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TITLE: ITALIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

REFER TO

NAME TO DATE
(and dept. when necessary) SEE:

Mr. Goodall

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Mr Goodall

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19/3

Mr Vereker

13

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Mr Harborne

23/5

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Mr Nash

24

R

Mr Nash

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Mr Vereker

28

18/7

Mr Vereker

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19/7

Mr Vereker

34

21/10

Mr Gladstone

REFER TO

NAME TO DATE
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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

LAST PAPER

✓ Mr Venke
Mr Maffei
Mr Bonifazi
30/10
29/10

C D Powell Esq
Rhodesia Dept
FCO

WR 0211

RECEIVED INTEL. NO. 13		
3 OCT 1979		
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INDEX		

Your reference

Our reference

Date 25 October 1979

Dear Powell,

RHODESIA: ITALIAN ATTITUDE

1. In my letter of 15 October I mentioned the concern expressed to me by Ferrero of the MFA that the Italians might find themselves out of line with us if we were forced in the end to go for a settlement which did not involve the Patriotic Front.
2. The same point was reinforced by Ferrero's colleague Bascone when I went to see him on 23 October (in Ferrero's absence) to carry out the instructions in FCO telno 858 to Lusaka. Bascone expressed admiration for our handling of the Conference and assured me that the Italians would stand firmly by us so long as we remained on our present course. He made clear however that the Italians regarded themselves as being on the side of the majority, both in Africa and in the UN, who wanted the Patriotic Front to be involved in any eventual solution. This was both for internal political reasons in Italy (the delicate parliamentary balance here and the sympathy of the Italian left for the Patriotic Front - see para 4 of my earlier letter) and also for external reasons (the pattern of Italy's relations with the developing world and with Black Africa: Bascone mentioned by way of example Angola and Mozambique, with whom the Italians have been busily cultivating economic links in the years since independence). For all these reasons Bascone thought that it would be very difficult for the Italians to support us if, in the end, we had to go to the UN and recommend, against the opposition of the majority of the UN, a solution which involved Muzorewa alone. Nor in these circumstances, assuming there was no clear UN determination to end sanctions, did he think there was any chance of the Italian Parliament taking the necessary action to lift sanctions here.

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3. On the immediate issue of our proposals for pre-independence arrangements, Bascone accepted without demur the idea of a Governor appointed by HMG. (We had however told the MFA on instructions only last week [FCO telno 247 to Mirimba Salisbury] that "to talk of a British Governor is premature". It would have helped to bridge the gap if we had been asked to act on FCO telno 492 to Canberra: we read FCO telno 76 to Oslo as meaning that there was no point in our taking such action here until after last weekend). Bascone undertook to brief his Political Director, Gardini, on our proposals for the pre-independence period.

4. It seems likely from all they have told us that we shall have a hard time convincing the Italians if we eventually have to go for a solution without the Patriotic Front. For this reason I hope we can be particularly sensitive about keeping them informed of our thinking over the coming weeks. It might, for example, be helpful if we could give them a copy of the summary of our understanding of the legal position about sanctions in the UN which I see we have promised to give the French (para 5 of FCO telno 434 to Paris). It is also fortunate in this connection that Mr Luce will be in Rome on 14/15 November (primarily on FAO business). We are trying to arrange for him to see an Italian MFA junior minister as well as the Political Director or his deputy. No doubt Rhodesia will be the main topic of conversation.

Yours sincerely,
Mark Pellew

M E Pellew

cc:
 (with copy of letter under ref) UKMIS NEW YORK
 R P Nash Esq, WED, FCO

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139

British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4756.441

Your reference

Our reference

Date

15 October 1979

C D Powell Esq
Rhodesia Department
FCO

RHODESIA: ITALIAN ATTITUDE

1 called on Ferrero, the acting Head of the African Department in the MFA, on 12 October to give him one of our regular round-up briefings on the progress of the Constitutional Conference.

2. Ferrero started by saying that the Italians were very grateful for the way we had kept them informed through briefings of the Nine in London and through the documentation we have passed on to them here. This had enabled them to keep their Ministers well briefed, eg for the visit of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State on 4/5 October.

3. I referred to the fact that at the lunch for the Prime Minister on 5 October Lord Carrington had thanked both Prime Minister Goria and Foreign Minister Malfatti for the support they had shown for our position over Rhodesia in the past, and had expressed the hope that they would continue to do so in future. Ferrero said that the Italians would of course go on supporting our efforts to reach a solution acceptable to all parties. He readily agreed with me that, apart from subscribing to joint positions of the Nine, the most effective way for the Italians to do this was by seeking to promote understanding for our efforts on Rhodesia in the course of contacts with third parties, eg during the forthcoming visit of Hua Guofeng. I stressed the importance we attached to obtaining Chinese understanding of our position during this visit.

4. Ferrero went on to say that the aspect which worried him most for the future was the possibility that we might in the end be forced to go for some sort of settlement which fell short of full involvement of both Mugabe and Nkomo as well as Muzorewa. In these circumstances, given the political balance here and the degree of sympathy felt by the Italian left for the Patriotic Front (especially for Mugabe, who has long-standing contacts with the PCI), it would be very difficult for the Italian Parliament to approve legislation lifting sanctions (since positive parliamentary action will be required here to get the existing sanctions legislation repealed). Assuming that HMG would not, in these circumstances, seek to renew the UK Sanctions Order there was a real risk that we would find ourselves out of step with Italy and possibly others of our partners.

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5. Ferrero agreed, however, that the situation described in para 4 was purely hypothetical at this stage. For the time being I am sure that the Italians feel a genuine admiration for our efforts and will continue to lend us such support as they can.

M E PELLEW

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
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R P Nash Esq
WED
FCO



Your reference

Our reference

Date 25 October 1979

Dear Ronald,

PRAGUE DISSIDENTS TRIAL: ITALIAN REACTIONS

1. The Charter 77 trial and the sentences announced yesterday have evoked strong reactions from all shades of political opinion in Italy, including the PCI.

2. President Pertini captured the popular mood when he sent a telegram to President Husak on 22 October appealing for him to intervene in the trial in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. (A rough translation of the telegram is attached.) Pertini has always laid great emphasis on the theme of liberty (he was of course himself for many years a victim of Fascist prisons) and it is not forgotten here that his first political action after being elected to the Presidency in July 1978 was to send a similar message to Brezhnev about the dissident trials which were then in progress in the Soviet Union.

3. The most interesting reaction from the domestic political point of view was that of the PCI. In an interview in the independent left-wing newspaper, La Repubblica, on 23 October (also reported in other papers, including the official PCI daily L'Unità) the PCI spokesman on international affairs, Pajetta, took a more forthright line than PCI spokesmen have taken on previous occasions on the subject of dissidents. Pajetta said that Italian Communists could not accept as valid a legislative process which branded political dissent as espionage. He added that it was "unfortunately neither a new nor an isolated occurrence that errors, affronts, and wrongs are being committed against human rights even in countries where the means of production have changed, and where there is not the excuse - if one can call it that - of defending privilege, the rights of ownership, the search for profit, and the needs of exploitation". Asked whether the laws under which the Prague trial took place were not an offence to socialism, Pajetta referred to the millions of people who believed and hoped that socialism offered a way out of the economic, social and moral crisis of capitalist society: "I do not think that acts such as those which have been, and are being, committed in Prague will encourage them in their action and their hopes". He concluded by saying that fundamental problems

/had



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had not been resolved in Czechoslovakia which was why its government was forced to resort to coercion and threats in order to maintain a situation of relative stability.

4. After the sentences had been announced, the PCI published a communiqué on 24 October expressing the "sharpest condemnation" of the conduct of the Prague authorities and stressing the damage which violations of human rights in socialist countries caused to the image of socialism in the world. A translation of the full text of the communiqué is attached.

Yours ever,

Mark

M E Pellew

cc:
CCR Battiscombe Esq, EESD, FCO
Chancery, PRAGUE
Mrs K Colvin, Research, Dept, FCO



(TRANSLATION)

TEXT OF TELEGRAM SENT BY PRESIDENT PERTINI
TO PRESIDENT HUSAK ON 22 OCTOBER

"The trial which has begun in Prague of six intellectuals connected with the Charter 77 movement has forcibly struck the Italian people and induces me to appeal to you, in your capacity as President of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, for an intervention in conformity with the principles and dispositions of the Helsinki Final Act. I am confident that you will wish to contribute to the cause of détente and of a growing understanding and solidarity between peoples".



(TRANSLATION)

TEXT OF PCI COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED ON 24 OCTOBER

"The trial against Czech citizens charged with subversion and the penalties inflicted during the trial are serious and inadmissible facts. The PCI expresses the sharpest condemnation of the conduct of the public authorities in Prague and of every practice of persecution, administrative and penal, of the free manifestation of ideas, of criticism and political dissent. The PCI, consistent with its positions of principle, again confirms the necessity of respecting in all circumstances the liberty of citizens and of political democracy, and stresses that violations and affronts in this field which occur in countries which have rid themselves of capitalist exploitation cause serious damage to the image and the ideals of socialism in the world. The Italian Communist Party hopes that the Czech authorities will listen to criticisms and requests which have come from so many quarters in order that every practice of violation of democratic principles may be finally abandoned".

M. Wash (33)
Mr Bougace

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR RIDLEY,
 AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR ROBERTO DUCCI, AT THE
 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AT 4.25 PM ON TUESDAY 15 OCTOBER 1979

Those present:

Nicholas Ridley, MP

K D Temple

G S Cowling

Roberto Ducci

1. After an exchange of courtesies Signor Ducci said that the Italian Government was extremely interested in recent events in Central America and Latin America and prior to the visit to the UK next weekend of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Malfatti, the Italian Government would like to know our views on the current situation in Central America, Chile and Argentina.

2. Mr Ridley said that in Nicaragua we did not maintain a Mission and thus did not receive regular reports. He congratulated the Italians on keeping a Mission in Nicaragua throughout the recent disturbances. He thought the present Nicaraguan Junta contained elements ranging from Marxists to Christian Democrats. The Marxists might not in fact be either pro-Cuban or pro-Russian. On balance the Junta wanted to establish a moderate government but it was evident that other elements wanted a stronger left-wing bias. A truce existed between all factions to enable the problem of rehabilitating the country to be undertaken first. Possibly the Communist elements were willing to agree to this in order to get as much Western aid as possible. While all could go smoothly for the next 6-10 months, internal problems could develop after that. Signor Ducci agreed. Nicaragua first needed to reconstruct its country. It had no time to export its revolution. Mr Ridley thought that could well be the view of the government, but not necessarily of individual soldiers in the Sandinista army. Tremendous experience in guerrilla warfare had been built-up and many individuals wished to continue fighting on behalf of the depressed groups in neighbouring countries. He knew for example that Argentina was concerned that left-wing extremists who had gone to fight in Nicaragua, would return to Argentina with new experience and resume their terrorist campaign with increased zeal. As far as the rest of Central America was concerned, the next countries likely to be affected by events were: El Salvador, Guatemala and (possibly) Honduras in that order. These were extremely offensive regimes. The US had now learned that by giving them support they brought far more problems from a human rights point of view than the stability they brought to the area. Venezuela and Colombia would certainly not object to their overthrow. Signor Ducci agreed that the Americans had learned from their experience in Nicaragua and were encouraging the bourgeoisie in El Salvador to detach themselves from President Romero and undertake liberal reforms. But it was likely that these reforms were now too late.

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3. In answer to a point raised by Mr Ridley, Signor Ducci felt that the EEC was approaching the matter of discussing Latin America completely wrongly by trying to discuss in the Political Cooperation framework the whole of Latin America at once. There was little point raising Central America with the EEC. Mr Ridley said that while he was in Panama for the Canal handover ceremony, he met Mrs Violeta de Chamorro, a member of the Nicaraguan Junta, who told him she would shortly be visiting Rome and would be prepared to visit London if invited. We planned to write to her and confirm this, but it might be an idea to ensure that she visited the EEC. Signor Ducci knew nothing of Sra de Chamorro's visit to Rome and said that it was difficult for the EEC to give aid on political grounds, because the EEC itself did not have a foreign policy. Mr Ridley said the EEC need not confine itself to discussing aid but use the opportunity to show that it supported the new Nicaraguan Government politically. Signor Ducci said his Minister would be extremely interested in this.

4. Turning to Chile, Mr Ridley said that only Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom did not have Ambassadors in Santiago. The Belgian Ambassador in London suggested that they might consider sending an Ambassador if we did. We should have an Ambassador there, not because we approved of the regime but because we saw no point in making an exception. In fact, (speaking confidentially) it was only a matter of time before an announcement was made, this depending on when the Letellier case was resolved between Chile and the United States. Signor Ducci said that there was strong opposition in Italy against exchanging Ambassadors. Allende was almost a legend among the left-wing. But it would be pointless for the Italians to be the odd man out in Europe if Belgium and the United Kingdom exchanged Ambassadors with Chile in the near future, and he would discuss the matter with his minister.

5. Concerning Argentina, Mr Ridley said that the Falkland Islands dispute was at the stage where the Argentine Government were expecting us to negotiate, and for the present they were being extremely charming to us. However, the basic fact remained that the population of the Falkland Islands was British and wish to remain so. It had been announced by Argentina and the UK in July that Ambassadors would be exchanged, but so far agreement for candidates had not yet been sought by either country. Signor Ducci thanked Mr Ridley for the information he had given and said that he would discuss the issues with his minister when he arrived next week.

6. The meeting finished at 4.55 pm.

cc: WED ✓
SAM
M&CD

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M. Nash
(WED)



With the compliments of

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT
(INTERNAL) E17

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

17.10.79

Pershing missiles



cc Mr. Nash WFO

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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

857
Mr. Gooding (32)
Mr. Mansfield
MJS 7/10

N Spreckley Esq
EID(I)
FCO

Mr. Goro / 7	Your reference
19 OCT 1979	Our reference
	Date

Your reference

Our reference

Date

15 October 1979

Dear Nick,

MEETING BETWEEN COSSIGA AND VAN AGT: ITALIAN PRESS REPORTING

1. The Italian press of 14 October carries several reports of the meeting between Signor Cossiga and Dutch Prime Minister Van Agt at Cernobbio (Lake Como) on 13 October.
2. Most papers state in their headlines that the main topics for discussion were the CAP and the siting of Cruise and Pershing missiles. But the articles themselves make it clear that neither Signor Cossiga nor Mr Van Agt had anything to say to the press on the latter subject.
3. The fullest account of the meeting is carried in the right of centre Rome daily *Il Tempo*. As regards CAP it reports that Signor Cossiga handed Mr Van Agt a document, complete with statistics, showing the need to reform the EEC budget, giving larger shares of the budget to regional policy, energy problems, and transport and industrial problems. (This sounds rather like the document sent to you in Rome telno 459.) *Il Tempo* comments that Italy has for some time contested the workings of CAP which forces her to bear a high economic and social cost, obliging her to buy EEC agricultural produce at prices three or four times higher than on world markets, while at the same time extending trade concessions to Mediterranean countries which are Italy's natural competitors. *Il Tempo* also comments that this explanation, already given to the Germans and to the British, whose position is described as "akin to" that of Italy, cannot have given much pleasure to Van Agt since the Dutch are among the largest beneficiaries of the CAP.

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4. As Renato Ruggiero (who should be in Luxembourg today) and Signor Cossiga's diplomatic adviser were the only officials present, it may be a day or two before we get any further information about this meeting, and in particular about how Van Agt in fact responded.

Yours ever,

James F. Adams

W J Adams

cc:
G Fitchew Esq
UKREP BRUSSELS
Chancery, THE HAGUE
Chancery, BONN
Chancery, PARIS

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FM BONN 111820Z OCT 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 583 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK ROME UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW THE HAGUE BRUSSELS PARIS

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CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE	PA
SECRETARY	PA

ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BONN: DEFENCE ISSUES.

1. ACCORDING TO THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, THERE WAS AN ALMOST COMPLETE MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRIME MINISTER COSSIGA ON THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AND TNF. THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE FORMER WAS THAT IT WAS A MOVE DESIGNED PRINCIPALLY TO AFFECT ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON TNF. THE PROPOSAL TO REDEPLOY MISSILES EAST OF THE URALS CLEARLY HAD NOTHING IN IT OF ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT THE POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 MEN AND 1,000 TANKS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT CLOSELY IN THE MBFR CONTEXT. BUT IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT IT AMOUNTED TO AND IN ANY CASE THE OFFER SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE WEST ATTACHED TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON DATA. MORE GENERALLY THE RUSSIAN OFFER ADDED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT IN THE TNF PACKAGE.

2. AS REGARDS TNF BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND COSSIGA AGREED THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE DETERMINATION OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO PRESS AHEAD WITH TNF MODERNISATION. DOMESTICALLY NEITHER HEAD OF GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUSLY INCREASED DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING THROUGH SUCH A PROGRAMME. OF THE TWO COSSIGA SEEMED TO BE THE MORE BULLISH ABOUT THIS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF DEGREE. (HE HAD APPARENTLY ALREADY CLEARED HIS LINES WITH LEADERS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES EXCEPT BERLINGUER. CRAXI NEEDED SOME MORAL SUPPORT). COSSIGA ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MORE ROBUST IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM ITS COURSE, EVEN IF THE DUTCH, POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY THE BELGIANS, WERE TO DECIDE THAT THEY COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE AGREE TO STATION LONG-RANGE TNF ON THEIR SOIL. WE WERE TOLD THAT IN THE CHANCELLOR'S VIEW SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE QUOTE VERY SERIOUS INDEED UNQUOTE AND ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO PERSUADE THE

/ DUTCH

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DUTCH TO AGREE. BOTH COSSIGA AND THE CHANCELLOR AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN RATHER EARLIER THAN DECEMBER BUT SCHMIDT TOLD COSSIGA THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN THIS FOR THE DUTCH.

3. THE IMPRESSION WE GAINED FROM THIS ACCOUNT WAS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOW INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THE DUTCH AND TO KEEP THE BELGIANS ON BOARD AND IS LOOKING FOR SUPPORT FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE (COSSIGA WILL BE SEEING VAN AGT ON 13 OCTOBER): BUT IF THIS AIM SHOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED THEY WILL TAKE SOME SOLACE FROM CONTINUED ITALIAN PARTICIPATION.

WRIGHT

FCO WHITEHALL DIST:

WED

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BRITISH EMBASSY
BONN

28 September 1979

P W M Vereker Esq,
WED
FCO

WRS 0211

1/10
Balance Dept
NENTAS
E.O.C.I.

Mr. L. H. 1/10
Mr. H. 1/10
Mr. B. 1/10
R.

Dear Peter,

PRESIDENT PERTINI'S STATE VISIT TO THE FRG

1. President Pertini paid a state visit to the Federal Republic between 18 and 21 September. He was accompanied by S. Malfatti and by officials. After the usual talks in Bonn with President Carstens, Chancellor Schmidt, Brandt and others, he visited Berlin and Munich. c/10
2. A number of factors combined to make the occasion stand out somewhat from the plethora of state visits to Germany. Firstly, relations between the two countries are well developed, as one would expect between fellow members of the Community and NATO and fellow participants at world economic summits. Despite periodic squalls (the escape of the war criminal Kappler from detention in Italy two years ago; Italy's non-participation in Guadeloupe and the inner circle of Defence Ministers; outbursts of anti-Germanism in the Italian press and retorts in the German media about terrorism and so on in Italy) Schmidt and Andreotti managed to build up a good working relationship. (See, for example, the Chancellor's very favourable words about Andreotti in his interview in the Economist of 28 September). The summit consultations were put on a regular basis and all is set for this to continue under Cossiga. The two heads of government will meet in mid-October.
3. Secondly, this was the first inward state visit since Carstens became President. The spotlight was therefore on the occasion more than normal. Although there was a marked contrast between the informal approach of Pertini and that of his host (Carstens was stiff and a bit cold) the visit passed

/off well

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off well from the protocol point of view and Carsten's staff have expressed satisfaction (perhaps with a tinge of relief).

4. Thirdly, and to his hosts' enormous relief, Pertini handled with some delicacy the question of Germany's past. He himself had been active in the underground during the war and his brother died in a German concentration camp. So predictably the Germans were jittery. But Pertini said clearly at the outset that he did not believe in the philosophy of collective guilt. The Germans of today were no more to blame for Nazi behaviour than were today's Italians for that of the Fascists. Pertini also put heavy and welcome emphasis on the ultimate goal of German reunification and he appeared genuinely moved when he visited the Berlin wall.

5. Fourthly, the Socialist Italian President spent much of his time here talking to members of the SPD: Schmidt, Brandt and others. Pertini was portrayed as a dedicated and influential member of the movement; and his meeting with Brandt was an obviously warm and happy occasion.

6. All these factors made for a successful visit and both German officialdom and the Italian Embassy are well pleased. (The atmosphere was good enough to survive Henry Moore, who was in Bonn to present "Large Two Forms" to the Chancellor, addressing Malfatti as Forlani! Malfatti promptly replied by offering Henry Moore the freedom of the city of Florence).

7. There were suggestions in the press, notably "Der Spiegel", that Pertini had snubbed Carstens over the most delicate part of the visit by rejecting Carsten's offer to accompany him to a memorial at Flossenburg where his brother had died in Nazi hands. The story had almost died away but the Federal President's Press Office have seen fit to revive it by publishing today a firm denial that the visit was anything other than harmonious at all stages. We do not know what actually happened, but it would have been contrary to normal protocol arrangements for the Federal President to accompany a state guest outside Bonn. The Italian Embassy have been at pains to say that nothing went wrong and the Government are accusing "Der Spiegel" of stirring up trouble. (There is something of a running battle between the magazine and the President. The former was instrumental in digging up dirt about

/Carsten's



Carsten's Nazi activities and the latter has been unenthusiastic about giving them an interview). In the event Pertini was accompanied at Flossenbürg by Strauss and by von Dohnanyi, the number two Minister at the Auswärtiges Amt.

8. During the visit Malfatti had talks with Genscher, covering the following subjects:

(a) TNF: The Germans took the opportunity to re-emphasise the importance they attached to as many NATO members as possible agreeing to permit the siting of the modernised systems on their territory. Malfatti said that Italy was in principle prepared to agree but that the final decision had to be taken within the context of the Alliance. (cf Bonn tel 530).

(b) MBFR: Genscher repeated German interest in extending associated measures to all participants at the Vienna talks, including Italy. According to the Italian Embassy, Malfatti replied that confidence building measures should apply to all CSCE countries and that the question should be discussed and implemented as part of the CSCE rather than the Vienna process.

(c) Community Questions: Malfatti went over the Italian complaints about the Commission's reference paper on the Community budget. He repeated well known arguments about the need for convergence and alluded to a further Mediterranean package. But all our interlocutors have commented that it was impossible to work out from Malfatti's presentation or from that of his accompanying officials precisely what the Italians wanted in concrete terms. Genscher was sympathetic but we are told that he made no firm commitment. The subject, he said, would have to be discussed at the Dublin European Council.

(d) Middle East: Genscher described his recent visits to Arab capitals and Dayan's visit to Bonn. He reaffirmed that the FRG had no intention of recognising the PLO until the PLO had accepted Res 242. He denied emphatically that there was any intention of inviting Arafat to Bonn.

Yours ever
R F Cornish
R F Cornish

cc: Chanceries: Rome: UKDEL NATO: UKREP Brussels.

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Reference

(29)

P&CD

cc: WED
Mr Fursland

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Mr Nash

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
② Pa Rhan

Dna
- 7/9

S/A

VISIT OF PREMIER HUA GUOFENG TO ITALY

1. Mr Melani of the Italian Embassy came to see me yesterday afternoon to ask about our plans for Premier Hua's visit and (I think incidentally) for some impressions of Vice President Mondale's recent visit to Peking.
2. I gave him in confidence a general outline of our provisional plans for Premier Hua, stressing that though a draft programme had been put to the Chinese we had not yet received substantive comments on it. I mentioned that he would be received by The Queen, would have formal talks with the Prime Minister, would meet representatives of Parliament, the business and cultural worlds, etc at various receptions and would travel outside London. I also gave Mr Melani a run down on the overall political/commercial objectives we were pursuing in having him in the UK. I told him that we did not necessarily envisage signing agreements while he was here, though if we had made enough progress on eg the ASA, cultural or other agreements, we might be able to do something while he was in London. I said I doubted that any Harrier agreement would be signed. The negotiations were continuing and we had never envisaged using Premier Hua's visit as an occasion for signing an agreement of this kind.
3. When I asked Mr Melani (following early confidential indications that this might be the case) whether Italy would also be included in Premier Hua's itinerary, Mr Melani professed to have no information. Since Peking telno 761 came to hand immediately after he had left, I telephoned him at the Embassy and said we had heard that a visit to Rome from 3-6 November now seemed to be envisaged. I said I hoped the Italians would keep in close touch with us about their arrangements for such a visit. When he asked if the sacrifice of the last three days of the UK visit would be difficult for us, I said that in practical terms it would only mean the loss of the last substantive day of the programme (Saturday 3 November). There had been no time so far to consult any of the other Departments concerned with the planning of the visit, but my personal reaction was that it would "not be impossible".
4. Mr Melani telephoned me again this morning to say that the Italians now understand the Chinese request for a visit from 3 to 6 November was firm. They proposed to arrange calls on the President of the Republic and talks with the Italian Prime Minister, together with appropriate hospitality. It looked as if there would not be time for any visits outside Rome.


R C Samuel
Far Eastern Dept

4 September 1979

British Embassy

Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4766441

cc SET JC 24/7
&
Pa
OK 25/7

WRS 02/11
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 13
Rome 25 JUL 1979

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Your reference

HE Mr I J M Sutherland CMG
British Embassy
ATHENS

Our reference

Date

19 July 1979

My dear Ian,

NEW ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO GREECE

1. The appointment of Remo Paolini to succeed Frazzi as Ambassador to Athens has been announced and he tells me that he and his wife, Pucci, will be going to Athens in August.
2. Paolini was Minister in London for four or five years and you will have known him personally there before you went to Athens. He is extremely friendly towards the United Kingdom and a good friend of mine. He has been Chief of Protocol in Rome for the past two years, a job he has carried out with dignity, courtesy and consideration. He is so terribly thin that he gives the impression of ill health, but I believe this impression is misleading. He and Pucci are looking forward to Athens very much, though I understand they are preoccupied by the problems of their Residence which needs a complete overhaul. I am sure you will find him a notably friendly and agreeable colleague and Pucci is lively and charming. They both speak English well. He is looking forward to seeing you again.

Very good wish, Yours ever,

Alan

A C Goodison

cc: WED ✓

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Il Tempo 17 July 1979

ITALY'S NEW REPRESENTATIVE IN ATHENS

Ambassador Remo Paolini is Italy's new diplomatic representative in Athens. He was born in Rome on 17 June 1921, and after taking a degree in jurisprudence at Rome university he joined the diplomatic service in 1948 at the age of 27. He was posted to the Italian Embassy at Tirana the following year as Second Secretary and in 1951 joined the Italian Embassy to the Holy See in the same rank.

During the subsequent years he was posted first to the Italian Embassy in New Delhi (1953) as First Secretary and then to Mendoza as Consul. In 1962 he was Counsellor at the Italian Embassy at The Hague and subsequently at Brussels for a period of three years. In 1972 Paolini was posted to the Italian Embassy in London with the rank of Minister and remained there until 1977, when he was appointed Head of Protocol Department of the Italian Republic.

His appointment as Italian Ambassador in Athens was announced a few days ago.

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BELGRADE

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C C R Battiscombe Esq
Eastern European & Soviet Dept
FCO

11 July 1979

1. Enter 28
2. Mr Battiscombe
My note
Miss Colvin
3. ga
Rh
16/7
City & RD
WED
015
M. Smith
the entire...
12/7

Dear Christopher,

YUGOSLAV/ITALIAN RELATIONS

1. David Miller's letter of 17 January to Michael Smith reported inter alia on Yugoslav/Italian bilateral relations in the light of the Italian Foreign Minister's visit. Today's press reports on a session on 10 July in Ljubljana of a working group of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Chamber and the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Assembly reviewing co-operation with Italy under the Osimo Treaty.

2. According to Tanjug, both countries were seeking to make use of the advantages which "the most open frontier in this part of Europe" offers them. But, as we know, all is not proceeding as smoothly as the Yugoslavs would like. Tanjug refers to obstacles to expanding co-operation which it makes clear are both economic and political. First, progress is slow on the projects to build a free zone at Sezzana and an industrial area in the Kras area nearby; and unspecified barriers are hindering the development of local border traffic. The main political difficulty is described as "the lack of a complete solution for the status of ethnic Slovenes in Italy".

3. I asked Augelli, Counsellor at the Italian Embassy, what was at the root of the obstacles. He said that the main trouble was that the Yugoslavs wanted to make haste to show concrete gains from Osimo. In the economic field this was difficult for the Italians because there were other areas that also needed development and there were strong local environmental objections to the construction of the free zone. As regards the status of the Slovenes, the Yugoslavs wanted them to enjoy the same rights and privileges of minorities in Yugoslavia. This too was

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difficult for the Italians whose Constitution was different. Augelli said that he believed that the Italians would have to continue to play these problems long.

Yours ever,
Terry

T J Clark

cc Chancery, Rome
HM Consul-General, Zagreb

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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Mr Bullard
Mr Kerquison (27)
GC
CAD
EAD
SAD
Rhodesia Dept
NAD
FRD

David Gladstone Esq
WED
PCO

Mr Vance
Mr Nash *by*

Your reference
EID (E)
Our reference
EID (Y)
Date
NEWAD
4 June 1979
Defence Dept.

Myra David *by*

WAS call	
25 JUN 1979	
INDEX	FILE
INDEX	FILE

VISIT OF MR VANCE TO ROME

(26) 1. Gardini, the Political Director-General at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a Community briefing on this visit to Embassies of the Nine on 1 June. (You will already have seen our telegram No 8 Saving, giving Italian press reactions to the visit). Since Ministers have been very much in touch with Mr Vance, both in London and The Hague over the past fortnight, I do not suppose it necessary to report in any detail what he said to the Italians. In what follows I shall try to confine myself to the Italian response to the points he raised as given us by Gardini. We are reporting separately by telegram on the points made by the latter on Indo-Chinese refugees.

2. Gardini began by stressing that the date of this visit, which was the first made to Rome by Vance as Secretary of State, had been fixed at the time of the NATO Meeting in December. It was entirely accidental that Vance had come immediately before the Italian elections and it was wrong to give any significance to the date.

3. Gardini asked which of the many topics covered we should like to hear about, so I asked for African problems first. Gardini said that, with others, Italy had given her support to the action of the Five on Namibia and to Anglo/United States initiatives on Rhodesia. Italy was not directly involved. Italy took the view that the separate development of ethnic groups was no longer possible in Africa. On Namibia, they thought the matter must be left to the Security Council. On Rhodesia, a very critical position had been reached. They were not taking up any position on the Rhodesian elections. The simple acceptance of an internal settlement was not a realistic policy. The policy must be directed to trying to avoid further fighting and to trying to avoid the dangers of intervention by the Soviet Union, Cuba or Ethiopia. Italy would wait and see what the new Conservative Government in London could achieve. The President of the Italian Republic had stressed to Vance the importance of human rights in Africa. Vance had stressed to the Italians that

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- 2 -

no hasty decisions were going to be taken. On Somalia and Ethiopia, Vance had agreed with the Italian Foreign Minister that it was desirable to try to keep in contact with Ethiopia, which meant a reserved position in relation to Somalia. Signor Forlani had said that the present level of Italian contacts with Ethiopia was both the minimum desirable and the maximum possible. They had solved a few individual cases but there was no political discourse. The Somalis were bombarding the Italians with continual and excessive requests. The Italians were responding cautiously but trying to do what they could to help. The Somali situation as a country which had abandoned its dependence on the Soviet Union was unique and justified Italy in giving a certain weight to Somalia. The Italians were sceptical about the possibility of improving United States/Ethiopian relations. The two Ministers had agreed that the different religious background in Ethiopia and Somalia was significant. No Muslim country had permitted Communist ideology to gain ground. But the Ethiopians, with a Christian culture, were subject to the infiltration of Marxist-Leninist thought. Although nationalism was their main inspiration, this meant that Ethiopia was less likely to "unhook" from Moscow. The danger remained that Somalia, disappointed by the West, would turn back to Moscow, but the Italians had noted some improvement in Somali/Kenyan relations which were encouraging in this respect.

4. In a discussion of Albania, the Italians spoke on lines recorded in the record of Ewen Fergusson's conversations in Rome on 17 May.

5. The discussions on the forthcoming Tokyo summit appeared to have produced nothing new. The Italians stressed the great interest in Europe that the United States adopt an energy policy which would assist the maintenance of the world economy.

6. There was also a discussion on NATO and theatre nuclear weapons. Signor Andreotti had told Mr Vance that the modernization of Italian weapons offered no political difficulties, but technical and financial difficulties.

7. On the Middle East, Mr Vance had set out his policy and had asked the Nine to put pressure on Israel over its West Bank policy and the Lebanon. Signor Forlani had stressed the importance in the Italian view of maintaining a forward movement. During his visit to Tunisia and his conversation with Prince Fahd and with Kaddumi of the Palestine Liberation Organization, he had gained the impression that the PLO were for the time being in a less rigid posture and that it would be desirable to move forward in relations with them as a means of involving the other Arabs. But any such move was dependent on early progress in the talks between Egypt and Israel on the West Bank. My French colleague asked a number of questions about US aid to Egypt. Would it suffice to replace Arab subsidies for arms purchases? Gardini said that Fahd had been equivocal with Andreotti on this topic. He had been rigidly opposed to Sadat, but Saudi Arabia would not forget the needs of the Egyptian people. The Italians had the impression that not merely would Saudi Arabia and Kuwait permit a continued flow of remittances but would also not withdraw existing deposits in Egypt. My French colleague asked whether the Americans were proposing a coordinated plan for economic aid to Egypt. Gardini replied that he knew the Americans were asking the Germans to give loans



- 3 -

to Egypt but added that the Italians had not asked Vance about all this since they did not want to come under pressure to contribute. They nevertheless thought the Americans might raise the topic at the Tokyo summit and they believed that Sadat was preparing an appeal for economic assistance to be directed to a large number of states. Signor Andreotti had said to Fahd and to others that the West must avoid a formula of giving aid solely to Egypt. It was a question of presentation. Any aid programme should cover all the poor Arab states in order to avoid accusations of alignment with one side or the other in the inter Arab quarrel. In answer to a French question, Gardini said it was not clear whether Vance had accepted this advice.

8. I am sending a copy of this direct to John Williams in preparation for his talks on Thursday on Africa with the Italians. I should be grateful if you would copy it further as you think fit.

Townsend

Alan

A C Goodison

cc:

John Williams Esq CMG FCO

Chanceries: Washington
Paris
UKREP EEC

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SAVINGS TELEGRAM

TOP COPY
Rm 20/6

BY BAG

FROM ROME

TO FCC TELNO 8 SAVING OF 31 MAY AND TO
WASHINGTON, UK REP BRUSSELS AND ALL EEC POSTS

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Desk of	REGISTRY
EEC POSTS	14 JUN 1979

SUMMARY OF ITALIAN PRESS COMMENT ON VISIT OF UNITED STATES
SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE TO ITALY - 28-29 MAY.

1. The two day visit of American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has been widely reported in the Italian Press. The general tone of the reporting suggests that the visit has helped to bolster Signor Andreotti's personal prestige as a politician of international standing and has thus given valuable psychological support to the Christian Democratic Party.
2. La Stampa (Fiat owned) of 29 May describes this visit as of "special significance" during which Mr Vance gave a first hand account of American thinking on the Middle East, the Energy crisis, SALT II talks and the forthcoming summit meeting in Tokyo.
3. Il Popolo (Christian Democrat) of 29 May quotes Vance as describing Italy as "one of our key allies and a dear friend whom we consult on every question of major importance".
4. Corriere della Sera (Independent) 30 May - comments on the cordiality and satisfaction of Mr Vance's meetings with President Pertini, Foreign Minister, Forlani and Signor Andreotti and quotes the Secretary of State's description of Italy as

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'a vitally important country for the United States and our people'.

5. 'L'Unita' (Communist) 30 May in article headlined "Vance satisfied with visit to Rome" quotes Vance as speaking of the talks as "underlining the strong bonds of friendship which unite our two countries".

6. Most papers carried factual reports of the talks and gave prominence to Andreotti's and Vance's agreement that, despite the energy crisis, economic development should be increased. Prominence was also given to Andreotti's suggestion that industrialized countries should plan to increase humanitarian aid to the poorer Arab countries. Cooperation between Italy and the United States in seeking to find alternative sources of energy was also picked out as an important theme.

CAMPBELL

F I L E S:

WED	PS
NAD	PS/LPS
EID (I)	PS/PUS
NENAD	MR BULLARD
E S & S D	MR CORTAZZI
FUSD	MR FERGUSON
NEWS D	MR LEAHY

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
BRITISH EMBASSY
BRASILIA

026/2

7 May 1979

J.B. Ure, Esq., MVO
SAMD
FCO

Dear John.



VISIT OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO BRAZIL

1. The Italian Ambassador, Maurizio Bucci, gave other Community Ambassadors a briefing during the recent visit to Brazil (25-29 April) by Sen. Forlani. The briefing was rushed because Bucci only had about half an hour available between a meeting with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Guerreiro, and an official lunch which Forlani was hosting. This was to be followed by a meeting with President Figueiredo before Forlani (and Bucci) went off to São Paulo and Rio. Hence, Bucci was only able to tell us about the two talks which Forlani had with Guerreiro and, because of time pressure, concentrated on what the Brazilians had said, and said very little about any Italian contribution.

2. Bucci said that the visit should have taken place last year but it had been cancelled because of problems in Italy. They had decided to fit it in now, despite the fact that they were awaiting an election, since

- (a) the Italian constitution made no difficulties about such visits, and
- (b) because the Italians wanted to show their approval of the process of political abertura in Brazil which they believed needed to be encouraged.

If the visit had not taken place now it would have had to wait until September. He said that expectations on the Brazilian side had been built up and it would have been impossible to cancel the visit for a second time.

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3. The atmosphere of the talks had been good and with Forlani talking Italian and Guerreiro Portuguese they had managed to get on for the most part without any interpretation.

4. The Italians had asked about Brazilian policy towards Latin America. Guerreiro had said that this was based on a series of principles - non-intervention, respect for sovereignty and mutual co-operation - and the agreements they made with other Latin American countries reflected these interests. The Italians had apparently suggested that Brazil was the big force of the future in Latin America and the others might have to recognise Brazilian supremacy. Guerreiro had said they were conscious of the distress with which some other Latin American countries had viewed their growing economic strength. They tried to avoid any hegemonistic tendencies.

5. The Italians had asked about the Beagle dispute. Guerreiro said that they had followed it with extreme detachment until they had got frightened and intervened by appealing to both parties for moderation. The Brazilians tended to the Chilean rather than the Argentine point of view but sought to reinforce moderate elements in both countries. It had been their aim to lower the temperature and gain time. They were very happy with the Pope's intervention; they felt that the more Brazil could keep out of the situation the better. It had apparently been suggested to them (it seems by the Chileans) that a new crisis might be expected in September. The Italians had been unable to determine what justification there was for this fear except that September was a month when military activities again become possible and they were informed that Argentina had left plenty of arms and equipment in the area whilst withdrawing most of her troops.

6. On Cuba Guerreiro had said that "Brazil and Cuba understood each other well enough on sugar exports", but, he implied, on not much else. He had recalled Cuban influence and Cuban training of Brazilian urban guerrillas in the years from 1968-72. Relations

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at the moment were in "une phase de possibilisme" but Brazil noted that Cuba still supported subversive activities in Uruguay and their activities in Africa were dangerous, in countries where Brazil had substantial interests. So development of Brazilian relations with Cuba was not an urgent matter. In reply to a question Guerreiro had said he believed that the Argentine crisis was indigenous and not Cuban influenced, but he could not exclude the possibility that Cuba was helping out one or other revolutionary group.

7. The question of Cuban Membership of the Security Council was raised. Guerreiro said he hoped that Peru would accept nomination as the Latin American candidate. The Italians had suggested that Brazil might be an even better candidate but Guerreiro said that they did not want it. They were against membership of the Security Council at the moment - there were too many vetoes, too much rhetoric and no progress. They might reconsider their position in the future but for the moment they supported Peru.

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8. Guerreiro had said they wanted a more open Community. There were restrictions on too many imports into the Community from Brazil, things which mattered little relatively to the Community but much to Brazil. He complained about the difficulty of any sensible negotiation in talking to the technocrats of the Community, who were inward-looking and insufficiently conversant with the real problems of the world outside. He envisaged "bilateral negotiation" between Brazil and the Community to reach a framework agreement - not an association evidently but not limited merely to 3 or 4 products. Guerreiro had asked how the Community had had the courage, given their own dependence on the Arab oil, to support the Israel-Egypt settlement, and Forlani had explained the Community position. Guerreiro had said that they could not come out openly because of their total dependence on Arab sources of oil; they had no room for manoeuvre at all. Forlani had talked of the

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EMS (explaining why the EMS represented an element of stability in the world) and the forthcoming European elections.

9. On China Guerreiro had said, in answer to a question from Forlani who had commented that the Chinese requested armaments whenever co-operation was talked of, that Brazil had received no such requests. Relations with China were good and developing. The Chinese Vice-President with responsibility for the economic sector was coming to Brazil shortly to conclude some agreements, particularly on maritime transport.

10. Finally, said Bucci, Forlani had talked about Africa, the Helsinki Conference, Iran and Yugoslavia, but because of the lack of time, Bucci was unable to enlarge.

11. A communiqué was issued at the end of the talks. A translation of its salient points is attached.

Yours ever

Norman

Norman Statham

copies to: WED
FCO

Chanceries at: ROME
BUENOS AIRES
SANTIAGO
HAVANA
UKMIS NEW YORK
UKDEL BRUSSELS

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TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
ISSUED FOLLOWING TALKS BETWEEN THE BRAZILIAN AND
ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS on 27 APRIL 1979

The two Ministers (Forlani and Guerreiro) recalled with satisfaction the traditional friendship which links the Italian and Brazilian peoples, a great contribution to which has been made both by the common cultural origin and the presence of a large and active Brazilian community of Italian descent.

The two Ministers had a full exchange of views on the international situation in an atmosphere characterised by great cordiality and spirit of co-operation. They affirmed their support for the principles of mutual respect, non-intervention, peaceful solution of disputes and respect for human rights, all of which they considered indispensable to the strengthening of peace, security and international co-operation.

In examining the world economic situation and bearing in mind, amongst other things, the fact that Italy participated in the meeting of the Seven at Tokyo, they expressed their concern at protectionist measures of all kinds, especially in so far as they affect developing countries, and affirmed their firm support for the establishment of a new international economic order. In this connection they expressed their conviction that the expansion of international trade will depend increasingly upon solidarity and a spirit of understanding between nations. They agreed to contribute in a positive manner to the success of UNCTAD V in Manila in May.

The two Ministers reviewed the principal bilateral questions of common interest. Minister Forlani listed the principal initiatives in economic, industrial and financial co-operation in which Italian private and public sector enterprises are participating or would wish to participate, and emphasised the Italian Government's interest in facilitating this co-operation and making it more efficient. Minister Guerreiro in turn emphasised the mutual advantages which this co-operation offers to both countries and the growing importance of Italian investments in Brazil.



Minister Forlani reaffirmed the intention that the present agreement on economic co-operation dated 30 April 1956 should be replaced by a new agreement on economic, industrial and financial co-operation. Minister Guerreiro restated the Brazilian wish to bring the institutional framework of bilateral relations up to date so as to make it more adequate to the needs of economic co-operation between the two countries.

The two Ministers expressed the satisfaction of their Governments with the progress achieved during the Third Session of the Brazilian-Italian mixed Commission held in Rome from 29 November to 1 December 1978. They agreed that the solutions reached in that meeting, in particular as they affect the activities in Italy of the Banco do Brasil and the Brazilian Coffee Institute should be put into effect as soon as possible.

They commented with satisfaction on the arrangements put in train by the appropriate bodies in the private sector of both countries with a view to holding in the first half of this year the inaugural meeting of the Brazilian-Italian Business Committee.

The two Ministers recognised the importance of the contacts maintained between the Italian and Brazilian National Research Councils and noted with satisfaction the progress made on co-operation in the field of telecommunications in the Electronic Committee. Minister Forlani expressed the lively interest of his Government in seeing that initiatives in this area might be further expanded and diversified, and should become a model for technical and industrial co-operation between the two countries.

The two Ministers showed particular interest in the development of cultural co-operation between the two countries on the basis of the work carried out by the Brazilian-Italian mixed commission on cultural co-operation.



Minister Forlani had expressed his thanks to Minister Guerreiro for the warm and cordial welcome which he had received during his stay in Brazil and invited him to visit Italy. Minister Guerreiro accepted this invitation with pleasure.

Mr Fursland, FED

CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO ITALY

CONFIDENTIAL

29 MAY 1979

13

Reference

1) S. Pares

2) Mr. Nash *ab40*

3) Mr Boniface (cr)

4) P. P.

BM
29/5

1. New China News Agency of 9 February reported that Zhang Yue (Chang Yueh) had arrived that day in Rome as China's new ambassador to Italy. Although this biographical note has been delayed, I hope it may still be of interest to recipients.

2. We have no information on Zhang's date of birth or early history. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Taiz (Yemen) reporting his impressions of Zhang in March 1961, guessed that he was then in his late forties. Our earliest records on him indicate that in 1951 he was Deputy Director of the Western European and African Affairs Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he appears to have held until 1955. In December of that year he was appointed assistant commercial representative at the Chinese Trade Organisation Office which opened in Cairo in January 1956, in advance of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt. In June 1956, following Egypt's decision in May to recognise China, Zhang was appointed Counsellor at the newly-opened Chinese Embassy in Cairo. Twice in 1958 he was noted as Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, presumably ad interim.

3. Remaining in the Middle East, Zhang was transferred in November 1958 to Yemen where he served first as Counsellor and later as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. From March 1961 to July 1964 he was ambassador to the Somali Republic. In August 1963 he was present in Peking when Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) and Chen Yi (Ch'en I) received the visiting Somali premier, and participated in talks leading up to the signing of a Sino-Somali agreement on economic and technical co-operation. He was back at his post when in February 1964, Zhou Enlai visited the Somali Republic on his African tour.

4. From 1964 to 1974, we have no record of Zhang who was doubtless affected, as were many of his colleagues, by the demands for examination and re-education that the cultural revolution engendered. In September 1974 he left Peking to take up the post of ambassador to Sudan, a position he held until December 1978. His recent posting to Rome is a break in the pattern of his service in Africa and the Middle East.

5. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Taiz, writing in March 1961, described Zhang as a large man physically, clearly of some culture, who at that time spoke practically no English, no other European language, so far as could be discovered, nor, apparently, any Arabic. On the few occasions when he and his British colleague discussed political matters of common interest, Zhang was forthcoming and sensible. We have no details on his private life.

S. Pares

24 May 1979

Ms S Pares
Far Eastern Section
Research Department

/cc:

CONFIDENTIAL

cc:

Chancery, Peking

Chancery, Rome

Mr Lambert, OID

Mrs Colvin, Atlantic Region, Research Department

Western European Department

Mr Fraser Darling, PUSD

STATE DEPT. MARINA SWANSON

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELNO 71 OF 13 MAY

INFO UKREP BRUSSELS,ROME.

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1. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAID A ONE-DAY WORKING VISIT TO TUNIS ON 16 MAY FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT WHICH PRINCIPAL POINT OF CONTENTION WAS AS EXPECTED FISHING. PRESENT ITALIAN/TUNISIAN AGREEMENT EXPIRES ON 19 JUNE AND TUNISIANS FIRMLY REFUSED TO RENEW IT THEREAFTER (THUS KEEPING ITALIAN FISHERMEN OUTSIDE 12 MILE ZONE FROM 12 JUNE). AT THE SAME TIME TUNISIANS REJECTED ANY COMMUNITY COMPETENCE IN THE MATTER DESPITE PRESSURE FROM THE ITALIANS: THEY SAID THEY WOULD ONLY HANDLE IT BILATERALLY. BETWEEN NOW AND 19 JUNE THERE ARE TO BE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL AND THE ITALIANS THINK THAT THE TUNISIANS MIGHT IN THE END BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT A FURTHER SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT.
2. TUNISIAN OPPOSITION TO RENEWAL OF AGREEMENT OSTENSIBLY STEMS FROM THEIR DESIRE TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN FISHING INDUSTRY (WHICH OF COURSE WILL TAKE TIME) AS WELL AS TO SAFEGUARD THEIR "PATRIMOINE". TUNISIANS WILL CERTAINLY PLAY HARD TO GET. THERE IS THE BACKGROUND OF TRADITIONAL SENSITIVITY OVER ITALIAN FISHERMEN SWEEPING UP TUNISIAN FISH, PLUS ITALY'S RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT ITSELF TO PURCHASE MORE TUNISIAN OLIVE OIL, TOGETHER WITH RESENTMENT AT QUOTE PROTECTIONIST UNQUOTE POLICIES IN OTHER SECTORS, CURRENTLY, FOR INSTANCE, APRICOTS.
3. ONLY POSITIVE ASPECTS OF M FORLANI'S VISIT WERE SIGNATURE OF A DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT AND A DECISION TO FORM AN ITALIAN/TUNISIAN MIXED COMMISSION.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LAMBERT

FILES
WED
NENAD
EID (E)
MR. BULLARD

MR. FEAGUSON
MR. FRETWELL
SIR A. PARSONS
MR. J.C. NOBLE

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FM ANKARA 151610Z MAY 79

TO IMMEDIATE DISTRESS FCO

TELNO DISTRESS 23 OF 15 MAY 1979

INFO PRIORITY ROME, ISTANBUL.

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RECEIVED	17 MAY 1979
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23/5

MY TELNO DISTRESS 22: ALBINO CIMINI

1. H.M. CONSUL AND VICE-CONSUL ATTENDED THE FINAL HEARING OF ALBINO CIMINI'S TRIAL WHICH WAS HELD IN AGRI ON 14 MAY.

2. IN HIS FINAL STATEMENT OF DEFENCE CIMINI ADMITTED (AS HE HAD DONE SINCE HIS ARREST) THAT THE DRUGS, FOUND IN HIS SHOULDER BAG DURING A SPOT CHECK SOME 30 KMS INSIDE THE TURKISH BORDER BY THE TURKISH POLICE, WERE HIS, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD OBTAINED THESE DRUGS FROM A TIR DRIVER INSIDE TURKEY. IN SUPPORT OF THIS HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SEARCHED ON ENTERING TURKEY BUT THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN FOUND BY THE CUSTOMS. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AN ADDICT OF HEROIN AND NEEDED THE HASHISH TO OVERCOME THIS ADDICTION AND THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED A MEDICAL REPORT TO THIS EFFECT TO THE COURT. HE DENIED HAVING BROUGHT THE DRUGS INTO TURKEY AND SAID THAT AT NO TIME DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (WHERE A TURKISH SCHOOLBOY HAD BEEN USED AS INTERPRETER) HAD HE BEEN ASKED WHERE THE DRUGS HAD COME FROM - ONLY WHERE HE HIMSELF HAD COME FROM. HE CLAIMED THAT THE INTERPRETER HAD MISUNDERSTOOD ALL THIS AND TRANSLATED TO THE POLICE THAT BOTH CIMINI AND THE DRUGS HAD COME FROM AFGANISTAN. ON THE BASIS OF THIS EVIDENCE CIMINI ASKED THAT HE BE CHARGED UNDER SECTION 404 (POSSESSION) OF THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE.

3. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROXIMITY TO THE BORDER IN WHICH THE DRUGS WERE FOUND, HE WAS CHARGING CIMINI, UNDER SECTION 403 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, WITH IMPORTATION OF 251 GRAMMES OF HASHISH.

4. AFTER A BRIEF ADJOURNMENT, THE COURT RECONVENED AND THE PRESID-
ING JUDGE ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S
CHARGE AND PASSED A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WHICH, IN VIEW
OF CIMINI'S GOOD CONDUCT AND THE SMALL QUANTITY OF THE HASHISH,
HE COMMUTED TO 30 YEARS. IN A STATEMENT, HE SAID THAT IT WAS
DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO PASS SUCH A HEAVY SENTENCE BUT THAT HE WAS
SIMPLY DELIVERING THE SENTENCE WHICH THE LAW DEMANDED, HE WAS ONLY
A JUDGE AND HAD NO DISCRETION TO ALTER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY.
HE ADDED THAT HE WISHED IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NATIONALITY
OF CIMINI WAS NOT A CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT, A TURK WOULD HAVE
RECEIVED THE SAME SENTENCE FOR THE SAME OFFENCE.

5. CIMINI WAS SHOCKED BY THIS VERDICT BUT REMAINED CALM.


6. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT WILL NOW GO AUTOMATICALLY TO THE
HIGH COURT OF APPEAL IN ANKARA FOR REVIEW. CIMINI'S LAWYER SAID
THAT HE WOULD LODGE AN APPEAL. THE CASE IS THEREFORE STILL SUB
JUDICE. IF THE ANKARA COURT CONFIRMS THE SENTENCE IT WILL IN
PRACTICE MEAN (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT REDUCTIONS) A SIXTEEN YEAR
SENTENCE FOR CIMINI OF WHICH HE HAS DONE NEARLY TWO.

BARRETT

FILES
CONSULAR
SED
WED
NEWS
PS/MR LUCE
MR FLY

(2)

LA 20/2/3

British Embassy
ROME

10 May 1979

Mr T Jenkins
Deputy Overseas Labour Adviser
FCO
LONDON SW1

Dear Mr. Jenkins,

Pa
RM
IA/V

ITALIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION: RELATIONS WITH CHINA

- (15) 1. On 22 March this year I wrote to Michael Walsh (letter reference LA 20/2/3) about a planned visit to Italy by Chinese trade unionists on the unilateral invitation of UIL which was promptly disowned by CGIL and CISL.
2. This visit duly took place between 20 April and 5 May. Indeed I encountered the Chinese delegation myself when I attended a UIL special Congress on its internal organisation on 27 April. The delegation was headed by Wang Ja-Chong, temporary general secretary of the Chinese trade union, and apart from Rome it also travelled to Naples, Venice, Milan and Genoa. There were meetings with the President of the Republic, Pertini, with the President of the Senate, Fanfani, and with the Leader of the Camera, Ingrao. Despite the initial protestations of CGIL and CISL, senior representatives of these unions (including Lama, leader of CGIL) were present at a reception for the delegation as were Craxi, leader of the Italian Socialist Party who was warmly greeted by the Chinese, and Berlinguer, the Communist leader who was, I understand, greeted less enthusiastically.
3. Part of the programme of the visit included a long discussion with representatives of the Italian host union, UIL, which is reported as having revealed "significant agreement" on the need for pressure from all trade union movements to achieve world peace. The Chinese unionists expressed gratification for UIL's invitation, this being the first visit by a Chinese delegation to a Western country for 11 years. They expressed the hope that it would not be an isolated visit and that it would be only the start of a more profound exchange of experiences and reciprocal collaboration.
4. The visit has been seen by some commentators here as a coup not only for UIL but also for the Socialist Party with which the Chinese are clearly more interested in consorting than the Communist Party, for obvious reasons. No doubt this was the reason for the invitation and Benvenuto's (leader of UIL) visit to China last summer.

/5.

5. It might be useful also to note, apropos of the Italian union movement's international relations that Marianetti, leader of the Socialist faction of the Communist-dominated CGIL, recently paid a visit to the USA to deliver a lecture on the Italian trade union situation at the Centre for European Studies of Harvard University. He took this opportunity to have talks with Leo Suslov, head of the International Section of the United Auto Workers' union, about the continuing cool state of relations between CGIL and AFL-CIO which is interpreted, of course, as being mainly a result of George Meany's hostility. The impression given (though this may be one-sided) was that more cordial relations might exist with American labour after Meany's retirement. Marianetti also spoke to Robert Hunter, Brzezinski's deputy, and to Lacy Wright who has the "Italian Desk" at the State Department.

Sincerely,
Peter Sullivan

P J Sullivan

cc. Mr Harborne, WED
Mr Tyrer, OID
Mr Beattie

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome
Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

pa *Bar*
23/4

20

M H Connor Esq
Mexico & Caribbean Dept
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 021/4

Date 19 April 1979

WRJ 021/4	
REC.	27 APR 1979
- DEPT -	
- IN -	

Dear Connor,

ITALO-CUBAN RELATIONS

1. Paragraph 4 of FCO tefno 59 to Havana referred to the possibility that our European partners might have been the object of self-invitations for a visit by the Cuban Foreign Minister.
2. You may like to know that the Latin American Department of the MFA have told us that approaches were indeed made by the Cubans about a possible visit by Malmica to Rome. The Italian response was that given the current political situation in Italy, with elections due to take place in early June, this would not be convenient. For the same reason we gather that nothing has yet been decided about the proposed Forlani visit to Cuba, to which you referred in paragraph 2 of your letter of 19 January to Bryan White in Havana.
3. Despite the above and despite the fact that Cuban policies in Africa during the past few years have given the Italian Government much cause for concern, the Italians have normally cultivated close relations with the Cubans and in the past Forlani has welcomed opportunities to meet his Cuban colleague.
4. Incidentally, we have not seen anything in the Italian press about links between Italian terrorist organisations and Cuba, to which you also referred in the letter mentioned in paragraph 2 above. It used to be said some years ago that such links existed. But we know of no evidence for this, and there has not been any recent publicity that we can recall.

Yours sincerely,
Mark Fellow

M E Fellow

cc:
B O White Esq, HAVANA
P G Harborne Esq, WED

CONFIDENTIAL

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British High Commission
7 St Anne Street Floriana Malta GC

Telephone Central 21285

1. CC. Col. ^{Can}
Pos D(2)
N. RAD.
WED
2. Mr. ^{David} ¹⁴ ¹⁸
Mr. Ashford A187n
3. PA ^{Malta} ^{Finance}
cc as at 1 and
to Malta PCC
K. ^{Malta} ^{Finance}
8/4

A L S Coltman Esq
Southern European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Your reference

Our reference 21/1

Date 12 April 1979

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Mr. Verck
Mr. ^{W. H. H. H.} ⁸⁴⁹¹⁴
Mr. ^{W. H. H. H.} ¹⁹⁶⁴
2 ^{W. H. H. H.} ^{Malta}

MALTA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

- At a routine lunch for the No.2's in the United States and EEC Missions to-day we all expressed our uncertainty over Mr Mintoff's next moves. We recognised that he had not made his expected announcement on Malta's future foreign relations on or about 31 March because he was not in a position to provide any figures or other firm evidence of support either from the Libyans or the Europeans. Mr Mintoff has not yet responded to the demarche made by the French, Italians and Germans on 29 March whereby those countries declared their readiness to hold talks in Malta at high official level as soon as the Malta Government wished. One would not expect any response yet. Nevertheless my French colleague to the evident surprise of his Italian and German colleagues said that if there was no response soon the French Ambassador would put the French proposals - a very soft loan and technical co-operation - directly to the Malta Government. I said I assumed that in this event the French Ambassador would be acting on behalf of the Italians and also the Germans who would take part as observers according to the agreed arrangements. He confirmed that this would be the case but the Italian and German representatives remained silent.
- I suggested that Mr Mintoff was himself in a quandary after his talks with Qadhafi on 31 March and 1 April and was probably still hoping to obtain marketable evidence of Arab support before returning to the Europeans and that if the French and their partners jumped in again too quickly Mintoff would take this as a sign of eagerness and exploit it. This I think is probably true, but on the other hand if as we understand Mintoff is unhappy about the uncertainties of his foreign relations some advantage might be derived through the Europeans making firm proposals before long.
- A further point which emerged was that the Libyan Ambassador before going off to Rome a few days ago had told the new American Ambassadress that he understood Mr Mintoff had not been pleased with the results of his talks with Colonel Qadhafi on 31 March and 1 April. He did not indicate the Libyan attitude to these talks but said that further bilateral talks between the Maltese and the Libyans would take place at a date and level yet to be decided.

Yours ever
Michael
R M Purcell

c.c. Chanceries at:
Paris
Dome



British High Commission
7 St Anne Street Floriana Malta

Telephone Central 21285

K per

1. CC BE Rom
WED
DS 11, MOD
Col Dandon, Cabinet Office

(18)

A I S Coltman Esq
SED
FCO

REC'D
06 APR 1979
DESK

Your reference

Our reference

Date

Mr Ashton

29 March 1979

pa Italy/Malta 3/4
Bony
5/4

Dear General

We thought you would like to see the generous message sent to Rear Admiral Cecil by Angelo la Marte, the Italian Chargé. Angelo is a good friend of ours and it is kind of him to write as he has. The problems he alluded to in his letter concern the preremptory dismissal of the Italian Military Mission from Malta. This Mission, much akin to the Specialist Team Royal Engineers which left Malta in November 1977, has contributed a good deal to several infrastructural developments over the past years and has now been given its marching orders in retaliation for Italy's unco-operative attitude to Malta's "need" for economic support after 31 March.

2. When the Italians first had the intimation that they had to be out by 29 March, they thought that by skillful footwork they could delay their departure, perhaps to a more propitious *moment* by which time Mr Mintoff could change his mind. General Poli was sent from Rome for this purpose. He learnt from Lorry Sant that the Italian Mission's departure was in deference to the wishes of Colonel Qadhafi as much as any other reason. No stay of departure was granted and the Mission found to their discomfort that Mr Mintoff's deadline on this occasion was *inm*utable. I enclose a press cutting which, at the end, gives a glimpse of the Italian Mission's feeling.

Yours ever
Stephen

S E TURNER

RESTRICTED

led but cancelled its trip to Italy and Marsello returned to Tripoli. Some Italian personnel who were on the ship had to find a means of transport yesterday.

"Garnata", or her sister "Tolettella", is expected soon to Grand Harbour later to serve as the temporary hotel for the Libyans.

A decorative stand put up by the students on the Regional 1, which was destroyed by fire or by vandals earlier in the week, was replaced with a new one yesterday. The decoration carries the same message of Libyan solidarity as the "Malta Attaining Freedom".

IN GOZO

March 31 at 9 a.m. Sunday, April 1, the programme continues with band marches by the St. Joseph Band, Ghajnsielem and La Stella Band of Victoria at 10 a.m. Mgr. N. Achi, Bishop of Gozo, will lead the Pontifical celebration at 10.30 a.m. The Te Deum is to be intoned. More band marches will follow with the bandmen of the Leone Band who will be accompanied by foreign folkloric groups.

The President of the festivities sub-committee, Mr. Gorg Pisani, will deliver the commemorative speech at 10.45 a.m. followed by the unveiling of a plaque by Mr. Cefal, Secretary for Gozo. Other activities during the day include folk dancing by the foreign participants at 11.15 a.m. and two football matches at the Silver Jubilee Ground at 12.15 p.m. and horse races at the James Race Track at 2.30 p.m.

Mexican delegation's mootings

Mr. Augusto Gomez Villanueva, Mexican Ambassador resident in Roma, will be leaving tomorrow after a four-day visit. The Ambassador's delegation is composed of officials from the Joint Ventures Department, Industrial Development, Secretariat, General Affairs, Planning and Budgetary Secretariat, Mexican Police Institute, Foreign Trade Ministry, and Embassy officials.

The Mexican delegation has held meetings with officials of the Sea Malta, Air Malta, Ministry of Trade and Industry and has also visited the Malta Drydocks and a number of factories.

CINEMA COMPLEX MARCH 1979

orable Occasion
ent two great films
by all Movie Fans
Late Night Viewings
OT MISS

GOJJELL

TOMORROW FRIDAY
10.30 p.m.
KABIR BEDI
IN

Saturday, Sunday at 11 a.m. Harbour the flag of the Commander British Forces Malta, Rear Admiral O.N.A. Cecil.

London's departure from Grand Harbour will be preceded by a Nimrod solo-flight past low and will be piloted by Air Commodore H.D. Hall, the last Air Commander Malta who will salute the President of the Republic, Dr. Anton Buttigieg, by tipping its wings. The President will be at Port St. Elmo. The Nimrod will then fly around the island before setting on a course to Britain.

An R.A.F. Squadron No. 203, equipped with Nimrods had been based in Malta for almost six years until a few months ago. Through the unit's main role was to keep watch on the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, it carried out several rescue and rescue operations contributing to the rescue of vessels and seamen of various nationalities. The Nimrods had also taken a leading part in the rescue of survivors of the small Maltese cargo ship "Queen of Peace".



Col. P. Zamperli holding the silver tray presented to him by Mr. L. Sant yesterday, in the presence of Italian Military Mission officers.

BA EXTRA FLIGHTS TO MALTA

By a Staff Reporter
British Airways will be operating a total of eight extra flights during April to cope with the increased demand for seats to and from London. The flights will be operated on April 7, 21, 26 and 29.

Coach services to Heathrow

The BA coach link between Heathrow Terminal and West London Air Terminal in Cranwell Rd. will discontinue as from next Saturday. But regular and frequent coach services will continue to operate between Heathrow and the BA Terminal at ray and the BA Terminal at Buckingham Palace Road, Victoria. Alternatively, passengers could head to London's Centre (Piccadilly) through the direct underground network from Heathrow itself, and vice versa.

MARINES' LAST PARADE

The last 130 Royal Marines at Malta will mount the last parade today at H.M.S. St. Angelo. The Parade will form on the quay at Vittoriosa alongside the RFA ship Sir Lancelot at about 9.15 a.m. and then march into the

GOZO STAFF

By a Staff Reporter

The service between Malta and Gozo, being run by the Gozo Channel Company, will start operating today when the ferry "Ghaudra", makes her first trip from Sa Maison, Pieta, at 9 a.m. Another trip to Gozo will be operated at 2 p.m. while departures from Gozo will be at 11 a.m. and 5 p.m. The price for passengers is 50 cents each way.

A special trip will be operated at 5 p.m. next Saturday for Gozo for Gozitians who wish to attend the March 31 ceremony at Vittoriosa with a return trip to Gozo after the ceremony.

Government's appreciation to Italian Military Mission

By a Staff Reporter

Mr. L. Sant, Minister of Works and Sport, yesterday presented a silver tray to Col. P. Zamperli, Head of the Italian Military Mission in Malta, in appreciation of the Mission's work here. Mr. Sant, who had worked closely with Mission officers on various projects undertaken by his Ministry, said that on behalf of the Government and the people of Malta he wished to thank them for their contribution in the field of infrastructure during their five-and-a-half years stay here.

The Minister explained to the Italian Military Mission the work of the Maltese Government for peace in the Mediterranean area for Malta to have gunners from European and Arab countries.

Mr. Sant said he and his friends regretted the departure from Malta of the Italian Mission. He assured them that the Maltese workers would remember the days they had worked together. On behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sant then presented Col. Zamperli with a silver tray and an album of photographs depicting members of the Mission at work on various projects. He also presented a book on Malta to each officer.

Col. Pietro and Signa Jole Zamperli wish to say goodbye to all their friends in Malta and to apologize for not being able to do so personally, due to unforeseen lack of time.

ACCIDENTS

John Vella, 15, of Birkirkara, was injured when, riding a bicycle, he was involved in a collision with a Landrover.

Violet Micallef, 61, of Gzira, was injured when she was hit by a car in Gzira on Tuesday evening.

SOCIAL AND PERSONAL


Dr. Richard Soler D.O. (Lond.), F.R.C.S. (Edn.), will be attending the Third International Intra-Ocular Lens Symposium in Los Angeles between April 8 and 12. The United States week visit to the United States Dr. Soler will be visiting the Oculatory Workshop at the University of California in San Francisco and the Ophthalmic Centres at the General Hospital in Detroit. He will be accompanied by his wife and two children. Dr. Willy Dubucq, Belgium, Manager Yamahia, after leaving returned to Belgium after leading two groups of Yamahia seamen for their convention in Malta.

INDIAN OFFICERS REPATRIATED

Three Indian officers aboard a Hongkong-owned freighter, sailing under the Panamanian flag, have been repatriated after the intervention of the General Workers Union.

The three officers, crew members of the "Lucky Importer", were M.T. Moniz, third officer; D. Khanna, second officer, and R. Moses, chief officer. They sought the union's assistance when the ship arrived in Malta, claiming that the ship's master was ill-treating them and that they were unable to perform their duties with the rest of the crew due to the attitude of the captain. The ship's master had refused to repatriate them saying that if they wanted to go home they should pay their own pockets. The initial discussions between the union and the ship's captain failed but the captain accepted to pay the cost of the repatriation.

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AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA

Malta, 27th March 1979

Dear Admiral,

I feel in duty bound to apologise for not attending yesterday night's reception on board the HMS London. Questions very much akin to those you have experienced in recent times have prevented me from doing so.

I take this opportunity, on the eve of your and British Forces's departure from Malta, to express my admiration for the extreme dignity and distinction which have characterized your command-ship under such difficult circumstances and my sadness in seeing the Army, Navy and Air Forces of a friendly and allied Country to leave the shores of this Island. We shall miss you as will - I am sure - a large section of people in Malta.

Cordially yours,

A. La Marte
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Rear Admiral O.N.A. Cecil
Commander
British Forces

M A L T A

Mr Gladstone
Mr Fergusson
PS/PUS

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GUADELOUPE SUMMIT: ITALIAN REACTIONS

- A 1. The PUS minuted on my submission of 1 February about Italian reactions to the Guadeloupe Summit that he would like to know what impression the French obtained of the strength of those reactions.
- B 2. Lord Gordon Lennox's letter of 5 March reported a conversation with the Assistant Director of M. François-Poncet's Cabinet on this point. M. Blot gave the impression that Italian approaches to the French on this issue had been regarded by the French as routine and expected. As far as M. Blot could remember, the Italians had not referred to 'resumption of Gaullist practices' but it would not have surprised him if they had. (I am sorry for the delay in submitting this reply. We were not able to keep a copy of my submission of 1 February and have had difficulty in tracing it and we have also been expecting a report from the Embassy in Bonn).
- C 3. The PUS will also have seen a report from HM Embassy Washington giving an American impression of the strength of the Italian reaction. An enquiry has now shown that the Germans, who received similar approaches from the Italians, take the view that Italian sensitivity on this question is 'a fact of life about which nothing much can be done'.
4. Mr Bullard may like to see these papers also in case there are any further repercussions in Political Cooperation.

4 April 1979

P W M Vereker
Western European Department

RESTRICTED

16



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 273 4424

P J Sullivan Esq
British Embassy
ROME

Your reference

Our reference

LA/ITA

Date

2 April 1979

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INDEX	

ITALIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION: RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE USSR.

WKS 210/13 - WKS 02/11 16

1. Thank you very much for your letters of 21 and 22 March concerning the plans of the Italian Federation to have exchanges of delegations with trade union organisations in the Soviet Union and in China. It seems that the planning of the exchanges has provided fertile ground for disagreement between the constituent confederations in Italy.
2. It may be significant that there was no discussion of East/West Europe trade union relations between the Federation leaders and the TUC during the recent visit to London. None of the Italians gave any hint either that contact might be established with China. We should be very glad to hear of the outcome of the planned visit by a Chinese delegation to Italy.

M T Walsh
Deputy Overseas Labour Adviser

cc: Mr Harborne, WED ✓
Mr Tyrer, OJD

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RM
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


British Embassy
ROME

LA 20/2/3

22 March 1979

Mr M T Walsh
Deputy Overseas Labour Adviser WORS 02411
FCO
LONDON SW1



ITALIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION RELATIONS WITH CHINA

1. I have reported separately on the on-going saga of the relationship between the Italian TU Federation and the Soviet union movement. However, a further dimension of the Federation's relationship with the Eastern block has recently been highlighted and this concerns relationships with Peking.
2. On 3 March this year, UIL announced that at its invitation a group of Chinese trade unionists would visit Italy at the end of the month. (The invitation had been issued by Benvenuto during a visit to China last summer.) The aim of the visit was to develop relations between the unions and workers of the two countries and discussion of the "problem of peace" was also to be an important objective.
3. This announcement was greeted by a statement from CISL and CGIL accusing UIL of unilateral action in issuing the invitation. Apparently the Federation as a whole were agreed that there should be an invitation to the Chinese but UIL had jumped the gun without consulting CGIL and CISL. It had been the Federation's intention to invite the Chinese delegation to a conference on "democracy and production" to be held in conjunction with the Italy-China Association. They had sent an invitation in December last and had only recently received a reply which had not yet been fully examined so that the timing and nature of the visit had not yet been determined by the Federation.
4. CGIL and CISL went on to say that the visit under the auspices of UIL could not involve the Federation. The unilateral UIL action they said contradicted the recent decisions on union unity (taken at a joint meeting of the three General Councils in February where union unity was discussed).
5. It would appear that the visit will go ahead as planned (at least there has been no indication that it will be cancelled) involving UIL-Chinese union contacts only.
6. UIL has justified its action by saying that it wishes to have links with all countries of whatever "socio-political nature". While it declares that it does not wish to act unilaterally because the greatest possible degree of agreement between the confederations on international matters is one of UIL's prime objectives, that union

/does



does not believe that bilateral contacts with other countries should be prevented. These contacts would not, however, involve, according to UIL, countries where civil or trade union rights were restricted or non-existent.

7. It would seem then that while displaying a hard line on Federation/Soviet relations, UIL is not averse to making overtures to the Chinese unions.

8. This whole confused business of the Italian union confederations' relationships with the Eastern block is just one more example of the difficulties (and indeed, it seems, lack of will) involved in promoting unity, or indeed co-operation between the Italian confederations.

P J Sullivan

cc: Mr P G Harborne, WED
Mr J E Tyrer, OJD
Mr Beattie


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MALTA/ITALY

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
1. Angelo La Morte, the Italian Chargé, told me yesterday that the Italians have been asked to remove their 46-man strong Military Mission from Malta by 29 March. This request was conveyed by Minister Lorry Sant to Colonel Zampieri, the Head of the Mission. When Zampieri asked for an explanation of the Maltese decision he was reminded that Mintoff had warned the Italians last September that if they remained un-co-operative over aid the Military Mission would have to go (see the last sentence of my letter 063/24 of 3 October 1978 to Timothy Daunt).
2. Sant also indicated that the Libyans had been leaning on Mintoff to get rid of all "foreign forces" before 31 March.



(Norman Aspin)

13 March 1979

c.c. SED
PCOChanceries at: Rome
Paris
Bonn
UKDEL NATO
Tripoli

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CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY

PARIS

13

P W M Vereker
WED
FCO

Esq. WRT 0211	
15 MAR 1979	
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA

5 March 1979

Dear Peter,

Mr. Blot
Mr. Harbar
Mr. Vereker
6/11
© 6/3

ITALIAN REACTION TO THE GUADELOUPE SUMMIT

Enter a reampl.

Thank you for your letter of 9 February.

2. I had an opportunity to discuss this today with Jacques Blot, the Assistant Director of François-Poncet's Cabinet. We compared notes about the Italian reaction, and Blot said that the Italians seemed to have spoken to the French on much the same lines as Ducci had done, when he called on Mr Judd. The Italians had given expression to their disquiet in Paris and in Rome, when M Wahl (the Secretary General at the Elysée) had gone there on the President's instructions to give them an account of what had taken place at Guadeloupe. As with us, the Italian tone had been one of disappointment, and they had pointed to the danger of restricted meetings becoming established and developed. As far as Blot could remember, they had not referred to "the resumption of Gaullist practices", but Blot said that it would not have surprised him if they had. The Italians had not, like Ducci, left any piece of paper.

3. Blot did not give the impression that the French had been at all disturbed by the Italian reaction. From what he said, it seems to have been regarded as routine and expected. He said that it was, after all, a fact of international life that limited groups of nations would meet from time to time to discuss different problems, and that these not included would make a fuss at being left out (eg the Canadians and Benelux, as well as the Italians).

4. Blot said that one feature which marked the Italian reaction to Guadeloupe, and their exclusion from other limited gatherings, was that so comparatively little attention was paid by Italian political figures to international affairs - Andreotti excepted. This meant that Italian uneasiness was normally expressed by diplomats, and in diplomatic language.

Yours ever
Nixby

Lord N Gordon Lennox

cc J S Whitehead Esq CMG CVO, BONN
W J Adams Esq CMG, ROME
P J Weston Esq, WASHINGTON



*Harborne -
did we ask for
this?*

For action, pte,

28/2

With the compliments of

For further circulation as necessary

26.2.1979

W J ADAMS

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BRITISH EMBASSY		
RECEIVED IN ROME NO. 13		
28 FEB 1979		
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TO: P VEREKER (WED, FCO)



(for further circulation as necessary)

- 1) U. PS/PUS 28/2 (12)
PVS
NATO
Planning Staff
2) Enter 28/2
3) Mr. Gootall to see
4) Mr. Harborne again

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR IN
CORRIERE DELLA SERA ON 26 FEBRUARY 1979.

GUADELOUPE ETC.

Q. Mr Chancellor, the Guadeloupe meeting aroused a certain amount of uneasiness in the other countries. Don't you feel that similar meetings represent a kind of World Directory in contrast with the political relaunching of Europe?

A. At Guadeloupe no decisions were reached which commit the EEC or NATO. There was merely an exchange of views, just as there are exchanges in many other ways, nearly always in bilateral meetings. When I visit Andreotti or Andreotti visits me we also exchange views, but without in any way binding the EEC or NATO to any sort of decision. One must not, I think, overestimate the consequences of such meetings. Their essential purpose is to deepen the understanding of the point of view of the other countries taking part and to deepen one's personal knowledge.

Q. But at Guadeloupe it was also decided to help Turkey. Is this not a decision which is binding also on the countries which were not represented?

A. As regards aid to Turkey, this was one of the few decisions which was adopted. But immediately afterwards we submitted it to an international organization of which Italy, among other countries, also forms part, i.e. the O.E.C.D. which is at present dealing with the question. Moreover, the four countries which met at Guadeloupe would have been too weak financially to carry out a Turkish aid programme on their own. As regards Turkey, what we had planned was a proposal to other countries to carry out jointly a similar aid programme. And this is why the matter is now being actively pursued by the Governments represented in the O.E.C.D. and by the I.M.F. in Washington. The Guadeloupe conversations have harmed no one.

cc: Chancery (BONN)

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W. Habon

(11)



British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384

Telex International 64224(WUI)/248308(RCA)/440015(ITT)

Telephone (202) 462-1340

P W M Vereker Esq

WED

FCO

WRT 0211	
28 FEB 1979	
INDEX	Regy

Your reference

Our reference

022/1

Date 22 February 1979

Please enter urgency of return with

(A)

Regy
26/2

Dear Peter,

ITALIAN REACTION TO THE GUADELOUPE SUMMIT

(A)

1. I am sorry that you have not had an earlier response to the request, in your letter of 9 February to Nicky Gordon Lennox in Paris, about the strength of the Italian reaction to Guadeloupe but I was able only yesterday to have a word with the Italian Desk at the State Department about this. My contact did not have a copy of the record of the Italian demarche in front of him, but it was clear from the account which he gave me from memory that the Italians took very much the same line in Washington as Ducci had with Mr Judd on 23 January, including the use of the terms of "directorates" and "Gaullist practices". Incidentally, the Italians had another canter over the Guadeloupe turf with the Americans following David Aaron's recent visit to Europe (see my separate letter to Miss Kenwick, not to all).

(10)

Your m.,
Lm

S I Soutar

Regy

Copies: J S Whitehead Esq, BONN
W J Adams, ROME
Lord Gordon Lennox CMG MVO, PARIS

(1) Mr Goodan has seen

(2) cc

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10



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Miss P Kenwick

WED

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~~before 2/28/79~~ ~~2/28/79~~ ~~2/28/79~~ ~~2/28/79~~ ~~2/28/79~~

Planning Staff

NAD PUSD

To see

2) Mr

3) Enter

Peter H. Bone

US/ITALY

1. US/Italian relations, which have been going through a period of strain since Guadeloupe, have been subjected to further stresses as a result of the expulsion from Italy of an American official, attached to the US Army in Europe, following the leaking to an Italian newspaper of a secret US report critical of the Italian security services. I understand that this affair, which occurred at an awkward point during the current attempts to form a new Italian Government, generated a certain amount of heat in Italy (although it has not had much impact here) and that as a result the Italian Ambassador was instructed to seek an interview with Secretary of State Vance. Vance saw Pansa last weekend and was read a lecture about the inadequacies of US security and the efforts which the Italian authorities had undertaken to ensure that the affair was not allowed to become a major irritant in US/Italian relations. Pansa also used the interview to complain, apparently also on instructions, about the fact that David Aaron, the President's deputy National Security adviser, had briefed the other Guadeloupe countries on Deng Xiao Ping's visit to the United States before briefing the North Atlantic Council.

2. The Americans were naturally embarrassed about the newspaper leak and Vance apparently made appropriate noises in reply to Pansa, but on Guadeloupe, Vance, while expressing his understanding of Italian views, was careful not to give any sort of guarantee that a Guadeloupe type meeting à quatre would never be repeated. However, I understand from the State Department's Italian Desk that in an effort to soothe Italian feelings, Vance is now planning to visit Rome on his way to or from the NATO Ministerial meeting in May.

*your love,
S I Soutar*

S I Soutar

Copy:

Chancery, Rome

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British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome


Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

Miss P Kenwick
WED
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 1 February 1979



Dear Pat,

GROMYKO'S VISIT TO ROME: 22/26 JANUARY

A

1. Would you please refer to our telegram no 75 about the Community briefing given by the Italian Political Director on 29 January.
2. You may like to have a brief note of one or two other points which Gardini made during the briefing. First, on the question of commercial exchanges between Italy and the Soviet Union, Gardini said that the Italians were rather pleased at the Russian desire to continue and increase bilateral trade and to make longer term agreements. On the other hand the Italians found the Russians displeased with the EEC over the question of relations between the EEC and COMECON. As regards the Middle East, the Italians thought that Gromyko had given the impression of considerable satisfaction at the fact that the Russians were on the side of the large majority of Arab governments. On Iran the Russians had seemed to avoid anything except indirect references, perhaps because they had not yet fully thought out their policy. As regards Southern Africa Gromyko had given a confident impression, as if he thought that the imperialist powers were on the way out and that the resulting situation would be quite favourable to Russian interests.
3. The Ambassador talked to Gromyko briefly at the reception given by the Russian Ambassador on 25 January. Gromyko spoke warmly of his many visits to London. The Ambassador commented afterwards that he showed no sign of ill health and looked exactly as he had seen him look for the last 20 years. There was a large turnout of Italian Ministers and personalities at the reception, including several leading Italian Communists. Gromyko was reported in the press to have had a "cordial" conversation during the reception with the Communist Party Secretary, Berlinguer.
4. As you will have seen from the communique, a translation of which we have sent under separate cover, four relatively minor bilateral Italo-Soviet agreements were signed during the visit. These were a Convention on legal assistance in civil matters; a Protocol to the Cultural Agreement of 9 February 1960 on cooperation between the Hermitage Museum and the Uffizi Gallery; a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in astrophysics; and the instruments of ratification of an agreement of 20 November 1975 to prevent double taxation in maritime navigation matters.

/5.



5. Andreotti's diplomatic adviser, La Rocca, told the Ambassador on 30 January that Andreotti had been quite pleased with the visit although he had not attached great importance to it. He was gratified at the trade aspects, and for the rest supposed that Gromyko had been more interested in talking to the Pope than in talking to Italian Ministers.
6. Alan Goodison is writing separately to Ewen Fergusson about the question of arms for China (para 3 of our telegram under reference).
7. I should be grateful if you would give this letter any further distribution you think necessary.

Yours ever,
Mark

M E Pellew

cc:

Chanceries: Moscow
Washington
Holy See

Pa. (7)

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05 FEB 1979	
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INDEX	

GRS 200

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FM ROME 291715Z JAN 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 29 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, EEC POSTS, WASHINGTON, PEKING.

GROMYKO'S VISIT TO ROME

1. I ATTENDED TODAY AN EEC BRIEFING GIVEN BY POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
2. GARDINI SAID THAT VISIT HAD BEEN RATHER LONGER THAN STRICTLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR THE INSERTION OF A DAY IN WHICH GROMYKO COULD SEE THE POPE, AND FOR SOME LEISURE WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD ASKED FOR IN ORDER TO SPARE GROMYKO UNDUE PRESSURE. TALKS HAD COVERED THE WHOLE WORLD SCENE BUT HAD NOT REVEALED ANY NEW SLANT OF SOVIET POLICY SO FAR AS THE ITALIANS COULD DISCERN. THE ONLY TOPIC ON WHICH GROMYKO HAD SHOWN EXCEPTIONAL ANIMATION WAS CAMBODIA, ABOUT WHICH HE HAD USED VIOLENT LANGUAGE. FOR THE REST, INCLUDING HIS REFERENCES TO CHINE, HE HAD BEEN VERY BLAND WHILE SHOWING HIMSELF AS ALWAYS MASTER OF THE APPROVED SOVIET LINE OF ARGUMENT.
3. GARDINI SAID THAT THE ITALIANS DID NOT FIND GROMYKO VERY PRESSING ABOUT ARMS FOR CHINA. HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY SURPRISED BY THE FIRMNESS OF THE ITALIAN ATTITUDE. AS REGARDS IRAN, GROMYKO HAD CONTRASTED THE OPEN BUT FUTILE INTERVENTIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH THE BENEFICIAL AND STABILISING EFFECT OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

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/ 4. MY IMPRESSION

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4. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THIS HAS NOT BEEN A VERY IMPORTANT VISIT EITHER FOR THE ITALIANS OR FOR THE RUSSIANS. PERHAPS GROMYKO WAS MAINLY INTERESTED IN MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POPE.

5. A TRANSLATION OF THE SOVIET/ITALIAN COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS BY BAG.

CAMPBELL

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MR HALL

MR THOMAS

ARMS SALES TO CHINA

SKWP



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755.441

1. Mr. Habene - pl.
Refer & submit w/ ref.

R.

A D S Goodall Esq
WED
FCO

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29/1

Our reference

Date 19 January 1979

ORJ 02/11.

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29 JAN 1979

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Mr Goodall to see 0/1

Perman
30/1

My dear David,

GUADALUPE

1. Thank you for your letter of 15 January about Rome telegram No 25. The reference in paragraph 3 to four nuclear Western powers was of course a mistake. The member of Chancery who drafted the telegram watched the interview with Signor Andreotti on television. He believes that Andreotti referred to something like the three Western nuclear powers and Germany, which is in the front line of Western defence. What he wrote in the draft was "the four nuclear Western powers". He submitted it to me and I crossed out the word "four". Our Communications Officer nevertheless transmitted the word "four".

2. Andreotti was not at fault. We were.

Yours sincerely,

Alan

A C Goodison

P.S. Many congratulations on your promotion, to a very worthy wife too. We are all glad for you. David Giladstone is of course an old friend, and we look forward to working with him.

ACG

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FM FCO 241530Z JAN 79

TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 19 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS DOWN UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO
OTTAWA TOKYO

GUADELOUPE SUMMIT: ITALIAN REACTIONS

M I P T

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BOUT DE PAPIER

1. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT THE APPROACH ESTABLISHED WITH THE GUADELOUPE MEETING, WHICH TENDS TO SET UP, AT LEAST IN FACT, A DIRECTORATE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FIELDS.
2. WERE THIS APPROACH TO BECOME ESTABLISHED AND DEVELOPED, IT WOULD OBJECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE EXISTING CONSULTATIONS, BOTH WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, OF PART OF THEIR SUBSTANCE AND RELEVANCE.
3. WHEREAS IN THE N A T O FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONALISED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES CAN CONTINUE TO BE HELD ON A BASIS OF THEORETICAL EQUALITY, THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN WOULD BE AFFECTED BY AN UNACCEPTABLE HIERARCHY ACCORDING TO WHICH THREE COUNTRIES WOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE AMERICANS ON A DIFFERENT AND PRIVILEGED LEVEL.

/4. THE

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4. THE ATLANTIC AND THE EUROPEAN SPIRIT WOULD THEREBY SUFFER THROUGH A RESUMPTION OF THE GAULLIST PRACTICES WHICH HAVE BENEFITED NEITHER THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE NOR THE EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION.
5. NO ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN THAT THE GUADELOUPE PROCEEDINGS WILL NOT BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER SIMILAR INITIATIVES, AND THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD EXPAND TO OTHER LEVELS. THE BONN MEETING OF EXPERTS FROM THE FOUR COUNTRIES ABOUT ECONOMIC AID TO TURKEY SHOWS THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLIES THAT THE ITALIAN OBJECTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN INTO DUE ACCOUNT.
6. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH TO OVER-EMPHASISE THE ISSUE, WHICH HOWEVER IMPOSES TO IT A REALISTIC REAPPRAISAL OF THE WHOLE CONSULTATION PROCESS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

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PS/MR JUDD

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3. MR JUDD TOOK NOTE AND UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY WHAT DUCCHI HAD SAID TO HIS COLLEAGUES. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT IN HIS VIEW, FAR FROM WEAKENING POLITICAL CO-OPERATION AND N A T O POLITICAL CONSULTATION, THE U K, BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, COULD IN FACT ENHANCE BOTH PROCESSES. THE RECORD OF THE U K CONTRIBUTION TO BOTH N A T O AND POLITICAL CO-OPERATION SPOKE FOR ITSELF.

OWEN

FILES

WED

EID (I)

PLANNING STAFF

DEF D

NAM D

FR D

PS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/PS

SIR A DUFF

SIR R HIBBERT

MR BUTLER

MR FERGUSSON

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MR FRETWELL

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FM F C O 241529Z JAN 79

TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TEL NO 18 OF 24 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO
OTTAWA TOKYO.

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Copy to
Defence Dept.
8K 24/1

GUADELOUPE SUMMIT : ITALIAN REACTIONS.

1. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MR JUDD ON INSTRUCTIONS AT SHORT NOTICE ON 23 JANUARY TO REPORT FURTHER DISQUIET ON THE PART OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OVER THE GUADELOUPE SUMMIT. PREFACING HIS REMARKS BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE BRIEFING WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY SIR JOHN HUNT (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS FULLER THAN THAT RECEIVED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FROM ANY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND 25% MORE THAN WHAT HAD APPEARED IN LE MONDE AS COMPARED WITH THE 25% LESS PROVIDED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT), HE THEN SPOKE TO THE BOUT DE PAPIER (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT WITH MR JUDD. HE SAID THAT SIMILAR DEMARCHES WERE BEING MADE BY ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON, BONN AND PARIS.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION HE EMPHASISED THAT THE ITALIAN'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS THE DILUTION OF POLITICAL CO-OPERATION AMONG THE NINE AND OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN N A T O CAUSED BY PRIVILEGED DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT TOPICS BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE NINE WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO GUARANTEE THAT THE GUADELOUPE SUMMIT IDEA MIGHT NOT BE REPEATED. AND THE INFORMAL; NO-CONCLUSIONS, NATURE OF THE MEETING WAS BELIED BY THE FACT THAT FOLLOW-UP ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN PUT IN HAND EG. ON TURKEY. HIS GOVERNMENT VIEWED THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH GRAVE DISQUIET. THEY FURTHER BELIEVED THAT, IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS IN A RESTRICTIVE SETTING, A FLEXIBLE USE OF THE QUOTE ECONOMIC SEVEN UNQUOTE FORMULA WITH ATTENDANCE DEPENDING ON SUBJECT WAS A BETTER WAY OF GOING ABOUT THINGS.

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13.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 January 1979

A C Goodison Esq CMG
ROME

WRT 02111	
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NAME	

My dear Alan

GUADELOUPE

1. We noticed with some surprise that Signor Andreotti is reported in paragraph 3 of your telegram no 25 as referring to the Guadeloupe meeting as a consultation between "the four nuclear Western powers". Is this really what Andreotti said? It seems an odd mistake for him to make in regard to the FRG.

Yours ever

David

A D S GOODALL
Western European Department

(D) WAHL GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE GUADELOUPE DISCUSSIONS, MENTIONING EAST/WEST RELATIONS, THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, CHINA, THE FAR EAST, THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, AFRICA AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. ACCORDING TO FRESCOBALDI'S ACCOUNT (THOUGH HE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS), SIGNOR ANDREOTTI MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN A REPORT OF THE GISCARD/SCHMIDT BILATERAL MEETING ON MCA'S AND THE EMS SEMICOLON

(E) THE ITALIANS WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE GUADELOUPE MEETING DID NOT IMPLY THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF A FOUR - POWER DIRECTORATE.

/3. IN

GRS 511

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FM ROME 111430Z JAN 79

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 25 OF 11 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN.

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WRS 0211.		
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ITALY AND THE GUADELOUPE MEETING

1. AN APPARENTLY INSPIRED ACCOUNT APPEARED IN THE CORRIERE DELLA SERA ON 17 JANUARY OF SIGNOR ANDREOTTI'S HALF - HOUR MEETING THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH JACQUES WAHL, SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE ELISEE, WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO ROME BY PRESIDENT GISCARD TO GIVE THE ITALIANS AN ACCOUNT OF THE GUADELOUPE MEETING.

2. THE ACCOUNT BY DINO FRESCOBALDI CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) THE ITALIAN SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT WAS NOT BY THIS BRIEFING DISPELLED SEMICOLON

(B) THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD PROTESTED TO THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED BEFORE THE GUADELOUPE MEETING SEMICOLON

(C) SIGNOR ANDREOTTI WAS PARTICULARLY DISTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT HIS THREE EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES INVOLVED HAD SAID NOTHING TO HIM ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING GUADELOUPE MEETING WHEN THEY SAW HIM RESPECTIVELY SHORTLY BEFORE IT WAS ANNOUNCED SEMICOLON

(D) WAHL GAVE A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE GUADELOUPE DISCUSSIONS, MENTIONING EAST/WEST RELATIONS, THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, CHINA, THE FAR EAST, THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, AFRICA AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION. ACCORDING TO FRESCOBALDI'S ACCOUNT (THOUGH WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS), SIGNOR ANDREOTTI MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN A REPORT OF THE GISCARD/SCHMIDT BILATERAL MEETING ON MCA'S AND THE EMS SEMICOLON

(E) THE ITALIANS WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE GUADELOUPE MEETING DID NOT IMPLY THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF A FOUR - POWER DIRECTORATE.

/3. IN

3. IN THE COURSE OF A TELEVISION PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY SIGNOR ANDREOTTI ON 10 JANUARY, HE REPLIED TO A QUESTION BY 'LE MONDE' CORRESPONDENT ABOUT ITALY'S EXCLUSION FROM GUADELOUPE. ON THIS OCCASION, SIGNOR ANDREOTTI STRESSED IN A VERY RELAXED FASHION THAT THE GUADELOUPE MEETING WAS ESSENTIALLY A CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE FOUR NUCLEAR WESTERN POWERS IN PREPARATION FOR THE SALT TALKS AND THAT ITALY "'THANK GOODNESS'" WAS NOT A NUCLEAR POWER. HE REPEATED THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S RESISTANCE TO ANYTHING WHICH IMPLIED THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF AN INNER DERECTORATE. HE REVEALED THAT IN ADDITION TO SENDING M. WAHL, PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD TELEPHONED HIM TO EXPLAIN THE ITEMS ON THE GUADELOUPE AGENDA. AS FOR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE GUADELOUPE HAD BEEN SET UP, SIGNOR ANDREOTTI SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT MR CALLAGHAN AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE TAKING A BRIEF HOLIDAY IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THAT EITHER THE FRENCH OR AMERICAN PRESIDENT (HE WAS NOT SURE WHICH) HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF CONTACTING THE FOUR LEADERS CONCERNED.

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WRT 0211 (78)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Italian Embassy and has the honour to refer to its Note No 9898 of 22 November requesting that certain British Dependent Territories be informed that, as a result of decisions taken by the World Health Organisation, Italy has been declared a small-pox free territory and hence certificates of vaccination are no longer required for travellers from Italy.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has the honour to confirm that with the exception of the Seychelles, which became independent on 28 June 1976, and Rhodesia with whom the United Kingdom has no diplomatic relations, the British Dependent Territories listed in the Note have been informed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Italian Embassy the assurance of its highest consideration.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1

5 January 1979