

1982

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FILE No. WRS 020/6 (Part ^{f13 -} B)

TITLE: THE ITALIAN ATTITUDES TO FALK-LAND ISLAND CRISIS

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<div data-bbox="480 662 589 770" style="background-color: yellow; display: inline-block; padding: 5px;">E 1775</div> <div data-bbox="180 739 1053 985" style="font-size: 4em; font-family: cursive;">FC033/5755</div>								
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(Sgd.) *SH*
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FILE No. WR > 02016 (Part B)

TITLE: ITALIAN ATTITUDES TO FALK-
LAND ISLAND CRISIS

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R		24/5						
Mr Osborne (A)		2/6						
Miss Bradley								
Mr Osborne (B)		4/6						
Mr Wood (16)		23/7						
Mr Osborne 25								
Mr Osborne 31		20/9						
R								
Mr Osborne 33		14/11						
Mr Osborne 34		2/11						

FCO 33/5755

Registry Address

Room No. 64
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1982

WR > 02016
FILE No.

LAST PAPER

Miss Barclay. (35)

RESTRICTED

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Enter you on new
file entitled ~~the~~ Political
relations with
Argentina
R 4/1

GRS 150

RESTRICTED

(FM BERNE 040900Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

WRJ 020/6.

TO ROUTINE ROME

TELNO 002 OF 31 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE FCO

MY TELNO 1 OF 17 DECEMBER

1. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION LEFT ON 21 DECEMBER HAVING MET THE MINISTERS OF SOCIAL ACTION AND CULTURE, LEADERS OF THE TWO CGT UNION GROUPS (UBALDINI AND TRIACCA) AND ONLY TWO OF THE FIVE LEADERS OF THE MULTIPARTIDARIA POLITICAL GROUPING : FRONDIZI (INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT) AND ALLENDE (INTRANSIGENT). THEY ALSO MET LEADERS OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY AND OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS BUT NO-ONE FROM CDHE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. DURING THEIR STAY THERE WAS GROWING POPULAR AND PRESS COMMENT AGAINST WHAT WAS VIEWED AS OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN ARGENTINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE ITALIAN EMBASSY ADMITTED TO US THAT THIS WAS NOT A GOOD MOMENT FOR SUCH A MISSION. THE MEDIA HAD BEEN ABLE EASILY TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE AN ENQUIRING COMMISSION WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. THIS WAS CLEARED UP SOMEWHAT BY THE

RESTRICTED

/ SECOND

RESTRICTED

SECOND COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FROM THE EMBASSY AT THE END OF THE VISIT STRESSING THEY WERE NOT AN INVESTIGATING BODY BUT AIMING TO IMPROVE ITALO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

3. THE STORY OF THE VISIT IS TOLD MORE FULLY IN THE DOZEN PRESS CUTTINGS WHICH FOLLOW BY BAG. OUR IMPRESSION IS THE MISSION CAME AND WENT QUOTE SIN PENA NI GLORIA UNQUOTE.

JOY

POWELL-JONES

MINIMAL
WED
5 AM D
NEWS D
FID

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

²
RESTRICTED

54

TOP COPY

GRS 130

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

(FM BERNE 201030Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO PRIORITY ROME TELNO 01 OF 17 DECEMBER

WRD	02016
20DEC1982	
<i>McRae</i> <i>DS</i> <i>20/12</i>	

YOUR TELNO 639 TO FCO : ITALY/ARGENTINA

1. THE ITALIAN EMBASSY TOLD US THE DELEGATION OF FOUR DEPUTIES REPRESENTING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND RADICALS WILL ARRIVE HERE TODAY AT 1430Z. THEY ARE TO MEET NAVAJAS ARTAZA, MINISTER OF SOCIAL ACTION AND PROBABLY LICCIARDO, MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND SOMEONE IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LATER TODAY: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND PROVINCES ON SATURDAY 18 DECEMBER AND THE TWO MAIN UNION GROUPS CGT-AZOPARDO (MODERATE) AND CGT-BRAZIL AND THE FIVE-PARTY MULTIPARTIDARIA GROUPING ON 20 DECEMBER.

2. RECENT PUBLICITY GIVEN HERE TO MISSING PERSONS OF ITALIAN ORIGIN HAS ENCOURAGED MORE CLAIMANTS TO EMERGE AND THE COMBINED TOTAL OF ITALIANS AND ITALO-ARGENTINES INVOLVED IS AROUND 300 (43 OF ITALIAN CITIZENSHIP ONLY).

3. WE WILL REPORT AGAIN NEXT WEEK. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HERE HOW LONG THE MISSION WILL REMAIN.

JOY

POWELL-JONEZS

MINIMAL
WED
SAMD

RESTRICTED

(33)

TOP COPY

see

(34)

GR 100

RESTRICTED

WES. 0206
13 DEC 1982
for the DS
Mlu

RESTRICTED

FM ROME 101735Z DEC 82

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 639 OF 10 DEC 82
INFO PRIORITY BIS BUENOS AIRES

ITALY/ARGENTINA

THERE WILL BE A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE DESAPARECIDOS OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY OF DESCENT ON 15-16 DECEMBER. A "MINI-MISSION" OF ITALIAN DEPUTIES IS REPORTED TO BE LEAVING FOR BUENOS AIRES ON OR SHORTLY AFTER 16 DECEMBER TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A MORE DETAILED VISIT BY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSION EARLY NEXT YEAR.

2. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY REPORT ON THE ITALIAN MISSION THAT BIS BUENOS AIRES CAN SEND US

ARCULUS

MINIMAL
WGD
SAMD

(Repetition to BUENOS AIRES
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telax 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Mr Colombo (32)
Mr P... ..
In the event the
desaparecidos and Community
solidarity comes the Falklands.

P R Fearn Esq
FID
FCO

WR 02016

- 8 NOV 1982

DS

Your reference

Our reference

Date

29 October 1982

John Robin

ARGENTINA: UNGA FALKLANDS DEBATE

Please refer to Guidance Telno 204 asking us to take active steps to remind opinion leaders of the weakness of the Argentine case. We have taken every opportunity to explain our position to the government and to opinion formers. In addition to the message to Spadolini, the Ambassador tackled Colombo (our telno 543) and various other politicians, and we have put the points to officials in the Farnesina and the Prime Minister's office. John Ure saw Bottai during this week's Anglo-Italian talks on Latin America.

2. You will see, however, from our reporting telegram on the Spadolini message that domestic political considerations will be uppermost in Spadolini's mind when he decides how to vote. The Falklands issue almost brought down his government in May, and he will not wish to risk further criticism from the socialists, especially when he and Colombo will be absent in the United States (2-5 November). We must hope that Spadolini and Colombo conclude that there is sufficient company for an abstention which will not invite criticism. The Americans, if they decide to abstain, could be best placed to persuade Spadolini to follow suit, and the Ambassador has reminded Spadolini's people that he will be in the US on the day of the vote.

3. In these circumstances we judge that it would be wrong here to take the initiative in starting a campaign based on the detailed points in paras 3-11 of TUR (We discussed this with Ure on 26 October). It would stir up interest and force Spadolini's coalition partners to define their positions, some of which would be unwelcome to us. Our best hope of an Italian abstention lies in discreet but firm lobbying, not in bringing overt pressure to bear. We shall however continue to explain to all our interlocutors why Britain cannot accept calls to negotiate with Argentina and as occasion offers we shall draw on the guidance. Indeed the Ambassador has already found useful the illustrations of Argentine bad behaviour and its effect on the Islanders.

4. Colombo said to the Ambassador the other day that the Falklands are not the centre of the universe. I fear that is the attitude here. I can only hope that by the time this reaches you we shall have better news to report.

Yours ever
T L Richardson
P R Young Esq WED

31

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

22148 - 1

RR ROME
RR ATHENS
GRS 247
CONFIDENTIAL

W2 > 02016

14 SEP 1982

REGISTRY
Action Taken

Re [unclear] D/S

14/

FM FCO 091100Z SEPT 82

TO ROUTINE ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 241 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN,
THE HAGUE, PARIS, BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOLRG, UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO SAVING OSLO, TOKYO, WELLINGTON, MADRID, LISBON, UKDEL NATO,
UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL STRASBOURG

— (U31)

YOUR TELNO 446: FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. WE ARE SURPRISED THAT THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TOOK IT UPON THEMSELVES TO BRIEF THE ARGENTINES ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS MATTER AT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE TEN. THE UNDERSTANDING SURELY HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT THIS TASK FALLS TO THE PRESIDENCY, AND THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE TEN MAY SPEAK TO THIRD PARTIES ABOUT THEIR OWN POSITIONS BUT NOT ABOUT THOSE OF THEIR PARTNERS. THIS MAY BE A COUNSEL OF PERFECTION, BUT WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THE ITALIANS AT LEAST TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF RESPECTING IT. IT SEEMS PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE OF THEM TO DRAW ATTENTION, NO DOUBT WITH AN ITALIAN SLANT, TO A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE TEN ON A MATTER WHERE THE SOLIDARITY OF THE TEN WAS SO STRIKING DURING THE CRISIS. WE WONDER WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF HIS OFFICIALS WOULD BE APPROVED BY COLOMBO, WHOSE RECENT LETTER TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN TREATED THIS PROBLEM WITH GREAT CORRECTNESS, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT OF HIM.

2. PLEASE SOEAK APOROPRIATELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND SAY THAT WE INTEND TO TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF RAISING THE QUESTION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TEN AND THIRD PARTIES AS A POINT OF PRINCIPLE WITHIN THE TEN.

PYM

LIMITED
WED
ECD(I)
ECD(E)
FID

UND
PS
PS/MR HURD
SIR J BULLARD

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 3266

Example (30)
18/1

P R Nelson Esq
British Embassy
ROME

Your reference

Our reference WRJ 020/6

Date 18 August 1982

WRJ 020/6
18 AUG 1982
ST
Taken
<i>DB</i>

ARGENTINES: ITALIAN OR SPANISH

(28)

1. Thank you for your letter of 10 August in which you reported Signor Leonardo Franchi's continuing correspondence on the Sunday Times article about Argentine soldiers in the Falkland Islands.
2. Signor Franchi is not the only one to have taken the piece in the Sunday Times to heart and I thought you might like to see the enclosed letter sent to the Prime Minister by Signor Giuseppe Fontana of the Instituto Del Nastro Azzurro. The letter makes for enjoyable reading but it also serves to underline the depth of feeling which the Sunday Times article roused.

R P Osborne
Western European Department

Enkripsi (29)
Italy / Falklands
Rp.
16/2



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Your reference

R M Jackson Esq
South American Dept
FCO

WRD 02016

17 AUG 1982

STAY
Taken

DS

Our reference
Date
12 August 1982

See Jackson

COLOMBO'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA

1. We spoke about this yesterday on the telephone. The Ambassador is seeing Colombo later today, and we shall report by telegram. On the basis of what you told me, I briefed the Ambassador about the Italian press reports that Colombo had said in Buenos Aires that the Argentines wanted to resume negotiations within the UN framework and looked for Italian support. This letter is simply to give you a fuller record of what the newspapers here have been carrying.
2. On 10 August Colombo was reported to have told Bignone that Italy could not condone unilateral acts of force that seriously risked damaging international relations; but that Italy would support Argentina in choosing the road of negotiations, and hoped that these would lead to a formal end to hostilities.
3. Colombo was more specific in an interview carried in yesterday's Corriere with the paper's correspondent in Buenos Aires. After his remark I have already quoted about negotiations within the UN framework, the correspondent reminded him that Britain was unwilling to resume negotiations. Colombo then referred to a Mexican initiative at the forthcoming UNGA. But Argentina, he said, would want reaffirmation of the principle of sovereignty and references to "all the concepts of decolonisation" (I take it he means the different interpretations of Resolution 1514) as well as to "the non-aligned resolution". Colombo went on to say that it would require a major effort, in which Latin American and European countries, including the UK, should take part, to find a form of words which would make it possible to reopen serious negotiations. The aim should be maximum UN support in a vote "which did not put Europe again in opposition with Latin America". The correspondent says that Colombo will now try to persuade his Community colleagues to make an effort to overcome the tensions provoked by the Falklands crisis.
4. No doubt Colombo's meeting with the Ambassador will reveal more of his thinking. As seen from here, while Colombo has carefully avoided committing himself to the Argentine position on negotiations, he may well want to work (if still in office next month) for a bland resolution in New York which could risk leaving us isolated. We look forward to receiving detailed instructions from you in due course on how we intend to play our hand at the UN.

Yours ever
T L Richardson

cc: R F Osborne
MED, FCO
Chanceries: IUT/15 New York, Washington, Paris, Bonn



BRITISH EMBASSY
VIA XX SETTEMBRE 80/A
00187 ROMA

Rob pm
28
Bo
16/8

reply sent.

R Osborne Esq
West European Dept
F C O

10 August 1982

Dear Ray,

w2 > 020 b

17 AUG 1982

Mc B... *D17*

taken

see
(20)

ARGENTINES: ITALIAN OR SPANISH

1. You will probably have seen the Ambassador's letter of 23 July to Alan Goodison reporting our dealing with Leandro Franchi over the controversy following the publication of Hugo Young's article in the Sunday Times with its allegations about the courage of Italians in the context of the Falkland Islands' fighting.
2. I am writing now to enclose a copy of the latest letter the Ambassador has received from Sig. Franchi. As you will see, Sig. Franchi is not disposed to consider this matter closed on the basis of the opinion expressed by the Secretary of State (see FCO tel. no. 123 of 27 May). The Ambassador does not intend to respond to Sig. Franchi's latest letter as it is in itself a reply to one from the Ambassador. Sig. Franchi says that he will continue in his action against whoever is responsible for the allegation in Hugo Young's article by a Minister or a journalist (Mr Young) but he does not specify what form this action will take.

NIT.

Yours ever,
Philip

Philip Nelson
(First Secretary)
Information

Enc.

cc: P G Goulden Esq, News Dept, FCO + encl.

(12)

Leandro Franchi

MEL. ... D'ORO AL VALOR MILITARE

ROMA, 28 Luglio 1982
VIA TIGRE, 16 - TEL. 8319491
8445101
855265
TEL. UFF. 856490

RACCOMANDATA
ESPRESSO R.R.

Sir RONALD ARCULUS
Ambasciatore del Regno Unito
Via XX Settembre, 80/A
00187 R O M A

Signor Ambasciatore,

La ringrazio della Sua lettera del 23/7/1982 recapitatami a mano la mattina del 27 corrente e con la quale ella non assicura che un anonimo Ministro non abbia pronunziato le ormai famose frasi riportate dal giornalista Hugo Young ma si limita a riferire l'opinione personale di Mr. Francis Pym, Ministro degli Esteri e del Commonwealth il quale "non può credere che uno dei Suoi colleghi di Gabinetto avesse parlato nel modo riferito da Mr. Young, così come non l'avrebbe fatto il Ministro stesso."

Signor Ambasciatore io capisco che la mia lettera l'ha messa in imbarazzo e che non Le restava che tentare di uscirne diplomaticamente ma, me lo consenta, il Suo è un tentativo veramente originale.

E' come se un giudice assolvesse, un ladro con la spiegazione di non poter credere al furto perché lui stesso non avrebbe rubato.....


Mi dispiace di non essere d'accordo con Lei ma non ritengo affatto chiuso l'incidente. Il ricordo dei miei Comilitoni caduti non me lo consente.

Proseguirò quindi nella mia azione contro lo sprovveduto vile calunniatore che, nascondendosi dietro l'anonimato, ha espresso il giudizio cui ci riferiamo, sia esso un Ministro del Gabinetto di Sua Maestà Britannica o un noto quanto imprudente giornalista.

E Lei che, come mi dice, è stato un combattente della guerra di liberazione, alla quale anche io mi onoro di aver partecipato, deve ben sapere come sanno combattere e morire i soldati italiani.

Voglia gradire l'assicurazione della mia viva considerazione.

Leandro Franchi



Na (27)
Italy/Falklands
R/S
9/1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233 8239

R N Culshaw Esq MVO
British Embassy
ROME

Your reference

Our reference

Date 2 August 1982

UR 0206
-5 AUG 1982
REGISTRY Not Taken
✓ DB

1. cc Mr Reed (USS)
Mr TISM, D173/AAT, MOD
McIntyre RWJ
→ Mr Osborne WED

ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

2. PAH
411

1. Thank you for your telnos 375 and 391. As I explained to you on the telephone last week I am afraid we need a more detailed account of what the Italians have done in response to the approaches the Embassy have been instructed to make.

2. Your telno 375 suggested we would hear separately, but the brief indication we have received on other channels does not go far enough. We in any case would much prefer an account containing views and judgements from you on FCO channels, even if it does not go into specific detail, both because we want your own views and for practical reasons.

3. We were prepared, in the heat of the conflict, to accept that action and feedback should be handled as it was. But we have received disappointingly little feedback and we are now suffering the disadvantages of not having had regular reports from you directly. For example, we have not been in a position to brief Ministers as fully as we would have liked on the allegation concerning Italy in paragraph 2 of Paris telno 779. We are fairly frequently asked to provide briefing and commentaries on arms traffic to Argentina. When we come to Italy we enter largely unchartered territory, at least as far as we are concerned in the FCO. This makes it harder to judge likely Italian reactions to any further approaches on the general question of continuing the arms embargo or over individual cases.

4. It would therefore be most helpful to have from you an early account of Italian performance in this area to enable us both to meet requests for briefing/comment (which we often get at short notice) and to reach sensible conclusions on what we can expect the Italians to do in future. Your own comments and judgements would of course be greatly valued.

(26) *Falklands*
14/7

Mr Goodison

Parliamentary Unit

WRS 02016
RECEIVED
26 JUL 1982
<i>JRS</i>

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION: ITALY AND THE FALKLANDS

PROBLEM

1. Mr K Harvey-Proctor (Conservative, Basildon) has put down a written PQ on Italian support for EC sanctions against Argentina during the Falkland Islands crisis. How should we respond?

RECOMMENDATION

2. I submit a draft reply, cleared with the Embassy in Rome and with SAMD.

BACKGROUND

3. Mr Harvey-Proctor has already put down two PQs on this subject. His interest is not confined to Italy. Questions on the Irish Republic's attitude have also been asked. There is no evidence that Mr Harvey-Proctor has any particular anti-Italian axe to grind. His interest in Foreign Affairs is wide-ranging. He has recently asked a series of questions on our relations with Latin America.

4. The thrust of his questions on Italy is directed towards obtaining an explanation of the Italian Government's action. The Italian Government did not however make public its reasons for failing to renew sanctions. We must hope that the rather unrevealing reply will convey the message to Mr Harvey-Proctor that it is not for HMG to provide a public exegesis of Italian Government decisions.

A M Wood

A M Wood
Western European Department

9 July 1982

Wood *12/7*

A B
(24)
(23)



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

*Copy to Mr Goulson, News Dept
(To see end of 6.)*

A M Wood Esc
WED
FCO

REGISTRY	
- 7 JUL 1982	
DI. FERRER	REGISTRI
INDEX	Action Taken

Your reference

Our reference

1 July 1982

See Andrew,

*Mr Young 7/7
Mr Ostrand 7/7
10 days to 6/7
with refs.*

ITALY AND THE FALKLANDS

1. In his letter of 25 May to Alan Goodison, Michael Simpson-Orlebar analysed Italy's reactions to the Falkland Islands crisis. This letter seeks to round off the story.
2. The attitudes of the political parties remained much as set out in Michael's letter. Most doubts about our policy, and especially about the degree of force we used, continued to come from the Socialist Party (PSI), the Christian Democrat Party (DC), and the Communist Party (PCI). The extent of business pressure on the first two of these three is gradually becoming clear: FIAT, for example, are said to have financed at least one of the South American delegation which came here to drum up support for the Argentine case. Once Italy was no longer involved in EC economic sanctions the criticism was less shrill. Prominent members of all these parties told us in private that they personally were fully behind the British government, in spite of the line their party was taking in public. The smaller parties of the governing coalition - the Social Democrat party (PSDI), the Liberal Party (PLI) and Spadolini's Republican Party (PRI) - continued to express support for HMG's line of not allowing aggression to pay and of upholding the principles of self-determination and international law. *Typical*
3. The Italian government, notably Spadolini and Colombo, kept up their series of statements of political support for Britain. Pertini kept a lower profile but was robust in private conversation with the Ambassador. Most such statements included a reference to the need for negotiation at some stage to settle the underlying problem; and now that the fighting has stopped the Italians are bound to emphasise this aspect.
4. The reaction to the Falkland Islands crisis in the press, radio and television differed significantly from the political reaction. In the independent press (i.e. those papers not tied to a particular political party) support for the British case was solid. The most notable and vociferous supporter was La Repubblica with its editor Eugenio Scalfari. We drew some of his most outspoken articles to Information Department's attention. Other papers, such as La Stampa and Il Giornale Nuovo, were also firm in their support. Some, like Il Corriere della Sera and Il Tempo had

/less clear



less clear editorial lines. Occasionally such papers would print an unhelpful article that was balanced by a better article a day or so later. The Ambassador's two press conferences, and a flood of communiquees from our Information Section, helped to keep the record straight.

5. The loudest criticism of HMG's position came from the party press - Avanti (PSI), Il Popolo (DC), and L'Unità (PCI). They were backed up by Paese Sera (close to the PCI) and Il Messaggero (close to the PSI). Their argument was usually that whilst Argentina was in the wrong, the Falklands were not worth spilling blood, and there must be some way of finding a negotiated settlement. We tried to emphasize to and through these papers how reasonable Britain's position had been throughout the crisis. We had only limited success.

6. Radio and television contained less editorial comment than the press on the crisis. But throughout there were references to this "absurd war". Often problems arose because more prominence was given to reports emerging from Buenos Aires than to those from London. Editorial desks had more information available from Buenos Aires, even if later the information turned out to be false. (In the latter half of the crisis TV and radio stations recognised explicitly that Argentine information was unreliable). Britain undoubtedly got its best press when the MOD was releasing most information. The clearest illustration of this was over the weekend of the landing at Port San Carlos. Newspapers and TV screens were suddenly filled with still pictures from British sources; no pictures had been available up to that point. The lesson is that if we wish to influence the picture of Britain presented in the Italian media we must work on the London-based Italian correspondents and give them something to say. Television and radio are particularly important, given that relatively few Italians read a daily newspaper.

7. The reaction of the general public to the crisis is harder to judge. Before the retaking of Port Stanley we received a largish post bag that was fairly evenly divided between support and criticism. We also received a number of resolutions from local councils that usually demanded the end of hostilities and the opening of negotiations. Since the retaking of Port Stanley and the Argentine surrender our post has been mainly expressions of support. A band-wagon effect, we suspect.

8. The issue has now dropped from the front pages. Neither the political parties nor the press is especially interested in the clearing up process, although I am sure that many journalists would want to go to the Falklands, if offered the chance. Some commentators continue to stress the importance of rebuilding bridges between Europe and Latin America.



9. The lessons are not easy to draw. Perhaps the clearest is that Italy, and especially an Italian government subject to precarious coalition arithmetic, will always try to find a middle way in a crisis. Horror of bloodshed, and the feeling of closeness to the many Argentines of Italian stock, were potent emotional factors this time. Italy has a natural temptation to mediate and usually believes, or affects to believe, that a compromise achieved through negotiations is the correct solution to any problem. The line proposed by Craxi, for his own ends, therefore found an echo not just among the Italian public, but also in other political parties.

10. No doubt the Falklands, and Latin American relations, will feature prominently at next week's Summit. Present signs are that Spadolini and Colombo will not press us unduly hard, especially now that the European Council statement on Latin America contains all the right phrases.

Yours ever.
Tom

T L Richardson

cc: K G MacInnes Esq
Information Dept
FCO

P R Fearn Esq
South American Dept
FCO

Chanceries:

WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK
PARIS
BONN

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

for WRITTEN answer on 5 July 1982

The draft reply should reach the Parliamentary Unit through your Under-Secretary by

4pm Today
Friday 2 July

5

24

C Mr K Harvey Proctor (Basildon): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what reasons were given by the Government of the Republic of Italy for not lending support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands crisis.

Mr Douglas Hurd

The Italian Government gave some useful support to the UK during

the Falklands crisis. It

failed to renew the economic sanctions ^{which} it imposed in the immediate

aftermath of the Argentine invasion, but consistently condemned

Argentine policies, and has maintained an arms embargo throughout.

Minister.

Dr
2 June

5 July 1982

Mr K Harvey Proctor (Basildon): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what reasons were given by the Government of the Republic of Italy for not lending support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands crisis.

No W165

MR DOUGLAS HURD

The Italian Government gave some useful support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands crisis. It failed to renew the economic sanctions which it imposed in the immediate aftermath of the Argentine invasion, but consistently condemned Argentine policies, and has maintained an arms embargo throughout.

Madrid Conference

• Sir Bernard Braine asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will discuss with the United Kingdom's partners in the European Community the desirability of postponing the Madrid conference, which is due to be re-convened on 9 November, until such time as the Unions of Soviet Socialist Republics and other Warsaw Pact countries observe the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki accord and the Polish Government in particular lifts martial law, releases Mr. Walesa and other Solidarity leaders and restores human and civil liberties in that country.

Mr. Rifkind: All decisions at the Madrid meeting are taken by consensus and the last session ended on 12 March with a decision to reconvene on 9 November. It would not therefore be practicable for us and our Community partners to postpone the reconvening of the meeting. However, the United Kingdom delegation will, as in the past, take full advantage of the reconvening of the conference to draw attention to any failures by Warsaw Pact countries to observe the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly if there has been no significant improvement in the situation in Poland.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Antarctica

• Mr. Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will give details of the preliminary agreement recently reached by the 14 signatory countries of the Antarctic treaty upon the exploitation of oil and minerals in Antarctica.

Mr. Onslow: No agreement about the exploitation of oil and minerals in the Antarctic was reached between the Antarctic treaty consultative parties at their recent meeting in Wellington. However, the meeting drew up a procedural framework to guide the conduct of future discussions on a minerals regime. It was also agreed that informal discussions would be continued in Wellington in January 1983.

Geneva Convention

• Mr. Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will introduce legislation enabling the Government to ratify the Geneva convention, Cmnd. 6927, Treaty Series Miscellaneous No. 19 of 1977.

Mr. Rifkind: Consultations with our NATO allies concerning the additional protocols to which my hon. Friend refers are continuing, and I am unable to say when we shall be in a position to introduce the necessary legislation.

United Nations Institute for Namibia

• Mr. Eldon Griffiths asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if the United Kingdom contributes directly to the United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka or if any part of the contribution made to United Nations central funds is made over to this organisation.

Entered on 36
Mr. Rifkind: We do not contribute directly, but part of the funds received by the institute derives from the contributions of member States to the regular budget of the United Nations.

Lebanon (Israeli Invasion)

• **Mr. Marlow** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government will maintain its current attitude towards the Israeli invasion of Lebanon so long as any part of Lebanese territory, including strategically important areas, such as Beaufort Castle, remain in Israeli hands.

Mr. Hurd: The Government's position will continue to be based on the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Prisoners of War (South Lebanon)

• **Mr. Hooley** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will hold discussions with representatives of the International Red Cross about the treatment of Palestinian prisoners of war in South Lebanon, and those moved to Israel, and the extent to which the Geneva convention is being observed.

Mr. Hurd: We have already acted in support of the International Committee of the Red Cross in urging the Israeli Government to apply the principles of the relevant Geneva conventions to Israeli-held prisoners.

The Israeli Government have said in reply that captured Palestinian prisoners are being treated as civilian detainees under the fourth Geneva convention and not as prisoners of war under the third Geneva convention. According to the Israeli Government, this is because the Palestinians have been engaged in terrorist activities and are not themselves a party to the Geneva conventions. The Israeli Government assure us that Palestinian prisoners are being treated properly and humanely by the Israeli armed forces.

Chile

• **Mr. Proctor** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether any bilateral agreements have been made between the Republic of Chile and the United Kingdom during the last 12 months; what areas have been covered by any such agreements; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Onslow: None, other than an arrangement which related to the sale of HMS "Norfolk" and RFA "Tidepool".

Italy (Falkland Islands Operation)

• **Mr. Proctor** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what reasons were given by the Government of the Republic of Italy for not lending support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands operation.

Mr. Hurd: The Italian Government gave some useful support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands crisis. They failed to renew the economic sanctions which they imposed in the immediate aftermath of the Argentine invasion, but consistently condemned Argentine policies, and have maintained an arms embargo throughout.

23

WRD		02018
OFFICER		REGISTRY
-6 JUL 1982		
INDEX	PA	Action Taken
	✓	JB

see
(20)

Mr Hannay *- side copy sent*

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

1. Mr K Harvey Proctor MP has put down a PQ on Italian support for the UK over the Falkland Islands crisis.
2. I submit a draft reply, agreed with the Embassy in Rome and with South American Department. The draft should reach Parliamentary Unit by 4.00 pm today.

A M Wood
Western European Department

2 July 1982

HD/WED

per Italy/Argentina

WES 02016	
28 JUN 1982	
4000	DK

WES 02016

SECRET

GRS 70
 SECRET
 DEDIP
 FROM ROME 231400Z JUN 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELNO 330 OF 23 JUN 82
 INFO ROUTINE MODUK (DIC ARMS CONTROL CELL)

Mr Tompkins 20/6

Mr Osborne 20/6

df

YOUR TELNO 158: ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

1. WE HAVE TAKEN ACTION BOTH WITH THE MFA AND AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL ELSEWHERE, STRESSING THAT AS THE FH 70 HOWITZER IS A JOINT VENTURE IN WHICH WE ARE INVOLVED DIRECTLY, WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT NO DEAL WITH THE ARGENTINES SHOULD GO FORWARD. THE ITALIANS ARE NOW MAKING ENQUIRIES.

ARCULUS
BT

LIMITEI)

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/PUSD

HD/DEFENCE D

D HD/PUSD

D HD/SAMD

HD/WED ✓

MR WRIGHT

MR WILLMORE

SECRET

(21)

Tel. to issue as amended
24/6

Private Secretary
9H 24/6

25/6
Mr Southwood
Mr Osborne
Mr Booth
25/6

Sir J Bullard

MESSAGES TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. You asked WED to consult Private Office about possible replies to the messages to the Secretary of State from M. Cheysson (17 June) and Sig. Colombo (16 June). Mr Richards agrees that a formal reply is not necessary but suggests a short instruction to the Ambassadors in Paris and Rome on the lines of the attached draft telegram.

A

Adel'd.

WR 5 02016

28 JUN 1982

INDEX	OFFICER	REGISTRY
	PA	Action Taken
		C DB

J R Young
Western European Department

23 June 1982

cc. Falklands Unit

Original 24/6

Ent. Sec. / K. Williams
1/2
4/1
(20)

CONFIDENTIAL

11113 - 1

OO ROME

GRS 418

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181404Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 18 JUNE

MY TELS 158, 159 TO BRUSSELS :

ARGENTINA: EC SANCTIONS

<i>WRD</i>	<i>02010</i>
<i>PC</i>	<i>NY</i>
21 JUN 1982	
<i>STRY</i>	
<i>in Taken</i>	
<i>✓ DS</i>	

1. FOLLOWING IS ITALIAN EMBASSY'S INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF MESSAGE OF 16 JUNE FROM COLOMBO TO ME.
BEGINS

AT THE TIME WHEN THE BRITISH SOLDIERS, AFTER HAVING SHOWN EXTRAORDINARY PATRIOTISM, BRAVERY AND COURAGE, ACHIEVE THEIR AIMS IN THE FALKLANDS, I WISH ONCE AGAIN TO EXPRESS TO YOU ITALY'S FEELINGS OF SOLIDARITY AGAINST THE ARBITRARY ACT OF VIOLENCE REPRESENTED BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION.

THIS ACT HAS AFFECTED, TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, ALL THE NATIONS WHO DEEM IT FUNDAMENTAL TO REASSERT, ESPECIALLY IN THIS TROUBLED TIME, THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

WE REGRET THE LOSS OF SO MANY YOUNG BRITISH AND ARGENTINE LIVES WHICH HAVE BEEN SACRIFICED IN THESE DRAMATIC EVENTS AND WE STRESS OUR FEELINGS OF SORROW TO THEIR FAMILIES.

RELATING TO THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT ON THE 9TH OF JUNE TO ME AND TO THE OTHER COLLEAGUES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FULLY SHARES THE AIM TO EXERT EVERY POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT RELINQUISHES ANY AGGRESSIVE INTENTION AND COMMITS ITSELF TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACEFUL RELATIONS AND UNDERTAKES AGAIN TO NEGOTIATE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE WERE THE TRENDS THAT WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING DURING THE LAST DIFFICULT MONTHS IN OUR CONTACTS WITH BUENOS AIRES.

AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO YOU, I BELIEVE THAT FROM THE DISCUSSION AMONG OUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON THE EVENING OF THE 14TH OF JUNE IN BRUSSELS, THE OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS

1
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/HAS

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11113 - 1

HAS EMERGED - AND IN ANY CASE IT IS LOYALLY ITALY'S OPINION - IN FAVOUR, AFTER THE BRITISH MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT, OF A PROMPT RENEWAL OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, TOWARDS WHICH IT IS EVIDENTLY NECESSARY THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE AVAILABLE.

I UNDERSTAND HOW MUCH SUCH A GESTURE COULD COST, AFTER THE COMMITMENT TO WHICH YOUR COUNTRY HAS BEEN OBLIGED AND AFTER THE SACRIFICES SUSTAINED, BUT I BELIEVE THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAS BEEN ABLE TO GIVE IN HER PAST HISTORY MANY EXAMPLES OF POLITICAL FORESIGHT AND OF MAGNANIMITY, AND THAT THESE ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH TO RECALL THEM. SUCH AN ATTITUDE WOULD HAVE IN MY OPINION A WIDE POSITIVE ECHO ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE, STARTING NATURALLY IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE THE TRADITIONAL FEELINGS TOWARDS YOUR COUNTRY ARE ONLY WAITING FOR THE OCCASION TO EMERGE AGAIN.

ENDS

PYM

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

PCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Copy to the Secy/Adm. Secy
(19)
High (WED)
Rps

SECRET D E D I P

Mr. Osborne

10737 - 2

PP ROME
GRS 58
SECRET
D E D I P
FM FCO 161900Z JUNE 82
TO PRIORITY ROME
TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 16 JUNE
INFO MODUK (DIC ARMS CONTROL)

<i>WED 0200</i>
21 JUN 1982
STAY
Non Taken
<i>DB</i>

17/6

ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

1. [REDACTED] THE ARGENTINES HAVE APPROACHED MONTEDISON REGARDING A CONSIGNMENT OF EXPLOSIVE FOR ARGENTINA VIA ITALY.
2. PLEASE ASK THE ITALIANS TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STOP THIS.

PYM

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MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

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IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
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PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

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19
H/WED Rps
4/6

SECRET D E D I P

10737 - 2

Mr. Ochs

PP ROME
GRS 58
SECRET
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FM FCO 161900Z JUNE 82
TO PRIORITY ROME
TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 16 JUNE
INFO MODUK (DIC ARMS CONTROL)

W22 0200
21 JUN 1982
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tion Taken
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17/6

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LIMITED
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MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958



CONFIDENTIAL

186 G. K. sp. 2/6

It will take a lot of time, energy and patience. It's essentially a long-term hope. But, like the Franco-British Council, it can't help.

BRITISH EMBASSY, ROME.

Italy's ability to field a good team is a bit questionable.

Mr Young

Mr Osborne
Mr Wood

25 May 1982

Alan Goodison Esq CMG CVO
FCO

I have thanked him
we really think

Dear Alan, a Council not be useful for long?

W.A. 123 02016
ec. Ms. B. G. 117
5 JUN 1982 '86
PS
PS/PUS
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REGISTRY
Action Taken
PS

ITALY AND THE FALKLANDS

1. Why did the Italians fail to join in the renewal of the EC import ban on 17 May, and what lessons should we draw? These questions also have particular relevance if the Prime Minister visits Rome, as planned, on 6-7 July for the next Anglo-Italian Summit.

2. In the past month, the Italian government surprised itself and others by agreeing to impose an import ban, and then gradually retreated from that position as the consequences became clearer. The Socialists were the first to do so. Indeed, it took a lot of effort by Spadolini and Colombo to persuade their Foreign Trade Minister to sign the relevant April decree; and the party complained from the outset that it had not been consulted. We ourselves thought DC attitudes equally questionable because of that party's strong links with Latin America. We reckoned that the other three parties in the coalition (PLI, PSDI and Spadolini's own PRI) were safer.

3. The problem here was that the range of people to be lobbied was very wide (some of our efforts are described in the Annex to this letter). We have a five-party coalition in which, as you well know, the Ministers themselves are often less important than the party secretaries to whom they owe allegiance. Not only that, but the coalition's future is itself in doubt and everyone is speculating on the timing of the next elections.

4. I set out below what we believe to be the main reasons, some general and others more specific, why Italy would not renew the ban even for a week.

/General

CONFIDENTIAL



General

a) Ties of blood with the large Italo-Argentine community. Estimates of its size vary, but according to the MFA there are 1.3 million Italian passport holders in Argentina and several more millions of Italian descent. The Italo-Argentines swamped the Italian political parties and other organisations (eg. Rotary) with letters and telegrams, and sent over a delegation in the crucial final stages which saw Pertini, Spadolini, Cdombo and the party secretaries. Part of their success was due to the fact that many proclaimed their dislike of the generals but were still in favour of the invasion and anti-sanctions.

b) A degree of pacifism, partly but not exclusively on the Italian left, abetted by the post-war reaction against all that Fascism stood for. Many Italians are genuinely and instinctively horrified by any shedding of blood. Press coverage of the sinking of the "General Belgrano", and reports of sailors abandoned in the freezing South Atlantic, had an enormous impact.

c) The Pope's equivocal attitude may have been a contributory factor, especially on Christian Democrat opinion. His statements command more attention here than those of any Italian politician - even Pertini (who was himself pretty sound but failed to restrain Craxi).

✓ d) A deep-rooted conviction that everything is negotiable. Italian life is a perpetual compromise. Problems are there to be got round, not confronted head-on. You will have noted how the endless Chigi and MFA communique urged negotiations on the two parties almost for negotiation's sake.

e) Allied to (d) was the notion that the future of the distant Falklands and of their tiny population was not worth fighting for. The commonest press clichés have been that the war was "absurd" and our reaction "disproportionate".

f) Another deep prejudice which has surfaced in the past month is that this is British colonialism's last fling.

/Disparaging



Disparaging references by Piccoli to the "British lion" were symptomatic; Craxi has been much harsher. The emotional scenes when our fleet departed probably mystified many Italians. They see the despatch of our Task Force as a 19th century reaction out of time. Those who are old enough remember the loss of their own colonies. Even those who accept that Falklanders who want to remain British have the same rights as, and are entitled to be treated differently from, the ex-colonies whom we brought to independence nevertheless believe that the islands' future belongs to the Third World and not to a remote metropolitan power.

f) Last but not least, many people saw sanctions as contributing to the escalation of the conflict: they were particularly afraid of the opportunities offered to the Russians and harmful effects on the long term relationship between Europe and Latin America.

Specific

5. There were other, more specific reasons:-

a) Italian commercial interests in South America. These, like their political interests are substantial, both in trade, contracts and investment - many major firms have subsidiaries in Argentina. (We therefore welcome the department's agreement to an Anglo-Italian bilateral on the region when the dust has settled). Specific evidence is hard to come by, but there are reports that Italian firms stood to lose half a dozen major contracts. Any extension of the conflict to countries like Venezuela would be bad for Italian trade. Incidentally, though Latin American reactions are widely reported, few Italians know or care about African support for us.

b) Disbelief in the efficacy of sanctions. Those who opposed renewal argued that they were costing Italy money while merely hardening the junta's attitudes. Even MFA officials to whom we passed the useful JIC background papers expressed scepticism. Nor of course could we argue that maintaining sanctions would automatically

/avoid



CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

avoid any recourse to military action in an argument which would have appealed here. It was argued that sanctions had a perverse effect on Mussolini and were likely to make matters worse, not better, in Argentina.

c) The prospect of winning the votes of Italian nationals resident abroad, especially in Latin America, if the voting law is changed. Colombo said this was the main factor. (We shall be commenting in more detail to WED). It is not clear whether Craxi was deliberately bidding for such votes from the outset; he has other reasons for opposing sanctions. But I am sure that Piccoli had these possible votes in mind when he attacked sanctions at the DC Congress, the first prominent DC politician to do so. The lesser parties had to trim accordingly.

As usual.
6. I have left Craxi and the PSI to the last, partly because our telegrams have dealt with them, partly because I wanted to show that, however opportunistically Craxi had behaved, he was pushing at a half-open door. This year alone the PSI have made serious trouble for Spadolini's coalition over El Salvador, Poland, the Siberian pipeline, the cost of money, the Andreatta affair - and now the Falklands. A man with only 10% of the vote is making the going very rough for Spadolini. Why did he break ranks on sanctions and what are the main implications? We believe his primary motive was to show that his coalition partners are obliged, once again, to jump to his tune; and he was determined that the party secretaries of the coalition should decide, not the cabinet. Policy justifications came later. By the end, most of the reasons listed above - and several more - had been paraded, without any notable consistency. The PSI are now making much, for example, of their hostility to sanctions; but they were in the van in pressing for action against Poland and the Soviet Union after the December military takeover.

7. What has happened since 17 May is the mirror-image of what happened after 20 April. The Italians are now beginning to realise the consequences of non-renewal. Already the PLI, PSDI and PRI have criticised the decision harshly; Longo (PSDI) has called it an "irreparable error", and Zanone has regretted that the recent resolution of the European Parliament, which his

/Liberal

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Liberal group helped to promote, was set aside so cavalierly. It was typical of Italy - and in accordance with Craxi's wishes - that the party secretaries, whom Spadolini telephoned frenziedly on the crucial Monday, took the decision rather than the Council of Ministers. When the latter finally met last week, it was by all accounts a stormy session (3½ hours of post-mortem) and we know of at least two DC Ministers (Darida and Andreatta) who, with the representatives of the smaller parties, strongly criticised the decision. Craxi launched a violent attack on all who dared question it, and there are some Socialists who think he went too far. Many in the DC are unhappy. You know how miserable Colombo was. He tried so hard.

8. Looking to the future, much will depend on how quickly we finish the job and at what cost. We have had some support from many sections of the Italian public, though they are apt to faint at the sight of blood. The arguments running in our favour are basically four. First, many people from Spadolini downwards do believe that aggression should be resisted and international law upheld. Secondly, many accept that we nevertheless tried to negotiate a fair settlement (though the ground has been confused somewhat by Perez de Cuellar's last-minute intervention). Thirdly, the Italians dislike military regimes. Fourth and most important, for 30 years Italy has been a "good European"; there is no denying the sense of shame and guilt in the press at Italy's first major parting of the ways with its fellow Europeans. It has been striking how the case for supporting us has rested largely on European rather than Anglo-Italian ties. The ties that predominate are Italo-Argentine ie. ties of blood.

10. The Ambassador has already written to David Gladstone about the July summit; he agrees this should be an occasion for mending fences inspite of the poor Italian performance on 17 May. The same goes for the other Ministerial visits proposed for later this year, about which we are writing separately. We hope planning will go ahead on the proposed Anglo-Italian Council that the Ambassador discussed with Gladstone earlier this month. More could be done to foster party to party links; we may have some thoughts on this too.

11. Meanwhile we shall carry on the good fight.

*Yours ever
Michael*

M K O Simpson-Orlebar

ANNEX

1. In the fortnight before 17 May, HM Ambassador saw Colombo and took advantage of the DC Congress and other conferences to talk to Fanfani, Pandolfi, Piccoli (then Party Secretary and now President of the party) and Gerardo Bianco (DC leader in the Chamber). Piccoli was the most unhelpful, and the Ambassador subsequently wrote to him. Finally the Ambassador called on the elusive Craxi and followed up, when it was clear that Craxi was determined to end sanctions, by writing a tough letter to him copied to all Socialist Ministers in the government.
2. In the Ambassador's absence in London two weeks ago, the Minister wrote to some other party secretaries, De Mita (the new DC Secretary), Zanone, Longo and Biasini (for the Republicans), urging them to support renewal. He and other members of the Embassy lobbied other party and government contacts at all levels, including the PCI, though they are in opposition: the PCI behaved better than the Socialists.
3. The Embassy was active with the media too. The Ambassador gave a press conference to counter critical comment after the sinking of the "Belgrano" and "Sheffield", and another on 25 May to emphasise the reasonableness of the settlement we had been prepared to negotiate. Press communiques were sent regularly to more than 200 media contacts and to selected politicians, supplemented as necessary by personal approaches. The Embassy took issue in print with unhelpful articles and editorials, notably in the Socialist press.
4. The Embassy took advantage of the presence of well-disposed Labour MP's in Rome to try to stimulate a telephone call to Craxi from Mr Foot or Mr Healey.
5. In the last few days before the Luxembourg meeting Britain's allies also helped. The (Socialist) French Ambassador tackled Craxi without success. The Americans leant heavily on Andreotti. Craxi's deputy Martelli was prudently unobtainable during the crucial period; the US Embassy, who arranged a recent tour for him to the United States, chewed him up after Luxembourg. Haig pressed Colombo to renew. Most important of all, there were direct appeals from British Ministers, notably the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with Colombo.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Secretary of State

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Sig Emilio Colombo
Foreign Minister
ROME

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I should like to thank you for your letter of 16 June and for the sentiments of solidarity with the United Kingdom which you express in it. I am also grateful to you for your readiness to seek to influence the Argentine government to relinquish, once and for all, the path of aggression.

We welcomed the opportunity at the meeting of Political Directors on 14 June to discuss with our European colleagues the next steps, following our repossession of the Falklands Islands. We noted the view of some of those present that negotiations should be resumed between the United Kingdom and Argentina. However, this view was not supported by all. For our part, our future policy must take account of Argentina's unwillingness to negotiate seriously in the first phase of the crisis, and of the great sacrifices which our forces had to make

in order to counter Argentina's unprovoked aggression. Vital principles are at stake and it is politically unthinkable for Argentina now to reap

/the

and apparent unwillingness to accept factors as well as
Enclosures—flag(s).....

have

to allow

reward of a unilateral attempt to establish Argentine rule by force against the clearly expressed wishes of the Islanders. The British government cannot now sit down to resume negotiations over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands as though nothing had happened.

Argentina still shows no sign of recognising its error in invading the Islands. Indeed the Junta refuses to renounce further hostilities in pursuit of its claim. However, it remains our earnest hope that, in response to the representations of the British government and many other governments at our request, the Argentine government will confirm that they regard all hostilities in the South Atlantic as at an end. Such a statement on their part would pave the way to a gradual resumption of more normal relations, which must be our objective as soon as circumstances permit. Meanwhile I am fully conscious of the vital importance of sustaining Europe's links with Latin America as a whole. Friendly relations with the countries of the area are clearly anecessity for all our European partners, as well as for the future development of the Falkland Islands.

I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these questions further when we meet on 20-22 June for the Foreign Affairs Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Enclosures—flag(s).....

CONFIDENTIAL

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I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these questions further when we meet on 20-22 June for the Foreign Affairs Council.



Mr Crowe, ECD(E)

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 'STRY
 18 JUN 1982
 ✓ DB

Be one week for
 draft.
 KAS
 u/c

FALKLANDS: MESSAGES TO EC PARTNERS

1. I understand that you are drafting a message to EC Foreign Ministers, which will take account of the message to the Secretary of State from Sig. Colombo. A toutes fins utiles I attach a redraft of the reply to Sig. Colombo's message which Mr Williams of the Emergency Unit drafted on 17 June. It was prepared on receipt of Mr Williams' submission.
- || 2. WED would be grateful to see your message to Foreign Ministers in draft, if possible.

J R Young
 Western European Department
 W62A 233 4759

18 June 1982

cc. Mr Williams, Emergency Unit
 Mr Wood

File - Pym/Fontana
16
14/6

Italian Embassy to 21/6/82
14, Three Kings Yard,
London, W.1.

6175

London, 16th June 1982.

Hd (Fan. Unit)
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PS/PUS
n Bullard
n Wiffard
n Vire
Bar Woodson
n Willmore
Def. Dept
F.D.C.E.
W.F.D.
Plan Staff
J.H.
16/6

Dear Foreign Secretary,

I take pleasure in enclosing a message which
Foreign Minister, Signor Emilio Colombo, has asked me to convey to you, together with a rough translation.

Very sincerely yours

Luigi M. Fontana Giusti

Luigi M. Fontana Giusti,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

URS 0206
17 JUN 1982
M. R. 1/6

The Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Pym, M.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

2 encs.

Caro Francis,

nel momento in cui i soldati britannici, dopo aver dato una straordinaria prova di patriottismo, di bravura e di coraggio, si affermano nelle Falklands, desidero ancora una volta esprimere i sentimenti di solidarieta' dell'Italia nei confronti dell'atto arbitrario di violenza costituito dall'invasione argentina.

Quell'atto ha colpito con la Gran Bretagna tutte le nazioni che ritengono fondamentale riaffermare, soprattutto nell'attuale agitato periodo, l'inaccettabilita' della forza come mezzo di soluzione delle controversie internazionali.

Pensiamo con rimpianto alle molte giovani vite britanniche ed argentine che si sono sacrificate in questa drammatica vicenda ed esprimiamo i nostri sentimenti di cordoglio alle famiglie colpite.

In relazione al messaggio da Lei inviato il 9 giugno a me e agli altri colleghi della Comunita' Europea, il Governo italiano condiziona pienamente l'obiettivo di svolgere tutta la possibile influenza sul Governo argentino, perche' abbandoni ogni proposito aggressivo e si proponga di ristabilire relazioni pacifiche e di riprendere la via negoziale.

A questa linea ci siamo del resto ispirati nel corso degli ultimi difficili mesi, nei contatti con Buenos Aires.

Come Le sara' stato riferito, credo che dalla discussione sull'argomento fra i nostri Direttori Politici svoltasi il 14 sera a Bruxelles sia emersa l'opinione dei partners comunitari della Gran Bretagna - che in ogni caso e' con lealta' l'opinione dell'Italia - a favore, dopo l'affermazione militare britannica, di una pronta ripresa della prospettiva negoziale, alla quale evidentemente occorre che entrambe le parti siano disponibili.

Comprendo quanto questo gesto possa costare, dopo l'impegno a cui il Suo Paese e' stato costretto ed i sacrifici compiuti, ma credo che la Gran Bretagna abbia saputo dare nella sua storia molti esempi di lungimiranza politica e di magnanimita' e che questa sia la circostanza per ispirarsi ad essi. Un simile atteggiamento avrebbe a mio avviso una vasta eco positiva sulla scena internazionale, a cominciare

naturalmente dall'America Latina ove i tradizionali sentimenti verso il Suo Paese aspettano solo l'occasione per riemergere.

Colgo l'occasione per inviarLe l'espressione della mia sin
cera amicizia.

EMILIO COLOMBO

Roma, 16 giugno 1982.

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Francis,

At the time when the British soldiers, after having shown extraordinary patriotism, bravery and courage, achieve their aims in the Falklands, I wish once again to express to you Italy's feelings of solidarity against the arbitrary act of violence represented by the Argentine invasion.

This act has affected, together with the United Kingdom, all the nations who deem it fundamental to reassert, especially in this troubled time, the unacceptability of the force as a mean of settlement of international disputes.

We regret the loss of so many young British and Argentine lives which have been sacrificed in these dramatic events and we stress our feelings of sorrow to their families.

Relating to the message which you sent on the 9th of June to me and to the other colleagues of the European Community, the Italian Government fully shares the aim to exert every possible influence on the Argentine Government so that it relinquishes any aggressive intention and commits itself to re-establish peaceful relations and undertakes again to negotiate.

On the other hand, these were the trends that we have been following during the last difficult months in our contacts with Buenos Ayres.

As it might have been reported to you, I believe that from the discussion among our Political Directors on the evening of the 14th of June in Brussels, the opinion of the European partners has emerged - and in any case it is loyally Italy's opinion - in favour, after the British military achievement, of a prompt renewal of the negotiating process, towards which it is evidently necessary that both parties should be available.

I understand how much such a gesture could cost, after the commitment to which your Country has been obliged and after the sacrifices sustained, but I believe that Great Britain has been able

continued

to give in her past history many examples of political foreseeing and of magnanimity, and that these are the circumstances under which to recall them. Such an attitude would have in my opinion a wide positive echo in the international stage, starting naturally in Latin America where the traditional feelings towards your Country are only waiting for the occasion to emerge again.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the expression of my sincere friendship.

EMILIO COLOMBO

Rome, 16th June 1982.

1 June 1982

20 St. James, (C218)

482

7 JUN 1982

No Italy/Italians.

(15)

*Rp.
4/6*

Mr Bullard

NON-ALIGNED MEETING: ITALIAN LOBBYING

1. At your Community briefing on 27 May you urged that members of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement should be lobbied to prevent pro-Argentine resolutions at the Havana and Baghdad meetings.
2. The Minister-Counsellor of the Italian Embassy, Sr Fontana Giusti, spoke to me this morning to confirm that appropriate instructions had been sent on 28 May to the Italian Embassies in Senegal, Jordan, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia and Yugoslavia.
3. Sr Fontana Giusti had no more to say - he only wished to confirm that Italy had taken this action. I thanked him suitably and said that I would let you know.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

1 June 1982

cc Mr Cooper, ECD(E)
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CONFIDENTIAL

OO ROME
 GRS 142
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM FCO 271522Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE ROME
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 27 MAY

1. THE MINISTER AT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY HAS DRAWN BULLARD'S ATTENTION TO A PASSAGE IN THE SUNDAY TIMES OF 23 MAY BY ITS POLITICAL EDITOR, WHICH CLAIMS THAT A MEMBER OF THE CABINET HAS SAID ''THE ARGILS ARE HALF ITALIAN AND HALF SPANISH. IF THE SPANISH SIDE COMES OUT ON TOP, I RECKON THEY'LL FIGHT. IF IT'S THE ITALIAN SIDE, THEY'LL SURRENDER. IT MAY BE AS SIMPLE AS THAT.'' FONTANA GIUSTI SAID THAT THE ALLEGATION HAD ALREADY BEEN REFERRED TO TWICE IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT, ONCE BY A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AND ONCE BY A MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITION.
2. BULLARD HAS TOLD FONTANA GIUSTI, ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, THAT I CANNOT BELIEVE ONE OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE CABINET WOULD SPEAK IN THIS WAY, ANY MORE THAN I SHOULD MYSELF.
3. YOU MAY LIKE TO REPEAT THIS SHOULD THE OCCASION OFFER.

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 PS/MR ONSLOW
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 PS/LORD BELSTEAD
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 MR GOODISON

IF WE HAVE to be at war, Mrs Thatcher is a born war leader. No British prime minister now living would have taken on the role with half the aplomb that she has shown. Wilson, Heath, Callaghan — even Macmillan and Home—all might have wriggled more astutely to prevent this moment occurring. Once it had come, none would have sounded so unafraid, or been so sure that they were right.

The military men like Mrs Thatcher and respect her. She has the military virtue of clarity. Throughout the piece, the service chiefs have warmed to her decisive men. To them it is an utterly unfamiliar quality to find in a politician. She is therefore able to rebuke them. When the Vulcan bombers were brought belatedly into play, she was very sharp with air marshals she thought were keen only to get their own service in on the show.

In her turn, she particularly respects the military. She feels comfortable with men in uniform. Close observers say she has been far more civil to the officers than to the diplomats. She feels an emotional bond with soldiers, as if she were their commander-in-chief. When 18 British soldiers were slaughtered by an IRA bomb at Warrenpoint in August 1979, Mrs Thatcher sat down and hand-wrote 18 personal letters to their families.

Some barrack-room language she would avoid. It is the contention of one of her

cabinet colleagues, for example, that the outcome of the war will be determined by the racial characteristics of the enemy: "The Argies are half Italian and half Spanish. If the Spanish side comes out on top, I reckon they'll fight. If it's the Italian side, they'll surrender. It may be as simple as that."

This is not the way Mrs Thatcher thinks. Not for her these jaundiced and helpless anxieties, this gamble on the throw of the genetic dice. Now that battle is joined, it is a just and heroic venture. In the House of Commons, she conveys this with cold magnificence—quite different from the hideous scenes among the Scottish Tories last weekend, which one minister likened to a Nuremberg rally. In the House, she has led not only her party, but all parties. No one has led like this for 40 years.

IN THIS, it must be said, she speaks for the nation too. The fact of war brushes aside criticism. There was a time for restraint and doubt. There will be a time for post mortems: after many deaths, this will be a critical phase of national self-examination, from beginning to end of the enterprise. But that time is not now.

Now what is striking is

the unity which backs the Falklands war, and the order with which it has so far been conducted. For this, too, the prime minister takes credit. We have here not another Eden, lurching and shouting and failing to inspire either his colleagues or his country, and finally collapsing under pressure.

The prospect of war seems, instead, to have improved Mrs Thatcher. Rather than talking incessantly, she listens—especially to admirals. Several people have commented on her tranquillity. She is not insensitive to the agonies of war, but agonising she leaves to others. Here at last is a cause—unlike the economy or trade unions or unemployment—w h i c h exactly matches the simplicity of her temperament.

If I were a soldier in the South Atlantic, I would be glad to have a leader like this. Mine not to reason exactly why I was fighting; but mine to be sure the politicians would not betray me, as I fought this bloody

and clinical battle to repossess a British possession.

THAT, HOWEVER, is not quite all that the battle is about. And here, even at this delicate hour, there is room for some disagreement. One may devoutly wish the soldiers well, support the task force in what it has to do, stop nitpicking about what might have been. The question of what this saga will prove—what benefit it will bring to whom, what lessons it will teach—remains a valid one.

The government puts it on the grandest plane. Mr Nott says historians will look back and note what Britain, in 1982, was made of. Mrs Thatcher says it shows Britain can never be trifled with. At the back of their minds, and the front of their rhetoric, is the belief that Britain is doing something for the world at large: showing that aggression must not and does not pay.

This would be a fine thing, and it is central to

Heroes of an unheroic war

Inside Politics

by HUGO YOUNG
Political Editor



Mrs Thatcher's heroic view. Yet for how long will anyone believe it? Why should Britain's old-fashioned gesture in the Falklands persuade an aggressor anywhere else in the world to stay his hand? Why, even in Britain, shouldn't the moral be quite different: that hanging on to imperial anomalies requires an expenditure of men and money which is quite inordinate?

The message of the Falklands war is more apocalyptic than heroic. Great acts of gallantry will be, have been, committed. Brave men have been required to test their guts and professionalism in circumstances that can never have envisaged when they joined up. They are doing so under the best kind of British leadership, both military and political. But when all that is said, the episode will be seen as an emblem of something entirely different: the terrifying inability of political leaders to settle even a simple dispute peacefully.

In essence, the Falklands constitutes a very simple dispute. Compared with the Middle East or the nuclear arms race, it's child's play. No vital strategic or economic interests have ever been claimed to be at stake. The contending governments had been moving, in fits and starts, towards a sensible agreement. The great powers were mercifully absent.

If there had been no international dispute, no other words, none could have been more suitable for peaceful settlement. Yet somehow the leaders muffed it. By far the greatest blame attaches to the Argentines. They have been incredibly stupid. With patience and suppleness, they could have got what they wanted without a shot being fired. But British parliamentarians are also to blame: for their trivialising folly, the Falklands would now be living at peace.

At the time when that was possible, it was thought to be undesirable by the islanders. It may well have been so. It may also be, as Mrs Thatcher insists, that when all this is over, they will still vote to stay British. But who can seriously contend that, had they known two years ago the price they would now be paying, as the catspaw in this war between distant nations, they would have voted against a reasonable compromise?

We must now recover the islands. Men are dying horribly. Shivering young conscripts are waiting for the end. Families in Britain and Argentina are stricken. Families in the Falklands live in terror. It has its deeply heroic aspects. It is led, on our side, by a leader who knows what she is doing. But the lasting moral is not that aggression does not pay. It is that political leaders are capable of most grievous error. If they cannot solve a small argument without war, what price a big one?

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INFO BRITAIRAT BERNE

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FROM BRITAIRAT ROME.
MODUK FOR DMS1(0). YOUR ACA/UDM DTG 140936Z MAY 82.

1. MY INFO FROM MILITARY, CIVIL AND ATC NETWORKS IS THAT NO BOEING 321C WITH CALLSIGN LIMA VICTOR MIKE SIERRA GOLF HAS LANDED AT BRINDISI DURING LAST MONTH. ONLY SIMILAR A/C TO LAND BRINDISI WAS BOEING 707 (PAX) BELONGING TO SOMALIA AIRLINES. RGDS
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