

SEC
N.B.
UPG

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

D.S.R. 12
Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date

CONFIDEN

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

SOUTH AMERICA

FILE No. ALA 020/1 (Part A)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
UK and ARGENTINA

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
SIC								
FC07/3573								
						Registry Address		
						Ln K274		

Registry Address

Ln K274

SECURITY GRADING

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

1979

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

YEAR
STAMP

כ"ה

PART.

020/PAP

FILE No.AL-

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.K. AND ARGENTINA

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
R		24/1	R		2/5	R		17/2
Mr Malcolmson	(1) (2)	5/1	Mr Malcolmson	(24)	4/5	Mr Malcolmson	(45+46)	
R		31/1	R		8/5	R		
Mr Malcolmson	(4)	5/2	Mr Malcolmson	(25)	8/5			
R			R		11/5			
Mr Malcolmson	(5)	5/2	Mr Malcolmson	(26)	21/5			
R		15/2	R					
Mr Malcolmson	(5-7)	15/1	Mr Malcolmson	(28)	28/5			
R		26/2	R		6/6			
Mr Malcolmson	(10) (11)	27/2	Mr Cowling	(31)	35/4			
R		20/3	R		27/6			
Mr Malcolmson	(14)	21/2	Mr Malcolmson		28/6			
+ (15)			R		7/7			
R		24/3	Mr Malcolmson	(43)				
Mr Malcolmson	(16) (17)	28/5	R	44	9/7			
(15A-18)			Mr Cowling	(44)				
R		1/5	R		17/2			
Mr Malcolmson	(23)		Mr Cowling	(45+46)				
R			R					

Registry Address

K274

SECUR
N.B. TH
UPGRA

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

1979

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT BY MR RIDLEY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ARGENTINA, JULY 1979

BRIEF NO. 19 : EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

Points to make

In Falklands (talking to Councillors)

1. Governor has already provided background to decision to reinstate Ambassadors. We are responding to Argentine request. What we are agreeing to is simply a return to normal full diplomatic relations. Does not indicate any change of policy on our part in respect of Falklands. Ambassadors will help mutual understanding, which can only benefit the Islanders and all concerned. News will be announced in Buenos Aires and London on Thursday, 26 July (text below).

In Argentina

2. Welcome Argentine move to reinstate Ambassadors.
3. We attach importance to our bilateral relations. Reinstatement of Ambassadors will facilitate exchanges. Regret no longer possible to keep to original timetable and announce names of Ambassadors during visit. But glad that announcement can be made with news of decision of principle to exchange Ambassadors.
4. Hope we shall both be able soon to submit our respective requests for agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT BY MR RIDLEY TO ARGENTINA, JULY 1979

Essential Facts

1. The last British Ambassador to Argentina was recalled in January 1976 at the suggestion of the Argentine Government (who had already withdrawn their own Ambassador in London) following a deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute. His mission was formally terminated in January 1977. Earlier this year the Argentines indicated their wish to see Ambassadorial relations restored.

2. Ministers decided that we should respond positively. However, given the Argentine Veto on our ^{proposal} ~~promise~~, the joint announcement (text below) will cover the decision of principle to exchange Ambassadors without mention of respective nominations. The Argentines now know that it may take a further 3/4 months for us to find a candidate.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4300 - 1

PP-BUENOS AIRES

GRS 202

K

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131800Z JULY 79

TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 14 JULY 1979

INFO ROUTINE PORT STANLEY

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

1. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE ARGENTINES THAT THE NEWS THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED DURING MR RIDLEY'S VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES, BUT THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID BY EITHER SIDE AT THIS STAGE ABOUT THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINATIONS.

2. WE SHOULD AIM FOR A JOINT TEXT. WE HAVE GIVEN THE ARGENTINE CHARGE THE FOLLOWING TEXT AS A PROPOSAL AT OFFICIAL LEVEL:

'DURING THE COURSE OF MR RIDLEY'S VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES, THE MINISTER OF STATE HAS DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER BRIGADIER CARLOS WASHINGTON PASTOR AND THE TWO MINISTERS HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' EARLIER AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO RESTORE RELATIONS TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WILL BE SEEKING AGREEMENT FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES IN DUE COURSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE'.

3. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT MR RIDLEY WOULD LIKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE ON THURSDAY, 26 JULY.

CARRINGTON

/ FILES

NNNN

1
CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT BY MR RIDLEY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ARGENTINA, JULY 1979

BRIEF NUMBER 3: THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

Points to Make

In the Falkland Islands

1. The Secretary of State asked me to make an early visit to the Islands to make personal contact with you. I am here to find out what you are thinking and what your concerns are; on my return to Britain I shall want to tell my colleagues of them.
2. We recognise and accept your wish to remain British.
3. We are concerned that the Islands should have a viable economic and political future. This must involve cooperation with Argentina.
4. We propose to continue talks with Argentina. You will, I hope, recognise the need and support us in them.
5. I shall be seeing the Argentine Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister in Buenos Aires after I leave the Islands. I will not be entering into any substantive exchanges with them at this stage but I shall confirm our willingness to continue the talks later in the year, when I and my colleagues have had time to consider the issues.

6. Our aim will be to see whether a solution can be worked out which will be acceptable to you, to them and to Parliament. At the same time we will explore the possibilities of practical economic cooperation in the SW Atlantic and in Antarctica.

7. While I am in Buenos Aires, we shall announce our agreement to the Argentine suggestion that we restore Ambassadors. This will be a positive step forward in improving relations; it will ensure that the Argentines at the highest level know and appreciate our joint views and conclusions.

In Argentina

8. You will not expect me at this early stage, just after my first visit to the Islands, to be able to enter into substantive negotiations. I want to report back to my colleagues with my impressions.

9. As the Secretary of State said in his letter to Foreign Minister Pastor, (Annex C) we hope to continue our dialogue in a constructive spirit and with sincere intention of resolving our differences. Lord Carrington hopes to meet Sr Pastor in New York in September. We would hope to have a round of talks before the end of the year.

10. There is no question of our renouncing our sovereignty over the Islanders while they wish to remain British, but there are possibilities for a solution which we should explore properly.

/It is ...

It is important that we develop economic cooperation in the South West Atlantic which will benefit us all; you can help us in convincing the Islanders that a viable economic future for them is possible in cooperation with Argentina.

END OF
PART A

SEE

PART

'B'

GRPS 286

RESTRICTED

020/1

DATE: 29 JUNE 1979

ESQ, SAMD

HOUSE, PORT STANLEY

FROM: D R H GOENEY, BUENOS AIRES

FALKLANDS DISPUTE AND EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: PUBLIC COMMENT

1. TWO INTERESTING PIECES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS OVER THE PAST WEEK.

2. IN AN EDITORIAL ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, LA NACION STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WHICH, THE PAPER SAID, HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED UNDER MOST UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES OVER THREE YEARS AGO. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND ANGLO-ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL LINKS ALL MADE AMBASSADORIAL RELATIONS WORTHWHILE. PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH AND SOLUTIONS WOULD NATURALLY BE EASIER, WITH AMBASSADORS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. THE EDITORIAL ADDED THAT CAVANDOLI'S VISIT TO LONDON AND MR RIDLEY'S PROPOSED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES WERE GOOD SIGNS.

3. THAT THIS EDITORIAL FOLLOWED THE CRITICISMS OF CASTEX (OUR TELNO

Mr Ure to see
Mr Wallace

25/7

44

Mr Ure
Mr Wallace
Mr Balfour

5/7
Capt to Aus 06/125/1
Mr Conley

44

DATE 3/1/79
COL 200
VOL 401

BAFO 013/04

GRPS 280

RESTRICTED

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

RESTRICTED

ALA 020/1	
RECEIVED	13
-6 JUL 1979	

Mr 5/7
Mr [unclear]
Mr [unclear] 5/7
Mr [unclear]

FILE NO: 040/1

DATE: 29 JUNE 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J R COWLING ESQ, SAMD

5/7
Capt to Aus 06/125/1
Mr [unclear]

COPY TO: (BY BAG) GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PORT STANLEY

FROM: R H GOZNEY, BUENOS AIRES

FALKLANDS DISPUTE AND EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: PUBLIC COMMENT

1. TWO INTERESTING PIECES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS OVER THE PAST WEEK.

2. IN AN EDITORIAL ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, LA NACION STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WHICH, THE PAPER SAID, HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED UNDER MOST UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES OVER THREE YEARS AGO. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND ANGLO-ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL LINKS ALL MADE AMBASSADORIAL RELATIONS WORTHWHILE. PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH AND SOLUTIONS WOULD NATURALLY BE EASIER, WITH AMBASSADORS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. THE EDITORIAL ADDED THAT CAVANDOLI'S VISIT TO LONDON AND MR RIDLEY'S PROPOSED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES WERE GOOD SIGNS.

3. THAT THIS EDITORIAL FOLLOWED THE CRITICISMS OF CASTEX (OUR TELNO

RESTRICTED

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

RESTRICTED

FILE NO: 040/1

DATE: 29 JUNE 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J R COWLING ESQ, SAMP

COPY TO: (BY BAG) GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PORT STANLEY

FROM: R H GOZNEY, BUENOS AIRES

FALKLANDS DISPUTE AND EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: PUBLIC COMMENT

1. TWO INTERESTING PIECES HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS OVER THE PAST WEEK.

2. IN AN EDITORIAL ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, LA NACION STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WHICH, THE PAPER SAID, HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED UNDER MOST UNFORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES OVER THREE YEARS AGO. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND ANGLO-ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL LINKS ALL MADE AMBASSADORIAL RELATIONS WORTHWHILE. PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH AND SOLUTIONS WOULD NATURALLY BE EASIER, WITH AMBASSADORS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES. THE EDITORIAL ADDED THAT CAVANDOLI'S VISIT TO LONDON AND MR RIDLEY'S PROPOSED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES WERE GOOD SIGNS.

3. THAT THIS EDITORIAL FOLLOWED THE CRITICISMS OF CASTEX (OUR TELNO 133) ADDED TO ITS IMPACT.

4. ON 26 JUNE DR CARLOS HELBLING (PRESIDENT OF THE BANCO NACIONAL DESAROLLO (ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) UNTIL LAST YEAR AND, ALTHOUGH OUT OF THE NEWS IN RECENT MONTHS, STILL A PROMINENT FIGURE) REFERRED TO ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FALKLANDS IN THE COURSE OF A WIDE-RANGING SPEECH IN CORDOBA. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR BURNING ISSUES TO INSPIRE THE PEOPLE AND THAT THESE SHOULD INCLUDE AN AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST FOREIGN POLICY. HE CALLED FOR QUOTE THE RE-CONQUEST OF THE MALVINAS, EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE ANTARCTIC, AND THE RE-OCCUPATION OF THE GEO-POLITICAL AREA BELONGING TO THE NATION UNQUOTE. HE LEFT AMBIGUOUS WHETHER HE INTENDED THAT THE RE-CONQUEST SHOULD BE BY MILITARY OR MERELY DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

5. DR HELBLING'S REMARKS CONTINUE THE TREND WHEREBY NON-GOVERNMENT FIGURES ARE MAKING INCREASING USE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS QUESTION TO CATCH THE PUBLIC EYE. THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE LOW KEY APPROACH TAKEN BY MINISTERS OR OFFICIALS, FOR EXAMPLE ON QUOTE MALVINAS DAY UNQUOTE.

(SIGNED) R GOZNEY

RESTRICTED

NNN

'SENT AT 04/2005Z HQ

RECD UP TO AND INCLUDING GRU
BAFO 013/ AT 04/2005Z ITF

DATE 3/7/79

COL. 222-2240

VOL. 401

History

221

Pay Beds in

[LORDS]

NHS Hospitals

222

Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: My Lords, what has happened to them?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer that question, because many of those pay beds were underused at the time. Most of the pay beds which have been phased out were phased out on account of the fact that they were little used.

Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, the noble Lord said that so much money would be lost if pay beds were abolished. Could he tell the House how much the average pay bed costs the country in provision of staff, nurses, doctors, facilities, and what have you?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot. I can say that, of the £29 million-odd that the NHS received, a good deal would of course go in providing the service. There would be some profit on it, but not a very great one. On the other hand, if all the pay beds were phased out, those beds would have to be otherwise financed.

Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to press the Government to proceed with legislation? It seems ridiculous to continue with an old, out-of-date policy which is against the present elected Government's Manifesto, particularly denying the money which comes from pay beds when modern equipment such as body scanners have to be closed down and sold off because hospitals do not now have the money to keep them equipped. This is a waste of effort and is totally unnecessary. Will legislation be coming forward fairly soon to reverse the policy of getting rid of pay beds?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, consultation is now going on and we are awaiting publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the National Health Services which is due to come out this month. Before that is seen and consultations have taken place no further decisions will be taken.

Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the Minister said that £29 million would have been the figure to be received by the Government. Would he agree that it

would be dependent on whether the pay beds in existence at that particular time had been in full use?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: That is correct, my Lords.

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

2.44 p.m.

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made with the normalisation of our diplomatic representation with the Argentine.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, We are actively considering the level of our relations with Argentina. Our decision will be announced in due course.

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I suggest to the noble Lord—

Several noble Lords: No!

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to consider that while there are certain differences between the Argentinians and ourselves, those difficulties would be much better handled and solved if we had an ambassador there who would give us a certain status which at the moment we do not have?

Lord TREFGARNE: I think my noble friend is quite right, my Lords, and that is why we are actively reconsidering our policy in this matter.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to accept from this side of the House—perhaps I might put this in an interrogatory form—the full support of the Opposition for the earliest possible resumption of normal diplomatic relations with a country with which we have had for some centuries ties of close friendship, both commercial and cultural? Perhaps from this House might go to our Argentinian friends, as proof

223

Relations with

of our desire to resume these relations face that the ambassador designate Buenos Aires is an officer of the highest credentials, of great experience of America and of great personal friendship for the Argentine itself.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for that helpful observation. I think actually continuing the policy of the previous Administration in this matter.

Lord MORRIS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to be good enough to firm that approaches were made to the Argentinian Government as long ago as February/March of this year, and he further confirm that the reason for the delay can in no way be attributed to the Argentinian Government? Her Majesty's Government's usual appointment of an ambassador is a bargaining counter?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, of course we already have diplomatic representation at a lower level in Buenos Aires but the appointment of an ambassador is an important matter and is not rushed.

Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister aware that on 19th June of both Houses received a delegation of the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who were here to plead on behalf of 15,000 persons who have disappeared since the coup of 1976 and whose relatives have been in ignorance as to what has happened to them? Would the Government be standing any change in the level of diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires, press for this matter before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under the current procedure as a gross and flagrant violation of human rights? Will the Government assert on behalf of the Government the restoration of diplomatic representation at ambassadorial level is the way to be taken as a direct horror that the British people are aware of the continued atrocities committed by the people of Argentina by

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, approval or disapproval or considerations in various circumstances.

Mr. Ure to see
in balance

25/7

(41a)

222

the pay
ar time

URNE:

TINA

RLEY:
Question
e Orderernment
with the
c repre-ds, We
of our
decisionRLEY:
e nobleRLEY:
ister to
ertain
ans and
uld be
we had
give us
nent weny noble
and that
ing ourS: My
o accept
erhaps I
form—
for the
normal
try with
ries ties
cial and
se might
is proof

223

Relations with

[3 JULY 1979]

Argentina

224

of our desire to resume these relations, the face that the ambassador designate in Buenos Aires is an officer of the highest credentials, of great experience of Latin America and of great personal friendship for the Argentine itself.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for that helpful observation. I think we are actually continuing the policy of the previous Administration in this matter.

Lord MORRIS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to be good enough to confirm that approaches were made by the Argentinian Government as long ago as February/March of this year, and would he further confirm that the reason for the delay can in no way be attributed either to the Argentinian Government's or to Her Majesty's Government's using the appointment of an ambassador as a bargaining counter?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, of course we already have diplomatic representation at a lower level in Buenos Aires, but the appointment of an ambassador is an important matter and not to be rushed.

Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, is the Minister aware that on 19th June Members of both Houses received a deputation of the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who were here to plead on behalf of the 15,000 persons who have disappeared in Argentina since the coup of March 1976 and whose relatives have been kept in ignorance as to what has happened to them? Would the Government, notwithstanding any change in the level of diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires, press for this matter to be laid before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under the Article 1503 procedure as a gross and persistent violation of human rights? Will the Minister assert on behalf of the Government that the restoration of diplomatic representation at ambassadorial level is in no way to be taken as a derogation of the horror that the British people feel at the continued atrocities committed against the people of Argentina by the State?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, our approval or disapproval of human rights considerations in various countries of the

world does not necessarily affect our decision to appoint or otherwise the ambassador. If we took that as a criterion we should have hardly any ambassadors anywhere.

Viscount MONTGOMERY of ALAMEIN: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the fact that there are more than half a million citizens of British descent living in Argentina, who are all God-fearing citizens, and the fact that there is great opportunity for trade and investment in the revived economic climate, give added reason to have an ambassador at an early date?

Lord TREFGARNE: That is certainly a special consideration, my Lords, but it is perhaps relevant and right for me to point out that the Argentine Government last year issued a decree calling on all religious organisations to register. Organisations which are considered a threat to public order, national security or Argentine morals or traditions may be refused registration and thus denied permission to practise. We are not very happy with that decision.

CHANNEL TUNNEL PROJECT

2.48 p.m.

Lord SWINFEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are giving any consideration to the construction of a Channel Tunnel.

The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Lord Bellwin): My Lords, as noble Lords will be aware, a report prepared by the British Railways Board setting out the results of preliminary studies undertaken in conjunction with the French railways for a single-track rail-only Channel tunnel was published in February last. At the same time, the chairman of the board asked for an early indication of the Government's attitude. The Government are giving careful consideration to the board's proposals, but it is too early to say what view the Government will take of this new project.

(41a)

Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: My Lords, what has happened to them?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer that question, because many of those pay beds were underused at the time. Most of the pay beds which have been phased out were phased out on account of the fact that they were little used.

Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, the noble Lord said that so much money would be lost if pay beds were abolished. Could he tell the House how much the average pay bed costs the country in provision of staff, nurses, doctors, facilities, and what have you?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot. I can say that, of the £29 million-odd that the NHS received, a good deal would of course go in providing the service. There would be some profit on it, but not a very great one. On the other hand, if all the pay beds were phased out, those beds would have to be otherwise financed.

Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to press the Government to proceed with legislation? It seems ridiculous to continue with an old, out-of-date policy which is against the present elected Government's Manifesto, particularly denying the money which comes from pay beds when modern equipment such as body scanners have to be closed down and sold off because hospitals do not now have the money to keep them equipped. This is a waste of effort and is totally unnecessary. Will legislation be coming forward fairly soon to reverse the policy of getting rid of pay beds?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, consultation is now going on and we are awaiting publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the National Health Services which is due to come out this month. Before that is seen and consultations have taken place no further decisions will be taken.

Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the Minister said that £29 million would have been the figure to be received by the Government. Would he agree that it

would be dependent on whether the pay beds in existence at that particular time had been in full use?

Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: That is correct, my Lords.

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

2.44 p.m.

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made with the normalisation of our diplomatic representation with the Argentine.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, We are actively considering the level of our relations with Argentina. Our decision will be announced in due course.

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I suggest to the noble Lord—

Several noble Lords: No!

Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to consider that while there are certain differences between the Argentinians and ourselves, those difficulties would be much better handled and solved if we had an ambassador there who would give us a certain status which at the moment we do not have?

Lord TREFGARNE: I think my noble friend is quite right, my Lords, and that is why we are actively reconsidering our policy in this matter.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to accept from this side of the House—perhaps I might put this in an interrogatory form—the full support of the Opposition for the earliest possible resumption of normal diplomatic relations with a country with which we have had for some centuries ties of close friendship, both commercial and cultural? Perhaps from this House might go to our Argentinian friends, as proof

Lords

Vol 401

No 20

3 JULY '79

Cols 222-224

of our desire to resume these relations, the fact that the ambassador designate in Buenos Aires is an officer of the highest credentials, of great experience of Latin America and of great personal friendship for the Argentine itself.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for that helpful observation. I think we are actually continuing the policy of the previous Administration in this matter.

Lord MORRIS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to be good enough to confirm that approaches were made by the Argentinian Government as long ago as February/March of this year, and would he further confirm that the reason for the delay can in no way be attributed either to the Argentinian Government's or to Her Majesty's Government's using the appointment of an ambassador as a bargaining counter?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, of course we already have diplomatic representation at a lower level in Buenos Aires, but the appointment of an ambassador is an important matter and not to be rushed.

Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, is the Minister aware that on 19th June Members of both Houses received a deputation of the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who were here to plead on behalf of the 15,000 persons who have disappeared in Argentina since the coup of March 1976 and whose relatives have been kept in ignorance as to what has happened to them? Would the Government, notwithstanding any change in the level of diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires, press for this matter to be laid before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under the Article 1503 procedure as a gross and persistent violation of human rights? Will the Minister assert on behalf of the Government that the restoration of diplomatic representation at ambassadorial level is in no way to be taken as a derogation of the horror that the British people feel at the continued atrocities committed against the people of Argentina by the State?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, our approval or disapproval of human rights considerations in various countries of the

world does not necessarily affect our decision to appoint or otherwise the ambassador. If we took that as a criterion we should have hardly any ambassadors anywhere.

Viscount MONTGOMERY of ALAMEIN: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the fact that there are more than half a million citizens of British descent living in Argentina, who are all God-fearing citizens, and the fact that there is great opportunity for trade and investment in the revived economic climate, give added reason to have an ambassador at an early date?

Lord TREFGARNE: That is certainly a special consideration, my Lords, but it is perhaps relevant and right for me to point out that the Argentine Government last year issued a decree calling on all religious organisations to register. Organisations which are considered a threat to public order, national security or Argentine morals or traditions may be refused registration and thus denied permission to practise. We are not very happy with that decision.

CHANNEL TUNNEL PROJECT

2.48 p.m.

Lord SWINFEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are giving any consideration to the construction of a Channel Tunnel.

The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Lord Bellwin): My Lords, as noble Lords will be aware, a report prepared by the British Railways Board setting out the results of preliminary studies undertaken in conjunction with the French railways for a single-track rail-only Channel tunnel was published in February last. At the same time, the chairman of the board asked for an early indication of the Government's attitude. The Government are giving careful consideration to the board's proposals, but it is too early to say what view the Government will take of this new project.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

AV 020/1
RECEIVED IN
-3 JUL 1979
DESK OFFICE
INDEX
M 6/7

See Malcolmson
enter (43)
Mr Dwyer.
Bn 28/6.

Mr Alexander
POD

MR CARLESS

1. We spoke about the Chief Clerk's minute to me of 25 June.
2. My belief is that we should do nothing for the time being but that if we have no further word from the Argentines by the end of next week I should speak to the Chargé d'Affaires again. I would say that, at their suggestion, we had not put forward the request for agrément whilst they considered what Mr Ridley and I had said to them about the appointment of Mr Carless, but that we could not go on doing this for very much longer. An exchange of Ambassadors had been agreed in principle and there was agreement that this and the names should be announced during Mr Ridley's visit to Buenos Aires in the middle of July. Unless requests for agrément could be exchanged immediately this would just not be possible and in these circumstances we might not be able to reach an agreement of a simultaneous exchange for some time to come. If this did not produce a definite yes or nay from the Argentines by July 9th then we might either precipitate matters by asking formally for agrément or by saying that it would now no longer be possible to announce an exchange of Ambassadors during Mr Ridley's visit.

G E Hall

26 June 1979

cc
Sir A Parsons
Mr Ure or

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

House of Lords
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

(42)

for **ORAL** answer on **TUESDAY 3 JULY.**

S. Am.

Department

OK NR

Please submit your draft reply (normal maximum 50 words) through an Under-Secretary and the Private Secretary to **Mr. Ridley** to reach **Parliamentary Unit WSA** this office by **NOON ON WEDNESDAY 27 JUNE**.
The draft reply should be accompanied by full supplementary and background material: see Diplomatic Service Procedure Volume 5 for guidance. Text of Question as follows:

†*The Baroness Emmet of Amberley — To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made with the normalisation of our diplomatic representation with the Argentine.

ANSWER
THE LORD TREFGARNE

My Lords,

We are actively considering the level of our relations with Argentina. We shall of course inform the House of any decision.

✓

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

3 July 1979

The Baroness Emmet of Amberley to ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made with the normalisation of our diplomatic representation with the Argentine.

A N S W E R

THE LORD TREFGARNE

My Lords,

We are actively considering the level of our relations with Argentina. Our decision will be announced in due course,

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

(13009) Dd.532910 5m 10/69 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863
(14154) Dd.737147 10m 6/70 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

REFERENCES

Flag A House of Commons Hansard, 13 June,
Vol 968, Col 233

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

1. Who Took the Initiative in Recalling Ambassadors?

It was the Government of Argentina which was responsible for reducing the level of relations with their country.

2. Has Argentina made an Approach about Ambassadors?

The Argentine Government recently indicated their wish to see relations restored at Ambassadorial level. We have not received any request for Agrément for a new Ambassador.

3. Importance of Ambassadors to Trade

This is one of the factors which needs to be taken into account.

4. Human Rights Abuses (e.g. "Disappeared" Political Prisoners)

The Government is aware of the Human Rights situation in Argentina. We deplore all abuses wherever they may occur. But having, not having or reappointing Ambassadors does not betoken any mark of favour of a regime's policies and cannot depend only on our view of the human rights situation in that country. If it did there would be a great many countries with

/no

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

no British Ambassador. We have Ambassadors abroad to serve our interests - including our human rights interests.

5. Abuses of Human Rights: Action in the EEC

We regularly take part in discussions on Human Rights with our partners in the 9 member states of the EEC who share our concern about the situation in a number of countries in South America, including Argentina. On 6 April last year the members of the Nine made a joint démarche to the Argentine Government on the subject of Human Rights and the detention and disappearance of EEC nationals in Argentina.

6. Refugees in Argentina

The programme established in 1976 whereby refugees in Argentina are allowed entry to this country continues to operate. In June of last year the Home Office said that we shall, exceptionally, accept for consideration an application from Argentine nationals from Argentina.

7. Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Argentine Government last year issued a decree calling for all religious organisations to register^t. Organisations which are considered a threat to public order, national security or Argentine morals or traditions may be refused registration and thus denied permission to practice. No decision has yet been taken about Jehovahs Witnesses' application for registration.

Very
restricted
- Need a
link
or

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

8. Trade with Argentina

Argentina was our third largest export market in Latin America last year. British exports were £114 million (UK imports from Argentina in 1978 were £153 million). The normal services to exporters are available.

9. ECGD Cover

Normal ECGD cover is available for British exports to Argentina.

10. Arms Sales

There is no general ban on the sale of arms to Argentina but in accordance with our general policy each proposal for the supply of defence equipment to Argentina, or anywhere else, is considered against all the factors involved including the relevant political, strategic and economic considerations. The Government also takes into account the use to which the equipment might be put.

11. Will HMG Not Reconsider Their Policy On Argentina And Impose An Arms Embargo

We already have a policy whereby individual sales are dealt with under criteria which take all relevant factors into account. We do not believe any change is necessary.

If Asked About Particular Contracts

It has been the policy of successive Governments not to reveal details of individual sales.

/Consular

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

CONSULAR CASES

12. Protection of UK Nations in Argentina

We regard the protection of UK nationals in Argentina, as in other foreign countries, as being, ~~the~~ ^{primarily, the} responsibility of the host Government. British visitors are entitled to consular protection in the normal way.

13. Consular Functions in Argentina

There are no restrictions on the exercise of consular functions by our consular officers in Argentina.

14. UK Nationals Detained in Argentina

Three UK nationals, one of whom is a dual Anglo/Argentine citizen, are currently detained in Argentina.

[If Pressed] Details of UK Nationals in Prison and of Their Offences

It has been the policy of successive Governments not to disclose such details without the specific consent of the persons detained. We do not have this consent in these cases.

15. UK Nationals Who have Disappeared in Argentina

Two UK nationals have been reported to us as having disappeared in Argentina in the past 3 years. Both were longtime residents there. At the request of our Embassy in Buenos Aires the Argentine authorities have made, and continue to make, extensive enquiries into these incidents, which, as far as we know, are unconnected.

/If pressed

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

If pressed: Details of Missing UK Nationals

The next of kin of the two missing persons have asked that personal details should not be made public in order not to prejudice safety and welfare of the two persons concerned.

16. Falkland Islands: What are the Implications?

There are no implications for our policy. But on a practical plane to restore relations to Ambassadorial level would improve the capacity at both ends for dialogue on a whole range of complex matters.

17. Falkland Islands: Further Negotiations

No dates have been arranged for further talks with Argentina about the Falkland Islands. We shall continue fully to consult the Falkland Islanders on any developments which affect their interests; nor will any proposals about the future of the Islands be brought before Parliament unless these are acceptable to the Islanders.

18. Argentina: Presence on Southern Thule

The position on the Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule remains as it was: we have protested at their presence and in doing so protected our sovereignty position. Negotiations have been undertaken to remove any sovereignty implications from these scientific activities, but these have not been concluded. This is one of the topics which will be for consideration when we continue talks with the Argentines.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Withdrawal of Ambassador from Argentina

1. The last British Ambassador to Argentina was recalled in January 1976 at the suggestion of the Argentine Government (who had already withdrawn their own Ambassador in London) following a deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute. His mission was formally terminated in January, 1977. Subsequently we entered a series of negotiations with the Argentines over the Falkland Islands; and earlier this year they indicated that they wished to see Ambassadorial relations restored. Ministers have now decided that we should respond positively. The arrangements for the exchange of Ambassadors are still to be settled but Ministers have agreed that it would be appropriate for an announcement to be made when the Minister of State, Mr Nicholas Ridley, is in Buenos Aires in mid July. (Before the election, Ministers in the last Government had confirmed that they would be prepared to agree to the Argentine approach, and this news became public when it was leaked by the Argentines.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Argentina: Consular Matters

1. There are 3 cases of current concern. Dr Douglas Gillie, a UK national but long resident in Argentina, disappeared from his home in Buenos Aires in September, 1977. Mr Walter Fleury, also born in the UK and resident in Argentina, was abducted in August, 1976 from a boarding house in Buenos Aires. Despite repeated representations to the Argentine authorities about these cases, neither has been heard of since. Miss Daisy Hobson, a dual national, was arrested in Buenos Aires in May 1976 and charged with subversion and illegal possession of firearms. She was subsequently sentenced to 22 years' penal detention. An appeal for clemency is under consideration. Her dual nationality means we have no standing to act formally on her behalf but informal representations have been made and the Argentine authorities are aware that if Miss Hobson is released she will be accepted into the UK.
2. The cases of Dr Gillie and Mr Fleury have been given no publicity in this country in accordance with the wishes of their friends and relatives who have always believed that publicity might be harmful.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41a)

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Southern Thule


Thule

1. We discovered an Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule at the end of 1976. Thule is the most southerly of the Falkland Islands' Dependencies, is twelve hundred miles from Port Stanley and on the edge of the Antarctic Treaty Area. We immediately protested and left the Argentine Government in no doubt that we consider Southern Thule as British territory. We have continued to make our views clear to the Argentine Government so our legal position over sovereignty is fully and explicitly protected. The Argentines have assured us that their activities are purely scientific in support of their Antarctic Research programme.

2. At the Geneva negotiating round in December, 1978, we reached a draft agreement on scientific co-operation with Argentina in the Falkland Dependencies. This would have explicitly removed any sovereignty implications, but the Falkland Island Councillors have said they are not happy with such an agreement as it stands and the matter has been left for further consideration.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41A)



Mr Hall / Mr Stratton
Parliamentary Unit

PS/Mr. Ridley

Private Secretary

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

1. I submit a draft reply, with Notes for Supplementaries, to Lady Emmett's question for oral answer on Tuesday 3 July. Background Notes on Ambassadorial relations with Argentina, outstanding consular cases and the Argentine presence on Southern Thule are attached.

A 2. We have now told the Argentines of our agreement to their suggestion that Ambassadors should be restored. But no announcement has yet been made and no requests for agrément have yet been exchanged. When the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Commodore Cavandoli, called on Mr Ridley on 14 June, it was agreed that the announcement should be delayed until Mr Ridley is in Buenos Aires on 19 July for talks with Commodore Cavandoli. The reply to this PQ and the Notes for Supplementaries therefore maintain the line used in answering similar questions by Mr Kershaw and Mr McCrindle on 13 June.

3. In supplementary questions, their Lordships may well range widely over aspects of our relations with Argentina, including the Falkland Islands and human rights abuses. Supplementaries have been drafted to cover these.

G A Duggan

G A Duggan
South America Department

26 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

R.D. Stratton

27 June

Aw 020/

27 JUN 1979

FOBA 401/21

RR BUENOS AIRES

Aw 040/325/

GROUPS 879

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TELE-LETTER

FROM G E HALL

DATED 19 JUNE 1979

FOLLOWING FOR H M CARLESS ESQ, BUENOS AIRES

UK-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT FOLLOWING MY TELELETTER TO YOU OF 22 MAY, WE PRODUCED A PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHICH WAS AGREED BY MR RIDLEY IN WHICH WE RECOMMENDED PUTTING A MINUTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE RELEVANT CABINET COMMITTEE ASKING FOR GENERAL AGREEMENT TO THE OUTLINES OF FALKLAND ISLANDS POLICY IN ORDER TO GIVE MR RIDLEY A GENERAL CONTEXT IN WHICH TO OPERATE DURING HIS VISITS TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND BUENOS AIRES. THE PROPOSAL WAS THAT WE SHOULD AGREE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PREVIOUS BASIS, INCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT, AS PART OF AN OVERALL SOLUTION, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER FRESH ARRANGEMENTS ON SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA WHICH WOULD NOT AFFECT THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS BY HMG, PROVIDED THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REACTION WAS THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND THAT HE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP IT QUIET FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. I ARGUED FOR THE LINE WHICH WE HAD PROPOSED, BUT COULD GET NO DECISION TO TAKE THIS FURTHER.

3. NEVERTHELESS, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE LETTER TO WASHINGTON PASTOR, 'WE SHALL CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, ETC'. I THINK YOU WILL FIND, HOWEVER,

THAT WE WILL GO ON FROM WHERE MATTERS WERE LEFT IN MARCH, BUT THERE IS NO ENTHUSIASM FOR TAKING BOLD DECISIONS. IN THE TALK AND LUNCH WITH CAVANDOLI MR RIDLEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO CO-OPERATE WITH ARGENTINA CLOSELY IN ANTARCTIC MATTER, IN FISHERY AND OIL EXPLOITATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, OVER SUPPLIES FOR THEIR NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME, IN THEIR AIR FORCE AND NAVY AND IN TRADE AND ECONOMIC MATTERS GENERALLY. CAVANDOLI REPLIED THAT THE ARGENTINE SIDE EQUALLY WANTED THIS BUT THAT PART OF THE PACKAGE WOULD NEED TO BE BRITISH WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, INCLUDING SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS NEEDED REVIVING FROM THE LOW POINT THEY HAD REACHED AT THE END OF MARCH. MR RIDLEY SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED TIME TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THIS PROBLEM BEFORE UNDERTAKING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, PREOCCUPIED AS THEY WERE WITH

MANY OTHER IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND WITH HAVING TO BRIEF THEMSELVES AS MINISTERS COMING FRESH TO MANY OF THE QUESTIONS REACHING THEM FOR DECISION. CAVANDOLI SEEMED VERY HAPPY WITH THIS AND IN GENERAL WITH THE RECEPTION HE HAD RECEIVED. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SORT OF PROGRAMME WE HAD IN MIND WAS FURTHER GENERAL EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR RIDLEY AND HIMSELF IN MID-JULY, COVERING ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS IN GENERAL, A FIRST CONTACT BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND WASHINGTON PASTOR IN NEW YORK IN THE AUTUMN AND PERHAPS A FORMAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MR RIDLEY AND HIMSELF BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. MR CAVANDOLI TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THIS PROGRAMME WOULD SUIT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ADMIRABLY. CAVANDOLI ASKED MR RIDLEY PARTICULARLY TO TRY IF HE COULD TO AVOID MAKING ANY STATEMENT IN THE ISLANDS OR IN ARGENTINA BEFORE HE HAD TALKED TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, UNDER THE PRESSURE THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE FROM THE PRESS, WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN UP AND MISUSED BY CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN ARGENTINA TO ATTACK OUR IMPROVED RELATIONS OR THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. MR RIDLEY SAID THAT WHILST, OF COURSE, HE MUST REMAIN FREE TO SAY WHAT HE THOUGHT BEST, HE UNDERSTOOD CAVANDOLI'S POINT, AGREED WITH IT, AND HOPED THE ARGENTINES WOULD DO THE SAME.

4. AS YOU SEE WE ARE IN FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE 'BACK BURNER' AND MR RIDLEY WOULD RATHER DISCUSS ALL ITEMS OF RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA OTHER THAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ALSO, WITHOUT GOING FURTHER THAN WE HAVE DONE BEFORE. EVEN TO GO AS FAR WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE US TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE MR RIDLEY GOES TO BUENOS AIRES.

5. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE LUNCH FOR CAVANDOLI WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY SIR RONALD ELLIS, JAMES JOHNSON MR, DAVID MONTGOMERY AND HUNTER CHRISTIE. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF CONVERSATION

ABOUT FISHERIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND MR RIDLEY AND RON ELLIS TALKED ABOUT ARGENTINE AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS. ON FISHERIES I REPEATED STRONGLY WHAT I HAD SAID TO CHEVARA, THAT THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS TO CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF THIRD PARTIES FISHING IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY TO CONSERVE AND REVEY FISH STOCKS AND THAT THE BRITISH WIDE WOULD BE PERFECTLY WILLING TO BEGIN SUCH CO-OPERATION IMMEDIATELY, WHILST THE ARGENTINES WERE BLOCKING THIS BY DEMANDING CONCESSIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY FIRST. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY ALL THOSE ON THE BRITISH SIDE, INCLUDING HUNTER CHRISTIE WHO IN GENERAL MADE NO QUALIFICATIONS ABOUT SUPPORT FOR ANGLO-ARGENTINE CO-OPERATION.

6. I HOPE THIS WILL BE USEFUL IN THE RUN UP TO MR RIDLEY'S VISIT. WE ARE PRODUCING TALKING POINTS FOR HIM ON ALL ASPECTS OF ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION. THE EMPHASIS FROM HIS SIDE WILL BE TO PLAY DOWN POLITICS, AND PARTICULARLY SOVEREIGNTY, AND TO HIGHLIGHT TRADE AND ECONOMICS. YOU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES TO DO EXACTLY THE REVERSE.

SIGNED C E HALL

MINI

SENT AT 210413Z JCM JUST ONE MORE SMALLIE ONE THEN ITS ALL DONE

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

(40)

AA 620/1

19 JUN 1979

Mr Duggan

Mr Cowling

Mr Anderson - to enter & discuss after x 2/13/6

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. Please see Mr Carless's teletype to me of 11 June (below).
2. I have discussed this with Mr Hall and we both think that we should look again at these suggestions in the light of the talks which Mr Ridley will be having with Commodore Cavandoli later this week.
3. We do not think that any amendment is necessary to Mr Ridley's briefing in the light of the teletype.

JBW

J B Ure
South America Department

13 June, 1979

Now see Mr Hall's teletype
of 19 June.

2/13/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Av 020/1

27 JUN 79

U7

(39)

TX NEW

SN

BAFO 012/11

GRPS530

CONFIDENTIAL

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO: 020/5

DATE: 11 JUNE 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J B URE ESQ , SAMD

FROM: H M CARLESS, BUENOS AIRES

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO: 020/5

DATE: 11 JUNE 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J B URE ESQ, SAMD

FROM: H M CARLESS, BUENOS AIRES

MY TELNO 120 : ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. SINCE THE BRITISH ELECTIONS AND THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY'S VISIT TO LONDON, THE CONCEPT OF ARGENTINA OPTING FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN WOULD SEEM TO HAVE GAINED GROUND HERE WITHIN A LIMITED BUT INFLUENTIAL CIRCLE.
2. THIS INCLUDES MARTINEZ DE HOZ AND PASTOR (PRESIDENT VIDELA'S BROTHER IN LAW) WHO IS LINKED, AS ARE TWO OF HIS MINISTERS OF STATE (GROUP CAPTAINS CAVANDOLI AND CURA), WITH THE AIR FORCE WHOSE CHIEF OF STAFF IS AIR MARSHAL TEMPORINI. OUTSIDE THIS CIRCLE, IS THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN MANRIQUE WHO, SINCE HIS VISIT TO BRITAIN IN JANUARY, HAS CANVASSED THE IDEA OF A NEW ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP WITH BRITAIN IN BOTH DISCUSSION AND PRINT.
3. THE THINKING BEHIND THESE CONCEPTS IS STILL BLURRED AND HESITANT. ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CLEAR GOVERNMENT POLICY, IT RUNS MUCH AS FOLLOWS. ARGENTINA IS ISOLATED AND WITHOUT ALLIES APART FROM LIGHTWEIGHT PERU. MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED IS A SHORT TERM EXPEDIENT. ARGENTINA URGENTLY NEEDS RELIABLE PARTNERS AMONG THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES. BUT IT WILL BE YEARS BEFORE THE BREACH WITH THE UNITED STATES IS REPAIRED: ITALY AND SPAIN ARE INFESTED WITH ARGENTINE TERRORISTS: RUSSIA CAN NOT BE TRUSTED FAR AND THE JAPANESE, ALTHOUGH INTERESTED, ARE AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.
4. THIS LEAVES GERMANY, ALREADY A MAJOR SOURCE OF SUPPLY, FRANCE AND BRITAIN. OF THE LATTER TWO, BRITAIN COULD NOW BE POLITICALLY MORE STABLE AND APPROACHABLE. SOME FORM OF DEAL WITH BRITAIN IS THEREFORE WORTH CONSIDERING.
5. WHAT FORM SHOULD IT TAKE? FROM WESTERN EUROPE ARGENTINA NEEDS:
 - A. POLITICAL RECOGNITION AS A VALID PARTNER:
 - B. MILITARY AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY:
 - C. SOME ADVANCE, IF ONLY SYMBOLIC, OVER THE FALKLANDS.
6. IN RETURN, ARGENTINA CAN OFFER, SO THE ARGUMENT RUNS, LARGE INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS. THESE NOW INCLUDE THOSE FOR:
 - I ELECTRICAL GENERATING AND TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT WORTH ABOUT US DOLLARS ONE BILLION OVER THE NEXT 7 TO 10 YEARS:
 - II NUCLEAR PLANTS:
 - III AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND DEFENCE SYSTEM WORTH ABOUT US DOLLARS ONE BILLION:
 - IV THE MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT ENGINES:
 - V OFFSHORE OIL IN THE (DISPUTED WATERS OF THE) SOUTH WEST ATLANTIC.
7. ON (I) ABOVE, WE HAVE ASKED THE DOT WHETHER A BRITISH PACKAGE OFFER MIGHT BE FEASIBLE: ON (II) YOU HAVE SENT ME INSTRUCTIONS: THE ARGENTINES ARE ALREADY DISCUSSING (IV) WITH BOTH DORNIER AND ROLLS ROYCE: AND ON (V) ANY ADVANCE DEPENDS ON POLICY TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM. THIS LEAVES (III) WHICH COULD PROVE A STARTER.
8. ON 7 JUNE THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE AWARDED GEC A US DOLLARS 29 MILLION CONTRACT FOR QUOTE HEAD UP UNQUOTE AND OTHER AVIONIC EQUIPMENT: AND, AS REPORTED IN MY TUR, TEMPORINI HOPES TO SEE LORD NELSON LATER THIS MONTH. HE KNOWS AND TRUSTS NELSON AND, ACCORDING TO THE GEC REPRESENTATIVE HERE, MAY USE THE OCCASION TO PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF A 10 OR 30 YEAR COMMERCIAL TREATY OR HEADS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. HIS PARTICULAR INTEREST WILL OF COURSE BE TO SECURE TECHNOLOGY FOR MODERNISING THE AIR FORCE AND ITS DEFENCE SYSTEM.
9. MY CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE IS THAT - DRAWING ON OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE FRIGATES CONTRACT - WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE PROS AND CONS OF SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANISING OURSELVES TO WIN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND DEFENCE SYSTEM CONTRACT. TO DO SO, I BELIEVE WE WOULD REQUIRE:
 - A. MINISTERIAL AND RAF SUPPORT:
 - B. HARD-HITTING MERCHANT BANKERS BACKED BY ECOD:
 - C. A GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY TASK FORCE IN LONDON: AND
 - D. ANOTHER WORKING TO ITS INSTRUCTIONS IN BUENOS AIRES.
10. BUT THIS DEPENDS ON THE VIEW OF ARGENTINA WHICH MUST NOW BE EMERGING IN WHITEHALL. MAY I THEREFORE LEAVE IT TO YOU TO COPY THIS LETTER AS MAY BE APPROPRIATE.

(SIGNED) H M CARLESS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SENT AT 11/2020Z HR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AW 020/1	
26 JUN 1979	
INDEX	FILE

(38)

Mr Hall

Parliamentary Unit

RELATIONS WITH CHILE AND ARGENTINA: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

1. I submit a draft reply with Notes for Supplementaries to Mr Anthony Kershaw's and Mr Robert McCrindle's Questions for Oral Answer on 13 June (which have been grouped together with the agreement of Parliamentary Unit). Notes on the background to the present lack of Ambassadorial relations with Chile and Argentina and on the Argentine presence on Southern Thule are also attached.
2. Ministers are currently considering submissions by the Department on the question of Ambassadorial relations with Chile and with Argentina, and the reply to these PQs and the Notes for Supplementaries have been drafted on the assumption that they will not be ready to announce a decision in respect of either country by 13 June, when the Questions are due to be answered. Though the Secretary of State has decided that we should respond favourably to the recent Argentine approach about exchanging Ambassadors, the timing and form of an announcement are still under consideration.
3. In Supplementary Questions, some members are likely to press for a rapid restoration of Ambassadors, on trade and other grounds, and others to urge that full relations should not be resumed in view of human rights abuses and the lack of democracy in both countries. Reference may be made in the human rights context to William Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean who is one of hundreds of missing persons in Chile who are the victims of secret arrests. Further information on this case is included in the background note; and on outstanding Argentine cases in a separate note.

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

4 June, 1979

Hall 5/v1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

Withdrawal of Ambassadors from Chile and Argentina

1. The last British Ambassador to Chile was withdrawn in December 1975 when a British subject, Dr Sheila Cassidy, was arrested and tortured after attending to a fugitive guerrilla leader wounded in a clash with the police. The Chilean authorities failed to give a satisfactory reply to our strong protests over this case, attempting instead to refute Dr Cassidy's evidence. The Ambassador never returned to Chile, and his mission was formally terminated on July 1976. The following January the Chilean Ambassador in London was not replaced when he left on completion of his tour of duty. The stated position of the Labour Government was that no Ambassador would be sent back to Chile until there was "real and tangible evidence" of an improvement in the human rights situation there. Following the general election, the Chilean Charge d'Affaires in London told the department that he was being recalled for consultation in Santiago about restoring Ambassadors, and sought for an indication of HMG's views. Ministers have decided that we should not be rushed on this.

2. The last British Ambassador to Argentina was recalled in January 1976 at the suggestion of the Argentine Government (who had already withdrawn their own Ambassador in London) following a deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute. His mission was formally terminated in January, 1977. Since then, we have begun a new round of negotiations with the Argentines over the Falkland Islands; and earlier this year they indicated that they wished to see Ambassadorial relations restored. Ministers have now decided that we should respond positively, but the arrangements for an exchange of Ambassadors and the timing of an announcement remain under consideration. (Before the election, Ministers in the last Government had confirmed that they would be prepared to agree to the Argentine approach, and this news became public when it was leaked by the Argentines.)

/Chile: ...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Chile: The Beausire Case

3. Sr Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean dual national, disappeared at Buenos Aires airport in Argentina when travelling from Chile to Europe on the same day (2 November 1974) that other members of the family in Chile were arrested and interrogated about the whereabouts of one of Sr Beausire's sisters, the companion of the leader of a clandestine extremist group. Sr Beausire appears to have been detained and flown secretly back to Chile, where several witnesses have testified to seeing him in detention centres between November 1974 and July 1975. The lack of any subsequent evidence suggests that he later died or was killed. We have made several strong representations to the Chilean authorities about the case - including a personal message in 1976 to the Foreign Minister from the then Foreign Secretary - Mr Crosland - but they have continued to deny any involvement or responsibility. The UK has also submitted the case formally to the UN Human Rights Commission (which recently appointed two experts to study the question of disappeared prisoners in Chile).

4. A British lawyer recently visited Chile to pursue the case, with the help of our Embassy. He presented a habeas corpus petition in the courts on Sr Beausire's behalf, and the case has now been referred to one of five specially appointed judges who are investigating evidence about several of the "disappeared".

5. Sr Beausire's mother, and another of his sisters, have since come to London as refugees. The case has been extensively publicised here by Amnesty and other human rights groups.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

ARGENTINA: CONSULAR MATTERS

1. There are 3 cases of current concern. Dr Douglas Gillie, a UK national but long resident in Argentina, disappeared from his home in Buenos Aires in September, 1977. Mr Walter Fleury, also born in the UK and resident in Argentina, was abducted in August, 1976 from a boarding house in Buenos Aires. Despite repeated representations to the Argentine authorities about these cases, neither has been heard of since. Miss Daisy Hobson, a dual national, was arrested in Buenos Aires in May 1976 and charged with subversion and illegal possession of firearms. She was subsequently sentenced to 22 years' penal detention. An appeal for clemency is under consideration. Her dual nationality means we have no standing to act formally on her behalf but informal representations have been made and the Argentine authorities are aware that if Miss Hobson is released she will be accepted into the UK.

2. The cases of Dr Gillie and Mr Fleury have been given no publicity in this country in accordance with the wishes of their friends and relatives who have always believed that publicity might be harmful.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Southern Thule

1. We discovered an Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule at the end of 1976. Thule is the most southerly of the Falkland Islands' Dependencies, is twelve hundred miles from Port Stanley and on the edge of the Antarctic Treaty Area. We immediately protested and left the Argentine Government in no doubt that we consider Southern Thule as British territory. We have continued to make our views clear to the Argentine Government so our legal position over sovereignty is fully and explicitly protected. The Argentines have assured us that their activities are purely scientific in support of their Antarctic Research programme.

2. At the Geneva negotiating round in December, 1978, we reached a draft agreement on scientific co-operation with Argentina in the Falkland Dependencies. This would have explicitly removed any sovereignty implications, but the Falkland Island Councillors have said they are not happy with such an agreement as it stands and the matter has been left for further consideration.

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONfor ORAL answer on 13 June 1979

S.A.M.D. (37)

The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary
Office through your
Under-Secretary by

16.
#.

NOON ON WEDNESDAY
6 JUNE 1979

*C Mr Robert McCrindle (Brentwood and Ongar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he plans to review United Kingdom diplomatic representation in Argentina and Chile.

Mr Douglas Hurd

Taken with Question no.

13 June 1979

*C Mr Robert McCrindle (Brentwood and Ongar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he plans to review United Kingdom diplomatic representation in Argentina and Chile.

No 14

MR DOUGLAS HURD

Taken with Question No 11

13 June 1979

*C Mr Robert McCrindle (Brentwood and Ongar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he plans to review United Kingdom diplomatic representation in Argentina and Chile.

No 14

MR DOUGLAS HURD

[Taken with Question No 11]

I will, with permission, answer this question and No ~~14~~¹¹ together.

Argentina and Chile are separate cases, but we are now actively considering the level of our relations with both countries. We shall, of course, inform the House of any decision.

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

for ORAL answer on 13 June 1979

S A N D

36

12.

The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary
Office through your
Under-Secretary by

NOON ON WEDNESDAY
6 JUNE 1979

*C Mr Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, whether he will propose an exchange of ambassadors with Argentina and Chile.

Mr. Douglas Hurd

I will, with permission, answer this question and no. together. Argentina and Chile are separate cases, but the level of our relations with both countries, ~~is under active consideration.~~ ^{we are} ~~I am~~ not in a position to announce any decision at this stage.

We are now actively considering

We shall of course
inform the House of
any decision

13 June 1979

*C Mr Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, whether he will propose an exchange of ambassadors with Argentina and Chile.

No 11

MR DOUGLAS HURD

I will, with permission, answer this question and No 14 together.

Argentina and Chile are separate cases, but we are now actively considering the level of our relations with both countries. We shall, of course, inform the House of any decision.

13 June 1979

*C Mr Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, whether he will propose an exchange of ambassadors with Argentina and Chile.

No 11

MR DOUGLAS HURD

14
I will, with permission, answer this question and
No 14 together.

Argentina and Chile are separate cases, but we are now actively considering the level of our relations with both countries. We shall, of course, inform the House of any decision.

14 *C Mr Robert McCrindle (Brentwood and Ongar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he plans to review United Kingdom diplomatic representation in Argentina and Chile.

(17490) Dd.897502 Sm 2/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

REFERENCES

KERSHAW
McCRINDLE

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

SEPARATE CASES

1. It was the Government of Argentina which was responsible for reducing the level of our relations with that country. In the case of Chile it was this country, under the previous Government, which took the initiative by withdrawing our Ambassador from Santiago.

HAS EITHER COUNTRY MADE APPROACHES ABOUT AMBASSADORS?

2. The Argentine Government recently indicated their wish to see relations restored at Ambassadorial level, and the Chileans have raised this matter with us informally. We have not received any request for agreement for a new Ambassador from either country.

IMPORTANCE OF AMBASSADORS TO TRADE

3. This is one of the factors which needs to be taken into account.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (EG "DISAPPEARED" POLITICAL PRISONERS)

4. The Government is aware of the human rights situation in Argentina/Chile. We deplore all abuses, wherever they may occur. But having, not having or reappointing Ambassadors in any particular country cannot depend only on our view of the human rights situation in that country. If it did there would be a great many countries with no British Ambassador. We have Ambassadors abroad to serve our interests - including our human rights interests. Sometimes these interests are best served by withdrawing an Ambassador temporarily: but how long such a withdrawal can be useful must be a matter of judgement - however valid the original decision. (If asked about Sheila Cassidy and/or William Beausire.) What I have just said is very relevant to the cases of Dr Cassidy and Mr Beausire.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

5. No dates have been arranged for further talks with Argentina about the Falkland Islands. We shall continue fully to consult the Falkland Islanders on any developments which affect their interests, nor will any proposals about the future of the Islands be brought before Parliament unless these are acceptable to the Islanders.

ARGENTINA: PRESENCE ON SOUTHERN THULE

6. The position on the Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule remains as it was: we have protested at their presence and in doing so protected our sovereignty position. Negotiations have been undertaken to remove any sovereignty implications from these scientific activities, but these have not been concluded.

This is one of the topics which will be for consideration when we continue talks with the Argentines.

EXTENSION OF ECGD INSURANCE COVER: CHILE

7. This is a question for my ^{rt hon} Right Honourable Friend, the Secretary of State for Trade.

It was decided last week to resume medium term cover for exports to Chile.

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/PS

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

1. During the conversations yesterday between the Minister of State, Mr Ridley, and the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Commodore Cavandoli, the latter said that, whilst the Argentine Government had the highest regard for Mr Carless personally, they wished to mark the change in our relations symbolised by the exchange of Ambassadors by sending here Dr Ortiz de Rosas, who was probably their best diplomat and would like to suggest the possibility that we might take similar action on our side. The Argentine Government had to take account of the fact that there would be opposition in some Argentine circles to the exchange of Ambassadors before progress had been made over the Falkland Islands and this criticism might be increased if from the British side the exchange of Ambassadors was carried out by upgrading our existing Chargé d'Affaires.

2. Mr Ridley said that he understood the Argentine point of view but the choice of a British Ambassador was one for us to decide and we were thinking of nominating Mr Carless. Mr Ridley added, over the lunch table, that he believed that when Mr Carless had originally been appointed as Chargé d'Affaires it had been with the idea that if an exchange of Ambassadors could be approved he would be an appropriate man to be nominated and that in any case were we looking today at the question of an appointment of an Ambassador to Argentina completely de nouveau then Mr Carless was

/exactly

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

exactly of the standing and seniority to be nominated for the post.

3. The formal meeting with Commodore Cavandoli was hurried and the conversation at lunch was, to a certain degree, hampered because Commodore Cavandoli spoke and listened in English without interpretation, although his command of the language is far from perfect. Consequently, I think it would be wise, if you agree, if I were to call the Chargé d'Affaires in urgently and tell him politely but firmly that we propose to ask for agrément for Mr Carless and that there was no question of changing this. In doing so I would repeat the points which Mr Ridley did his best to make to Commodore Cavandoli.

GE Hall
G E Hall

15 June 1979

~~Chief Clerk~~
~~Sir A Parsons~~

Chief Clerk

*After discussion with you and
I spoke as proposed to
Sir A. Parsons
the Argentine Charge.*

GE Hall 15/6

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(34)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 June, 1979

ALU 020/1

15 JUN 1979

M. Helander

M J Treble Esq
Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street
London SW1

Sam Mike,

R. G.

ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. As you know, one of the ways in which Hugh Carless considers we might put more content into our relations with Argentina would be to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding. He has now sent me the attached copy of a draft based on the Brazilian model.

2. Although it is the wish of Ministers to put more warmth into our relations with Argentina, the time to put the idea of a Memorandum of Understanding to the Argentines, as Carless himself recognises, is probably still some way off. And even then, I know you have reservations about the idea. Meanwhile it would be helpful to have your comments in due course on the draft.

*Yours ever
John.*

J B Ure

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

AVT 020/1

26 JUN 1979

INDEX	PA	Person Taken
-------	----	--------------

Mr Hall

ARGENTINA

1. I have seen your minute of 24 May about the Argentine Charge's call on you, and you have seen my minute of 23 May about the visit Sr Pimentel will be making on you tomorrow. While the former primarily relates to the restoration of Ambassadors, and the latter to human rights in Argentina, the two questions are related.

2. It was clear from Lord Avebury's lunch today for Sr Pimentel that we must expect a good deal of trouble from the human rights lobby when the re-instatement of Ambassadors is announced; Lord Avebury told me that Mr Filochowski had recently spoken to him about the undesirability of sending Ambassadors back to BA and Santiago in present circumstances.

3. This being so I am not at all sure that we should go along with the Argentine desire "to bring out the exchange of Ambassadors into high relief"; I think Ministers should be advised, and I think from his own comments the Secretary of State already has in mind, to keep the exchange in as low relief as possible.

4. It follows from this that even if the Argentine Charge comes back to you and says that his Government would prefer the "more striking effect if someone other than Mr Carless were nominated" I think we should disregard their view in our own interests. In any case, it would - in my view - be fairly good cheek if they said this since (a) it was they who broke off Ambassadorial relations in the first place, (b) a number of senior Argentine establishment figures have said that Mr Carless was just the sort of person they wanted as Ambassador, and (c) whatever criticisms might be made of

/his ...

CONFIDENTIAL

16 Kingston
CONFIDENTIAL

his performance in BA over the last two years, no one could say that Mr Carless had not worked vigorously for improved relations or that he had made no mark in Argentina: quite the reverse.

5. In short, my department's advice would be that you should give Sr Blanco no encouragement to think that we are likely to send a more conspicuous, senior or public figure to BA than the present incumbent!

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

29 May, 1979

Copy to:

Sir A Parsons

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

Mr Cowling

Mr Malcomson

16 Kingston

33

33

28

AM 020/1

10

6 JUN 1979

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

1. I have now submitted to the Secretary of State on how we should implement Mr Wall's minute of 27 May below.

¹⁷
J B Ure
South America Department

30 May, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

(32)

Mr Hall ✓
Sir A Parsons ✓
PS/Mr Ridley ✓
Private Secretary ✓

AA 020/1

RECEIVED	13
12 JUN 1979	
DEPT. OF STATE	
INTER	

Secretary of State
H. Ridley is content.
Purfla

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

A

1. Mr Wall's minute of 17 May recorded the Secretary of State's decision that Ambassadorial relations with Argentina should be restored in response to the Argentine request. The Secretary of State said that the timing should be carefully handled and that we should take care to warn the Falkland Islanders of what is intended.
2. The department has proposed, in a separate submission, that Mr Ridley should visit the Falkland Islands and Argentina in July. We have delayed putting up the proposals about relaying to the Islanders and to the Argentines the Secretary of State's decision on Ambassadors, while we considered whether it might not be appropriate for Mr Ridley to do this on his visit; however, it now seems desirable that we should make these approaches before July, and in response to representations by the Argentine Charge, Mr Hall has told him of the decision in principle. On the assumption that the Secretary of State agrees to Mr Ridley's travel plan, it might nonetheless be appropriate that the Ambassadorial exchange should be announced - complete with names - while Mr Ridley is in BA.
3. I therefore recommend that we should telegraph now to the Governor of the Falklands asking him to explain the decision to the Islanders; and that we should also telegraph to the Charge in BA instructing him to confirm our response to the Argentine authorities. I submit draft telegrams.

/4. ...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I further recommend that when the time for an announcement is reached (ie in July) News Department should brief the press on lines similar to those which the Governor is being instructed to use with the Falklands Councillors. This department will also provide News Department at that time with further background material - for off-the-record briefing - about the improvements in human rights in Argentina in recent months and about the whole background to the original withdrawal of Ambassadors. News Department should also emphasize at that time that Mr Ridley's visit demonstrates the on-going need to have a high-level dialogue with the Argentine Government and that it is in fulfilment of that need that Ambassadors are being sent back.

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

29 May, 1979

Copies attached for:

PS/Lord Privy Seal

Copies sent to:

PS/PUS
Chief Clerk
POD
News Dept

Full 20/1

Islanders

30

5.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

(31)



020/5

ALA 020/1.	
-6 JUN 1979	
INDEX	FILE

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BUENOS AIRES.

21 May 1979

J B Ure Esq MVO
S Am D
FCO

Va see (34) 14 25/1

Dear John,

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. Many thanks for your Personal letter of 4 April, dealing with the question of a Memorandum of Understanding between UK and Argentina.
2. Martinez de Hoz has not since asked me for a copy of the MOU with Brazil, nor have I raised the subject with him.
3. While I recognise that we are still far from the time to consider putting to the Argentines a proposal for such a document, I hope the day may come when we can do so. We have therefore remodelled the Brazil MOU to serve our purpose with Argentina. I enclose a copy.

Yours ever,
Hugh.

Hugh Carless

Enc

Reg
To me with
previous pps.

R4 6.

In Context.
Are JBT in on this saga?
If not, may I have a
draft to the table.

Ron 4/6.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DSR 11

DRAFT

Type 1 +

Register
No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
CONCERNING CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Republic of Argentina;

Recalling the historic ties which form a part
of the common heritage of the two countries;

Recognising the responsibilities that fall upon
them as the Governments of countries with wide ranging
connections and interests within the international
community;

Noting their mutual desire to maintain and
strengthen a fruitful economic relationship;

Aware of the value of consulting each other on
questions of common interest;

Have reached the following understanding:

1. The two Governments will be ready to hold consultations
on current issues of international concern. These
consultations may, for example, include such subjects

/ as

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

2

as: international developments of special interest to either Government; matters under discussion at the United Nations and in other multilateral bodies such as the Antarctic Treaty; future arrangements for commodities and raw materials; economic and industrial cooperation in general; the strengthening of commercial exchanges through the facilitation of joint ventures, banking, credit and similar services for the promotion of industry and agriculture; cultural relations; scientific, technological and educational exchanges.

2. Such consultations may be held, by mutual agreement, at senior official or Ministerial level. They will normally take the form of meetings arranged alternately in the United Kingdom and in Argentina. The agenda for such meetings will be agreed through the normal diplomatic channels. By joint decision of the two Governments appropriate experts including representatives of national agencies and the private sector may participate in these meetings.

3. In addition to these meetings, consultations will be carried forward on a flexible and day-to-day basis through the diplomatic channels of each country.

4. By joint decision of the Governments ad hoc study groups or working parties may be set up either to study particular questions of current political interest or to help carry forward special projects in one country or the other or in third countries.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of Argentina intend that the arrangements established by this Memorandum will complement and in no way replace or detract from

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11C

RESTRICTED

3

the existing means of freely transacting business
between the countries.

6. This Memorandum will come into operation upon
signature.

RESTRICTED

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

for ORAL answer on 13 June 1979

Original at: ALW 04-725/8
This Copy for: ALA 02-
Information only / Action on
Para(s)

S A M D
The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary
Office through your
Under-Secretary by

13.

NOON ON WEDNESDAY
6 JUNE 1979

*C Mr Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, whether he will propose an exchange of ambassadors with Argentina and Chile.

I will, with permission, answer this question and no. together. Argentina and Chile are separate cases, but the level of our relations with both countries is under active consideration. I am not in a position to announce any decision at this stage.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1979 (28)

Mr. Dawson

S.A.M.D.

The draft reply should reach the Parliamentary Office through your Under-Secretary by 17.

NOON ON WEDNESDAY 6 JUNE 1979

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

for ORAL answer on 13 June 1979

*C Mr Robert McCrindle (Brentwood and Ongar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he plans to review United Kingdom diplomatic representation in Argentina and Chile.

REFERENCES

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

SEPARATE CASES

1. It was the Government of Argentina which was responsible for reducing the level of our relations with that country. In the case of Chile it was this country, under the previous Government, which took the initiative by withdrawing our Ambassador from Santiago.

HAS EITHER COUNTRY MADE APPROACHES ABOUT AMBASSADORS?

2. The Argentine Government recently indicated their wish to see relations restored at Ambassadorial level, and the Chileans have raised this matter with us informally. We have not received any request for agrément for a new Ambassador from either country.

IMPORTANCE OF AMBASSADORS TO TRADE

3. This is one of the factors which needs to be taken into account.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (E.G. "DISAPPEARED" POLITICAL PRISONERS)

4. The Government is aware of the human rights situation in Argentina/Chile. We deplore all abuses, wherever they may occur. But the appointment of an Ambassador is not a token of approval: it is the establishment of a working link.

CONFIDENTIAL

CHILE: WILLIAM BEAUSIRE (ANGLO-CHILEAN MISSING PRISONER)

5. This serious human rights case is clearly an issue which affects our bilateral relations. We strongly hope that an effective investigation will be conducted into William Beausire's fate and shall continue to press for one. [If pressed] But we should not necessarily wish to make this a precondition for the return of an Ambassador.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

6. No dates have been arranged for further talks with Argentina about the Falkland Islands. We shall continue fully to consult the Falkland Islanders on any developments which affect their interests.

ARGENTINA: PRESENCE ON SOUTHERN THULE

7. The position on the Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule remains as it was: we have protested at their presence and in doing so protected our sovereignty position. Negotiations have been undertaken to remove any sovereignty implications from these scientific activities, but these have not been concluded. This is one of the topics which will be for consideration when we continue talks with the Argentines.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

Withdrawal of Ambassadors from Chile and Argentina

1. The last British Ambassador to Chile was withdrawn in December 1975 when a British subject, Dr Sheila Cassidy, was arrested and tortured after attending to a fugitive guerrilla leader wounded in a clash with the police. The Chilean authorities failed to give a satisfactory reply to our strong protests over this case, attempting instead to refute Dr Cassidy's evidence. The Ambassador never returned to Chile, and his mission was formally terminated on July 1976. The following January the Chilean Ambassador in London was not replaced when he left on completion of his tour of duty. The stated position of the Labour Government was that no Ambassador would be sent back to Chile until there was "real and tangible evidence" of an improvement in the human rights situation there. Following the general election, the Chilean Charge d'Affaires in London told the department that he was being recalled for consultation in Santiago about restoring Ambassadors, and sought for an indication of HMG's views. Ministers have decided that we should not be rushed on this.

2. The last British Ambassador to Argentina was recalled in January 1976 at the suggestion of the Argentine Government (who had already withdrawn their own Ambassador in London) following a deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute. His mission was formally terminated in January, 1977. Since then, we have begun a new round of negotiations with the Argentines over the Falkland Islands; and earlier this year they indicated that they wished to see Ambassadorial relations restored. Ministers have now decided that we should respond positively, but the arrangements for an exchange of Ambassadors and the timing of an announcement remain under consideration. (Before the election, Ministers in the last Government had confirmed that they would be prepared to agree to the Argentine approach, and this news became public when it was leaked by the Argentines.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chile: The Beausire Case

3. Sr Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean dual national, disappeared at Buenos Aires airport in Argentina when travelling from Chile to Europe on the same day (2 November 1974) that other members of the family in Chile were arrested and interrogated about the whereabouts of one of Sr Beausire's sisters, the companion of the leader of a clandestine extremist group. Sr Beausire appears to have been detained and flown secretly back to Chile, where several witnesses have testified to seeing him in detention centres between November 1974 and July 1975. The lack of any subsequent evidence suggests that he later died or was killed. We have made several strong representations to the Chilean authorities about the case - including a personal message in 1976 to the Foreign Minister from the then Foreign Secretary - Mr Crosland - but they have continued to deny any involvement or responsibility. The UK has also submitted the case formally to the UN Human Rights Commission (which recently appointed two experts to study the question of disappeared prisoners in Chile).

4. A British lawyer recently visited Chile to pursue the case, with the help of our Embassy. He presented a habeas corpus petition in the courts on Sr Beausire's behalf, and the case has now been referred to one of five specially appointed judges who are investigating evidence about several of the "disappeared".

5. Sr Beausire's mother, and another of his sisters, have since come to London as refugees. The case has been extensively publicised here by Amnesty and other human rights groups.

16/1/79 (28)

Mr. Dawson

BACKGROUND NOTE

Southern Thule

1. We discovered an Argentine scientific station on Southern Thule at the end of 1976. Thule is the most southerly of the Falkland Islands' Dependencies, is twelve hundred miles from Port Stanley and on the edge of the Antarctic Treaty Area. We immediately protested and left the Argentine Government in no doubt that we consider Southern Thule as British territory. We have continued to make our views clear to the Argentine Government so our legal position over sovereignty is fully and explicitly protected. The Argentines have assured us that their activities are purely scientific in support of their Antarctic Research programme.

2. At the Geneva negotiating round in December, 1978, we reached a draft agreement on scientific co-operation with Argentina in the Falkland Dependencies. This would have explicitly removed any sovereignty implications, but the Falkland Island Councillors have said they are not happy with such an agreement as it stands and the matter has been left for further consideration.

13 June, 1979

South Atlantic Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Hall
Parliamentary Unit

RELATIONS WITH CHILE AND ARGENTINA: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS

1. I submit a draft reply with Notes for Supplementaries to Mr Anthony Kershaw's and Mr Robert McCrindle's Questions for Oral Answer on 13 June (which have been grouped together with the agreement of Parliamentary Unit). Notes on the background to the present lack of Ambassadorial relations with Chile and Argentina and on the Argentine presence on Southern Thule are also attached.
2. Ministers are currently considering submissions by the Department on the question of Ambassadorial relations with Chile and with Argentina, and the reply to these PQs and the Notes for Supplementaries have been drafted on the assumption that they will not be ready to announce a decision in respect of either country by 13 June, when the Questions are due to be answered. Though the Secretary of State has decided that we should respond favourably to the recent Argentine approach about exchanging Ambassadors, the timing and form of an announcement are still under consideration.
3. In Supplementary Questions, some members are likely to press for a rapid restoration of Ambassadors, on trade and other grounds, and others to urge that full relations should not be resumed in view of human rights abuses and the lack of democracy in both countries. Reference may be made in the human rights context to William Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean who is one of hundreds of missing persons in Chile who are the victims of secret arrests. Further information on this case is included in the background note.

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

4 June, 1979

74FO 010/24

XXXX GRES

RESTRICTED	
14	020/
2 MAY 1979	
INDEX	

Reg

Pl let me see
with ref.

R
29 =

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

RESTRICTED

FILE NO: 040/1

DATE: 23 MAY 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J R COWLING ESQ, SAMP

COPIED TO (BY BAG): MISS M A M LAWRENCE, PORT STANLEY

FROM: R GOZNEY, BUENOS AIRES

PRESS SPECULATION ON A VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE

1. FOLLOWING FOULKES' SPECULATION IN LA OPINION LAST WEEK (MY TELE-LETTER 020/5 OF 16 MAY) LA NACION TOOK UP THE THEME YESTERDAY AND REPORTED THAT ON HIS WAY TO VISIT THE FALKLANDS IN JULY, MR RIDLEY WOULD VISIT BUENOS AIRES. NO SOURCE WAS GIVEN FOR THE INFORMATION.
2. THE REPORT ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES THE 2 COUNTRIES WOULD REAPPOINT AMBASSADORS BEFORE THE VISIT TOOK PLACE AND THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE WOULD, DURING HIS VISIT, CONTINUE THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS.
3. THE AUTHOR OF THE PIECE IS UNKNOWN TO US. OTHER RELIABLE JOURNALISTS HERE TELL US THAT THEY HAVE NOT PICKED UP ANYTHING SIMILAR.

(SIGNED) R GOZNEY

PA

RESTRICTED

Mr Duggan

Remarkably on target
for a change!

SENT AT 24/19587 NSC

for use

Except for x

302

R 305

Mr Duggan

Mr Kingston

(28)

Pl eat we see

with X.

Mr Hay

18/5.

18/5

ALAN 020/1

18/5

FILE NO: 12/5

DATE: 16 MAY 1977

FOLLOWING FIR: J P COULING ESC, 18/5

Copied to AUS 026/1.

MINISTERIAL VISIT & EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS : PRESS SPECULATION

1. WRITING TO 15 MAY 1977, LA PRINCE, HAROLD FOULKES CONTINUED HIS SPECULATION ABOUT THE NEXT MOVES IN ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS.
2. HE REPORTS THAT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A FINANCIAL TIMES JOURNALIST ON 14 MAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN TO SOUTH AMERICA HE DID NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, KNOW ARGENTINA. BUT HE CONSIDERED IT APPROPRIATE TO SEND ONE OF HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS TO LOOK AT THE PRESENT STATE OF ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ANSWER CARRIED IN THE DETRACK, FOULKES IS CLEARLY MIS-HEARING, BUT HE GOES ON TO SPECULATE THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE, WHO SPOKE WITH GREAT CONFIDENCE, MIGHT GO IN JUNE OR JULY.
3. ON THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS, FOULKES REPEATS THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOMINATE ARTURO ROZAS. AS FAR AS THE BRITISH NOMINATION IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THE ADVENT OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT MAKES IT LESS LIKELY THAT RICH CARLSON WILL BE NOMINATED. HE ADDS THAT IF HE WERE, THE NOMINATION WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GIVEN CARLSON'S EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY. BUT, HE SAYS, OTHER SECTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE LOOKING FOR MORE OF A GESTURE FROM LONDON AND THE NOMINATION OF A LONG TERM HEAD OF MISSION OF THE HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC RANK.
4. ALL THIS POINTS, FOULKES SAYS, TO A PERIOD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMPLETED HIS ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLEX OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO THE UK.

Original at: ALW 020/1

This Copy for: ALW 020/1
Information only / Action on
Para(s)

See p. 3

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MINISTER OF STATE'S MEETING, 16 MAY

Present:

Mr Ridley MP
PS/Mr Ridley
APS/Mr Ridley
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall
Mr Ure SAmD
Mr Duggan SAmD
Mr Cowling SAmD
Mr Osborne SAmD

Visit to Falkland Islands and Argentina

1. Mr Ridley said that early discussion of the important Falklands issue seemed necessary from his reading of the department's submissions. It would be a mistake for the new Government to hedge or prevaricate further with the Argentines who knew we had been doing so in the past. To continue would make them think that the new Government was not in earnest and might make them more inclined to act foolishly. He thought there was a possibility of getting them to accept a continuation of UK sovereignty if we acted in a friendlier fashion and tried to help them in other areas, for example the Antarctic. He therefore felt it was right to visit the Islands soon to reassure them of our wish to help and to obtain their authority to continue the negotiations. He could at the same time make a courtesy call on the Argentine authorities. On his return, we could work out a more detailed strategy for a resumption of negotiations in the autumn.

2. Sir A Parsons thought that it would be difficult to go through Buenos Aires and restrict contact with the Argentines to a mere courtesy call: some broad decisions of principle should be

/taken

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

taken in advance of the visit. The Argentines would be likely to seek confirmation that the new Government would continue the negotiations and from the point reached at the last round.

3. Sir A Parsons said that the Minister might be pressed to confirm that the "lease back option" still remained a possibility. Mr Hall thought a direct reference to lease back unlikely; it had never been mentioned in so many words in the negotiations. From the Argentine stand-point, negotiations had to include sovereignty; they had to see some possibility of progress and of obtaining sovereignty over both the Dependencies and the Falklands, or there would be an unpredictable but strong reaction. On the basis of his experience in the negotiations to-date, he thought there was a narrow path between the two positions; to avoid a breakdown in the negotiations and to give the moderates on the Argentine side some support, it was important that this chink should be left open. Mr Ridley said he felt that it would be premature to mention lease back to the Argentines which would be interpreted as capitulation by the Islanders and in Argentina. We should continue talking to them about a general condominium of economic interests (e.g. in the Antarctic) and try to get a package together which would divert attention from the sovereignty issue. Everything could be included, except sovereignty over which it was difficult to compromise given Parliamentary and public opinion. Mr Hall suggested that it was important to tell the Argentines that the new Government was prepared to negotiate within the existing terms of reference as announced in April 1977. So long as the Argentines clearly understood our insistence on sovereignty over the Islanders, then progress in the negotiations might be possible.

4. Mr Hall suggested that the department should put forward a draft minute for the Secretary of State to send to his OD colleagues explaining that it was necessary to enter fairly quickly into further negotiations with the Argentines and that it

/was

- 3 -

was important to get the support of the Falkland Islanders for this. This meant a Ministerial visit to both Argentina and the Falklands. Mr Hall said that the new Argentine Ambassador might arrive before the end of June and would probably bring instructions to raise the Falklands issue: this underlined the need for an early visit. Mr Duggan recalled that the Argentine Foreign Minister was hoping to talk to the Secretary of State in the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York in late September. Mr Ridley looked at two possible schedules for a visit. He thought that if he was going to go to the trouble of visiting the Falklands it should be done properly and he should spend some time there. He said he would like to leave on 11 July after the visit of the Colombian President. This would give ample time for briefing the Secretary of State before any meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York. Mr Hall thought that the Argentines would be unlikely to press for a further full negotiating round until probably December. Mr Ridley felt that his visit to Buenos Aires and the Falklands would buy time and that in the meantime we should show friendliness wherever possible.

Exchange of Ambassadors with Argentina and Chile

5. Sir A Parsons believed that Ambassadors should be exchanged before the Ministerial visit. Mr Ridley agreed; he felt that we should also consider restoration of Ambassadors with Chile soon. There was much to be said for getting Ambassadors back into Chile and Argentina at the same time.

6. Mr Hall mentioned that we had already gone some way down the road with the Argentines who had a nominee ready. The restoration of Ambassadors with Chile posed a rather different problem. It had been HMG who had withdrawn her Ambassador from Chile whereas in the case of Argentina our Ambassador had been withdrawn at the

/Argentine's

- 4 -

Argentine's request. It had to be a political decision for Ministers. Mr Hall saw no great advantage to our interests in moving quickly or in doing it concurrently with the Argentines. Mr Ridley felt that, if we were able simultaneously to restore relations with Argentina and Chile at Ambassadorial level, it would have the advantage of avoiding criticism that any one country had been treated preferentially; we should whip Chile through. Sir A Parsons agreed; he mentioned however, that there were implications for Nicaragua which would need to be considered. Mr Ure said that the department would be submitting also on another aspect of our relations with Chile, the resumption of medium term ECGD cover; he proposed covering both in one paper before the weekend. Mr Ridley welcomed this.

Visits to Other Countries

7. Mr Ridley said that if Brazil, Venezuela and possibly Mexico were to be included in the same trip, as the department was suggesting, this could mean a total absence of perhaps three weeks, returning to London in early August. Sir A Parsons felt this should be acceptable. August was a quiet month and he could see no difficulty in leaving serious consideration on the future of our negotiations with the Argentines until September.

Action

8. It was agreed that:

- a) approval should be sought for a Ministerial visit to the Falklands and Argentina leaving London on 11 July. The department would prepare a draft minute for the Secretary of State to send to OD colleagues explaining the basis for the visit;

/b)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

- b) once this had been agreed, arrangements would be made to include Brazil, Venezuela (and possibly Mexico) in the same trip, entailing a total absence of about three weeks;
- c) the possibility of resuming Ambassadorial relations simultaneously with both Chile and Argentina should be examined: and
- d) the Department would submit on policy towards Chile as it affected ECGD medium-term cover and the restoration of Ambassadors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution

PS/Mr Ridley
Sir A Parsons
Mr J R Freeland - Legal Advisers
Miss G G Brown
Mr G E Hall
Mr J B Ure - SAmD
Mr J W R Shakespeare - M&CD
Mr D H A Hannay - ESSD
Mr W E H Whyte - News Department
Mr M R Morland - MAED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 120

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 181114Z MAY 79

TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 18 MAY

ALA

020/1

21 MAY 1979

TOP COPY

29

MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

ON MY OWN BEHALF AND THAT OF THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, I HAVE MUCH PLEASURE IN EXTENDING TO YOU THE MOST SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS DURING YOUR PERIOD OF OFFICE.

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING REPLY (SIGNED COPY BEING SENT BY BAG):

QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS. I MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR GOOD WISHES AND ENCOURAGEMENT UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

FILES

SAMD

PCD

MR HALL

CONFIDENTIAL

(28A)

Submission
Mr Ure (SAmD)

AM 020/1
- 6 JUN 1979

Exchange of Ambassadors with Argentina

The Secretary of State has seen your submission of 9 May and subsequent comments. The Secretary of State agrees that we should restore relations to Ambassadorial level in response to the Argentinian request. However, he would like the timing to be carefully handled and has asked whether it might be possible to link the announcement of the resotation to, e.g. Mr Ridley's visit to the Falkland Islands, the purpose being to emphasise the functional need to restore Ambassadorial relations. I should be grateful for advice. The Secretary of State has commented that we would in any case need to take care to warn the Falkland Islanders of what is proposed.

The Secretary of State has also noted paragraph 5(iii) of your minute (the relationship between Chile and Argentina). Lord Carrington thinks that we would need to point out that the Argentines had taken the initiative in asking our Ambassador to leave and in withdrawing their own Ambassador, and that we were now responding to their request to restore relations to Ambassadorial level. In other words there was no parallel with Chile.

J S Wall
(J S Wall)

17 May 1979

cc: PS
PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/Mr Ridley
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Chief Clerk
Mr Hall
POD

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Mr Duggan~~

~~Mr Kingston~~

(28)

Re eat we see
with X.

~~Mr Hall~~ B/V

R/S

AL A 020/1	
21 MAY 1979	
INDEX	18/5

TO: FC

18/5.

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE NO: 020/5

DATE: 16 MAY 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J R COWLING ESQ, SAND

FROM: R GOZNEY, BUENOS AIRES

Copied to AUS 026/1

MINISTERIAL VISIT AND EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS : PRESS SPECULATION

1. WRITING ON 16 MAY IN LA OPINION, HAROLD FOULKES CONTINUES HIS SPECULATION ABOUT THE NEXT MOVES IN ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS.
2. HE REPORTS THAT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A FINANCIAL TIMES JOURNALIST ON 14 MAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN TO SOUTH AMERICA HE DID NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, KNOW ARGENTINA. BUT HE CONSIDERED IT APPROPRIATE TO SEND ONE OF HIS PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS TO LOOK AT THE PRESENT STATE OF ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ANSWER CARRIED IN THE RETRACT SERIES FOULKES IS CLEARLY MISQUOTING, BUT HE GOES ON TO SPECULATE THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR RIDLEY WILL QUITE POSSIBLY VISIT BUENOS AIRES IN JUNE OR JULY.
3. ON THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS, FOULKES REPEATS THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOMINATE ORTIZ DE ROZAS. AS FAR AS THE BRITISH NOMINATION IS CONCERNED, HE SAYS, THE ADVENT OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT MAKES IT LESS LIKELY THAT HUGH CARLESS WILL BE NOMINATED. HE ADDS THAT IF HE WERE, THE NOMINATION WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GIVEN CARLESS' EXPERIENCE AND ABILITY. BUT, HE SAYS, OTHER SECTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE HOPING FOR MORE OF A GESTURE FROM LONDON AND THE NOMINATION OF A LONG TERM HEAD OF MISSION OF THE HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC RANK.
4. ALL THIS POINTS, FOULKES SAYS, TO A PERIOD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMPLETES HIS ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLEX GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO THE UK.

BCKE12.27

915448 COILDN G

KEY+3440072+

RCA MAY 15 0727

40072 PROST CL

915448 COILDN G

RETRACT 627.15MAY.

LORD CARRINGTON'S PRESS CONFERENCE (EXTRACT)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, LORD CARRINGTON, ACCOMPANIED BY SIR IAN GILMOUR, THE LORD PRIVY SEAL, GAVE AN ON-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE FCO ON MONDAY FOURTEEN MAY NINETEENSEVENTYNINE. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXTRACT RELEVANT TO SOUTH AMERICA :

HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY, FINANCIAL TIMES: COULD YOU SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA. CAN YOU FORESEE THERE BEING A BRITISH AMBASSADOR BACK IN SANTIAGO AND IN BUENOS AIRES IN A SHORT TIME, AND WOULD YOU LIKE TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS.

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL, THESE ARE THE SORT OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WHICH IN NINE DAYS YOU WOULD NOT PERHAPS HAVE EXPECTED ME MAKE A DECISION ABOUT. BUT IT SO HAPPENS THAT IN THE EARLIER PART OF THIS YEAR I SPENT SOME TIME IN SOUTH AMERICA, THOUGH NOT IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES, AND I CAN SEE VERY VIVIDLY THE IMPORTANCE OF THOSE COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF BRITISH TRADE IN TERMS OF RELATIONSHIPS AND I HOPE THAT EVEN IF I MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DO IT VERY OFTEN MYSELF, SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES IN PARLIAMENT WHO ARE MINISTERS IN THIS DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO GET OUT TO SOUTH AMERICA AND PERHAPS STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRY AND THOSE COUNTRIES

CENTROFORM LONDON: That, whatever Government came to power in Britain on 3 May, there would be serious difficulties.

SENT TLX....1134/15/JPK

40072 PROST CL

915448 COILDN G

BUA 02-1/6

RECEIVED
-6 JUN 1979

INDEX

Mr Ridley has considered Mr Ure's submission of 9 May and subsequent minuting by Mr Hall, Sir A Parsons, and the PUS. He agrees with Mr Ure's recommendation, but has minuted that careful publicity will be needed at the time of the announcement.

K D Temple
14 May 1979

cc: PS/Lord Privy Seal
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Chief Clerk
Mr Hall
Mr Ure
POD

CONFIDENTIAL

we had a Falkland Islands lobby and the trade unions and other organisations might protest in the context of human rights. But I still did not think that, whatever Government came to power in Britain on 3 May, there would be serious difficulties.

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

for Sewling
w/pt cons to
subject files

1/5 2 0 2 75

- I speak. p 2⁵
ng my call on

the Argentine
adores as soon
candidate. He
signal to us
gh level represen-
otiator on the
ible man with

r the exchange
would of course
t here. I had
ted that the
nt had asked
ly.

y domestic
discounted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Original at: <i>AV 121/7</i>
This Copy for: <i>AV 020/1</i>
Information only / Action on
Para(s)

Mr. Sewling
enter / pl copy to
subject files

Mr. Duggan
2/15

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Duggan, South American Department

Copy to Mr G Hall

M Malcomson 3/5
M Osborne 7/5
M Kingston - pl speak
12-5

The following are the main points which came up during my call on Dr Martinez on 1 May.

2. Exchange of Ambassadors. Dr Martinez said that the Argentine Government wanted to complete the exchange of Ambassadors as soon as possible. Carlos Ortiz de Rosas was still their candidate. He was their top Ambassador and his appointment was a signal to us of the importance which they attached to having a high level representative in London. Ortiz de Rosas/^{would} also be a good negotiator on the Falkland Islands since he was a reasonable and flexible man with impeccable nationalist credentials in Argentina.

3. I said that I did not anticipate any problem over the exchange of Ambassadors from our side, although any decision would of course have to await the establishment of the new Government here. I had seen a message from Mr Carless recently which suggested that the ball was in our court ie that the Argentine Government had asked us whether we would be prepared to move simultaneously.

4. Dr Martinez asked if I thought there would be any domestic problems in Britain. I said that this could not be discounted. We had a Falkland Islands lobby and the trade unions and other organisations might protest in the context of human rights. But I still did not think that, whatever Government came to power in Britain on 3 May, there would be serious difficulties.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

AUT 020/1

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM SPEAKING AND BACKGROUND NOTES FOR THE VISIT
OF ARGENTINE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY : 30 APRIL - 5 MAY 1979.

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

Line to take [If raised]

1. We have noted the Argentine wish to reappoint an Ambassador in London. We await their nomination. As Dr Martinez de Hoz will know, we have been able to respond positively to the approach made by the Argentine Foreign Minister and would not foresee any problems about accepting a suitable candidate.

Background

2. It was the Argentines who took the initiative in October 1975 in recalling their Ambassador following the deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute: they objected to the economic survey of the Islands by Lord Shackleton and fired on the RRS Shackleton on the high seas. They subsequently suggested that our Ambassador be recalled in January 1976.

3. The Argentines have indicated to us that they would like to restore relations at Ambassadorial level. We have told them that if they wish to reinstate an Ambassador in London there should be no political problems about accepting a suitable candidate. The next move is with them: they have not so far followed up with a request for agreement. No mention has yet been made of a British Ambassador in Buenos Aires: we are in no hurry and would wish to be flexible about the timing.

4. Given British public and parliamentary concern about abuses of human rights in Argentina, the appointment of an Argentine ambassador is bound to be controversial.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

(26)

11/1/20
Mr Hall ✓
Sir A Parsons ✓
PS/PUS
PS/Mr Ridley
Private Secretary

ALA 020/1

RECEIVED		13.18	
-6 JUN 1979			
DEPT. OF STATE	STATE DEPT.	STATE DEPT.	STATE DEPT.
STATE DEPT.	STATE DEPT.	STATE DEPT.	STATE DEPT.

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

Problem

A

1. The Argentine Government have approached us about restoring our relations at Ambassadorial level in London and Buenos Aires, suggesting that we should take action simultaneously in requesting and granting agrément. How should we respond?

Background

2. The Argentine Government withdrew their Ambassador from London and requested the withdrawal of our Ambassador at Buenos Aires in 1975/76 at a moment of high tension in our quarrel with them over the Falklands; an Argentine warship had shot at the RRS Shackleton. Since then both countries have been represented by Chargé d'Affaires. The Argentine Chargé in London was recalled in March and at about the same time feelers were put out to us regarding restoring Ambassadors. It has always been our view that it was for them to make the first move on this since it was they who had been responsible for withdrawing Ambassadors. British Ministers told the Argentine Government earlier this year that there would be no objection in principle by us to a restoration of Ambassadors, and there was premature press speculation at the time that we were on the point of exchanging Ambassadors again.

3. If it were decided to restore Ambassadors simultaneously and quickly as the Argentines now wish, it would be necessary for us to reach an early decision about who the British

/Ambassador ...

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

B Ambassador should be. Mr Carless, the present Chargé, was sent to BA on promotion less than two years ago; those responsible for personnel affairs would doubtless be submitting separately about whether he should now be given the title of Ambassador, or whether it would be necessary to send a different officer. In this connection the PUS's minute of 11 October 1977 is relevant.

Argument

4. The arguments in favour of restoring Ambassadors include the following:

- (i) We are currently involved in protracted negotiations about the Falkland Islands and, even if these were to be wound up, there would remain an important and complex political problem. In these circumstances denying ourselves the access and authority of an Ambassador, presents both countries with practical difficulties.
- (ii) We have never considered the appointment of an Ambassador conveying approval on a regime or its policies;
- (iii) The most likely Argentine candidate (Dr Ortiz de Rosas) is a diplomat of high standing and ability who will attract much less criticism in this country than a military man - which many of their Ambassadors are. The other likely candidate is a former civilian Foreign Minister who would also be uncontroversial.
- (iv) We are currently involved in a large number of public sector commercial deals where the prestige of an Ambassador could be advantageous.

/5. ...

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

5. Arguments against include the following:

- (i) It might give the impression to the Falkland Islanders and the Falklands lobby here that we were about to "do a deal" with Argentina to their disadvantage. Although the Islanders and their lobby are congenitally suspicious, I think these fears could be allayed by explicit ministerial explanations.
- (ii) The Argentine Government's record in the human rights field is lamentable; they have been waging an internal war on their terrorist opponents which has involved the abduction of many thousands of Argentine citizens and the widespread use of torture on suspects. The human rights lobby in this country must be expected to raise a protest at any move which might be interpreted as placatory. The outcry would probably be sharper against action by a Conservative Government than against action by a Labour Government, because the strong links between sections of the human rights lobby and the Labour movement enabled the latter to exercise some control on the former. However, effective use could no doubt be made of the argument in paragraph 4(ii) above. We could also rightly claim that we could make more effective representations about human rights through an Ambassador than without one.
- (iii) If we restore Ambassadorial relations with Argentina, it will highlight the anomaly of not having Ambassadorial relations with Chile, where human rights abuses are now less frequent and disturbing than they are in Argentina. But there are separate considerations. The department will be submitting in due course about this problem which is one that can await an approach from the

/Chilean ...

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Chilean Government; and, in any case, we would not need to be rushed into parallel action.

6. On balance I consider that the advantages in terms of enhanced effectiveness in political negotiation and trade promotion outweigh the disadvantages of having to answer misdirected criticism.

Recommendation

7. I therefore recommend that the Secretary of State should authorise the Department to pursue with the Argentine Government the early restoration of Ambassadors.

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

9 May, 1979

Copies to:

Lord Privy Seal
Chief Clerk
POD

1. I agree. There was really no question of our snubbing the Argentines about their request to send an Ambassador. The only question was whether Ambassadors should be appointed more or less simultaneously or whether we should take our time about an actual appointment whilst agreeing to the exchange in principle.

/2.


CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL




2. I do not think that we need worry greatly about the reaction of the Falkland Islanders and the Falklands lobby or about the problem of Chile, but Ministers will certainly wish to be aware of the likely outcry in this country. On this I have two points to add to Mr Ure's minute. The first is that the Argentine Government have not only been involved in thousands of abductions and the widespread use of torture but also in hundreds of murders of suspected political opponents without any semblance of trial. Abductions, torture and murder continue but on a much reduced scale. Secondly, the likely protests in this country will, as Mr Ure says, come from the human rights movement as a whole including many of independent and, particularly, Liberal tendencies and Ministers should be prepared for this in Parliament and in the press.


G E Hall

9 May 1979

cc PS/Lord Privy Seal

I agree. The Argentinians want to mend this fence and our national interest would be better served with Ambassadors than without them. To turn the Argentinians down or to procrastinate would amount to an unjustifiable snub.


A D Parsons

10 May 1979

E 100/

CONFIDENTIAL

I too think we should proceed with
the exchange of Ambassadors. If the
Security of State gives, it will be for my
No 1 Function. Good to write a
Memorandum to him about the proposed
Candidates.

Niklaus Salvis
1075

~~Confidential~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from minute by Sir Michael Palliser on 11 October 1977

"Mr Ure is correct in thinking that when Mr Carless was appointed to Buenos Aires as Minister, it was envisaged that it would be possible at the right moment to get back to Ambassadorial representation with the minimum of fuss and publicity by merely changing his title. (That was one of the reasons why we picked Mr Carless, who would be fully up to the job.)"

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

K2804(-

RAFO 6307/33

PP FCO

GRPS 114

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BUENOS AIRES 03/2400Z MAY 1979

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 3 MAY 1979

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS.

1. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS MADE FURTHER PUBLIC REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF AN EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS.

2. IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH A LA PLATA NEWSPAPER, NOW REPRINTED IN THE BUENOS AIRES PRESS OF 3 MAY, HE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR MUTUAL RESTORATION OF RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL : THEIR MAINTENANCE AT THE LEVEL OF CHARGES, HE SAID, QUOTE LIMITS THE FREEDOM OF EXCHANGES IN CONSIDERING AN IMPORTANT PACKAGE OF SUBJECTS : THE MALVINAS IS THE FIRST PRIORITY AND ITSELF JUSTIFIES THE INTENTION OF NORMALIZING THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION UNQUOTE.

CHICK

NNNN

SENT AT 03/2430Z HR

M 4/5

25

AA 020/1

NO DISTRIBUTION

124

SAMD

TOP COPY

Full copy
available
m 4/5

Confidential

(24)



As 020/1

2 MAY 1979

Mr Dyer 1/5
Mr Lowry 1/5

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BUENOS AIRES.

Mr Malcolm 1/5
Mr Osborne 2/0

26 April 1979

George Hall Esq CMG
FCO

Li 5/1
Mr Line
Hall 30/10
Bon 30/4

Dear George,

RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

1. In continuation of the message which I have sent by safe hand to Sir A Parsons about the démarche made to me yesterday by the Political Director at the Foreign Ministry (Lupiz) on the subject of agrément for Ambassadors, you will wish to know that:

- a. Lupiz had Katzenstein (Chief of Protocol) with him. He asked that we should take action simultaneously with the Argentines in requesting agréments for, and in granting them to, Ambassadors.
- b. Lupiz did not mention who the Argentines had in mind to nominate but hinted that it would be Ortiz de Rosas. Nor did he mention the conversation which the Foreign Minister had with Mr Rowlands in Brasilia in late March.

2. As reported in my message to Parsons, I said that I believed that Ministers would wish to hold over any decision on the Argentine démarche until after the elections. I added that, if this were the case, the new Foreign Secretary would hardly be able to give the matter priority attention. Lupiz said that he understood this and would not expect any agrément to be granted before the end of May. Katzenstein added that any requests for agrément would of course be kept secret until they were granted and could be published.

3. My reading of the situation is that:

- i. President Videla has now concurred with the recommendation that Ortiz de Rosas be nominated.
- ii. The Foreign Minister is anxious to get an Ambassador to London as soon as possible - especially to prepare the way for a successful meeting between himself and the next British Foreign Secretary at the UN in late September.

/ iii. In

RECEIVED

Confidential

2



iii. In order to appease nationalist and Peronist opinion, opposed to having ambassadorial relations with Britain, the Argentine government wishes HMG to help them by taking simultaneous action.

4. Where British advantage lies you will be able to gauge more accurately than I. I imagine that some domestic political considerations may apply. If I can help in any further discussion on this matter, I will, as you know, be available in London next week.

Yours ever.

Hugh

Hugh Carless

P S You will of course have spotted the fact that when the Foreign Minister spoke to Mr Rowlands in Brasilia in mid-March about exchanging Ambassadors, Pastor believed that we would be agreeing to sign the Agreement on Scientific Cooperation in the Dependencies. The Argentines did not know that we would be unable to sign until your talks in New York with Oliveri López on 21 March. Thus the peg - of progress in the Falklands negotiations - on which the Foreign Minister had hoped to hang his initiative about Ambassadors has been removed. This makes it awkward for him.

HMC

RESTRICTED *Conf*

RESTRICTED

(23)



ALA 020/

30 APR 1979

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BUENOS AIRES.

11 April 1979

J B Ure Esq MVO
South America Department
FCO

(4)

Dear John,

N. Halperin

MY TELNO 39: APPOINTMENT OF ARGENTINE AMBASSADORS

1. Last month, the Foreign Minister submitted to the President a list of recommendations for Argentine Ambassadors to be appointed to ten or so foreign governments. These include the Italian and Spanish as well as our own.

2. The tendency behind these recommendations was to replace military men serving as politically appointed Ambassadors - in Rome and Madrid, for example - by career diplomats. I believe the recommendation for London is Ortiz de Rosas.

3. Whether the President and the Junta will follow the Foreign Minister's recommendations remains to be seen. So far the only appointment which seems to have emerged from the process is that of Rafael Martínez Raymonda, a politician and one of the leaders of the Progressive Democratic party, who is being appointed to Rome. Rumour here has it that Nicanor Costa Mendes, who you know from his recent visit, continues to be a candidate for London although not recommended as the Foreign Minister's first choice.

4. Even if the President shortly decides whom he wishes to appoint to London, the Argentines may delay in seeking agreement until after our General Election.

Yours ever

Careless

Hugh Careless

PS: My Italian colleague has since told me that the Argentines have not yet asked for agreement on behalf of Raymonda and that he is not certain that Raymonda is the man for whom they will ask it eventually.

RESTRICTED



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Resisted

(22)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 April, 1979

Mr 020/

RECEIVED	13
F.C.O.	
APR 11 1979	
LONDON	

H M Carless Esq CMG
British Embassy
BUENOS AIRES

Sam Hughes

(21)

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. Many thanks for your letter of 30 March which I have discussed with George Hall.
2. The possibility of a Memorandum of Understanding with Argentina is certainly an interesting idea but we see a lot of problems involved. I am arranging for you to receive (under separate cover) a copy of the MOU concluded with Brazil in 1975; but I must ask you to treat this as for your own information only at this stage. If you have further ideas on how this might be adapted for relevance to Argentina, by all means let me know, but I should warn you that the DOT have very serious reservations about this method of approach.
3. If Martinez de Hoz does ask you straight out for a copy of the MOU with Brazil, we would prefer that you reported this approach to us before either supplying or promising copies. I do not think he will be too surprised at your not having one readily available and I think in fact although - as you say - this is "a more or less public document" he might not find it readily accessible from other sources. We must avoid any impression of getting together with him to cook something at this stage when we are far from sure that this is what we would want.
4. As regards the other points in your letter, you may be sure that in briefing incoming Ministers about Argentina we will keep in mind the factors you mention.

*Yours ever
John*

J B Ure

Resisted

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(21)

and Personal



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BUENOS AIRES.

AM 024/

30 March 1979

J B Ure Esq MVO
South America Department
FCO

Dear John,

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. You may already have begun to prepare policy option papers for the incoming administration. I am writing to George Hall about options over the Falklands. Should you be doing a separate option paper on policy towards South America, I hope you may be able to argue for a more forward-looking policy towards Argentina.

2. The following scraps of recent news may be of use to you.

- a. The French Finance Minister is planning a visit here soon.
- b. The American Ambassador in his well publicised speech this week to the American Chamber of Commerce stated that human rights were improving here.
- c. At a lunch which Martínez de Hoz gave for Bobby Henderson and his team from Kleinwort Benson on Tuesday (at which I was not present), he enquired how his British guests believed that relations might be improved. When his turn came to speak, Robin Edmonds mentioned the possibility of a Memorandum of Understanding - on the lines of that which we concluded with Brazil in 1975. Martínez de Hoz expressed interest and said that he would ask me if I could show him a copy.

/ which

3. We have no copy of the MOU here and I would be most grateful if you would consider letting me have one.

4. In view of the fact that Martínez de Hoz will be in England during election week, the possibility of his being able to discuss our relations with British Ministers seems slight. You may perhaps prefer me not to give him a copy of the MOU during this pre-election period. On the other hand, it may seem curious to withhold a more or less public document from him since he could easily obtain a copy from other sources.

Yours ever,
Hugh.

Hugh Carless

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY
BUENOS AIRES

20 March 1979

(20)

J R Cowling Esq
SAmD
FCO

R. P. Calvey 128/3

Dear Roy, 28³

R 28³

AMBASSADORS

1. We talked on the telephone on 19 March on this subject. For the record, the Argentine Foreign Minister, Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor, broached the subject during a conversation with journalists on his way back from Caracas and Brasilia. There he had met Mr Rowlands, at the celebrations in honour of the new Presidents of Venezuela and Brazil, and he said that they had agreed on the exchange of Ambassadors.
2. The Clarín report was the longer of the two that appeared. It reported Pastor as saying that Argentina would shortly be proposing to Britain the normalising of diplomatic relations with the appointment of respective Ambassadors. A note proposing this move would shortly be delivered to Hugh Carless. The press reports implied that the matter was virtually a fait accompli.
3. The FCO spokesman's statement on 19 March has been widely reported here. The headlines used tend to suggest that the initiative for the restoration of Ambassadors was at least mutual, rather than Argentinian, but the substance of the stories is reasonably accurate. There seems to be little surprise at the move, on which has been rumoured here for some time.

Yours ever,

Andrew David Stephen
1st Adviser

22 March 1979

Copied to: Mr Wall
PS/Mr Rowlands
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall or

A R Murray.
(Head of Chancery)

UNCLASSIFIED

Minute
Mr Ure, South America Department

ALA 2201

27 MAR 1979	

(19)

BRIEFING ON ARGENTINA FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Political Office at No 10 have asked for briefing for the Prime Minister in connection with the meeting of the Labour Party NEC on Wednesday 28 March. Members of the NEC have received notification of the following emergency resolution submitted by Mr Alex Kitson:

"On the occasion of the third anniversary of the military coup in Argentina, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party deplores the fact that the régime of General Videla continues to deny basic political rights to the people of Argentina. The National Executive Committee therefore calls on the Argentine authorities to restore political and trade union rights, to hold free elections, to account for the "disappeared" and to release all political prisoners. The National Executive Committee believes it would be totally inappropriate for the British Government to accredit an Ambassador to Argentina until such time as political and trade union rights have been re-established."

2. I should be grateful if you could let me have factual briefing for the Prime Minister by close of play tomorrow, Friday 23 March. In view of recent controversy about Civil Servants briefing for Party political occasions, I should make it clear that the Prime Minister will be defending Government policy and that any specifically Party political briefing will be added by me. PS/PUS, whom I have consulted, concurs with this approach. I shall submit the final brief to Dr Owen over the weekend. I should be grateful for any comments which Mr Rowlands may have by close of play Friday.

David Stephen

David Stephen
Political Adviser

22 March 1979

Copied to: Mr Wall
PS/Mr Rowlands
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall or

CONFIDENTIAL

(18)

ALA 020/1	
27 MAR 1979	
INDEX	PA
28/3	

Mr Hall ✓

(15A)

Argentina: Exchange of Ambassadors

Dr Owen has seen your minute of 20 March, together with comments by Mr Rowlands and Mr Stephen.

The Secretary of State has commented that it is a great pity that the news about the possible exchange of Ambassadors has come out in this way. It is his view that, when a story breaks like this, there should be a standing instruction that both the geographical department concerned and News Department should consult Ministers. If Ministers are not in the FCO they can be consulted by telephone. In any event Private Office should be informed of the line it is proposed that News Department should take.

G G H Walden

(G G H Walden)

23 March 1979

CC: PS/Mr Rowlands
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Sir A Parsons
Mr Whyte, News Dept
Mr Ure, SAMD

Mr Ure ✓ *26/3.*
13m

Mr Malcolm
26/3

Mr Conley - for Mr

R OS 26/3

Mr Hall *26/III*

P *26/3*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

17

PS/PUS

Aut 02/1	
26 MAR 1979	
11/28/1	

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

- A 1. I understand that you have asked for a note about the background to Mr Walden's minute of 23 March. I was away from the Office on the day when this incident occurred, having not yet returned after a week's Antarctic Conference in Berne. However, Mr Hall's minute of 20 March, together with its supporting attachments, explains what happened.
- B
- C,D Subsequent minutes by Mr Stephen and Mr Rowlands are also relevant, as is the Financial Times piece of 20 March which gives the flavour of the press reports to which the Secretary of State took exception.
- E
2. Since my return, the Labour Party NEC have put down a resolution on this and I have submitted, at Mr Stephen's request, a note for the Prime Minister's use when he sees the NEC next week.
- F

JBure

J B Ure
South America Department

23 March, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALA 020/1

POS

Mr Hall has seen.

184 3/8.

Mr Ure: SA and

PS/PJS

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

- A (18) 1. I understand that you have asked for a note about the background to Mr Walden's minute of 23 March. I was away from the Office on the day when this incident occurred, having not yet returned after a week's Antarctic Conference in Berne. However, Mr Hall's minute of 20 March, together with its supporting attachments, explains what happened.
- B (15) C, D (16) E Subsequent minutes by Mr Stephen and Mr Rowlands are also relevant, as is the Financial Times piece of 20 March which gives the flavour of the press reports to which the Secretary of State took exception.
- F (16) 2. Since my return, the Labour Party NEC have put down a resolution on this and I have submitted, at Mr Stephen's request, a note for the Prime Minister's use when he sees the NEC next week.

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

23 March, 1979

In the circumstances, I am quite sure that the Depr / News Depr did the only thing they could have done and that no blame attaches to them.

J B Ure

23

3.

CONFIDENTIAL

/1 am



CONFIDENTIAL

1. I am not sure that the line drafted by the Department was quite right - though I entirely agree that no blame attaches to News Department for using what they were advised to use.

2. But what is essential in these cases is to ensure that such advice is cleared with the Political Adviser and with a Minister. It is particularly true of the present case since Mr Stephen had already indicated, in his minute of 6 February, that very careful press briefing would be required. I can not think why the Department failed to do this. It was more than remiss.

2 April 1979

Michael Palliser

CONFIDENTIAL

17
cc: Mr Hall
Sir A Parsons
Mr Whyte
Mr Ure

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

The unfortunate fact about this business is that what ought to have been a two-stage affair, beginning with an Argentine announcement of their intentions and then, possibly later afterwards, with a response from us, has come out all at once as an agreement to exchange Ambassadors. The presentation, about which I

✓✓ warned on 6 February in Mr. Ure's submission of 2 February, has gone all wrong. A major gesture to the Argentines on the week of the third anniversary of the military coup - as the news is being seen outside and as I expect it is being presented in Argentina - is being interpreted by human rights activists as a corresponding slap in the face to them. Pressures on Ministers to finesse their line on Argentina will now increase. The Labour Party NEC, for example, will call next week on the Government not to send a British Ambassador until there is a clear sign of an improvement in the internal situation in Argentina. Anglo-Argentine policy may in the end be the worse because account was not taken of political sensitivities in making the announcement; though I am trying to get people inside to understand our position

David Stephen

CONFIDENTIAL

16A

Secretary of State

ALA 020/

27 MAR 1979

M 28/3

When a story breaks like this
it should be at least in the
News Dept. should consult
Ministry as should the
Dept. This is something which
can be done up on the
teletype. - It's a good
policy here it has been
in his way - My
Private Office should also
be informed

PS

cc: Mr Stephen
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall o.r.
South America Dept
News Dept

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

15A

1. Mr Rowlands has seen Mr Hall's submission of 20 March and Mr Stephen's accompanying minute of the same date. He has commented that he thinks that News Department took an entirely correct line in the circumstances; given the fact that the Argentine Foreign Minister had leaked the news, we could only react in the way we did.
2. Concerning Mr Stephen's point, that there will be criticism from the human rights activists at the reinstatement of an Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Mr Rowlands believes that we should make it clear that our Ambassador was not withdrawn over any particular human rights issue, and that we wish to respond to the Argentine request to restore diplomatic relations to Ambassadorial level.

F A Doherty
21 March 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

126
Sir A Parsons
PS/Mr Rowlands
Mr Stephen

117

16

AM 020/1	
26 MAR 1977	
1428/1	

BRIEFING ON ARGENTINA FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1. I suggest that when the Prime Minister meets members of the Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC) on 28 March he should respond to the resolution about Argentina along the following lines:

Line to take

2. The British Government not only deplores the abuses of human rights which have taken place in Argentina over the past 3 years and before, but has missed no opportunity to make our views known to the Argentine authorities and to press for information about all cases in which we have a direct interest. There have in fact been some signs recently that international pressures have been beginning to achieve some effect: most notably, the Argentine Government has recently agreed to allow a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to look into some of the questions which worry the NEC and others.

3. As regards Ambassadors, it was the Argentines who withdrew their Ambassador from London and asked for the withdrawal of ours from Buenos Aires in 1975/76. This was in the absence of any talks about the Falkland Islands and at a time when the temperature over that dispute was rising. They had shot at one of our ships. Since then - with the support of the Falkland Islanders - we have embarked on a dialogue with the Argentine Government to reach some measure of understanding about the future of the Falklands. We have conceded nothing on sovereignty. But the atmosphere is less tense, which is a considerable relief to the Falkland Islanders among others.

126

4. In these circumstances, the Argentines have approached us about restoring Ambassadors. We have told them privately, but quite bluntly, that it is for them to make any move on this. So far they have not put forward a name for London. We have told them that if and when they do, we will give careful consideration to their candidate. No decision has yet been made, and indeed none is yet called for, on when we might send an Ambassador to Buenos Aires or who this might be.

5. But in this connection, I would point out two things: firstly, the fact of having Ambassadors is not an indicator of the warmth of our relations. We have Ambassadors in a lot of countries whose policies we abhor. Secondly, it is at times when there are awkward problems to be sorted out that Ambassadors can be most useful. It suits us and the Falkland Islanders to talk now to Argentina, and the moment may well come soon when an Ambassador would be an essential instrument in this process. Equally, we wish to continue to keep up the pressure on Argentina about human rights, and an Ambassador - with the access that only he can have - is likely also to be an effective tool in this process.

6. The NEC may be quite sure on one point: if and when we send an Ambassador back to Buenos Aires it will be made perfectly clear to the Argentine Government that this represents no tolerance of the unacceptable aspects of their society to which the NEC resolution rightly draws attention.

Defensive Note

7. If asked why, in the above circumstances, we still have not had an exchange of Ambassadors with Chile, the Prime Minister might reply that the cases are quite different. We withdrew

...
/our ...

120

our Ambassador after the torture of Dr Sheila Cassidy as a protest against this despicable mistreatment of a British subject. Nothing that has happened there since has made us feel that the time was right for sending back our Ambassador. In short, in Chile the absence of a British Ambassador is the result of a British initiative directly concerned with human rights. That has never been the case in Argentina.

117

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

22 March, 1979

Copies to:

Mr Wall

PS/PUS

Mr Hall o.r.

CONFIDENTIAL

15A

20/11/20

Alt 020/1

27 MAR 1979

428/3

Mr Stephen
PS/Mr Rowlands
Private Secretary

520 16A x 18
y
21
28/3

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

- A 1. I attach a copy of comment made by News Department yesterday in answer to questions on this subject.
- B 2. The Secretary of State agreed to Mr Ure's submission of 2 February on this subject which recommended that we should tell the Argentines that if they wished to reinstate an Ambassador in London we would not foresee any problems about accepting a suitable candidate and that as far as the appointment of an Ambassador by us was concerned we would need to look at the timing of this and the person to be appointed. The Secretary of State repeated his decision at a meeting held in his office on 6 March, when he said that we should be flexible about the timing of our own appointment and should perhaps try to make it coincide with an expected announcement that Argentina was accepting a visit from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.
3. When Mr Rowlands saw the Argentine Foreign Minister during the Presidential inaugurations in Caracas and Brasilia he confirmed to Sr Pastor that if the Argentine Government wish to reinstate an Ambassador in London we would not foresee any problems about accepting a suitable candidate. On his way back to Buenos Aires Sr Pastor leaked to journalists, including the BBC Latin American

/correspondent


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

correspondent, what Mr Rowlands had said to him. There had been no agreement between ourselves and the Argentines to say anything in public on this question.

C 3. In order to handle any questions that might arise on this subject the Department, in the absence of Mr Rowlands and the Secretary of State, gave News Department a line to take in answer to questions in Mr Sindall's minute of 19 March. This line was completely in accordance with Ministerial decisions. Given Sr Pastor's leak to the press we clearly could not in answer to questions deny his account of our response to the Argentine initiative. News Department did not offer any comment - nor were they asked - about our intentions over the appointment of a British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. Had they been asked they were, as can be seen, briefed to reply that this question had not yet arisen and that if the Argentines did seek agrément for an Ambassador here we would naturally wish to consider the level of our own representation in Argentina. If there is any further press interest - and News Department do not expect questions today - I believe it would be right to stick to what was said yesterday but to volunteer the answer to question C provided in Mr Sindall's minute of yesterday.

4. The Department has briefed Mr Stephen on these lines in dealing with enquiries from the Labour Party.


G E Hall

20 March 1979

cc Sir A Parsons
Mr Whyte, News Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Mr Hall
Sir A Parsons
Mr Whyte
Mr Ure

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

The unfortunate fact about this business is that what ought to have been a two-stage affair, beginning with an Argentine announcement of their intentions and then, possibly long afterwards, with a response from us, has come out all at once as an agreement to exchange Ambassadors. The presentation, about which I worried on 6 February on Mr. Ure's submission of 2 February, has gone all wrong. A major feature to the Argentines in the week of the third anniversary of the military coup - as the news is being seen outside and as I expect it is being presented in Argentina - is being interpreted by human rights activists as a corresponding slap in the face to them. Pressures on Ministers to finesse their line on Argentina will now increase. The Labour Party NEC, for example, will call next week on the Government not to send a British Ambassador until there is a clear sign of an improvement in the internal situation in Argentina. Anglo-Argentine policy may in the end be the worse because account was not taken of political sensitivities in making the announcement; though I am trying to get people outside to understand our position.

David Stern 20/2

cutting dated 120 147 1977 19

Argentina and UK to restore ambassadors

BY DAVID TONGE

BRITAIN and Argentina are to restore ambassadorial relations, the two Governments confirmed yesterday.

These relations had been broken off by Buenos Aires in 1976 because of the dispute about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The islands are believed to have potential oil reserves and are rich in fish.

Relations between the two countries were strained when Argentina occupied the Falkland island of Thule 1,400 miles east of South America. Argentina is now interested in nuclear and oil co-operation.

On Wednesday, delegations from the two countries meet in New York for the latest round of talks on Anglo-Argentine relations.

The emphasis is to be on economic co-operation, but diplomats say that the initial terms of reference agreed in April, 1977 for such talks allow the question of sovereignty also to be broached.

Diplomats insist that no proposals on this subject would be put to the British Parliament unless they were acceptable to the Falklanders as a whole.

Representatives of the Falkland Islanders said in London last night that they welcomed restoration of relations at ambassadorial level so long as it implied recognition of the islanders' rights to remain British as long as they wished.

The Foreign Office echoed this view, saying that the development had no implications for British policy towards the islands.

The Foreign Office also made it clear that restoration of ambassadors did not signify any change in British attitudes towards human rights in Argentina. Human rights organisations estimate that at least 15,000 people have "disappeared" since the present régime took power.

The Committee for Human Rights in Argentina last night described as "totally wrong" the UK's decision to grant the Argentina junta full diplomatic recognition.

The British suggest that the junta's record has been improving and report that a committee from the Organisation of American States is to visit Argentina in the next two months.

x
S Am.

Mr McCrory, News Department

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. We spoke. You should use the following on the record line in answer to questions:-

"It was Argentina and not Britain who took the initiative in withdrawing Ambassadors. The Argentine Government have now indicated that they wish to see relations restored to the level of Ambassadors. The Argentine Government is aware of Britain's view that, where differences exist, it is better to have Ambassadors than not; and that if the Argentine Government now wish to restore relations to ambassadorial level we would be ready to see this happen."

Supplementaries

(a) Question: Who has taken the initiative?

Answer: Argentina. It was she and not Britain who took the initiative in October 1975 in recalling her Ambassador.

(b) Question: Have the Argentines formally proposed an Ambassador?

Answer: No request for agrément has yet been made.

(c) Question: Has HMG formally proposed an Ambassador in BA?

Answer: This question has not yet arisen.

If the Argentines now do seek agrément for an Ambassador here, we shall naturally wish to consider the level of our own representation in Argentina.

(d) Question: What about human rights?

Answer: Ministers have made our views on human rights very plain to the Argentine Government. The restoration of Ambassadors would not signify any change in HMG's policy over human rights. (If pressed) If Ambassadors are restored this could help not hinder our exchange of views with the Argentine Government on this important issue.

(e) Question: What about the Falklands?

/Answer ...

2115
1

Answer: There are no implications for our policy. Nor does the prospect of restoring Ambassadors mean there has been any new development or new initiative in the current Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

A J Sindall

A J Sindall
South America Department

19 March, 1979

23/115
1
17
telex to namco, paris, brussels, bonn, ukrep, ee, ukdel nato, oslo. coi
onpass no 10 downing street and dept of trade and industry. fco new
conference 1230 4256 Monday 19 March 79

ST KITTS AND NEVIS

Spokesman said that Mr Rowlands would be receiving representatives from St Kitts and Nevis this afternoon for talks on constitutional developments in the area. Asked about the position concerning Anguilla, he said that representatives from Anguilla would be calling at FCO for talks later in the week.

ARGENTINA - EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS?

Spokesman was asked to ^{comment} ~~report~~ on ~~xxxx~~ reports that ~~xxxx~~ diplomatic relations between Britain and ~~xxxx~~ Argentina were to be resumed at Ambassadorial level. He replied that it had been ^{and not Britain} Argentina who had taken the initiative in withdrawing Ambassadors in 1976. The Argentine government had now indicated that they wanted to see relations resumed at the level of Ambassadors. The Argentine government was aware of Britain's view that where difficulties existed it was better to have ambassadors than not, and that if the Argentine government now wished to restore relations to Ambassadorial level Britain would be ready to see this happen. Questioned further, Spokesman said that no request had yet been made ^{by the Argentines} for agreement.

23/4/85 1 17
MR. JUDD TO ATTEND EEC/ACP MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE: ~~22-24~~ MARCH
Spokesman made the following announcement;

" The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Frank Judd MP, will head the British delegation to the joint ACP/EEC Ministerial Conference from Wednesday 21 March to Saturday 24 March which will be organised by the ACP side at Freeport, Bahamas.

Mr Judd will be accompanied by officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development and the UK's Permanent Representation to the European Communities.

The purpose of the Conference is to press forward with the negotiations for a successor to the Lomé Convention between the European Community and 57 African, Caribbean and Pacific States (including 28 members of the Commonwealth) which expires in 1980. A similar Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels on 21 December 1978. The meeting is being held in Freeport because it is the turn of the Caribbean countries to act host.

The Conference, which will begin with a Joint Council of ACP and EEC Ministers on the management of the existing Lomé Convention, opens on 22 March and is expected to last until late on Saturday 24 March. Mr Judd will return to London early on Sunday morning 25 March. He will then go straight to his constituency in Portsmouth."

ENDS

23/4/75

17
16

ALA 020/1
27 MAR 1979
Mr. Rowlands is not available

OK but TR should check this over

Sir A Parsons
PS/Mr Rowlands
Mr Stephen

David Simon
23/3

Profile
23/3

Action completed.
Return to S. Am D.

BRIEFING ON ARGENTINA FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

1. I suggest that when the Prime Minister meets members of the Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC) on 28 March he should respond to the resolution about Argentina along the following lines:

Line to take

2. The British Government not only deplores the abuses of human rights which have taken place in Argentina over the past 3 years and before, but has missed no opportunity to make our views known to the Argentine authorities and to press for information about all cases in which we have a direct interest. There have in fact been some signs recently that international pressures have been beginning to achieve some effect: most notably, the Argentine Government has recently agreed to allow a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to look into some of the questions which worry the NEC and others.

3. As regards Ambassadors, it was the Argentines who withdrew their Ambassador from London and asked for the withdrawal of ours from Buenos Aires in 1975/76. This was in the absence of any talks about the Falkland Islands and at a time when the temperature over that dispute was rising. They had shot at one of our ships. Since then - with the support of the Falkland Islanders - we have embarked on a dialogue with the Argentine Government to reach some measure of understanding about the future of the Falklands. We have conceded nothing on sovereignty. But the atmosphere is less tense, which is a considerable relief to the Falkland Islanders among others.

4. In these circumstances, the Argentines have approached us about restoring Ambassadors. We have told them privately, but quite bluntly, that it is for them to make any move on this. So far they have not put forward a name for London. We have told them that if and when they do, we will give careful consideration to their candidate. No decision has yet been made, and indeed none is yet called for, on when we might send an Ambassador to Buenos Aires or who this might be.

5. But in this connection, I would point out two things: firstly, the fact of having Ambassadors is not an indicator of the warmth of our relations. We have Ambassadors in a lot of countries whose policies we abhor. Secondly, it is at times when there are awkward problems to be sorted out that Ambassadors can be most useful. It suits us and the Falkland Islanders to talk now to Argentina, and the moment may well come soon when an Ambassador would be an essential instrument in this process. Equally, we wish to continue to keep up the pressure on Argentina about human rights, and an Ambassador - with the access that only he can have - is likely also to be an effective tool in this process.

6. The NEC may be quite sure on one point: if and when we send an Ambassador back to Buenos Aires it will be made perfectly clear to the Argentine Government that this represents no tolerance of the unacceptable aspects of their society to which the NEC resolution rightly draws attention.

Defensive Note

7. If asked why, in the above circumstances, we still have not had an exchange of Ambassadors with Chile, the Prime Minister might reply that the cases are quite different. We withdrew

/our ...



our Ambassador after the torture of Dr Sheila Cassidy as a protest against this despicable mistreatment of a British subject. Nothing that has happened there since has made us feel that the time was right for sending back our Ambassador. In short, in Chile the absence of a British Ambassador is the result of a British initiative directly concerned with human rights. That has never been the case in Argentina.

Bure

J B Ure
South America Department

22 March, 1979

Copies to:
Mr Wall
PS/PUS
Mr Hall o.r.

Aslan

23
3

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)
(15)

Am 020/1
20 MAR 1979
Meds

Mr Ure
Mr Hall
Mr Stephen
PS/Mr Rowlands
Private Secretary

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

A

1. I attach a copy of the News Department's statement made yesterday on this subject.

B

C

2. The background to this is as follows. When Mr Rowlands saw the Argentine Foreign Minister at the Brazilian Presidential inauguration he confirmed to Sr Pastor that we would be ready to see relations restored to Ambassadorial level if the Argentines, as we gathered, now wished this. On his way back to Buenos Aires, Sr Pastor told journalists including the BBC Latin American Correspondent, what Mr Rowlands had said to him. This was a leak; there had been no agreement between ourselves and the Argentines to say anything public on this question. Hence the British press wished to know whether what Sr Pastor had said was indeed so. I therefore agreed with Mr Hall that News Department should take the line given in my minute of 19 March; this was reflected in their statement. The Secretary of State had earlier agreed (Mr Ure's submission of 2 February) that we should not rebuff the Argentine initiative over a resumption of relations at Ambassadorial level.

3. News Department did not offer any comment - nor were they asked - about our intentions over the appointment of a British Ambassador in Buenos Aires. Had they been asked, they were briefed to reply that this question had not yet arisen; and that if the Argentines did seek agreement for an Ambassador here, HMG would naturally wish to consider the level of its own representation in Argentina.

/4.


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. Given Sr Pastor's leak to the press we could clearly not deny his account of our response to the Argentine initiative. But our line has so far remained firmly within the concept of a resumption of relations at Ambassadorial level and has not gone on to speculate what we might do about an Ambassador in Buenos Aires. If there is any further press interest - and News Department do not expect questions today - I believe it would be right to stick to what we said yesterday and avoid any further comment. We might, however, indicate however unattributably that there is a distinction to be drawn between the present position of principle and what practical consequences might later flow from this.

5. The department has also briefed Mr Stephen to reassure Labour Party enquirers, and to point out that there has been no UK initiative towards Argentina about relations.



A J Sindall
South America Department

20 March 1979

CC:

Sir A Parsons

Mr Whyte News Department

CONFIDENTIAL

telex to namco, paris, brussels, Bonn, ukrep, cc, ukdel nato, oslo. coi
onpass no 10 Downing street and Dept of Trade and Industry. Fco new
conference 1230 4250 Monday 19 March 79

ST KITTS AND NEVIS

Spokesman said that Mr Rowlands would be receiving representatives from St Kitts and Nevis this afternoon for talks on constitutional developments in the area. Asked about the position concerning Anguilla, he said that representatives from Anguilla would be calling at FCO for talks later in the week.

ARGENTINA - EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS?

Spokesman was asked to ^{comment} report on ~~xxxx~~ reports that ~~xxxx~~ diplomatic relations between Britain and ~~xxxx~~ Argentina were to be resumed at Ambassadorial level. He replied that it had been ^{and not Britain} Argentina who had taken the initiative in withdrawing Ambassadors in 1976. The Argentine government had now indicated that they wanted to see relations resumed at the level of Ambassadors. The Argentine government was aware of Britain's view that where difficulties existed it was better to have ambassadors than not, and that if the Argentine government now wished to restore relations to Ambassadorial level Britain would be ready to see this happen. Questioned further, Spokesman said that no request had yet been made ^{by the Argentines} for agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

AA 020/1

Mr Sindall

29/3

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

M/S 1/1

1. Andrew Murray called from Buenos Aires this evening on the following two points:

- a) Ambassadorial relations. Following Pastor's return to Buenos Aires, articles have appeared in the local press saying that following Mr Rowlands's meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister in Venezuela/Brazil, both sides have agreed that relations will be resumed at Ambassadorial level. One press report, in particular, said that the Argentines will be submitting a Note to the British Charge as soon as Mr Carless gets back to Buenos Aires. In return, I gave Mr Murray the gist of the line which News Department are taking.
- b) Sir Frederick Catherwood's interview with Videla. When Catherwood saw Videla last Friday he had a general exchange on Anglo/Argentine relations. Videla said our relations were on a rising curve due partly to the improvement in trade and partly also to the fact that a more positive dialogue had been opened regarding sovereignty over the Falklands. Continuity was required. On the Falklands issue, the passage of time had been beneficial. We should continue to search for a pragmatic solution.

J. R. Cowling

J R Cowling
South America Department

19 March 1979

in
x
at
ni
Co
er
19
his
sua
nt
C
nta
aten
parli
Fri
the
emer

MM
IRS

Sul
Secr
mon
rage
its re
igh C

CONFIDENTIAL

Aw 040/245/15.

Mr Ure o.r.

FAKLANDS

1. As you will see from the minutes below, Mr Rowlands approved our draft message to Island Councillors and draft press announcement about the New York talks.
2. I duly telegraphed the Councillors message to the Governor (using the Marines' communications link) and asked the Governor, as Mr Rowlands had requested, to mention to Councillors the question of exchanging Ambassadors with Argentina (see tel attached).
3. On 13 March the Embassy in Buenos Aires telephoned to say that the Argentine MFA had now formally ~~said~~ ^{proposed} that there should be a press announcement. The Argentines had offered a draft text and wanted the announcement to be made as soon as possible. I therefore relayed the Embassy our ⁹⁸⁰ draft and asked them to seek Argentine agreement to this. I also asked the Embassy to seek Argentine agreement that the announcement should not be made until 16 March so as to give the Governor time to clear his lines with Councillors.
4. Mr Gozney telephoned me again on 15 March to say that the Argentines ~~both~~ accepted our conditions and ^{agreed} that this should be simultaneously released in London and Buenos Aires on Friday 16 March.

A J Sindall
A J Sindall
South America Department

16 March 1979

cc: Mr Hall, o.r.

DATE 12/3/79

COL 81W

VOL 964

en Answers

80

the Council agreed to
ons at its next meeting

ness the United King-
e need for the pro-
sion on imports of
Cyprus to be imple-
her delay. The Pre-
eal with the question
Council on 26 March
ing of the Committee
sentatives.

only (Members'
uses)

Secretary of State
monwealth Affairs if
ment on the arrange-
made for the auditing
the members of the
n Assembly.

ances paid to mem-
n Assembly will, as
t to supervision and
the financial services
and, like other Com-
o audit by the Court

statements

and the Secretary of
and Commonwealth
his practice in the
ning statements of
Community business
er this practice has
1978; and if he will
his future intentions;

sual practice is to
nt to the House on

On the last three
nary timetable has
atements be made
parliamentary ques-

Friend hopes that
the future to revert
ements.

MONWEALTH
IRS

Sub-continent)

Secretary of State
monwealth Affairs
range length of wait-
its requiring inter-
igh Commission of

81

Written Answers

12 MARCH 1979

India, Bangladesh and Pakistan; and
what were the respective figures for such
waiting times in 1970, 1974 and 1976.

	December 1974*	December 1976*	Priority
New Delhi ...	15½	7	No delay
Bombay ...	13	14½	No delay
Dacca ...	Not available	25	6
Islamabad ...	22	13	3½
Karachi ...	22	13	3½

* Between 1974 and 1976 all applicants were interviewed in the order in which they applied. In 1977 separate queues were instituted.

Argentina

Mr. Ford asked the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
what are the prospects for an exchange of
ambassadors between the the United
Kingdom and Argentina.

Mr. Rowlands: The Argentines with-
drew their ambassador from London in
1975 and requested the withdrawal of
our's a few months later. It is therefore
for them formally to initiate the reinsta-
ment of ambassadors.

Spandau Prison, West Berlin

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton asked
the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs what is and has
been the annual cost of maintaining Span-
dau Prison, West Berlin for each of the
last 10 years, to (a) Great Britain, (b) the
Federal German Government, and (c) to
France, the United States of America, and
the USSR.

Mr. Judd: Information on the costs
of maintaining Spandau prison in each
of the last 10 years is not readily avail-
able.

In 1978, the only direct cost to the
United Kingdom in connection with main-
taining Spandau prison was the salaries
of the British warders which amounted to
£25,732. My right hon. Friend has no
details of the direct costs incurred by
France, the United States and the Soviet
Union.

No costs fall directly on the Federal
German Government, although the latter
reimburses the Senat for the costs of the
occupation of Berlin. These occupation
costs include some of the running costs
of the prison which in 1978 amounted to

Written Answers

82

Mr. Tomlinson: Waiting times were
not recorded before 1974. Times waited
since then were as follows:

	Time in months		
	December 1978		
	Main settlement	Husbands	Fiances
No delay	5	10½	10½
No delay	4½	11½	11½
	20	None seen	None seen
	19	19	21½
	19	19	21½

approximately DM 150,000 in respect of
expenditure incurred by the British autho-
rities. My right hon. Friend has no
details of the expenditure incurred by
the French, United States and Soviet
authorities.

The balance of the cost of maintain-
ing Spandau prison is borne by the Senat,
without reimbursement from the Federal
German Government. For 1978 this sum
was estimated at DM 945,000.

Liberia

Mr. Greville Janner asked the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs whether he will request the
Liberian Ambassador to the Court of St.
James to send back to Liberia the diplo-
mat who refused to allow an inquest to be
held on his three-year-old daughter by
relying upon diplomatic immunity.

Mr. Tomlinson: We have seen a press
report about this incident which was not
accurate in all respects. The matter has
been discussed with the Liberian Amba-
sador who has been most co-operative,
and with the authorities concerned. It is
our understanding that the coroner de-
cided, having regard to all the circum-
stances, that it would not be appropriate
to proceed with an inquest on the
daughter of the Liberian diplomat con-
cerned.

Commonwealth Day

Mr. James Johnson asked the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs if, recognising that 12 March is
Commonwealth Day, he will make a
statement.

Dr. Owen: The British Government
attach great importance to membership
of the Commonwealth and will continue

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12 March 1979

1a Mr Ben Ford (Bradford North): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what are the prospects for an exchange of ambassadors between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

No W79

MR TED ROWLANDS

The Argentines withdrew their Ambassador from London in 1975 and requested the withdrawal of ours a few months later. It is therefore for them formally to initiate the reinstatement of Ambassadors.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Au 020/1		
RECEIVED IN DEPT. OF STATE		
-7 JUN 1979		
DEAR OFF	PA	AY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

Reference

13a

Mr Cowling
Mr Malcomson

ARGENTINA: RESTORATION OF AMBASSADORS

1. I am grateful to you for pointing out to me that the Argentine Chargé did not call on the Minister of State on 16 February and that obviously some other conversation is in mind here. We should report this to Mr Chick.

2. I discussed with the Head of News Department yesterday whether we should at this stage submit to Ministers a line to take about exchanging Ambassadors, but Mr Whyte says that his department is not being pressed about this at present and can rest quite happily on the line that we have received no request for agrément and that it was the Argentines who originally provoked the breach.

3. However, particularly in view of Mr Stephen's reminder that the restoration of Ambassadors with Argentina will need careful press briefing here, I think we should now have prepared a submission covering press briefing which could be put up to Ministers as soon as we receive the formal request for agrément for Ortiz de Rozas (or anyone else). This can be on the lines of the piece prepared recently and shown to me by Mr Sindall. The background for the record briefing might usefully however be expanded to illustrate how we use Ambassadors to defend human rights in Latin America and elsewhere. The theme of the briefing must be:

- (a) The breaking of Ambassadorial relations was an Argentine initiative, and so is the restoring of them.
- (b) Ambassadors are not an indicator of cordiality; they are a channel of communication.
- (c) Restoration of Ambassadors in no way indicates a change or acceleration in our Falklands negotiations.
- (d) Restoring Ambassadors will enable us to exert more influence on Argentina - see above.

4. In short, I would like to have all this teed up so that we can go forward at very short notice when required.

Bu

J B Ure
South America Department

1 March, 1979

Copy to:

Mr Sindall

I explained position on phone to Mr Murray on 9/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

AA 020/

RECEIVED	17 MAR 1979
2 MAR 1979	
AMERICAN LEGATION	PARIS
Mr. Hall	Mr. Ure

Mr Hall
Parliamentary Unit

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

1. Mr Ford's question is doubtless prompted by the imminent departure of the Argentine Chargé d'Affaires from London.
2. The Secretary of State has agreed that there need be no political objection to accepting a suitable Argentine Ambassador if and when one is proposed; and that we would then re-consider our own representation in BA. The Argentine Government have been informally notified of this view.
3. We wish to avoid criticism from the human rights lobby if and when Ambassadors are reinstated; we also wish to avoid speculation that this heralds fresh developments in our Falklands negotiations. The reply should therefore be low key and emphasise that the initiative lies with Argentina.
4. I submit a draft which has been agreed with P & CD.

JBure

J B Ure
South America Department

8 March, 1979

Copies to:
PS/Mr Rowlands
P & CD
News Dept

Hall 8/III

CONFIDENTIAL

AVA 020/

C A T

1. 17

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

AVA 020/

RECEIVED		JUN 18 1979	
-7 JUN 1979			
Mr. Sindall	Mr. Rowlands	Mr. Cowling	Mr. [unclear]

120

Mr Sindall

*May we discuss?
I have answered
Mr Cowling's letter*

28/2

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. This morning, Mr Malcomson took a call from Miss Imogen Marks of the Latin America Economic Report. She said that "Clarín" in Buenos Aires had carried a report to the effect that we were about to exchange Ambassadors. (we have also received a letter from Mr Chick about press speculation along these lines). Miss Marks appeared to know that when Sr Manrique called on Mr Rowlands the latter had pointed to the need to improve Anglo-Argentine relations and had said that the British Government would respond favourably if the Argentines wished to propose a suitable candidate for the post of Ambassador in London. Mr Malcomson also took a call on my phone from "La Prensa's" London correspondent. It was not clear why this correspondent was trying to get in touch with me but it could well be on the same subject.
2. Given the press speculation in Buenos Aires and Miss Marks' specific question I think it is only a matter of time before the story breaks more widely in London. I therefore think we should arm News Department accordingly. (You will recall that Mr Stephen has minuted on our submission on this subject that "very careful press briefing will be required to ensure that any decision along the lines of the recommendation is not misrepresented outside as a turning of a blind eye by us to the appalling human rights situation in Argentina").
3. I attach, in draft, a press line together with a background note for the use of News Department.

J. R. Cowling

J R Cowling
South America Department

27 February 1979

cc: PS/Mr Rowlands

CONFIDENTIAL

Ans 020/1

S Am. D.

JB (12)
3. R

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

12 March 1979

for WRITTEN answer on.....

The draft reply should reach the Parliamentary Unit through your Under-Secretary by

**NOON ON FRIDAY
9 MARCH 1979**

La Mr Ben Ford (Bradford North): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what are the prospects for an exchange of ambassadors between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

Mr. Ted Rowlands

formally
formally
The ~~Argentine~~ withdrew their Ambassador from London in 1975 and requested the withdrawal of ours a few months later. It is therefore for ~~them~~ to initiate the reinstatement of Ambassadors. ~~No request for agreement has so far been received, but if and when it is it will be carefully considered in the light of all the circumstances then prevailing.~~

Vm
8/3

CONFIDENTIAL

490/1

AV 020/1

RECEIVED
-7 JUN 1979

INDEXED



BRITISH EMBASSY
BUENOS AIRES

23 February 1979

J B Ure Esq MVO
South America Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Dear John,

RESTORATION OF AMBASSADORS

1. Thank you for the guidance given in your tele-letter of 9 February. You should know that over the week-end of 10-11 February articles were published in the Argentine press stating that there would soon be an Argentine Ambassador in London. The name of Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas was specifically mentioned. One newspaper reported that the Argentine Chargé called on the Minister of State on 16 February in this connection. You will doubtless let me know whether there is any truth in this report, if today's Confidential bag does not provide the answer.

2. If the Argentine Embassy in London seek agrément for an Ambassador, it is likely that this will quickly become public knowledge here. No doubt some weeks will elapse however before an answer can be given. There is thus a danger that unless we do something in the meantime the idea could get around that for one of several reasons we were delaying agrément, and that the Argentines were being rebuffed. As I hope that you agree that there would not be advantage in delaying agrément, I suggest that as soon as it is sought an announcement should be made by both governments that Ambassadors would be appointed.

3. You may wish to discuss this with Hugh Carless when he is in the Office. I enclose copies of this letter in case there are others who wish to consult as well.

Yours ever

J S Chick
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

encs

Copy: PS/Mr Rowlands

CONFIDENTIAL

(11)

AN 020/1

26 FEB 1979

APS/Lord Goronwy-Roberts

CALL ON LORD GORONWY-ROBERTS BY SR GOWLAND: 10.30 AM
TUESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY

1. I submit speaking and background notes on:
 - a) Exchange of Ambassadors
 - b) Falklands Negotiations
 - c) Human Rights
 - d) Beagle
 - e) Canning House seminar
2. Sr Rafael Gowland has been Chargé d'Affaires for Argentina for the past 3 years since they withdrew their Ambassador on account of our then reluctance to engage in serious negotiations over the Falklands. Sr Gowland is leaving London in mid-March on a posting to the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Sr Gowland has had a difficult job to do but he has done it well. His efforts have been consistently constructive and he has displayed both energy and skill. Mr Rowlands is giving him a farewell lunch on 7 March.
3. Mr Cowling from the department will attend to take a note.

Burs

23 February 1979

J B Ure
South America Department

Copy: PS/Mr Rowlands

LINE TO TAKE

(If raised)

1. Exchange of Ambassadors. / As Sr Gowland will know, we have been able to respond positively to the approach made by the Argentine Foreign Minister and would consider sympathetically any suitable candidate for the post of Argentine Ambassador in London. Given all the good work which Sr Gowland has done during his spell as Chargé, he must feel particular satisfaction at this development.
2. Falklands. The Falklands issue is one which has bedevilled our relations with Argentina over a great number of years. It is a very difficult problem and one which requires much patience and understanding on both sides. The agreement the two Governments reached in February 1977 was something of a landmark in that the terms of reference clearly established that the negotiations were to cover political relations, including sovereignty, as well as economic co-operation. But in agreeing to this, we made it clear that our major concern was for the inhabitants of the Islands. As Sr Gowland will know, no proposals for a settlement can go forward unless the British Government is satisfied that they are acceptable to the Islanders themselves. We have given both the Islanders and the British parliament clear assurances on this.
3. No side is going to win the dispute. Compromise is the only way to solve the dispute as a whole. We should seek to break the present deadlock on sovereignty by looking for agreement on specific issues. We are therefore glad that at the last round of talks in Geneva, we were able

/to....

- 2 -

to look constructively at the theme of scientific co-operation in the Dependencies and at co-operation in the maritime areas of the Dependencies with special reference to fishing by third parties. There are still differences of approach but there appears to be sufficient common ground between us to encourage us to believe that with goodwill agreement on fisheries co-operation in the South Atlantic is within our grasp.

4. Human Rights. There is continuing concern both in Britain and internationally over the situation in Argentina. This is also relevant to the Falkland Islands negotiations. Many people say to us that, on human rights grounds, we should not be negotiating with Argentina at all. We do not accept this; but the human rights record of Argentina would be a factor to be taken into account by Parliament and by the Islanders if a solution to the dispute emerged for consideration. I hope therefore that the Argentine Government will be able to continue to bring about further improvements over human rights.

5. Beagle Channel dispute. Our own involvement, as Arbitrators, has of course ended. But we are pleased that the Argentine and Chilean Governments have agreed to make fresh efforts to find a peaceful solution with the Vatican's assistance. Are you optimistic about the outcome of the mediation?

6. Canning House seminar on Argentina. We are grateful that Canning House, in association with the BOTB, is organising a business seminar on Argentina on 3 May. The aim of the seminar will be to examine Argentina's present economic situation and the medium-term prospects for British trade and investment. A representative group of Argentine businessmen and officials will participate.

/We.....

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

We are particularly pleased that Dr Martinez de Hoz, Argentine Minister for the Economy, has been able to accept BOTB's invitation to attend the seminar as principal guest speaker.

Mr. Martinez de Hoz, who was Argentine Foreign Minister recently, told our Chief of Mission in Buenos Aires that the Argentine would like to restore relations at Ambassadorial level, and would like to have an Ambassador in London by the end of April. It was the Argentine who took the initiative in January 1974 in recalling their Ambassador from our then consulate in Buenos Aires in various negotiations near the fall of 1974. The Secretary of State has agreed that if the Argentine will be represented by Ambassador in London, we will be in a position to start negotiating a possible exchange of Ambassadors. Mr. Martinez de Hoz, who was Argentine Minister in London's Embassy, also visited us in mid-February and has been invited by the Argentine Foreign Minister to visit the UK next. We ourselves have had no change of this subject with Mr. Gonsalves. Mr. Gonsalves also told us that if the Argentine proceeds to Ambassador in London, we would, of course, wish to have our own Ambassador in Buenos Aires. The subject of all the practical and personnel considerations involved.

2. Yokohama. Dr. CONFIDENTIAL in Tokyo in 1973 and again in New York in December 1977. Also in February 1978 and last December in Tokyo. No decisions have been taken and the negotiations remain at an exploratory stage. Arrangements for the next round have not been made. The Argentines have suggested a meeting at official level in New York at the end of March.

3. Other points. The Government's policy towards the question has been to deal with the issue on a case-by-case basis in accordance with international principles and to avoid any

BACKGROUND

1. Exchange of Ambassadors. The new Argentine Foreign Minister recently told our Chargé in Buenos Aires that the Argentines would like to restore relations at Ambassadorial level, and would like to have an Ambassador in London by the end of April. It was the Argentines who took the initiative in January 1976 in recalling their Ambassador following our then reluctance to engage in serious negotiations over the Falklands. The Secretary of State has agreed that if the Argentines wish to reinstate an Ambassador in London there should be no political problems about accepting a suitable candidate. Mr Rowlands conveyed this message to Sr Manrique (a former Minister in Lanusse's military Government who called on him on 8 February and who had been briefed by the Argentine Foreign Minister to raise the subject). We ourselves have had no dealings on this subject with Sr Gowland. Mr Rowlands also told Sr Manrique that if the Argentines proposed an Ambassador in London, we would, of course, wish to consider the level of our own representation in Buenos Aires in the light of all the practical and personnel considerations involved.

2. Falklands. Despite meetings in Rome in July and again in New York in December 1977, Lima in February 1978 and last December in Geneva, no decisions have been taken and the negotiations remain at an exploratory stage. Arrangements for the next round have not been made but the Argentines have suggested a meeting at official level in New York at the end of March.

3. Human Rights. The Government's gains against the guerillas have enabled the régime to show some signs of response to international criticism over human rights in

Argentina. They have released a number of political prisoners, reinstated the right of political detainees to opt for exile and released the names of over 3500 prisoners in detention. But arrests and "disappearances" continue. Self-imposed press censorship remains and trade union rights are still in abeyance.

4. Ministers have on several occasions made our views on violations of human rights very plain to the Argentine Government. Human rights questions in Argentina are also constantly reviewed with our partners in the EEC. We participated in a formal démarche by the Nine to the Argentines last April.

5. Beagle Channel dispute.⁴ A successful intervention by the Vatican has averted for the time being at least, the danger that the dispute would lead to open hostilities between Argentina and Chile. When bilateral talks between the two countries broke down late last year there were fears that Argentina would take unilateral action to assert her sovereignty in the area under dispute. The Vatican - already agreed by both sides to be an acceptable mediator - then took the initiative by sending an envoy (Cardinal Samore) to Buenos Aires and Santiago. The outcome of this mission, after several days of negotiations, was a formal request from both Governments - to which the Pope has since agreed - that the Holy See should act as mediator in helping them to reach a peaceful settlement; and an undertaking not to resort to force and to reverse the recent military build-up in the far South. Tension has since eased considerably.

6. Besides being rejected by Argentina, the award to Chile in 1971 of three disputed islands in the Beagle Channel by a British-appointed International Court of Arbitration has left the two countries at odds over their common maritime

- 3 -

boundaries at the tip of South America. Chile is prepared to negotiate over maritime limits and zones, but not over territory to which she has an established legal right; whereas Argentina appears to be insisting on some territorial concession. In spite of the recent détente, the two sides remain as far apart as ever on the substance of the issue. B.

7. Canning House seminar on Argentina. Argentina is Britain's third largest export market in Latin America: our exports in 1978 were expected to be £114 m with imports from Argentina at £150 m.

Aut 020/1

RE

10

Mr Cowling

Pl. let me see a draft brief
I arrange to attend yourself.

15/2. MB

SAM

1. The Argentinean Charge d'Affaires, Senor Gowland, is making a farewell call on Lord Goronwy-Roberts at 10.30 am on Tuesday 27 February.

2. I should be grateful if you would let me have a brief by 12 noon on Monday 26 February. I should also be grateful if someone from the department would attend to take a note of the meeting.

F A Doherty

F A Doherty
APS/Lord Goronwy-Roberts

14 February 1979

cc: PS/Mr Rowlands
PCD

Mr Sindale

Draft brief below.

R
21 2 M.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

Av 020/1

GRS 200

TELELETTER

TO BUENOS AIRES

CONFIDENTIAL

14/15/79
9 FEBRUARY, 1979

FOLLOWING FOR J S CHICK, BUENOS AIRES

FROM : J B URE, SAMD

RESTORATION OF AMBASSADORS

(4)
1. BA TELNO 39 REPORTED THAT WHEN HUGH CARLESS PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, THE LATTER RAISED WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF RESTORING RELATIONS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED, SR MANRIQUE ALSO RAISED THIS EXPLICITLY WITH MR ROWLANDS DURING THEIR TALK ON 8 FEBRUARY.

2. MR ROWLANDS REMINDED MANRIQUE THAT IT WAS THE ARGENTINES WHO TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN WITHDRAWING THEIR AMBASSADOR, AND IF THEY NOW WISHED TO REINSTATE ONE IN LONDON WE WOULD NOT FORESEE ANY POLITICAL PROBLEMS ABOUT ACCEPTING A SUITABLE CANDIDATE. MR ROWLANDS WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE BE CONSIDERING THE LEVEL OF OUR OWN REPRESENTATION IN BA IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND OF ALL THE PRACTICAL AND PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED. SR MANRIQUE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THIS TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. THE WAY IS NOW CLEAR THEREFORE FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSE A CANDIDATE FOR AGREEMENT. IT IS FOR THEM TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND THIS LETTER IS PURELY TO KEEP YOU IN THE PICTURE IN CASE IT IS RAISED AGAIN WITH YOU.

SIGNATURE.....J B URE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALA 020/1

Chit. (Cens)
4/15/79

Mr Alexander, FOD

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS: LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION

1. I sent you a copy of my submission of 2 February about this and Mr Hall, Mr Yapp and the Private Secretary copied to you subsequent minutes.
2. You may, however, now like to see the complete submission, particularly as there are manuscript minutes by the PUS and the Political Adviser which are relevant to your considerations and which you have not previously seen.
3. Mr Rowlands spoke to Sr Manrique in the terms of paragraph 9 of my submission and Manrique undertook to convey this response to the Argentine Foreign Minister. It is up to them to make the next move. I have informed Mr Chick (in Mr Carless's absence on leave) of the general terms of the exchange (copy of my teletype letter attached).

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

9 February, 1979

Mr Ure: Many thanks for letting me see these papers. I should be grateful to be kept in the picture as the situation develops.

Mr Alexander
12/2

Mr Alexander 14/2
J B U
14/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Ure, SAmD

Relations with Argentina

The Secretary of State has seen and approved your submission of 2 February.

G. G. H. Walden

(G G H Walden)

8 February 1979

cc:- PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall
Mr D Stephen
POD
PCD

*Now see record
7 in Rowlands'
talk with Sir
Mannique, and
my teletype to BA.*

*TBU
1/2.*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 020/L

2/II

2A

posal in
my proposed
Carless's
sphere)
ne Minister
y own view
uring cold

B

ca Department

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

ALA 020/L

~~6A~~
6A

Ameline

Boguel

JA 7/II *11/13/2*

Mr Hall ✓

SEMINAR ON ANGLO ARGENTINE RELATIONS

~~4A~~ (2A)

1. I think you would wish to see the proposal in Mr Carless's teletype of 24 January, and my proposed reply. It is always possible (granted Mr Carless's propensity to take things up in the stratosphere) that he may revert to this proposal with the Minister of State or Under-Secretaries; however, my own view is that we need not consult them before pouring cold water on the idea?

J B Ure

J B Ure
South America Department

7 February, 1979

Teletype to issue

J B Ure 8/2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

14/02/1

15 FEB 1979
14/15/1

Secretary of State

PS

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

The Minister of State has seen Mr Ure's submission of 2 February along with the subsequent minuting by Mr Hall, the PUS and Mr Stephen. Mr Rowlands, endorsing Mr Stephen's point that very careful press briefing will be necessary, supports the recommendations. He has, in addition, commented:

"I met de Rosas in New York in 1975 over the Shackleton affair. We could do business with him. He is a professional heavyweight.

TR."

J W Yapp

J W Yapp
7 February 1979

cc: PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall
Mr Stephen
POD
PCD

CONFIDENTIAL

6/11/79
TELELETTER

ALA 020/1

RECEIVED	18
13 FEB 1979	
INDEX	FILE
41.5/2	GPS 230

5A



TO: H M CARLESS ESQ CMG BUENOS AIRES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

FILE REFERENCE: ALA 121/2

DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1979

FROM: J B URE SAMD FCO

4A

2A

YOUR TELELETTER OF 24 JANUARY. SEMINAR ON ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

1. WE HAVE GIVEN THIS SOME THOUGHT. BUT, AS WAS THE CASE WITH YOUR EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A SEMINAR (LETTER FROM THE PUS OF 8 MARCH 1978) OUR CONCLUSION REMAINS THAT SUCH INITIATIVES ARE FOR THE FUTURE. THE FORTHCOMING CANNING HOUSE SEMINAR SHOULD KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM ON THE ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SIDE FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT, WE CANNOT BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT A POLITICAL SEMINAR - IN WHICH, AS YOU YOURSELF RECOGNISE, THE FALKLANDS WOULD INEVITABLY LOOM LARGE - UNTIL AFTER AN ELECTION HERE AND CONSEQUENT DECISIONS ON OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS AND ON RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA GENERALLY. IF COSTA MENDEZ REVERTS TO HIS IDEA I HOPE YOU CAN CONFINE YOURSELF TO SAYING THAT WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF HIS INITIATIVE AND WILL BEAR IT IN MIND FOR THE FUTURE.

2. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT TO BE ANY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THIS COULD BEGIN TO APPROACH SOME FORM OF POSITIVE INTEREST. WE SHOULD AVOID RAISING ANY HOPES, SINCE AS YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, ANY INCOMING GOVERNMENT LATER THIS YEAR WILL WANT ITS OPTIONS ON POLICY TO BE ENTIRELY OPEN.

3. WE SHOULD SPEAK ON SIMILAR LINES TO MACKENZIE IF HE RAISES THE SUBJECT WITH US.

SIGNED. J B URE

6/11/20

CONFIDENTIAL

(5)

AM 020/.

Secretary of State

Mr Hall ✓
PS/PVS ✓
Mr Stephen ✓
PS/Mr Rowlands ✓
Private Secretary

4/15/1

Sep min.

Dr Owen has seen
and approved this submission.

RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

see
8/2

Problem

- A (4) 1. The new Argentine Foreign Minister has told Mr Carless (BA tel no 39) that the Argentines would like to restore relations at Ambassadorial level: how should we react?

Background

- B 2. We had already heard that the question of Ambassadorial representation may well come up when Sr Manrique, a former Minister in Lanusse's military Government calls on Mr Rowlands on 8 February (para 2 (iv) of BA tel no 34). — AM 314/2 (7)
- C 3. My submission of 29 September, 1977 explains the background: it was the Argentines who took the initiative in January 1976 in recalling their Ambassador following our then reluctance to engage in serious negotiations over the Falklands.
- D 4. Sr Pastor has indicated that he would like to have an Ambassador in London by the end of April. This timing ties in with the departure of the present Chargé, Mr Gowland, who has told us that he will be leaving London within the next 6 weeks. The Argentine Foreign Minister's candidate for the post, Sr Ortiz de Rosas (personality note attached) served as Argentine Ambassador to the UN from 1970-1977.

N.B.
Archona
left London
in Oct 75.

/Where...

CONFIDENTIAL

Where Argentine national interests are concerned, he is tough and uncompromising, but I would think him acceptable for the post.

Argument

5. Unlike Chile (where we have said publicly that we would not restore relations to Ambassador level unless there was real and tangible evidence of an improvement in the human rights situation) we have never imposed conditions which the Argentine Government should meet (e.g. relating to human rights or the Falklands dispute) before we would consider a resumption of relations to Ambassador level.

6. The principle attractions to us of restoring relations at Ambassadorial level are that this would facilitate the conduct of the Falklands negotiations and other business, and would make it unlikely that the Argentines - having taken the initiative on this - would do anything to bring our relations to a crisis within the first few months of their Ambassador's arrival in London. This could be very useful to us at the present time when, because of the Islanders' reaction, we are facing a sticky patch in the Falklands negotiations.

7. The main snag to us would be the possibility of criticism in this country from the human rights lobby, who might see the move as placating a vicious régime; and from the Falkland Islanders and their lobby here, who might see the move as a prelude to some new and dramatic development. We could, of course, defend it in both directions: firstly, to the human rights lobby we could point out that we have used our Ambassadors in other South American countries to bring pressure to bear both in defence of human rights in general, and in protection of individuals; secondly, to the Falkland Islanders we could point out that since complex negotiations are in progress the
/practical...

for Ambassadors
practical requirement/is self-evident and does not constitute
any change of policy.

8. Most of the criticism we might expect will be directed towards the appointment of a British Ambassador in Buenos Aires rather than the acceptance of an Argentine Ambassador in London. It would be open to us to avoid this criticism by accepting the Argentine Ambassador and leaving our own Chargé. But this would to some extent disappoint the Argentines and weigh against the advantages mentioned in para 6 above. (If it will be for others to make recommendations about whether, in the event of our restoring an Ambassador, this would merely involve a change of title for Mr Carless or the appointment of a different officer; the PUS's minute of 11 October 1977 is relevant). I see no reason why we should hasten to tailor the level of our own representation as an immediate and automatic response to Argentine requests, unless it suits us to do so for our own reasons.

Recommendation

9. I therefore recommend that if this question is raised by Sr Manrique on 8 February, Mr Rowlands should take the line that it was the Argentines who took the initiative in withdrawing their Ambassador, and if they now wish to reinstate one in London we would not foresee any problems about accepting a suitable candidate. If pressed about whether we would simultaneously put an Ambassador into Buenos Aires, Mr Rowlands might say that we would of course be considering this in the light of developments.

10. I further recommend that if and when the Argentines appoint an Ambassador here we should review the question of our own representation in Buenos Aires in the light of the reaction in this country and in the Falklands to the re-appearance of an Argentine

/Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Ambassador in London; in the light of progress over the next few weeks in our Falklands negotiations, and in the light of the personnel considerations involved.

J B Ure

2 February, 1979

J B Ure
South America Department

Copies to:

Sir A Parsons

POD

PCD

I agree with the recommendation in paragraph 9. I think that it would just not be worth it to rebuff the Argentines on this, particularly if they have taken the trouble to choose, in Dr Ortiz de Rosas, a very senior professional diplomat rather than one of the military officers who must be queueing up for the job. Sr Manrique did not raise this with me directly at dinner on 31 January but did make the point that it was very necessary to improve Anglo/Argentine relations in all fields at

/a

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

a high level. He said this with particular reference to the visit of the Argentine Minister of Economy Dr José Martinez de Hoz to London at the beginning of May for the Argentine seminar to be held by Canning House. He said that people like himself, who wanted to see an end to military government in Argentina and to counter-terrorist terrorism, felt the need for a return to a strong connection with Britain. This was needed not only in the economic field, where pent up British investment on a large scale could swing the balance in Martinez de Hoz's favour, but also in the socio-politico sense where the British rather than the American example could help towards the solution of Argentina's fundamental problems. He said that the reorganisation going on in the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs was putting the direction of policy into the hands of professionals who thought in this way and that he and they welcomed the progress that had been made in Anglo-Argentine relations over the Falkland Islands and Antarctica. He had read Allara's report on the Geneva discussions and said that it was extremely positive and encouraging.

2. I do not think that we need to decide on the recommendation in paragraph 10 at the moment. I think there might be some difficulties in having too long a gap between agreement to the appointment of an Argentine Ambassador and a decision of principle on our part to appoint an Ambassador. In practice we might not need to make the appointment for some time, whether it involved a change of title for Mr Carless or the appointment of someone else. Mr Carless will be on leave in this country from 8 February until the last week of March.

5 February 1979

cc Sir A Parsons
POD
PCD


G F Hall

I agree

CONFIDENTIAL

I agree with Mr. Hall: we if the Argentines
send an Ambassador here, I think we should appoint
one there before too long. This is not the same as
Chile: and there is no logical case for a difference
in status between the two here and over there.

Richard Palais
5/2

Very careful press briefing will be required
to ensure that any decision along the lines of the
recommendation is not misrepresented outside as
a turning-of-a-blind-eye by us to the appalling
human rights situation in Argentina.

David Smith.
6/2

CONFIDENTIAL

4

PPS 114

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BUENOS AIRES 30/1725Z JAN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 39 OF 30 JANUARY.

AUA 020/1	
31 JAN 1979	
INDEX	1415h
COUNTRY	
Section Taken	

ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. WHEN I PAID A COURTESY CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY , SR. PASTOR TOLD ME THAT IT WAS HIS AIM TO RESTORE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.
2. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT CONCURRED, AND THAT HIS OWN CANDIDATE FOR NOMINATION AS ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR WAS ORTIZ DE ROSAS (LP) . THE LATTER IS NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AND ALSO A CANDIDATE TO CONDUCT THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHILE, UNDER VATICAN MEDIATION, OVER THE BEAGLE DISPUTE.
3. PASTOR SAID THAT HE WAS IN NO HURRY TO MOVE QUICKLY, BUT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON BY THE END OF APRIL, AND IN TIME FOR THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY'S VISIT. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE FALKLANDS.

CARLESS

FILES
SAMD
PCD
PUSD
OLD
NEWS D
PS
PS|MR ROWLANDS
PS|PVS
SIR. A. PARSONS
MR HALL

CONFIDENTIAL

BAFO 003/26

00 FCO

TOP COPY

GRPS 30

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BUENOS AIRES 262000Z JAN 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 36 OF 26 JANUARY.

PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF S AM D.

1. I AM DUE TO MAKE MY FIRST COURTESY CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER LATE ON MONDAY, 29 JANUARY.
2. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU WOULD WISH ME TO SAY.

CARLESS

NNNN

SENT AT 26/2003Z NSC

RECD AT 26/2003Z HH

APPARENTLY, READY TO EXAMINE THE IDEA.

2. COSTA MENDIZ, WHO IS ORGANIZING A NUMBER OF OTHER SEMINARS, BROUGHT THE MATTER AGAIN IN A MEETING WITH HURLEY JACKSON, WHO IS WITH THE EMBASSY'S CONTACT WITH THE COUNCIL. HE ASKED US TO WRITE WICKENTON REMINDING HIM OF THE REQUEST AND CONFIRMING HIS INTEREST. WE COMPLIED WITH HIS REQUEST (ILLIAN'S LETTER TO WICKENTON OF 26 JANUARY, COPIED TO WICKENTON, REFERRING).

3. NEARLY, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ANY SUCH SEMINAR. THE COUNCIL IS A NON-GOVERNMENTAL, SPONSORED BY LOCAL BUSINESSMEN, BUT IT ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, AND IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SEMINAR TO BE MISINTERPRETED BY THOSE OPPOSED TO ANY CLOSER CONTACT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS.

4. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT:

(1) AND SHOULD, IN PRINCIPLE, WE FAVOR THE PROPOSAL FOR A SEMINAR

Mod inform

22

2A

Draft submission

the workman

Do we know 5
about this?

M
26/1

ATA 020/1	
-5 FEB 1979	
GRPS 356	
CONFIDENTIAL	

BAFO 008/25

TELE-LETTER

TO: FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO: 922/3

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1979

FOLLOWING FOR: J B URE ESQ MVO, SAND

FROM: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, BUENOS AIRES

SEMINAR ON ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT DR NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ, THE SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WAS IN LONDON DURING NOVEMBER AS A CATEGORY II SPONSORED VISITOR. WHEN THERE HE DISCUSSED WITH STEVEN MACKENZIE THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT SEMINAR BETWEEN CANNING HOUSE AND THEO COUNCIL TO DISCUSS ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. MACKENZIE WAS, APPARENTLY, READY TO EXAMINE THE IDEA.

2. COSTA MENDEZ, WHO IS ORGANISING A NUMBER OF OTHER SEMINARS, RAISED THE MATTER AGAIN IN A MEETING WITH DUDLEY ANKERSON, WHO IS ACTING AS THE EMBASSY'S CONTACT WITH THE COUNCIL. HE ASKED US TO WRITE TO MACKENZIE REMINDING HIM OF THE PROJECT AND CONFIRMING HIS INTEREST. WE COMPLIED WITH HIS REQUEST (ILLMAN'S LETTER TO MACKENZIE OF 19 JANUARY, COPIED TO MALCOMSON, REFERS).

3. MEANWHILE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ANY SUCH SEMINAR. THE COUNCIL IS A NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODY SPONSORED BY LOCAL BUSINESSMEN, BUT IT ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, AND IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SEMINAR TO BE MISINTERPRETED BY THOSE OPPOSED TO ANY CLOSED CONTACT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS.

4. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT:

(I) HMG SHOULD, IN PRINCIPLE, WELCOME THE PROPOSAL FOR A SEMINAR (CF. THE ANGLO-POLISH ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES WHICH BEGAN IN THE 1960S):

(II) ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ITS TIMING DEPENDED ON THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES:

THE MATTER AGAIN IN A MEETING WITH DUDLEY ANKERSON, WHO IS AS
THE EMBASSY'S CONTACT WITH THE COUNCIL. HE ASKED US TO WRITE TO
MACKENZIE REMINDING HIM OF THE PROJECT AND CONFIRMING HIS INTEREST.
WE COMPLIED WITH HIS REQUEST (ILLMAN'S LETTER TO MACKENZIE OF 19
JANUARY, COPIED TO MALCOMSON, REFERS).

3. MEANWHILE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF ANY SUCH SEMINAR. THE COUNCIL IS A NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODY
SPONSORED BY LOCAL BUSINESSMEN, BUT IT ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE
PRESENT GOVERNMENT, AND IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH A SEMINAR TO BE
MISINTERPRETED BY THOSE OPPOSED TO ANY CLOSED CONTACT BETWEEN THE
BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS.

4. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT:

(I) HMG SHOULD, IN PRINCIPLE, WELCOME THE PROPOSAL FOR A SEMINAR
(CF. THE ANGLO-POLISH ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES WHICH BEGAN IN
THE 1960S):

(II) ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ITS TIMING DEPENDED ON THE APPRO-
PRIATE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES:

(III) IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, A SEMINAR COULD BE VALUABLE IN
SYMBOLISING A MORE MODERN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND
ARGENTINA AND IN DRAWING PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE MUTUAL
ADVANTAGES OF CO-OPERATION IN THE S W ATLANTIC AND THE
ANTARCTIC:

(IV) THE IDEA OF SUCH A SEMINAR MIGHT EVEN BE DISCUSSED IN THE
MARGIN OF THE NEXT ROUND OF ANGLO-ARGENTINE TALKS. ITS FORM
AND PARTICIPANTS COULD BE DEVISED TO SUPPORT THE DIRECTION
WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING:

(V) THE EARLIEST A SEMINAR COULD TAKE PLACE WOULD BE LATE 1979 OR
EARLY 1980, THE TIMING BEING DEPENDENT ON CIRCUMSTANCES IN BOTH
COUNTRIES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS:

(VI) SOME OF THE NEGOTIATORS MIGHT EVEN TAKE PART IN ANY SEMINAR.

(SIGNED) HUGH CARLESS

CONFIDENTIAL

24/1/79

ALA 020/1

25 JAN 1979

MOD informed
by telephone
P.A.

Mr 25/1

29

25/1

Mr Hall

PS/Mr Rowlands

Yes

M. Sindall

M. Rowlands would wish "sincere"
to replace "warm"; this would be
in line with the wording
to Lambroschini.

25/1

ARGENTINA: NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE

1. On 25 January, General Agosti will be succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Air Force and as a Member of the ruling Junta by Brigadier General Gaffigna.

2. MOD have sought our agreement to the Chief of the Air Staff sending the following message to General Gaffigna:

"On behalf of all members of the Royal Air Force I send you ^{sincere} warm congratulations and all good wishes on your appointment as Commander-in-Chief".

3. Mr Rowlands approved a similar message of congratulations last October from the First Sea Lord to the new Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy, Admiral Lambruschini (my submission of 20 October). MOD say that the present message is on standard lines and conforms to the messages sent whenever the Chief of the Air Staff learns of the appointment of the head of another air force. MOD also see advantage in making this gesture since it is now General Gaffigna who will have the final word on the Hawk advanced jet trainer contract.

4. I recommend that we should raise no objection to this message being sent.

A

A J Sindall

A J Sindall
South America Department

23 January, 1979

Hall 24/1

RESTRICTED

To: Ian Hamill, Defence Secretariat 8b



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2638 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

24 JAN 1979

Your reference

T H Malcomson, Esq
South American Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Our reference

D/DS8/23/53

Date

18th January 1979

Dear Malcomson,

NEW COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE

1. We spoke about the appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Air Force and the fact that the Chief of the Air Staff might wish to send him a short signal extending, on a personal basis, his congratulations and best wishes. This is a fairly standard procedure when CAS learns of the appointment of the head of another Air Force in advance but in this case CAS's Office have asked us to ensure that there would be no political objection to such a message.
2. CAS is away from his office at present but returns tomorrow (Friday) and, if he wishes to send such a signal, will probably want to do so then. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could let me know as soon as possible whether there is any political objection. CAS's Office have emphasised that any message would be purely personal.
3. A copy of the signal from Buenos Aires carrying news of the appointment is attached.

Yours sincerely,
I. Hamill

RESTRICTED

PSO/CAS

23/53.

17/1
17/1

UNCLASSIFIED

CBD087 15/2051 01503960

FOR CBD

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

PRIORITY 151645* JAN

17 JAN 1979

FROM BRITDEFAT BUENOS AIRES
TO MODUK AIR

OFFICE OF
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

UNCLASSIFIED

SIC WBC

FOR PSO TO CAS. NEW CINC ARGENTINE AIR FORCE.

1. BRIGADIER MAYOR D. OMAR DOMINGO RUBENS QGAFFIGNA,
AT PRESENT CHIEF OF AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF, IS TO SUCCEED
BRIGADIER GENERAL D. ORLANDO RAMON AGOSTI AS COMMANDER
IN CHIEF ARGENTINE AIR FORCE WEF 25 JAN 79 IN RANK OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL.

2. DOES CAS WISH TO SEND CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE?

CARLESS
BT

DISTRIBUTION WBC

F WBA (INSERTED BY AMRAD NO SDL WBC)

CBD - 1 DGPM(RAF) ACTION (CYP 1 DAO(RAF))

DS8

We spoke.

Should CAS wish to send a signal congratulating

General Gaffigna, would the Fco clear
that action?

17 Jan

8