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WESTERN EUROPEAN

FILE No. WR) 021/1 (Part.....)

TITLE: ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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FILE No. **WRJ 0211** (Part )

TITLE: **ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

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Mr. Osborne (2A)								
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Mr. Osborne (5)		14/2						
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Mr. Arman		22 21/2						
Mr. Osborne		22/2 +22						
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Mr. Osborne		30 2/2						
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*Europe*  
*A. 2/11*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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LAST PAPER

23 December 1982

T L Richardson Esq  
 ROME

*Dear Tom,*

ITALY/FRG RELATIONS

WRJ 021/1	
RECEIVED	30 DEC 1982
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INDEX	✓
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- 39
1. Thank you for your letter of 2 December which provided a comprehensive analysis of the current state of Italian relations with the FRG. I am sure you are correct in your assessment that the relationship has sufficient substance to it to survive changes of government on either side.
  2. It was convenient that your letter should have arrived at a time when we are giving closer examination to our own relations with Italy. We are currently considering comments from other departments on the Anglo-Italian relations paper and your letter provided an opportunity to compare notes. Certainly the Germans have several points in their favour. A clear commitment to Europe is a factor which earns Germany respect in Italian eyes. We cannot claim similar standing. The number of tourists quoted in your letter is impressive and the British cannot match that. The economic relations between the FRG and Italy are much weightier than Anglo-Italian economic ties.
  3. Obviously we must do and will do all we can to ensure we do not lag too far behind. But I have my doubts as to whether it is realistic to expect our views in Rome to carry - at least consistently - as much weight as those of the FRG (your last paragraph). Geography alone would point to the Italians being prepared to go to considerable lengths to ensure that no bilateral problems muddy the waters of their relationship with the FRG. More positively, the willingness of German politicians to build up personal relationships with Italian leaders (Kohl/Fanfani, Genscher/Colombo) shows an understanding - which is not matched among British politicians - of the importance of the personal touch in dealing with Italy.



4. In this context, we are conscious of the inadequacy of inter-party ties to which you rightly draw attention. It applies to most of our clients. I look forward to your ideas on how this weakness might best be rectified. It may be possible to arouse some interest if and when our Round Table/Seminar gets off the ground. If we were able to attract politicians we would at least have provided a forum at which they could get to know one another.

5. The observations in paragraph 12 of your letter are also relevant to our Anglo-Italian relations paper, which at present deliberately makes no reference to Italian sensitivity at being omitted from restricted meetings. There have been less complaints of late, but we shall bear the risk in mind. Italy's closeness to the US may make such exclusion more difficult in future, even if the reasons behind it remain unchanged. This is an important consideration given that the UK has in the past usually borne the brunt of Italian anger. But, mounting my hobby-horse again, part of Italy's problem lies in her defence effort relative to that of her major allies. I hope the Germans use their close ties to advantage in this field.

6. Finally, I agree that the changes of government in France and Germany have altered the European pattern. The Paris-Bonn axis no longer dominates as it did a couple of years ago, and it is a healthy sign that Italy and Germany are paying each other such attention. It would be interesting in due course to have your thoughts on Franco-Italian ties.

*Yours ever*

A M Wood  
Western European Department

cc. A J Hunter Esq, BONN

Heads of Chancery: Brussels  
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East Berlin  
Moscow

Enter + p...

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British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

WRI. 021/1

§ 9

A M Wood Esq  
WED  
FCO

c.o. Info Dept  
30-12  
Award Dept  
Mr Oshorn Ab 11/12  
Mr Wood o/r  
Date

Your reference  
Our reference

16 December 1982

Dear Andrew,

## SHULTZ'S VISIT TO ROME

1. Please refer to our telno 650 of 15 December. Franceschi's Community briefing was not completely satisfactory; he was not present himself at the meeting with Colombo and in any case tends to waffle. Nevertheless, I ought to record some additional points that Franceschi made. I will not cover the Antonov affair since we are reporting this separately; needless to say, however, it did dominate press reporting here of Shultz's visit.

East/West Relations

2. It is not at all clear what institutional arrangements, and what numbers, the Italians have in mind for the co-ordination of Western economic policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. What is clear (but only because the French Embassy man pushed Franceschi into a corner) is that the Italians do hanker after institutional arrangements of some sort, and not just a vaguer form of bilateral co-ordination. Colombo said elliptically that the Italians wanted to "follow a political line", by which, I think, he meant that given the difficulties the Washington group had experienced in keeping the smaller EC countries happy, consideration should at least be given to broadening the group. It was Colombo who raised the German Presidency problem, and he seems to have suggested that the Danes might continue to participate ex officio in a renewed Seven plus Two group, presumably with some watching brief on behalf of the smaller countries. The Danish representative made no comment, but the Dutchman was predictably exercised that Seven plus Two was still being talked about. On all this, Franceschi's main points were that the Japanese had to be included somehow and that the Italians recognised that NATO would be ill-placed to co-ordinate, because of Japanese non-membership and assumed French objections. I think it is worth noting that Colombo takes a personal interest in these US/EC institutional questions; witness his speech in Georgetown earlier this year. Shultz very sensibly did not get into the numbers game, though he shared Italian views about the need for some form of directoire.

/Eastern Europe



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2.

Eastern Europe

3. The only point worth recording is that both Shultz and Colombo agreed that more time was needed to judge whether the suspension of martial law was or was not a genuine step towards unfreezing the Polish political scene.

Middle East

4. Reading between the lines, it is reasonable to assume that the Italians are getting increasingly worried about taking on a near-indefinite commitment to maintain forces in the Lebanon. Nevertheless, they are prepared in principle to increase the size of their force, along with the French and the Americans; and would not rule out a moderate increase now, while the MNF remains confined to Beirut, if that would please Gemayel. Franceschi noted, however, that it was hard enough already to find accommodation in Beirut for the existing troops. We have reported separately (our telno 649) the US Embassy's account of the discussions on 14 December between the Italians and a US military mission on the strengthening of the Lebanese Army. The only additional point that Franceschi made was that there was some talk in Beirut of introducing conscription; but Franceschi was sceptical whether conscripts would be of much value, at any rate outside Beirut. Shultz and Colombo seem to have discussed briefly the question of financial assistance for any future troop contributors to the MNF who could not pay their way; the implication was that the Americans would in principle be willing to find some money. Franceschi said that there had been no discussion of UNIFIL.

5. More generally, the Italians are clearly worried that the momentum of Pez and of the Reagan plan could be lost unless the Americans make an early negotiating breakthrough. Shultz's reassurances are unlikely to have satisfied the Italians, though Shultz did emphasise to them Reagan's basic commitment to reaching a Middle Eastern settlement. There was some discussion of Habib's future movements, and the Americans apparently suggested that instead of Habib shuttling between the contestants, they might come to see him, at a negotiating headquarter that might be located in Cyprus or even Rome.

*Yours ever,*

*Robert Curshaw*

*M.* T L Richardson

cc: B L Crowe Esq, ECD(E), FCO; EESD, FCO; NENAD, FCO; NAMd, FCO; TRD, FCO;  
Chanceries: Washington, Paris, Bonn, UkRep Brussels, Copenhagen, Beirut

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Mr Young <sup>Ho 14/11</sup>  
Mr Osborne. (Redistribute)  
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Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

cc: ECD(S)

Digne Dept  
Es 10  
As. Dept.

Your reference

Our reference  
020/13

Date

2 December 1982

1. I sendack  
2. Do we accept the side-lined passage in 1.3? I'm not sure it's practical.  
Please consider in the context of the Anglo-Italian paper.  
fuss Good? 1/2

A M Wood Esq  
WED  
FCO

Jean Andrew

Ho 14/11

ITALY/FRG RELATIONS

1. In our telno 552 (not to E. Berlin) we promised comments on Carstens' state visit on 25-29 October. It was followed by Kohl's visit here of 18 November, which so far as the Italian rather than the Vatican part was concerned turned out to be little more than a round of courtesy calls because of the fall of the Spadolini government and the political crisis. For these same reasons, the fuller Italo-German consultations planned for 25-26 November in Florence (Spadolini's birthplace) were postponed.

SEE (41)

2. This spate of visits, abortive through some turned out to be, prompted us to look more closely at the Italian/FRG relationship. As I have commented before (in the context, for example, of your draft paper on Anglo-Italian relations) the relationship looks healthy from here. Clearly some of the current warmth stems from the close working relations between Genscher and Colombo, but there is a depth to the relationship which should survive changes in Ministers. I think it worth setting out the various aspects of the relationship in some detail. Bonn may see it differently, and I hope Alistair Hunter will forgive us if I have inadvertently trespassed onto his territory.

Introduction

3. No account of Italy/FRG relations can ignore the historical perspective. Most Italians over 60 in north and central Italy have bitter memories of the German occupation, and many blame Hitler as much as Mussolini for dragging their country into a ruinous war. The hysterical reaction to the escape of Kappler four years ago showed how close to the surface these wartime scars still are. The memory of the Ardeatine massacres in Rome, the site of which Carstens visited, is still vivid, and the massacres are commemorated in an official ceremony every year. This background explains why a member of the FRG Embassy described to us Carstens' State Visit, the third since the war, as the first 'normal' one made by a FRG President. Yet the shared experience of emerging defeated in 1945, being occupied by Allied troops and having to overcome a Fascist/Nazi past to build new republics has also helped to make Italian and German views converge on some subjects, such as the political construction of the European Community.

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4. Geography



4. Geography has always played an important part in forming the relationship. It is easy (and cheap) for Germans to come here. 5,100,000 did so last year, making this the most popular holiday destination for Germans; the Federal Republic supplied 1/3 of all Italy's tourists, and the number of German visitors this year may reach 6 million. The resulting injection of Deutschmarks (estimated at over 7 billion last year) helps to repeat the annual summer miracle of avoiding disaster for the Italian balance of payments. In the other direction, holidays have been prohibitively expensive for most Italians, but 600,000 work in Germany and their remittances are an important economic input into many of Italy's most depressed areas; Carstens was at pains to point out that these Italian gastarbeiter would suffer no worse than the Germans themselves from the current FRG recession. Although economically valuable, this export of labour to Germany creates a form of inferiority complex, but not the degree of bitterness engendered by the Swiss treatment of Italian expatriate workers, which is thought to be far worse.

#### Economy

5. The FRG is Italy's most important trading partner, accounting for almost 16% of her exports and of her imports in 1981. The respective figures in lire were 13,350 billion and 16,180 billion, producing a significant deficit for Italy which looks set to worsen this year. In terms of trade, therefore, the Deutschmark rate against the lire is of crucial importance; only the dollar rate is watched more closely here (because so many essential imports, like oil, are priced in dollars). The increasing strength of the Deutschmark over the last four years has had a serious effect on the balance of trade, tilted as it is in the FRG's favour, though it brings concomitant benefits to Italian exporters. The downturn in FRG demand is seen here as one of the most important reasons for the recent slowdown in Italian export performance. Private German investments in Italy were worth 250 million marks at the end of 1981, compared with 690 million marks for comparable Italian investments in Germany. Italians have for so long been accustomed to regard the FRG economy as the strongest in Europe, and to profit from it accordingly, that they find it hard now to believe German stories of real domestic difficulties.

#### The Community

6. Pursuit of Italian economic interests in the EC often leads to disagreement with the FRG, although both governments agree on the broad objectives. Italian attempts to secure better terms for Mediterranean agricultural products, for example, are bound to meet resistance in Bonn. The Italians appreciate the German commitment to the ideal of greater integration and more comprehensive Community policies, but are disappointed when the natural prudence of a net contributor means that this is not translated into support for specific Italian requests. On the central issue of the EC budget,





one of Colombo's main concerns was to avoid the fierce domestic criticism which he expected if Italy was seen to 'pay back' Germany when the latter declined to shoulder her full share of UK refunds in 1982. This is likewise now the major Italian concern in the budget negotiations for 1983 and beyond. The Italians believe that the FRG is still rich enough to continue to shoulder part of the burden of financing European policies designed to help the less fortunate (including Italy).

7. There are differences too over other EC issues with an immediate economic impact. The Germans (like others) resent Italy's refusal to cut steel capacity. Italy thinks that the FRG, like others, with antiquated plant, should cut its capacity much more drastically than Italy. The Italians, who employ quite a wide range of protectionist instruments (e.g. quotas for Japanese cars and restrictions on services), dislike having to listen to the Germans vaunting untrammelled liberalism in trade (though they are quick to protest at French protectionist measures).

8. The "European Act" showed the similarity of Italian and German views on the political aspects of European cooperation; it is significant that both Spadolini and Schmidt had reservations about their Foreign Ministers' draft because it sought to gloss over the underlying economic problems. The process of drafting the 'Act' helped to cement the already close personal relationship between Colombo and Genscher. Now that both have been confirmed in office until next spring, but not necessarily beyond, they will have a joint interest in pressing ahead with the 'Act' as quickly as possible during the FRG Presidency. The key theme of closer consultation between EC partners will, however, remain acceptable to any conceivable future Italian Government. One reason for this is that the political class sees Italy's integration into Europe as an important way of underpinning Italian democracy. There are signs of growing nationalism here, which protectionist pressures will no doubt reinforce, but in an unstable world and in a growing recession I would expect the Italians to be conscious of their dependence on their stronger neighbours, however much at times they might resent it.

#### Defence

9. In the defence field Italy and Germany have much in common. Both know that their national security depends on Nato, and are non-nuclear powers; both have substantial US forces on their territory, and have agreed to INF basing next year; both have a vocal peace movement, although the Italian demonstrations have so far been smaller and have made less impact than their equivalents in Germany. Italy is concerned to keep closely in step with the FRG over defence and security matters, and this accounts for the close questioning of Genscher about the recent Franco-German exchange on nuclear defence. For the same reason Italy has always been keen on parallel INF deployment next year;



Kohl's willingness to go it alone if need be will not help the Italian government defend their decision on Comiso basing to public opinion during 1983 (we shall report separately on this when the new government is firmly in place). The main difference of defence outlook stems from Italy's natural preoccupation with southern flank issues, and her wish to create commercial opportunities in the military sector in the third world. The difference of view over arms sales has been sharply illustrated by Tornado.

#### Party links

10. The links of Italian parties with their FRG counterparts (where these exist) are probably as close as those with any other country, and contact sadly with ours - a theme which we will take up separately. Craxi (PSI) has received support from the SPD (including cash, according to some observers) and takes care of his links with Schmidt, Brandt etc. Apart from Socialist International meetings and encounters at the European Parliament, there are policy seminars which help to foster the connection; an important one takes place next week. The Adenauer foundation is active in Rome (and assists the contact work of the FRG Embassy). The Italian Christian Democrats have a more limited international outlook, and as always fear the result of being identified too closely with any 'Conservative' party; nevertheless, there are regular exchanges with the CDU, and Kohl called on DC leaders when in Rome on 18 November. The PCI have sought to establish better links with the SPD, as with the PSF, to the annoyance of the PSI; this is part of their effort to acquire democratic credentials as the major force of the Italian left. Our impression is that their success in Bonn has so far been more limited than in Paris, but the relationship with the SPD could improve as the PCI moves further away from Moscow and the SPD perhaps further to the left. (This could embarrass Craxi's PSI, which supports INF basing at Comiso). The minor parties suffer from the usual lack of a precise match with parties elsewhere, but generally attract a German representative of high calibre to their party congresses (it is not clear to us whether they send comparable representatives to Germany).

#### Trade Union links

11. Contacts between the Italian trade union federation CGIL/CISL/UIL, and its FRG counterpart, DGB, are regular and certainly more frequent than those with the TUC. UIL (the smallest union, PSI aligned) appears to take the lead, perhaps because of DGB sensitivity about CGIL's (the largest union) links with PCI. There has been recent contact at a high level. The General Secretary of UIL, Benvenuto, visited the head of DGB, Ernst Breit, in November to discuss joint action to combat high unemployment and to seek reassurance about DGB attitudes towards Italian migrant workers in FRG. Reports here suggest little progress on the former, beyond agreement to pursue the issue with ETUC, but Benvenuto expressed satisfaction with the DGB response on the latter.



### Government links

12. Germany is one of the few countries with which Italy has biannual summits, usually attended by several Ministers. Contact between individual Ministers is frequent; in the field of terrorism, for example, where the two countries faced similar problems in the 70s, the Interior Minister Rognoni keeps in closer touch with developments in Bonn than with those in Paris. When a Community policy is being evolved, the German position is always studied with great attention in Rome, and in political cooperation the two countries usually march in step. Exchanges of visits by officials or Parliamentarians are less frequent, perhaps because Italians think first of London as a destination with more obvious attractions. There is no doubt however that the professionalism and efficiency of the FRG state machine is admired (and sometimes feared) by the Italians.

### Foreign Policy

13. On transatlantic relations Italy has not usually found it difficult to keep in step with the FRG. This is not surprising given their similar concerns over issues like the pipeline. But the Italians will always be more anxious to pacify the Americans for reasons that lie outside the scope of this letter. In the third world their interests rarely if ever come into conflict, and differences of view can usually be resolved within the EC framework. The major source of concern has therefore been relations with the Eastern bloc. Ostpolitik was from the beginning regarded with suspicion in Italy, on the grounds that it might detract from Germany's commitment to the Community and perhaps even call into question her role in Nato. Those fears were exaggerated, and it is now more widely accepted here that the problem of the inner German relationship imposes on the FRG an approach to the East which is unique in Western Europe. There was also an element of jealousy, in that the Italians resented the VIP treatment which Schmidt received in Moscow; Italy has sought to expand her extensive commercial links with the East (in which the PCI and some organisations linked with the Party have a role), and would like her political access to match. It remains true that German pronouncements on, for example, the USSR after Brezhnev are studied here with a degree of attention second only to that accorded to statements from Washington.

12. The fundamental Italian hatred of being left out of restricted meetings or 'directorates' of any kind affects their attitude to the FRG, although we usually shoulder more of the blame. As always, the main Italian concern is not to appear to have been relegated to the second division; the Germans understand this, and adjust their presentation (not their policy) accordingly. There is also no doubt that Italy sees bilateral links with the FRG as one way of breaking down what in Giscard's time was seen as the excessive weight of the Paris/Bonn axis in the Community. I would guess that the Italians are far happier with the fluid situation that seems to be emerging in intra-Community relationships.



Conclusion

13. Italy's relations with Germany are in good shape, and likely to remain so. Their joint interests are too extensive to be ignored by any government in Rome. We need not view this close relationship with concern; it is a positive development for Europe and helpful to us in many fields (not least defence). But we should try to ensure that our views in Rome carry at least as much weight as those of the FRG. Given the considerable efforts devoted to this country by the German government from the Chancellor down, that can no longer be taken for granted. A small sign of the times is that some journalists to whom I have spoken regard London as a fringe posting; and certainly Italian press reporting from Bonn is much more comprehensive. As always, the dilemma for Italy arises in periods of German-US tension. Kohl's succession has done much to remove this particular problem. It is too soon to judge whether a more left-inclined SPD will create a new set of problems for Italy, particularly in its possible impact on the Italian parties of the left. We shall watch this carefully.

*Yours ever,*  
 T L Richardson

T L Richardson

cc: A J Hunter Esq  
 BONN

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CALL ON ARCHBISHOP GLEMP

1. I CALLED TODAY ON ARCHBISHOP GLEMP, I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CANON  
MOSSMAN, THE VISITING EMBASSY CHAPLAIN, WHO TOOK WITH HIM A LETTER  
FROM THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

2. ARCHBISHOP GLEMP RECEIVED US WARMLY AND WAS CLEARLY TOUCHED BY  
THE GOOD WISHES FROM THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AS CONVEYED BY CANON  
MOSSMAN. HE THANKED THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE  
FOR THE HELP WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO POLAND. HE SAID HE WAS  
IMPRESSED AND SURPRISED BY THE DURABILITY OF THE SUPPORT WHICH  
POLAND HAD RECEIVED FROM THE WEST.

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3. I ASKED HOW HE SAW THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE SAID THERE WAS  
NO GROWTH OF CONFIDENCE IN THE REGIME BY THE PEOPLE. BUT IT HAD TO  
BE RECOGNISED THAT THE REGIME ITSELF HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE.  
HE THOUGHT THE POPE'S VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE AND THAT THE  
CHURCH WOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER  
MARTIAL LAW WOULD BE LIFTED BEFORE THE POPE'S VISIT. HE AGREED THAT  
THE GOVERNMENT HAD VACILLATED BETWEEN LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW AND  
SUSPENDING IT. FOR TWO WEEKS THERE WAS UNCERTAINTY. HE THOUGHT THAT  
A MIXTURE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES HAD RESULTED IN THE  
GOVERNMENT NOT TAKING RISKS. OF COURSE THIS GOVERNMENT CALLED  
THEMSELVES SOCIALIST, BUT IF THEY HAD BEEN REALLY SOCIALIST, THEY  
WOULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT TO DO FOR THE PEOPLE. BUT THEY WERE NOT.  
(I DID NOT COMMENT).

4. I ASKED ABOUT THOSE STILL IN PRISON FOR OFFENCES UNDER MARTIAL  
LAW. DID HE HAVE ANY IDEA HOW MANY THERE WERE? HE SAID THAT  
FIGURES VARIED FROM 8,000 AT THE MOST TO 1,600. THE TRUE FIGURE  
WAS PROBABLY SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO. HE SAID THE CHURCH WAS TRYING  
TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF YOUNG PEOPLE, WOMEN AND THOSE WITH  
FAMILIES. THEY WERE ALSO TRYING TO GET PEOPLE MADE 'POLITICAL'  
PRISONERS WHERE THIS WAS JUSTIFIED RATHER THAN CRIMINAL OFFENDERS.  
IN GENERAL, THE CHURCH WOULD STRIVE FOR PEACE WITHIN POLISH SOCIETY  
AND FAVOUR HARD WORK. WORK WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE WELL-BEING OF  
POLAND.

5. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE AUTHORITIES CLAIM THAT THINGS WERE  
GETTING BETTER ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT  
THERE WAS A SMALL IMPROVEMENT. SOME ELEMENTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM

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HAD SUBSTANCE AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RECENT DEBATES IN THE SEJM. (WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY BY SAVINGRAM). BUT HIS EXPERTS TOLD HIM THAT MARCH, APRIL AND MAY OF NEXT YEAR WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT MONTHS FOR THE PEOPLE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE SEVERE SHORTAGES OF MEAT AND FATS ESPECIALLY.

6. ON CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS TALK BUT NO UNDERSTANDING. THE CHURCH WOULD BE CONTENT IF THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT OPENLY ATTACK THEM. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TRIED TO GET HIM TO APPEAR ON TELEVISION BUT HE HAD REFUSED.

7. ON THE NEW TRADE UNIONS, HE THOUGHT THAT AS TIME WENT ON MORE WORKERS WOULD JOIN - THOUGH THE CHURCH WOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF DIRECTLY IN THIS MATTER.

8. COMMENT. I FOUND ARCHBISHOP GLEMP IN CONFIDENT FORM. HE WAS, AS ALWAYS, DIRECT AND CLEAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE POPE'S VISIT WILL BE A VERY GREAT EVENT BUT I DETECTED MUCH UNCERTAINTY HOW IT WOULD GO AND HOW THE AUTHORITIES WOULD TRY TO HANDLE IT.

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JAMES

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EESD  
FCO

*Jean Vigor*  
POLAND

I have seen Liotta of the MFA's East European division, whom you know, a couple of times recently. You are probably already aware that he is sceptical about our and others' advocacy of a "flexible" approach towards Poland. It is hard to judge how much weight he carries within the MFA. I see, for example, that his director, Bottai, took a far more open attitude at the recent PoCo meeting (Copenhagen telno 450). Liotta likes playing the hard man, and probably is by instinct.

2. At any rate, he questioned the need to make any adjustments in our policy towards Poland. In his view - we spoke shortly before 13 December - Jaruzelski's measures would be purely cosmetic. We all knew in the West that we could not prise Poland away from the Soviet Union. The Russians were bound to win that particular battle. But that was no reason to give them game, set and match by reconsidering and revoking such few measures as we had in place against Poland, i.e. no rescheduling and no political contacts (cf para 4(d) of FCO telno 313 to UKDel NATO). Of course, NATO should reconsider its position in the light of developments in Poland, and we were right to urge such a reappraisal; but in Liotta's view the new Polish measures were most unlikely to warrant any change in NATO members' policies. The crucial criterion of the three we had established concerned tangible progress towards a freer society and a dialogue between the Polish government, the Church and Solidarity or its supporters. There was no way that Jaruzelski could satisfy this criterion, and it remained the bedrock of our position. We might lose this time round but should not give up hope for the future. And so on.

3. The reason I report these unremarkable remarks is to draw your attention to Italian domestic politics. A year ago, the Italian socialists seized on Jaruzelski's takeover as a stick with which to beat the PCI. They used the controversy over the Soviet gas pipeline for the same purpose, and also to mark their distance from their DC partners in the coalition. Now we have the Antonov affair, and the spectre of Bulgarian or even Soviet complicity in the attempt on the Pope's life. There may be general elections here as early as next spring, and in what is bound to remain a pre-electoral atmosphere the socialists could easily exploit any moves by the government towards "normalisation" of relations with Poland.

/I do not



-2-

I do not believe that Italy would stand in the way of NATO policy adjustments. But I would not expect the Italians, on this occasion, to be out in front; indeed, a collective NATO decision is probably the only excuse a divided coalition government could plausibly deploy for adjusting its policies towards Poland; it would need some such cover. I think you will find it hard to shift the Italians away from the three criteria, and as seen from here we should be careful not to push Colombo further than he can go. Fortunately our assessment of the 13 December measures does not seem to vary markedly from that of our partners.

*Handwritten signature*  
Tom

T L Richardson

cc: TRED  
WED  
EOD(E)  
Chanceries  
WASHINGTON  
PARIS  
BONN  
MOSCOW  
WARSAW  
UKDEL NATO





*With the compliments of*  
**SOUTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT**

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
**London, S.W.1.**

RESTRICTED

British Embassy  
BRASILIA

ALB 021/1



26 November 1982

H D MacPherson Esq  
South America Department  
FCO

R  
1) cc WED  
2) Mr. MacPherson B.i.o.t. *Ma* *High foreign relation.*

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VISIT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO ITALY,  
18-19 OCTOBER 1982

- I refer to Mr Gulshaw's letter of 26 October and Mr French's letter of 4 November about the visit of Dr Guerreiro to Rome in October.
- To take first the point about Brazil's attitude to the PLO, the position is that the PLO are allowed an office in Brasilia but it is not officially recognised. The PLO representative has diplomatic status via the Arab League and not qua PLO representative.
- Secondly, to obtain a Brazilian view of the visit, I called this week on Conselheiro Orlando Galveas, who covers Italy and Austria in the MFA, and had accompanied Dr Guerreiro to Rome and Vienna.
- His account of the visit was generally in line with the report received from Rome. I commented that the timing of this visit after Colombo's to Brazil in August seemed unusually close and Galveas explained that Guerreiro's visit to Italy and Austria had been arranged in July in response to long-standing invitations. It was after this that Colombo had decided to include Brazil (and Buenos Aires) in a trip which he was already undertaking to South America in August. Thus no special significance should be read into the way in which one visit had followed close upon the heels of the other, although there was no doubt that Italy was making a particular effort to improve relations between Europe and Latin America as a whole after the Falklands war. The UN debate had of course been discussed and Galveas added that after the voting in the UN, the Italian Ambassador had made a point of explaining to his Brazilian colleague that Italy was in favour of negotiations although he had not been able to vote in favour of the resolution.
- I asked about the Economic Mixed Commission and Galveas said the new agreement was a revision and renewal of an existing one dating from 1956. It was to include economic, commercial and industrial matters but not scientific, cultural or technical cooperation questions which were each governed by separate agreements. He did not say when it would meet.

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6. On other topics Galveas said that each side had propounded well-known positions. He elaborated, as Dr Guerreiro had done in Rome, on Brazil's position on Central America and her doubts about the US plan for the Caribe because of the possible long-term destabilising effect of allowing considerable power to the multinationals in such small countries.

*Jim*  
J M Leiper (Miss)

cc:  
R French Esq, WASHINGTON  
R N Culshaw Esq, ROME

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Mr Amoy



Her pc.

With the compliments of

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
ROME

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Chancery Paris  
[unclear]

FRENCH VIEWS

1. I gave lunch today to Bajolet of the French Embassy.

Franco/Italian Summit

2. He was gloomy about the chances of the Franco-Italian Summit taking place as planned on 12 November. Spadolini would fulfil the engagement if he possibly could, but Mitterrand would need to be reassured that Spadolini was not a "lame duck". Bajolet expected the Italian cancellation this afternoon, whatever the outcome of Spadolini's talks with Pertini. Mitterrand had no other dates available until 1983.

3. Bajolet said the plan had been for Spadolini to be accompanied only by Colombo. Lagorio was in Paris on 10/11 November on separate business, returning to France some gold coins originally given by Mussolini before the second World War but later returned by France. Lagorio would meet Hernu and would see Mitterrand at a large function. The Quai had resisted efforts by the French Embassy to include Lagorio in the Summit, since this would fuel press speculation in the wake of the Franco/German talks on nuclear defence.

4. Bajolet commented that the atmosphere might in any case not have been ideal for a Franco/Italian Summit. Spadolini's announcement of the McDonnell-Douglas purchase had upset Paris; the Farnesina were hinting that Colombo might yet try to reverse the decision, but this seemed improbable. Spadolini's plans for Spanish accession to the EC in January 1984 were also a bone of contention with the French, who feared that once Spain was in it would prove impossible for the Community to negotiate satisfactory terms for Spanish agricultural produce. Finally, Spadolini's over-optimistic and independent line in Washington on the pipeline and East/West economic relations had infuriated Cheysson. In Bajolet's view, Spadolini's sole purpose was to get the sanctions on Nuovo Pignone lifted, at whatever price, so that he could announce this as a political success.

Falklands/UN

5. Bajolet said that the French Ambassador in New York had received instructions two to three weeks before the vote that /he

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he should support the Argentine resolution. The Italians had been delighted to follow suit, but had implored the French not to change their mind at the last minute, for example because of Mrs Thatcher's visit to Paris. When Mitterrand did decide to abstain, this was solely to improve Anglo/French relations and not connected with the merits of the new text. Colombo had been embarrassed and angry. Bajolet thought that by comparison the desaparecidos issue had been of minor importance in changing the Italian vote.

6. We discussed links with the Italian parties at some length, and I explained our difficulties. He said that the UDF had virtually no contact with the Christian Democrats, and that the Gaullists showed no interest whatsoever in any Italian politicians. The French Socialists were wary of cultivating Craxi too much because they found him ideologically unattractive and because they recognised that the PCI was the major popular left-wing force in Italy. Conversely, Berlinguer had better access than Craxi to the present French government. Bajolet thought that after the PCE failure in Spain Berlinguer would be more keen than ever to reinforce his links with Social Democrats in Western Europe. None of the minor Italian parties had any worthwhile links in France. Finally, Bajolet said that his Ambassador enjoyed such good access to Craxi and Martelli that other Embassy staff did not spend much time at Via del Corso. Martinet's main aim now was to cultivate De Mita, but this was proving very difficult; the only consolation was that Piccoli had been worse, even snubbing a reception for Mitterrand.

7. Bajolet gave me the standard line on Franco/German defence talks. These were merely an application of the 1963 DeGaulle/Adenauer agreement, given added urgency because the replacement of Pluton by Hades missiles would give the French nuclear forces a wider range of targets in West Germany (and just over the border into East Germany). France was alive to the risk of decoupling Europe from the American nuclear deterrent, which was always the Italians' main concern. Finally, he thought the Comiso basing would proceed without much trouble, particularly if elections had been held by the time deployment began. The French Embassy's view was that it was best to let sleeping dogs lie rather than ask repeated questions about the coalition policy on INF, as the American did.

*Rumson*  
R N CULSHAW

10 November 1982

cc: AA  
Mr Morrice  
IO  
Mr M Richardson  
Mr Tuke (for party links file please)

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GRPS 400

DAMASCUS

TEL AVIV

ROME

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TELELETTER

FOLLOWING FROM:

R E PALMER, BEIRUT

FILE REFERENCE:

O21/2 16 NOVEMBER 1982

FOLLOWING FOR :


E CHAPLIN ESQ, NENAD, FCO.

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PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS.

VISIT TO LEBANON BY ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. SGR COLOMBO PAID A 24 HOUR VISIT TO LEBANON ON 9/10 NOVEMBER. HE SAW THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, SPEAKER OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE VISITED THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.
2. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 11 NOVEMBER. IT WAS WELL ATTENDED WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH, WHO WERE NOT REPRESENTED. (FRENCH ABSENTEEISM HAS BECOME A FREATURE OF COMMUNITY COORDINATION HERE).



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 Study H.  
 R.P.  
 19/11

(34)

3. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SGR COLOMBO'S TALKS CONTINUED THE DIALOGUE STARTED DURING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO ROME LAST MONTH. THEY PRODUCED LITTLE THAT WAS NEW. SGR COLOMBO WAS HOWEVER STRUCK BY THE FORCE WITH WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND SPEAKER OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY PUT FORWARD THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FIRE AND THAT THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF LEBANON WAS DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE NORTH AND THE BEKA'A. HE, COLOMBO, HAD TRIED TO INJECT A SENSE OF REALISM INTO LEBANESE THINKING, LAYING STRESS ON THE STRONG CARDS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO PLAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS GLOOMY ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR A SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

4. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN PRINCIPLE ON A 100 MILLION DOLLAR LINE OF CREDIT FOR LEBANON WHICH WOULD BE TIED TO THE PURCHASE OF ITALIAN GOODS TO THE TUNE OF 85%. MOST OF IT WOULD BE AT CONSENSUS RATES OF INTEREST BUT A PORTION - MAY BE AS HIGH AS 25% - WOULD BE AT CONCESSIONARY RATES. A TEAM OF EXPERTS WAS EXPECTED SHORTLY TO NEGOTIATE A FINANCIAL PROTOCOL. ON RECONSTRUCTION SGR COLOMBO DID NOT SEE IMMEDIATELY HOW THE LEBANESE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEND ANYTHING LIKE THE DOLLARS 12,000 MILLION FOR WHICH THEY HAD ASKED. IT WOULD BE SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE PLANNING GOT UNDER WAY. MEANWHILE, ITALY WAS INTERESTED IN HELPING WITH EMERGENCY REPAIR WORK AND THE RESTORATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN BEIRUT AND THE MAIN TOWNS.

5. I HAVE WRITTEN SEPARATELY ABOUT THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.

6. I AM COPYING THIS TELELETTER TO DOT(OT5), ECGD, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON AND UKREP BRUSSELS. NENAD REGISTRY PLEASE PASS COPIES TO DOT AND ECGD. *AND UKREP BRUSSELS*

SIGNED: R E PALMER

NNNN



British Embassy

Via XX Settembre 20A 00187 Rome

Tel: 47749 Telex: 4256.447

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## STATE OF THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

1. Saraiva Guerreiro paid an official visit to Rome on 27th October, leaving for Vienna on 28th October for the President's Meeting, Pansani (President of the Chamber of Deputies, and the visit is based on a Community briefing by the MFA.

2. Saravani said that this visit was part of the process to improve links between Europe and the rest of the world since the Falklands war. A partial dialogue had been re-established between Italy and Brazil, part of which was tele-vised. Ministers agreed to concentrate on international issues leaving bilateral issues to be dealt with separately.

3. Saraiva Guerreiro said that Italy's policy to renew contacts with Latin America was well known and that the war had left serious problems but showed that links between Latin America and the rest of the world were being re-established.



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
*Encl. p. 2*  
*July 14th*  
*R. 30/1.*

H D MacPherson Esq  
SAMD  
FCO  
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 26 October 1982



VISIT OF THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO ITALY

1. Saraiva Guerreiro paid an official visit to Rome on 18/19 October, leaving for Vienna on 20 October. He saw President Pertini, Fanfani (President of the Senate), the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, and Colombo. The following account is based on a Community briefing given today by Barbarani of the MFA.
2. Barbarani said that this visit reciprocated Colombo's trip to Brazil in August, and should be seen as part of Italy's efforts to improve links between Europe and Latin America in the wake of the Falklands war. A particularly close understanding had been re-established between Italy and Brazil. In their discussion, part of which was tete-a-tete, the two Foreign Ministers agreed to concentrate on international questions, leaving bilateral issues to be dealt with separately by officials.
3. Saraiva Guerreiro said that Italy's initiative in seeking to renew contacts with Latin America was welcome. The Falklands war had left serious problems but should not obscure the fact that links between Latin America and the EC were basically good. There were trading problems, eg over sugar and steel, but the \$600 million loan given by the European Coal and Steel Community to Brazil for mineral exploitation was an example of the benefits which Latin America could derive from the relationship. Colombo replied that Italy was keen to play an active role in promoting further links, both between COREPER and GRULA in Brussels and in talks between the EC and the Andean Pact. Colombo added that the normalisation in Bolivia gave the latter talks new impetus.

14.



4. The two Ministers discussed the Argentine UN resolution on the Falklands. Saraiva Guerreiro said that because of internal difficulties, the Argentine regime could not have produced a more moderate text. It was essential for negotiations to begin afresh. Colombo replied that the UK rejected the concept of negotiations for understandable reasons, but that Italy favoured a resumption of dialogue. It would be a mistake to give Latin American public opinion the impression that Europe was inflexible. (We know from other MFA contacts that Colombo was much influenced by Saraiva Guerreiro's insistence on negotiations, and indicated that Italy would, if possible, vote in favour of the draft resolution - see Rome tel no 543, not to all).
5. Colombo asked Saraiva Guerreiro about territorial disputes within Latin America. Saraiva Guerreiro replied that Brazil tried to exercise a moderating influence but never intervened in the internal affairs of other countries. More use should be made of the OAS as a forum for discussing regional problems. No Latin American country really wanted to exclude the United States from the OAS; the existing structure should be perfected, rather than replaced.
6. Discussion then turned to Central America. Saraiva Guerreiro spoke of "structural crisis" in the region and added that the disastrous economic situation favoured "progressive" solutions. (Barbarani commented wryly that it also favoured extreme right solutions). Saraiva Guerreiro pointed to Nicaragua's search for weapons and support for guerrilla movements as a factor of instability, and also had harsh words for Honduras. He criticised the US plan for the Caribbean basin, describing it as a device to concentrate attention on areas of interest to the United States and to permit increased activity by the multinationals. When pressed by Colombo he had few constructive suggestions to make about Central America.
7. The two Ministers ended their talks with a rapid tour d'horizon, as follows:-

/(a)



- (a) East/West. Colombo explained the present imbalance in INF, and stressed the need for early progress in the START talks. He was pessimistic about the prospects for CSCE and MBFR.
- (b) Middle East. Saraiva Guerreiro said that Brazil had always favoured a solution based on Israel's withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Palestine. He admitted that this policy reflected the pressure of Arab immigrants to Brazil as well as his country's commercial interests in the Arab world. Brazil accepted the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and allowed them an office in Brasilia. Colombo explained Italy's involvement in the Lebanese multinational force, and said that the Reagan plan and the Fez Summit had narrowed the gap between the West and the Arabs.
- (c) Southern Africa. Saraiva Guerreiro said that Brazil was interested in the region but had been unable for technical reasons to respond to the UN request to participate in a future multinational force for Namibia. He commented that withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola would be a natural consequence of Namibian independence, but should not be made a precondition for it. The US Government were wrong to contemplate matters by insisting on an advance commitment from the Angolan government about Cuban withdrawal. Colombo said little.

8. An agreement on economic cooperation was signed, including establishment of an economic Mixed Commission. Barbarani did not provide further details about when or how often it would meet. According to press reports, one of Italy's aims will be to reduce her current trade deficit: Italy's exports to Brazil in 1981 were worth Lire 650 billion (£300 m), against imports of more than Lire 1100 billion (£500 m).

/9.



9. To sum up, this visit looks to have been another example of Italian activism in foreign policy with a sound commercial basis. Italian firms from the private and parastatal sector are involved in innumerable Brazilian projects, especially in the fields of energy and transport. Although no further exchanges of visits with Latin America are planned at present, there is no doubt that Italy is paying the area more attention than hitherto. When it suits her, Italy will invoke Latin ties to justify taking the lead in promoting better relations between Europe and Latin America. Unfortunately, the same arguments will be used to explain her unhelpful line over the Falklands.

pp J Adkinson

R N CULSHAW

25 October 1982

cc: Chancery, Brasilia  
Chancery, Washington  
R P Osborne Esq, WED

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BRITISH EMBASSY.  
ROME.

12 October 1982

R O Miles Esq  
NENAD  
TCO

*Mr Osborne*

*Mr Sidney Longman*  
*Mr King*  
*Mr [unclear]*

Dear Oliver,

ITALY-MIDDLE EAST

1. I enclose a minute by Tom Richardson (who is on tour) recording his discussion with Moscato in the MFA at the end of last week. It covers Habib's visit here on 4 October and some of the developments on the ground in Beirut.
2. Since the demarche to the Lebanese on 2 October (paragraph 3), the Italian Ambassador is reported in this morning's press as having joined his US and French colleagues yesterday in a further approach to President Gemayel. Gemayel is said to have undertaken to restrain the activities of Lebanese forces (some still said to be operating in plain clothes) in the camps and to allow the Ambassadors access to those arrested.
3. But news from Beirut this week has been overshadowed by Saturday's terrorist attack on the Rome synagogue as the congregation, with their children, were emerging from the service to mark the last day of the Jewish New Year. One small child was killed, his brother is dangerously ill, and more than 30 people were wounded, some seriously. The authorities believe that those responsible were Arab members of the "Black June" group, helped by Italian terrorists, but they have so far failed to run anyone to earth.
4. The PLO's representative here was quick to issue a statement of sympathy with their "Jewish brothers" and Arafat condemned the "monstrous crime" in a message to President Pertini. This has not prevented a violent reaction from the Italian Jewish community who have accused Pertini, the Pope, the Italian authorities and the press of having unleashed a flood of anti-semitic feeling as a result of the way they received Arafat during the IPU Conference last month. The Ministry of the Interior has come under particularly heavy fire for having failed to provide protection for the synagogue in the light of earlier attacks on synagogues in Paris and Vienna.
5. The Pope denounced the attack during his homily at the end of the moving service in St. Peter's Square on 10 October to canonise the Polish Franciscan monk who was martyred in Auschwitz in 1941. The Prime Minister's office yesterday issued a communique defending the Government and Pertini. The sense of outrage is almost universal but the party overtones are creeping in. For example, the PSI's party newspaper has rejected the possibility of any link

/ between



between the attack and the treatment afforded Arafat (Pertini is a socialist and Craxi, the party secretary, was another of those who received him); but it has joined the attack on the Ministry of the Interior, which is headed by a Christian Democrat.

*Yours ever*

*Michael*

M K O Simpson-Orlebar

cc: A M Wood Esq  
WED, FCO

Chanceries: Beirut  
Tel Aviv  
Paris  
Washington

Minister  
Mr Culshaw o/r

ITALY-MIDDLE EAST

1. I saw Moscato briefly today. He was very busy but ran quickly over Habib's visit on 4 October and subsequent developments.

Habib

/That 2. In briefing Colombo, Habib said, despite the enormous difficulties in finding a way forward, there had been two positive developments: Amin Gemayel's election with Muslim support, and the departure of the Israelis from Beirut Airport, which in its small way had been a test of American determination. Colombo and Habib had agreed that while the Lebanese problem was small in itself compared to the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, it could poison the negotiating atmosphere and must therefore be solved if possible. Habib talked (the Italians thought over-optimistically) about the prospects of a start, at least, to Israeli and Syrian troop withdrawal from the Lebanon before the end of the year. The Americans would propose simultaneous and "autonomous" withdrawals i.e. no direct negotiations and the presentation of either withdrawal as a decision independently arrived at by the country concerned. But the Syrians were being very difficult.

Situation in Beirut


3. As you know, the Italian Government has been criticised in the press for letting its troops stand by while Lebanese forces raided the camps and took away Palestinians. The Ambassadors of the three troop contributing countries made a demarche to the Lebanese on 2 October. Moscato said they obtained some guarantees that future Lebanese police actions would respect certain principles: for example, the policemen must be in uniform, the names of those arrested must be taken down, their treatment would be humane and due legal process would be observed. The Italians hoped that these guarantees could be strengthened. But the real problem lay in Lebanese/Palestinian relations, and the Italians believed that the Lebanese government should negotiate with the PLO about the future of the Palestinian population in the Lebanon. Moscato gave me the attached copy of a MFA communique released yesterday which makes the same point. This will continue to remain a sensitive question here.

The Future

4. Moscato commented briefly that the Italians were now evaluating the multilateral force's mandate. On the one hand, the force was there to help the Lebanese restore their full sovereignty in the Beirut area; on the other, the references in the mandate to guaranteeing the safety of the civilian population could be construed more widely. I asked whether the Italians envisaged the use of their troops outside Beirut. Moscato replied that both the multilateral forces and UNIFIL could in principle be deployed as buffer forces once the Israelis and Syrians had begun to disengage. This



This ties in with Lagorio's comment, reported in the Italian press, to the effect that the Italians were prepared to make available more parachute troops in the context of any expansion of the multilateral forces role.

  
T L Richardson

9 October 1982



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ADNON TAVOR

Mr Wood  
WED

*Mr Young*

*You may like to glance at my minute. At 31/8*

*PKA/JS JB*

THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S IDEAS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

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1. With reference to your minute of 23 August to Mr Fearn regarding the ideas contained in Sr Colombo's message to the Secretary of State dated 17 August, following his South American tour. I think on balance we have every reason to share Sr Colombo's concern over the intention of certain South American countries to seek membership of the NAM. Traditionally most South American countries have seen themselves as an offshoot of Christian Western Europe and as defenders of Western values. As a result they have tended to align themselves with the US and Western Europe.

2. The current moves towards the NAM represent a rejection of this traditional approach in favour of a policy motivated by the belief that their interests will be better promoted by distancing themselves from the US and Europe and joining this Third World pressure group. Certain Latin American countries unfortunately appear to believe that there is more to be gained from a policy of confrontational pressure than by one of good relations.

3. I fear that Latin American association with NAM might well lead to it becoming a more effective pressure group without any corresponding benefit in terms of greater moderation. Linked to this move towards association with the NAM is a parallel initiative by certain Latin American countries to create an exclusive regional organisation which would largely supersede the OAS. This body would not include the US or the Anglophone Caribbean. Such moves are clearly designed to undermine the links with the West and to diminish Western influence.

*Woods*

4. In the longer term I would not imagine that the US would have much cause for concern over greater European involvement in Latin America. Most of the difficulties so far have stemmed from German and French attitudes towards Central America. European countries have played a useful part in helping the US and Canada to encourage stability in the Caribbean and there is no reason why they should not make a similar, if less prominent, contribution in Latin America. The Americans have as much, if not more interest than we have in preventing any incursion in the region which the Russians would no doubt seek to exploit. And the US would clearly appreciate the EC taking on more of the aid burden which of course the majority of the EC countries are prepared to do, with the notable exception of the UK.

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5. We have good reasons for being seen to be in favour of encouraging a European view and a reinforced Euro-Latin American relationship. Such efforts enable us to harness the prestige and weight of the Community behind our own fence-mending exercises which, on our own, are likely to have a more limited impact. Such efforts might also be instrumental in dissuading some of the key Latin American

/countries



countries from following the NAM road and the proposal to set up some new exclusive regional body. The EC is now too important a trading partner of Latin America not to be taken seriously and so it has the ability to exercise such a role. However, given our own preoccupation with budgetary constraints it will be difficult for us to make a positive contribution. While we cannot risk the wrath of the Community in the wake of the Falklands crisis by openly opposing their fence-mending exercises, which they see as vital to restoring relations, we are nevertheless effectively undermining their efforts through our attitude to further aid to Central America. It will require a very delicate balancing act if we are to succeed in giving the appearance of supporting European efforts to improve relations with Latin America, while at the same time refusing to contribute to the cost. Our present stance seems to annoy both our EC Partners and the Latin Americans. Partly with this in mind we want every opportunity to be taken to reassure our European Partners that we intend to play a full role in restoring Western/European relations with Latin America. We are therefore including positive passages along these lines in the briefing for the forthcoming round of bilaterals between the Secretary of State's EC colleagues, and hope also to promote the insertion of an appropriate passage in the Presidency statement at the UN.

*R. J. Chase*

R J Chase  
South America Department  
233 4970

27 August 1982

Copy to: Sir J Bullard  
Mr Walden, Planning Staff  
Mr White, MCAD  
Mr Edwards, WIAD  
Mr Bone, ECD (E)

29

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23 AUG 1982

DESK OFFICER: [Signature]

INDEX: [Signature]

REGISTRY: [Signature]

Non-Tolson

Mr Fearn, SAMD

LATIN AMERICA

27

1. Sir Julian Bullard mentioned in his minute of 18 August that he would be interested to know what departments thought of the Italian Foreign Minister's ideas as expressed in his message of 17 August to the Secretary of State. This is more for you than for me, but I wonder if you might like to take account of two points:

26A

- (a) Colombo is no doubt preaching to the converted when he says that Latin America should be kept as part of the Western family and implies there are dangers in a drift towards the non-aligned movement. There might however be something to be said for having more moderate members in the NAM and there are dangers in our building up our relationship with the area as a sort of surrogate for the United States. The Americans would no doubt be happy enough with increased European aid but might find the increased determination by the Europeans to play a political role awkward. One has only to think of French policies towards Central American countries to illustrate the point. We in Europe already have our differences with the Americans over the Middle East, which is much more important to us.
- (b) The 'Euro-Latin American relationship' only exists in very general terms. It is probably more real for Italy than the UK which has more particular interests (eg Belize and Guyana as well as the Falklands). Even so Europe has a different relationship with the different countries of the area (eg Chile or Brazil) and there are obvious problems about subordinating our particular interests and concerns to a generalised ideal.

*A M Wood*

23 August 1982

A M Wood  
Western European Department

cc. Sir J Bullard  
Mr Walden, Planning Staff

RESTRICTED

28  
 P/B  
 Within Foreign Policy.  
 R/S  
 2/10



British Embassy  
 Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

R M Jackson Esq  
 SAAD  
 FCC

REC'D	0211 HY
23 AUG 1982	
REGISTRY	
Action Taken	
✓	DS

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 August 1982

See Jackson,

COLOMBO'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA: COMMUNITY BRIEFING

1. The MFA briefed us yesterday on Colombo's visit. They apologised for the delay (Colombo returned to Rome on 11 August); they had been waiting for the head of the MFA's Latin American division, who accompanied Colombo, to return but he was still in Chile. It was not a very exciting briefing, but I report it because it fills in one or two gaps in our telno 419 and in my letter to you of 12 August.
2. The MFA said that Colombo's main objective in visiting Peru, Brazil and Argentina had been to build bridges between Latin America and the West, to help avert the growth of isolationist foreign policies in the region and (in Argentina) to encourage a return to democracy. They played down the bilateral aspects of Colombo's visit, though doubtless these featured prominently.
3. In Peru, Colombo found the President and Foreign Minister anxious to get over this awkward phase in European/Latin American relations as soon as possible. Both in Peru and Brazil, there was some loose talk of forming a separate association of the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries of the region, on the grounds that unity of action within the OAS was hampered by the US and Caribbean presence, and that Washington would heed Latin views more if the latter spoke with a united voice. The Peruvians stressed, however, that they wanted the OAS to remain in being and hoped for better relations with the Americans. On the Falklands, they recognised that a UN resolution this autumn affirming Argentine sovereignty over the Islands would be counter-productive; on the face of it, this seems to distance the Peruvians somewhat from the current Mexican initiative (see below). They favoured the resumption of negotiations between the Argentines and ourselves, but without any predetermined outcome.
4. The Brazilians told Colombo that they had been completely taken by surprise by the Argentine invasion, not least because the Argentines had announced only shortly before that they wanted to prompt a UN initiative designed to speed up the negotiations. Their policy had been dictated by their wish both to safeguard Argentine/Brazilian relations and to maintain the best possible relations with us. The Brazilians did not believe that the

/present



present situation in the Islands could last long; the maintenance of UK troops there could only be a transitional arrangement, and there would have to be a "gradual political opening". In the forthcoming GA the Brazilians would like a text which urged negotiations on both sides, entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of mediation, and cited previous Security Council and GA resolutions. On the other hand, they would be opposed to specific references to decolonisation and sovereignty, which would lead to a lot of confusion, would not contribute to a solution and upset European/Latin American relations. Colombo said that any text should refer only to past Security Council (and not GA) resolutions. Nor would it help to talk about decolonisation or to quote the non-aligned text.

5. More generally, the Brazilians shared the Peruvian view that the crisis had not produced a lasting rift between Europe and Latin America. There were problems, but they had existed long before the crisis. Relations with Washington would be trickier to restore. There was no Brazilian interest in a purely Latin American regional organisation; in particular, the Brazilians did not want to isolate the Anglophone Caribbean.

6. Colombo spent 3 days in Argentina. He met the mothers of some of the "disappeared" at the Italian Ambassador's residence. He also saw representatives of the parties and talked to the press. The meeting with the mothers had been the price that the Argentines had been asked to pay for Colombo's visit; but the Italians expect the Argentine military to insist that the cases of the "disappeared" be well and truly buried as a condition for returning power to the civilians. The Argentines apparently said that they were considering freeing political prisoners whose trials were still pending.

7. Colombo found the Argentines very worried about Central America. While they believed that political solutions in, for example, Salvador must emerge from within the countries themselves, they advocated outside support for any such solutions once reached, mentioning in this connection the Europeans, Mexico and Venezuela. They did not believe that Cuba was directly responsible for what was happening in Central America, though undoubtedly it had profited. They were worried about recent changes in Bolivia. On inter-American links, the Argentines said that Panama had pressed for a meeting of Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Foreign Ministers only, to set up some form of consultative organisation. The Argentines commented that they would like to strengthen Latin American unity, but not at the expense of relations with the Americans and Caribbean countries. They were opposed to the creation of new organisations.

8. Turning to the Falklands, the Argentines predictably told Colombo that they would persist in their claim of sovereignty.

/They gave



-3-

They gave him two drafts, the first of a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the inscription of the Falklands item on the agenda of the GA (as distinct, I assume, from the agenda of the Fourth Committee); and a Mexican draft resolution which cited previous Assembly, Security Council and non-aligned resolutions. I assume you already have this; if not please let me know and I will try to extract a copy. They confirmed that they would not negotiate bilaterally with Britain, but wanted negotiations in New York under the Secretary-General's auspices. Colombo made it clear that the Italians disagreed with these tactics. He repeated that any Assembly text should be confined to underlining the desirability of a resumption of negotiations, with a mandate for the Secretary-General but no specific references to previous resolutions (I am not sure whether he included SCR.502 and 505 in this context). Otherwise, Colombo said, the Argentines would find it hard to achieve wide support.

9. We were given a copy of the letter Colombo sent to his Community colleagues, including ourselves, on 14 August. No doubt you have already received it from the Italian Embassy in London. The MFA said vaguely that they expected to put forward some ideas for the handling of the Falklands question at the UN at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen on 9 September. On the assumption that Colombo will still be able to see Mr Pym in London on 7 September, you will have an opportunity to disabuse Colombo of any wild ideas for a consensus resolution.

10. Finally, I should record that according to the MFA there was no discussion in Buenos Aires of the arms embargo. We all greeted this news with some incredulity. I limited myself to saying that we certainly hoped that there would be an opportunity early in September for serious Community discussion of the handling of the New York debate before our partners took any firm decisions, and reminded the meeting that we had often abstained on or voted against Argentine-inspired resolutions in the past because of the references they made to previous, unacceptable, resolutions of the Assembly. The MFA said that Colombo had made it clear to the Argentines that European/Latin American relations could be set back by a messy UN debate.

*Yours ever*  
*T L Richardson*  
 T L Richardson

cc: BIS, BUENOS AIRES

Chanceries: BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN,  
 WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS

R P Osborne, WED, FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

Rel per (27)

(message benefit too)

I have commented to Mr Giffard my work to see

19/8 (29)

Mr Giffard

- cc Mr Ure o.r.
- ECD(E)
- UND
- MCAD
- WED ✓
- ERD
- Mr Walden
- SAmD

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1 AUG 1982	
REGISTRY	ACTION TAKEN

*Handwritten: 18/8, 20/8, 21/8, 24/8*

This is not priority for WFO.

23/8

(20)

LATIN AMERICA

1. We spoke about the Italian Foreign Minister's message of 17 August to the Secretary of State.
2. As regards Argentina and the Falklands Islands, we agreed that the draft message being prepared for the Secretary of State to send to his colleagues in the Ten should refer (politely) to Colombo's message, but should explain the limitations on our ability to accept the concept of a 'dialogue between London and Buenos Aires in the framework of the United Nations' - a concept which seems self-evidently right to Colombo. The drafting of this message is going to be tricky and I should like the opportunity to contribute.
3. At slightly greater leisure, I should be interested to know what you and departments think of Colombo's other ideas, some of them more substantial than is often the case in these Ministerial messages; eg the tendency of Latin American governments to edge toward the non-aligned movement (para 1), the prospects for 're-launching the Euro-Latin American relationship' (also para 1) and the suggestion that the Ten should shoulder part of the economic burden in that region (para 5).
4. Separately, or as part of the same exercise, we shall have to consider how far we can go along with Colombo's thoughts about contributing to a perspective of political equilibrium in Central America (para 6). Incidentally, the Chargé d'Affaires at the American Embassy told me yesterday that he presumed that the bullish piece in the New York Herald Tribune about the improving situation in Central America was an attempt by the Latino lobby in Washington to rally support for President Reagan's Caribbean initiative, which threatened to run into the rocks for lack of funds.

75

18 August 1982

J L Bullard

CONFIDENTIAL



Ambasciata d'Italia a Londra

Il Ministro

London, 17th August 1982.

S. Am D

PS

PS/M constans

PS/POS

Sir J. Bullard

Mr. Giffard

ECO (E)

UND

UED

ERD

MCAO

7650

Dear Foreign Secretary,

In the absence of Ambassador Cagiati, at present in Scotland, I take pleasure in enclosing, herewith, a message addressed to you by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Emilio Colombo.

Please believe me, very sincerely  
yours  
Luigi Fontana Giusti

Luigi M. Fontana Giusti,  
Minister.

WD 0211	
RECEIVED	
19 AUG 1982	
INDEX	REGISTRY
INDEX	Action Taken
	10/12/82
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The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, M.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

encl.

26A

130

2A

3A

JKH  
18/8

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE ET CHER COLLEGE,

DE RETOUR D'UN VOYAGE EN AMERIQUE LATINE, QUI M'A CONDUIT AU PEROU, AU BRESIL ET EN ARGENTINE, JE DESIRE FAIRE PART A VOUS-MEME COMME AUX AUTRES COLLEGUES DE LA COMMUNAUTE, DE QUELQUES REFLXIONS ET APPRECIATIONS QUI POURRONT, JE PENSE, / <sup>ETRE</sup> DE QUELQUE UTILITE POUR LE TRAVAIL COMMUN DANS LE CADRE <sup>DE</sup> COOPERATION POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE. A LIMA, OUTRE J'AI REUNIS EN / TOUS LES AMBASSADEURS ITALIENS AUPRES DES ETATS LATINO-AMERICAINS ET J'AI PU AINSI OBTENIR UNE VUE D'ENSEMBLE DE LA SITUATION DANS LA REGION.

1. LE PROBLEME D'UNE RELANCE DU RAPPORT EURO-LATINO-AMERICAIN APRES LE CONFLIT DES FALKLANDS EST PARTOUT RESSENTI VIVEMENT. IL EST VIVEMENT RESSENTI, DIRAIS-JE, EN TERMES A LA FOIS POLEMQUES ET CONSTRUCTIFS, EN CE SENS QU'IL EXISTE DES RESSENTIMENTS ET DES MALENTENDUS, MAIS QU'IL EXISTE EN MEME TEMPS UNE FORTE VOLONTE DE DIALOGUE. SUR LES RESSENTIMENTS DERIVANT DU CONFLIT POURRAIT PREVALOIR (BIEN ENTENDU AVEC DE PLUS GRANDES DIFFICULTES EN ARGENTINE) - IL ME SEMBLE - LA FERME RESOLUTION DE DONNER ENFIN LE DEPART A UN RAPPORT QUI DEVIENNE PLUS POLITIQUE ET QUI SOIT PLUS SUIVI ET PLUS INTENSE, ENTRE LES DIX ET LE MONDE LATINO-AMERICAIN. IL FAUT VEILLER TRES ATTENTIVEMENT A UNE TENDANCE QUI SE MANIFESTE AU VENEZUELA, ET PLUS RECEMMENT AUSSI EN COLOMBIE, EN FAVEUR D'UNE PLUS GRANDE INTEGRATION DE CES PAYS DANS LE MOUVEMENT DES NON-ALIGNES. IL N'Y A PAS D'IDEES PRECISES SUR LES MODALITES DE RELANCE DU RAPPORT EURO-LATINO-AMERICAIN, MAIS L'ON S'ATTEND CERTAINEMENT A LA FORMULATION DE PROPOSITIONS DE LA PART DES DIX ET, EN TOUS CAS, A UNE PRESENCE ET UNE ATTENTION PLUS GRANDES QUE PAR LE PASSE. JE PENSE QUE MEME LES VOIES BILATERALES DONT DISPOSE CHACUN DE NOUS SONT UTILES: MAIS IL EST NECESSAIRE DE NOUS COORDONNER D'AVANTAGE. C'EST UN DESIR DE TOUS, MAIS PARTICULIEREMENT ESPLICITE AU BRESIL; PAYS QUI ME PARAIT DECIDE A ASSUMER TOUJOURS PLUS NETTEMENT LE ROLE ET LES RESPONSABILITES QUI LUI REVIENTENT.

2. PERSONNE N'A DISSIMULE LA PREOCCUPATION AVEC LAQUELLE ON CONSIDERE LA DETERIORATION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES ETATS-UNIS.

ELQUES-UNS DES ASPECTS DU COMPORTEMENT AMERICAIN AU COURS DE LA CRISE RECENTE ONT ETE RESSENTIS PLUS ENCORE QUE LA SOLIDARITE COMMUNAUTAIRE AVEC LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE. A TORT OU A RAISON, ON AVAIT COMPTE SUR UNE SOLIDARITE INTERAMERICAINE QUI AURAIT PREVALU SUR TOUTE AUTRE CONSIDERATION.

3. L'ARGENTINE CONSTITUE NATURELLEMENT UN CAS PARTICULIER. LE PROCESSUS D'ACHEMINEMENT VERS LA DEMOCRATIE ME SEMBLE SUR. TOUTEFOIS, EN RAISON DES TRES SERIEUSES CONDITIONS ECONOMIQUES, FINANCIERES ET SOCIALES ACTUELLES, ET DU PROBLEME QUE REPRESENTE LA GRAVE BLESSURE INFLIGEE A SON ORGUEIL NATIONAL, LA TACHE DE FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES N'APPARAIT PAS FACILE. CELLES-CI, EN OUTRE, APRES AVOIR ETE LONGTEMPS ELOIGNEES DES PROBLEMES CONCRETS, AURONT INDUBITABLEMENT DES DIFFICULTES A ASSUMER LES DURES RESPONSABILITES ACTUELLES QUI S'IMPOSENT POUR TRACER LE CHEMIN VERS UNE REPRISE DU PAYS.

4. TOUJOURS EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'ARGENTINE, LE PROBLEME SE POSE EN OUTRE DES INITIATIVES QUE BUENOS AIRES ENTEND PROMOUVOIR AU COURS DE LA PROCHAINE ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ONU. AVEC L'APPUI D'AUTRES PAYS LATINO-AMERICAINS (DONT PRINCIPALEMENT, DANS CETTE PHASE, CELUI DU MEXIQUE) L'ARGENTINE VISE A UNE RESOLUTION QUI, DE QUELQUE FACON, EQUILIBRERAIT, AUX YEUX DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE, LA GRAVE DEFAITE QU'ELLE A SUBIE. J'AI ETE TRES FRANC. J'AI DIT QUE DU COTE ITALIEN, MALGRE LES DEGATS CAUSES PAR L'INADMISSIBLE COUP DE FORCE ARGENTIN, ON POUVAIT CERTES SOUHAITER UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE ENTRE LONDRES ET BUENOS AIRES QUI SE PREVAUDRAIT DU CADRE DES NATIONS UNIES. MAIS J'AI AJOUTE QU'IL NE ME SEMBLAIT PAS ACCEPTABLE DU COTE EUROPEEN QUE L'ON PRETENDRE DONNER, MOYENNANT UNE RESOLUTION DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE, DES INDICATIONS PREJUDICIELLES ET DE NATURE A CONSTITUER UN ENGAGEMENT SUR LES OBJECTIFS DU DIALOGUE TOUCHANT AU FUTUR DE L'ARCHIPEL DES FALKLANDS. JE PENSE QUE DU COTE EUROPEEN IL EST NECESSAIRE DE SUIVRE DE PRES L'EVOLUTION DE CE DEBAT, SOIT A BUENOS AIRES, SOIT DANS LES AUTRES CAPITALES LATINO-AMERICAINES, ET AUSSI POUR EMPECHER QU'EN SEPTEMBRE PROCHAIN NE SE DETERMINE UNE

NOUVELLE SITUATION DE FORTE POLEMIQUE DANS LE CADRE OCCIDENTAL, QUI VERRAIT L'EUROPE ET L'AMERIQUE LATINE SUR DES LIGNES OPPOSEES. NOUS DEVONS, A MON AVIS, FAIRE TOUT LE POSSIBLE POUR EVITER CELA, OU TOUT AU MOINS POUR ATTENUER AU MAXIMUM, DANS UN ESPRIT DE LOYAUTE RECIPROQUE ENTRE EUROPEENS ET LATINO-AMERICAINS ET DE COMPREHENSION DES POSITIONS RESPECTIVES, LES RIPERCUSSIONS NEGATIVES D'UNE TELLE POLEMIQUE.

5. JE CROIS QUE NOUS DEVONS AUSSI REFLECHIR A CE QU'IL NOUS CONVIENT DE FAIRE EN FACE DES SERIEUX PROBLEMES ECONOMIQUES ET FINANCIERS DES PAYS LATINO-AMERICAINS. LES DIX, CERTES, NE DOIVENT PAS S'EN FAIRE UNE CHARGE EXCLUSIVE, MAIS IL NE ME SEMBLE PAS SAGE D'IGNORER LA SITUATION NI DU POINT DE VUE POLITIQUE, NI POUR CE QUI A TRAIT AUX INTERETS IMPORTANTS DE CHACUN DE NOUS EN AMERIQUE LATINE.

6. DANS LE CADRE LATINO-AMERICAIN, LE PROBLEME PARTICULIER DES ETATS DE L'AMERIQUE CENTRALE SE FAIT TOUJOURS PLUS AIGU ET PLUS CONFUS. IL Y A <sup>LE</sup> RISQUE QUE SUR LES TENSIONS ET DIFFICULTES LOCALES NE VIENNE SE GREFFER, PLUS DANGEREUSEMENT ENCORE QUE JUSQU'A PRESENT, LA TEMATIQUE DE LA CONFRONTATION EST-OUEST. JE CROIS DONC QU'IL EST NECESSAIRE DE REPRENDRE L'ARGUMENT ENTRE LES DIX, EN CHERCHANT A SOLLICITER ET A CONTRIBUER AUX EFFORTS DES AUTRES PAYS EN MÊME SURE DE LE FAIRE (ETATS UNIS, MEXIQUE, VENEZUELA, CANADA), EFFORTS DESTINES A OFFRIR UNE PERSPECTIVE D'EQUILIBRE POLITIQUE, TOUT AU MOINS POUR LES PAYS DE L'AMERIQUE CENTRALE ENCORE SUSCEPTIBLES D'EN FAIRE LEUR PROPOS.

VEUILLEZ CROIRE, MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE ET CHER AMI,

EMILIO COLOMBO.

Europe (26)  
Italy/Libya  
LW 10/8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 4134

J M Edes Esq CMG

TRIPOLI

Your reference

Our reference

Date 3 August 1982

WR 2021	
10 AUG 1982	
Taken	DS

Dear Ambassador,

BBC PANORAMA INVESTIGATION: "MURDER IN THE AIR"

1. I am enclosing an extract from last week's "Listener" containing the transcript of a "Panorama" investigation broadcast on 26 July about the destruction in June 1980 of an Italian airliner with 81 people on board. The programme concluded that the aircraft had been hit by a radar guided air-to-air missile, fired by an unidentified fighter aircraft, and ended with a finger pointing very firmly in Libya's direction.

2. The People's Bureau in London have complained in a note verbale of yet another BBC/CIA plot to discredit the Jamahiriya, and we have replied along standard lines reminding the Libyans of BBC editorial independence (copies of exchange of notes to Tripoli only).

3. In the course of the programme the reporter, Tom Mangold, said that the results of the BBC investigation were being made available to the Italian investigators. Although some British experts were interviewed on the programme, we are not, I understand formally involved in assisting the Italian authorities. Clearly any British contribution to an Italian report which blamed Libya for the crash could damage our fragile relations and it would be helpful if Rome could keep an eye on this point.

Yours ever,

Dave Roycroft

D A Roycroft  
Near East and  
North Africa Department

cc: N W Browne Esq, MAED  
N Armour, Esq, WED  
Chancery, ROME (with encl)

# THE LISTENER

MARVELL HOUSE, HIGH STREET, LONDON W1  
TELEPHONE: 01-560 5577  
29 JULY 1982 VOL 108 No 2771

## Tom Mangold: The Italian air crash mystery

'Life goes on' cover is meant for  
and Dean's story about old age and the  
ing of his documentary based on a  
tric ward in a Balham hospital. He  
that by the year 2000 there will be  
million Britons over 70 and the number  
0-year-olds will have increased by a  
However, Peter Brookes' drawing,  
d on the famous shoe advertisement,  
perhaps refer to other articles in this  
John Cole's political commentary  
the end of the summer term at West-  
er perhaps, or Robert Burchfield's  
on the history of slang, 'Dustbin  
es', or even Michael Meacher's analysis  
dia bias. At a pinch, it could have been  
for the distinguished Langham  
at Malcolm Muggeridge, now happily  
ing his 80th year. R.T.

# Murder, at 25,000 feet, by person or persons unknown

### NEWS

the Italian air crash mystery  
Tom Mangold  
end of term report John Cole  
Life goes on ...

Michael Dean  
Main economic options Will Hutton  
The Pleasurers—If Palating  
Ernest Levin  
Personal view of the woman in Islam  
Sadia Afif  
Sustina Words Robert Burchfield  
The Great Groundnut Scandal  
Roger Clark  
Langham Diary Malcolm Muggeridge  
News bias Michael Meacher  
Letters to the Editor  
Entrepreneur Julian Critchley  
The Art of the Air

### SPORTS

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Flight, John Valzey, Paul Johnson,  
Argentis Laski

### REVIEWS

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The Christopher Reid  
The Culum MacDonald  
Research Peter Fiddick

## THE LISTENER GUIDE

Features Peter Lennon  
The Michael Poole  
The Derwent May  
The Gavin Millar  
The Waves Roger Green  
The Barry Took  
The word

Russell Twisk  
EDITOR: Richard Gilbert  
BY EDITOR: Derwent May  
ART EDITOR: Michael Poole  
TODAY: Mary Gibson (editor)  
IN Fearnside, Deborah Hartley  
NEXT TO EDITOR: Timothy Moore  
STATION SALES MANAGER: Gordon Nixon  
ILLUSTRATION: Peter Brookes, with  
acknowledgement to Startrite Limited

**A**t 15 seconds before 9pm on Friday,  
27 June 1980, 81 men, women and children  
aboard an internal Italian flight en route  
to Palermo were murdered at 25,000 feet  
by person or persons unknown. To this  
day, the killer remains free; no official  
report has yet been published, and no  
detective has yet been ordered to investi-  
gate the crime. As time drags on, clues  
are vanishing, witnesses' memories fading,  
and public concern evaporating. Yet the  
destruction of Itavia flight IH 870 remains  
one of the most macabre murder mysteries  
of our time, with serious implications for  
airline passengers everywhere. If a British  
Airways Trident had been shot down with  
the loss of 81 souls, one might reasonably  
have expected some sharp answers pretty  
quickly.

IH 870, a DC9 jet, left Bologna in north-  
ern Italy on a routine flight to Palermo,  
Sicily. It was just after 8pm GMT. The  
plane carried 77 passengers and a crew  
of four. The official passenger list indicates  
only Italian names, and a subsequent check  
by the Italian secret service reportedly  
concludes that no unusual or distinguished  
passenger was on board.

IH 870's route took it south across Italy,  
and under Rome airport's modern and  
efficient radar control it joined a major  
air route, 'Upper Amber 13', for its short  
journey across the Tyrrhenian Sea to  
Sicily. About 120 miles out, at the limit  
of Rome radar's operating ability, IH 870  
was switched, as is normal, to radio control  
only. Surprisingly, the southern Tyrrhenian  
Sea does not have radar control for civilian  
flights. At 8.56pm, the pilot asked for  
permission to begin his descent. He was  
cleared to drop to 11,000 feet, but failed  
to acknowledge that clearance. For some  
eight minutes IH 870 was repeatedly called,  
without success. At six minutes past nine,  
a full emergency was called.

The following dawn, rescue helicopters

found some of the bodies (there were 10  
survivors), some of the plane's seat cushions,  
a few bits and pieces of metal, and  
much more. That's all that remained of  
IH 870. The rest had sunk 10,000 feet  
beneath the waves, where it remains.

Later, the computer records of Rome air-  
port radar showed precisely what had hap-  
pened to the DC9. The plane was seen  
on course, at 25,000 feet, when, suddenly,  
just before 9pm, the clear radar signal  
broke up, to be replaced by a series of  
tiny fragmented readings which drifted  
slowly eastwards with the prevailing jet-  
stream. IH 870 had exploded.

The obvious causes for the catastrophe  
were either that the plane had suffered  
a massive structural failure and disint-  
tegrated, or that it had collided with an-  
other plane, or that a bomb had exploded  
on board. One further element, peculiar  
to the location, needed to be considered.  
The area, bounded very roughly by Rome  
to the north, Sicily to the south and Sar-  
dinia to the west, is infested by NATO  
fighters, warplanes, bases and exercise  
areas. The US Sixth Fleet aircraft-carriers  
also fly armed fighters in the area. 'There  
is' said one Luftwaffe pilot to me, 'a hell  
of a lot of iron up there at any time.'

Following the disaster, two formal in-  
vestigations began. Dr Carlo Luzzatti, the  
deputy head of Alghero airport in Sardinia,  
was placed in charge of the technical in-  
vestigation, and Dr Giorgio Santacroce, a  
leading Rome magistrate, is in charge of  
the judicial inquiry. Luzzatti must conclude  
what happened, Santacroce must establish  
culpability. Then, and only then, will  
Italian detectives open their notebooks.

Although Luzzatti's work still remains  
unfinished, he did reach one or two key

Tom Mangold reported on the Italian air crash  
mystery for last Monday's 'Panorama' (BBC).  
The producer was Jane Drabble.

conclusions about the death of IH 870. Despite the lack of forensic evidence, some precious clues were yielded by the corpses, the seat cushions and the metallic debris. Luzzatti established that there had been no structural disintegration of the DC9, nor had it been involved in a collision. He did establish that the plane had disintegrated as the result of an explosion either inside or outside the jet.


Luzzatti came to London, to the prestigious Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE). He brought a few pieces of metal from the crash, including rivet heads found inside seat cushions and bodies. The DC9's skin is riveted from the inside, so the rivet heads are on the inside—how could they fly off into a body or a seat cushion unless there had been an explosion outside the plane? He carried more metal fragments, examined but not analysed in London. Several came from outside the plane, reinforcing the strong feeling of British air accident investigators (who were informally consulted) that there had been an explosion outside the plane.

Some clever scientific detection by Luzzatti's men produced two vital clues. First, a tiny piece of Sellotape, identifiably from a plastic tray always kept in the plane's galley, was found buried inside a passenger seat cushion. The tape had been blasted by an explosion from the galley (which is right behind the cockpit in a DC9) up the cabin aisle and into a seat cushion. This places the source of the explosion in the galley area on the starboard side of the plane. That's hardly the place for a terrorist to leave a bomb. Secondly, a small piece of crystal-clear plastic was found in a body. According to Douglas Higgs, head of Forensic Investigations at RARDE, this could only have come from the plane's window or window-protector—more evidence indicating an explosion from outside the plane blowing debris inside.

Indeed, RARDE has pioneered the science of explosions inside planes at its top-secret laboratories in south-east London. It is now relatively easy to prove an on-board explosion even from very little debris. No such evidence has been found by the Italian investigators.

But it was when Dr Luzzatti and his team moved to Washington that the first sensational break developed. They carried with them the full computer tape record of Rome radar shortly before and after the DC9 crash. Although Rome radar was operationally out of its range, it was still automatically and clearly recording events beyond that operational range.

There are basically two kinds of radar. Primary radar is the system by which a beam is sent into the sky, and when it strikes a plane, it bounces back, giving a definable echo or blip to the radar operator, who sees that on his screen. Primary radar tells you there's something out there, it indicates speed and direction, but not much else. Secondary radar is more sophisticated, and involves a plane deliberately identifying itself as it flies, by sending signals to ground radar stations. This is, for example, how commercial jets are



Dr Transue (left) and Tom Mangold examine radar blips indicating the presence of a 'malign' fighter close to the doomed DC9

accurately tracked as they fly. When a plane sends these signals it's said in the trade to be 'squawking'.

The Rome radar tape was formally handed to the US National Air Transport Safety Board in Washington for analysis. A senior Performance Engineer, John Macidull, was assigned to the task. What he found on the tape quickly shattered the already weakened 'bomb' theory, and opened up a whole new can of worms.

Macidull saw the DC9 squawking its way, south and on course, but he also saw something else. He discovered three primary radar blips close to the DC9. The first appeared behind and to starboard of the DC9, at one minute and 34 seconds before the explosion, the second appears 29 seconds later, still slightly behind, still to starboard, but now catching up and only 15 miles away, and the third blip appears 12 seconds after the jet exploded, about five and a half miles to starboard and closing.

John Macidull, himself a former fighter pilot with the USAF, had not the slightest doubt what he was looking at. He considered the three separate blips to represent the movement of one flying object. In his official report he concluded: 'An unidentified object traversed the area of the accident site from west to east at a high rate of speed at approximately the same time as the accident occurrence... the accident aircraft and the unidentified object were separated by several miles at the time of the accident.' And then, for good measure, he made the following melodramatic point: 'At the time of the accident and according to the radar information, the unidentified object west of the accident site was coming out of the sun in the direction of the accident aircraft, and the accident aircraft was looking into the sun (my italics) in the direction of the object.'

The identity of that flying object has never, to this day, been established. No pilot has ever come forward and admitted that it was his plane on some harmless mission. No NATO airforce has any record of any plane in that area at that time. Most NATO fighters fly in pairs anyway. Since any pilot involved in an innocent

flight would not hesitate to admit he was the 'unidentified object' on the radar plot, and as no one has come forward, logic alone dictates two assumptions. First, there is a direct link between the unidentified object and the demise of the DC9; secondly, the presence of the unidentified object, an object with all the parameters of a modern military fighter, was malign.

Dr John Transue is a small, tidy man with a penchant for the pedantic and a huge weakness for Austin Healey sports cars. His old model looks incongruous parked beside the black staff Cadillacs and Lincolns of the Pentagon top brass in Washington. Dr Transue was until recently the Director of Air Warfare at the US Department of Defence. Today, he is still a Pentagon consultant with his own office in the famous building.

We asked Dr Transue to examine all the available evidence surrounding the crash of the DC9, and specifically to analyse in detail the official computer-generated radar print-out which led to Macidull's discoveries. It is one thing to spot a 'zombie', as the trade calls suspicious unidentified objects, but it is another thing to prove a direct relationship between a zombie and the deliberate murder of 81 people.

Dr Transue took the evidence and computed an enormously complex series of facts and figures from the radar plot: heights, speeds, closing speeds, relative distances, missile speeds, optimum firing ranges—the whole boggling arithmetic that surrounds the science of tactical air warfare. His conclusions were decoded for us with stark simplicity. Assuming the flying object was near the DC9 for malign reasons, then:

- (1) The flying object displayed the precise characteristics of a modern jet fighter.
- (2) Its approaches and turns relative to the DC9 were classically the tactics of a fighter on an attack manoeuvre.
- (3) As the fighter closed on the hapless civilian airliner, it must have fired its missile to strike, or explode very close to, the starboard side of the DC9.
- (4) The attack must have been deliberate. The only air-to-air missile which qualifies for this attack would have been what is called a semi-active radar homing guidance missile. To fire this, the attacking pilot must first acquire his target by radar, 'illuminate' the target with his radar beam, then send his missile down that beam until it strikes. He must, therefore, consciously keep illuminating, or holding, the target for the entire duration of the missile flight—some 30 to 40 seconds. That positively rules out an accidental firing.

Who and why?

A deliberate attack should rule out any NATO fighter, or indeed any fighter from the Sixth Fleet carrier (then the USS *Saratoga*, in Naples port all day on the day; no flying took place at all). Anyway, missiles must be accounted for to a whole raft of officers; to lose one or misfire one is a very serious offence. These things cannot, in my experience anyway, be covered up very easily. Every NATO nation that flies the area has formally denied to the Italians (and again to us) having any planes in the area at that time. → 18



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← 3 Coincidentally, three weeks after the crash, a Libyan airforce Russian-built MIG 23 invaded Italian airspace (it was probably spying), slipping under the ageing military radar at Marsala in Sicily, and eventually crashing at Castelsilano in southern Italy.

In a long and revealing statement, read into the official American congressional record last December, Dr Vittoriofranco Pisano, a senior Foreign Law specialist in the European Law Division of the Library of Congress, catalogued a complex series of violent events between Italy and Libya, particularly in 1980-81. Libyan murder squads alone, operating in Italy and Sicily, assassinated five Libyan political exiles. There have been real political strains between both countries. Although none of this is in any way evidence in terms of the DC9 disaster—indeed, the Libyans have also formally denied that their planes were anywhere near the DC9 at the time of the explosion—it would be necessary to programme that political tension into any assessment of possible motive. Fighter planes are run by governments after all. Of course, any hostile or equally unaccountable airforce might have been involved.

Perhaps it would be a little cynical to wonder why the official Italian investigation still drags on after two years. These things do take time, but there is a growing restlessness, especially among Italian airline pilots, for more answers, and more answers now. ANPAC, the Italian Airline Pilots' Association, now blacks Upper Amber 13 whenever there are military exercises in the area. One plane has turned back, others have refused to take off, several have demanded rerouting on the flight to Sicily. And now, IFALPA, the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations, has warned its members around the world to follow the lead of their Italian colleagues.

But it's not crowded and ill-controlled airspace or reckless military manoeuvring that did for the 81 people on the Itavia jet. If, as now seems most probable, an unarmed Italian airliner was deliberately shot down in Italian airspace by a murderer in a fighter plane, and the Italians are actually unable to establish who or why, then it is possible the official report may take even longer before dropping on the relevant Minister's desk in Rome.

Ultimately, given that the wreckage of the plane (and the answers) lies too deep for easy salvage, and given that two full years have now drawn a cloak over whatever dreadful passion caused the tragedy, it is not inconceivable that the final report will simply record some anodyne verdict. The real truth may just be too hard to come by, and too inconvenient to bear. We shall see.

The set of eight back numbers of THE LISTENER containing Joseph Hone's series, 'Russian Roundabout', is now available from BBC Publications, 144 Bermondsey Street, London SE1 3TH. £4.00, post free.

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FM ROME 060840Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO. 408 OF 06 AUG 82

WRD 02111	
- 9 AUG 1982	
INDEX	SYSTEM
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TELCON McCLEARY/CULSHAW: ITALY/SOUTH AMERICA

1. ITALIAN VIP VISITS TO SOUTH AMERICA SINCE 1980 INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING (OUR FILES MAY NOT BE COMPLETE, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN TIME TO CONSULT MFA):

NOVEMBER 1980	URUGUAY	PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION
JANUARY 1981	VENEZUELA	COLOMBO (FOREIGN MINISTER)
JANUARY 1981	ECUADOR	GUNELLA (MFA JUNIOR MINISTER)
MARCH/APRIL 1981	MEXICO,	STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT
	COLOMBIA,	PERTINI, ACCOMPANIED BY
	COSTA RICA	COLOMBO
AUGUST 1982	PERU, BRAZIL,	VISIT BY COLOMBO (SEE ROME
	ARGENTINA	TELEGRAM NO. 408)

2. IN THE OTHER DIRECTION, OUR RECORDS SHOW ONLY A VISIT BY ZAMBRANO VALASCO, FOREIGN MINISTER OF VENEZUELA, IN MARCH 1982.
3. ITALY MAINTAINS CLOSE LINKS WITH SOUTH AMERICA IN MANY OTHER WAYS. VISITS AT A LOWER LEVEL ARE FREQUENT, BY INDUSTRIALISTS, ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS, PARLIAMENTARIANS AND UNION LEADERS. THERE IS AN ACTIVE ITALY/LATIN AMERICA INSTITUTE IN ROME, FUNDED BY THE MFA.
4. ITALIAN IMPORTS FROM THE AREA IN 1980 WERE POUNDS 1.15 BILLION AND EXPORTS WERE POUNDS 1.05 BILLION; THE 1981 FIGURES WERE POUNDS 2.3 BILLION AND POUNDS 1.64 BILLION RESPECTIVELY, A VERY MARKED INCREASE. THE STRENGTH OF THE BUSINESS LOBBY DURING THE FALKLANDS CRISIS SHOWED HOW IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH AMERICA ARE TO SOME ITALIAN FIRMS.
5. ITALY'S BILATERAL AID REMAINS LOW: 1980 FIGURES WERE AS FOLLOWS (WORLDWIDE TOTAL IN BRACKETS):

GRANTS	DOLLARS 7.8 MILLION (DOLLARS 101 MILLION)
TECHNICAL	DOLLARS 6.6 MILLION (DOLLARS 55 MILLION)

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*Europe*

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British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*When the new Austrian Ambassador first called on Mr Colombo he gave the impression that the Alto Adige presents a serious practical obstacle to further Italo-Austrian relations.*

R P Osborne Esq  
WED  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 3 August 1982

*RPB  
9/8*

<i>LR</i> → <i>0211</i>		
RECEIVED		
-9 AUG 1982		
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY		
INDEX	PA	Action Taken
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*Dear Roy,*

VISIT OF DR PAHR

1. Dr Pahr, the Austrian Foreign Minister, paid a working visit to Italy on 26/27 July and had talks with Colombo in Venice. This was to reciprocate Colombo's visit to Austria in September 1980. This letter is based on a downbeat Community briefing given by Vinci Giacchi of the MFA on 30 July, who was present at some of the talks.
2. The main subject discussed was the Alto Adige, but despite misleading press reports (which may suit Dr Pahr's domestic purposes) this did not take up much of the four hours of talks between the two Foreign Ministers. Colombo said the Italian Government were close to finalising a package of administrative measures which would implement in full the 1969 agreement; it should be ready before the end of this year. In September Magnago would see Spadolini to discuss the difficult outstanding issues of the use of German in local tribunals and the guaranteeing of ethnic rights under the Italian constitution. Colombo added that once the package was complete, Austria should take note of the measures and thus put an end to the controversy so that bilateral relations could improve. In reply, Dr Pahr was very correct, confirming that these matters were the responsibility of the Italian Government and that Austria was bound by the Copenhagen agreement. He was not prepared to put any pressure on the German speaking population to accept the package. Vinci Giacchi said that Dr Pahr seemed almost to be going through the motions of raising this subject with Colombo.
3. The two Ministers also discussed some minor bilateral problems concerning frontier traffic and relations between Italian and Austrian universities; the text of an agreement on the latter was finalised some months ago but has yet to be signed.

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- 2 -

4. The two Ministers also had a wide ranging discussion of world affairs. Vinci Giacchi described the four main topics as follows:

a) East/West

Colombo outlined the views of Schultz as he had heard them in Washington; detente depended on a resolution of the Polish crisis, and Jaruzelski's recent moves were not a sufficient indication of flexibility on the part of the regime. Colombo produced his standard line on the perils of dividing Europe from the United States, and ran through current problems over steel, interest rates, and the pipeline. Dr Pahr spoke in favour of continuing economic aid to Poland and said that to stop the Siberian pipeline would do no real damage to the USSR. It was dangerous to use the politics of confrontation when dealing with the Eastern bloc. He spoke enthusiastically about detente and said that the resurgence of Bulgarian nationalism was one of its fruits (Vinci Giacchi said that the Italians could not understand his argument on this).

b) Middle East

Colombo described his brief talks with Habib who had made a transit stop in Rome. The two Ministers found themselves in broad agreement on the Lebanon problem. Both Italy and Austria had agreed to participate in a multinational force; Dr Pahr said that because of the Austrian constitution, any Austrian contingent would have to be volunteers and that a UN framework for the force would be required. Colombo asked whether this meant a Security Council resolution, but got no clear answer.

c) Cambodia

Dr Pahr described his recent visit to South East Asia, where he had seen the Vietnamese leaders. He was pessimistic about prospects for Cambodia, because of the fundamental clash of interests between China, USSR, and Vietnam.

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d) Council of Europe

Dr Pahr explained the Austrian proposal to revitalise the Council of Europe. Colombo was non-committal, and Vinci Giacchi told us that the Italians had little enthusiasm for this.

5. There was no discussion of relations with the PLO or Libya.

6. Finally, Vinci Giacchi said that there was a longstanding invitation to Pertini to visit Austria. The MFA would not however advise him to go until the Alto Adige problem had been completely resolved.

*Yours ever,*

R N Culshaw

cc: Miss T A Gallagher, WED, FCO  
Chancery, Vienna  
Captain Foster, Venice  
G Pirie Esq, Milan

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British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

23  
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A. 3/4

W N Wenban-Smith Esq

EAD

FCO

Your reference

Our reference 021/1

Date 29 July 1982

Dear Wenban-Smith,

URS 021/1	
RECEIVED - 3 AUG 1982	
INDEX	REGISTRY
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ITALY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

- Smith's teleletter of 19 July from Addis Ababa.
- I have discussed Palleschi's visit to Addis with Vecchi, who accompanied him. Despite misleading press reports, this visit was nothing to do with the Italo-Ethiopian Mixed Commission, which is due to meet in Addis in October. Palleschi's purpose was to resolve a series of outstanding bilateral problems, and he had considerable success. His visit had been planned for earlier in the year, but the Italians decided to wait for some sign of greater flexibility from the Ethiopians; Feleke's visit (my letter of 1 July) gave them that green light. It was pure chance that Palleschi's visit coincided with fresh fighting in the Ogaden; Vecchi hinted that Colombo was rather put out that Palleschi was able to make the political demarche described in FCO telno 93. Colombo took care to ensure that Palleschi had a personal letter from him to hand over (see the last sentence of my letter to Edgerton of 4 March).
- Feleke's response to the Italian demarche was to deny that there were any Ethiopian troops inside Somalia. He would not be drawn on the use of aircraft (Vecchi was sceptical about press reports that the Somali Salvation Front had planes of their own). Feleke added delphicly that in any case the international border in that part of the Ogaden had never been defined. Feleke described Siad Barre's internal difficulties in lurid terms; northern units of the armed forces had fought those from the south, the people wanted a change, and Siad Barre had been obliged to resort to repression, arresting many former ministerial colleagues. Palleschi replied that Italy was aware of Siad Barre's difficulties but that they could not be said to justify Ethiopian action in the Ogaden; even if Somali dissidents

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were responsible for recent fighting inside Somalia, they could not operate without the support of the Ethiopian regime, who let them enjoy secure bases just over the border.

4. Palleschi also saw Mengistu. After a discussion of bilateral matters, Palleschi said that if the Russian and Cuban presence could be reduced, Italy would have more scope for improving relations with Ethiopia. Mengistu retorted that Ethiopia had not been the first country in the region to invite in the Russians, and that their assistance did not compromise Ethiopia's non-alignment. I suspect that Palleschi went through this ritual exchange mainly for domestic political reasons.

the

5. Vecchi said that/five days of negotiation over bilateral problems were very hard, and that final agreement was only reached after an all-night session on 23 July. The Ethiopian Government had now for the first time accepted Italy's title to the Italian Government property which had been taken over after the revolution; in return, Italy would now pass legislation allowing the Ethiopians to continue their de facto use of most of these properties. The Italians would however be allowed to use four of the properties, including the former Consul's residence in Asmara, where the Ethiopians would let them build a new "interests section" (to avoid setting an awkward precedent about Consulates). On Italian schools, the Ethiopians had at first taken a very tough line but in the end had agreed that the Italians could establish a senior secondary school in Eritrea, in addition to the existing elementary and junior secondary schools; Ethiopians could continue to attend; a shift system would be introduced to make maximum use of the premises; the curriculum would have to be "in line with the principles of the Ethiopian revolution".

6. Palleschi's other success was to secure Ethiopian agreement to freedom of movement and departure for all Italian citizens in Ethiopia, many of whom have for years been used as hostages because of alleged outstanding debts to the Ethiopian state. The agreement is that Italy renounces outstanding claims to compensation for nationalisation of Italian assets after the revolution; an amount of compensation has been agreed, but it is to be offset against the notional debts of the Italian nationals and the balance is to be credited to the Italian Government in Addis but then deposited in a fund for development

/projects

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/debts projects. Vecchi said that this pragmatic and novel solution had to be accepted by both sides before 30 September; it caused the Italians some juridical problems, since the state was in effect accepting liability for/of private citizens, but the political argument for going ahead was unanswerable. Italy had in any case long ago abandoned hope of receiving any meaningful compensation for nationalisation. Vecchi was confident that Italy's relations with Ethiopia would improve as a result of this settlement and that the Italian Embassy would henceforth be better placed to look after the interests of the 2,000 Italians in Ethiopia (including 800 in Eritrea and 1000 in Addis).

7. Vecchi said that the Ethiopians made no request for arms from Italy, but that an Ethiopian military team might come to Rome later this year for training.

/package 8. Vecchi said that the economic/agreed during the visit (see para 3 of my letter of 1 July) was as follows:

a) A line of credit for development worth Dollars 80 million. This was a soft loan at 2.25%, with two years of grace and 11 years of repayment;

b) A Lire 200 billion line of credit at consensus rates (not in the written agreement because other Ministries in Rome first had to approve its terms);

c) A separate line of credit for Lire 200 billion at consensus rates, for "special operations" (Vecchi could not be more precise).

9. Finally, I asked Vecchi about the Somali request to Italy for arms supplies. He said that it mainly referred to the supply of US weapons, including heavy equipment like tanks, which were already in Italy. Some Italian contracts which had already been approved were being speeded up; there was no question of Italian military assistance. Vecchi said that the Italian Government had decided to be helpful to Siad Barre over arms,

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partly to offset the resentment which was bound to be felt in Mogadishu after Palleschi's visit to Addis.

TO PRIORITY BOX

UNREP BRUSSELS, COBENHAGEN, RIO BUENOS AIRES  
COLONNO'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA

5. THE ITALIAN PRESS PICKED UP COLONNO'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA  
WOULD VISIT ARGENTINA IN EARLY AUGUST.  
6. I ASKED BOTTAI ABOUT THIS ON 23 AUGUST. HE CONFIRMED THE REPORT,  
SAYING THAT HE WOULD ACCOMPANY COLONNO TO LATIN AMERICA FROM  
20-25 AUGUST. AFTER LIMA COLONNO WOULD VISIT ARGENTINA AND HAVING TALKS ON  
29 AUGUST. SLIGHT UNCERTAINTY REMAINED ABOUT THE ARGENTINE VISIT  
BECAUSE THE ITALIANS HAD LAID DOWN CERTAIN CONDITIONS. IN PARTIC-  
ULAR, COLONNO MUST BE ALLOWED TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLIT-  
ICAL COMMUNITY ON THE EVENING OF HIS VISIT TO ARGENTINA.

*Yours ever*

*R N Culshaw*

R N Culshaw

cc: Chanceries: Mogadishu  
Addis Ababa

R P Osborne Esq, WED, FCO

3. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT WESTERN CONTACT WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE  
REGIME, AND COLONNO WILL MAKE THE MOST OF GOOD ITALIAN ACCENT;  
THE ITALIANS HAVE NOT SAID ANYTHING TO US ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS OVER  
THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS AND KNOW OUR VIEWS, BUT THEY WILL  
NOT BE BLINDLY BY THE ARGENTINES.

4. THIS INITIATIVE IN LATIN AMERICA WILL INCREASE THE VALUE OF BI-  
LATERAL TALKS ABOUT THE REGION THIS AUTUMN (YOUR TELEGRAM NO.  
257) AND TO WELSH AS FORECAST IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 348; FRANCESCHI  
AS DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR WILL PROBABLY CLEAR FOR THE ITALIANS SO  
HE SHOULD FILE IN WELSH. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IN DUE COURSE WHETHER DATES  
HE OUTGOING ARE CONVENIENT FOR OUR TEAM AND WHETHER WE INTEND TO  
ENTER LONDON IN THE YEAR.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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27 JUL 1982

Not Taken

*John* *DR*

TO PRIORITY-FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 397 OF 26 JUL 82

INFO ROUTINE BRASILIA, LIMA

SAVING FOR INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN,

UKREP BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, BIS BUENOS AIRES

COLOMBO'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA

*Stand as handling*

1. THE ITALIAN PRESS PICKED UP A BUENOS AIRES REPORT THAT COLOMBO WOULD VISIT ARGENTINA IN EARLY AUGUST, AFTER ATTENDING A REGIONAL MEETING OF ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN LIMA FROM 02-04 AUGUST.
2. I ASKED BOTTAI ABOUT THIS ON 23 JULY. HE CONFIRMED THE REPORT, SAYING THAT HE WOULD ACCOMPANY COLOMBO TO LATIN AMERICA FROM 02-10 AUGUST. AFTER LIMA COLOMBO WOULD GO TO BRASILIA, AND IT WAS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD THEN VISIT ARGENTINA, MEETING THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY ON THE EVENING ON 08 AUGUST AND HAVING TALKS ON 09 AUGUST. SLIGHT UNCERTAINTY REMAINED ABOUT THE ARGENTINE VISIT BECAUSE THE ITALIANS HAD LAID DOWN CERTAIN CONDITIONS. IN PARTICULAR, COLOMBO MUST BE ALLOWED TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE MOTHERS (NOT JUST THE ITALIAN MOTHERS) OF THE (FLG WD UNDLNED) DESAPARECIDOS. BOTH POINTS WERE A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR THE PARTIES IN ROME. BOTTAI SAID THAT COLOMBO WOULD PASS ON ANY MESSAGES TO THE ARGENTINES IF WE WOULD LET THE MFA KNOW IN TIME. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS IF YOU WISH TAKE UP HIS OFFER.
3. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT WESTERN CONTACT WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE REGIME, AND COLOMBO WILL MAKE THE MOST OF GOOD ITALIAN ACCESS. THE ITALIANS HAVE NOT SAID ANYTHING TO US ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS AND KNOW OUR VIEWS, BUT THEY WILL DOUBTLESS BE BLANDISHED BY THE ARGENTINES.
4. THIS INITIATIVE IN LATIN AMERICA WILL INCREASE THE VALUE OF BILATERAL TALKS ABOUT THE REGION THIS AUTUMN (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 167, NOT TO ALL). AS FORECAST IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 348, FRANCESCHI (DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR) WILL PROBABLY LEAD FOR THE ITALIANS, SO WE SHOULD FIELD AN AUS. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IN DUE COURSE WHETHER DATES IN OCTOBER ARE CONVENIENT FOR OUR TEAM AND WHETHER WE INTEND TO OFFER LONDON AS THE VENUE.
5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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BY BAG

FROM PARIS

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TO FCO TELNO 68<sup>r</sup> SAVING OF 9 JULY 1982

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, BONN

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12 JUL 1982	
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INDEX	PA

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VISIT OF THE ITALIAN PRESIDENT

1. President Sandro Pertini of Italy paid a State Visit to Paris between 5 and 7 July. He was the first Head of State to pay a full state visit since the change of government in France, and he came to Paris only 5 months after Mitterrand had visited Rome. In according Pertini this special treatment the French Government intended to mark its wish to place relations with Italy on the same level as those with Britain and West Germany. Pertini made a favourable impression and received an excellent press.
2. In addition to the usual formal events Pertini held two short rounds of talks with Mitterrand. Separate, more substantial discussions were held between Colombo and Cheysson, and between the French Ambassador to Rome and the Italian Ambassador to Paris. Pertini called on Chirac, in the latter's capacity as Mayor of Paris. After the conclusion of the official part of his visit he also received ex-President Giscard d'Estaing: each side maintains that this meeting took place at the request of the other.
3. The bulk of the official talks were conducted en tête-à-tête or in very restricted session, and our informants do not have a full record of what was said. The following account draws on press coverage and conversations with the Quai and the Italian Embassy.

International Affairs

4. These were discussed between Pertini and Mitterrand (but only in very general terms, as befitted the difference between their constitutional positions) and en tête-à-tête between Colombo and Cheysson. Colombo told the press that the following subjects had been discussed:

- (i) Lebanon The Lebanon crisis was in the forefront of discussions, but no new elements seemed to have emerged.
- (ii) Europe Colombo claimed to the press that French views on the proposed European Act were very similar to those of Italy. Discussion on enlargement had been "theoretical", but Italy had emphasised that the political value of Spanish membership of the Community should not be lost from sight. The

/Italians

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Italians had argued for a "gradual entry" of Spain, and had stated that Italy was proposing to make proposals which would facilitate this. The Quai told us that the French side questioned the positive tenor of the remarks made by Spadolini in Spain in favour of early Spanish succession to the EC (Madrid telno 388).

- (iii) Europe/US relations In his main public speech Pertini laid some emphasis on the need for better concertation between Europe and the US, while in contrast Mitterrand spoke of the urgent need for a political reinforcement of a European identity. The Quai told us that the French side encouraged the Italians to take as firm an attitude towards the US over the pipeline as they were doing, but that they were not entirely reassured by the Italian reaction.

5. According to our informants Latin America was not discussed.

#### Bilateral Affairs

6. These were mainly discussed between the two Ambassadors. The following aspects were covered:

(i) Cultural co-operation

There was a general survey of the arrangements for teaching each other's language in schools. Italian proposals for the establishment of an Italian Institute in Paris were briefly discussed. The Italians complained at French plans to drop the brief daily broadcast in Italian carried by French radio, and a compromise was reached. The French displayed enthusiasm for the concept of an "espace audiovisuel européen", created by the use of satellites to beam television programmes across frontiers.

(ii) Industrial and technological collaboration

There was inconclusive discussion of possible Italian participation in the Airbus 320, but the French concluded that Boeing was exerting strong counterpressures. The Italian delegation took the line that while bilateral contacts between technical and financial experts continued they were not in a position to discuss the project in substance. The joint civil airline project (ATR 42) was reviewed. The French expressed disappointment at Italian choice of American nuclear technology. They also made a strong bid for Italian purchases of French electronic equipment, in particular in connection with Italian plans to re-equip their national radio stations.

/(iii)

(iii) Agriculture

The French made it clear that for domestic political reasons it was important that the new wine regulation should be agreed by the Council on 18/19 July. The Italians said that they hoped there would be no recurrence of last year's French administrative blockage of Italian wine exports to France, or of the incidents in which Italian wine was destroyed by French demonstrators. The Italians expressed private doubts to us whether the French Government would or could control anti-Italian demonstrations if these occurred.

(iv) Commercial relations

The French expressed disquiet at trends in the bilateral trade balance, where a traditional French surplus was on the point of turning into deficit.

7. This was a visit designed to symbolise the readiness of the two governments to work for a closer and more harmonious relationship rather than to reach agreements of political significance. Both sides seemed to think that its limited aim had been well achieved.

FRETWELL

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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STANDARD

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
Your reference

Our reference

T L Richardson Esq

Date 29 June 1982

ROME



Dear Richardson

ITALY/CENTRAL AMERICA

1. The question of US/Italian dialogue on Latin America has been discussed in your telegram 315 and FCO telegram 167. We agreed that it would be a good idea to promote a senior level meeting about Latin America later in the year. — NIT
2. Our main interest clearly lies in relations with the major countries of Latin America. With her large ethnic communities, especially in Argentina and Brazil, and strong trading links Italy should have much to offer. Nevertheless we see some virtue in keeping up the momentum of discussion with the Italians about developments in Central America, not least because of the links which the Italian Christian Democrats have with similar political parties there (notably in El Salvador). Until recently we have had a fairly regular exchange of views and information on Central America with Felicani of the Italian Embassy here. But he left last week and has not been replaced. Those who are now dividing his work between them seem to be less interested in the subject.
3. Your telegram 315 seemed to us to suggest that you felt in need of some briefing. Having consulted WED, I have therefore taken the liberty of putting together a background brief on Central America, with some suggested principal points to make, on which you may care to draw in your dealings with the Farnesina.
4. Some additional briefing material on Cuban activities in Central America, and on the Mexican and Honduran peace initiatives is also attached.

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5. I am also enclosing a copy of Colum Sharkey's recent despatch on the elections in El Salvador about which you have received guidance telegrams from us.

6. We have not, however, included briefing on the question of EC aid to Central America. The recent exchange of telegrams with UKrep Brussels covers this subject adequately for the time being.

7. We should of course be most grateful for further reporting on Italian views from time to time.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Gordon Baker*  
G M Baker  
Mexico & Central America Dept

cc: Mr Young (WED)  
Mr Chase (S Am D)  
Miss Young (ECD(E))

PS. We have just heard that the Italian Ambassador to Costa Rica will shortly be accredited on a non-resident basis to Belize. This is good news. We welcome any moves to help Belize to stand on her own feet and demonstrate to Guatemala that the international community accepts Belizean independence as an accomplished fact. As the attached brief indicates, we should be interested to hear whether Italy has any plans to give aid or technical assistance to Belize. Please let us know if Farnesina would like to know more about Belize.

*J*  
*29/6*

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British Embassy  
PARIS

22 June 1982

19  
PC 246  
Miss Saunders f.i.

Young Esq  
WEL  
FCO

Copy to Research Dept (Mrs  
Cotvin)  
Mr Osborne

*Photo (B) is missing.*

*De R.*

VISIT OF THE ITALIAN PRESIDENT

1. The Elysée announced yesterday that President Pertini of Italy will pay a state visit to France between 5 and 7 July. You will recall that President Mitterrand paid an official visit to Rome last February and held a long conversation with President Pertini. The promptness of this return visit is no doubt intended to maintain the impetus of efforts to give more warmth and substance to Franco/Italian relations.

*23/6*

*C. e.  
Chit*

C O Hum

cc: Chancery ROME

*WRS 0211*

24 JUN 1982

	Action taken
<i>M. K.</i>	<i>7/3</i>

*25/6*

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Folio ⑱ is missing.

cc Sir J Leahy O.P.  
Mr J Moberly  
WED  
ECD(E)

?

ISRAEL/ITALY

1. Over dinner at the end of the Commission on the Ten in Brussels, a very long account of Colombo took notes but have since seen almost everything of consequence.

2. He did however have rather a different view by Colombo, which seemed to be the general view among the Ten. Israelis frankly that they were disturbances on the West Bank were the scene, that the participation in settlement must include the PLO and peace process must be able to determine and free democracy.

18 May 1982

(17)

WCS 02.11
INDUSTRY
19 MAY 1982
CONFIDENTIAL
Taken

JRS

Europe  
Study foreign relations.  
R/S  
r/s

NENAD

cc Sir J Leahy o.r.  
Mr J Moberly  
WED ✓  
ECD(E)

HMA Tel Aviv  
Rome

Mr Colombo

ISRAEL/ITALY

1. Over dinner at the end of the meeting of the Political Committee on the Ten in Brussels on 15 May Bottai (Italy) gave a very long account of Colombo's recent visit to Israel. I took notes but have since seen Tel Aviv telno 192 which contains almost everything of consequence said by Bottai.

2. He did however have rather more to say about the line taken by Colombo, which seemed to have been in full accordance with the general view among the Ten. For example, he had told the Israelis frankly that they were creating a crisis, that the disturbances on the West Bank were not a favourable element in the scene, that the participation in negotiations for a settlement must include the PLO and that " all parties in the peace process must be able to exercise the right of self-determination and free democratic choice".

jb

18 May 1982

J L Bullard

BY BAG  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM BONN

WR 0211  
TOP COPY  
17 MAY 1982  
Pa. Po  
445  
DS

TO FCO SAVING NO 25 OF 13 MAY 1982  
INFO OTHER EC POSTS  
VISIT BY ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. Spadolini and Foreign Minister Colombo came to Hamburg on 8 May for one of the regular six-monthly FRG/Italian consultations with Schmidt and Genscher. Spadolini went on afterwards to visit Berlin. We have been briefed by the Auswärtiges Amt.

Falklands

2. The Falklands crisis was the main topic discussed between the Foreign Ministers. They drafted a declaration for the Heads of Governments (my telno 437 not to all). This called for the full implementation of Resolution 502 and a ceasefire accompanied by the start of withdrawal by the forces of both sides. Colombo had explained at length the difficulties posed for him by the size of the Italian and Italian-origin community in Argentina. He had had considerable difficulty defending sanctions against Argentina at the recent congress of the Christian Democrats.

Spain/NATO

3. Schmidt had made clear to Spadolini German concern at a possible delay in Italian ratification. Apparently formal ratification under normal Italian procedures can only follow 14 days after the vote by Parliament. Spadolini said that this would not be a serious problem; the Italians attached great importance to Spain attending the NATO Summit in Bonn next month. Schmidt had also explained the concerns put to him by the Portuguese Prime Minister the previous week (but not revealed to us in the Community briefing - our telno 22 Saving) that Portuguese susceptibilities should be taken into account in any arrangements made for Spain.

INF

4. Schmidt had said that he found the current state of the INF negotiations thoroughly satisfactory. Spadolini had explained that there was growing public criticism of stationing in Italy and he saw a parallel, though belated, to the development of public opinion in the FRG.



British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Roma

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*WRSS out*

14 MAY 1982	
DLR	SECRETARY
<i>M. R. 1115</i>	<i>DB</i>

*RH mai.*

*RH 14/5*

*15*

W N Wenban-Smith Esq  
EAD  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

11 May 1982

*Spoke to Godson  
(3400) who with check  
what happens.*

*Jean W. J. J.*

ITALY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA


1. I had lunch with Vecchi (Italian MFA) today; he said he met you at the recent Anglo/Italian bilateral on African problems in London. I report one or two points of interest on the Horn as a follow up to Robert Culshaw's letter of 4 March to Edgerton (not copied to UKMis New York).
2. Vecchi confirmed that there was continuing party pressure upon the Italian Government to "do something" about Eritrea. This pressure came from all parties except the Italian communists (PCI) and spanned the spectrum from neo-fascists to far left. Colombo had been made aware of it both before and after his recent trip to Addis Ababa. The Italian position on Eritrea, Vecchi said, was gloriously inconsistent; respect for Ethiopia's territorial integrity coupled with an invitation to the parties (i.e. including the Eritreans) to negotiate a peaceful solution, and respect of human rights. The Italians could not or would not take an initiative over Eritrea, at New York or elsewhere, but were faced with the difficulty that neither the Arab nor the Islamic Leagues would take action to which Italy could rally.
3. He asked me a number of procedural questions about the ability of dissident groups or "liberation movements" to obtain a hearing in New York. I told him, with dim memories of practice when I was there in 1974-8, that one or two of these (PLO, SWAPO) had the right to be heard, but not to vote, in the General Assembly, and that a wider swathe of movements, mainly from the Portuguese territories of those days, had had the right to address the Fourth Committee. In both cases, however, a majority vote of UN members was required, and I saw no prospect of the Eritreans getting a hearing in New York given the OAU's steadfast support of the principle of territorial integrity.
4. I report this simply as an indication of the way Italian MFA minds are moving. If I had to bet, I would guess that they would try to enlist Arab support for pro-Eritrean statements in the Human Rights Commission. I have not yet seen the record of the Anglo/Italian bilateral and do not know if the subject came up in these terms.

*Yours ever,*

T L Richardson

cc: Chanceries: MOGADISHU, ADDIS ABABA, KHARTOUM, UKMis NEW YORK,  
R P Osborne Esq, WED, FCO

GRS 400  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM ROME 191620Z APR 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 173 OF 19 APR 82  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN



(13)  
MPT: GENSCHER'S VISIT TO ROME

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ITALO-GERMAN PRESS RELEASE

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER, EMILIO COLOMBO, TODAY MET THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WITH WHOM HE HAD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON TOPICS OF COMMON INTEREST. AMONGST OTHER SUBJECTS, THEY EXAMINED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANGLO/ARGENTINE CRISIS, ON WHICH THERE WAS A COMPLETE CONVERGENCE OF ITALIAN AND GERMAN VIEWS. IN BOTH ROME AND BONN IN CONFIRMING FULL COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WITH GREAT BRITAIN FOR THE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST IT, THERE WAS SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE DIFFICULT MISSION THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG HAD UNDERTAKEN WITH THE AIM OF AVOIDING, FIRST OF ALL, ARMED CONFLICT AND AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE CRISIS. A QUICK END TO THE PRESENT TENSION WOULD ALSO PERMIT, AS ALREADY FORESEEN, THE ABRIGATION OF THE EC'S ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.
2. ON THE SUBJECT OF EURO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE TWO MINISTERS, COLOMBO AND GENSCHER EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND INTENSIFIED. WITH THIS IN MIND, THEY DECIDED TO MAKE JOINT CONTACT WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION.
3. THE TWO MINISTERS FINALLY HAD A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA. THEY CONFIRMED THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION ADOPTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP IN BRUSSELS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE ZERO OPTION TARGET. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE FOR POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND REPEATED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' DETERMINATION TO FULFIL THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION SHOULD THE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO YIELD CONCRETE RESULTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TWO MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN FOR THE CONTINUING SOVIET TENDENCY TO INTRODUCE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF US/USSR NEGOTIATIONS THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE START NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GET QUICKLY UNDERWAY, AND THEIR SATISFACTION THAT THE US POSITION ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS WAS NOT SIMPLY AIMED AT THEIR LIMITATIONS BUT AT THEIR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION.

4. COLOMBO AND GENSCHER FINALLY UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WOULD ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL OF A MEETING IN NEW YORK AT THAT TIME''.

ARLULUS

FCO

W.E.D  
CABINET OFFICE

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WRD 0211  
REGISTRY  
TO 23 APR 1982  
REGISTRY  
IND  
M. B. 20/4 JPS

GENSCHER'S VISIT TO ROME

1. GENSCHER VISITED ROME AT SOMEWHAT SHORT NOTICE ON FRIDAY 16 APRIL TO SEE COLOMBO. MIFT IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A PRESS NOTICE RELEASED SEPARATELY BY THE TWO MFAS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL PRESS AGENCIES. YOU WILL NOTE THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR US OVER THE FALKLANDS, LINKED TO THE HOPE THAT ARMED CONFLICT COULD BE AVOIDED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN THAT WOULD PERMIT THE ABROGATION OF EC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. THE MFA ALSO DREW OUR ATTENTION TO THE REFERENCE IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH TO UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.
2. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE QUESTION OF EUROPE-AMERICAN RELATIONS OCCUPIED MUCH OF GENSCHER'S AND COLOMBO'S TIME. AS THE PRESS RELEASE NOTES THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE A JOINT APPROACH TO THE US ADMINISTRATION ON THE LATTER POINT: ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW CLOSELY COLOMBO AND GENSCHER NOW SEEM TO BE WORKING IN TANDEM. LAY (ITALIAN MFA) TOLD H OF C IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE TWO MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE AIM OF THE EXERCISE WAS CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CLOSER EUROPE/US COORDINATION, AND THAT ITALY AND THE FRG WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THE MEANS. THEY AGREED TO PURSUE GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL FOR GYMNIKH-TYPE INFORMAL MEETINGS OF NATO MINISTERS, AS THE PROPOSAL LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO FEWEST PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. THEY WOULD ALSO WORK FOR EARLY AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ACT, AND THEN, BUT ONLY THEN, PURSUE COLOMBO'S ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL OF AN EC/US PACT. WHETHER THIS IS SIMPLY A FACE-SAVING FORMULAE FOR THE ITALIANS REMAINS TO BE JUDGED. LAY ADDED THAT BOTH MINISTERS WERE AGREED THAT NEITHER THE EC NOR THE NATO FORUM WAS PERFECT. IN TERMS OF ITS MEMBERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY QUESTIONS, NATO WAS PREFERABLE; ON THE OTHER HAND, IT HAD LESS EXPERIENCE OF CONDUCTING BROAD-RANGING POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, AND THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF SECURING GENERAL AGREEMENT ON DISCUSSION IN NATO OF OUT OF AREA QUESTIONS.

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3. LAY EXPECTS THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON TO BRIEF COMMUNITY MISSIONS ONCE AN APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS HAS BEEN MADE, PROBABLY LATER THIS WEEK. GRATEFUL IF YOU AND OTHER ADDRESSEES WOULD TREAT LAY'S REMARKS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

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*De G... 12*  
*12*  
*12*



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 5412

T L Richardson Esq  
British Embassy  
ROME

Your reference

Our reference JC (Gen) 025/1

Date

25 March 1982

*Mr Osborne 12/4*

*To*  
*12/4*  
*25/7*

WED 0211
26 MAR 1982
Mr Osborne 12/4

*Now enforce - Blue one fresh*


*Dear Richardson,*

ANGLO/ITALIAN TALKS ON AFRICA

1. Thank you for your letter of 3 March to Sir Leonard Allinson about a further round of bilateral talks on Africa.
2. Sir John Leahy, who will be chairing the talks, has suggested that we would invite Sr. Vecchi to London for discussions on Wednesday, 28 April, immediately preceding the next African Working Group meeting in Brussels on 29/30 April.
3. Would you please let us know whether this date is convenient and, if so, what topics Sr. Vecchi would like to discuss. It would also be useful to know the names of accompanying officials. If 28 April is not convenient perhaps he could suggest alternative dates in May.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Ronald Harrison*

R C G Harrison  
Central African Department

- cc: PA/Sir J Leahy  
Mr Gladstone (WED)   
Mr Barder (SAfD)  
Mr MacRae (WAD)  
Mr Wenban-Smith (EAD)

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British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*cc aboo BSSD.*  
*cc MAF 60*  
*11*  
*160*  
*Ma 140 2/3*  
*Ma Amoye 12/14/82*  
*24/7*  
*Italy/France*

R Osborne Esq  
W E D  
F C O

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25 MAR 1982			
INDEXED		FILED	
		✓ MS	

Your reference

Our reference 020/6

Date 17 March 1982

*Jean Roy*

THE MITTERRAND VISIT

1. One of our contacts in the MFA has shed a little more light on the proposals for industrial collaboration between France and Italy discussed during President Mitterrand's recent visit (paragraph 5 of Rome telegram number 93). The feedline aircraft on which collaboration was agreed (the ATR 42 turbo prop short take-off commuter) has already been the subject of advanced negotiations between Aeritalia and Aerospatiale. What the visit achieved was an intergovernmental agreement which was described as "facilitating and harmonising credit structures for the venture" between both countries. On the next generation airbus, the French pressed very hard for the Italians to commit themselves, but the Italians declined to do so on the grounds that it was too soon for decisions.

2. In the electronic sector, the MFA claim that no specific projects were discussed: both sides merely agreed in general terms that collaboration in this field was desirable, and, on a European scale, essential if Europe was to offer an effective response to Japanese domination.

3. Likewise, the MFA claim that there were no specific discussions of steel and nuclear collaboration (other than that already existing, eg over super-phenix).

*Yours ever*  
*Richard*

M J Richardson

cc: E Jones-Parry Esq, ECD(I) FCO  
Chancery, Paris  
HMCG, Milan

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Enter p2  
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236



British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A. 00187 Rome  
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

J C R Gray Esq  
EESD  
FCO

WR > 0211  
23 MAR 1982  
NOT TAKEN  
✓ DB

Your reference  
Our reference  
Date 10 March 1982

Dear Charles,

VISIT OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. Stefan Andrei, the Romanian Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Rome from 1-3 March; he also spent a couple of days privately in Sardinia. This visit, made at Romanian request, reciprocated that made to Bucharest by the then Italian Foreign Minister, Malfatti, in 1979; Andrei was also here twice last year (July and November) for informal talks with Colombo.
2. There was no Community briefing, and the press paid the visit little attention. Liotta, head of the MFA Eastern Europe Political Department, gave me yesterday the following account.
3. In three busy days in Rome, Andrei saw President Pertini, Spadolini, Colombo, Capria (Socialist Minister of Foreign Trade) and the secretaries of most political parties, including Berlinguer of the PCI. With Colombo and Spadolini he concentrated on foreign affairs, as follows:

a) Poland

Jaruzelski's military takeover did not please the Romanians, but might have saved Poland from a "probable external intervention". Martial law should be ended as soon as possible, and all the political forces, including the Party, must be involved in finding a solution to the fundamental problems. Colombo asked whether Andrei intended to include Solidarnosc and the Church; Andrei said yes, but added that Solidarnosc would have to shed its "extremist elements". Andrei reaffirmed Romanian opposition to any form of external interference in Poland's affairs, and argued that Western economic sanctions were counter-productive, serving only to increase Poland's dependence on the USSR.

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/b)



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- 2 -

b) Arms Control

Andrei and Colombo agreed on the need for results from the Geneva negotiations, and Andrei put forward the Romanian idea that Europe should participate directly. He agreed with Colombo that the USSR should "eliminate" all their SS20 missiles, but in his address at the official banquet spoke only of "withdrawal". There has also been a routine exchange of letters between Ceausescu and Spadolini on the general theme of disarmament.

c) CSCE

Colombo found Andrei's position predictably more autonomous and favourable to the West than that of other East European countries.

d) Balkans

Andrei argued in favour of the Bulgarian plan to "de-nuclearise" the Balkans.

e) Middle East

There was a broad measure of agreement. Andrei expressed appreciation of European participation in the MFO, condemnation of Israel's annexation of the Golan, and recalled Ceausescu's role in persuading Sadat to take the Camp David road.

4. With Capria, and to a lesser extent Colombo, Andrei discussed bilateral economic issues. He ascribed Romania's economic problems primarily to her fall in agricultural production and loss of revenue from oil products supplied to the West. Romania had contracted too many short term debts at high rates of interest, was talking to the IMF, but needed help from the United States, Italy, France, Germany, and Britain. He asked specifically for Italian support in the Club of Paris. He produced no figures for Romania's total indebtedness to the West, but the press have spoken of \$10-14 billion, adding that Italy's balance of trade with Romania in 1980 showed a deficit of lire 230 billion. The

/MFA

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- 3 -

MFA say that of an Italian line of credit worth \$300 million, agreed in 1979, only \$60 million has been taken up; Andrei asked that the agreement should be changed to allow the rest of this line of credit to be used for finished products as well as capital goods (mainly industrial plant); Capria agreed to study this.

5. Liotta concluded that this had been a successful visit, even though no significant progress had been made on the economic issues which were Andrei's main preoccupation; the problem of Romanian debt had to be looked at by the West in the overall East European context. Colombo had once again been struck by Andrei's detailed grasp of international issues and willingness to pursue an independent Romanian line.

6. Italian relations with Romania are close, partly because of linguistic and other Latin affinities (Andrei was able to read his speech in flawless Italian) and partly because Italy appreciates the value of Romania's independent stance on many foreign policy issues. There has recently been a rush of Italian visitors to Bucharest. Pajetta, the veteran head of PCI International Affairs, was invited by Ceausescu and was pleased with the results (see Colin Munro's letter of 8 February to you): such contacts are especially valuable for the PCI leadership at present, and may help counter any feeling of isolation felt at the base after the harsh words from Moscow and her closest allies. The good relationship between the PCI and the RCP helps Italy as a whole, as Andrei himself said during his visit. Corti (Social Democrat), one of the Junior Ministers at the Farnesina, also visited Romania recently, primarily to discuss economic and trade matters. Biasini of the Republicans has been there twice to compare notes with the Romanians on foreign policy issues. All the other coalition parties have sent their Secretaries (Piccoli of the DC, Craxi of the PSI - see Colin Munro's letter of 23 November 1981 - Zanone of the PLI, and Longo of the PSDI) to Bucharest on similar missions; all seemed to enjoy good access and to find the visits worthwhile.

7. Finally, a moment of comic relief from Andrei's visit. Late one night his police escort had their credentials questioned by

/Carabinieri

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- 4 -

Carabinieri at a road block, who had not been advised of their route and took the group for terrorists in disguise. Heated words followed, and two at least of those involved came to blows - fortunately not in front of the Minister. Perhaps Andrei knows Italy well enough not to be surprised.

Yours ever,

*R N Culshaw*

R N Culshaw

cc: R P Osborne Esq, WED, FCO  
Chancery, Bucharest

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Carry on  
R. 15/3  
9



British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755441

Miss J Brown  
EESD  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 021/1

Date 8 March 1982

WRD 0211	
15 MAR 1982	
	DB

Dear Miss Brown,

POLAND: ITALIAN MEASURES

1. Tom Richardson's letter of 3 March to Nigel Broomfield.
2. One of Spadolini's diplomatic staff has given us in confidence a copy of the list of measures against Poland and the USSR which have been decided or are under consideration. I enclose a copy of my translation. There are no surprises; the wording shows how keen the Italians are to have good Western company.
3. It is still not clear when these measures will be formally approved by the Council of Ministers and made public. The earliest date possible is now Friday 12 March, and it could well slip beyond that; much depends on the outcome of the Buckley Mission this week, as well as on the degree to which the five Italian coalition parties (with their eye on domestic political repercussions) really wish to reach agreement on all these measures.

Yours ever,

*(Signature)*

R N Culshaw

cc: Chanceries: UKREP Brussels  
Warsaw  
Moscow  
Washington  
Paris  
Bonn  
UKDEL NATO

cc: ERD  
ECD(E)  
WED

## A) MEASURES TOWARDS POLAND

### Economic and commercial measures

- a) By agreement with the other Western countries which are Poland's creditors, to suspend the restructuring of guaranteed Polish debt falling due in 1982.
- b) To suspend the allocation of credits already agreed for Poland but not yet taken up, without affecting operations which relate to contracts already completed.
- c) To suspend for the time being any new credit for Poland.
- d) By agreement with the other members of the EC, to suspend supplies to Poland of Community products on easy terms accompanied by bilateral credits. The Community funds dedicated to this will be applied to humanitarian assistance through private organisations and those of the Church. For its part the Italian government has decided to continue to give bilateral food aid to Poland, through non-governmental organisations and after receiving precise guarantees that it will in fact reach the civil population.

### Political measures

- 1) We are examining the possibility of extending to Polish citizens the restrictions on movement and travel in Italy which already apply to the citizens of other Socialist countries.
- 2) We are considering a refusal to allow any increase of staff for Poland's diplomatic, consular and commercial representation in Italy.
- 3) The meeting of the Mixed Commission to renew the protocol on cultural and scientific cooperation, planned for the present



month of February, may be postponed. For the moment cultural relations with Poland are limited to exchanges of researchers, university professors, and people attending conferences.

B) MEASURES TOWARDS THE USSR

Economic and commercial measures

- 1) To adopt a restrictive attitude towards economic cooperation with the USSR and towards implementation of the relevant agreements.
- 2) To re-examine existing understandings with the USSR on maritime and air transport.
- 3) In agreement with the EC states, to give Italy's agreement to put the USSR in the first category of possible recipients of credits on easy terms, according to the rules of the OECD consensus.
- 4) In agreement with the EC countries, to adopt restrictive measures towards the importation of manufactured and luxury goods from the USSR.

Political measures

- 1) We are examining more restrictive rules for the movement of Soviet citizens who live in Italy.
- 2) We are considering the possibility of authorising no increase in staff for the USSR's diplomatic, consular and commercial representation in Italy.
- 3) We are examining the possibility of postponing a series of cultural exchanges planned for the next two years (an exchange

of cultural delegations, an exhibition of books, cinema weeks etc). On scholarships, the conditions governing the awarding of scholarships in the high technology field could be made more rigorous.

4. In agreement with the allies, we might ask for a reduction in the number of Soviet oceanographic and scientific research vessels operating in the Mediterranean.

VISIT OF PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Salazar, visited Rome on 11/24 February accompanied by Foreign Minister Pereira and Finance Minister Salgueiro, as part of his tour of European capitals. He saw President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Giolitti, and the other Ministers had talks with their respective counterparts. The Italians set these meetings in the context of their close relations with Portugal, as exemplified by Salazar's recent 10 day visit to Lisbon last October.

2. The Portuguese told us that the discussions were cordial and concentrated entirely on Portuguese interests and related to issues. The substance was covered in a meeting between Portuguese Directors (at which the Portuguese Ambassador to the EC was present) which lasted 4 hours and went over the enlargement negotiations in some detail. Hans Jansen, head of the relevant Economic Department of the Directorate, who was present, said that the Portuguese reiterated their desire that the pace of negotiations should be kept up. He then agreed "within the limits of what was possible". The Portuguese also maintained that there would be no cooperation between progress in the agricultural dossier and the market. The Italians disagreed, saying that there was a necessary connection between the agricultural and regional dossiers and the market, and that final agreement in the former would have to await a solution in the latter. They also expressed displeasure at Portugal's proposal to leave the fish dossier until last when they described as improper. The Portuguese agreed Italian support for their ideas on an overall timetable for the negotiations (completion by the end of this year or latest six weeks of next); the Italians merely took note. There was apparently no suggestion of 'delinking' Italian and Portuguese interests.

RESTRICTED

Europa (8)  
R/R  
1/3



**British Embassy**  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome  
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

R P Osborne Esq  
WED  
FCO

WR 10211
12 MAR 1982
JDS

Your reference

Our reference

Date 8 March 1982

Dear Roy,

VISIT OF PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Portuguese Prime Minister, Sr. Balsemao, visited Rome on 23/24 February accompanied by Foreign Minister Pereira and Finance Minister Salgueiro, as part of his tour of European capitals. He saw President Pertini and Prime Minister Spadolini, and the other Ministers had talks with their opposite numbers. The Italians set these meetings in the context of their close relations with Portugal, as symbolised by Pertini's successful State Visit to Lisbon last October.

2. The Farnesina told us that the discussions were cordial and concentrated entirely on Portuguese accession and related EC issues. The substance was covered in a meeting between Economic Directors (at which the Portuguese Ambassador to the EC was present) which lasted 1½ hours and went over the enlargement negotiations in some detail. Muzi Falconi, Head of the relevant Economic Department of the Farnesina, who was present, said that the Portuguese reiterated their request that the pace of negotiations should be kept up. The Italians agreed "within the limits of what was possible". The Portuguese also maintained that there need be no connection between progress on the agricultural dossier and the mandate. The Italians disagreed, saying that there was a necessary connection between the agricultural and regional dossiers and the mandate, and that final agreement on the former would have to await a solution to the latter. They also expressed displeasure at Portugal's proposal to leave the fish dossier until last, which they described as improper. The Portuguese sought Italian support for their ideas on an overall timetable for the negotiations (completion by the end of this year or first few months of next): the Italians merely took note. There was apparently no suggestion of 'de-linking' Spanish and Portuguese accession.

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- 2 -

3. The visit attracted very little attention here, partly because of a newspaper strike on the following two days.

Yours ever,

R N Culshaw

cc: H N H Synnott Esq, SED, FCO  
D S Broucher Esq, ECD(E), FCO  
Chanceries: Lisbon  
UKREP Brussels

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

Green ops (7)  
R. J. S. (15)



British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Roma

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

J Edgerton Esq  
EAD  
FCO

WRD 0211

-9 MAR 1982

✓ JS

Your reference

Our reference 021/3

Date 4 March 1982

Dear Edgerton,

ITALY AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

1. In the light of Robert Tesh's letter of 12 February to John Robson, I had a general discussion the other day on Eritrea with Aragona of the MFA Africa Department.
2. I began by asking why Bottai had raised Eritrea at the last meeting of the Political Committee. Aragona replied that the MFA were very worried about the situation. In their view Mengistu badly needed a success for domestic political reasons; in military terms this would have to be the fall of Nacfa, since no other target in Eritrea was susceptible to a conventional assault and the Ethiopians knew well the capacity of the EPLF to resist with guerrilla tactics on their home ground. In the Italian view, the political and development aspects of the "Red Star" campaign were just a cover for the military push.
3. Aragona underlined the political sensitivity of the Eritrean issue in Italy. Accusations of genocide or the use of gas (with overtones of 1936) would arouse a storm of protest here. The Communist Party (PCI) was split, with the older guard retaining a sentimental attachment to the Eritrean cause and the younger party leaders disposed to back Mengistu's Marxist regime. The Christian Democrats too were sympathetic to Eritrea but unwilling to jeopardise economic interests in Ethiopia on their behalf. The Socialists (PSI) would back the Eritreans in order to embarrass both the two larger parties; they at one point intended to raise Eritrea at last week's 'summit' of coalition party secretaries but in the end did not; I suppose the harsh Ethiopian reaction to their French colleagues' line on Ethiopia - Addis telno 40, not to all - may now make them more cautious. If Eritrea hit the headlines, therefore, it could become a foreign policy issue capable of causing divisions within the Italian coalition and between them and the PCI opposition, albeit not on the scale of the row over Salvador.

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- 2 -

4. Aragona asked me in strict confidence whether we had seen any recent indication of an Ethiopian wish to purchase arms from Western governments. The Italians had heard some vague rumours to this effect but had received no such approach themselves; it was inconceivable that the coalition could agree to reinforce Ethiopia's armed forces in present circumstances. Aragona would give no more details, but said that any such move towards Western sources would be interesting evidence in favour of Colombo's theory (expressed after his visit to Addis last year) that there was some scope for weaning Mengistu away from the Eastern bloc: he speculated that it might also show a greater freedom of manoeuvre on Mengistu's part vis-a-vis the Derg than had been apparent in recent months. I should be grateful for any comments you or Addis may have, though it is not for us to give the Italians any account of the position of other countries.

5. Finally I asked Aragona about the visit of Palleschi, the Socialist Under Secretary at the MFA, to Mogadishu in early February. He said it had no political content, but was intended solely to fill out the details of Italian aid to Somalia (which is the biggest single recipient of Italian development assistance): Colombo would never let one of his deputies, least of all a Socialist, take a political initiative in a sensitive area like the Horn.

Yours ever,

R N Culshaw

cc: Chanceries: Mogadishu  
Addis Ababa  
Khartoum  
R P Osborne Esq, WED, FCO

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British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

(6)

*Extra copy foreign Miss  
Party secretaries are to meet in the  
middle of next week. The end danger to  
Spadolini lies in the risk that discussion with  
Norge began (El Salvador) on phone to embrace  
all the nagging differences  
between the partners. Right -*

G S Cowling Esq  
M C D  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

16 February 1982 *19/2*

WR > 0211	
23 FEB 1982	
SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DB	

*Geo Cowling*

*Mr Osborne  
Mr Shillington o/a  
19/2*

EL SALVADOR

1. In our Telno 67 we summarised last week's flurry of statements on Italian policy towards El Salvador and participation as observers in the elections there.
2. In reply to questions in Parliament, Colombo made a full statement on El Salvador on 10 February. He described the situation as a real civil war and drew the Chamber's attention to the two massacres of El Mozote and Nueva Trinidad, for which government and left-wing rebel forces respectively were responsible. He set out the history of the problem and the attitude of other countries, with particularly sharp criticism of Cuban involvement. He repeated that Italy's aim was to encourage a political solution, and that violations of human rights by whichever side had been condemned. Italy's views had been made clear to the junta, which did not however bear sole responsibility for the present tragic situation. He defended Duarte's objectives and said that the Salvador Christian Democrats still effectively represented the vast mass of the population. Colombo assured the Chamber that he had expressed Italian concern about Salvador to its political leaders, particularly Antonio Morales Ehrlich of the junta in December 1981 and Manual Guillermo Ungo of the FDR in March 1981. Finally, in reply to two specific questions Colombo said that the Italian Ambassador in Salvador would not be recalled and that Italy had given no undertaking to send observers to next month's elections.
3. In the debate which followed Colombo's statement the Communist and Socialists bitterly attacked his line as being too favourable to the junta. There were harsh words about US military support for the regime and about the attempts of Christian Democrats worldwide to bolster Duarte: the impartiality of the Italian Ambassador, Righetti, was also called in question. Finally, the Communists insisted that the subject be debated again on the basis of a motion (which makes a concluding vote inevitable); this is an unusual step and shows that they intend to press home their attack on the government. The Radicals have since put down a motion of their own.

/ 4.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. Robert Culshaw had a word about this last week with Barbarani at the MFA. He thought it would be very difficult to paper over the cracks within the coalition (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals and Spadolini's own Republicans) and that even if Spadolini, as President of the Council, made the vote an issue of confidence, some Socialists might desert the government ranks unless the government distanced itself more from the junta, which would in turn annoy many right wing Christian Democrats. The full Parliamentary debate may take place within a couple of weeks, unless the Parliamentary group leaders (who must agree on the timetable) manage to defer it.
5. Barbarani also told us that Colombo had no intention of recalling Righetti, since once he was back in Rome Communist opposition to any move to send him back would be irresistible. Withdrawing Righetti even temporarily would be tantamount to suspending relations, since there was no other diplomat to serve as Chargé d' Affaires.
6. Over this last weekend the dispute spread. The Socialists put out a statement critical of Colombo's policy towards El Salvador: it describes the elections as "a farce which offends the values of freedom" and opposed any despatch of Italian observers. Piccoli and Colombo, for the DC, went some way towards appeasing the Socialists by condemning recent violations of human rights, but insisted that Duarte was seeking a third way, which deserved support, between Castroism and military dictatorship.
7. As we reported in our telegram, however, the issue at stake is less Salvador than the future of the government coalition. We have already written to WED about the possibility of early elections in Italy, and this is not the place to speculate on the effect of the Salvador crisis on the government. The essential point is that Craxi, for the Socialists, is complaining that he and his party were not consulted about Colombo's statement. He has now said that the Socialists will not feel bound to support the government in the Chamber, and has demanded, with support from the Liberals and Social Democrats, a "summit" meeting of the secretaries of the five coalition parties to discuss foreign policy issues, and El Salvador in particular. The Social Democrats want to raise Poland as well; and WED should note that there will undoubtedly be pressure to go further and to have a general review of the coalition's performance and of its future: something which the DC have been resisting until their party congress has taken place.
8. Spadolini has now agreed to a meeting next week of the coalition's party secretaries to discuss foreign policy. Speaking at Monza this weekend, as we reported in our telegram, he went further than

/ Colombo

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- 3 -

Colombo and claimed that "the government has already decided, and announced in the Chamber, not to send any observer to the Salvador elections". He said that a political solution was essential; that all the Internationals (ie. Christian Democrat, Socialist and others) should join in this effort, and that any solution should both avoid the "growing risks" of US military intervention and block further Cuban/Soviet penetration in Central America: "neither a second Cuba nor a second Vietnam" (he is reported to have said a "third Cuba", no doubt with Nicaragua in mind, but the official text limits itself to two).

9. In taking up this somewhat pious and unrealistic stand, and in condemning violations of human rights by both sides in Salvador, Spadolini is clearly trying to paper over the coalition cracks. But his partners are still quarrelling. The Christian Democrat party secretary Piccoli continues to defend Duarte's "third way"; while the Socialists have accused Colombo of acting against the spirit of the UN resolution for which Italy voted (with Britain noted as the sole EC abstainer). The MFA have rejected this and say that Colombo's policy fully accords with the UN resolution.

10. I have already reported by telegram my conversation with Badini in Spadolini's cabinet. There will be no official Italian observers at the Salvador elections, though the DC are likely to send party representatives.

11. So El Salvador has become a major foreign policy test for Spadolini's government. It is almost unknown for an Italian government to fall on a foreign policy issue, and the opposition motion may well be buried by Parliamentary manoeuvring (as happened with a similar motion on Afghanistan after December 1979). Nevertheless, this open breach within the coalition has done much damage and will affect relations between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists on a wide range of other issues.

*Yours ever*  
*Tom Richardson*  
T L Richardson

cc: Chancery, Washington  
J R Young Esq, WED


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BRITISH EMBASSY

ATHENS

15 February 1982

*Mr. Station Foreign - Party**ECN(I) Mr. [unclear]  
copy sent to [unclear]**Mr. Tucker**(S)*A C Hunt Esq  
Southern European Dept  
FCO

Dear Alan,

VISIT BY FANFANI

1. The President of the Italian Senate, Fanfani, visited Greece 8-11 February. In addition to talks with his Greek counterpart and host, Alevras, he had meetings with Karamanlis, Papandreou and with the leaders of New Democracy and the KKE (Ext). The leader of the Euro-Communist KKE (Int) Kyrkos, complained of his exclusion: the protocol reason for this was that Fanfani's meetings were confined to the three parties represented in Parliament, but Kyrkos may have felt that the close relations between his party and the PCI gave weight to his complaint.
2. I called on a member of the Italian Embassy, Malfatti, who gave me a frank account of the visit. Overall, it had been largely devoid of content - the exception being the meeting with Papandreou (paras 3 and 4 beneath). In his meeting with Alevras, Fanfani had described Italian practice in three areas (electoral system, financing of political parties, parliamentary rules) in which the Greek side had expressed interest - Malfatti disarmingly said that he could not think why, but the first two are areas in which the PASOK government are committed to introducing reforms. The meeting with Averoff had been very warm (with Averoff delivering a bitter attack on the Government's reform of the Civil Service) and that with the KKE very cold. Karamanlis had rather brushed Fanfani aside with the comment that he would soon be visiting Italy.
3. The only meeting of interest was the one with Papandreou, which yielded some significant points. Fanfani and Papandreou agreed that since Italy and Greece had similar agricultural interests, they should cooperate (Malfatti pointed out that logic made them competitors not partners but it is of course true that they stand to gain by mutual support in the EC in arguing the relative importance of Mediterranean against northern products). Papandreou gave the impression that he did

/not



-2-

The Greek side were apparently pleased with the not regard the EC, or Greek membership, as a priority issue. On the Aegean, Papandreou repeated that Greece required a guarantee. Asked whether this should be given by NATO or the US bilaterally, Papandreou said that the former was preferable but the latter acceptable - though the Greeks wanted more than a second "Kissinger letter". The bases negotiations offered a forum for discussion on this point (this tends to confirm the impression at desk level in the US Embassy that the question of a guarantee will be top of the Greek agenda when the bases negotiations begin).

4. As regards Cyprus, Papandreou spoke in predictable terms: Cyprus was a very important issue, the Greek Government was ready to withdraw troops if the Turks withdrew their forces, the Greeks favoured recourse to the UN. On Spanish accession to NATO, Papandreou said that the Greek side were worried about NATO command structures in the Mediterranean: any modification should affect only the western area and not the Aegean. Turning to internal policies, Papandreou admitted that his Government was in some trouble as a result of lack of experience, and difficulties in applying its programme. The reform of the administration and economic measures were first steps. Greece wanted to decentralise, and wanted investment (Malfatti told me not to take seriously press reports that Fanfani had expressed interest in socialisation). There was no discussion on Poland. Fanfani did not raise the subject, since it was such a hot potato in Italian internal politics.

5. Malfatti concluded by expressing surprise at the warm welcome and extensive press coverage given to Fanfani. Fanfani wanted to be the next Italian President, and therefore had a clear interest in good publicity for his journeyings abroad. But why had the Greek Government given such a warm welcome to a right-wing member of the DC who had been invited by Alevras' predecessor? Malfatti speculated that Greece was actively searching for partners, and that after Papandreou had received heavy doses of Teutonic advice in Bonn, he was rather relieved to receive a representative of a Mediterranean country with a number of shared interests. There may be something in this: though with her EC interests (and need for support within the EC) in mind, and with her stated interest in giving special emphasis to the Mediterranean in foreign policy, it is hardly surprising that Greece should want warm relations with Italy.

/6.



- 3 -

6. The Greek side were apparently pleased with the coverage of the visit in Italy, including a special feature devoted to Greece on Italian television. One item in this was an interview with Papandreou which, as reported here, appears to have been an unbending exposition of Greek views on the EC and NATO. On the former, Papandreou claimed that Greek accession had had negative economic effects and that it would be better for Greece to have a special relationship instead of being a full member. On the latter, he suggested that unless the problem of the Turkish threat was solved, Greece "must find other ways of safeguarding its territorial integrity". On the US bases, Papandreou stated that these were contrary to Greece's ideology and policy, though the Greek Government would not take unilateral initiatives. The interview has occasioned some surprise here, since at one point Papandreou stated that there were no nuclear weapons at the US bases. Since Papandreou repeatedly reaffirmed during the election campaign that there were, and has continued to state that he wanted to see these weapons removed, his words suggested a certain degree of confusion. It is possible however that Papandreou was meaning to say that the bases, and the nuclear weapons, were separate issues and should be handled separately.

Your ever,

Davis

D C A M Madden

cc: Chanceries: ROME  
WASHINGTON  
UKDEL NATO

RESTRICTED

DMF G 169/10

LTC NR 919/10

RR MODUK

RR FCO

WR 0211

11 FEB 1982

OFFICER	PA	Action Taken
	<i>Pa. [initials]</i>	<i>[initials]</i>

VZCZCFDG COM  
 ROU  
 101145Z FEB 82  
 FROM COMMCEN HSP  
 TO MODUK

*1700*  
 Tp+1/KICK/WED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LTC 28H~~

NO DISTRIBUTION

THIS TELEGRAM  
 WAS NOT  
 ADVANCED

GR 145

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME 101145Z FEB 82

[ cc FED  
 Defence ]

LO ROUTINE MODUK  
 TELEGRAM NO. 28H/101145Z OF FEB 82  
 AND TO FCO (WED) AND MODUK (DEFENCE SALES)

FROM: BRITDEFAT ROME  
 TO: DI3 (WEST)

ITALIAN MILITARY DELEGATION VISIT TO CHINA.  
 A REPORT HAS APPEARED IN THE ITALIAN PRESS OF A VISIT TO CHINA OF

RESTRICTED

*Colombo Report* (2)



British Embassy  
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

S F Howarth Esq  
NENAD  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 4 February 1982

WRJ 0211	
RECEIVED IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE	
- 8 FEB 1982	
INDEXED	

*✓ DS*

*Dear Howarth,*

VISIT OF THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. Benyahia visited Italy from 27-29 January. The following account is based on a Community briefing given by Moscato, head of the MFA Middle East political department.
2. Moscato said that this visit, the first by an Algerian Foreign Minister to Rome, had been long awaited and was in a sense in response to Colombo's trip to Algiers with Pertini for the State Visit of May 1980 (see Algiers savingram no. 6 of 13 May 1980). The main purpose was to make progress in the dead-locked negotiations for supply of natural gas, on which we are reporting separately (see Rome telno 37 of 29 January, not to all): the press concentrated almost exclusively on this aspect. Moscato said that Colombo's thorough exchange of views with Benyahia on political topics had helped to repair any damage to bilateral relations which might have resulted from the failure to agree on the gas price.

Arab/Israel

3. Benyahia was critical of European participation in the MFO, which he equated with involvement in the Camp David process. He also had some harsh words for the feebleness of the EC reaction to Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. Colombo stressed that the Saudis had not consulted the other Arabs before launching it, and was not optimistic about the possibility of achieving an Arab consensus based upon its principles. The Syrians' attitude was understandable, given that they were virtually in a state of undeclared war with Israel and had lost territory. King Hassan should not have abandoned the Fez summit for fear of an open disagreement; there had been other important agenda items to discuss.

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/Libya



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- 2 -

Libya

4. On Libya, Benyahia said that Algeria's bilateral relations were excellent but that he was fully aware of the unacceptable features of Libyan activity in third countries. Qadhafi had restored order in Chad but the proposal for union showed his true intentions. Algeria fully supported the OAU decision to reject any idea of amalgamation of Chad with Libya; Qadhafi had accepted it grudgingly, to improve his image with the Africans in advance of Libya's presidency of the OAU. Benyahia criticised US policy towards Libya, adding that their unfounded accusations only served to increase tension in the region.

Iran

5. Benyahia said that after the attempted coup in Bahrain last December the Algerians had made representations in Teheran, asking Iran to clarify her intentions towards the Arab States of the Gulf. Algeria had also urged the need for a compromise solution to the Iran/Iraq conflict. He did not report how the Iranians had reacted. In reply to a question, Moscato told me that the Italians had the clear impression that this Algerian demarche had been made at the request of the Arab States of the Gulf.

6. Colombo and Benyahia also had a wide-ranging tour d'horizon of other international problems. Little new emerged, except that on Poland Benyahia showed a tendency to equate external intervention from East and West. Colombo gave him a lecture and Benyahia eventually conceded that Soviet pressure on Jaruzelski had been the factor which pushed him into the repressive military measures of 13 December 1981.

*Yours ever,*

*R N Culshaw*

R N Culshaw

cc: R P Osborne Esq, WED, FCO  
Chanceries: Algiers  
Bahrain  
Teheran

RESTRICTED

Haig / Polson



2A

Mr. Yacobi  
Mr. Osborne

Ro. 1/2  
Dunlop

1/2

WJ 30/1

Mr Bullard

ITALY AND NON-UNDERMINING

1. I met the Italian Minister in the park at 1445. He asked me to let you know that he had spoken this morning to Signor Bottai who had confirmed that Italy was ready to take part in a meeting of economic officials with the Americans and that they were also willing to instruct their Embassy in Washington to support any representations in favour of such a meeting that we might make.

2. Since he had already mentioned Mr Haig's visit to me I said that the holding of such a meeting would no doubt be a subject of discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr Haig and we would have to see how that went before we could consider our next move.

WRS 0211	
HY	
- 8 FEB 1982	
REGIS.	HY
Action Taken	
Mr Haig	DM

Quada

A C Goodison

29 January 1982

cc

- Mr Evans
- Mr Broomfield, EESD
- Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff

30



Damon,  
do we have a copy  
of letter referred to at X?  
If not, could you ask  
READ for me please?

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 200  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM ROME 270800Z JAN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 26 OF 27 JAN 82  
INFO ROUTINE BONN, WASHINGTON, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO SAVING HOLY SEE (WITH TUR - ACTIONED)

YOUR TELNO 25 TO BONN: EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS

02/11/82

FILED IN REGISTRY

- 5 FEB 1982

CLASS OFFICER	FILE
EX	ACTUAL
PA	

Malpas

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH BARBARANI, HEAD OF MFA LATIN AMERICA DEPARTMENT.

2. BARBARANI SAID THAT THE ITALIANS TOO HAD BEEN PRESSED BY THE AMERICANS. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT TALKS LAST WEEK IN ROME BETWEEN MALFATTI (MFA SECRETARY GENERAL) AND A SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL. THE ITALIAN VIEW AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WAS THAT THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SENDING OBSERVERS WERE FINELY BALANCED. BARBARANI'S ANALYSIS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT IN TUR. THE EL SALVADOR ELECTIONS MIGHT BE FAIR ENOUGH FOR THOSE PARTIES WHICH HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE, BUT WOULD BE UNREPRESENTATIVE BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE LEFT. WHATEVER THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED THEY WOULD BE OPEN TO CRITICISM. TO SEND OBSERVERS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS ENDORSEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS, WHILE TO REFUSE WOULD SOUR RELATIONS WITH THE REGIME.

3. BARBARANI SAID THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IN ITALY WAS THE DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT COALITION (CULSHAW'S LETTER TO PAYNE OF 16 FEBRUARY 1981, NOT TO ALL, GIVES THE BACKGROUND). THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. BARBARANI HIMSELF THOUGHT THE ATTITUDE OF MAJOR EC PARTNERS MIGHT BE THE DECIDING FACTOR, AND THAT ITALY WOULD IN THE END PROBABLY NOT SEND OBSERVERS.

4. BARBARANI UNDERTOOK TO KEEP US INFORMED, AND ASKED TO BE TOLD WHEN HMG REACHED A FIRM DECISION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ITALIANS HOPE WE OR OTHERS WILL GET OUT IN FRONT SO THAT THEY CAN SHELTER BEHIND US.

ARCULUS  
LIMITED  
MCAD  
ECD(E)  
NAD  
WED  
SED  
WIAD  
SAMD  
UND  
DS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MLRUC  
PS/IPS  
MR/DAY  
MR/URE

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Folio ① has been  
transferred.

