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PART 2

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CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Visit of the South African President,
F.W. de Klerk.

SOUTH AFRICA

PT1: April 1984

PT2: February 1990

Series closed.

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Charles

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23 April

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(Penish Resident's
State visit 23-26 Apr)

Could manage a

call: approx Questions on

- ① Tuesday 23 Apr
- ② pm on Mon 22 Apr
- ③ a.m. on Wed 24 Apr

(If you were working
in terms of a meal,
fron on Mon 22 +
Wed 24 April for
dinner - but both
pre-PMQs). S 23/1

cele



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 January 1991

Pear Charles,

*Sir Peter
Does it look
a matter?
C*

Institute of Directors' Dinner:
Invitation to President de Klerk

Sir Peter Walters, President of the Institute of Directors, has told Sir Patrick Wright that the Institute has invited President de Klerk to address its annual dinner on 23 April (at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer would also be present). Sir Peter has undertaken to let us know President de Klerk's answer.

Sir Robin Rewick has told us that President de Klerk may well find this invitation attractive. It would be helpful to know whether the Prime Minister would be willing to see President de Klerk if he came to London at about that time.

*Answer
Sir Peter*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street



B7/9/21/2

South African Embassy
LONDON WC2N 5DP

October 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

CC FCO

CDP

16/x

Dear Charles,

I should like once again to convey my personal thanks for your part in arrangements for the visit of State President De Klerk to Britain this weekend. He and Mrs De Klerk were most appreciative of the warmth of their reception at Chequers.

We were afforded the customary full co-operation by the various British authorities, for which I am most grateful.

Yours sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER



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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1990

Dear Robin,

I enclose copies for you of my letter recording the Prime Minister's talk with President de Klerk: and a brief note - which I am not sending to the Foreign Office - about the possibility of the Prime Minister visiting South Africa.

Yours ever
C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

His Excellency Sir Robin Renwick,
K.C.M.G.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL



SJ
arc
cc Robin Renwick
cc B1

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT cc MINISTER

14 October 1990

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DE KLERK
OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister had a talk at Chequers this morning with President de Klerk lasting rather over one hour. The President was accompanied by the South African Ambassador. Sir Robin Renwick was also present. The climate of the discussion was as good as the weather. President de Klerk detailed some of his grievances against the ANC in the early stages, but then got on to talk constructively and frankly about his plans for the future.

Some of the material in this letter is of a sensitive nature and it should be given only a very limited distribution to those with a strict need to know.

Visit to Washington

President de Klerk began by saying that his visit to Washington had gone well, as the Prime Minister had predicted it would. He had had a warm reception from President Bush and Secretary Baker, and helpful assurances about support in restoring access to IMF/IBRD funds once the remaining steps had been taken to get rid of apartheid.

The ANC

President de Klerk then talked about the ANC. he was worried that Mandela seemed to be losing his grip under pressure. At their last meeting, he had told Mandela very frankly that he simply must take decisions, even if it did mean losing some support among his followers. The Prime Minister agreed that Mandela often seemed to bear the imprint of the last person to talk to him. She thought the basic problem was that the ANC were not yet ready for serious negotiations. President de Klerk said that he was worried about the ANC's conference in December. There were signs of divisions within the movement, with the internal leadership feeling it was not getting its due. It could reach the point of expulsions at the conference. There was a deep uncertainty within the ANC. The Prime Minister said that, for 20 years, the ANC's only function had been to hit out. Now they had to turn from being a destructive organisation to a constructive one, and they were finding that difficult.

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The Prime Minister continued that she had been cross with Mandela for his allegation that the security forces were provoking the violence between rival black organisations. President de Klerk said that efforts by the ANC to implicate the security forces in the violence were indeed part of the problem. Mandela was unable to control his own supporters, and therefore tried to shift the blame to the government. The more fundamental problem was that some of the ANC saw suspension of the armed struggle as no more than armistice, and were refusing to hand in their weapons. There was clear evidence that caches of weapons remained in South Africa, with plans to bring in more. That was why two members of the ANC had been detained in August, one of them being Mac Maharaj. The Prime Minister said that she hoped Maharaj would be charged soon. President de Klerk said that he was pressing for this. The President continued that he had no option but to put his foot down on the issue of illegal arms. The Government could never accept that a political party should have its own private army. The ANC had advanced in some respects: for instance they no longer referred to the South African government as an illegal, racist organisation. But they were not living up to their promise to suspend violence and all related activities.

President de Klerk continued that the ANC remained reluctant to accept competition from other black organisations. That was at the root of the ANC/Inkatha problem. But no one could ignore the Inkatha: Chief Buthelezi had at least 50 per cent of South Africa's Zulus with him. Buthelezi's aim was to find an expression for Zulu nationalism within a South African framework. Unfortunately his behaviour was a bit erratic, explicable partly by the fact that he was a diabetic. He could be irrational and had been through a bad patch lately. That was why Dhlomo had left him. But he himself had a good relationship with Buthelezi. He thought Buthelezi's position had been strengthened as a result of recent events. The Prime Minister said that she would see Chief Buthelezi when he came to London in November. The crucial thing was that he should not put himself in the wrong.

The Prime Minister asked about Chief Mabuza. President de Klerk said Mabuza had felt piqued because Mandela had treated him as unimportant. But he was now getting his balance back and playing a useful role.

Returning to his catalogue of the ANC's sins, President de Klerk said that he was constantly reminding Mandela that the ANC's association with the South African Communist Party was an albatross round their necks. They should distance themselves from socialism. More generally, some way had to be found to bring home to blacks in South Africa how devastating had been the effects of socialism elsewhere on the continent. All they ever saw was pictures of black heads of government standing at the end of red carpets: they needed to see the starvation, the poverty and the misery. Sir Robin Renwick commented that the President had moved Mandela quite a long way, as was evident in his recent interview denying that he was a socialist. President de Klerk said the problem remained that Mandela could not exert proper control over the ANC. He had promised that violence would be

stopped, but in fact Hani and others were going on recruiting and training. It was possible that Mandela did not know about this. But there was an inner core of the ANC, with a hidden agenda, and they constituted a real problem.

Sanctions

President de Klerk said that this led him on to the illogicality of continuing sanctions. The South African government was getting in step with the rest of the world. But a lot of countries were continuing to support those in South Africa who were out of step and wanted to continue with violence. During his visit to the United States, he had the strong impression that President Bush wanted the Europeans to take the lead in relaxing sanctions. The Prime Minister said it was not worthwhile having a big battle about this in Europe. In practice many countries were ignoring sanctions and they were becoming almost irrelevant. The main difficulties were caused by France, Spain, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands. President de Klerk commented that the Netherlands' position had evolved: he had been invited there on an official visit next week. The main effect of continuing sanctions was to deprive South Africa of the capital it needed. He thought the bankers were looking to European governments to give a signal before resuming lending. The Prime Minister said that other European governments would want to see further steps towards lifting apartheid before they would agree publicly to lift sanctions. But she would certainly raise the matter with Signor Andreotti the following week and at the European Council in December. President de Klerk said that Mandela was watching the evolution of international thinking of sanctions closely. Once he was convinced they would be lifted anyway, he would give the signal to do so. That way it would appear to be in response to the ANC's request.

Negotiations on a new Constitution

The Prime Minister invited President de Klerk to tell her something of his plans for the future. She assumed he would announce further important measures in his speech at the opening of parliament early in 1991. President de Klerk confirmed this, but added that he did not have that many cards left to play. He could tell the Prime Minister, in strict confidence, that he hoped to lift the state of emergency in Natal in the not too distant future. Violence could be dealt with under other legislation, without a state of emergency. He thought this decision would have a considerable psychological effect. The other main issue in the period immediately ahead was the return of exiles. The intention was to carry this through in phases, with completion by the end of April 1991. But an announcement had been suspended following an intemperate attack on the government by the ANC last week. Sir Robin Renwick commented that these steps should put President Bush in a position to say, by next April, that the conditions for easing sanctions had been met.

The Prime Minister asked about the timetable for negotiations. President de Klerk said he still hoped they could start early next year. Indeed he had wanted a third round of

informal talks with the ANC on constitutional principles by now. The truth was that neither side could afford a protracted period of negotiations. That would only enable the hard-liners to emasculate them. What he had tentatively in mind was partial implementation of changes as negotiations made progress. This might take the form of bringing individuals into the government, but would not be an interim government as such. It would be important to have some early results. You could not negotiate for two or three years without any visible progress. The Prime Minister commented that the ANC would be wary of anything which did not put them at the end of the red carpet. President de Klerk said that his tactic would be to make the ANC ask for participation. Mandela was in a hurry because of his age. It was interesting for instance that Mandela was now talking of black elections to decide who should negotiate. Six months ago he had been flatly opposed to this. The Prime Minister said that great care would be needed to ensure that such an election was free from intimidation. There would need to be observers. President de Klerk said that the South African government would control the election and ensure that it was done properly in terms of South African electoral law. For his part he had four years of his mandate left. He could not see himself going to the country again under the present constitution.


The Prime Minister asked about sources of constitutional advice. President de Klerk said that Mr. Viljoen was the main source of ideas. But the Law Commission had been instructed to work out alternative constitutional frameworks. The Prime Minister asked who was advising Chief Buthelezi and the ANC. Was this an area in which we could help? President de Klerk said that Buthelezi certainly needed better advice and the South African government might itself help him obtain it. In these constitutional discussions, he was trying to avoid talking about models, sticking instead to basic principles. The main principle had to be power sharing in the executive. Under a future constitution, no one person could have as much power as he had now. The system would have to enforce cooperation. In some respects the Swiss federal cabinet was a guide. In practical terms he was saying that both he and Mandela would have to be in a future government, as would some of the other leaders. One of the biggest problems, to which he at present saw no answer, would be control of the security forces.

The Prime Minister said that once negotiations started, it would be important to keep other African governments regularly informed. They might be persuaded to bring pressure to bear on the ANC at crucial stages. We had used this tactic successfully during the Rhodesia negotiations. President de Klerk said that he was getting the message from several African governments that they did not want South Africa to be destabilised, which meant in effect that they did not want power simply to be handed over to the ANC. The Prime Minister observed that this reflected the importance to them of South Africa's economy. President de Klerk commented that Mugabe was adopting a more sensible position, and the two of them might meet fairly soon. He had been assured privately that the girl being held by the Zimbabwe government would be released shortly.

Rugby Tour

As the meeting was adjourning for lunch, President de Klerk commented that the one thing which would help him more than any other against his right wing opponents would be a British Rugby tour of South Africa.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (HM Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO SOUTH AFRICA

During her talks with President de Klerk at Chequers today the Prime Minister commented that she would love to come to South Africa, but thought it better not to do so for the time being. It would be prudent to wait at least until there had been substantial progress in negotiations. President de Klerk said demonstrating that the South African Government's guest house was being got ready for the Prime Minister. He would like her to come sooner rather than later. But it would be important to gauge black South African, and in particular ANC, reaction. What happened over sanctions would be crucial. It would be better for the Prime Minister not to come while she appeared in the eyes of the ANC as their main opponent over sanctions. But once most sanctions were lifted, he thought their attitude would be different. He would keep in touch with the Prime Minister about the best timing for a visit. He repeated his hope that it could be sooner rather than later.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

14 October 1990

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TO DESKBY 131000Z FCO

TELNO 363

OF 130800Z OCTOBER 90

INFO PRIORITY HARARE, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG, DURBAN, CAPE TOWN

SOUTH AFRICA: INTERNAL

SUMMARY

1. PUBLICATION OF GUIDELINES RELATING TO POLITICAL OFFENCES AND RETURN OF THE EXILES DELAYED. REMAINING CURFEWS IN JOHANNESBURG AREA LIFTED. SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT TO BE FORMALLY REPEALED ON 15 OCTOBER.

DETAIL

2. ON 12 OCTOBER THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE ANNOUNCED THAT THE GUIDELINES ON POLITICAL OFFENCES (FAXED TO THE DEPT), WHICH HE HAD BEEN DUE TO PUBLISH THAT DAY, WOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL THE ANC HAD CLEANED UP PRESS STATEMENTS BY FACELESS AND APPARENTLY UNINFORMED ANC SPOKESMAN. COETSEE SAID THAT THE ANC'S PRONOUNCEMENTS APPEARED TO BE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE, THE PRETORIA MINUTE, AND THE WORKING GROUP REPORTS EXPRESSLY ACCEPTED BY THE ANC. THE GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO PROCEED ACCORDING TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THOSE DOCUMENTS ONCE THE ANC HAD CLARIFIED THEIR PRESS STATEMENTS. A SPOKESMAN FOR HIS DEPARTMENT AGREED THE POSTPONEMENT COULD DELAY THE FURTHER RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE RETURN OF EXILES.

3. PRESIDENT DE KLERK IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID IN LISBON THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO STRATEGY TO UNDERMINE THE ANC, AS THE LATTER HAD ALLEGED. HE STRONGLY REJECTED THE ACCUSATION THAT THERE WAS A BREACH OF FAITH ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PART AND MADE A PLEA FOR THE ANC NOT TO ACT IN ANY WAY THAT WOULD ENDANGER THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. THERE WAS AN INCOHERENCE IN THE ANC WHICH MANIFESTED ITSELF IN CONFLICTING STATEMENTS FROM TIME TO TIME: THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF DUALISM WITHIN THE ANC AND STILL AN ADHERENCE IN CERTAIN CIRCLES TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

4. IN A BRIEF REACTION TO COETSEE'S STATEMENT, THE ANC SAID THE ISSUES RAISED WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN CONTACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT

AND THE ANC. THE LATTER WERE ENCOURAGED THAT COETSEE HAD STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO PROCEED ACCORDING TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE REPORTS OF THE WORKING GROUPS AGREED BY BOTH PARTIES: THE FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS ALL THE ANC HAD BEEN SEEKING.

5. MEANWHILE, THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER ANNOUNCED THE LIFTING ON 12 OCTOBER OF THE CURFEW IN THREE WITWATERSRAND TOWNSHIPS, IMPOSED UNDER OPERATION IRON FIST ON 25 SEPTEMBER: NO CURFEW MEASURES IN THE AREA NOW REMAIN. VLOK SAID THE DRAMATIC DROP IN VIOLENCE HAD WARRANTED THE MOVE BUT WARNED HE WOULD REIMPOSE THE CURFEW IF NECESSARY.

6. FINALLY, ON 15 OCTOBER THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT WILL BE FORMALLY REPEALED, MARKING THE DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE STATUTE BOOKS OF ANOTHER PIECE OF APARTHEID LEGISLATION ALTHOUGH, AS MRS SUZMAN COMMENTED, THE REPEAL WILL HAVE A WATERED DOWN IMPACT: THE ACT HAD BEEN UNDER-MINED IN RECENT YEARS. NONETHELESS, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT WOULD SEE TO IT THAT NO INTERFERENCE IN ITS POLICIES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES WOULD BE ALLOWED, CONSERVATIVE DOMINATED COUNCILS ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO CIRCUMVENT THE EFFECT BY PASSING NEW BY-LAWS AND REGULATIONS: AND IN MIDDELBURG, IN THE TRANSVAAL, FOR EXAMPLE, RESIDENTS RECENTLY VOTED IN FAVOUR OF CLOSING FACILITIES RATHER THAN OPENING THEM TO ALL RACES.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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
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PAGE 2
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PRIME MINISTERMEETING WITH PRESIDENT DE KLERK

President De Klerk and his wife are coming to Chequers on Sunday, together with the South African Ambassador and his wife. They will arrive by helicopter at 1130. There will be a photocall on the steps or in the rose garden (depending on the weather). You and the President will then have talks from 1145 till 1230. Mrs. De Klerk and the Ambassador's wife might spend this time seeing more of the house and the garden. The intention is to have lunch fairly early - 1230 for 1300 - so that the De Klerks could leave at 1445. They are flying back to South Africa later in the afternoon.

The President and Mrs. De Klerk have sent you down some flowers and South African wine to Chequers for your birthday. You will wish to mention this.

The background for the talks is well set out in Robin Renwick's two telegrams in the meeting folder. De Klerk has kept up the momentum of reform within South Africa, and has continued to make an impact on the world scene with the successful visit to the United States. Sanctions continue to be eroded. His main problems are the violence between ANC and INKHATHA supporters: the inability of the ANC to make up its mind and start negotiations: and Mandela's constant peregrinations round the world. (He is somewhere in Asia at present.) The relationship between De Klerk and Mandela remains good, and they have recently reached an agreement on the release of political prisoners.

You will want to encourage De Klerk to continue on the path on which he has embarked, and discuss the next steps with him and how he sees the way through. Another major speech by him at the Opening of Parliament next year, in which he pledges to remove the remaining apartheid legislation, will have a major impact. We will go on doing what we can to get sanctions lifted. There are continuing difficulties in the EC with countries like Ireland and Denmark, although in practice most European countries

are increasingly ignoring sanctions, especially on investment. You might say you will raise the need for Europe to respond constructively to all that De Klerk has done at the forthcoming European Council in October, and call for decisions at the further Council in December. (But we don't want to mount an initiative prematurely which fails. We will of course support the resumption of IMF and World Bank lending: but the main obstacle here is the American position.

De Klerk may mention the subject of your visiting South Africa. You will probably want to repeat what you have said before: you would love to go, but only when it would be positively helpful from his point of view. It is still too early to say when that will be, but you do not exclude a visit next year.

cd?

CDP

12 October 1990

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

12 October 1990

For Charles,

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South Africa: Visit of President de Klerk: 14 October

President and Mrs de Klerk will visit Chequers for talks and lunch on Sunday 14 October. Mr de Klerk will arrive at Southampton on the Queen Elizabeth II from Lisbon. On board, he will have addressed a meeting of the "Young Presidents", an international organisation of senior businessmen, presumably to advertise the economic hopes of a new South Africa. (His fellow guests include Shimon Peres, former President Ortega, and the Rev Jesse Jackson.)

I enclose a copy of Mr de Klerk's short programme in Britain.

Objectives

Mr de Klerk last called on the Prime Minister at Chequers in May (record enclosed). On this occasion, our objectives are:

(a) to learn how Mr de Klerk envisages progress with the negotiating process in the coming months.

(b) to discuss South Africa's future economic prospects and to explain our efforts to restore South Africa's access to international finance and investment.

Political Developments

These are described in Sir Robin Renwick's telno 353 (enclosed). The Prime Minister may wish:

- to tell President de Klerk of our deep concern that the negotiating process should not be knocked off course by inter-black violence, and ask about prospects for a reconciliation between Chief Buthelezi and Mr Mandela. If President de Klerk thought we could help with this more than we were already, we should be ready to consider it;

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- to welcome Mr de Klerk's readiness to investigate police actions, and stress the need for the security forces to be seen to enforce the law impartially;

- to remind President de Klerk of concern in this country at the continued use of detention without trial, mentioning the case of Mr Mac Maharaj in particular. (Mr Maharaj - a senior ANC leader - has been held without charge since his arrest in early August, despite assurances that he would be brought to trial);

- to ask for Mr de Klerk's view of the way forward to negotiations. Who will take part? Does he still envisage full negotiations beginning in early 1991? Does he propose to announce major new initiatives when he opens Parliament next February?

Economic Issues

Any political settlement in South Africa will need economic underpinning. Whites will need reassurance that South Africa's "first world" economy will remain. If the black population's support for a new constitution is to be retained, and stability preserved, a real effort will be needed to meet some of their economic expectations and give them a material stake in the future prosperity of the country. Mr de Klerk has made a start on government action to tackle the great disparities in spending on services for blacks and whites. But to address the enormous backlogs in black education and housing, he urgently needs to restore growth to the South African economy, at present constrained by tight monetary controls to protect the balance of payments and finance debt repayment.

Pretoria telno 350, copy enclosed, records the South African Finance Minister's outline of the government's strategy. The two key external factors are a relaxation of sanctions and renewed access by South Africa to IMF lending. On the first point, the Prime Minister may wish to remind President de Klerk of what we are doing in the EC to encourage the removal of artificial constraints on South African growth. Despite the Community's failure to take any formal step, in effect sanctions are crumbling: notably as regards restrictions on new investment in South Africa.

The second point is primarily a matter for the Americans. For our part, we will continue to press the US administration to take a positive line in IMF discussions of South Africa.

/We

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We are also in touch with the World Bank whose officials are discreetly making preparations to play a significant role if asked. The Prime Minister may wish:

- to remind President de Klerk that we began to try to prepare the way for the restoration of South Africa's access to the IFI's a year ago;
- to ask President de Klerk about his talks with President Bush on the issue.

Sporting Sanctions (if raised)

Mr de Klerk may ask for the Prime Minister's view of the likelihood of modification of the Gleneagles Agreement, in the light of political progress in South Africa. There have been a number of signals in recent weeks that the ANC are considering a relaxation of the sporting boycott of South Africa, probably starting with the return of South African football to international competition next year. But the process is likely to be a slow and cautious one. If President de Klerk raises the subject, the Prime Minister might say that our views on the sporting boycott are well known. But sporting sanctions are best left to wither away: a high-profile attempt to overturn Gleneagles at this stage would be likely to breathe new life into the issue.

Iraq/Kuwait

While maintaining their position of principle against sanctions of all kinds, the South Africans have assured us that they will observe the UN embargo on Iraq. We believe they have been as good as their word. President de Klerk intervened personally at our request in August to stop a shipment of South African arms to Iraq; the Prime Minister might wish to express our appreciation.

Jens Lew
J. Gass
(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

NO: 55 (OCTOBER 1990) : DE KLERK'S ACHIEVEMENT

Pres de Klerk and Nelson Mandela between them have taken South Africa out of apartheid into the new post-apartheid era. And there should be no doubting the importance of their continued presence for the successful conclusion to this process. Yet, quite surprising is how the public perception of their roles has changed since 11 February (when Nelson Mandela was released).

The general expectation was that, after a relatively short period during which the two leaders would move more or less in tandem, Mandela would move onto a higher plane. That has not happened. On the contrary, it is de Klerk who has actually moved into a new orbit, leaving Mandela behind. This is not a personal impression, but an impression which is widely held and (significantly) shared also by persons who may be assumed to be sympathetic to the ANC and its leader.

What seems to be the case is that, whereas de Klerk is acting on the basis of a new political reality, Mandela and the ANC simply have not adjusted to the post-2 February situation. Two issues which dramatically illustrate this are the handling of the violence and South Africa's changing international relations.

On the unrest in black areas, Mandela and the ANC have failed to provide leadership. Thus, not the ANC leadership but the Zulu king and the Transkei President drew thousands at a "peace Rally" in Johannesburg. These are men, as one observer remarked, who only a couple of months ago were thought to be insignificant.

Instead, Mandela has vacillated between blaming the unrest on the security force, and the police in particular, and then calling on de Klerk to use the security forces to end the unrest. When de Klerk did take action with the so-called "Iron Fist" exercise, Mandela criticised him on grounds of excessive action.

The perception is that it was the Government and not the ANC which ended the violence. The "Iron Fist" strategy worked. Thus Thami Mazwai, a black columnist on Finance Week (October 11-17) writes: "Unless black organisations take the initiative in defusing township political violence, they stand to lose much of their popular appeal. Denouncing Government for the measures it takes, however unacceptable, is not enough." He goes on to say that de Klerk "is thus beginning to enjoy grudgingly-given sympathy, or even support, from blacks."

On the international relations front, De Klerk went to Washington with the purpose obviously of influencing US perceptions of the South African situation. But he was also not unmindful of the fact that he would be improving his credibility back home. And that is exactly what happened.

De Klerk exacted from Bush what he wanted - namely the acknowledgement that the process of change in South Africa is

"irreversible"; and de Klerk got this notwithstanding Mandela's and the ANC's contrary view.

This is not to say that the repeal of the CAAA is around the corner: Congress will want a go-ahead from Mandela. But there is no doubt that Western Governments in general are adopting a more flexible attitude toward South Africa, and this is an issue on which Mandela and the ANC are perceived to be failing. Yet Mandela's only response is to call for the further isolation of South Africa in rather tired rhetoric.

Few things illustrate the changing attitude toward South Africa, and the increasing reactionary nature of the ANC's position as the reception which the South African Minister of Labour, Eli Louw, received when he visited the ILO late last month. This followed agreement between representatives of trade unions, employer organisations and the Government on a new proposed Labour Relations Act. If the ANC's case for isolation was still holding, here is an organisation which would not give a South African Minister of Labour the time of day. Yet he was well-received.

The key to de Klerk's success is the sweeping nature of his actions. Having decided that South Africa needed a new start, that it had to move out of apartheid, de Klerk has acted without flinching, without any qualification. Thus he realised that he had to normalise the situation politically, which involved unbanning the ANC, the PAC and other organisations. His predecessor (P W Botha) also understood this, but coupled the recognition with the requirement that the ANC renounce violence first.

De Klerk brushed all this aside. To have unbanned the ANC and the PAC without reference to the "armed struggle" was dramatic; to have unbanned the SACP in the same breath, was spectacular.

De Klerk has adopted the same approach in relation to the ending of statutory discrimination. One major pillar of apartheid has gone after the other; and while there still are apartheid laws, most blacks accept that their repeal is also just a matter of time. De Klerk's sincerity and integrity are accepted.

The upshot of de Klerk's performance is that he could emerge as the primary reformer on the political scene. In fact, a leading political sociologist suggested two weeks ago that the NP under de Klerk could expect to play a balancing role in the new political situation. This is remarkable turn around. And de

Klerk must be given full credit.

12 OCTOBER 1990

\POSPAPER\12OCT90

VISIT OF STATE PRESIDENT F W DE KLERK: 14 OCTOBER

0800 Arrive

1000 South African Ambassador and Mrs Killen greet Mr and Mrs de Klerk on board ship

1100 Depart by RAF Puma for Chequers (de Klerks, Killens, two Private Secretaries, three Security Guards, two South African Embassy staff)

1130 Arrive Chequers

1140-1245 Photocall, followed by talks

1300 Lunch

1445 Depart Chequers

1545 Visit the Stud House, Hampton Court Park

1730 Arrive Heathrow

1800 Depart, SA 235, for Johannesburg

MR POWELL

Yes. Thanks you
CPM

Lunch at Chequers Sunday, 14 October

I attach the list of guests attending the lunch on Sunday together with a draft seating plan.

The following is a draft outline programme for the visit:

1130	Arrival of State President and Party Photocall
Coffee	PM, State President, South African Ambassador, Sir Robin Renwick and Mr Charles Powell Long Gallery Mr Thatcher, Mrs de Klerk Mrs Killen and Mrs Powell in Hawtrey Room
12.30 ish	Drinks
1300	Lunch Coffee in Great Hall
1445 approx	Departure by road of State President and party.

Agree seating plan and programme?

Sue

10 October 1990

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
AND MR DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MRS DE KLERK ON SUNDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1990
AT 12.30 PM FOR 1.00 PM

The Prime Minister
and Mr Denis Thatcher

The Hon F.W. de Klerk
and Mrs de Klerk

His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa
and Mrs Killen

Sir Robin Renwick

Mr Charles Powell
and Mrs Powell

mt

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON SUNDAY 14 OCTOBER

Mr Charles Powell

Mrs Killen

The Hon. F.W. de Klerk

MR DENIS THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER

Mrs de Klerk

HE The Ambassador of the
Republic of South Africa

Sir Rlbin Renwick

Mrs Powell

ENTRANCE

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PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PRESIDENT DE KLERK IS HOPING FOR A RELAXED DISCUSSION AT CHEQUERS. HE HAS BEEN EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR, DURING WHICH HIS OWN PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN A REMARKABLE ONE.

2. SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS IN MAY, THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANC, CULMINATING IN THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRETORIA MINUTE ON 6 AUGUST UNDER WHICH THE ANC AGREED TO SUSPEND THE "ARMED STRUGGLE" AND THE TWO SIDES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THE EXILES AND THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS. DESPITE THE APPALLING INTRA-BLACK VIOLENCE IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING AND HAVE MADE FURTHER PROGRESS. MANDELA IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAS TRIED TO ATTRIBUTE MOST OF THE BLAME FOR THE VIOLENCE TO ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THIS IS UNJUSTIFIED AS MOST OF THE CLASHES HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN ZULU HOSTEL DWELLERS AND OTHER INKATHA SUPPORTERS ON THE ONE HAND AND ANC "COMRADES" ON THE OTHER. BUT THERE IS LIABLE TO BE SOME TRUTH IN THE ALLEGATIONS THAT ROGUE ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES MAY BE INVOLVED AND INKATHA SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE WORST INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE. MANDELA'S ATTEMPTS TO ENGINEER A MEETING WITH BUTHELEZI ON HIS TERMS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED, BUT TALKS BETWEEN INKATHA AND THE ANC ARE CONTINUING. DESPITE ANC COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO END THE VIOLENCE, THOSE MEASURES SO FAR HAVE PROVED REMARKABLY EFFECTIVE. AS DE KLERK MADE CLEAR TO US FROM THE OUTSET, HE WILL NOT PERMIT CONDITIONS OF ANARCHY TO DEVELOP HERE.

3. THESE EVENTS HAVE EXPOSED THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ANC AND THEIR INABILITY TO CONTROL MANY OF THE YOUNGER "COMRADES." BUT MANDELA AND MBEKI HAVE ASSURED US OF THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO PERMIT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE DE-RAILED. IN THEIR MEETING IN CAPE TOWN YESTERDAY DE KLERK AND MANDELA REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE INDEMNITY FOR AND PHASED RELEASE OF PRISONERS WHOSE CRIMES WERE DEEMED TO BE POLITICAL AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE WELL ADVANCED FOR THE RETURN OF THE

FIRST 3000 OF THE EXILES. AS DE KLERK MAKES PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES, HE IS ELIMINATING PROGRESSIVELY THE REMAINING CONDITIONS LAID DOWN IN THE US COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT ARE DETERMINED TO HOLD THE ANC TO THEIR UNDERTAKING ABOUT SUSPENSION OF THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE' AND TOUGH DISCUSSIONS WILL CONTINUE ABOUT ARMS CACHES ETC. MBEKI, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN PURSUING ACTIVELY THE IDEA PUT TO MANDELA BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES EVEN BEFORE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. DR VILJOEN HAS BEEN EXPLORING THIS ALSO WITH INKATHA.

4. THROUGHOUT THIS RATHER TURBULENT PERIOD DE KLERK HAS REMAINED CALM AND DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH REFORM AND NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS JUST CONFIRMED THAT THE LAND ACTS WILL BE SCRAPPED IN THE NEXT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT AND THAT NEW ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE INTRODUCED TO MAKE AGRICULTURAL CREDITS AVAILABLE TO BLACK FARMERS. DE KLERK IS COMMITTED ALSO TO THE REPEAL OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT NEXT YEAR. THAT WOULD LEAVE THE POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT AS THE REMAINING LEGISLATIVE PILLAR OF APARTHEID. THAT WILL DISAPPEAR WITH AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION. STATE EDUCATION REMAINS SEGREGATED BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS STARTED TO MOVE TOWARDS THE PARTIAL OPENING OF SOME STATE SCHOOLS. THE COUNTRY WILL HAVE TO END UP WITH A UNIFIED STATE SCHOOL SYSTEM, BUT THIS REMAINS VERY SENSITIVE VIS A VIS THE WHITE ELECTORATE.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WISH TO ASK DE KLERK HOW HE SEES THE WAY FORWARD. IT MAY BE WORTH ENCOURAGING HIM IN THE IDEA THAT, DEPENDING ON WHAT HAPPENS MEANWHILE, HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE ANOTHER MAJOR FORWARD MOVEMENT IN HIS SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING OF PARLIAMENT NEXT YEAR. IF HE ANNOUNCES THE REPEAL OF THE LAND ACTS AND GROUP AREAS ACT AND REITERATES THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO A NEW CONSTITUTION BASED ON ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, WITH PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES, AND THAT THIS MUST COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS, THAT COULD MAKE A MAJOR IMPACT IN BRINGING ABOUT A FURTHER NORMALISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT WILL BE WORTH PROBING DE KLERK'S THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE WILL SUPPORT PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES BUT NO RACIALLY-BASED VETO. WE HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY IN DUE COURSE TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ALSO IN NATAL.

6. SO LONG AS DE KLERK GOES ON MOVING AHEAD IN THIS FASHION HE WILL CONTINUE PROGRESSIVELY TO UNDO THE ENTIRE EXTERNAL SANCTIONS MOVEMENT. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS JUST ASSURED HIM THAT AS THE CONDITIONS

LAI'D DOWN UNDER THE CAAA ARE FULFILLED (ENDING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID LAWS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES) HE WILL NOT ALLOW THE GOAL-POSTS TO BE MOVED. WHILE MANY STATES WILL NOT FORMALLY RESCIND SANCTIONS UNTIL THE ANC AGREE, TRADE MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA ARE BARELY BEING ENFORCED ANYMORE EXCEPT BY THE UNITED STATES, SCANDINAVIA, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE JUST SIGNED A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH HUNGARY. POLISH AND HUNGARIAN TRADE REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOW STATIONED IN JOHANNESBURG. SOUTH AFRICA IS NOW TRADING OPENLY WITH THE WHOLE OF AFRICA AND WITH MOST OF EASTERN EUROPE. DE KLERK HAS MET AND MADE A VERY FAVOURABLE IMPRESSION ON MOST OF THE OTHER AFRICAN PRESIDENTS. KENYA IS RESUMING AIR LINKS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE MINISTER HAS JUST MADE A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE THE ONLY EC COUNTRY FORMALLY TO HAVE LIFTED THE BAN ON NEW INVESTMENT AND SOME BRITISH COMPANIES (INCLUDING GLAXO, RTZ AND JOHNSON MATTEY) ARE INVESTING HERE. BUT THE ITALIANS HAVE ABANDONED THEIR BAN WITHOUT TELLING ANYONE AND THE GERMAN 'VOLUNTARY' BAN HAS NEVER REALLY OPERATED.

7. DE KLERK DESERVES STRONG ENCOURAGEMENT IN WHAT HE IS TRYING TO DO. HE IS GRATEFUL FOR THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN AND HE REALISES THAT WE HAVE TO WORK CAREFULLY TO GET OTHER PEOPLE'S SANCTIONS LIFTED. IT WOULD NOT HELP HIM TO HAVE A MAJOR CHARGE ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH FAILED. IT WILL BE WORTH TELLING HIM THAT THE KEY TO A FORMAL CHANGE IN THE EC POSITION WILL BE CHANCELLOR KOHL. SO FAR HE HAS FAILED TO SUPPORT FORMALLY LIFTING THE INVESTMENT BAN, BUT AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS HE MAY BE PREPARED TO ADVOCATE THAT. AS DE KLERK CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD, EC SANCTIONS ARE LIKELY PROGRESSIVELY TO FALL AWAY, THOUGH THE DANES AND IRISH WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR SOME SIGNAL FROM THE ANC. THE ANC THEMSELVES ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THAT IF THEY DO NOT RE-THINK THEIR POSITION, SANCTIONS WILL SIMPLY CRUMBLE AROUND THEM. MANDELA AND MBEKI HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT AS THE RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION IS REPEALED AND IF THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO MAKE SOME DECLARATION OF INTENT ABOUT A NEW CONSTITUTION, THEY MAY THEMSELVES CALL FOR THE SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS. THIS WILL BE DIVISIVE WITHIN THE ANC AND IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT DE KLERK THINKS OF THE PROSPECTS OF THEIR MOVING TO THAT POSITION.

8. A KEY SOUTH AFRICAN REQUIREMENT IS TO RE-GAIN ACCESS TO IMF LENDING (PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 350). THIS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT YEAR. THE UNITED STATES POSITION WILL REMAIN THE KEY AND THERE WAS PROGRESS ON THIS DURING DE KLERK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. BUT DE KLERK WILL BE LOOKING FOR ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD OURSELVES SUPPORT ANY APPLICATION FROM SOUTH AFRICA BEING DEALT

WITH ON ITS MERITS AND WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL INHIBITIONS. THE C
OF SOUTH AFRICA REGARDING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE NOW MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE, PROVIDED PROGRESS
CONTINUES WITH NEGOTIATIONS.

9. SO FAR AS RELATIONS WITH THE ANC ARE CONCERNED IT IS WORTH NOTING
THAT OF THE FOUR MAIN POINTS PUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO MANDELA IN
LONDON IN JUNE - THE NEED TO SUSPEND THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE', NOT TO TRY
TO INSIST ON A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, TO DROP TALK ABOUT
NATIONALISATION AND TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A MEETING WITH BUTHELEZI -
MANDELA HAS MADE SOME EFFORT TO MOVE ON ALL OF THEM. HE HAS MADE
CLEAR THAT HE VALUES THE RELATIONSHIP HE FEELS HE HAS ESTABLISHED
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THIS DOES ENABLE US TO GET SOME USEFUL
MESSAGES THROUGH TO HIM. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS HE CONTINUES TO MAKE
FAR MORE SENSE THAN IN SOME OF HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES. THE SOUTH
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT VALUE OUR ACCESS TO HIM.

10. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO MENTION TO DE KLERK AN ISSUE THAT
IS GOING TO STIMULATE CONCERN IN PARLIAMENT. THIS IS THE DETENTION OF
ONE ANC LEADER, MAC MAHARAJ, SINCE 26 JULY. THE POLICE CLAIM TO HAVE
EVIDENCE OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING FOR RENEWED MILITARY
ACTIVITY. IF THAT IS SO, HE SHOULD BE CHARGED AND NOT KEPT IN
DETENTION INDEFINITELY WITHOUT ACCESS TO A LAWYER. FOLLOWING
DE KLERK'S SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH MANDELA IN CAPE TOWN YESTERDAY, I
WOULD EXPECT THIS ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED SOON ANYWAY.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10

RENWICK

YYYY

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MR APPELYARD CABINET OFFICE

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PAGE 4
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FILE

KK

c/Foreign Goede

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 October 1990

Thank you for your letter of 9 October about the arrangements for President de Klerk's visit on 14 October.

I am sorry to be awkward, but I am afraid we cannot cope with another two people at Chequers. We simply have to impose these restrictions and find that most people manage to live within them: including in recent times, President Gorbachev, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. I promise you we will look after the President well, despite our limited resources!

(C. D. POWELL)

Mr. Justus de Goede



South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

9 October 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your confirmation of the arrangements for the visit of 14 October. We have been liaising closely with the Foreign Office on the detail.

If you see no problem, we would like to place two officers from the Mission on the helicopter taking the President and Mrs de Klerk to Chequers. They will be very happy to join the security officers at the Bernard Arms and will help supervise the departure in the afternoon.

Yours sincerely,

Justus


Justus de Goede
MINISTER

*P.S. Thank you for the advice on the matter
24/10.*

J



British Overseas Airways
Travel Agents
LONDON WC2N 5DP



9 October 1950

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your confirmation of the arrangements for the visit of 14 October. We have been liaising closely with the Foreign Office on the details.

If you see no problem, we would like to place two officers from the Mission on the helicopter taking the President and Mrs de Klerk to Chagners. They will be very happy to join the security officers at the Bernard Arms and will help supervise the departure in the afternoon.

Yours sincerely,

Robert

Justus de Goede
MINISTER

Mr. Thank you for the advice on the mission
Right

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FM PRETORIA

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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cc PUSI (CN)

MY TELNO 343: SOUTH AFRICA: SANCTIONS AND THE IMF

1. I HAD A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCE MINISTER ABOUT HIS MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND EUROPE. BAREND DU PLESSIS SAID THAT HE HAD COME BACK REASONABLY ENCOURAGED. A YEAR AGO HE HAD EXPLAINED TO BAKER THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY DEPENDED IN PART ON SOUTH AFRICA RE-GAINING ACCESS TO IMF LENDING. BAKER HAD SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD PIK BOTHA THAT THE US ATTITUDE WOULD HAVE TO BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT AS WELL AS THE GRAMM AMENDMENT SPECIFICALLY ON THE IMF (THIS STIPULATES THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD ONLY CONSIDER VOTING IN FAVOUR OF AN IMF LOAN TO SOUTH AFRICA IF THIS WOULD REDUCE CONSTRAINTS ON LABOUR AND CAPITAL MOBILITY THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS INCREASING EDUCATION, WOULD REDUCE OTHER LABOUR AND CAPITAL DISTORTIONS, WOULD ECONOMICALLY BENEFIT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY AND WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COUNTRY WAS SUFFERING FROM A GENUINE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM). THE US ADMINISTRATION WERE NOW INDICATING THAT THEY WOULD NOT TRY TO INSIST ON ALL THE CAAA CONDITIONS BEING MET BEFORE AN APPLICATION TO THE IMF COULD BE CONSIDERED, THOUGH THEY WERE LOOKING FOR VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS MEETING THOSE CONDITIONS TO BE MADE. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD EMPHASISED THAT THEY COULD NOT TACKLE THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR BECAUSE OF THE NEED FIRST TO SECURE CONGRESSIONAL AGREEMENT TO IMF REPLENISHMENT.

2. BAREND DU PLESSIS SAID THAT THIS FITTED IN WITH HIS OWN TIME-SCALE. TO PROTECT THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FINANCE DEBT REPAYMENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN DRASTIC ACTION THROUGH HIGH REAL INTEREST RATES AND OTHER MEANS TO CUT BACK REAL GROWTH IN GDP TO ZERO THIS YEAR. SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOW AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE. BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR THERE WOULD BE SOME RESUMPTION OF GROWTH AND THAT WOULD START TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD GET ACCESS TO IMF LENDING IN THE LATTER PART OF NEXT YEAR, THIS WOULD ENABLE THEM TO

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PLAN FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH AND INCREASED SPENDING ON BLACK EDUCATION AND HOUSING. IF NOT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO PUT THE BRAKES ON AGAIN AND THE RESULT WOULD BE A FURTHER INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT. THE CONDITIONS OF THE GRAMM AMENDMENT COULD BE MET BY THE LATTER PART OF NEXT YEAR, BY WHICH TIME THERE ALSO WOULD HAVE BEEN FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN KNOCKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE CAAA THROUGH REPEAL OF THE LAND ACTS, GROUP AREAS ACT ETC AND, HE HOPED, LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN NATAL.

3. THE US TREASURY SECRETARY HAD AGREED, WITH THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE IMF PRESENT, THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD ENGAGE IN TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF TO JUSTIFY THEIR EVENTUAL APPLICATION FOR A LOAN. THE AMOUNT OF DEBT IN THE STANDSTILL 'NET' HAD BEEN REDUCED SINCE 1986 FROM US DOLLARS FOURTEEN TO DOLLARS SEVEN BILLION. AS SOON AS SOUTH AFRICA REGAINED ACCESS TO IMF LENDING, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO END FORTHWITH THE DEBT STANDSTILL, AND THAT WOULD TRIGGER FRESH LENDING BY THE WESTERN COMMERCIAL BANKS.

4. DU PLESSIS ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE ANC WERE STILL SEEKING FORMALLY TO INSIST ON THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING SANCTIONS, THABO MBEKI WAS NOW TALKING IN PRIVATE OF A RELAXATION OF THIS POSITION NEXT YEAR. I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT DE KLERK SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE ANOTHER SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT ON 1 FEBRUARY NEXT YEAR, ANNOUNCING THE REPEAL OF THE REMAINING APARTHEID LEGISLATION EXCEPT FOR THE POULATION REGISTRATION ACT, WHICH WOULD DISAPPEAR WITH AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION. IF PROGRESS ALSO COULD BE MADE TOWARDS AGREEING PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A FUTURE CONSTITUTION, THAT WOULD GIVE A FURTHER STRONG IMPETUS TO THE NORMALISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD FURTHER MOVEMENT IN THE EC AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN DECEMBER, BUT THAT DID NOT DEPEND ONLY ON US. DU PLESSIS AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL FOR A HIGHLY PUBLICISED BRITISH BID TO GET EC SANCTIONS LIFTED TO BE MADE IF IT THEN FAILED. THAT WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE POLITICAL EFFECT HERE. WHAT WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE POLITICAL EFFECT HERE WOULD BE A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL THAT THE ENDING OF EC SANCTIONS WAS IN SIGHT.

5. DU PLESSIS HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ADDRESSING THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM IN GENEVA, TOGETHER WITH BUTHELEZI AND MBEKI FOR THE ANC. DU PLESSIS SAID THAT HE WAS NOW IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH MBEKI. WHILE THE ANC'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY DOCUMENT WAS STILL A MISH-MASH FULL OF IDEAS ABOUT ALL-PERVASIVE STATE CONTROL AND OLD-STYLE COLLECTIVIST

THINKING, IT DID REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL RETREAT FROM THEIR EARLIER POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON NATIONALISATION. AS I WOULD REALISE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT GOING TO GIVE WAY ON THE ISSUE OF MAINTAINING A FREE ENTERPRISE ECONOMY. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO FUTURE FOR SOUTH AFRICA OR THE REGION.

6. DU PLESSIS ADDED THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO GET THROUGH QUITE SMOOTHLY WHAT POTENTIALLY MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE MOST DIFFICULT PERIOD IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DEBT REPAYMENT PROGRAMME IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF THIS YEAR. IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO ROLL FORWARD NEARLY U.S. DOLLARS HALF A BILLION OF THE DEBT. THAT REFLECTED CHANGED POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA. BANKING AND BUSINESS SENTIMENT WAS NOW MUCH BETTER TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA BUT THAT WOULD DEPEND ON INTRA-BLACK VIOLENCE BEING CONTAINED, AS THE GOVERNMENT FIRMLY INTENDED TO DO. DU PLESSIS ADDED THAT HE HAD PERSUADED HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES THAT, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ITS IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD NOW START TO REDUCE THE VERY LARGE STRATEGIC OIL STOCK-PILE. THAT WOULD HELP TO CUSHION THE IMPACT OF THE SURGE IN OIL PRICES FOLLOWING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT.

7. DU PLESSIS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING BRITAIN AGAIN IN NOVEMBER AND WILL BE IN TOUCH ABOUT APPOINTMENTS DURING THAT VISIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10 AND HM TREASURY.

RENWICK

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
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MR GANTLEY ECON ADVR

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: THIS MESSAGE REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL RETIRE FROM THEIR EARLIER
POSITION, PARTICULARLY ON NATIONALIZATION, AS I HAVE REALIZED, THE
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT GOING TO GIVE A
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FOR PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10 AND HM TREASURY.

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- MR HENNING
- MR BRIDGEMAN CH ECON ADV
- MR GARTLEY ECON ADV
- MR GARDNER
- MR MONTFIELD MR TBY

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*me slow
call*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 August 1990

low Skyle.

SOUTH AFRICA

The South Africans have been in touch to say that President and Mrs. de Klerk will be visiting Britain on Sunday 14 October, arriving by ship at Southampton at 0800 and leaving again by air in the afternoon. They ask whether the Prime Minister could see President de Klerk for a courtesy call. The Prime Minister is likely to be at Chequers that day but would be happy to see the President, possibly over lunch if that fits in with his other timings. We might need to helicopter him from Southampton to Chequers. You may like to pursue this with Mr. de Goede of the South African Embassy.

*you dicomh,
P. de Klerk*

(C. D. POWELL)

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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hm



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
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 August 1990

Dear Tusk,

Thank you for your letter of 7 August about the visit of President and Mrs. de Klerk on 14 October. The Prime Minister will be very happy to see President and Mrs. de Klerk that day. She is likely to be at Chequers, so we shall have to devise arrangements to bring the President there and to return him to Heathrow. We can discuss these in the autumn. Meanwhile I am informing the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Mr. J. de Goede

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SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY,
TRAFALGAR SQUARE,
LONDON,
WC2N 5DP.

①

Prime Minister

This would mean
7 August 1990

seeing him at
Chequers. You are
free. Agree?

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

Yes Mr CDP
HP

Further to my telephone call to you earlier today, I have been informed that State President and Mrs de Klerk will be visiting Britain on Sunday 14 October. They will be arriving by ship at Southampton at approximately 08h00 on that day and will leave again by air in the afternoon.

I should like to enquire whether it would be possible for the State President to make a courtesy call on the Prime Minister during his visit. If so, I could discuss details at your convenience.

Yours sincerely,

J de Goede

J DE GOEDE
MINISTER

10, WHITE HALL PLACE,
LONDON, W. 1.



Mr. Charles Powell,
Foreign Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
London, W. 1.

I should like to enquire whether it would
be possible for the Vice President to
make a courtesy call on the Prime Minister
during his visit. If so, I would discuss
details at your convenience.

J. DE GORDE
MINISTER



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

30 May 1990

COO
395

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

I should like to convey my personal thanks for the time and effort on your part in connection with the visit of State President de Klerk to Britain two weeks ago. The State President was, as you know, highly gratified by the warmth of his and Mrs de Klerk's reception at Chequers.

From our vantage point, we were particularly pleased by the positive reaction to the visit by British business and the British media, whose senior representatives had the opportunity to speak in some depth to the State President. Throughout the visit to this country, we received the fullest cooperation from the British authorities, in the greatest measure from your office.

Yours sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER

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LONDON

30 May 1950

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Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
W2 1AA

Dear Sir,

I should like to convey my personal thanks for the time and effort on your part in connection with the visit of State President de Klerk to Britain two weeks ago. The State President was, as you know, highly gratified by the warmth of his and Mrs de Klerk's reception at Chiswick.

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Yours sincerely,

Justin de Goede
MINISTER

CF



2

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1990

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 22 May and for the very kind gifts from the President and Mrs. de Klerk. These are very much appreciated. The Prime Minister very much enjoyed the President's visit and hopes that he will have equal success in the other European capitals he will be visiting this week.

(C. D. POWELL)

His Excellency Mr. Peter Rae Killen

2



SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY,
TRAFALGAR SQUARE,
LONDON,
WC2N 5DP.

22 May 1990.

Dear Prime Minister,

Mr. de Klerk
has asked me to arrange for
an arrangement of protest to
be sent to you, in appreciation
of your friendly reception and
hospitality on Saturday.

May I add my
own thanks to Mrs? My wife
and I are grateful to have
had an opportunity of seeing
Chegers, and appreciated very

the caring attention that
you and your husband gave to
us and all our group. We were
all particularly touched by your
speech.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Rae Killeen,

MASTER CC SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

Filed on SOUTH AFRICA:
Visits of Pres. de Klerk & 2



f7
MJ

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

19 May 1990

From the Private Secretary

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH
THE PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister had a talk lasting some one and a half hours with President de Klerk at Chequers this morning. The President was accompanied by the South African Ambassador. It was a very friendly occasion. The Prime Minister commented to me afterwards that she felt President de Klerk had grown considerably in stature since their last meeting a year ago. The speeches at lunchtime were both rather moving (I enclose the text from which the Prime Minister spoke), marking South Africa's acceptance back into the international community.

Distribution of this record should be limited to those with a need to know.

Introduction

The Prime Minister congratulated President de Klerk on the achievements of his first year in office and on the success of his tour of European capitals. President de Klerk said he was satisfied with the progress that had been made. He had been able to carry his party with him and had made great efforts to involve the party caucus in all the main decisions. The President continued that he and all the members of the South African delegation had been shocked and dismayed by an article in today's Independent alleging that the South Africans were not paying much attention to their visit to the United Kingdom, because they could take us for granted. It was an absolute travesty of the truth. The Prime Minister said she had not read the article in question but it sounded characteristic of the Independent.

Progress in South Africa

President de Klerk said that he wanted to give the Prime Minister an account of developments in South Africa. He had established a good rapport with Mandela. Mandela was a very interesting person, who had thought deeply about certain things. But there were some large empty areas as well, particularly on economic matters. His European visit would be important in opening his eyes to the fact that free enterprise was the key to prosperity. He hoped that the Prime Minister would impress on

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Mandela the need to be realistic about the South African economy. More generally, he thought that Mandela accepted his integrity. The two of them were able to work well together. The Groote Schuur meeting had gone well. There had been a perceptible will to succeed on the part of the ANC and an absence of acrimony. The commitment to eliminate violence had been a breakthrough and he was sure that the ANC meant it. The meeting had also been an instructive guide to the ANC's culture of collective decision-making. There had been constant adjournments to enable Mandela to consult his delegation even on trivial points. He seemed to lack self-confidence and this made for slow decision-taking.

President de Klerk continued that the South African Government would insist that the ANC give up the armed struggle. The ANC for their part wanted to focus on practical issues, in particular the return of exiles and the release of political prisoners. Neither of these presented insuperable difficulties. He already had the power to grant pardons or immunity from prosecution. The working group which had been set up to look into the question of political prisoners had already completed its work, and their conclusion was one with which he could live (although there were some doubts whether the ANC's National Executive would accept it). He hoped to be able to take the necessary steps quite soon to allow the exiles to begin to return. The ANC also wanted him to lift the state of emergency and make changes in the security laws. He had made clear that the ANC, for their part, must exert themselves to help bring down levels of violence and intimidation. The state of emergency came up for renewal on 12 June. He could not yet predict what action the Government would take. One possibility would be to lift it in large parts of South Africa, while keeping it in Natal and some other districts. He hoped that such action would be accepted internationally as another major step forward. It was important to understand the fabric of violence in South Africa. It used to be directed at overthrowing the State. Now it was essentially black fighting black in order to get the upper hand in negotiations leading to power.

President de Klerk continued that the ANC had been more successful than Inkatha in broadening its base and indisputably now had majority support in urban areas. Buthelezi had more support in Natal, but westernised and unionised Zulus were moving against him. The President added that his aim was to bring Mandela and Buthelezi together with himself to form the core group for future negotiations. But the ANC wanted first to cut Buthelezi down to size and try and make him a junior partner. They were trying to blame him for the problems in Natal and drive wedges between him and other homeland leaders. This at least had the advantage that the ANC were now themselves talking to some of the homeland leaders. It was significant that the ANC had postponed their party congress from June until mid-December. This was to enable them to get their people back into South Africa. The ANC saw 1990 as a year for consolidation and positioning themselves as the major black political movement in South Africa. 1991 would then be the year for negotiations. The ANC claimed that they and the Government were the two main players in negotiations. But the Government itself drew a clear distinction between talks with the ANC on matters which affected

only them, and actual negotiations. When it came to the latter, there would have to be the widest possible representation covering all racial constituencies. The Prime Minister commented that Buthelezi would not give up easily. President de Klerk said he was determined to give Buthelezi a major part in negotiations.

President de Klerk said that he was optimistic that an accord could be reached in South Africa on a new constitution, and he sensed that the ANC believed this too. The Prime Minister said that there was probably a lot of education still to be done. Africans tended to use power in an all embracing way. They did not recognise the concept of limitation of power in the interests of democracy and freedom. That was the clear lesson from experience elsewhere in Africa. President de Klerk said this was precisely what he had in mind when he insisted on some kind of protection for minorities. He meant protection against misuse of power by a majority. At this stage, he was not committing himself to any specific constitutional model. But there would have to be a Bill of Rights and a system of checks and balances. One possible model was a Second Chamber with guaranteed representation for minorities. Certain principles must be firmly entrenched in the constitution, in particular the right to private property. He was also looking at the scope for cantonisation, involving devolution of power to very small units. Returning to the subject of the security laws, the President said there was scope for considerable amendment. For instance communism would have to be legalised now that the Communist Party had been unbanned. The ANC as an instrument in the hands of a powerful and expansionist Soviet Union had been dangerous. Without Soviet backing it was a political movement and manageable. It would take time to swing the ANC round to giving up the rhetoric of violence. Mandela was constantly worried about estranging his followers and was himself considerably more moderate than his lieutenants.

President de Klerk added that the far right were getting very emotional. They were coming to realise that any chance of getting rid of him in an election was vanishing. If all went well, the next election would be held under a new constitution under which they would have no chance of victory, although he was honour bound to have a referendum of the white electorate before introducing such a constitution. This might have to be matched by referenda among other racial groups.

International reactions to events in South Africa

President de Klerk said that, on sanctions, he was not like a dog begging for a biscuit, seeking rewards for actions which South Africa had taken. Rather he wanted the widest possible international recognition and support for what had been done, leading to a fundamental revision of attitudes towards South Africa. He wanted to convince people that South Africa had crossed the Rubicon and that the time had come to normalise relations. The main obstacle to this was the ANC's attempt to internationalise the negotiating process. Their ideas of a United Nations Resolution, election of a constituent assembly and appointment of an interim government were simply not acceptable. South Africa was an independent sovereign country and the present

government would continue to govern constitutionally. He thought that Europe offered the best hope of securing recognition for what he was doing. He almost despaired of the United States. The Prime Minister interjected that she despaired of the Commonwealth without any "almost". The President continued that, despite his request to the contrary, the Americans had arranged his visit and that of Mr. Mandela back to back. This would be very unfortunate since they would be forced into a battle for public attention. Mr. Mandela would certainly be invited to address Congress while he would not. This would be a bad situation. He was not asking the Prime Minister to intervene but simply explaining why he attached such importance to making a success of his European tour. The Prime Minister said that one could argue that Mandela would be honour bound to stick to the agreements which he had made with President de Klerk when it came to public pronouncements in the United States. We were reaching the point where he could no longer say one thing in private and another in public. President de Klerk said he could tell the Prime Minister in confidence that he was discussing with Mandela the possibility that both of them might change the dates for their prospective visits to the US.

The Prime Minister said that the President's visit to Europe had clearly been very successful and there were signs that sanctions were beginning to slip. President de Klerk agreed that sanctions were crumbling. He wanted to make one point about that. He could understand a phased approach to lifting sanctions, but did not like a check-list approach under which specific actions by the South African Government would meet a specific response. He was trying to put together a practical package of measures comprising the early release of a fairly impressive number of political prisoners: return of well-known ANC figures: repeal of the Separate Amenities Act: and probably some movement on the state of emergency. He hoped that such a package would have a considerable impact. The Prime Minister said that it certainly ought to, although the President should not discount the need of European governments to save their own faces.

President de Klerk continued that he had been agreeably surprised by the warm welcome which he had received from President Mitterrand. Mitterrand had said that if South Africa took concrete steps to implement what had been promised, France would be ready to normalise relations fully. He had mentioned the possibility of despatching a French rugby XV to South Africa. He had acknowledged that South Africa could not be expected to get rid of apartheid in a trice. His meeting with Rocard had also been very positive, with Rocard saying that it was an emotional experience for him to change his stance on South Africa. The President continued that he had been able to consolidate positive relations with Portugal and regarded Cavaco Silva as a personal friend. In Greece, Mitsotakis had said that he could not take the lead in removing sanctions but would support steps to alleviate them. He had found Martens rather reserved and ill-informed, but had been impressed by Delors, who had said that the Commission would look at South Africa purely from the point of view of economic principles. He hoped for a reasonably positive response from his visits to Germany,

Switzerland, Spain and Italy. His two key requirements were to be able to demonstrate support for his policies, so as to reinforce moderates in South Africa, and to attract investment.


Southern Africa

President de Klerk said that South Africa was deeply involved in efforts to achieve reconciliation in Mozambique and Angola. In the former, Chissano was now asking for direct talks with Renamo and South Africa would try to facilitate these. In Angola, Savimbi was once again in a strong position militarily and there was some possibility of a meeting between him and Dos Santos. His general conclusion was that, apart from Mugabe, the whole of Southern Africa was being reasonable.

Prime Minister's visit to South Africa

President de Klerk said that he very much hoped the Prime Minister would pay a visit to South Africa. The Prime Minister said that she would love to come but would not want to make things more difficult for President de Klerk by attracting demonstrations. It might be better for her to stand back for the moment and at least wait until negotiations were under way. There was too much at stake to risk making matters worse at a crucial moment in South Africa. President de Klerk wondered whether it might not be an idea for the Prime Minister to come to South Africa in the context of a visit to several Southern African countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. If he was asked by the press, he would say that the Prime Minister had an open invitation to visit South Africa and the two of them would consult about the appropriate time.

I am copying this letter to John Gieve (H.M. Treasury), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), Martin Stanley (Department of Trade and Industry) and Myles Wickstead (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours sincerely,


(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq., L.V.O.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

OUT TELEGRAM

PS No 10

		Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence PRIORITY
ZCZC	1	ZCZC		
TC	2	CONFIDENTIAL		
CAVEAT	3			
M	4	FM FCO		
TO	5	TO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN		
TELNO	6	TELNO		
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ND TO	8	INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG, LUSAKA, HARARE		
	9	INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA, MAPUTO, WINDHOEK		
	10	INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, EC POSTS		
	11	INFO ROUTINE MASERU, MBABANE, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, LAGOS		
	12	INFO ROUTINE KINSHASHA		
	13			
	14	VISIT OF <u>PRESIDENT DE KLERK TO UK: SENIOR OFFICIAL TALKS, 18 MAY</u>		
	15	1. Tomkys chaired talks at the FCO on 18 May with the		
	16	<u>Director-General of the South African DFA.</u> Sir R Renwick,		
	17	Fairweather, Dales and Dowse (SAFD) and Cook (CAFD) were also		
	18	present: Van Heerden was accompanied by Steward (Director,		
	19	European Division, DFA), De Goede (Minister, South African		
	20	Embassy) and a Private Secretary.		
	21	SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL		
	22	2. Van Heerden said the 2-4 May talks with the ANC established		
	23	a very good rapport between the two sides. But they had		
	24	demonstrated the limitations on Mandela's authority. The ANC		
	25	operated a rather quaint style of collective decision making,		
	26	even over quite trivial matters. There were tensions between		
	27	the ex-Robben Island Old Guard. The younger generation of		
	28	external ^{LEADERS} such as Thabo Mbeki, and the internal UDF and Cosatu		
	29	leaders who considered themselves more in tune with popular		
YYY			Catchword: feeling.	
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feeling. Mandela had to keep all these factions on board. So far he was succeeding, though he faced a particular problem with Joe Slovo. Most of the black SACP members could be regarded as opportunist marxists. Slovo was a true believer.

3. The next step would be the Report on 21 May of the Joint Working Group set up to deal with obstacles to negotiation. De Klerk was confident that amicable solutions could be found. Van Heerden stressed the need to press ahead quickly to resolve the outstanding issues over, eg political prisoners. The longer white South Africans were left in a state of uncertainty, the more the risk of violence provoked by extremists. The ANC shared this desire for speed, but they were facing unexpected difficulties in re-establishing themselves in South Africa. Some ANC leaders had expected black support to fall into their laps. Now they found that they had to work for it. The turnout at recent ANC rallies had fallen off markedly. The SAG did not believe the ANC would be ready for full constitutional negotiations for some time.

SANCTIONS/DE KLERK'S EUROPEAN TOUR

4. Van Heerden said that de Klerk's current exposure to international opinion was proving very valuable. De Klerk was being sensitised to the fact that the EC had its own timetable, and that the SAG could take advantage of this. (We pointed out that EC discussions on 18 June would follow immediately after the State of Emergency fell due for renewal). Tomkys said that the UK had hitherto been fighting a lone crusade over sanctions, but others in Europe were beginning to move. It would be best if we could leave some of our partners to make the running for a while. Van Heerden agreed: in his European discussions de Klerk had been careful to deal with the sanctions issue on its own merits. He did not want to appear to be pleading the UK's case. The thrust of his argument was to point out that sanctions inhibited the ability of his government to underpin political

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change with new social programmes for blacks. De Klerk's interlocuters had seemed receptive: even Collins had defended continued sanctions not on their merits/ But in terms of the time needed to educate European public opinion that South Africa was changing.

5. Tomkys commented that the EC would agree that a political settlement would need economic support. But the crucial factors would be attraction of private investment and access to international financial institutions. The SAG should not expect a quick fix in the form of a massive quote marshall plan unquote.

6. On de Klerk's European tour so far, Van Heerden said only that the talks with Mitterand and Delors had been the high spots. De Klerk had established an excellent personal rapport with Mitterand in particular.

MOZAMBIQUE

7. Van Heerden thought that Chissano had lost faith in mediation: he did not trust Moi, and Mugabe had proved difficult to work with. Chissano now wanted direct talks with Dhlakama, and looked to the SAG to provide the channel. The South Africans had been initially cautious, but were expecting a high level meeting between the two sides before long. Talks about talks had been planned to take place in Malawi last week, but the new FRELIMO offensive in Gorongosa had forced Dhlakama to pull out. Van Heerden said the South Africans had tried to persuade Chissano to cancel the offensive, but he had claimed to be unable to stop his military commanders, who had invested long planning in the operation.

8. Fairweather commented that unless Chissano showed more determination to open direct talks soon, we might have to put stronger pressure on him. Van Heerden suggested that the South Africans might time their own pressure accordingly.

9. Meanwhile, the SAG were committed to giving Chissano every

assistance

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assistance they could. There was steady progress on rehabilitation of the Cabora Bassa Scheme. If successful, it could make both FRELIMO and RENAMO realise that peace could bring dividends.

10. On Mozambican refugees, Van Heerden reiterated the SAG's opposition to UNHCR involvement. Formal UN refugee camps and feeding centres would simply risk attracting more migrants from Mozambique to South Africa. The existing problem was manageable.

ANGOLA

11. Van Heerden said Angola was a less optimistic prospect than Mozambique, primarily because of the personalities involved. Dos Santos seemed to be operating several channels simultaneously, via Portugal and South Africa. Perhaps this was deliberate, intended to keep his own colleagues off-balance. The Portuguese hoped that the last low-level contact between the parties in Lisbon might lead to more meetings. Meanwhile, Savimbi had sent a message to Dos Santos through the SAG offering direct talks. A similar message had gone via Lisbon. Mobutu renamed the mediator on paper: but had been cut out by both sides.

12. Van Heerden said he was cautious of believing military claims by either side in Angola. But the FAPLA offensive seemed to have halted on a Cuito Cuanavale - Mavinga Axis. UNITA seemed to have scored a victory: Savimbi claimed that he had put FAPLA to flight, but had not pursued them as a conciliatory gesture to Dos Santos.

13. Fairweather commented that the solutions in Mozambique and Angola were linked: one settlement would probably be quickly followed by another. Van Heerden agreed, adding that the moves in favour of multi-party democracy elsewhere in Africa had not been lost on Chissano and Dos Santos.

NAMIBIA

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14. Van Heerden said relations were developing quite well. Most issues were being resolved satisfactorily (eg bushmen, pensions, Koe^vnoet): Nujoma showed sensitivity to South African feelings. There might be a few visible ministerial meetings (perhaps even between de Klerk and Nujoma) in the coming months. The Namibian Minister of Finance was making a big play over the inherited debt, but this looked like an attempt to get maximum international sympathy before next month's pledging conference. It was politically very difficult for South Africa to write off 800 million Rand, particularly when there were a number of other quote handouts unquote that the SAG would want to make to Namibia in the future.

15. It was important to keep Walvis Bay on a back burner for the moment. So far, Namibian independence had had remarkably little impact on South African public opinion: de Klerk did not want to give the right-wing a gift by making another concession now. Meanwhile, the SAG recognised Namibia's need of Walvis Bay: Namibians were promised free access to the Port, and there was an offer to involve Namibians in Port management.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

16. Van Heerden said the US leak of South African willingness to sign the NPT had been very unhelpful. At a time when de Klerk was facing criticism for making concessions on so many internal issues, he was reluctant to move on the NPT unless he could show some positive benefit to South Africa. The SAG accepted that firm guarantees of cooperation under article IV would be impossible. Hence the political need for the FLS also to make a move. If enough of them did so, the SAG could present it domestically as a de facto nuclear-free zone in Southern Africa.

17. Sir R Renwick pointed to the value of accession before the August Review Conference. He stressed the need to strike the right note if the subject was raised at de Klerk's press conference on 19 May. It was important not to create an

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impression of impasse.

ZIMBABWE

18. Van Heerden said that these ^Rwere modest signs of improvement in relations. He had visited Zimbabwe in early May for talks with Shamuyarira, but was concerned that this should not become known. (Please protect).


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SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1990

[Handwritten signature]
20/5/90

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Visit of President de Klerk

You may like to have the enclosed, namely

1 a summary of President de Klerk's European tour so far;

1 - a note on the response so far by other EC member states to reform in South Africa.

[Handwritten signature]
Jans.
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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A. M. 1900
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A. M. 1900
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DE KLERK'S EUROPEAN TOUR: RECEPTION BY EC PARTNERS

France (9-10 May)

"Red Carpet" treatment. Mitterand described de Klerk as "clear and determined". Told de Klerk that there could be no change in France's position on sanctions before Dublin Summit (but he recognises need for positive gesture by Twelve). Mitterand referred to possibility of visit by a French rugby team and increasing bilateral trade. Rocard said obstacles to relaxing measures were State of Emergency and political prisoners.

Greece (11-13 May)

Working visit. De Klerk made "a good impression". Met Karamanlis and Mitsotakis. Mitsotakis said publicly that EC should re-examine its policy towards South Africa. Greek officials say Greece will support relaxation of EC measures.

Portugal (14-15 May)

Official visit. Met Soares and Cavaco Silva. Cavaco Silva reportedly told de Klerk that Portugal had advocated the lifting of sanctions in the EC. He has said publicly that sanctions against South Africa should be lifted and that Portugal should take lead in EC. But Soares said Portugal would respect views of EC Partners.

Brussels (16-17 May)

Meeting with Collins who described de Klerk as "a man of great courage and great conviction". Collins told de Klerk EC would discuss South Africa on 18 June. Review of measures could take place when State of Emergency had been lifted and all political prisoners released. Addressing a private seminar, Pik Botha asked for EC financial support for the resettlement of exiles (but said he would deny this in public).

After London, de Klerk will visit Bonn (21 May), Berne (22-3 May), Madrid (24 May) and Rome (25 May).

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RESPONSE BY EC PARTNERS TO REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>PUBLICLY AVOWED ACTION</u>	<u>CONTEMPLATED ACTION (IN CONFIDENCE)</u>
Belgium	None. De Klerk/Brussels (16-17 May).	Will not take action without EC consensus.
Denmark	Re-opening Embassy in South Africa.	Considering lifting visa restrictions.
FRG	None. De Klerk/Bonn (21 May)	
France	Before 20 Feb EPC Dumas favoured lifting "symbolic" sanction. Rocard opposed. Willing expand cultural and scientific links. De Klerk/Paris (9-10 May).	Considering lifting coal ban. Considering possible tour by a French Rugby xv. No change on sanctions before Dublin Summit.
Greece	De Klerk/Athens (11-13 May).	Favour review. Support lifting sanctions.
Ireland	None. Collins met de Klerk in Brussels (16 May). Announced review of EC policy at 18 June FAC.	Delicate sources suggest Irish may be considering restoring diplomatic relations.
Italy	Voluntary ban on new investment lapsed in October 1989. De Klerk/Rome (25 May).	Italians will work for progressive easing of sanctions. Favours review at June FAC.
Luxembourg	None.	
Netherlands	Relaxed visa policy. Stopped action on legislation to formalize investment ban.	Circulated proposals (possibly agreed with Italy) for staged easing of sanctions.
Portugal	De Klerk/Lisbon (14-15 May).	Favours relaxation of EC measures.
Spain	Lifted restrictions on air cargo and sporting contacts. De Klerk/Madrid (24 May).	Possibility of further move on passenger services.

G18AAT/1

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK

You have talks with President de Klerk at Chequers tomorrow, followed by a lunch in his honour.

The President will arrive by car at 1100, accompanied only by the South African Ambassador. There will be separate talks between Foreign Ministers in London, after which they will helicopter to Chequers arriving at 1230. Mrs. de Klerk, Mrs. Botha and other wives will also arrive at about 1230. The photograph will be done then, followed by lunch. Departure is set for 1500/1530.

The visit to Britain is part of an 8 nation tour of Europe, which has been proceeding successfully and has earned de Klerk considerable praise. He has every cause to be grateful to you, since it was your initiative to invite him to Chequers which launched the whole business. He is going to Washington in June.

Meanwhile the Commonwealth Group of Foreign Ministers has been meeting with Mandela in Nigeria, and has despatched emissaries (including the Canadian and Australian Foreign Ministers) to various European capitals to urge that sanctions be maintained. De Klerk himself is playing the sanctions issue in a low key, making clear that he will not bargain for lifting of them. He is obviously pinning his hopes on their steady erosion in practice - and that is happening - rather than some dramatic decision to lift them. The idea is to present sanctions as yesterday's issue. What he wants is active support and encouragement for the course which he is pursuing. This is all right up to a point: but we want to be sure that a fair share of the credit for the changes in South Africa, and the changed international climate surrounding South Africa, comes to you - as is fully deserved.

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You had to be pretty tough on de Klerk at your first meeting and it worked. He has done virtually everything you asked of him then. This time you can afford to be much nicer to him. You will want to start by congratulating de Klerk on the enormous progress made since your last meeting. Thereafter the main issues which you will want to cover in your talk are:

- the remaining obstacles to negotiation (state of emergency, release of political prisoners, armed struggle) and how he intends to surmount or circumvent them
- how he sees the structure of future negotiations: in particular how Buthelezi and non-ANC black South Africans will be involved
- his ideas on a future constitution. You will recall that you had an interesting discussion with Viljoen about this (one Chamber elected by one man, one vote: another with entrenched minority representation: a white President and a black Prime Minister). You will urge not to harp too much on avoiding crude majority rule, and concentrate on the objective of real democracy (ie. multi-party system, bill of rights, free press);
- his intentions on getting rid of remaining apartheid legislation
- how seriously he regards the dangers of a white backlash
- how he thinks the sanctions issue should be played. We intend to make a further push at the Dublin European Council to get the EC to start lifting measures. Will he have lifted the state of emergency by then? You will be aware that several European countries

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are already beginning to ignore their sanctions in practice: and South Africa is trading with all East European countries.

- he is likely to raise the question of economic help. We shall maintain our expanding programme of aid for black South Africans. But the key will be to restore South Africa's access to IMF and World Bank lending.
- South African signature of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.
- he will renew the invitation to you to visit South Africa. You will want to accept but not set a date yet.

The outcome which we want from the meeting, and the message which we want to get over to the media afterwards is:

- de Klerk has done almost everything which you asked of him at your last meeting.
- you are confident as a result of your talks that there will be further substantial progress on all fronts in the near future.
- Britain has been the prime mover in achieving this. Our policy has worked.
- sanctions belong to the past. We gave a lead in lifting them and it is clear that others will now follow, either openly or by simply turning a blind eye. But that is their problem.
- the task now is to help South Africa create the wealth and have access to the international finance necessary to create a successful post-apartheid society.

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You will find in the folder a fuller note by the FCO, telegrams from Sir Robin Renwick, reports on de Klerk's visits to Paris and Athens, a letter from Julian Amery and the note of your last meeting.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

18 May 1990

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17/5

112, EATON SQUARE,
LONDON SW1W 9AE

Tel: 071- 235 1543
071- 235 7409



URGENT

17th May, 1990

Dear Margaret,

I was in Cape Town at the end of the Easter recess and saw a few old friends.

I enclose a note of my impressions which you may like to glance at in advance of your meetings with the South African President.

I don't think it says anything new but the perspective may be a little different. There is a tendency over here and among the whites in South Africa to see President de Klerk's initiative as a Pauline conversion to anti-apartheid pressure including sanctions. The reality is different.

Already as Defence Minister, P.W. Botha and his close colleagues recognised the need for a power sharing and wealth sharing arrangement. They could not, however, attempt it in the face of a Soviet backed radical offensive. It was only when, thanks to Reagan and yourself, Gorbachev realised that he was in a "no-win" situation that the ANC were forced to come to the negotiating table and that there is now a prospect of some constructive agreement.

Julian

Julian Amery

P.S. I have marked this urgent in the hope you may have a chance to see it before your talks with the South Africans.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

NOTES - SOUTH AFRICA

The South African regime has won the Southern African war. Can it win the peace?

First the war. A major aim of President Breschnev's strategy was to deny the resources of Southern Africa to the West and, if possible bring them under Soviet control.

The headquarters of the operation was established in Zambia soon after its independence. But the campaign only got under way after the Portugese revolution.

The Soviets then tried to establish a Communist regime in Angola backed by a Cuban expeditionary force and a Soviet command structure.

They tried to do the same in Mozambique but judged (wrongly as it proved) that only a few hundred Soviet and other 'bloc advisors would be required.

From Zambia and Mozambique they launched a guerrilla campaign against the Rhodesian Government, successfully concluded at Lancaster House.

From Angola they launched the SWAPO campaign into Namibia.

In Angola and Zambia they trained and equipped the ANC to attempt an insurrection in South Africa itself.

The South African regime prevented the consolidation of Soviet power in these countries for nearly a decade. They sustained UNITA in Angola with their own troops. They destabilised the regime in Mozambique by building up RENAMO. They exercised powerful economic pressures on Zimbabwe. They contained SWAPO in the northern border Ovambo province of Namibia. They raided into Zambia when necessary. They successfully suppressed the insurrection in South Africa itself. All this was achieved virtually unaided and in the teeth of opposition from the West as well as the Soviets and the Commonwealth.

When, eventually, the Reagan Administration reversed the Clark Amendment and decided to support Savimbi and press for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces, President Gorbachev recognised that he was in a "no win" situation and decided to abandon Breschnev's forward strategy in Africa.

The radical Southern African offensive has, in fact been defeated throughout the area. South Africa's victory is signalled by the increase in its diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbours. The ANC has agreed to talk to Pretoria precisely because they can see no prospect of securing Soviet support for a renewed insurrection.

What then are the prospects for peace?

The South African regime is determined not to transfer power to the ANC or to accept a 'socialist' economy.

How far they can go in the direction of power sharing and wealth sharing will mainly depend on what they judge they can sell to their own existing electorates - white, Asian and Coloureds - all of whom have to be consulted.

The ANC, for their part, are playing their hand from weakness. They cannot seriously hope to revive the insurrection without external support. They can no doubt attempt to crush any black rivals in the townships by "black on black" violence but this is a two-edged weapon as the troubles in Natal show. The South African police can always load the dice against the radical side.

In the end the ANC will have to choose between co-operating in a power sharing and wealth sharing administration or rejecting the regime's proposals and constituting themselves as a more or less loyal opposition.

Oddly enough the Afrikaners adopted the latter course after the Boer War. From 1902-10 they refused to co-operate with the system. After 1910 they agreed to co-operate in the Act of Union and became an increasingly equal partner with the British. After 1948 they became, with Dr. Malan's victory, the dominant political element in the country. They had the sense, however, to give the mainly English-speaking business community enough leeway to lay the necessary 'golden eggs'.

Could Mandela and his colleagues be brought to show similar statesmanship?

JULIAN AMERY
17.5.90



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

17 May 1990

Dea Charles,

CCF
Group
CBI
19/5

Visit of President F W de Klerk

State President F W de Klerk will have talks followed by lunch with the Prime Minister at Chequers on 19 May. Mr Pik Botha will have parallel talks in London with the Foreign Secretary. President de Klerk is making a working visit to Britain from 17-20 May as part of a wider European tour; I enclose a copy of his full programme in this country, together with reporting telegrams from our posts in Paris and Athens on his visits to France and Greece. Mr de Klerk last called on the Prime Minister in June 1989, before his election as President: record enclosed.

Our objectives in these talks are:-

- (a) to encourage President de Klerk to carry forward the process of negotiated constitutional change, and to learn how he plans to do this. In particular :
- (b) to encourage him to find a way of lifting the State of Emergency;
- (c) to explore how he plans to reconcile a constitution based on one-person one-vote with protection of minority rights;
- (d) to encourage him to press on with moves to repeal apartheid legislation;
- (e) to encourage his efforts to begin to redress economic imbalances;
- (f) to press for South Africa's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Sir Robin Renwick has set out the background to Mr de Klerk's visit, the state of progress towards negotiations and Mr de Klerk's likely current concerns in Cape Town telno 314, enclosed. I also enclose Sir Robin's telno 313, describing Dr Viljoen's account of recent progress in resolving obstacles to full negotiations, and his thoughts on possible elements of the future democratic South African constitution.

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Obstacles to Negotiations

The principal remaining problems which must be resolved before negotiations can take place are: - the continuing State of Emergency. The South African Government's hopes that this might be lifted at an early stage have been thwarted by the increased communal violence which followed the unbanning of the ANC and PAC. The situation has now improved somewhat and it may prove possible to lift the Emergency, except in Natal where violence between supporters of Inkatha and the ANC remains serious.

- the release of political prisoners, where the ANC's definition of a "political" offence is far wider than that of the government.

- the ANC's continued reluctance to abandon the rhetoric of "armed struggle".

These issues are being addressed by a working group set up following talks between the ANC and South African Government on 2-4 May, which appear to have established a good atmosphere of trust between the two sides. The working group is expected to report on 21 May.

The Prime Minister may wish to:

(a) congratulate Mr de Klerk on the progress made so far in talks with the ANC and welcome the close personal relationship he has clearly established with Mr Mandela;

(b) ask about prospects for further progress in resolving the remaining obstacles. In particular does Mr de Klerk envisage being able to lift the State of Emergency when it expires in June? Will special arrangements be needed to control violence in Natal?

(c) seek Mr de Klerk's views on the likelihood of the ANC suspending their public support for armed struggle. In our own contacts with the ANC we will continue to press this point. (At the 2-4 May talks, the ANC offered a commitment to a peaceful negotiated solution, and said they would be reviewing their policy; since then Mr Mandela has dropped his own public references to continuation of the armed struggle.)

(d) ask Mr de Klerk how he proposes to deal with the increasing militancy of right-wing extremists.

Structure of Negotiations

The ANC seem now to accept that they cannot exclude all other parties from the negotiating table with the South African Government (although they may still hope that the negotiations in practice will be a two-sided affair). In



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particular Chief Buthelezi will remain an important factor. But it remains unclear how black representatives will be chosen (the ANC has proposed elections). The Prime Minister may wish to sound out Mr de Klerk on this point, and assure him of our continued view that all parties enjoying real support should have the opportunity to join in negotiations.

The Future Constitution

While assuring Mr de Klerk that we regard the shape of South Africa's future constitution as a matter for South Africans to determine free from outside interference, the Prime Minister may wish to ask him to outline his views on how the requirements of genuine democracy can be reconciled with his stated objective of avoiding majority "domination".

The Prime Minister might stress that the issue of one person, one vote must be addressed directly in any constitutional arrangement, but add that we recognise the importance for future stability of providing checks and balances and genuine protection for minorities. How might such protection be achieved?

The Prime Minister might emphasize the importance internationally of presenting the objective not as a rejection of majority rule, but as support for real democracy in South Africa (ie for a lasting multi-party system, a free press, independent judiciary, bill of rights etc) as opposed to a "winner-takes-all" arrangement.

Apartheid Legislation

The Separate Amenities Act, which controls access to public amenities on a racial basis, will be repealed in the present session of a Parliament. The Land Acts and the Group Areas Act could also be abolished, if in slower time. (The Population Registration Act, which classifies all South Africans by race, is an integral component of the present constitution. President de Klerk has said it can only go once a new constitution is in place.) The Prime Minister may wish to remind President de Klerk of our hope that this legislation can be repealed at an early date, and ask how he would expect to deal with its removal in an orderly way. Would any replacement legislation be required?

Sanctions

Mr de Klerk is grateful for the support we demonstrated for his reform moves by lifting our voluntary ban on new investment in February. He would undoubtedly welcome further moves of this kind. But he is unlikely to make a major pitch for the lifting of more sanctions. If the subject is raised, the Prime Minister may like to point to moves by other European countries to follow our lead, as evidence that



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sanctions are crumbling. The favourable impression made by President de Klerk's other visits to European capitals is likely to accelerate this process. We shall certainly return to the charge in the EC next month, by which time we hope that the South African Government will have made further progress with the ANC on removing the remaining obstacles to negotiations. However, the Prime Minister might also make clear that we consider sanctions to be yesterday's issue. The real challenge now will be to mobilise resources to help underpin South Africa's transition to a post-apartheid society.

Economic Issues

Mr de Klerk may take up this last point and ask what resources Britain would be willing to contribute. In reply, the Prime Minister might say that the international community will be prepared to do what is necessary to make an eventual agreement between the South African parties stick. An important factor would be the renewed availability in such circumstances of funds from the international financial institutions. We have already been encouraging the World Bank and IMF to consider how they might respond.

The main burden of reducing imbalances will fall on South Africans themselves. President de Klerk has set about addressing the great disparities in the distribution of wealth in South Africa by means of a number of imaginative social programmes, notably the new fund to be administered by Jan Steyn (whom the Prime Minister received on 2 May). The Prime Minister may wish to tell him of our support for his efforts, and hope that more can be done. Such measures are an important demonstration to black South Africans that their economic aspirations can be addressed by means other than simple nationalisation. The Prime Minister might assure Mr de Klerk that our own substantial (and expanding) programme of aid for black South Africans will be maintained. It concentrates on education (1,000 students this year) and community development (250 projects). We believe it will be most effective if it remains separate from the South African Government's own initiatives.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The South Africans informed the Depositary Powers of the NPT (UK, US and the Soviet Union) in March that they were going to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. They also said that they would accede to the NPT, provided the Front Line States (FLS) not parties to the Treaty made a commitment to do likewise. The Depositaries approached the FLS with this proposition. The FLS reaction was positive, but none of them were prepared to make the firm and public commitment to accede which the South Africans require.



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Without such commitments, the South Africans do not believe that a decision to accede can be defended domestically. This point seems more important to them than whether they will be granted full Article IV benefits (nuclear collaboration). We are lobbying FLS governments again to persuade them to be more forthcoming. In speaking to President de Klerk, the Prime Minister might say :

- We are glad to hear of the South African intention to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards from next year. This was an important step forward. But it is not a substitute for accession to the NPT.

- We are pressing neighbouring African states also to accede. We know that this will make South Africa's decision easier.


- We hope South Africa will be able to accede to the NPT before 20 August, so that she will be able to participate fully in the Treaty Review Conference which opens in Geneva on that date.

If Mr de Klerk asks about Article IV, the Prime Minister might say that if South Africa accedes to the Treaty and concludes a safeguards agreement, Article IV will apply between the UK and South Africa as between the UK and other parties.

Jami,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK TO ATHENS, 11-13 MAY

1. PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND PIK BOTHA VISITED ATHENS FOR TALKS ON 11 MAY. IT WAS THE SECOND DESTINATION OF HIS 8 NATION EUROPEAN TOUR. THIS WAS AS OFFICIAL VISIT, THE FIRST TO GREECE BY A SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT: HE CALLED ON PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS AS WELL AS SEEING MITSOTAKIS. THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY LEFT THIS MORNING FOR LISBON, AFTER A QUIET WEEKEND.
2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN LINE HERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SIMILAR TO THE ONE DESCRIBED IN PARIS TELNO 553. DE KLERK DESCRIBED THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AS IRREVERSIBLE. IN HIS PUBLIC COMMENTS, MITSOTAKIS RESTATED GREECE'S OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND WELCOMED THE POSITIVE STEPS TAKEN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE RE-EXAMINING POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA (BUT DID NOT EXPLAIN HOW AND WHEN). THE TALKS ALSO COVERED THE SIZEABLE GREEK COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH HAS SO LONG BEEN AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING GREEK POLICY IN THIS AREA.
3. POLITICAL REACTION IN GREECE HAS BEEN MUTED, ALTHOUGH PASOK DID CALL FOR MORE RADICAL REFORMS IMMEDIATELY FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND ARGUED FOR A CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS. ANARCHISTS ORGANISED A SMALL DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL ATHENS, BUT IT WAS DISPERSED WITHOUT REAL INCIDENT.
4. ACCORDING TO THE CANADIAN EMBASSY (PLEASE PROTECT) THERE WAS SOME CONTACT OVER THE WEEKEND BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN VISITORS AND THE CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS HERE ON OTHER BUSINESS.
5. WE SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN THE MFA GIVE THEIR PROMISED COMMUNITY BRIEFING.

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FILE KK

C/Foreign/Barber -

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 May 1990

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you very much for sending the notes on South Africa. It will be very useful for her to have these in advance of her meetings with President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela over the next few weeks.

(C. D. POWELL)

Dr. James Barber

A handwritten signature in the bottom right corner of the page.

p-027/3.

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK TO PARIS, 9-10 MAY

SUMMARY

1. APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL VISIT. DE KLERK IMPRESSES MITTERRAND AS A SERIOUS AND SINCERE INTERLOCUTOR. HINT FROM MITTERRAND THAT FRANCE IS FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO REEXAMINING SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS AT THE JUNE DUBLIN SUMMIT. POSSIBLE FRENCH RELAXATION OF BAN ON SPORTING LINKS EG A VISIT BY A FRENCH RUGBY TEAM TO SOUTH AFRICA.

DETAIL

2. DE KLERK LEFT PARIS FOR ATHENS THIS MORNING AFTER A TWO-DAY VISIT WHICH INCLUDED TALKS WITH MITTERRAND AND ROCARD AND A LUNCH WITH LEADING FRENCH INDUSTRIALISTS (ALSTHOM, CGE, SOCIETE GENERALE AND AIR LIQUIDE). VIDAL (ONE OF MITTERRAND'S AFRICA ADVISERS) AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING READ-OUT.
3. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT WAS BILLED AS PRIVATE, DE KLERK RECEIVED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF RED-CARPET TREATMENT, BOTH AT THE AIRPORT AND AT THE ELYSEE WHERE HE WAS GREETED PERSONALLY BY MITTERRAND ON THE ELYSEE STEPS (AN HONOUR NOT ACCORDED, INCIDENTALLY, TO AN EARLIER VISITOR TO PARIS THIS WEEK, VICE-PRESIDENT QUAYLE). BOTH THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY AND THE ELYSEE SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS WAS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. (THIS IS ECHOED IN FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE.) VIDAL SAID THAT MITTERRAND WAS IMPRESSED WITH DE KLERK AND DESCRIBED HIM AFTERWARDS AS QUOTE CLEAR AND DETERMINED UNQUOTE. THE TALKS AT THE ELYSEE WHICH LASTED AN HOUR CONCENTRATED ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. DE KLERK SAID THAT HE HOPED FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A RELAXATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY; THE MAIN CONSTRAINT AT PRESENT WAS THE NEED TO CONTROL THE UPSURGE OF BLACK VERSUS BLACK VIOLENCE IN THE NATAL.
4. ON SANCTIONS, SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY STRESSED THAT DE KLERK DID NOT COME TO PARIS ON BENDED KNEE TO ASK FOR SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE

LIFTED. HE ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXISTING MEASURES AFFECTED BLACKS MORE THAN THE WHITE COMMUNITY. HE FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH ADOPTING A MORE OPEN ATTITUDE TOWARDS CULTURAL AND SPORTING LINKS. THIS STRUCK A CHORD WITH MITTERRAND WHO REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY A RUGBY TEAM TO SOUTH AFRICA WITHOUT SAYING WHETHER THIS WOULD BE THE FRENCH NATIONAL XV. HE ALSO REFERRED - AGAIN IMPRECISELY - TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING BILATERAL TRADE. AS FAR AS THE EC MEASURES WERE CONCERNED, MITTERRAND MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE FRENCH POSITION BEFORE THE DUBLIN SUMMIT. MEANWHILE FRANCE WOULD STUDY THE QUESTION. (VIDAL INTERPRETED THIS AS A FAVOURABLE HINT AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT MITTERRAND WAS POSITIVELY INCLINED TOWARDS THE ARGUMENT THAT POLITICAL REFORMS IN SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE MATCHED BY POSITIVE GESTURES FROM THE TWELVE.)

5. ACCORDING TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, THE LINE ADOPTED BY ROCARD ON SANCTIONS WAS SLIGHTLY LESS FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THERE WERE THE TWO MAIN OBSTACLES TO RELAXING THE CURRENT MEASURES: POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. WHILST INFORMED CIRCLES IN FRANCE ACCEPTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA, PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE WAS LAGGING BEHIND. (THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY INTERPRETED THIS AS A HINT THAT ROCARD WAS CONCERNED ABOUT NOT GETTING TOO FAR AHEAD OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY RANK AND FILE.) ROCARD ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT SOME RELAXATION OF SANCTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. IN ANSWER TO ROCARD'S QUESTION ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS, DE KLERK DESCRIBED THEM AS A VOCIFEROUS BUT FISSIPAROUS MOVEMENT. THEY WERE ADEPT AT PLAYING ON WHITE EMOTIONAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES AND WOULD NO DOUBT POINT TO THE LACK OF ANY EC REACTION TO DE KLERK'S REFORM PROGRAMME IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE IT. THE EC THEREFORE NEEDED TO RESPOND WITH CONCRETE GESTURES TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA.

COMMENT

6. THE FEELING OF MOST POLITICAL COMMENTATORS HERE IS THAT DE KLERK'S VISIT TO PARIS HAS BEEN A SUCCESS. HE CLEARLY IMPRESSED MITTERRAND AS A SINCERE AND SERIOUS INTERLOCUTOR. THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE ADVERSE REACTION TO DE KLERK ON THE STREETS. THE ANC ORGANISED A PROTEST OUTSIDE THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY BUT ONLY FIFTY OR SO PEOPLE TURNED UP AND WERE CONSIDERABLY OUTNUMBERED BY THE SECURITY FORCES. TO THE EMBARRASSMENT OF THE ANC REPRESENTATIVE, THIS DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE PRESS REPORTED THAT MANDELA HAD NO OBJECTION TO MITTERRAND'S

DECISION TO RECEIVE DE KLERK FOR A VISIT HERE.

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MIPT: DE KLERK'S VISIT

1. DE KLERK SET OFF FOR HIS TALKS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON A WAVE OF OPTIMISM GENERATED BY THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS LAST WEEK WITH THE ANC. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO AGREE TO RELEASE A LOT MORE PRISONERS AND TO LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN NATAL. THE ANC AGREED ON A 'COMMON COMMITMENT TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXISTING CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE ... AND TO A PEACEFUL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS' AND UNDERTOOK TO RE-CONSIDER THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE. DE KLERK AND MANDELA GAVE A FURTHER PUBLIC DISPLAY OF THEIR CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. DE KLERK HAS ESTABLISHED AN EQUALLY GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH BUTHELEZI. THERE COULD STILL BE DIFFERENCES OVER THE DEFINITION OF 'POLITICAL' PRISONERS AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN NATAL, IS STILL TOO HIGH. THE ANC WILL CONTINUE TO EQUIVOCATE OVER THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'. NEVERTHELESS, A REAL BREAKTHROUGH WAS MADE IN TACKLING THESE OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ONCE THAT IS DONE, THE GOVERNMENT WILL SET UP A NEGOTIATING FORUM IN WHICH ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES WILL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE TO WORK OUT A NEW CONSTITUTION. BUTHELEZI WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE. THE OTHER HOMELAND LEADERS ARE ALL NOW INCREASINGLY DEFERRING TO THE ANC. THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT AGREE TO ANC DEMANDS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OR TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, THOUGH IF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SUCCEEDS, SOMETHING OF THE KIND MAY EVENTUALLY EMERGE FROM IT. IF THE ANC SEEK TO INSIST ON THOSE DEMANDS FROM THE OUTSET, THE PROCESS WILL GET STUCK. IN THE NAMIBIAN CASE, FREQUENTLY CITED BY THE ANC, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS WERE HELD AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION ALREADY HAD BEEN REACHED.

3. THE GOVERNMENT IS HAVING TO CONTEND WITH A POTENTIALLY VIOLENT RIGHT-WING BACK-LASH. TREURNICHT AND CO ARGUE THAT DE KLERK HAS NO MANDATE FOR THE ACTIONS HE HAS TAKEN. THERE ARE REAL ANXIETIES IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY AS TO WHERE THIS PROCESS WILL LEAD (REFLECTED, FOR INSTANCE, IN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PASSPORT APPLICATIONS WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING OURSELVES). THERE HAS BEEN SOME SLIPPAGE OF

SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONAL PARTY TO THE RIGHT BUT THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY HAS GAINED A GOOD MANY OF THE VOTES WHICH WERE CAST FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. DE KLERK IS A TOUGH AND RESILIENT CHARACTER WELL IN COMMAND OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. HE IS SHOWING NO GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE DEFECTION OF P W BOTHA. BUT THE THREAT OF RIGHT WING VIOLENCE IS BEING TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY. ON THE EXTREME LEFT, THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS ARE CONTINUING TO OPPOSE ANY NEGOTIATIONS AT ALL AND TRYING TO OUT-BID THE ANC FOR TOWNSHIP SUPPORT.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO ASK DE KLERK IF HE IS NOW CONFIDENT THAT ALL THE PRE-NEGOTIATION OBSTACLES CAN BE CLEARED AWAY AND HOW HE ENVISAGES RECONCILING ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE WITH EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR MINORITY RIGHTS. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ENTRENCHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND A JUSTICIABLE BILL OF RIGHTS. THE ANC SAY THAT THEY ARE COMMITTED TO A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM AND A FREE PRESS. SO THE MAIN ARGUMENT WILL TURN ON HOW THE CHECKS AND BALANCES CAN BE INCORPORATED: ON WHAT FORM MINORITY REPRESENTATION SHOULD TAKE: ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH EXISTING PROPERTY RIGHTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED: AND ON THE DEGREE OF FEDERALISM IN THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION. THE ANC WILL GO ON DEMANDING STRAIGHT-FORWARD MAJORITY RULE AND NO WHITE VETO, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES AND A CONSTITUTION WHICH CANNOT BE TORN UP OR DISREGARDED LIKE THOSE IN MOST OF THE REST OF AFRICA. ALL THESE ISSUES ARE GOING TO BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE.

5. DE KLERK WILL HAVE TO CARRY A MAJORITY OF THE WHITES WITH HIM IN A FUTURE REFERENDUM ON WHATEVER IS AGREED. MANDELA AND THE OTHER BLACK LEADERS WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SELL THE RESULTS TO THEIR SUPPORTERS. A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF POWER-SHARING AND A GRADUAL RATHER THAN AN ABRUPT TRANSFER OF POWER. THAT, FURTHERMORE, OFFERS THE ONLY HOPE FOR A STABLE SITUATION AND A PROSPEROUS ECONOMY IN A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA. WHILE BUTHELEZI WILL ACCEPT THIS, THE ANC ARE GOING TO FIND IT VERY HARD TO COMPROMISE TO THE EXTENT WHICH WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT RESULT.

6. IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH DE KLERK, BRIAN WALDEN POINTED OUT THAT THE GAP BETWEEN DE KLERK'S BOTTOM LINE AND THE ANC'S MINIMUM DEMANDS WAS VERY WIDE AND APPARENTLY NOT BRIDGEABLE. IF NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, WHAT WOULD DE KLERK DO THEN? DE KLERK REPLIED THAT IF THERE WAS A DEADLOCK, IN DUE COURSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESUMED, BECAUSE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. UNLIKE HIS PREDECESSOR DE KLERK ACCEPTS THAT REPRESSION CANNOT SUCCEED AND HAS NO INTENTION TO

RELYING ON IT ANYWAY. BUT NOR HAS HE ANY INTENTION OF COMMITTING SUICIDE. HE WILL NOT AGREE TO AN OUTCOME HE DOES NOT BELIEVE HE CAN SELL TO THE WHITE ELECTORATE. BOTH HE AND THE NATIONAL PARTY INTEND TO BE IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS IN THIS ONE.

7. LEGISLATIVE APARTHEID IS BEING DISMANTLED. THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT IS ABOUT TO BE REPELLED. THE LAND ACTS AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT ARE DUE TO BE REPLACED NEXT YEAR. THE POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT WILL DISAPPEAR WITH AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION.

IM EVEN THAT WILL NOT REMOVE ALL FEATURES OF APARTHEID. THE STATE SCHOOL SYSTEM REMAINS SEGREGATED THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW AGREED THAT WHITE SCHOOLS CAN BE OPENED TO ALL RACES PROVIDED A LARGE MAJORITY OF PARENTS AGREE. THIS IS A STEP FORWARD BUT IT WILL HAVE ONLY A VERY GRADUAL EFFECT. MOST PRIVATE SCHOOLS ALREADY ARE OPEN. THE FOUR 'INDEPENDENT' HOMELANDS ALSO REMAIN IN PLACE, WITH THREE OF THEM NOW UNDER MILITARY RULE. THEIR LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO BE PRESENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS AS OBSERVERS. IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION, THE 'INDEPENDENT' HOMELANDS OF TRANSKEI, CISKEI AND VENDA ARE LIKELY TO VOTE THEMSELVES OUT OF EXISTENCE. IN BOPHUTHATSWANA MANGOPE STILL CLINGS TO 'INDEPENDENCE' BUT HE NO LONGER HAS MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT.

9. DE KLERK HAS SAID THAT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TRIP HE WILL NOT BARGAIN FOR THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND WILL NOT ACCEPT INTERFERENCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICANS. BUT HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE PROCESS HE HAS INITIATED. HE IS GRATEFUL FOR THE ACTION WE TOOK OVER NEW INVESTMENT AND THERE IS NOW A GRADUAL CRUMBLING OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS. THE SPANIARDS HAVE JUST ANNOUNCED THE RESUMPTION OF IBERIA CARGO FLIGHTS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND ARE CONSIDERING REINSTATING PASSENGER FLIGHTS AS WELL. THERE IS NOW A POLISH TRADE OFFICE IN JOHANNESBURG AND THE HEAD OF THE POLISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE HAS JUST VISITED SOUTH AFRICA. THERE IS A SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION IN BUDAPEST AND INCREASINGLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE NEW HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT. A ROMANIAN MISSION IS HERE AT PRESENT. THE DANES ARE OPENING AN EMBASSY HERE. THE DUTCH ARE PROPOSING A STAGED EASING OF EC SANCTIONS. TWO EUROPEAN COMPANIES (ONE BRITISH, ONE GERMAN) ARE SETTING UP CATALYTIC CONVERTOR PLANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. DE KLERK HAS ESTABLISHED GOOD RELATIONS WITH MANY OF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THE ANC HAVE GIVEN UP CALL FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF SANCTIONS THOUGH THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING SANCTIONS WHILE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE.

10. THE MAIN ECONOMIC PROBLEM REMAINS THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EXTERNAL CAPITAL AND, PARTICULARLY, TO IMF AND WORLD BANK FACILITIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THE TOUGH DECISIONS NECESSARY TO COOL DOWN THE ECONOMY TO ABOUT ONE PER CENT REAL GROWTH IN GDP THIS YEAR TO ENABLE SOUTH AFRICA TO RUN A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TRADE SURPLUS (US DOLLARS SIX BILLION) TO BE ABLE TO COVER DEBT REPAYMENTS AND OTHER CAPITAL OUT-FLOWS. THE FINANCE MINISTER HAS PUSHED THROUGH A TOUGH BUDGET IMPOSING FOR THE FIRST TIME SUBSTANTIAL REAL CUTS IN DEFENCE SPENDING AND ALLOCATING RAND THREE BILLION TO HELP REDRESS CIO-ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS (RAND TWO BILLION OF WHICH IS BEING ADMINISTERED BY JAN STEYN). THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE A FURTHER RAND 500 MILLION TO THESE INITIATIVES. WE SHOULD NOT CHANNEL OUR FUNDS THROUGH SOUTH AFRICAN MECHANISMS BUT ARE INCREASING OUR OWN SUPPORT FOR BLACK EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY PROJECTS. THE ODA ARE LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE NEXT YEAR TO OPERATION HUNGER (IN THE RURAL AREAS), PROMAT (FOR TEACHER TRAINING) AND THROUGH THE URBAN FOUNDATION IN THE SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS.

11. STATE SOCIALIST IDEAS REMAIN DEEPLY INGRAINED IN THE ANC. BUT THEY HAVE STARTED BACK-TRACKING ON NATIONALISATION. BY THE TIME THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS REACH ANY KIND OF CONCLUSION, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATING MANDELA AND OTHERS IN THESE ISSUES WILL BE MUCH FURTHER ADVANCED. DE KLERK UNDERSTANDS THAT THESE ARGUMENTS WILL NOT GET THROUGH UNLESS THERE CLEARLY IS AN INTENTION TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE WILL ARGUE THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE THROUGH AN EXPANDING ECONOMY WHICH NEEDS ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT GET ACCESS TO THE IMF UNTIL THERE IS A SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN POSITION. THIS WILL BE A MAIN SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WHEN DE KLERK MEETS PRESIDENT BUSH IN WASHINGTON ON 18 JUNE.

12. AS WILL BE OBVIOUS, THERE ARE ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE FACED HERE AND MUCH THAT COULD GO WRONG. SO FAR AS DE KLERK'S OWN PERFORMANCE IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, HE HAS HARDLY PUT A FOOT WRONG SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT AND, ASTOUNDING HIS CRITICS, HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN TRANSFORMING THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. ALTHOUGH THE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD ARE FORMIDABLE AND THE GAP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL PARTY AND THE ANC ON A FUTURE CONSTITUTION CERTAINLY WILL APPEAR FOR A LONG TIME AS UNBRIDGEABLE, DE KLERK IS DETERMINED TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. HAVING PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN PUSHING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT INTO THE DECISIONS

THEY HAVE NOW TAKEN, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO APPEAR TO BE INVOLVING OURSELVES DIRECTLY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT RATHER TO DRAW DE KLERK OUT ON HIS OWN INTENTIONS. VILJOEN WILL, I AM SURE, CONTINUE TO CONSULT US PRIVATELY ABOUT THE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS.

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SOUTH AFRICA: NEGOTIATIONS

1. I HAD A TALK YESTERDAY WITH DR GERRIT VILJOEN, WHO IS ACTING PRESIDENT IN DE KLERK'S ABSENCE. DR VILJOEN ASKED FOR HIS REGARDS TO BE PASSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD GREATLY ENJOYED HIS MEETING WITH HER.
2. I CONGRATULATED VILJOEN ON THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS LAST WEEK WITH THE ANC. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS AND THE RESULT HAD BEEN VERY ENCOURAGING. I ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR LIFTING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS FALL TO BE RECONSIDERED IN JUNE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DO SO IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAPPENED OVER THE NEXT MONTH AND THE ANC'S RESPONSE IN TERMS OF GETTING AWAY FROM THE RHETORIC ABOUT THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'. VILJOEN HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, EXCEPT QUITE POSSIBLY IN NATAL. THE ANC THEMSELVES ACCEPTED THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE EMERGENCY IN THE NATAL TOWNSHIPS AND HAD MADE NO FUSS WHATEVER ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE PRESENCE THERE, WHICH THEY PREFERRED TO THE POLICE.
3. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IN THIS PHASE WAS THAT OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE JOINT WORKING GROUP WOULD BE RECOMMENDING BY 21 MAY WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. VILJOEN WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RELEASE CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS BUT THERE WERE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CRIMES TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE HARDEST CASES WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH AT THE END OF THE PROCESS, AND NOT AT THE BEGINNING. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE EXILES.
4. ON THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE', VILJOEN SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH TO GET THE COMMITMENT FROM THE ANC TO HELP END VIOLENCE AND TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE IN A STATE OF TRANSITION AND HAD PRETTY WELL ADMITTED THEIR INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OVER FORMALLY ABANDONING THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'. IT WAS NOT IN REALITY CONTINUING IN ANY VERY SIGNIFICANT FORM BUT THERE WAS A LOT

OF UNCONTROLLED VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION. THE ANC HAD PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINING SOME OF THEIR OWN SUPPORTERS BUT SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO MAKE A GREATER EFFORT TO DO SO. THE GOVERNMENT WANTED THE ANC TO STOP THE RHETORIC ABOUT THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE' BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT IT HAD ON UNCONTROLLED TOWNSHIP YOUTH.

5. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY LEGISLATION SHOULD BE REVIEWED. SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT WERE NO LONGER UTILISED AND SOME OF THE TERMINOLOGY SHOULD BE CHANGED. BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE HAD TO BE PUBLIC SECURITY LEGISLATION AND THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE CHANGES COULD ONLY BE MADE IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY SESSION (IE NEXT YEAR). THE ANC HAD ACCEPTED THIS.

6. I ASKED VILJOEN HOW LONG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE TO GET THROUGH THE PRE-NEGOTIATION OBSTACLES AND INTO DISCUSSION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION. VILJOEN SAID THAT HE FOUND THIS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. IT OBVIOUSLY WOULD TAKE SOME TIME FINALLY TO CLEAR THESE HURDLES BUT THE GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED THAT ANY DELAY SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM. THEY WANTED TO PRESS ON.

7. I ASKED ABOUT THE ANC'S CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE ACTION WE HAD TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THESE DID NOT FEATURE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT AGREE TO A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHICH AMOUNTED TO A DEMAND FOR MAJORITY RULE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE. ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REACHED CONCLUSIONS, DE KLERK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY MUST BE LEGITIMISED WHETHER THROUGH A REFERENDUM OR BY ELECTIONS IN WHICH EVERYONE MUST PARTICIPATE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS AGREED AND NEW ELECTIONS WERE HELD. THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT BUT THEY WERE TRYING TO INVOLVE THE ANC IN A MEASURE OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAPPENED IN THE COUNTRY. ONCE A NEGOTIATING BODY WAS SET UP, AN ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE MADE TO ENABLE THE PARTICIPANTS TO RAISE ISSUES WITH AND ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO MANAGE THE DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. MEANWHILE MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS HAD BEEN SET UP TO ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ANC TO COMMUNICATE IMMEDIATELY WITH ONE ANOTHER ABOUT MATTERS OF CONCERN TO EITHER SIDE.

8. ON THE NEGOTIATING BODY, VILJOEN SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED AS SUCH BUT THE NATIONAL PARTY DELEGATION WOULD BE

LED BY MINISTERS (IN PRACTICE, NO DOUBT, VILJOEN). THE BODY SHOULD ELECT ITS OWN CHAIRMAN OR AGREE ON A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TRY TO IMPOSE ITS NOMINEE. THE BODY MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OR CONVENTION BUT WOULD NOT HAVE THE POWER ITSELF TO ENACT THE NEW CONSTITUTION. DE KLERK WAS DETERMINED TO GET APPROVAL FROM THE EXISTING LEGISLATURE AND THE WHITE ELECTORATE FOR WHAT EVENTUALLY WAS AGREED: AND IT WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY THE TOTAL ELECTORATE ALSO.

9. ON THE LAND ACTS, VILJOEN SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO REPEALING THESE IN THE NEXT SESSION. I SAID THAT I HOPED THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OF THE KIND ENVISAGED BY THE HEAD OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHO HAD STRESSED THE NEED ACTIVELY TO HELP BLACK COMMERCIAL FARMERS GAIN ACCESS TO WORTHWHILE AGRICULTURAL LAND. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS THE KIND OF ASSISTANCE THE LAND BANK HAD GIVEN TO POOR AFRIKANER FARMERS. VILJOEN AGREED WITH THIS. NON-DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REPLACE THE LAND ACTS IN ORDER, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF LAND TENURE.

10. ON THE GROUP AREAS ACT, VILJOEN SAID THAT THIS TOO WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED AND THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE DOING SO. THAT WOULD SIMPLY CLUTTER UP THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT ANY NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO REPLACE THE GROUP AREAS, EG TO MAINTAIN HEALTH AND OTHER STANDARDS AND AVOID OVER-CROWDING, WOULD NEED TO BE GENUINELY NON-DISCRIMINATORY. OTHERWISE THEY WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. VILJOEN AGREED. THE GROUP AREAS WOULD HAVE TO GO, THOUGH THERE MIGHT HAVE TO BE A PHASING OUT PERIOD. I SAID THAT CAPE TOWN HAD APPLIED FOR THE MUNICIPALITY TO GO 'OPEN' WITH ELECTIONS BY ALL RESIDENTS WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL AREA ON A NON-RACIAL BASIS. I HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN. VILJOEN THOUGHT THAT THIS SORT OF THING COULD HAPPEN AS THE LEGISLATION WAS REPLACED IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY SESSION.

11. ON THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION, I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY VILJOEN'S AND NOW DE KLERK'S REFERENCES TO THE IDEA OF A BI-CAMERAL PARLIAMENT WITH A LOWER HOUSE ELECTED WITH ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, WITH PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. VILJOEN SAID THAT THIS WAS HIS PREFERRED APPROACH AND DE KLERK COULD SEE ITS MERITS, THOUGH AT THIS STAGE HE WANTED TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN. IN THAT EVENT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN UPPER HOUSE WITH REAL POWERS AS PART OF A GENERAL SYSTEM TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE CHECKS AND BALANCES. THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS GOING TO BE TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED A GROUP OR MINORITY. THE GOVERNMENT

WOULD BASE THEIR APPROACH ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. VILJOEN PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT MANY OF THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF MINORITIES COULD BE DEALT WITH IN A HEAVILY ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS AND OTHER FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH MIGHT BE AMENDABLE ONLY BY A VERY LARGE MAJORITY. I SAID THAT RATHER THAN SEEKING TO ENTRENCH BLOCKING MINORITIES IT MIGHT IN THE END TURN OUT TO BE EASIER TO GET IT AGREED THAT BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION E.G. THE BILL OF RIGHTS, SHOULD BE AMENDABLE ONLY BY UNANIMITY.

12. AS VILJOEN EXPLAINED TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE GOVERNMENT ENVISAGED A SEPARATION OF POWERS AND A PRESIDENT WHO AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD ACT AS GUARANTOR OF THE CONSTITUTION WITH A PRIME MINISTER DEALING WITH THE GENERAL RUNNING OF THE GOVERNMENT. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO WERE CONCERNED TO SEE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DEVOLUTION OF POWER. THIS AT PRESENT WAS STRONGLY RESISTED BY THE ANC BUT THEY WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS OF REGIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE END.

13. I MENTIONED DE KLERK'S REFERENCES TO NO "SIMPLISTIC MAJORITY RULE". I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT DE KLERK MEANT BUT THIS KIND OF TERMINOLOGY WAS LIABLE TO BE MISREPRESENTED (EG BY MR HAWKE). I HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD INSTEAD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO WAS A "WINNER TAKES ALL" SYSTEM: AND THAT THE OBJECT MUST BE TO ACHIEVE A GENUINE DEMOCRACY HERE, WITH A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM THAT WILL ENDURE A GENUINELY FREE PRESS AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, JUSTICIABLE BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW. VILJOEN SAID THAT HE TOOK THE POINT AND HAD HIMSELF TRIED TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE IN THESE SORT OF TERMS IN A DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT LAST NIGHT. "MAJORITY RULE" AS IT EXISTED ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA HAD NOT UNFORTUNATELY BROUGHT GENUINE FREEDOM OR DEMOCRACY. (IN HIS SPEECH VILJOEN STATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS WAS NOT TO FRUSTRATE MAJORITY GOVERNMENT, BUT TO MODERATE IT).

14. VILJOEN SAID THAT ANOTHER MAIN DIFFICULTY WAS GOING TO BE TO GET GUARANTEES IN THE CONSTITUTION THAT A FREE MARKET ECONOMY WAS GOING TO BE MAINTAINED. THIS WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUTURE. I SAID THAT THE ANC ALREADY WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE OF NATIONALISATION AND MANDELA HAD BEEN DOING SOME BACK-TRACKING. ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONSTITUTION. BUT THE ANC CLAIMED TO BE COMMITTED TO A MIXED ECONOMY AND PROTECTION FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS EXISTED IN ALMOST ALL OTHER CONSTITUTIONS (INCLUDING THE PROVISION THAT PROPERTY COULD ONLY BE TAKEN OVER WITH DUE COMPENSATION). THE BLACK LEADERS WOULD ONLY AGREE TO RESPECT PROPERTY RIGHTS IF IT WERE CLEAR THAT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS BEING

TAKEN TO REDRESS THE EXISTING ECONOMIC IMBALANCES.

15. I SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER UNDER-ESTIMATED THE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. NOR HAD WE BEEN SURPRISED BY THOSE WHICH HAD ARISEN ALREADY. BUT AS A RESULT OF DE KLERK'S INITIATIVES WE WERE MUCH MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SOUTH AFRICA FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS. VILJOEN SAID THAT THE ALTERNATIVES WERE TO NEGOTIATE NOW: OR TO NEGOTIATE LATER. IT OBVIOUSLY WAS BETTER TO NEGOTIATE NOW. IF THE NEGOTIATIONS GOT STUCK BECAUSE OF APPARENTLY UNBRIDGEABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO BE RESUMED LATER BECAUSE REPRESSION COULD NOT SUCCEED AND NOR COULD THE ''LIBERATION MOVEMENTS'' OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH WAS TO SEEK TO NORMALISE POLITICAL LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND TO DRAW THE ANC AND OTHERS INTO ACTING AS POLITICAL PARTIES AND ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HELPING TO RESOLVE SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. THERE WAS A STRONG AND POTENTIALLY VERY DANGEROUS RIGHT-WING REACTION BUT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS GETTING PLENTY OF SUPPORT FOR THE COURSE ON WHICH IT HAD EMBARKED. THEY WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM US.

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TAKEN TO REVIEW THE EXISTING ECONOMIC IMBALANCE.

10. I SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER UNDER-ESTIMATED THE ENORMOUS
DIVERSITY OF OPINION. NOW WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY THOSE WHICH HAS
ARMED ALREADY. BUT AS A RESULT OF DE KLERK'S INITIATIVES WE WERE
MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SOUTH AFRICA FINDING A
POLITICAL SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS. DE KLERK SAID THAT THE
ALTERNATIVES WERE TO NEGOTIATE NOW, OR TO NEGOTIATE LATER. IF
CONSENSUS WAS BETTER TO NEGOTIATE NOW, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS GOT STUCK
BECAUSE OF APPARENTLY UNRESOLVABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES,
THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED LATER BECAUSE REPRESSION COULD
NOT SUCCEED AND WE COULD THE "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" EVENTUALLY
OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. DE KLERK'S APPROACH WAS TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE
NOW, BUT TO BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE LATER IF THE NEGOTIATIONS
WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL. DE KLERK SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING WITH
THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND ALSO THE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT
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MOVEMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT
AND ALSO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN
TALKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND ALSO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.
THEY WERE VERY CAUTIOUS FOR THE SUPPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED
FROM US.

10. PLEASE SEE NEXT.

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JPB/cac
19th May 1990

Day Clerk
Please help
to be clear
briefs. on

R11/5

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London
SW1A 2AA

Dear Prime Minister,

I enclose a set of notes I have prepared following a recent trip I made to South Africa. I wrote them as background for the parliamentary select committee which is to investigate British interests in southern Africa and which I have been asked to advise.

I saw Sir Robin Renwick while I was in Cape Town and I am sure that he and his staff will provide very thorough briefs for you, but I thought you might welcome a few comments from another source.

Yours sincerely,
James Barber.
James Barber

Notes on the Current Situation in South Africa

These notes are not intended to provide a comprehensive coverage of the situation in South Africa, but rather to identify key issues in two broad developments - first the moves towards negotiation and second the competition for support among black Africans. The first of these is well publicised whereas the second has received less media coverage but may be of great importance.

Section 1 : Negotiations

Preliminary to Negotiations - Aims and Participants

1. A preliminary meeting has been held between the Government and the ANC (African National Congress) to remove "obstacles" to negotiations.
2. The Government group (all white, all male and all Afrikaner) was drawn from the Cabinet, with F.W. de Klerk and G. Viljoen the leading figures. The ANC sent a more mixed group, drawn from people of different races, sex and sections of the party (including the military wing - Umkhonto we Sizwe). While there were a couple of younger ANC members most of the group was drawn from party veterans.
3. Among the steps agreed at the talks were:
 - a) Both sides to work for peaceful solutions, which in effect mean the ANC suspending the armed struggle while the Government reviews the State of Emergency.
 - b) To set up a joint working group to consider the release of "political prisoners". (Mandela feels strongly about this. He sees himself as the leader who in the early 1960's called on his followers to take up arms, but while he has been released many who heeded the call are still in prison. On the Government side there will be no difficulty over those imprisoned for such offences as membership of a banned organization, but there is reluctance to release those involved in "terrorist" acts, especially those which caused death or injury.)
 - c) The Government will give temporary immunity to exiled leaders of the ANC who will return to South Africa to help set up the internal organization.
 - d) To set up channels of communication between the ANC and the Government to counter violence and intimidation.
4. Without doubt these preliminary talks were successful. That they were held at all was an achievement; that they generated a spirit of co-operation was remarkable; and they have opened up the chances of effective negotiations.

The Arrangements for Negotiations and the Participants

1. Although the first step has gone well, major obstacles lie ahead including the arrangement for negotiations and who will participate in them.
2. The ANC would (according to Thabo Mbeki) prefer a new constitution to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly to be elected by universal franchise. This body would have a substantial black majority.

3. The Government is almost sure to resist this, as it would leave it in a weak minority position in the negotiations. Instead it would prefer a body drawn up of representatives of major parties and groups - for example, on the white side the ruling National Party (NP), the Conservative Party (CP) and the Democratic Party (DP); among Africans the ANC, Inkatha, representatives of the black Homelands and perhaps even the Pan African Congress (PAC), plus Coloured and Indian parties.
4. If the discussions are to take place between representatives of groups, the ANC will be keen to organise a direct negotiation between the Government and an ANC led 'Front' comprising the ANC itself plus old and new allies.
5. If the ANC succeeds on recruiting allies the Government will have no choice but to form its own alliance. There will therefore, if this situation develops, be two major magnates (Government and ANC) trying to draw attract as much support as possible from other groups.
6. If broad alliances are formed the aims of each grouping will become hazier, and internal alliance management could be as important as bargaining round the table.
7. There is speculation that eventually the most successful alliance would be between the National Party and the ANC, with opposition from more radical parties to 'right' and 'left'. This may not be so far fetched as both the Government and the ANC are moving into the centre ground of South African politics.

The Distinctiveness of the Negotiations

1. The uncertainty that surrounds the form of the negotiations is one indication of their distinctiveness. This is not decolonization (i.e. an alien authority handing over power to the local population). Rather it is one group (the whites) negotiating away its exclusive control but remaining a participant in the new power structure.
2. There is no haven of retreat for most white South Africans and especially the Afrikaners (c.f. colonial situations, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia).
3. South Africa is greater in size, complexity and wealth than other sub-Saharan states, and therefore has more difficult issues to settle in the negotiations, including distribution of wealth and resources.
4. Within the 'process' of negotiations the Government's position is unclear. Does it organise the negotiations or is it simply a participant? If the Government does not organise the process who does? A possibility is that the process will be organized by the administration but Government leaders will attend as NP leaders. However, the ANC want an interim administration established for the transition period.
5. The Government is not a defeated power. However, the costs of continuing along the old road are considered too high by the present administration, but certainly not by all whites.
6. The blacks are not represented by a single liberation movement. The ANC recognises that there are diverse black voices.

7. South Africa is a sovereign state. Within the process of negotiation there is no outside mediator to bring the parties together, or, when negotiations start, to act as chairman, as Britain did in Zimbabwe and UN plus the major powers did in Namibia

Major Issues to be Faced in Negotiations

1. Group Rights

- a) The Government want 'group rights' enshrined in the settlement, whereas black groups are suspicious that this is a way of perpetuating racial divisions.
- b) At the heart of the difference is both a play for power (or powersharing) but also different perceptions of the nature of South African Society. (Should it predominantly be seen as a state containing a diversity of race and/or nations, or should a single South African identity override all these?)

2. The Land Acts (and Group Areas)

- a) The Land Acts divides the country outside urban areas between the races, with the bulk in white hands. The remaining area is divided into black 'homelands', four of which have been declared 'independent' by the Government (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana). Nobody else has recognised them.
- b) The removal of the Land Acts and the return of some land to blacks will be a major claim in negotiations. This could be very difficult, for in addition to differences between the Government and blacks over the legal situation, there are differences over the concept of land holding and land rights.
- c) The Group Areas Act defines settlement in the urban areas. Already the Government has introduced "common" areas and indicated that it is prepared to remove the whole Act, but talks of introducing substitute legislation. This will probably not create a major problem and the Government will probably withdraw the Act before full negotiations start.

3. The Economy

- a) South Africa has a 'mixed' economy in two senses - first a mix of state and private activities, and second, a mixture of First and Third World standards.
- b) In international terms South Africa has a small/medium economy, but it is by far the largest and most sophisticated in Africa south of the Sahara. The health of this economy directly affects all the other states of southern Africa.
- c) The South African economy is currently facing considerable difficulties - slow growth, high inflation, high unemployment and virtually no new foreign investment.

- d) The private sector is dominated by a small number of major multi-national conglomerates. They might have the ability to shift a substantial part of their activity and resources out of South Africa if the climate becomes hostile to them.
- e) As the existing system has discriminated against blacks for generations they will want in negotiations to achieve change in terms of a more even distribution of rewards, and increased services (e.g. Education).
- f) There is, however, great uncertainty about future economic policy. The government is seeking to reduce the public sector through privatization, but has no clear plans for redistribution of income and wealth other than increasing the allocation of resources for black social services. The ANC appears to have slogans but not clearly thought out economic policies, with great uncertainty about whether or not to extend nationalization. The business community is divided between those who believe that market forces should be largely unimpeded, and those who believe that an element of redistribution must be introduced.
- g) What seems clear is that if the economy is to grow to match the increasing black birth rate, external help will be needed. That can only come from the West in the form of government aid and private investment, but that will require a settlement which creates conditions attractive to Western capital.

4. Confirmation of a Settlement

- a) Even if the negotiations reach an agreement a further step could be required to confirm it, and that might be controversial.
- b) President de Klerk has said that a new constitution will have to be put to the electorate (and presumably he means the present electorate) via a referendum or election. The dominant element in the present electorate is white, although Coloureds and Asians also have a vote. The Government may have introduced this provision to appease the right wing or as a lever in negotiations but it could become a stumbling block.
- c) Alternative means of confirmation e.g. presentation to the existing Parliament, or acceptance that a Constitutional Assembly has legitimacy in this (as the ANC suggest) seem to be ruled out by de Klerk's statement.

Parties Operating Inside the Existing Constitutional Framework

1. There are three Chambers in the Legislature (White, Coloured and Asian). Many major policy issues are presented to all three houses sitting as an extended committee. However, voting power remains within the separate chambers with the white predominant.
2. The ruling National Party (NP) is holding together well behind de Klerk's leadership. De Klerk's steps have been bold and courageous and have kept the initiative for the Government.

3. The Conservative Party (CP) is completely opposed to the Government's negotiation policy. It gained c.30% of the white vote in the 1989 election and estimates now put its support at almost 40% (mainly Afrikaner). The CP says that it will work through parliament to try to counter the Government's changes but is ambiguous about action (including violence) if that fails. The CP may well be divided on whether to participate in negotiations and in its attitude to future resistance.
4. The Democratic Party (DP) can justifiably say that it has pointed the way for the present reform movement and sees itself continuing to play a prominent part in forwarding, speeding up the process, and providing new ideas. However, it is not powerful enough as a unit to be courted strongly by others, many of its ideas have now been taken over by the Government, and there are distinctive groups within the party (as witnessed by the triumvirate which leads it). One possibility is that it will form a tacit alliance with the Government, but there is also speculation that the party may split, some joining the NP, some the ANC and others continuing as a separate party.
5. The parties in the Coloured and Indian Houses support the Government's steps, which must encourage the NP but these parties have limited power even in their own communities.
6. There is, therefore, strong majority support for the Government within Parliament, but the CP opposition indicates the hostility of a considerable number of whites, and this hostility is even stronger among extreme white groups which may be planning forms of armed struggle against the Government. The possibility of attempted political assassination cannot be ruled out, or even more extensive military action later. For example, arms were recently stolen from an Air Force Base, with the help of some servicemen.

The Challenge of the Negotiations

In my view there are four great issues to be settled in the negotiations.

1. Order. How to retain order in a society in which several groups are prepared to take up arms if their views do not prevail (see below).
2. A Constitutional Democracy. How to offer a say in the political order for all, while avoiding a new form of domination, ensuring individual rights and reflecting diverse views.
3. The Land. How to settle the land issue so that South Africa retains a successful commercial farming sector and yet opens up opportunities for black farmers outside the present homelands.
4. The Economy. How to achieve steady economic progress while ensuring a more just distribution of rewards and retaining incentives for skills and effort.

Section 2 : The Struggle for African Support and the Security Implications

The Setting

1. There is a major struggle taking place for African support inside South Africa. The main parties in the struggle are the ANC, the Pan African Congress (PAC), Inkatha and the Azania Peoples Organization (AZAPO)
2. The participants in the struggle and the nature of the struggle differs in different parts of the country.
3. While in some areas the competition is peaceful in others it is bitter and brutal. The South African Institute of Race Relations estimated that c.1000 were killed in factional fights and murders in the first three months of 1990.
4. The security forces (both police and army) have been drawn into the conflict in an attempt to keep the peace but they have also been accused of participating in it.

The Parties - The African National Congress

1. The ANC has a large majority of black supporters but is a genuinely multi racial party.
2. It has the largest support and campaigns across the whole of South Africa.
3. It bases its aims on the Freedom Charter, drawn up in the 1950's, which outlines principles for a post apartheid South Africa. The Charter is an inspirational document, and of great importance to the ANC, but on some issues it is ambiguous and dated, and it provides little guidance on the process of achieving its ends.
4. In Nelson Mandela the ANC have a leader who is recognised and respected by all the anti-apartheid and black movements. This may be difficult to sustain, but potentially he is a great force for unity.
5. The Party now faces the challenge of operating openly within the Republic after decades of banning, underground activities and exile. This will throw up major organizational problems and expose divisions (e.g. between youth and elders; between those returning from exile and those inside the country; between the military and armed wings; and ideologically between a range stretching from Marxism to Methodism).
6. The organizational problems may be especially acute at local levels because of the lack of experience of such activities and the problems of controlling radicalised youth.
7. There is uncertainty about relations with other organizations who are ANC supporters and who were active inside the country while the ANC was banned - in particular the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Confederation of South African Trades Unions (COSATU). Do they merge with the ANC or keep separate identities? Both the UDF and COSATU have organizations in place and have established interests to pursue. For

example, it is rumoured that some COSATU members favour a 'workers led government', that Cyril Rampaphosa of the Mine Workers Union is strongly in favour of nationalization, and that he refused to join the ANC team for the preliminary talks because the unions were only offered one place.

8. The ANC has gone for breathing space by setting its conference for 16th December which, incidentally, is a day revered by Afrikaners - 'The Day of the Vow'.

The Pan African Congress (PAC)

1. The PAC is an 'Africanist' party. It rejects sections of the Charter, stresses black leadership as opposed to multi-racialism and favours a continuation of the armed struggle.
2. It is militant and at least in its rhetoric it brands all whites as intruders. One of its slogans is 'one settler, one bullet'.
3. The PAC aims to be a mass national movement like the ANC, but its organization is poorer, at a national and international level. However, in some local areas the PAC is active and well organised. Its support is therefore patchy.
4. The PAC appears to be recruiting among radical youths, and while it is difficult to assess its success it is a stronger movement than is often appreciated outside South Africa.
5. Although its public stand is opposed to negotiations, there are rumours of splits within the PAC about participation in them.

Azania Peoples Organization (AZAPO)

1. This is another 'Africanist' group which has its origins in the Black Consciousness Movement (BC) led at one time by Steve Biko.
2. It takes a tougher, more militant line than the ANC.
3. It is difficult to assess its strength but it is much smaller than the ANC and the PAC. However, it is influential among young black professionals.
4. Black Consciousness (which may still have an organization apart from AZAPO) has always found its most fertile soil among black intellectuals and therefore is not a mass movement but is influential in terms of the generation of ideas and the nature of its membership.
5. Neither AZAPO nor BC have strong organizations.

Inkatha

1. Inkatha is predominantly a Zulu party, largely restricted to Natal Province.
2. It is therefore not a 'national' party as its leader, Chief Buthelezi, often claims, but within Natal and among the Zulu it is more powerful than its opponents are prepared to admit and is well organised. Inkatha claims a

paid up membership of 1.7m. This is disputed by opponents who claim that people are forced to join, but by any standards it is a large movement.

3. Many Zulu, especially those in the Kwa Zulu homeland, have a strong sense of tradition and distinctiveness as a people. However, there are other Zulus, especially urban dwellers, who challenge this approach and support the ANC's broader, less traditional stand. The struggle for support in Natal is a Zulu struggle.
4. Inkatha will probably favour a federal constitutional solution, built around the major groupings of black African people in South Africa - the Zulus in Natal, the Xhosa in the Eastern Cape (and increasingly the Western Cape), the Northern Sotho in the Transvaal, and the Southern Sotho in the Transvaal/Orange Free State. This is a very different federal concept than that which is usually discussed, which is a complex interplay of racial groupings, existing homelands and geographical divisions.
5. Inkatha has difficult relations with all the other movements seeking black support. There are a number of reasons for this:
 - a) The size and distinctiveness of the Zulus.
 - b) Ideological differences, with Inkatha favouring a market economy and opposed to sanctions.
 - c) The personality of Buthelezi, who is proud, touchy and difficult to work with.

The Struggle for Black Support

1. In the struggle for black support the ANC is the most effective national party, in that it has support in all parts of the country, but in some provinces it is under challenge.
3. The pattern across the country varies from province to province. The provincial position appears to be as follows:
 - a) Transvaal (and especially Vaal triangle) - a three cornered contest between ANC, PAC and AZAPO in which the PAC is mounting a serious challenge. (A recent survey claimed that ANC and PAC were neck and neck in Soweto).
 - b) Natal - a straight, bitter and brutal struggle between ANC (plus UDF) and Inkatha.
 - c) Western Cape - a contest among Africans between ANC and PAC, while Coloured radicals support ANC/UDF.
 - d) Eastern Cape - ANC territory.
 - e) Orange Free State - Unknown to me.

The Conflict in Natal

1. Two points should be underlined. First, the conflict in Natal is extensive and brutal - three quarters of the 'political killings' have come from that province. Second, the conflict is mainly between Zulus (and not Zulus and outsiders).
2. The conflict operates at various levels:
 - a) A clash of parties - Inkatha vs ANC.
 - b) Traditionalist vs Modernist.
 - c) Youth vs Elders.
 - d) Rivalry between families and chiefs ('War Lords').
 - e) Local disputes leading to blood feuds. (e.g. rival taxi firms).
 - f) Criminal elements taking advantage of the disturbances.
3. It would be a mistake to underrate the seriousness of the conflict. A taste of its bitterness is reflected in recent statements from the ANC organizer in Pietermaritzburg (Harry Gwala) who said that there would be no need for Nuremberg trials at the end of the conflict - enemy leaders (presumably Inkatha) would be shot. On the other side, King Goodwill Zwelithini (King of the Zulus) at a meeting of chiefs accused the ANC of planning to destroy Zulu power, breaking the country into pieces and then putting it together again as ANC property. Chief Buthelezi told the chiefs the Inkatha stood between them and the destruction of the institution of chieftainship.

The Security Forces - Police and Army

1. Both the police and the army have been drawn into the black internal conflict, and also in the threat from extremists - white and black.
2. There are questions about the loyalty of the police:
 - a) Some white policemen have shown sympathy for the CP and even the more extreme white parties, and many of them are drawn from the same social groups as the far right (poor, often ill-educated Afrikaners).
 - b) Some white and black police in Natal have been accused of giving active support to Inkatha.
 - c) Other black police (and prison warders) have expressed sympathy with the ANC.
3. Black policemen have frequently been targets for radical black groups and youths - several have been murdered and many have had their houses attacked.
4. By white standards police pay is poor. There is dissatisfaction over pay and conditions, apart from the political situation and morale may be low.
5. The leaders of the army distance themselves from the police and claim that the army is superior in terms of training, discipline and morale.

6. Under de Klerk the influence of the armed forces in decision making has declined sharply partly from the change in leadership and partly from the end of border wars. However, there appears to be little resentment at the withdrawal from Namibia, and the army claims it is loyal to the civil authority.
7. There is currently no serious border threat for the army to handle (ANC/PAC guerilla activity is very small).
8. However, the military are now drawn into the Natal conflict, and this is already straining their capacity to be seen as objective keepers of the peace. The clearest example of this so far was the deployment and subsequent withdrawal of Battalion 121 from Natal. This is a Zulu Battalion, but according to Inkatha, has been heavily infiltrated by the ANC. Inkatha claims that Battalion 121 attacked Inkatha and supplied arms to the ANC/UDF alliance. There were also reports that there were clashes between 121 and pro-Inkatha police units. Currently Battalion 32(?) is deployed in Natal. This is a largely Portuguese speaking unit, and, according to Inkatha, has the advantage of being unable to communicate with any of the locals!

Conclusions

1. A very difficult period lies ahead, and the negotiations could break down because of irreconcilable aims, and/or violence by whites or blacks could tear the country apart.
2. However, there now is hope in South Africa where there was despair, and there are enough people who are prepared to follow the lead set by de Klerk and Mandela for guarded optimism, but it must be very guarded.

James Barber
8.5.90



8J
a. / Honey / Groebe

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1990

Thank you for your letter of 10 May about the arrangements for Chequers, covering a copy of a further letter to Richard Dales.

Your understanding of the position is rather wide of the mark, and does not reflect the various discussions which we have had. I have asked the FCO to go over the position with you. But in summary:

- the only person to come with the President to the talks will be the Ambassador;
- the only other people to be admitted to Chequers on the President's arrival will be one aide, one doctor and one security man, all three of whom will be in a room at the back of the building;
- since no media except cameramen are admitted to the grounds of Chequers, there is no need for any media personnel to come;
- the Foreign Secretary's talks with Mr. Botha will now take place in London;
- the other members of Mr. Botha's party attending the lunch will travel down to Chequers together with the Foreign Secretary and Robin Renwick. Only those actually attending the lunch will come into Chequers;
- Mrs. de Klerk and the other ladies should arrive with Mrs. Hurd in time for lunch;
- we will hold the photo-call after the talks and before the lunch, to enable Mrs. de Klerk to be present for it.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Wall.

(C. D. POWELL)

Mr. Justus de Goede

ca



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

10 May 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

I attach a copy of a letter on the Chequers discussions which I have had delivered to Richard Dales.

Could you confirm my understanding that the Prime Minister will greet the following ladies in the President's group prior to discussions beginning at Chequers and before the group is taken on a tour of a stately home by Mrs Hurd:

Mrs de Klerk
Mrs Botha
Mrs van Heerden
Mrs Roux
Mrs Killen

All the above are included in the luncheon. If your schedule permits, you might feel it useful to have a meeting before Mr de Klerk's arrival on Thursday evening.

Sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER

(1)

V. important
~~Handwritten text~~
Pledge Box to
Mr. Dala, SRG
Rubin 10/5

NOTES FOR SPEECH BY DR G VAN N VILJOEN DURING
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET VOTE DEBATE : 9 MAY 1990

The Government has in recent months repeatedly been expressing its future vision of the new South Africa in terms of certain fundamental principles. The National Party is challenging, inviting all South Africans to join it on the road to its ideal for South Africa.

This ideal is to establish a new, and in particular a just and better South Africa. A South Africa in which security and stability, progress and prosperity and justness will be a reality for all its citizens. A South Africa in which every South African, irrespective of colour, creed or race, will be recognised as a full citizen; in which the freedom and human dignity of everyone will be respected and protected; and in which happiness and prosperity will be promoted for everybody. Also a South Africa recognised as a regional leader and acting as a catalyst for growth, development and an enhanced quality of life for the peoples of our subcontinent.

The Government has expressed its vision of the future South Africa especially in terms of the following principles:

- * full and equal franchise and other political rights for all citizens within an undivided, multi-party democratic South Africa;
- * the sharing of political power and equal opportunities by all, on the basis that the rights of minorities as well as those of individuals will be protected through constitutional checks and balances and by a Charter of Human Rights;

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- 2 -

- * binding together all our people into one nation with one citizenship composed of a diversity of recognised minorities, with emphasis on nation-building and on common patriotism and loyalty to our nation and to South Africa;
- * identifying and strengthening the common values and ideals uniting our people, to form the basis of our nationhood;
- * devolution of power to levels of regional and local government;
- * dismantling the remains of discrimination and apartheid and ensuring fairness, justice and human dignity for all;
- * allowing freedom of association to take its course without statutory prescriptiveness;
- * independence of the judiciary and equality for all before the law;
- * the maintenance of stability and law and order as an essential basis for constitutional reform and socio-economic development;
- * an economic system based on free enterprise including private ownership, freedom of contract and effective competition, and also providing urgent special efforts to improve the quality of life of deprived communities.

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It is clear that a hot issue in the negotiation will be the accommodation, within the diversity and plurality of South African society, of the conflicting claims of power-sharing and simple majority rule, the latter in fact implying a transfer of power, leaving minorities even without any share in power.

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SPEECH BY DR G VAN N VILJOEN DURING CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET VOTE DEBATE : 9 MAY 1990

PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS

The biggest challenge facing the Government and the NP is to make our "group concept" acceptable and marketable against the suspicion that it is advanced merely as a disguise for continuing the disparities and injustices of apartheid. This suspicion is of course due to the albatross of apartheid and discrimination hanging around the neck of the historic group concept. Mr Mandela has over the past weekend also rejected the concept of the protection of group or minority rights, motivating it with the argument that any form of racism would be a recipe for disaster.

Therefore an early and prompt dismantling of the remains of apartheid and discrimination is essential for making minority protection acceptable. Without drastic action in this respect success will evade us. President De Klerk has clearly reiterated the Government's commitment to do just this in his Budget Vote address on 19 April 1990.

A new situation has to be created in which the point can be brought home that the claim for protection of minorities against domination should be assessed within an entirely new context, fundamentally different from the historical context which has so discredited the group.

Minorities requiring protection will have to be defined on the basis of freedom of association and in terms such as language, culture, ethnicity. The unacceptable group definitions in racial terms and with statutory prescriptiveness will have to be abandoned. Provision should be made for those wishing to have no group affiliation and simply to be South Africans and

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- 2 -

to function as such in the process of political power-sharing. If groups are no longer to be essential building blocks of the constitution, of the whole system as such, it should nevertheless remain available as one option for those requiring its protection.

In the new context the former almost exclusive emphasis on differences and on separate groups in the population will be replaced by the acceptance of one undivided South Africa and emphasis on one common nationhood. The NP in its election manifesto also departed from the past with its emphasis on differences by accepting the necessity to identify and strengthen those common ideals and values which all sections of the South African population share with each other, as the foundation for building national unity.

In the thinking of the NP its concept of nationalism is now coming to the maturity of all-encompassing inclusiveness: beginning in 1915 from a nationalism largely confined to the Afrikaner people, it gradually expanded to a nationalism embracing all the White people by the 1960's, while in 1983 the breakthrough came by the inclusion of Coloureds and Asians, and now we accept a nationalism embracing all South Africans irrespective of race, language or creed. Within this new context the protection of minority rights for groups requiring it, becomes a completely different proposition.

The new context will also be different from the old by the acceptance of an entrenched Charter of Human Rights, which is justiciable by the Courts, and will form the basis for the protection of individual rights and freedoms as well as community rights (language, culture, religion).

3/...

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The State President has stated that he does not have an ideological obsession with the group concept but rather considers it as an undeniable part of the practical reality of South Africa's heterogeneous population. The protection of groups or minorities is therefore not so much a permanent principle as rather an essential method or road - an open-ended road - at this stage of our history towards achieving success in nation building. This process could well be endangered by a dogmatic refusal to acknowledge and somehow accommodate the reality of minorities in a plural population. It would be wiser to acknowledge and accommodate its conflict potential rather than sweeping it under the carpet.

The Lusaka Manifesto of African States in 1969 also recognised the need for protecting certain group values or rights albeit in a transitional period. Moreover, the protection of minorities is well-established in international law and in United Nations initiatives.

The NP therefore believes that it has a sound case to argue in the negotiations on behalf of protection of minority rights, in the cultural as well as the political sense. It should be possible to negotiate a multi-dimensional system of protection through checks and balances which would comprise:

- * an acceptable new definition of minorities requiring protection;
- * a Charter of Human Rights;
- * constitutional provisions ensuring both political representation and effective participation in decision making for minorities on certain vital issues specified through negotiation;

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* a measure of autonomy for minorities as well as geographic regions, promoted by delegation as well as devolution of power to lower levels of Government.

In achieving an acceptable system of checks and balances the concerns of the minorities will of course have to be accommodated in such a way that the claims of the majority are not disregarded and in fact overridden by minority domination, The will of the majority must remain an essential prerequisite for decision-making.

The acknowledgement and accommodation of diversity must ultimately be seen as an instrument and basis for promoting the growth of a common South African nationhood.

But there is another important side to this matter viewed from the perspective of negotiation. Assuming all or most parties concerned accept the need of negotiations, it should also be understood that negotiation implies a process of debate and argument, of give and take, and ultimately of compromise. This is something quite different from a mere transfer of power, which really makes negotiations unnecessary. Negotiation should ideally result - as has now often been said - in all participants in some sense sharing in victory rather than in opposing total winners against total losers.

In this regard I would like to recall a few important statements elucidating the matter under discussion. Dr Helen Suzman warned an Oxford University audience a few years ago about the danger of replacing minority domination in South Africa by a majority domination entailing worse conditions than before - a warning which is not unreasonable in the light of experiences in Africa. Mr Nelson Mandela shortly after his release referred to the great dilemma of South Africa caught

between the demands of Blacks for one man one vote to the point of unqualified majority government and the concerns of Whites calling for some structural constitutional guarantee against being dominated in such a situation. This dilemma, Mr Mandela indicated, had to be reconciled through give and take, in a way acceptable to Blacks as well as Whites. Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi is also on record that though ideally he would prefer a simple majoritarian form of government, he accepts that the realities of the South African situation call for a readiness to negotiate protection for the rights of minority groups in a democratic non-discriminatory way.

DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITY RULE

To what extent does minority protection detract from real democracy? Is unqualified or simple majority rule an essential characteristic of democracy? President De Klerk dealt with this question in his address of 17 April 1990, when he contrasted a model of simple majority rule with a model of power sharing.

I would argue that there are enough historical and contemporary examples of undemocratic, unfree and tyrannical situations created by majority rule, to show that majority rule does not per se guarantee democracy. There are also other vital requisites.

Real democracy requires conditions of free debate, free choice and decision-making by individuals. It is furthermore characterised by representativeness, i.e. individuals must be effectively represented by leaders of their choice in the organs of Government. Together with representativeness goes the concept of accountability - accountability of representatives to their voters, and also of the executive to

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the legislature. For this to be effective there should be the ready possibility of replacing the Government by a different one. This implies a multiparty system coupled with regular secret ballot elections.

Provided full justice is done to all these characteristics, it could well be argued that absolute rule by an unqualified arithmetic majority may be considerably tempered without imperiling the essence of democracy.

Majority rule is not a necessary guarantee nor a sufficient condition to ensure that the essentials of democracy are being achieved. Especially in a majoritarian system in which "the winner takes all" the minorities are totally excluded from any meaningful political involvement. It is of course not questioned that the majority must rule. But it is questioned whether, especially in a plural society, stability and nation-building are best served by a simple majority ruling solely and exclusively.

This brings us to answer the question as to what minority rights are actually envisaged to be protected. The answer is the right to enjoy some meaningful measure of representation and of involvement in decision-making on certain vital or sensitive matters.

Minority protection is needed for the very reason that the majority does rule. This means that minority protection is not a cancellation or subversion of majority rule, but a qualification of it. Minority protection results in power-sharing, i.e. a combination of or an equilibrium between majority rule and minority protection, as President De Klerk explained on 17 April 1990. In this way minority protection

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in fact also contributes to a stability which is a necessary underpinning of majority rule.

What are the interests of the minority for which protection in the Constitution is sought, i.e. what is it that simple majority rule does not sufficiently secure? First, that the majority does not totally monopolise power. Second, the sense of security resulting from the fact that members of minority communities feel that they too are represented in the corridors of power by leaders who know their values and interests. Worldwide experience proves that an absence of this factor leads to turmoil and violence for exactly the same reasons as when a majority finds itself in a powerless position. Thirdly, especially in a situation of juxtaposition between third world and first world societies, the overall quality of public decision-making, the maintenance of acceptable norms and standards. Fourthly, in supplementation of the protection afforded by a justiciable Charter of Human Rights, the very existence of the Charter needs to be protected and also its specific provisions should not be subject to arbitrary majority decision. Similarly, essential elements of the Constitution, affecting the multiparty system, regular secret elections, the division of functions among political structures etc., also entail minority interests. Also essential minimum requirements for a feasible but just economic system could be included among minority interest requiring protection.



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

9 May 1990

Mr Richard Dales
Head
Southern Africa Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AH

Dear Richard,

Further to our conversation on the visit of the State President to Chequers on 19 May, the following is my understanding concerning the officials who will attend the Ministerial discussions and who will be at Chequers on that day:

From HMG side: The Foreign-Secretary
Mr Wall, Private Secretary
Ambassador Renwick
Mr Fairweather
Yourself

From the South African side : Minister R F Botha
Mr Neil van Heerden
Dr J C Roux
Mr V R W Steward
Mr F O Berg, Director, Ministerial Services
Myself

Apart from the South African officials listed above, the following would also be in the group proceeding to Chequers:

Mr P Swanepoel - Director, Media Liaison,
Office of the Minister
Mr C Venter - Director, Information,
Office of the State President
Mr L Crewe-Brown - Chief of Protocol
Mr V Dewing - Chief, Media Liaison,
Department of Foreign
Affairs
Mr A Pretorius - Deputy-Director, Information,
Office of the President
Mr H van der Westhuizen - Foreign Affairs coordinating
officer for the President's
visit
Mr S Basson - Private Secretary to
the State President
Mr M Farr - Personal Assistant to
the Director-General
Mr J Pretorius - Private Secretary to
Minister Botha

Dr J C Coetzee, the State President's physician and
mr P Zweel, security officer, will also be at Chequers.
There will also be a number of other security personnel
accompanying the Presidential group.

The following ladies will participate in the tour of
a stately home which Mrs Hurd is kindly arranging between
11h15 and 12h15:

Mrs de Klerk
Mrs Botha
Mrs van Heerden
Mrs Roux
Mrs Crewe-Brown
Mrs Killen

All the above, with the exception of Mrs Crewe-Brown,
will be at the Chequers luncheon.


I would appreciate it if you could indicate what arrangements
could be made for those officials not directly involved
in the discussions, both during for lunch and for the
duration of the discussions. We are aware of the physical
restraints imposed at Chequers.

As explained to Mr Dowse, the officers in question should
in my view be in the vicinity of Chequers for functional
reasons. Messrs Swanepoel, Venter, Dewing and Pretorius
will for instance be handling the South African media.

Regards,

Justus
Justus de Goede
MINISTER

Director, Radio Division
Office of the Director
Director, Information
Chief of the Bureau
Chief of Protocol
Chief, Radio Division
Department of Foreign
Affairs
Special Director, Information
Office of the Director
Foreign Affairs Commission
Office for the President's
Visit
Private Secretary to
the President
Special Assistant to
the Director-General
Private Secretary to
Assistant Secretary



Mr. [Name]
Mr. [Name]
Mr. [Name]
Mr. [Name]
Mr. [Name]

Mr. [Name], the State President's physician and
Mr. [Name], Secretary of State, will also be at [Location].
There will also be a number of other security personnel
organizing the Presidential group.

The following ladies will participate in the visit of
a group who will be kindly extending between
[Location] and [Location].

- Ms. [Name]
- Ms. [Name]
- Ms. [Name]
- Ms. [Name]
- Ms. [Name]
- Ms. [Name]

All the above, with the exception of Mrs. [Name],
will be at the [Location].

I would appreciate it if you could indicate what arrangements
could be made for these officials not directly involved
in the arrangements, both during the visit and for the
duration of the [Location] at the [Location].
Respectfully,
[Signature]

As explained in my letter, the officers in question should
be at [Location] in the vicinity of [Location] for [Location].
I am sure that the [Location] and [Location]
will be pleased to handle the [Location] [Location].

[Signature]
[Name]
[Title]

MAJOR PROJECTS AND BUSINESS IN THE PIPELINE

SOUTH AFRICAN POST OFFICE - New optical fibre undersea cable from Cape Town to London. Capital cost about £155 million. £50M equity to be provided by the SAPO. Telecomms will provide 50% of the project cost. STC bid for the project of France. Memorandum of Understanding between Northern Co-owners signed. Currently considering project with STC. If they decide to proceed, start of work in October; if against, then start of work in the fourth quarter of 1990. Completion of project in the first quarter of 1991.

COLUMBUS STATE - On our recommendation, the (OPF) support.

MIDDLEBURG - expansion of now being considered. progress in competing.

GENCOR - expenditure total.

SENTRACHE - in partnership.

ACORN AIRCRAFT - Understanding of craft valued at \$50 million. been made possible as questions.

MAGNUM AIRLINE - British Aeros with Border Airlines.

ISCOR - Davy are Pretoria High Court. GEC are quoting at Vanderbijlpark, near.

ESKOM - No major contracts for refurbishment programme for.

PLATINUM

Genmin are developing a new mine at Messina; Genmin and Lonrho are developing Merger Gazelle and Western Plains in the Western Transvaal. Lonrho are developing a new mine at Labosa Plains in the Northern Transvaal. Crocodile is developing a new mine at Gold Fields. Northern Transvaal Gold Fields have been sold to Anglo American Operations. GEC have been awarded a contract for won orders for new orders for the

OTHER

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MAJOR PROJECTS AND BUSINESS IN THE PIPELINE

SOUTH AFRICAN POST OFFICE SAT-2 CABLE New optical fibre undersea cable from Cape Town to the Canaries and Madeira. Capital cost about £155 million. ECGD component £90-£95 million. £50M equity to be provided by the Northern Co-owners. British Telecom will provide 50% of Northern equity; 15% share of total project cost. STC bidding. Only likely competition, Submarcon of France. Memorandum of Understanding between SAPO and Northern Co-owners signed March 1990. SA Government Ministers currently considering proposal to enter into negotiated contract with STC. If they decide in favour, the contract can be awarded by October; if against, then tenders likely will be invited during fourth quarter of 1990, with contract awarded during latter half of 1991.

COLUMBUS STAINLESS STEEL PROJECT Separate minute attached. On our recommendation, Davy have received Overseas Project Fund (OPF) support for their bidding costs for this project.

MIDDLEBURG STAINLESS STEEL PLANT EXPANSION Plans for a major expansion of this Barlow Rand-owned stainless steel mill are now being considered in the context of Gencor and Highveld Steel's progress in reaching agreement with the Taiwanese on the competing Columbus Project.

GENCOR Possible expansion of their refinery at Durban. Capital expenditure R1.2-R1.5 billion.

SENTRACHEM Planning R6 billion naptha cracker at Richards Bay in partnership with AMCI and SASOL.

ACORN AIRCRAFT British Aerospace obtained a signed Memorandum of Understanding from ACORN in January 1990 for two HS 146 aircraft valued at \$60 million, including spares. No further progress has been made pending the resolution of certain local financing questions.

MAGNUM AIRLINES Possibly in the market for small aircraft e.g. British Aerospace's Jetstream 31 or 41, following their merger with Border Air and Citi Air.

ISCOR Davy are bidding for 2 continuous casters for ISCOR's Pretoria High Carbon Steel Plant. GEC are quoting for rectifiers for the new galvanising line at Vanderbijlpark, worth about R5M.

ESKOM No major contracts at present, except ongoing refurbishment programme for old power stations.

SASOL/AECI AMMONIA PLANT This project is still at an early stage. Decisions will be announced in 1991. It would use ICI technology. Davy who have just completed a new ammonia plant on Severnside, would be major bidders. The contract could be worth between £25 and £50M.

JAN SMUTS AIRPORT A major upgrading of facilities is proceeding. The initial construction contract has recently been awarded. There may be some opportunities for British equipment suppliers (e.g. baggage handling equipment, air bridges, elevators etc) which have been advertised through the Export Intelligence Service.

PORT ELIZABETH LIGHT RAILWAY SYSTEM Tenders are expected to be invited this year for the infrastructure and an initial 35 vehicles for this project, valued at about R175M. Several British firms are interested, including GEC and London Transport.

MINING SECTOR : POSSIBLE PROJECTS AND DEVELOPMENTS

- GOLD - Anglovaal are developing their Sun Project. Total estimated capital expenditure R2 billion. GEC have been invited to quote for 4 minewinders worth R75-80M.
 - Anglo American are expected to invite enquiries shortly for their new Moab mine at Vaal Reef. Total estimated capital expenditure, R2.5 billion.
 - Gemmin are developing Winkleshaak No 6 subvertical shaft. GEC have bid for the supply of three minewinders worth some R18M.
 - Goldfields are enquiring about the purchase of seven minewinders, for undisclosed utilization.
 - JCI are seriously considering the development of South Deep.
 - Plans to develop new deep level gold fields in the OFS and Potchefstroom Gap are also under consideration.
-
- DIAMONDS - De Beers are developing a new mine at Venetia in the Northern Transvaal. Total cost estimated at R1,1 billion. The initial development contract has been awarded; and the tender for the construction of the process plant should be awarded (to Bateman's) shortly. GEC will be quoting for the 24 KV distribution systems worth about R2.5M.

PLATINUM

- Genmin are developing a new mine at Messina; Genmin and Lonrho are developing Merger Gazelle and Western Plats in the Western Transvaal; JCI are considering a new mine at Labowa Plats; Rand Mines are shortly bringing Crocodile River into production; and Gold Fields Northam mine will shortly commence operations. GEC have been successful at Northam, having won orders for winders, rectifiers and two mill drives for the new technologically advanced cyclo-convector crushing drives, worth over RBM.

OTHER

- As a consequence of ESKOM's current over-supply position, the only new coal mining development is JCI's (as yet unnamed). Total value R530M.

- Anglo American are rumoured to be considering the development of a major new nickel and copper mine at Uitkomst in the Eastern Transvaal.



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

1 May 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

Further to your letter of 26 April, I now have confirmation that Mrs van Heerden and Mrs Roux will be accompanying their husbands to the lunch at Chequers on 19 May. Perhaps I could mention in passing that Mr van Heerden does not (as yet!) hold a doctorate and should be described as "Mr".

Yours sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER

ce/SG.

See SG 1/5
Kooch/SG
GB



at flap

SOUTH AFRICA

de Klerk
12

South African Embassy

Postmaster General
LONDON WC2A 2AP

1 May 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AA



Prime Minister

Dear Charles

Further to your letter of 28 April, I now have confirmation that Mrs van Heerden and Mrs Roux will be accompanying their husbands to the lunch at Champs on 13 May. Perhaps I could mention in passing that Mr van Heerden does not (as yet) hold a passport and should be contacted as 'Mr'.

Yours faithfully

John Goss
John Goss
MINISTER

2/1/92
12
OK



C: Foreign/Goede

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1990

Thank you for your letter of 24 April about the visit to Chequers. To take your points in order:

- (i) I am afraid that we cannot accommodate all the names which you suggest at the lunch. We have already included the State President and Mrs. de Klerk, the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Botha, the Ambassador and Mrs. Killen, Dr. Roux and Dr. van Heerden. The maximum which we could even consider is two more individuals. This could either be Mrs. Roux and Mrs. van Heerden: or Mr. Crewe-Browne and Mr. Steward.
- (ii) I enclose a copy of the guest list as it stands.
- (iii) you should discuss with the FCO. But we can only have those attending the lunch: there are no facilities at Chequers to look after anyone else.
- (iv) please ask the FCO about the Foreign Secretary. I know of no plans for wives to exchange gifts.

(CHARLES POWELL)

Mr. Justus de Goede

ca



South African Embassy

Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

24 April 1990

Mr Charles Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

Further to our telephone conversations on the subject of the Chequers visit of the State President on 19 May, I should like your views on the following points:

- (i) The core party from the South African side will be the State President, Mrs de Klerk, Minister RF Botha and Mrs Botha, plus of course Ambassador and Mrs Killen. The two senior civil servants are the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Mr NP Heerden and Dr JP Roux, Secretary-General in the Office of the State President. Both will be accompanied by their wives. The Chief of Protocol, Mr L Crewe-Browne and his wife will also be included in the visit. I should like to request that the van Heerdens, Rouxs and Crewe-Brownes be included in the luncheon, if this is possible. May I also request that Mr VRW Steward, who is Chief Director for Europe in the Department be included, should space allow? The other ladies would like to be included in any programme arranged for Mrs de Klerk for the period before the luncheon.
- (ii) You indicated earlier that we might make some input as far as guests for the luncheon are concerned. I enclose a list, which will certainly contain names already appearing on your own guest list. Ambassador Killen indicated that you might be kind enough to provide us with a final guest list.

- (iii) It is my understanding that Minister Botha will be holding parallel talks with the Foreign Secretary while the President is holding discussions with Mrs Thatcher. Should this be the case, I assume that Mr van Heerden and other senior members of the Department of Foreign Affairs will be able to attend the former discussions.
- (iv) We have already established that the Prime Minister will be presenting a gift to President de Klerk. Could I enquire whether the Foreign Secretary will be doing the same and whether it is the intention for any of the wives to exchange gifts?

Sincerely,

Justus
Justus de Goede
MINISTER

CHEQUERS: LUNCHEON, 19 MAY 1990

John Carlisle, MP : Chairman, UK/South African Parliamentary Group

Sir James Spicer, MP

Lord Marsh : Chairman, British Industry Committee on South Africa

Sir Keith Stuart : Chairman, United Kingdom - South Africa Trade Association

Bernard Weatherill : Speaker, House of Commons


Lord Chalfont : Deputy Chairman of the IBA; Chairman, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering

The Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley, MP : Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Robin Leigh-Pemberton : Governor, Bank of England

Sir Trevor Holdsworth : President, Confederation of British Industry

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
COUNTY OF [unclear]
I, [unclear], County Clerk,
do hereby certify that
[unclear] is a true and
correct copy of the
[unclear] filed for
record in my office
this [unclear] day of [unclear],
[unclear] 19[unclear].
[unclear]



LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE BUFFET LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF THE STATE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND MRS. DE KLERK ON
SATURDAY, 19 MAY 1990 AT CHEQUERS AT 12.30 PM FOR 1.00 PM

The Prime Minister
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

South African Suite

The Hon. F.W. de Klerk
and Mrs. de Klerk

State President

Mr. R.F. Botha
and Mrs. Botha

Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa
and Mrs. Killen

Dr. Johannes Roux

Secretary General, State
President's Office

Dr. Neil van Heerden

Director General, South African
Department of Foreign Affairs

HM Government

Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP
and Lady Howe

Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP
and Mrs. Hurd

Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, MP
and Mrs. Parkinson

Conservative MPs

Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, MP

Industry

Sir Alistair Frame
and Lady Frame

Chairman, RTZ plc

Mr. Robert Horton
and Mrs. Horton

Chairman, British Petroleum

Sir Denys Henderson
and Lady Henderson

Chairman, ICI

Sir Michael Angus
and Lady Angus

Chairman, Unilever

Sir Ralph Robins
and Lady Robins

Managing Director, Rolls Royce plc

The Lord Weinstock
and The Lady Weinstock

Managing Director, GEC

Mr. Arthur Walsh
and Mrs. Walsh

Chief Executive, STC

Industry (continued)

Sir Michael Colman and Lady Colman	Chairman, Reckitt & Colman
Mr. Roger Kingdon and Mrs. Kingdon	Chairman, Davy Corporation
Sir Peter Baxendell and Lady Baxendell	Chairman, Hawker Siddeley plc.

Media

Mr. Rupert Murdoch and Mrs. Murdoch	
Mr. Bruce Anderson	Sunday Telegraph
Sir David English and Lady English	Editor, Daily Mail
Mr. John Birt Officials	BBC
Sir Robin Renwick	HM Ambassador, Cape Town
10 Downing Street	
Mr. Charles Powell and Mrs. Powell	

copy
SA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1990

Dear Charles,

Send
at. Tyre to PM's
appt. ~~to~~

Visit of President de Klerk

Thank you for your letter of 3 April. I enclose a guest list for the Chequers lunch on 19 May.

Patrick Fairweather will be with the Foreign Secretary for his talks with Pik Botha and Mr Hurd very much hopes that he can be included in the lunch.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



LUNCH IN HONOUR OF STATE PRESIDENT F W DE KLERK, DMS, CHEQUERS, 19 MAY 1990

Lord Henderson Long Wave

Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher		
Hon F W de Klerk DMS and Mrs de Klerk	State President, Republic of South Africa	
Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE and Mrs Hurd	Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs	
Mr R F Botha DMS, MP and Mrs Botha	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa	
<i>Mr & Mrs Nick Ridley.</i> Hon William Waldegrave and Mrs Waldegrave	Minister of State, FCO	
Sir Robin Renwick KCMG	HM Ambassador, Cape Town	
HE Mr P R Killen and Mrs Killen	South African Ambassador	
Mr C D Powell and Mrs Powell	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister	
Dr Johannes Roux	Secretary General, State President's Office	
Dr Neil van Heerden <i>4th Hon John Major MP</i>	Director General, South African Department of Foreign Affairs	
Sir Alistair Frame and Lady Frame	Chairman, RTZ plc	(Prime Minister's request)
Sir Peter Holmes MC and Lady Holmes	Chairman, Shell Group	(" " ")
Mr Robert Horton and Mrs Horton	Chairman, BP	(" " ")
Sir Denys Henderson and Lady Henderson	Chairman, ICI	(" " ")
Sir Michael Angus and Lady Angus	Chairman, Unilever	(" " ")
Sir Ralph Robins and Lady Robins	Chairman, Rolls Royce	(" " ")
Mr Simon Jenkins and Mrs Jenkins	Editor, The Times	(" " ")

Dr. Bruce Anderson - Lady Pellon.

Lord Weinstock of Bowden and Lady Weinstock	Managing Director, GEC	(" " ")
Mr Arthur Walsh CBE and Mrs Walsh	Chief Executive, STC	(" " ")
Sir Michael Colman and Lady Colman	Chairman, Reckitt & Colman	(" " ")
Mr Roger Kingdom and Mrs Kingdom	Chairman, Davy Corporation	(" " ")
Mr Raymond Horrocks CBE and Mrs Horrocks	Chairman, Chloride Group	(Large investor in S Africa)

~~Mr Max Hastings and Mrs Hastings~~ Editor, The Daily Telegraph (Newspaper sympathetic to HMG's policy and supportive of Mr. de Klerk)

Sir David Leahy English.

(Mr Patrick Fairweather CMG and Mrs Fairweather)

A U S S

F C O

↙
Reviews.

Reserves

Mr Johathan Agnew and Mrs Agnew	Group Chief Executive, Kleinwort Benson	(Substantial business involvement with South Africa)
Sir Adrian Cadbury and Lady Cadbury	Chairman, Cadbury plc	(Large investor in S Africa)
Sir Peter Baxendell and Lady Baxendell	Chairman, Hawkes Siddley Group plc	(Large investments in and business with South Africa)
Lord Barber PC TD DL and Lady Barber		(Member of the 1986 Common- wealth Eminent Persons Group)
Lord Alexander of Weedon QC and Lady Alexander	Chairman, National Westminster Bank	(Leading UK bank in last re-scheduling of S Africa's debt, October 1989)
Sir John Quinton and Lady Quinton	Chairman, Barclay's Bank	(Former large investor in South Africa, still a leading correspondence bank)
Mr and Mrs Andreas Whittam Smith	Editor	The Independent

Reservist

Mr. Jonathan Agnew and Mrs. Agnew

Group Chief Executive
Kleinwort's Bank

Sir Adrian Cadbury and Lady Cadbury

Chairman, Cadbury

Peter Benschultz and Lady Benschultz

Chairman, Hawkes

Group Ltd

Lord Barber PC KC DL and Lady Barber

Alexander of Weston QC and Lady
Alexander

Chairman, National
Westminster Bank

Lord John Gifford and Lady Gifford

Chairman, Barclays
Bank

SOUTH AFRICA
Visits of Pen
Pt 2.

ERRATA

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 April 1990

file SLH

a Sir PC
Mrs Goodchild.

Dear Sir,

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK

I have had some discussion with the Prime Minister about the programme for President De Klerk's visit.

The Prime Minister has confirmed that she would like to hold talks with President De Klerk from 1100 to 1230 on Saturday 19 May at Chequers. She would prefer these to have restricted participation, that is just President De Klerk and a notetaker. Other members of the South African delegation might then come for the lunch.

The Prime Minister would propose to make this larger than usual at Chequers, by putting in a number of round tables. This would mean the lunch itself would have to be a buffet. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft guest list. But you should be aware that the Prime Minister has already indicated that she would wish to invite the following:

- Derek Birkin - Chief Executive of RTZ
(or Sir Alistair Frame)
- Lord Weinstock - GEC
- Sir Peter Holmes - Shell
- Robert Horton - BP
- Michael Angus - Unilever
- Arthur Walsh - STC
- Sir Ralph Robins - Rolls Royce
- Sir Michael Colman - Reckitt & Colman
- Sir Denys Henderson - ICI
- Mr. Roger Kingdom - Davy Corporation
- Simon Jenkins - The Times

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK

President De Klerk is coming in May. You have invited him to Chequers. We are now beginning to get more detail about his arrangements. It would be helpful to settle the outline of his programme.

De Klerk will arrive in London on the morning of Friday 18 May and will stay through most of Saturday 19 May. You have invited him down to Chequers for talks and lunch on the Saturday. He is accompanied by his wife, by Pik Botha and his wife, and by two senior officials.

The questions are:

- whether to concentrate all the programme on a single day at Chequers: or to spread it over two days;
- what sort of entertainment to arrange.

Programme

The simple version would be to have talks at Chequers at 1100 on Saturday, followed by lunch at 1230 for 1300. There is much to commend this, not least in terms of saving you time.

The alternative would be to have the main talks at No.10 on the Friday morning (you are in Finchley from lunch-time): and a brief further session at Chequers just before lunch on Saturday. But I don't really see much to be gained by this: the cachet for De Klerk is Chequers.

Entertainment

You suggested that you would like to get in some major business figures and potential investors in South Africa for the lunch, and Robin Renwick strongly favours this. Among the guests he has

recommended are:

- ✓ Derek Birkin - Chief Executive of RTZ
(or Sir Alistair Frame)
- ✓ Lord Weinstock - GEC
- ✓ Sir Peter Holmes - Shell
- ✓ Robert Horton - BP
- ✓ Michael Angus - Unilever
- ✓ Arthur Walsh - STC
- ✓ Sir Ralph Robins - Rolls-Royce
- ✓ Sir Michael Colman - Reckitt & Colman
- ✓ Sir Denys Henderson - ICI
- ✓ Mr. Roger Kingdom - Davy Corporation
- ✓ Simon Jenkins - The Times (he knows South Africa well)

If we are to score a reasonable number of these, we would need to get invitations out soon. Equally, if you add in a number of our Ministers, the South African delegation, Sir Robin Renwick etc., you considerably exceed the capacity of the Chequers dining room. Would you be prepared to do lunch at round tables in the dining room or in the Great Hall? That would enable you to invite 30 or 40?

Yes - it will have to be a buffet lunch.

In summary:

- agree restricted participation talks at Chequers from 1100 - 1230 on the Saturday? *Yes*
- agree lunch for 30/40 at round tables? *Yes*
- agree to invite the businessmen suggested in this note?

e.d.p.
(CHARLES POWELL)

Yes

2 April 1990

c:\wpdocs\foreign\declerk.dca

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

D E D N P

FM CAPE TOWN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 238

OF 271600Z MARCH 90

DE KLERK' VISIT TO BRITAIN

1. VAN HEERDEN HAS TOLD ME THAT MRS DE KLERK WILL ACCOMPANY THE PRESIDENT TO EUROPE IN MAY. DE KLERK ALSO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY P. H. BOTHA AND HIS WIFE, DR ROUX (SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY) AND VAN HEERDEN (DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS).
2. VAN HEERDEN SAID THAT ON PRESENT PLANS DE KLERK WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY 18 MAY IN TIME TO SPEND A WORKING DAY THERE BEFORE THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS ON THE 19TH. HE HOPED TO MEET SOME LEADING INDUSTRIALISTS AND EDITORS AND PROBABLY ALSO WOULD DO SOME TELEVISION INTERVIEWS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT PUBLICISING HIS PROGRAMME AS THEY DID NOT WANT TO ATTRACT HARRASSMENT FROM THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT. DE KLERK WOULD OFFER ALSO TO MEET THE OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS, PROVIDED THERE WAS NO OBJECTION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THERE WOULD NOT BE.
3. VAN HEERDEN ASKED IF WE COULD LET HIM KNOW THE TIMING OF THE MEETING AT CHEQUERS AND WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WANT TO HAVE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, PERHAPS WITH A NOTE-TAKER ON EACH SIDE, BEFORE ANY WIDER MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WISH TO OFFER MR AND MRS DE KLERK LUNCH. VAN HEERDEN ASKED IF WE COULD LET HIM KNOW WHO WOULD BE INVITED, IF IT WERE INTENDED TO INVITE GUESTS BEYOND THE OFFICIAL PARTY.
4. HE REALISE THAT SPACE WILL BE VERY LIMITED AT CHEQUERS. SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE GUESTS AT THE LUNCH WOULD INCLUDE SIMON JENKINS, EDITOR OF THE TIMES, WHO KNOWS SOUTH AFRICA WELL: MR DEREK BIRKIN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF RTZ (OR SIR ALASTAIR FRAME): LORD WEINSTOCK: SIR PETER HOLMES: MR ROBERT HORTON (BP) OR SIR MICHAEL ANGUS. MR ARTHUR WALSH, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF STC, HIS LEADING THE BIDDING FOR THE £150 MILLION CONTRACT WHICH WE HOPE TO WIN FOR THE SUBMARINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

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CABLE, SO IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD BE INCLUDED. IN CASE RESERVES ARE NEEDED, OTHER HEADS OF COMPANIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS HERE INCLUDE SIR RALPH ROBINS (ROLLS ROYCE): SIR MICHAEL COLMAN (RECKITT AND COLMAN): SIR DENYS HENDERSON (HCL) AND MR ROGER KINGDOM (DAVY CORPORATION).

5. ALTHOUGH DE KLERK'S PRESENT INTENTION IS TO SPEND 18 AS WELL AS 19 MAY IN BRITAIN HE HAD RECEIVED INVITATIONS TO VISIT PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS, LISBON, ROME AND POSSIBLE ALSO MADRID, SO HIS PLANS FOR 18 MAY COULD CHANGE.

RENWICK

YYYY

NNNN

LIMITED

HD/SAFD

HD/PUSD

HD/PROTOCOL

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR P. J. WESTON

MR TOMKYS

MR FAIRWEATHER

COPY TO:

PS/10 DOWNING ST.

MRS. PONSONBY

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DE KLERK

De Klerk has now asked to revert to earlier plans and come to Chequers on 19 May. Is this still possible?

If so, I presume it would in theory free the weekend 7/8 April for a meeting with President Bush if we needed a fallback.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

28 FEBRUARY 1990