Minister to the Chairman of Rolls Royce.
2. I have discussed the lines of the draft with Peter Gent (212-0950) who is dealing with the case. He will take the line in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 of Farrow's letter of 20 April to Bayne, changing the last few words to refer to Rolls Royce's legal advice. The last sentence of that paragraph will be left out and replaced by a request that Rolls Royce should let us know straight away if developments seem likely to lead to a conflict with Brazil. The third paragraph of Farrow's letter will be ignored. The fourth paragraph will be used with an additional gloss from Hagestadt's letter of 27 April on the lines that we can no doubt look to Rolls Royce's people to use their ingenuity in devising practical delays short of landing themselves in legal difficulties.
3. Gent will send you a copy of what he puts up later today. But if you have any problems over the line sketched out above, or would like to have read over to you the precise wording, perhaps you could give him a ring early on this afternoon. If he is tied up, the case will be in the hands of Basil Haines (212-5691).

*[Handwritten signature]*

28 April 1982

R M Jackson  
Economic Relations Department

4019



Mr Bayne

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE  
OVERSEAS TRADE DIVISION 5

1 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone Direct Line 01-215 4320  
Switchboard 01-215 7877

C J Farrow Esq  
Department of Industry  
Ashdown House  
London SW1

27 April 1982

Thank you for the copy of your letter of 20 April to Nicholas Bayne about the difficulties that may be countered over Rolls Royce's Brazilian subsidiary's business with Argentina. I do not dissent from the line that you propose that your Secretary of State should take.

Lord McFadzean's letter does concentrate rather heavily on the legal aspects. This is perhaps understandable in a Chairman-to-Minister letter written against the possibilities of things going wrong. However, whatever else senior people in Brazil lack it is not worldly wisdom. I would hope that in practice ways and means can be found of delaying the export of Rolls Royce equipment from Brazil to Argentina over the next two or three weeks by one ruse or another. There are a number of quite major contracts which may be clinched between now and 15 May in Brazil including a Rolls Royce interest in providing an engine for corvettes. I hope therefore that the RR men on the ground will adopt a spanner-in-the-works approach rather than a legalistic one in relation to Argentine business.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

J V HAGESTADT

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
ASHDOWN HOUSE  
123 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1E 6RB

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212 6808  
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676



N Bayne Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Great George Street  
London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1982

Dear Nicholas

My Secretary of State met Lord McFadzean, chairman of Rolls-Royce, last week, and discussed Rolls' efforts to prevent exports which could be of benefit to Argentina. The outcome of the meeting is recorded in an exchange of letters, of which I attach copies.

.....

There are two points of difficulty to which I should draw your attention. The first is the civil overhaul and spares business which Rolls' Brazilian subsidiary carries on for all South American markets, including Argentina. As you will see, the UK company have been asked to do all they can to avoid the Brazilian subsidiary trading with Argentina, including avoiding returning engines now completing overhaul. This could lead to conflict with the Brazilian government. I have in mind recommending to Mr Jenkin that in reply to Lord McFadzean's letter he should make clear that his request means that Rolls-Royce Ltd should take all steps legally open to them, and is not to be regarded as an instruction to take actions in Brazil which they know would be illegal. Subject to that, however, the risk of conflict with Brazil should be faced.

Sir Frank's letter does not cover the possibility that the Brazilian government might attempt to exercise control over the parts in the bonded store which serves as a bulk store for the needs of the whole South American market, and which are the property of Rolls-Royce Ltd. The only further action which could be taken over these would be to prohibit Rolls from sending any more spares there. This would, however, create a risk of grounding the airlines of other South American countries. My Secretary of State does not recommend that.

The second point of difficulty arises over Lord McFadzean's final paragraph. The way the company proposes to handle the sale of spares to third countries seems to be reasonable so far as civil spares are concerned. I will, however, recommend that in the case of all orders from third countries in South America for spares for types of military aircraft operated by



CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina they should ask for a declaration that the spares are for the customer's own use. This would be most likely to be relevant to orders from Brazil for engine spares for Macchi aircraft and for Lynx helicopters.

I should be glad to know if these arrangements seem satisfactory to you. I am also sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to Hagestadt (Trade), Hastie-Smith (Defence) and Alexander (Cabinet Office) from whom I would be grateful for any comments.

*Yours sincerely*

*Kit Farrow*

(Signed for Mr Farrow in his absence)  
C J FARROW





DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
ASHDOWN HOUSE  
123 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1E 6RB

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212 3301  
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

Secretary of State for Industry

16 April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Lord McFadzean  
Chairman  
Rolls Royce Ltd

For Miss  
P. See  
Mr Mearns  
Mr Gill  
Mr Craft  
Mr Farrow  
Mr Maynard  
Mr Hudson

Dear Frank,

We discussed last night problems for Rolls Royce arising out of the Falkland Islands situation, in particular the position of the company's Brazilian subsidiary, Motores Rolls Royce. I should like to emphasise the importance for the UK's national interest of the company's taking all possible steps to safeguard the integrity of the UK's policy on the ban of exports to Argentina.

While I appreciate the contingent difficulties you described for your Brazilian company, its directors and employees, arising from Brazilian legislation, I am sure you will equally recognise that any de facto breach of our policy imputed to Rolls Royce Ltd would be quite unacceptable. Such a breach would not only undermine the stance of the UK and its European Community and Commonwealth partners: it would be totally repugnant to British public opinion and would inevitably damage the good name of the company. I would therefore ask you to take all the steps open to you to ensure that any situation of this kind does not occur.

Yours ever

Peter



# ROLLS-ROYCE LIMITED

Chairman's Office



65 Buckingham Gate, LONDON SW1E 6AT  
Telex: 918091 (Telephone) 01-222 9020

PLEASE BY:

ASAP

COPIES TO

15/10

Mr. Cople  
Mr. Gell  
Mr. Jarr

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Patrick Jenkin, M.P.  
Secretary of State for Industry,  
123 Victoria Street,  
LONDON SW1E 6RB.

16th April 1982.

150

17:25

## ARGENTINA

Dear Patrick

To prevent any misunderstanding I would like to put on record our conversation of yesterday evening concerning the Argentine.

The Export of Goods (Control) Order 1982 effectively terminates direct supplies to the Argentine of new engines, engines overhauled in the U.K. or aero spares. As regards indirect supplies to U.K. based prime contractors for Argentine customers, Rolls-Royce will continue to supply in accordance with the terms of the relevant contracts.

As far as supplies to overseas based prime contractors for Argentine customers are concerned, Rolls-Royce is unable to export unless the British Government grants the necessary licence. The only case currently at issue is the engines for Blohm and Voss who are building for the Argentine Navy. As far as we are aware, the West German Government has blocked the export of warships to the Argentine. We agreed that Rolls-Royce would consult Blohm and Voss to ascertain what problems would arise for them if Rolls-Royce, as a result of force majeure, did not comply with the terms of their contract. If these problems were considerable, and it was possible to obtain adequate assurances that the ships would not be exported from West Germany until the end of the present crisis, the U.K. Government would consider the granting of an export licence.

Our position in Brazil is more complicated. There is a bonded store holding spare parts which are the property of Rolls-Royce Ltd. and the provisions of the U.K. export control restrictions are equally applicable to these bonded stores. In addition, Rolls-Royce Ltd. has a wholly owned, Brazilian registered, subsidiary which, in the normal course of business, overhauls engines for Brazil and other countries, including the Argentine. The directors are non U.K. residents. We have been advised that, while Brazilian

.../...



law does not specifically make it illegal for a controlling shareholder to decide the countries with which the Brazilian subsidiary may trade, company law does forbid such a shareholder from instructing the subsidiary to take actions which are contrary to its best interests. Since Argentina represents approximately 25% of the business of our Brazilian subsidiary, an instruction not to trade with Argentina could be interpreted as being illegal.

The immediate problem relates to two engines being overhauled for an Argentine civil airline. One engine is almost complete but not yet paid for; the other is due for completion in three or four weeks. If the Argentinians do not pay, there is no problem. However, if they do pay, you rightly stressed the fact that delivery of the engines could well be misrepresented and inflated out of all proportion to the detriment of Britain's interests. On the other hand, if Rolls-Royce Ltd. issues an instruction not to deliver it will be committing an act which, at best, is of doubtful validity under Brazilian law. We must assume that our action will become known - what we are doing could become obvious to some of our Brazilian employees and to the Argentinians who could well raise it with the Brazilian Government.

I am not sufficiently conversant with the local scene to judge how the Brazilian Government would react to the extra territorial aspects of this action. However, sovereignty at the present moment is a sensitive subject and our representative in Brazil has recommended strongly against any instructions being issued by Rolls-Royce Ltd. to our subsidiary concerning trade with the Argentine because of the "adverse political repercussions in Brazil for both Britain and the Corporation". You, however, were of the view that the consequences of not doing so are more important. We shall of course endeavour to achieve the objective as discreetly as possible but if the news leaks or the Argentinian Government sues, you agreed that the possible adverse repercussions in Brazil are acceptable to H.M.G.

We also discussed the problem of the possible resale to the Argentine of spares acquired by customers of another nationality. You suggested that we obtain a declaration from such customers that the supplies were required for their own consumption but because of possible repercussions you accepted that this declaration would only be sought if Rolls-Royce had evidence that particular customers would probably re-export such goods to the Argentine.

We shall keep you informed of developments.

*Y. J. McFadzean*  
McFadzean



CONFIDENTIAL

ARC-20/3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

12 April 1982

Mr Macpherson  
S.Am. D.

15/19/4  
cc Emergency Unit and R.D.  
done 16/4  
Mr Lane f.i.

CALL ON SR RACHE DE ALMEIDA

1. I called on the Brazilian Minister-Counsellor on Wednesday 7 April. He seemed interested in Cuba, and I gave him a potted account of life in Havana. From that I moved on to the Falkland crisis; my first reaction, when I read news of the invasion, was that I had not realised quite how bad things must have been in Argentina. What was the Brazilian position --- bearing in mind that the Falklands/Malvinas problem itself was now in abeyance, having been replaced by a far graver problem, that of armed invasion by one country of another's territory in violation of the UN Charter.
2. Rache de Almeida said that Brazil had historically supported Argentinian claims to the Falkland/Malvinas, but not the use of force. He did not know what the Brazilian attitude would be at the forthcoming OAS meeting. I said I had references to Argentine intentions to invoke the Rio treaty; it would be preposterous for them to invert the purpose of this treaty to justify their aggression.
3. As the Brazilian attitude evinced by Rache de Almeida seemed to be one of keeping their heads down, I warmed up on the Havana angle. I said that Gen. Galtieri might not see himself as an agent of Fidel Castro, but that was precisely his role. The outcome of all this would be to Havana's advantage alone, with primary damage in London and Buenos Aires, and heavy secondary damage in Washington. The effect of the invasion would be to inflame every disputed frontier in Latin America, of which there were plenty. And if the damage in Buenos Aires extended to the fall of the military, the left were waiting for a period of chaos in which they could take over. It would be ironic, and for Argentina's neighbours extremely dangerous, if Castro achieved more through Galtieri than he had managed through Che Guevara.
4. I said that disaster might still be avoided, and even a solution reached to both problems --- aggression and Falklands --- if Galtieri were capable of thinking tactically and not just with his cavalry boots. It was in all our interests for Argentina's friends, and particularly her neighbours, to persuade her to think tactically, and not just to cling onto the rocks.
5. The Dept phoned at this point with business for Brazil to transact as responsible for Argentine interests, so I left without developing parallels between Gen Galtieri and Brigadier Ioannides who launched the Cyprus coup in 1974. Perhaps as well; the geographical proximity factor was reversed in that instance, and Sr Rache may have thought I had crept his flesh crudely enough already. If so, the subsequent positions taken by Moscow and Havana may give him cause for more sober reflection. I read in the papers that the Havana-based Montoneros are eager to return home to join the patriotic fight. Not, I suspect, because they fear the military monopolising a success and consolidating their rule, but rather, in order to be ready in the wings.

cc. Chancery Brasilia

Michael Perceval



