

CAB 1 Part 20

SECRET TOP SECRET MT
Confidential Filing

Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE

EAST

Part 1 : May 77

Part 20 : December 1989

CAB ONE

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
6-12-89							
9-1-90							
25-1-90							
30-1-90							
7-2-90							
21-2-90							
27-2-90							
7-3-90							
15-3-90							
23-3-90							
27-3-90							
3-4-90							
17-4-90							
9-5-90							
27-5-90							
3-5-90							
26-6-90							
12-6-90							
28-6-90							
3-7-90							
4-7-90							
1-8-90							
PART ENDS							

S
300S

PREM 19/3073



CDF

*You may want to show this
to the Prime Minister if time permits.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

1 August 1990

*Dear Charles,**attached*Lebanon: International Fund

Many thanks for your letter of 24 July about Prince Bandar's call on the Prime Minister and your subsequent letter of 26 July recording the discussion between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

Prince Bandar handed over a message from King Fahd asking the Prime Minister to consider a bilateral contribution to the international fund which the Saudis propose to inaugurate in Geneva on 10/11 September to help Lebanon's recovery. The Prime Minister told Prince Bandar that she would consider the King's request seriously.

The minimum contribution to secure a seat on the governing board is US\$25 million, in cash or kind. Contributions can be phased. The French have already decided to contribute; the Americans, Italians and Luxembourg have said they will attend the September meeting. But it is not yet clear whether this means they intend to pay a national contribution. Foreign Ministers of the Twelve have mandated the EC Commission to attend.

We have agreed to support a collective EC contribution, now under study by experts before the next FAC on 17 September. But, because of severe constraints on public expenditure in this and the next financial year, it would be impossible to find US\$25 million from existing aid or other resources to make a national contribution. This would not exclude our being represented at the September meeting (preferably at official level), provided this is not construed by the Saudis as promising a bilateral contribution.

So far, the Saudis have been given no encouragement to believe that a UK contribution would be a possibility. When the Saudi Foreign Minister raised the subject with the Foreign Secretary on 3 June in Jedda, Mr Hurd made clear that our response would be in the context of an EC contribution. Mr Waldegrave gave the same answer to the Arab League Special Envoy, Lakhdar Ibrahimi, on 4 July in London. The Ambassador in Riyadh has this week commented that he does not think that the Saudis would take it to heart if we confined our financial support to an EC contribution provided we demonstrate our political support for their efforts.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

The Lebanese expatriate community could produce US \$2 billion in no time at all - provided Lebanon looked like regaining some sort of stability. And if non-Lebanese are going to be canvassed, the first port of call must be the oil-producing Arabs who are about to get even richer thanks to President Saddam Hussein.

Given the tight constraints on our aid resources and the lack of any major British connection with the Lebanon, our record of assistance to Lebanon is defensible. Apart from previous EC contributions to Lebanon through financial protocols, we give £1 million in bilateral humanitarian aid each year through the ICRC and EC. In March this year we provided 43 tonnes of emergency medical aid to alleviate the effects of the intra-Christian fighting in East Beirut. We have also offered an UKMTAS package - admittedly very small - to the Lebanese armed forces for training in the UK.

For the reasons given, we recommend that, in her reply, the Prime Minister should:

- reaffirm our support for President Hrawi's government and Taif;
- emphasise our strong support for a collective EC contribution;
- promise to consider further UK support once a peace settlement is achieved without spelling out precisely what we could do.

/ I enclose a draft message to the King.

Yours,

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELNO

REPEATED INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME

LEBANON: INTERNATIONAL FUND

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to King Fahd.

BEGINS

Your Majesty,

I wish to thank you most warmly for your message which His Excellency Prince Bandar delivered to me on 24 July about the proposed international fund for Lebanon, endorsed by the Arab Summit at Baghdad earlier this year. I have considered it most carefully.

Britain wants to see Lebanon recover from its tragic and costly civil war with all speed. We are deeply grateful to you for your patient and skilful efforts to provide through the Taif accord a solid and constructive basis on which to re-build Lebanon's independence and self-esteem. As you know we have given our full backing to these efforts since they began. Our Embassy in Beirut, which we have maintained

POXABF/AMF

NENAD

E C GLOVER

Telephone no

Processed by

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

there throughout Lebanon's long crisis, has played its part in helping them forward.

The international fund is an imaginative step. We are giving our complete support to collective contribution by the European Community; and the European Commission has been asked to represent the ~~Twelve~~ at the first meeting of the fund in Geneva. I believe that a European contribution will be the best signal of Europe's increasing coherence and the growing role which it is likely to play in the Middle East in the years to come. However as a demonstration of our political support for Lebanon and the Taif accord we shall send a senior representative to the fund's first meeting. In the meantime we shall continue to give every encouragement to the present efforts of Mr Ibrahimi in Beirut to reach agreement on a new national unity government.

I assure Your Majesty that once there is a peaceful settlement in Lebanon - and it is my earnest hope that it will come soon - my country will do everything in its power to ensure that Lebanon has the support and resources it requires to sustain the peace that has long eluded it.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

2. Signed original follows by bag.

HURD

YYYY

LEBANON
LIMITED

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 August 1990


LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR THE PLF


Thank you for your letter about the American briefing on Libyan support for the PLF. The Prime Minister agrees that we should press the Twelve to make a statement. If they decline, she thinks that we should issue one of our own.

Charles Powell

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3073 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: POWELL TO WALL 1-8-1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	RHONEY 18-11-2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3073</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <u>WALL TO POWELL</u> <u>31.7.1990</u>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>RT/orey</u> <u>18.11.2016</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

CONFIDENTIAL

(74)
013613
MDLIAN 9527

RECEIVED

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 900

OF 302350Z JULY 90

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, PEKING

INFO PRIORITY ACTOR

YOUR TELNO 400 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT: DISCUSSION AMONG THE FIVE

SUMMARY

1. LOW KEY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AMONG THE FIVE. RECOGNITION THAT THE IRAQ/KUWAIT BORDER REMAINS AN OUTSTANDING PROBLEM.

DETAIL

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN TUR I RAISED IRAQ/KUWAIT AT MY LUNCH FOR AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS ON 30 JULY. I SAID THE HEAT APPEARED TO HAVE GONE OUT OF THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS WITH THE FIXING OF A NEW AND HIGHER OPEC OIL PRICE. BUT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THE QUESTION OF THE BORDER COULD CAUSE FURTHER PROBLEMS: IT WAS RIGHT THAT THE FIVE SHOULD TAKE NOTICE AND EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS.

3. PICKERING (UNITED STATES) DESCRIBED AMERICAN CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS AND KUWAITIS. HE AGREED THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT OUTSTANDING PROBLEM WAS IRAQI PRESSURE ON KUWAIT OVER THE UNDEFINED BOUNDARY AND THE TWO OFF-SHORE ISLANDS OF BUBIYAN AND WARBA.

4. LOZINSKIY (SOVIET UNION) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE TWO SIDES THAT THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW MATTERS TO ESCALATE OUT OF CONTROL. THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE EFFORTS OF ARAB MEDIATORS AND TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. LI (CHINA) SAID HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. BLANC (FRANCE) NOTED THE DESIRE OF THE ARABS TO KEEP THE DISPUTE WITHIN AN ARAB FRAMEWORK.

5. SUMMING UP I SAID THAT IF MATTERS DEGENERATED INTO AN ARMED CONFRONTATION, THE FIVE WOULD NEED TO MEET VERY QUICKLY TO CONSIDER A RESPONSE. THE KUWAIT/IRAQ DISPUTE HAD IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ: THE SINGLE MOST WORRYING FEATURE FOR THE ARABS WAS THE EXTENSION OF IRAQI POWER DOWN THE GULF. PICKERING ADDED THAT WHEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN TO THE U S AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD, HE HAD APPEARED MORE RELAXED THAN FOR YEARS

ABOUT THE SHATT AL ARAB AND THE STATUS OF THE ALGIERS PROTOCOL. I COMMENTED THAT EVEN IF THE SHATT AL ARAB WERE REOPENED TO IRAQI SHIPPING, IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE OFF-SHORE ISLANDS BECAUSE THEY PROTECTED THE APPROACH TO THE ALTERNATIVE OIL FACILITIES IT HAD NOW CONSTRUCTED AROUND UMM QASR.

TICKELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

257

MAIN 219

IRAN/IRAQ
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 38

IRAN/IRAQ

NNNN

Prime Minister

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Harkson m

IRAQ

I think some of the
action proposed in the
27 July 1990
but para. is in hand -
though not yet to the
extent of formulating a

As I have minuted separately, it seems there are now some 100,000 Iraqi troops on the Kuwait border with possibly another two divisions on the way. Logistic arrangements suggest they could keep this force in the field for a month.

Statement. CSD
20/7

We still think the immediate aim is money (oil prices, writing off of old loans, provision for new payments) but success in this venture, already virtually certain, will only feed the appetite for more. The blackmail is likely to go on. The Iraqis have territorial ambitions; there are disputed areas; and at least limited military action is possible before too long.

The Kuwaitis will not stand up to this pressure. Nor are the Saudis likely to warn Iraq off: it is not their style.

The emergence of a successful bully and predator in this highly sensitive area of the world is not in our or the Western interest. The question is whether we should collectively try to do anything about it. Militarily, only the Americans can. The US Administration are confused and uncertain; they have moved ships but their comments are distinctly more cautious. They have spoken of a territorial dispute between Arab neighbours; but it is more than that.

We do not want to get out on a limb ourselves. We have no formal treaty obligations to Kuwait and we have an interest in continuing the repair work on our bilateral relations with Iraq. We want Richter out and better trade. Even if we do no more than take the lead in EC discussions there will a risk that the Iraqis will soon learn, via our partners, who is leading the pack. Any Western intervention might only help Saddam Hussein by enlisting instinctive Arab support on his behalf. On the other hand, I do not think the West in its own longer term interest should remain silent, and I doubt whether the UK's

8

SECRET

present low profile of simply responding to journalists' questions is enough. I suggest we should be talking urgently with our EC partners and with the Americans, with the possible object of statements expressing collective concern at military threats and our interest in Kuwait's security and integrity. With the Americans our additional object would be to establish what Iraqi actions they would regard as impermissible. We should also try to bring in the Russians. The matter should also be raised, even if only informally, in the Five at the United Nations. I believe this last is in hand.



PERCY CRADOCK

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 400
OF 261703Z JULY 90

12h 0212
RE IV - REGISTRY
PA R
[Signature]

⑤
YOUR TELNO 885: IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. WE SHOULD LIKE YOU TO RAISE IRAQ/KUWAIT AT YOUR LUNCH ON 30 JULY. WE HAVE TWO MOTIVES.

2. THE 'PUBLIC' REASON FOR PUTTING IT ON YOUR AGENDA WOULD BE TO ENGAGE THE FIVE ON A POTENTIAL THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH HAS MERCIFULLY BEEN DEFUSED BUT HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED. WE JUDGE THE UNSG WOULD NOT WANT THE ISSUE RAISED FORMALLY AT THIS STAGE IN THE COUNCIL, GIVEN IRAQ'S HOSTILITY TO 'INTERNATIONALISING' THE DISPUTE, AND HIS GREATER CONCERN TO PRESERVE HIS INFLUENCE OVER THE IRAN/IRAQ NEGOTIATIONS. BUT, AS THE SERIOUS PRESS IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN POINTING OUT, IT IS SCARCELY CREDIBLE FOR THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS SIMPLY TO IGNORE IT. THE OBJECTIVE OF YOUR DISCUSSION WOULD BE TO COMPARE NOTES AND ASSESSMENTS. WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC INITIATIVE BY THE FIVE IN MIND. BUT TWO ASPECTS TO INCLUDE IN YOUR DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING ARAB GOVERNMENTS THE CHANCE TO SORT OUT DISPUTES OF THIS KIND THEMSELVES: AND THE NEED TO DO SO WITHOUT OCCUPYING TERRITORY.

3. THE PRIVATE REASON IS THE OBVIOUS VALUE IN EXTENDING COOPERATION AMONG THE FIVE ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. THE EAST. ALTHOUGH IT MAY APPEAR TO HAVE ITS OWN DYNAMIC SEPARATE FROM ARAB/ISRAEL IT IS IN FACT THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON FRONT THAT HAS GIVEN SADDAM HUSSEIN THE CHANCE TO INFLATE HIS POSITION. AS THE COLD WAR RECEDES IT IS VITAL THAT THE FIVE USE THEIR REMAINING INFLUENCE TO RESOLVE THE REGIONAL DISPUTES WHICH THE EAST/WEST THAW HAS THROWN INTO STARKER RELIEF.

4. THE EXERCISE MAY HAVE THE ADDITIONAL VALUE OF FOCUSING US ATTENTION ON OUR CONCERN (SHARED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE FRENCH TO AVOID WORDS OR ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE MISREAD IN THE REGION. US HANDLING OF THE DISPUTE HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN AT ITS MOST SKILLFUL. THE EARLY PUBLIC STATEMENT REAFFIRMING THE US COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF GULF OIL SUPPLIES AND THE PROTECTION OF GULF STATES, TOGETHER WITH THE UNFORTUNATELY TIMED AIR EXERCISE WITH THE UAE, CARRIED RISKS OF RAISING RATHER THAN LOWERING THE TEMPERATURE. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN USING THE FIVE NOT ONLY TO MAXIMISE BRITISH (AND FRENCH) INFLUENCE BUT TO BRING HOME TO THE AMERICANS THAT UNILATERAL ACTION MAY NOT BE THE MOST

CONSTRUCTIVE IN AN INCREASINGLY MULTIPOLAR WORLD.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

257

MAIN

219

IRAN/IRAQ
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL

38

IRAN/IRAQ

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 885
OF 260100Z JULY 90

TOP COPY
Q DIST ?

YOUR TELNO 174 TO ABU DHABI (PARA 6): IRAQ/KUWAIT

SUMMARY

1. I COULD RAISE IRAQ/KUWAIT IN THE FIVE, PERHAPS AT THE LUNCH I AM GIVING FOR THE FIVE AMBASSADORS ON 30 JULY. BUT AS CHAIRMAN I WOULD NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN DOING SO.

DETAIL

2. I AM READY TO RAISE IRAQ/KUWAIT AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I SHALL BE GIVING A LUNCH TO SAY GOODBYE TO AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE ON 30 JULY: THIS MIGHT BE A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY IF YOU FEEL THE MATTER CAN WAIT UNTIL THEN. FOR ME TO CALL AN EARLIER MEETING WOULD REQUIRE SOME COMPELLING REASON.

3. WHATEVER THE OCCASION, I WOULD AS CHAIRMAN NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE. IT COULD BE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, OR FOR CONSIDERATION OF SOME INITIATIVE. IN EITHER CASE IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IF THE OTHERS HAD PRIOR NOTICE OF OUR INTENTION. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND IRAQI EFFORTS TO AVOID BRINGING THE PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT SOONER OR LATER THEY WOULD HEAR ABOUT OUR DISCUSSION (AS THE INDIANS AND PAKISTANIS DID OVER KASHMIR).

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE.

TICKELL

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

257

MAIN 219

IRAN/IRAQ
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 38

IRAN/IRAQ

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

18h 021/2	
RECEIVED - REGISTRY	
DESK	1
IN	1
[Signature]	

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELNO 174

OF 251631Z JULY 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, EC POSTS, OTHER ME POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PEKING

PA 25 26
7

VAG/25-26

Kumar/12/2

FCO TELNO 360 TO RIYADH (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/KUWAIT

1. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ ON THE ONE HAND AND KUWAIT AND THE UAE ON THE OTHER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY RAISED THE TEMPERATURE IN THE GULF. WE HAVE BEEN KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE KUWAITIS AND THE SAUDIS.

2. IN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS WITH ARAB GOVERNMENTS WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO DRAW A LINE BETWEEN SHOWING A RESPONSIBLE CONCERN OVER A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS DISPUTE, AND RISKING, BY TAKING TOO CONSPICUOUSLY ACTIVE A ROLE, THE POSSIBILITY OF RAISING EXPECTATIONS WE CANNOT MEET OF ACTIVE UK INVOLVEMENT IN FINDING A SOLUTION. MR WESTON'S DISCUSSIONS IN KUWAIT AND SIR A MUNRO'S IN RIYADH HAVE BEEN WELL JUDGED.

3. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT IN THE WAKE OF ACTIVE ARAB DIPLOMACY, IN PARTICULAR BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK, THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF IRAQI MILITARY INCURSION SEEMS TO BE SUBSIDING. BUT THE IRAQIS CONSIDER THEY HAVE SUBSTANTIAL GRIEVANCES AND THEIR BULLYING TACTICS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE DISPUTE WILL ONLY BE RESOLVED BY ARAB LEADERS PERSUADING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO DRAW BACK AND SETTLE FOR A SATISFACTORY OPEC AGREEMENT IMPOSING CLEAR COMMITMENTS ON KUWAIT AND THE UAE, POSSIBLY WITH SOME ADDITIONAL FORMULA INVOLVING FURTHER NEGOTIATION TO GIVE THEM SATISFACTION FROM THE KUWAITIS OVER WAR DEBTS AND THE FRONTIER.

4. FOR ABU DHABI AND DUBAI. WE SHOULD LIKE MR KAY TO TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH RASHID ABDULLAH OR, IF HE IS STILL IN MOROCCO, WITH THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE INTERLOCUTOR AVAILABLE. HE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF OVER-ACTIVITY DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. HE MIGHT ASK FOR A FAREWELL MEETING ON THE BASIS OF HIS IMMINENT DEPARTURE, AND IN RAISING THE DISPUTE WITH IRAQ TO REFER BACK TO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH MR WALDEGRAVE AT THE UK/UAE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 10 JULY. HE COULD STRESS THAT OUR CONCERN THROUGHOUT HAS TO BEEN CALM THE SITUATION DOWN AND NOT TO MAKE STATEMENTS, EG ABOUT THE STATE ARMILLA PATROL, WHICH COULD ONLY SERVE TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF IRAQI RHETORIC. WE WOULD WELCOME AN INDICATION OF

SF

UAE THINKING ON THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME.

5. FOR OTHER GULF POSTS AND BAGHDAD. WITHOUT SEEKING CALLS TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM ONLY, YOU SHOULD TAKE A SUITABLY EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS.

6. FOR UKMIS NEW YORK. THERE MAY BE SCOPE FOR THE FIVE TO DISCUSS IRAQ/KUWAIT. AS POINTED OUT IN AN EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S TIMES THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL AND PROPER EXTENSION OF PRESENT COOPERATION. YOUR PRESENT ROLE AS COORDINATOR GIVES YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE THIS PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF RISING TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE. IT WOULD NEED TO BE DONE CAREFULLY, BEARING IN MIND VITUPERATIVE IRAQI COMPLAINTS LAST WEEK THAT BY INVOLVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL KUWAIT HAD TRIED TO INTERNATIONALISE THE DISPUTE. GORE-BOOTH MENTIONED THIS IDEA TODAY TO HIS FRENCH COLLEAGUE, WHO WELCOMED IT. (LECLERCQ ADDED THAT THE FRENCH THEMSELVES HAD TAKEN NO ACTION ON IRAQ/KUWAIT, AND HAD DECIDED AGAINST SAYING ANYTHING IN PUBLIC).
HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

257

MAIN 219

IRAN/IRAQ
LIMITED

MED

ADDITIONAL 38

IRAN/IRAQ

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD

TO DESKBY 222345Z MODUK

TELNO U/N

OF 222200Z JULY 90

AND TO DESKBY 222345Z FCO, ACTOR

AND TO DESKBY 23030Z KUWAIT

ADVANCE COPY

SIC U2H

DESKBY 222345Z

FOR DI(ROW) A2E FROM DA, AND TO FCO

IRAQI MILITARY ACTIVITY 22 JULY.

MY AAA/U2H 221100Z JUL 90 REFERS

GENERAL

1. DEFENCE SECTION NCOS TRAVELLING KUWAIT- BAGHDAD PASS
VIRTUAL CONTINUAL MILITARY CONVOYS TRAVELLING SOUTH AND EXTENSIVE
CAMPS BEING ESTABLISHED WEST OF AZZUBAYR (3023N 4742E). MUCH OF
IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD IN PROCESS OF DEPLOYING TO KUWAITI BORDER.
IRAQI INTENTIONS NOT YET CLEAR.

DETAIL

2. DEFENCE SECTION NCOS TRAVELLED KUWAIT - BAGHDAD TAKING
ROUTE SAFWAN - NASIRIYAH (VIA OLD ROAD NOT EXPRESSWAY) - KUT
BETWEEN 1415 - 2015 LOCAL. FROM AREA OF JUNCTION EXPRESSWAY/
OLD NASIRIYAH ROAD (3020N 4731E) THERE WAS VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUS
MILITARY TRAFFIC TRAVELLING SOUTH, BECOMING MORE INTENSE AS NCOS
NEARED BAGHDAD. VEHICLES THAT HAD ALREADY ARRIVED AT THEIR
DESTINATIONS WERE MOVING INTO CAMPSITES BETWEEN
EXPRESSWAY/NASIRIYAH ROAD AND AREA 3031N 4712E. ESTABLISHED CAMPS
IN AREA APPEARED FULL AND AT LEAST 5X NEW CAMPS WERE BEING SET UP
BY RECEPTION PARTIES. FURTHER SOUTH IN AREA 3013N 4737E 2XTANK
TRANSPORTERS WERE SEEN BY EXPRESSWAY,
ONE OF THEM HAVING OFFLOADED A BMP1 THAT WAS TRAVELLING WEST
CROSS COUNTRY: PRESUMABLY A STRAGGLER JOINING ARMoured FORMATION
CAMP.

3. THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY SEEN IN PERMANENT CAMPS PASSED EN ROUTE: SOME INCLUDING CAMP IN KUT, APPEARED EMPTY. ONLY EXCEPTION WAS REPUBLICAN GUARD CAMP LOCATED AT 3306N 4443E, OUTSIDE WHICH 21XBMP1, 3XT-72 AND 5XYW750 AMBULANCE APCs WERE PARKED ON TRANSPORTERS WAITING TO MOVE SOUTH, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSORTED B VEHICLES.

4. ESTIMATED TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES ALL DESCRIPTIONS SEEN TRAVELLING SOUTH IN EXCESS OF 3000. GREAT MAJORITY WERE B VEHICLES CARRYING STORES/TROOPS/COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND NORMAL ASSORTED CAMP STORES SEEN ON ROUTINE UNIT MOVES, INCLUDING PORTACABINS. ARMoured VEHICLES SEEN ON TRANSPORTERS INCLUDED 46XT-72, 45XBMP1 AND 50 PLUS X T55T1/2 ARMoured RECOVERY. SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT INCLUDED 17 PLUS X PMP BRIDGING VEHICLES, 2XNBC RECCE BRDM RKH AND ENGINEER PLANT, SOME OF IT TRAVELLING ON CIVILIAN TRANSPORTERS.

5. ONLY MAJOR TRAFFIC SEEN TRAVELLING NORTH WAS TOTAL 93 EMPTY TANK TRANSPORTERS.

6. VIRTUALLY ALL TROOPS AND VEHICLES SEEN WERE IDENTIFIED AS REPUBLICAN GUARD. TROOPS WERE WEARING RED TRIANGLE FLASH ON SLEEVES AND B VEHICLE TACSIGNS SEEN INCLUDED SPECIAL FORCES YELLOW PARACHUTE (APPROX 30 PERCENT TOTAL NUMBER B VEHICLES SEEN). OTHERS CARRIED RED TRIANGLE WITH ARABIC NUMERALS 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22 SUPERIMPOSED.

7. TROOPS WERE DRESSED VARIOUSLY IN NORMAL WORKING DRESS /CAMOUFLAGE COMBAT KIT. HELMETS AND WEBBING WERE NOT BEING WORN BUT MAY HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON VEHICLES, AS WERE PERSONAL WEAPONS. TROOPS WERE IN HIGH SPIRITS.

8. NCOS DID NOT SEE EVIDENCE OF SURVEILLANCE ON EITHER LEG OF JOURNEY AND THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH TRAVEL OR HOSTILE REACTION TO THEIR PRESENCE.

9. TRAFFIC AT BORDER CROSSING WAS LIGHT: CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TRAVELLING IN BOTH DIRECTIONS WAS KUWAITI. PROCEDURE AT BORDER WAS NORMAL, HOWEVER AS ON 20 JULY KUWAITIS WERE MORE DEFERENTIAL TO IRAQI AUTHORITIES THAN WHEN PREVIOUSLY SEEN. NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS SEEN ON KUWAITI SIDE OF BORDER.

COMMENT

10. SIGHTINGS PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF MAJOR BUILDUP IN IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN AREA BETWEEN AZZUBAYR AND KUWAITI BORDER. PREDOMINANCE OF B VEHICLES SEEN IMPLIES MOVE OF LOGISTIC ELEMENTS AND PERSONNEL, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THOSE BELONGING TO ARMoured FORMATIONS THAT MAY ALREADY HAVE DEPLOYED. VIRTUALLY ALL TROOPS/VEHICLES SEEN CLEARLY REPUBLICAN GUARD. ARABI NUMERAL/RED TRIANGLE TACSIGN DESCRIBED IN PARA 6 BELIEVED TO BE BRIGADE TACSIGNS. IF THIS IS CORRECT ELEMENTS AT LEAST OF MOST RG BRIGADES MAY BE INVOLVED. USDA SAW TOTAL 400 PLUS VEHICLES CARRYING PROBABLE 11 AND 12 BRIGADE TACSIGN TRAVELLING NORTH TO MOSUL AS RECENTLY AS 15 JULY.

11. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CAMPS APPEARS TO BE AT EARLY STAGE AND IT IS LIKELY TO BE SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE TROOPS ARE IN A POSITION TO DEPLOY. GRANTING OF TRAVEL PERMISSION FOR ROUTE TAKEN AND ABSENCE OF INTERFERENCE WITH DEFENCE SECTION JOURNEY MAY BE INDICATION THAT IRAQIS WERE HAPPY FOR BUILDUP TO BE SEEN : IN ANY EVENT IT IS LIKELY TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE BEFORE LONG.

12. ABOVE ALREADY PASSED TO USDA.

KEALY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

22 20


ADVANCE

22 20

.IRAN/IRAQ
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD

HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD
HD/SECPOL D
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND
RESIDENT CLERK



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3073</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <u>MACRAE TO POWELL</u> <u>20.7.1990</u>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>RS HONEY</u> <u>18.11.2016</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1712

OF 202230Z JULY 90

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, ACTOR

UKMIS TELNOS 851 AND 863: THE PERMANENT FIVE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION CAN ACQUIESCE IN DISCUSSION OF ARAB/ISRAEL BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PERMANENT FIVE PROVIDED THAT IT DOES NOT BECOME INSTITUTIONALISED OR FOCUS TOO CLOSELY ON DETAILS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT THEIR LONGER TERM ATTITUDE WILL DEPEND ON THE FATE OF THE BAKER INITIATIVE.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO KURTZER (DAS/NEA, STATE DEPARTMENT) ABOUT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SUGGESTION OF MEETINGS WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. KURTZER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT OBJECTIVE REMAINED TO INITIATE AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. THEY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THE BAKER INITIATIVE. (THEY HOPED LEVY WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON ON 9/10 AUGUST - SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL) THEY THEREFORE DID NOT WANT AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM TO EMERGE WHICH DISTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES FROM THE PROCESS IN HAND. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, KURTZER THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT OBJECT TO MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PERMANENT FIVE TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST SO LONG AS NO PARTY PRESSED FOR THIS TO BECOME A REGULAR AND INSTITUTIONALISED FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE ADDED THAT THE MORE THAT THESE MEETINGS COULD ADDRESS THE BROADER SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST RATHER THAN TACTICS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS THE MORE COMFORTABLE THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE WITH THEM.
4. ON THE SPECIFICS, KURTZER SAID THAT ANY SUGGESTION THAT THERE WAS AN ALTERNATIVE TRACK FOR AN ARAB/ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF THE PARTIES AGREEING TO ENTER A DIALOGUE. THE PALESTINIANS WOULD APPLAUD INVOLVEMENT BY THE PERMANENT FIVE, SEEING IT AS THE FIRST STEP ALONG THE ROAD TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND WOULD BE LESS INCLINED TO MAKE

THE DIFFICULT CHOICES INVOLVED IN OPENING A DIALOGUE. THE ISRAELIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PERMANENT FIVE.

5. WE SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE JUST THE PRESSURE NEEDED TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO DROP THEIR OBJECTIONS TO A DIALOGUE. KURTZER SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF JUDGEMENT, BUT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD ONLY MAKE THE ISRAELIS MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ENTERING ANY PROCESS.

6. KURTZER ADDED THAT, IF BAKER WERE TO GET A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM LEVY, THEN THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE EVEN MORE ANXIOUS TO AVOID THE DISTRACTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE FOCUS OF ACTIVITY. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, LEVY SAID NO, THEN THE SITUATION WOULD MOVE ON: THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE LOOKING AROUND AT OTHER MEANS OF STAYING ENGAGED. THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY INCLUDE TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT THE VALUE OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE PERMANENT FIVE.

COMMENT

7. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT STANCE IS INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY UNCERTAINTY OVER THE FUTURE OF THE BAKER INITIATIVE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GAME PLAN, AS DESCRIBED IN SECOND TUR, OF ENTICING THEM GENTLY SEEMS JUST ABOUT RIGHT. INDEED, KURTZER REMARKED THAT NOTHING THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SAID IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK HAD MADE THE ADMINISTRATION UNCOMFORTABLE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL



Cole JN

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 July 1990

JORDAN

I enclose the reply from the Prime Minister to King Hussein's recent message. I should be grateful if you would ensure its early delivery.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

D85

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T149/90



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

SUBJECT "OPS
MASTER

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 July 1990

Y
Your Majesty,

I am most grateful to you for sending me a copy of your message to President Bush. Douglas Hurd had already told me of his talks with you in Amman a month ago and has since had an opportunity to discuss with Crown Prince Hassan here in London some of the problems which you raised. I have also read with great interest but also concern Mr. Reeve's account of his conversation with you on 27 June.

I share your worries about the current dangers in the Middle East. The need to break the deadlock in the peace process is pressing. Our European partners feel the same way. You will, I am sure, have seen the Declaration on the Middle East which we agreed at Heads of Government level in Dublin on 26 June. I have made our anxiety clear in a subsequent message to Mr. Shamir.

I shall be seeing President Bush at the NATO Summit at the beginning of July and again shortly afterwards at the Houston Economic Summit. I shall certainly talk to him about the Middle East, with your concerns very much on my mind. I shall urge him to remain fully engaged in the peace process and to press the Israelis to begin a direct dialogue with representative Palestinians. The US role will of course remain crucial. But I nevertheless share your view that the other Permanent Members of the Security Council also have their obligations, and should

concert more effectively; and the Europeans, who can maintain contacts with both the Israelis and the PLO, have an important part in opening the path to an international conference.

I look forward to remaining in close contact with you on this most important issue in the testing weeks ahead. I very much value your insights and will keep you in touch with the way we see things.

With warm regards
and good wishes,
Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal, G.C.B.

CONFIDENTIAL

113123
MDADAN 3677

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1579

OF 030203Z JULY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, AMMAN, TUNIS, BAGHDAD

INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 1558: ARAB/ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK CLARIFICATION OF SHAMIR'S REPLY TO BUSH, BUT ARE DETERMINED NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO A LONG NEGOTIATION. APPRECIATION OF DANGERS INHERENT IN CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND DETERMINATION TO REMAIN ENGAGED WHATEVER THE ISRAELI RESPONSE.

DETAIL

2. GORE-BOOTH DISCUSSED WITH ROSS (STATE DEPARTMENT) AND HAASS (NSC) TODAY (2 JULY) PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.
3. ROSS SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CRAFTED. HE DESCRIBED IT AS QUOTE NOT RESPONSIVE, BUT NOT DEFINITIVE UNQUOTE. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT SHAMIR WAS BROADLY POSITIVE ON THE IDEA OF A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS, BUT HE DID NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE ASSUMPTIONS IMPLICIT IN THE QUESTION (IE THAT A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WOULD INCLUDE DEPORTEES AND DUAL ADDRESSEES). ROSS SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD USED TERMS NOT PREVIOUSLY USED IN US/ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS.
4. IN VIEW OF THESE AMBIGUITIES, ROSS SAID, SECRETARY BAKER HAD DECIDED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE SHAMIR MESSAGE. HE PROPOSED TO ENGAGE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS THE POTENTIAL FOR AGREEMENT. ROSS STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT TO BE AN OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATION: NO DEADLINE HAD BEEN SET, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT BAKER WOULD WANT AN ANSWER BY THE END OF JULY. (HAASS, WHO SAID HE SAW LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS IN SHAMIR'S RESPONSE, ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT PROLONG DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL BEYOND THE END OF JULY.) ROSS FURTHER STRESSED THAT NEITHER BUSH NOR BAKER WERE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN CREATING THE ILLUSION OF A PEACE PROCESS WHERE ONE DID NOT EXIST. BOTH BELIEVED THAT THE PATH THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD FOLLOWED IN TRYING TO BROKER AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE HAD BEEN THE RIGHT ONE. BUT THEY

DID NOT HAVE THE PATIENCE TO PURSUE THIS IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE (CF BAKER'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE - MY TELNO 1408): IF IT COULD BE TAKEN NO FURTHER THEY WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT OTHER OPTIONS.

5. GORE-BOOTH NOTED THAT THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. AT A TIME WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS SQUARING UP TO ISRAEL, MODERATE ARAB STATES WERE FRUSTRATED AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. THE SITUATION COULD EASILY GET OUT OF HAND. BOTH ROSS AND HAASS AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SHARP DETERIORATION IN THE ENVIRONMENT. THEY ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A PEACE PROCESS WAS REQUIRED TO GIVE THE MODERATES SOMETHING TO HANG ON TO, WHICH IMPLIED CONTINUED US INVOLVEMENT. HAASS COMMENTED THERE WAS NO SENSE IN WASHINGTON THAT A PERIOD OF US DISENGAGEMENT WOULD MAKE THE PARTIES MORE WILLING TO COMPROMISE: RATHER THE OPPOSITE. ROSS SAID BAKER'S DETERMINATION TO STAY ENGAGED HAD BEEN REINFORCED BY ABDUL MAJID'S VISIT LAST WEEK, DURING WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NO INTENTION OF OPTING OUT.

6. GORE-BOOTH ASKED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA OF DEALING DIRECTLY WITH ARAB STATES ON THE PEACE PROCESS. ROSS SAID THAT BAKER HAD DESCRIBED THIS AS QUOTE PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE UNQUOTE. THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT, BY POSITIVE GESTURES TOWARDS ISRAEL, ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD HELP TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT FOR PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT THEY ACCEPTED THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN PRIVATE, SEVERAL MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ONCE AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE WAS LAUNCHED. ROSS SAID BAKER'S INCLINATION REMAINED TO GET A DIALOGUE GOING AND TEST OUT THE SINCERITY OF THESE CLAIMS.

7. ON THE US/PLO DIALOGUE, ROSS SAID THAT THE DECISION TO SUSPEND HAD BEEN NECESSARY BUT NOT EASY. AS IT TURNED OUT, IT HAD BEEN HELPFUL THAT THE PUBLIC REASON FOR THE BREAK HAD BEEN THE PLF RAID. THE RENEWED INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM OF FORCE 17, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION FOUND MORE DISTURBING, HAD BEEN HANDLED PRIVATELY AND COULD BE MET BY PRIVATE PLO ASSURANCES. THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTED THAT THE PLO WERE NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING QUICKLY, THOUGH ABDUL MAJID HAD MADE CLEAR LAST WEEK THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE WORKING ON THEM. GORE-BOOTH SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE ADMINISTRATION TO HAVE THE US/PLO DIALOGUE SUSPENDED WHILE THEY PRESSED THE ISRAELIS FOR A CLEAR RESPONSE. ROSS THOUGHT IT DID NO HARM: AN ISRAELI QUOTE YES UNQUOTE WOULD GIVE ARAFAT AN INCENTIVE TO MEET US CONDITIONS

AND WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE EGYPTIANS.

8. HAASS SAID THAT, IF THE ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO EXTRACT A QUOTE YES UNQUOTE FROM THE ISRAELIS, THERE WOULD BE A FULLY-FLEDGED REVIEW OF OPTIONS, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, EUROPEANS AND PLAYERS IN THE REGION. GORE-BOOTH NOTED THAT THERE WAS IMPATIENCE IN EUROPE WITH ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE: THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE FOR ACTION DURING THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY. WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT THIS WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL. HE ADDED THAT WE CONTINUED TO SEE A ROLE FOR DISCUSSION OF ARAB/ISRAEL BY THE PERMANENT FIVE IN NEW YORK, EITHER TO FILL A VACUUM OR TO PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. HAASS WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT A ROLE FOR THE FIVE. KURTZER (WHO SAT IN WITH ROSS) WAS NOT DISCOURAGING. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EC. HE THOUGHT THAT EACH COULD PROVIDE HELPFUL CORRECTIVES TO EXTREME TENDENCIES WITHIN THE OTHER'S POLICY: HE CITED THE ADMINISTRATION'S TENDENCY TO ALLOW ISRAEL TOO MUCH TIME TO RESPOND, AND THE EC'S TENDENCY TO ADOPT A PUNITIVE POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL.

COMMENT

9. THESE WERE GENERALLY ENCOURAGING EXCHANGES. THE ADMINISTRATION MADE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, NOR ARE THEY PREPARED TO FALL BACK ON THE EASY OPTION OF ACQUIESCING IN A PEACE PROCESS WHICH IS NOT GOING ANYWHERE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CLAIM TO SEE THE DANGER SIGNALS IN THE REGION AND AGREE THAT US DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE OPTION. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE PROCESS OF CLARIFICATION SHOWS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT WILLING TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE BAKER INITIATIVE THEN A PERIOD OF REASSESSMENT APPEARS INEVITABLE THESE CONVERSATIONS DID NOT SUGGEST THAT ANYTHING HAS BEEN RULED OUT AT THIS STAGE, OR THAT GREATER EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE CONSIDERED, A PRIORI, UNWELCOME.

ACLAND

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

113123
MDADAN 3677

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

celt



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1990

Dear Charles

flap

Amman telnos 330 and 331 contained a message from King Hussein of Jordan to the Prime Minister and a copy of a message from the King to President Bush about the peace process.

I enclose a draft reply to be transmitted by HM Ambassador. This commits the Prime Minister to talk to President Bush about the Middle East. The briefing we are supplying for both forthcoming Summits will reflect this.

King Hussein is in need of reassurance. We therefore recommend an early reply, which can be followed up after the meetings with President Bush if that looks right.

Yours ever,
S L Gass

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN

Your Majesty

To him

I am most grateful to you for sending me a copy of your message to President Bush. Douglas Hurd had already told me of his talks with you in Amman a month ago and has since had an opportunity to discuss with Crown Prince Hassan here in London some of the problems which you raised. I have also read with great interest but also concern Mr Reeve's account of his conversation with you on 27 June.

I share your worries about the current dangers in the Middle East. The need to break the deadlock in the peace process is *urgent*. Our European partners feel the same way. You will, I am sure, have seen the Declaration on the Middle East which we agreed at Heads of Government level in Dublin on 26 June. I have made our anxiety clear in a subsequent message to Mr Shamir.

Agreed

I shall be seeing ~~George~~ Bush at the NATO Summit at the beginning of July and again shortly afterwards at the Houston Economic Summit. I shall certainly talk to him about the Middle East. *1/2* Your concerns will be very much on my mind. I shall urge him to remain fully engaged in the peace process and to press the Israelis to begin a direct dialogue with representative Palestinians. There must be some movement in the peace process, and some prospect of an end to the Israeli territorial occupation, if the forces of extremism are not to gain ground.

The US role in the peace process will of course remain crucial. But I nevertheless share your view that the other Permanent Members of the Security Council also have their obligations, and should concert more effectively; and the Europeans, who can maintain contacts with both the Israelis and the PLO, have an important part in opening the path to an international conference.

I look forward to remaining in close contact with you on this most important issue in the testing weeks ahead. I very much value your insights, ~~as always~~, and will, ~~if I may~~, keep you in touch with the way we see things.

~~Yours sincerely.~~

an

MIDDLE EAST: 81r p 20

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	PREM 19 3073	Date and sign
Extract details:	POWELL TO WALL 29.6.1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION		
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958		RToney 18.11.2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED		21 November 2016 CBWardland
MISSING AT TRANSFER		
NUMBER NOT USED		
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)		
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)		

Advanced to No 10

referred to HDP/ENAD

for distribution advice
Ref Tel suggested

CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 334

OF 231835Z JUNE 90

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV

MY TELNO 329 TO FCO: MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN COMMENTS ON HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH. ADVOCATES A ROLE BY THE FIVE AS A MEANS OF INJECTING GREATER BALANCE INTO US POLICY. VERY ANXIOUS FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TO HELP CONTAIN INTERNAL PRESSURES.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 27 JUNE, I SAID THAT I KNEW THAT MRS THATCHER WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE HAD THE FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS THINKING CONTAINED IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH. THE LETTER WOULD HAVE REACHED HER SHORTLY AFTER THE MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN DUBLIN AT WHICH A STRONG STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAD BEEN ISSUED. I SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE A COPY OF THE STATEMENT TO ZAID BIN SHAKER (WHO WAS PRESENT AT MY AUDIENCE WITH THE KING).

3. IN DISCUSSION, THE KING SPOKE ABOUT HIS SUGGESTION FOR A ROLE BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ALONE AMONG ARAB LEADERS IN CONCLUDING THAT, BECAUSE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL, THE US SIMPLY COULD NOT PLAY AN EVEN-HANDED ROLE IN PROMOTING PEACE WHEN ACTING ON A BILATERAL BASIS. CLEARLY THE US WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A LEADING PART IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FIVE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO INJECT SOME BALANCE INTO THE US APPROACH. I COMMENTED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD BAKER WAS STILL WORKING TO KEEP SHAMIR ENGAGED IN PEACE DISCUSSIONS AND WAS DETERMINED NOT TO LET HIM BACKTRACK ON PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS. THE KING DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY. HE SAID THE DECLARED POSITION OF THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE TOTAL IMMOBILITY OVER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS POSED A MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO THE WHOLE REGION, NOT LEAST TO ARAB MODERATES SUCH AS JORDAN.

COMMENT

THE KING WAS DEPRESSED AND UNSMILING. THE COMMENTS HE MADE ON OTHER ISSUES (WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY) INDICATE THAT HE SEES THE PRESENT SITUATION AS MORE DANGEROUS THAN ANY SINCE 1967, BUT WITH THE ADDED RISK OF INTERNAL DISTURBANCES. FROM MY SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS ADVISERS, I CONCLUDE THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS VERY ANXIOUS FOR ANY EVIDENCE OF MOVEMENT OVER THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH IT CAN USE TO ANSWER THE GROWING NUMBER OF RADICAL VOICES WITHIN JORDAN (AT THE FOREFRONT OF WHOM ARE THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS) WHO ARGUE THAT MODERATION HAS PRODUCED NOTHING. GIVEN JORDAN'S CONTINUING COOPERATION WITH THE US IN SO MANY FIELDS (INCLUDING MILITARY EXERCISES), THE DILEMMA OF HOW TO REACT TO US POLICY IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE HERE. THE KING'S POLITICAL ADVISER TOLD ME THAT THE KING HAD BEEN ANGRIER ABOUT THE VETO THAN ANY OTHER ASPECT OF US POLICY PRECISELY BECAUSE IT PERPETUATED A STALEMATE AND CLOSED OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONALISING THE PEACE PROCESS IN A VERY MODEST WAY. THE JORDANIANS ARE PLEASED THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE TAKING A POSITION WHICH CLEARLY SEPARATES THEIR OWN POLICY FROM THAT OF THE US, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE KING RECOGNISES THE INESCAPABLE NEED FOR US INVOLVEMENT; HENCE HIS INTEREST IN ACTIVITY BY THE FIVE.

5. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KING'S LETTER TO MRS THATCHER, I ENQUIRED FROM ZAID BIN SHAKER WHETHER THE KING HAD ANY PLANS FOR VISITING BRITAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BIN SHAKER SAID THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHEN THE KING WOULD BE ABLE TO GET AWAY. THE SITUATION INTERNALLY WAS VERY DIFFICULT. HE DOUBTED WHETHER AN EARLY VISIT TO BRITAIN WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

YYYY

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 261530Z FCO

TELNO 330

OF 261000Z JUNE 90

INFO DESKBY 261530Z WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO DESKBY 270630Z TEL AVIV

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T139A/90

subject cc MASTER
cc OPS

1. MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE
PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

AS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE EXACERBATED AN ALREADY
DECLINING AND DANGEROUS ATMOSPHERE IN THE REGION, I
WOULD LIKE TO APPRISE YOU OF MY THOUGHTS BY SENDING YOU
A COPY OF MY LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

I DO BELIEVE WE ARE AT A CROSSROAD AND THAT WITHOUT
A CONCERTED WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
TO ARRIVE AT THE PATH FOR PEACE UNTOLD CONSEQUENCES WILL
RESULT.

AS ALWAYS I VALUE YOUR COUNSEL, SUPPORT AND FRIEND-
SHIP AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF
SEEING YOU AGAIN.

MEANWHILE, NOOR JOINS ME IN SENDING YOU AND MR.
THATCHER OUR WARMEST PERSONAL GOOD WISHES.

WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM,
I AM,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN

ENDS.

2. SEE MIPT.

3. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

JEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 261530Z FCO

TELNO 329

OF 261150Z JUNE 90

INFO DESKBY 261530Z WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO DESKBY 270630Z TEL AVIV

*Further signs of
the king's
increasing desperation
- and dependence
on Iraq. CDD-26/6*

Very worrying.

MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH.

1. THE CHIEF OF THE ROYAL COURT HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER A COPY OF A LETTER DATED 24 JUNE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH, TOGETHER WITH A COVERING LETTER DATED 25 JUNE FROM THE KING TO MRS THATCHER. TEXTS ARE IN MY TWO IFTS. I ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS ARE UNAWARE THAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THE BUSH LETTER.

2. I HAD ALREADY SOUGHT AN AUDIENCE WITH THE KING WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE LATER TODAY (26 JUNE) OR TOMORROW. I SHALL USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK HIS FURTHER COMMENTS. AT FIRST READING, HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH APPEARS SELF-EXPLANATORY. BY HIS NORMAL STANDARDS, IT IS EXTREMELY BLUNT, THOUGH SOME OF THE TELLING POINTS HE MAKES RISK BEING DEVALUED BY MORE QUESTIONABLE ARGUMENTS, NOT LEAST HIS ONE-SIDED DEFENCE OF IRAQ. THERE ARE TWO IMMEDIATE POINTS ON WHICH I SHOULD COMMENT:


1) IN THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH, HE REFERS IN RATHER OPAQUE TERMS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A LACK OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO JORDAN MAY HAVE CAUSED QUOTE OTHERS AMONGST OUR FRIENDS UNQUOTE TO REDUCE THEIR ASSISTANCE. BASED ON MY PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KING, I BELIEVE THIS IS A REFERENCE TO SAUDI ARABIA (AND PERHAPS OTHER GULF STATES) RATHER THAN TO BRITAIN OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES.

11) THE KING REFERS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOLVEMENT BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS PERHAPS QUOTE THE BEST AVAILABLE OPTION UNQUOTE FOR A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD SEEM TO PROVIDE A USEFUL PEG IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WE MAY HAVE WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT POSSIBLE ACTIVITY BY THE FIVE, IF INDEED WE SHARE THE KING'S VIEW THAT THIS IS THE MOST HOPEFUL AVENUE FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE FIVE SHOULD ALSO GET INVOLVED ON THE ISSUE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD SEEM MORE QUESTIONABLE.

3. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10.

REEVE

YYYY

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3073</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <u>AMMAN TELEGRAM 331</u> <u>26.6.1990</u>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>REMOVED</u> <u>18.11.2016</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<u>21 November 2016</u> <u>Chayland</u>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1477

OF 210010Z JUNE 90

INFO PRIORITY TUNIS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, BAGHDAD
INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

US/PLO
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES SUSPENSION OF US/PLO DIALOGUE PENDING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE PLO ON THE PLF ATTACK ON ISRAEL. DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCED TODAY (20 JUNE):
QUOTE BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I HAVE DECIDED TO SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO PENDING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE PLO OF STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM, IN PARTICULAR, THAT MAY 30TH TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAEL BY THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION FRONT, A CONSTITUENT GROUP OF THE PLO. UNQUOTE

3. BUSH THEN WENT THROUGH THE BACKGROUND TO THE PLO'S RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM, THE OPENING OF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE, AND THE 30 MAY PLF ATTACK. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TOLD THE PLO THAT THEY NEEDED TO CONDEMN THE OPERATION, DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM IT AND BEGIN TO TAKE STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABUL ABBAS, THE PERPETRATOR. HE WENT ON:

QUOTE WE'VE GIVEN THE PLO AMPLE TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE. TO DATE, THE PLO HAS NOT PROVIDED A CREDIBLE ACCOUNTING OF THIS INCIDENT OR UNDERTAKEN THE ACTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE US DOES TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE PLO HAS DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THIS ATTACK AND ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT AS WE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT -- THIS ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT. UNQUOTE
HE SAID QUOTE ANYTIME THAT THE PLO IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS, WE ARE PREPARED TO PROMPTLY RESUME THE DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. IN THE MEANTIME, HE HOPED THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE.

4. BUSH THEN REAFFIRMED US COMMITMENT TO THE PURSUIT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

AND THE PRINCIPLE IMPLICIT THEREIN OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, AND PROVISION FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. HE SAID THAT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS WAS VITAL TO ITS SUCCESS AND CALLED ON ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS AND ARAB STATES TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CREATE A SUITABLE ENVIRONMENT. HE CONCLUDED BY CALLING ON ALL PARTIES TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND OPT FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. QUOTE WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE PARTIES TOWARDS THIS END UNQUOTE.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BUSH SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE INTENT OF THE ATTACK MIGHT HAVE BEEN TO DERAIL THE PEACE PROCESS AND THAT, BY SUSPENDING THE DIALOGUE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THUS PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF HARDLINERS. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT US ALLIES, INCLUDING MODERATE ARAB STATES, WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE SUSPENSION OF THE DIALOGUE. BUT HE SAID THAT THE ANSWER WAS FOR THE PLO TO TAKE THE ACTION THAT HE HAD CALLED FOR. QUOTE IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY REITERATE ONE'S CONCERN ON TERROR UNQUOTE.

6. ASKED TO SPECIFY IN WHAT WAY THE US/PLO DIALOGUE HAD BEEN PRODUCTIVE, BUSH SAID THAT TALKING COULD ELIMINATE DIFFERENCES. QUOTE AND I WOULD LIKE TO FEEL THAT THE PLO, BECAUSE OF OUR DIALOGUE, DOESN'T SEE US AS THE HOSTILE COUNTRY THAT ONCE THEY DID UNQUOTE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DIALOGUE HAD ENCOURAGED PLO MODERATION (ARAFAT'S ACCEPTANCE OF UNSCR 242 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WAS QUOTE QUITE A STEP FORWARD UNQUOTE), AND THE DIALOGUE HAD OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLIDIFY THESE MODEST GAINS. HE WENT ON:

QUOTE BUT I CAN'T POINT TO THE FACT THAT THAT HAS REALLY SOLVED THE QUESTION OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE. I JUST FEEL THAT TALKING OFFERS MORE POTENTIAL THAN STIFF-ARMING EACH OTHER. AND YET, WE CAN'T DIGEST IT AS LONG AS THIS -- THIS TERRORIST ACT -- IS STICKING IN OUR THROAT, AND PROPERLY SO, AS A COUNTRY THAT DECRIES INTERNATIONAL TERROR. UNQUOTE

7. FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT BY FAX TO ARCHER, NENAD/FCO.

COMMENT

8. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TRIED TO AVOID HAVING TO TAKE A DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE. BUT FOLLOWING BAKER'S OUTBURST AGAINST ISRAEL LAST WEEK, AND GIVEN THE PLO'S CONTINUING FAILURE TO MEET THE ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLICLY STATED REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE PLF ATTACK, BUSH AND BAKER WILL HAVE FELT THAT THE DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY OF THEIR POLICY WAS WEARING THIN. THEY PROBABLY SAW SUSPENSION OF THE DIALOGUE PENDING PLO ACTION AS THE LEAST THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. DESPITE BUSH'S PROTESTATIONS OF CONTINUED US ENGAGEMENT IN - AND HOPES FOR - THE PEACE PROCESS, IT IS

CONFIDENTIAL

057120
MDADAN 2179

DIFFICULT TO SEE WHERE THE BAKER INITIATIVE CAN GO FROM HERE
WOOD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

1514

ADVANCE

1514

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE D10
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

053560

MDLIAN 0165

1. cc PS / Jo 10.

2. pm ~ 20/6

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MUSCAT

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 235

OF 200450Z JUNE 90.

INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, AMMAN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI

INFO ROUTINE BAHRAIN, DOHA, BAGHDAD

Good views

(E.R. Amos).

MIPT: ARAB ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

mf

SUMMARY

1. SULTAN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ARAB PLEDGES OF ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN AND BELIEVES SAUDIS ARE CONTENT TO SEE JORDAN RELATIVELY WEAK SO THAT IT WOULD NOT ADD TO THE THREAT WHICH THEY SEE FROM IRAQ AND YEMEN.

DETAIL

2. AT MY AUDIENCE LAST NIGHT, THE SULTAN WAS ALSO PREOCCUPIED WITH JORDAN AND SAID KING HUSSEIN WAS IN A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION FINANCIALLY AND POLITICALLY. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE PROMISES OF FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM 'THE RICHER BRETHREN' WOULD MATERIALISE. HE THOUGHT KING HUSSEIN HAD COMPLETELY MISHANDLED THE SAUDIS. THE LATTER HAD BEEN UPSET BY KING HUSSEIN'S DRAWING CLOSER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN WHOM THEY REGARDED AS A MAJOR THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDIS THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT HAVE ENCOURAGED KING HUSSEIN TO THINK THAT THEY WOULD HELP HIM TO RECOVER THE HEJAZ. THE SAUDIS FELT THREATENED FROM THE NORTH AS WELL AS FROM YEMEN. THEY WERE ARMING NOW IN ORDER TO DETER AGGRESSION FROM EITHER QUARTER.

3. HE HAD ADVISED KING HUSSEIN ON HIS STOPOVER THERE LAST YEAR AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS THAT HE SHOULD ABANDON HIS TACTIC OF APPEALING FOR HELP TO THE ARABS BECAUSE OF HIS FRONT-LINE STATUS. NO-ONE BELIEVED THAT JORDAN WAS IN A POSITION TO FIGHT ANYONE'S BATTLES. HE SHOULD RATHER APPEAL TO THEM AS A BROTHER IN NEED. AS IT WAS HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE SAUDIS WERE INTERESTED IN HELPING KING HUSSEIN TO MAINTAIN HIS ARMED FORCES AT ANYTHING LIKE THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE THE ARMY RUN DOWN AND THE AIR FORCE REDUCED TO ONE SQUADRON. THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN HELPING TO MAINTAIN A FORCE WHICH COULD COMBINE WITH THE IRAQIS AGAINST THEM. THEY WOULD JUST HELP TO KEEP JORDAN 'TICKING'.

4. THE SULTAN THOUGHT KING HUSSEIN WAS RIGHT TO ABOLISH

CONSCRIPTION BUT QUESTIONED WHAT HE WOULD DO WITH THE UNEMPLOYED. WHAT HE OUGHT TO DO WAS TO USE THEM TO REPLACE THE 200,000 FOREIGNERS WORKING THERE. AS FAR AS EMPLOYING FOREIGNERS WAS CONCERNED, JORDAN WAS NOT LIKE THE GULF STATES WHICH HAD MONEY TO BURN. THE GULF STATES WOULD RESPECT HIM MORE IF HE SENT HOME THE FOREIGNERS AND RELIED MORE ON HIS OWN RESOURCES. ✓

5. HE LAID MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR JORDAN'S PRESENT PREDICAMENT AT THE DOOR OF ZAID RIFAI. KING HUSSEIN HAD BROUGHT HIM IN AS PRIME MINISTER BECAUSE OF HIS GOOD LINKS WITH THE SYRIANS WITH WHOM KING HUSSEIN HAD WANTED BETTER RELATIONS. BUT RIFAI WAS CORRUPT AND UNTRUSTWORTHY. HE REFERRED FOR EXAMPLE TO ZAID RIFAI'S ATTEMPTS DURING THE DHOFAR WAR TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN HIM AND US SO THAT JORDANIAN FORCES MIGHT REPLACE OURS. HE SAID THIS WAS TYPICAL OF THE MAN.

COMMENT

6. AT VARIOUS POINTS I INTERJECTED THAT WHATEVER THE FAULTS MAY HAVE BEEN, KING HUSSEIN WAS IN A DESPERATE SITUATION AND NEEDED THE HELP OF ALL HIS FRIENDS. AT NO TIME DID THE SULTAN GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE HIMSELF: ON THE CONTRARY HE SPOKE RATHER POINTEDLY ABOUT THE RICHER BRETHREN.

7. HIS REMARKS ABOUT FOREIGNERS IN JORDAN SOUNDED STRANGE COMING FROM THE RULER OF A COUNTRY WHICH IS DEPENDENT ON A LARGE FOREIGN WORK FORCE. HE CLEARLY MEANT THAT THE GULF STATES COULD AFFORD THIS LUXURY, WHEREAS JORDAN COULD NOT AND HAD SKILLS WHICH WERE UNDER-UTILISED. ✓

CLARK

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

143

MAIN

131

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NAD

SED
SCD
DEFENCE D
HD/CONSULAR D
PS

CONFIDENTIAL

034365
MDADAN 1201

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1408

OF 140058Z JUNE 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

A file
CDm

MY TELNO 1391: ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. BAKER PUBLICLY BLAMES ISRAEL FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS EARLIER THIS YEAR AND QUESTIONS THE COMMITMENT OF THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO THE PURSUIT OF PEACE.

DETAIL

2. SECRETARY BAKER APPEARED BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TODAY (13 JUNE). IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, BAKER REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SAYING QUOTE WE WERE VERY VERY CLOSE ...TO PUTTING TOGETHER AN HISTORIC, FIRST-TIME-EVER DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. ...HAD IT BEGUN ,...I DON'T THINK WE WOULD BE FACING THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE FACING IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY UNQUOTE. HE NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ISRAEL HAD PREVENTED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FROM DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH THE PROCESS, AND THAT THE INTERVENING PERIOD HAD BEEN MARRED BY A REAL DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS IN PART TO GREAT FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF A PEACE-PROCESS, AND SAID THAT THE CHALLENGE WAS TO ALL PARTIES TO PUT IT BACK ON TRACK. HE SAID:

QUOTE FOR ISRAEL, THAT MEANS SAYING YES TO THE IDEA OF A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS, AND I HOPE THAT THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD TO SUCH A DIALOGUE AND DO SO IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR A CREDIBLE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION TO PARTICIPATE. WE, ON OUR PART, ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND IMPLEMENT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE, BUT LET ME SAY ONE MORE TIME, WE CAN'T DO IT ALONE.

FOR PALESTINIANS, THIS MEANS, I THINK, LOOKING BEYOND THE TRAGIC HUMAN LOSSES THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND RECOMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. AS I'VE INDICATED, THE

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

034365
MDADAN 1201

OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK OF MAY 30TH HAS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT RENOUNCING TERRORISM STILL STANDS, AND IT MUST DO SO IN AN AUTHORITATIVE AND UNAMBIGUOUS WAY, AS I SAID YESTERDAY OVER IN THE SENATE. SO FAR, IT HAS NOT DONE SO.

FOR THE ARAB STATES, I THINK THIS MEANS DOING MORE TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN SUPPORT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION. WE'RE STILL WILLING TO BE ENGAGED, BUT IF THE POLITICAL WILL TO MOVE AHEAD DOESN'T EXIST IN THE REGION, WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO CREATE THAT POLITICAL WILL FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION. AND THE SOONER EVERYBODY RECOGNIZES THAT, THE BETTER OFF I THINK WE ALL WILL BE UNQUOTE.

3. LATER IN THE HEARING, CONGRESSMAN LEVINE CLAIMED THAT THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE MIGHT HAVE COME ABOUT QUOTE HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE INTEMPERATE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT WITH REGARD TO EAST JERUSALEM UNQUOTE. BAKER RESPONDED VIGOROUSLY. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS QUOTE BUT WE MUST HAVE THE GOOD FAITH ENGAGEMENT OF ALL PARTIES, AND WE MUST HAVE IT PROMPTLY UNQUOTE. HE THEN INDICATED THAT IT WAS THE QUESTION POSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. HE WENT ON:

QUOTE WE COULD NOT GET A YES ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, QUOTE AS REGARDS THE PARTICIPATION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BE READY TO CONSIDER ON A NAME-BY-NAME BASIS ANY PALESTINIAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF THE TERRITORIES? UNQUOTE. AND, AT THE SAME TIME, I MADE IT CLEAR TO MINISTER ARENS THAT WE POSED THIS QUESTION WITH AN ASSUMPTION, NAMELY THAT IN THE END THERE WILL BE A FEW NAMES SELECTED THAT FIT THE CATEGORIES OF DEPORTEES WHO WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO RETURN AND THE CATEGORIES OF DUAL ADDRESSEES. NOW, THAT'S HOW CLOSE WE GOT. AND IT'S REALLY VERY HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND, IN THE FACE, AS WELL, OF THE FACT THAT PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES, AS YOU KNOW, WERE PREPARED TO COME TO THE TABLE, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK WITH ISRAELIS ABOUT ELECTIONS - IT'S HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE DIDN'T GET A YES ANSWER UNQUOTE.

4. BAKER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE WILLING TO LET BYGONES BE BYGONES, QUOTE BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE REASONS THAT WE DISCUSSED HERE THIS MORNING THAT THERE BE A PEACE

PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ...BUT THAT'S GOING TO MEAN A GOOD FAITH ENGAGEMENT, WITHOUT DELAY. OR OTHERWISE, WE CAN'T BE EFFECTIVE. AND IT'S GOT TO MEAN A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES, THAT THEY REALLY WANT PEACE UNQUOTE. HE THEN REFERRED TO PRESS STORIES COMING OUT OF ISRAEL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO IMPOSE NEW CONDITIONS FOR MOVING TO DIALOGUE, OR THAT THE BAKER INITIATIVE WAS NO LONGER RELEVANT. HE CONCLUDED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE NOW, IF THAT'S GOING TO BE THE APPROACH, AND THAT'S GOING TO BE THE ATTITUDE, THERE WON'T BE ANY DIALOGUE. AND THERE WON'T BE ANY PEACE, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CAN'T MAKE IT HAPPEN. YOU CAN'T, I CAN'T, THE PRESIDENT CAN'T. AND SO, IT'S GOING TO TAKE SOME REALLY GOOD FAITH, AFFIRMATIVE EFFORT ON THE PART OF OUR GOOD FRIENDS IN ISRAEL, AND IF WE DON'T GET IT AND IF WE CAN'T GET IT QUICKLY, I HAVE TO TELL YOU, MR LEVINE, THAT EVERYBODY OVER THERE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE TELEPHONE NUMBER (OF WHITE HOUSE) IS 1-202-456-1414. WHEN YOU'RE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, CALL US UNQUOTE.

5. FULL TEXTS OF THESE EXCHANGES FAXED TO ARCHER (NENAD/FCO)

COMMENT

6. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TOLD US BEFORE THAT, IF THE PEACE PROCESS STALLED, BAKER WOULD AT SOME STAGE PUBLICLY LAY BLAME WHERE IT WAS DUE. BUT THE TOUGH MANNER IN WHICH HE HAS DONE IT AND APPARENTLY ALSO THE TIMING - APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF IMMEDIATE PROVOCATIONS

BAKER CLEARLY TOOK EXCEPTION TO LEVINE'S STATEMENT. (BUT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY IT: LEVINE HAS MADE THIS POINT A NUMBER OF TIMES, MOST RECENTLY IN A SPEECH TO THE AIPAC POLICY CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY.) STATE TELL US THAT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE HEARING, BAKER HAD SEEN A REPORT OF A JERUSALEM POST INTERVIEW WITH SHAMIR, IN WHICH HE APPARENTLY INSISTED THAT PALESTINIANS HAD TO ACCEPT CAMP DAVID-STYLE AUTONOMY FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BEFORE DISCUSSION COULD BEGIN.

7. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THIS LEAVES THE ADMINISTRATION'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OR THE PEACE PROCESS. THE ISRAELI CABINET SECRETARY, RUBINSTEIN, SAW ROSS AND KELLY DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON YESTERDAY. HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WANTED TO WORK WITH THE ADMINISTRATION ON

CONFIDENTIAL

034365
MDADAN 1201

US/ISRAELI RELATIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT HE BROUGHT NO SPECIFIC IDEAS. KELLY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE READY TO WORK WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND WOULD JUDGE IT ON SUBSTANCE, NOT ON ITS POLITICAL LEANINGS. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO KNOW QUICKLY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT STOOD ON THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS EXCHANGE HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY OVERTAKEN BY BAKER'S REMARKS TODAY. WHICH COME CLOSE TO AN ULTIMATUM. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER SHAMIR RESPONDS POSITIVELY TO BAKERS FORTHRIGHT APPROACH, BUT THE ODDS MUST BE STRONGLY ON A DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD FOR US/ISRAELI RELATIONS

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE


18-13

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 4
CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT/SERIES PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	PREM 19 3073	Date and sign
Extract details:	Manuscript note POWELL To PM 12.6.1990, with attachment	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION		
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	RHONEY 18.11.2016	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED		
MISSING AT TRANSFER		
NUMBER NOT USED		
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)		
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)		



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister (2)
Re Foreign Secretary

personal account of
his Middle East
visit.
CAB
4/6.

PM/029/90

PRIME MINISTER

Visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia:

30 May - 3 June

1. The two Kings, though very different, share a melancholy approach to life, in contrast to President Mubarak's chirpiness. But even allowing for this, their analysis, endorsed by their Ministers and leading citizens, was deeply worrying. They see the peace process grinding to a halt, with no prospect of an Israeli government willing to talk to valid Palestinians, and the Americans failing to grasp the full danger. King Fahd was more complimentary about Bush and Baker than King Hussein or indeed Prince Saud, but even from him the main message was that Europe should urgently make a proposal on Arab/Israel which would guide the Americans. Both stressed the need to support Arafat and prevent the PLO slipping back into rejection of the peace process, though the Jordanian Ministers were scathing in private about the way he missed his chances. The danger if the peace process stays stalled used, of course, to be a communist advance. Now, and perhaps more lethally, the danger comes from fundamentalism. Perhaps the most vulnerable dominoes are the Palestinian leadership in the Occupied Territories, Algeria and Jordan itself. Certainly the warning signs are present in all three.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

2. King Hussein, of course, has his own problems. He was more robust about his experiment in democracy than his Ministers, but like them preoccupied with Palestinians, running costs and the debt. He wants to turn his army into a professional force so that he can screen out the unreliable soldier who is now conscripted. He cannot do this until he can provide adequate pay, but as things stand he cannot even pay for fuel for his fighters. He and his Ministers were reasonably sanguine about the financial undertakings given in private at the Baghdad Summit by the Saudis and the other Gulf states, but having now listened to the Saudis on the same theme, I am less so. I did my best to urge his case in Jedda, but we shall hear more of this. I had several open talks with Field Marshal Shaker and the Foreign Minister, Qasem. They hunt together, being able, loyal and sceptical East Bankers, fighting a series of rearguard actions against democracy, Palestinians and Saddam Hussain.

3. King Fahd and his Ministers went out of their way to be welcoming, and I do not doubt that Al Yamamah plus much hard work by yourself, Geoffrey Howe and others have put us on a high plateau of trust with the Saudis. This is a tremendous asset which we must do our utmost to maintain, both in the defence and commercial fields, and by taking seriously Saudi worries about the region. The King will pass through London on his way for treatment on his knees in the US. He moves with difficulty and his health must be in question, though he spoke vigorously for 70 minutes without stopping. The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, is exceptional, and I hope you would see Prince Naif, Interior Minister for fourteen years and one of the King's full brothers (with whom I signed our first



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Middle East drugs agreement), if we can get him to accept David Waddington's invitation for the autumn. Offset for Al Yamamah seems to be developing quite well, and there are no major bilateral problems.

4. Back, alas, to Palestine. The Israelis made quick, shrewd use of the terrorist attempt on their coast last week. The resulting American veto, the criticism of the US at the Baghdad Summit, the continuing political impasse in Israel have all built up the tension, so that King Fahd compared the Middle East to a man about to strike a match. I will discuss this week with Jim Baker and the Europeans the best way of getting round this corner. We may need to be more active at the UN.

5. A postscript in advance of your visit to the USSR. King Fahd is sending a million copies of the Koran to the Muslims in the Soviet republics, and money to repair mosques. Jedda is the headquarters of the World Islamic Conference of 46 countries. The question in their minds is whether the Soviet Muslims will be given freedom or be driven to seize it. Although the Saudis support the fundamentalists in Afghanistan, I do not think they want that pattern repeated across Central Asia.

DH.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4 June 1990

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO

TO DESKBY 021300Z FCO

TELNO 369

OF 021033Z JUN 90

INFO DESKBY 021300Z JEDDA

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH, AMMAN, TUNIS, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS

ADVANCE COPY

JEDDA (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. ABDUL MAGID EXPRESSES EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR HMG'S RECEPTION OF MUBARAK AND PARTY IN LONDON ON 17 MAY AND FOR OUR POLICIES (EG IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL) THEREAFTER. CURRENT TENDENCY IN ARAB/ISRAELI RELATIONS WAS UNFORTUNATELY TOWARDS RADICALISM, BUT EGYPT DETERMINED TO PURSUE PEACE PROCESS AND MODERATION. MUCH CRITICISM OF RECENT AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED. NEED FOR EXERCISE OF HMG'S INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON.

DETAIL

2. I SAW DR ABDUL MAGID AT 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 2 JUNE EXPLAINING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE AN AUTHORITATIVE EGYPTIAN READ-OUT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WHILE YOU WERE STILL IN THE REGION. I SAID THAT HMG HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH THE MUBARAK/ABDUL MAGID VISIT TO LONDON. ON THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT, REPORTS FROM HM EMBASSY BAGHDAD HAD PAID TRIBUTE TO EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MODERATE RESULTS: I KNEW YOU WOULD WISH ME TO EXPRESS THANKS FOR THAT. WE HAD DONE OUR BEST TO CALM DOWN ARAFAT IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT. MEANWHILE WE HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION REGARDING A SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BUT, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE DIABOLICAL SEA-BORNE RAID ON ISRAEL, WE HAD INSISTED ON A PREAMBLE DEPLORING DELIBERATELY PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE. OUR VIEW, AND THAT OF THE AMERICANS, WAS THAT THE PLO MUST CONDEMN THE RAID EXPLICITLY AND IN PUBLIC. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SAY, AS THE PLO HAD SAID TO HM AMBASSADOR TUNIS, THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WAS TO CONDEMN THIS INDIVIDUAL ACT. MEANWHILE I NOTED THAT THE ENTOURAGE OF COL GADDAFI (WHO PAID A LIGHTNING VISIT TO CAIRO ON 1 JUNE) HAD CLAIMED THAT LIBYA WAS IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE.

3. DR ABDUL MAGID SAID THAT FOR ALL THE REASONS I HAD MENTIONED HE WAS GLAD TO SEE ME AT THIS TIME. HE WISHED TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN LONDON. IT HAD BEEN AN EXCEPTIONALLY USEFUL, FRIENDLY AND WARM VISIT. HE HAD PARTICULARLY ENJOYED HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND MR WALDEGRAVE. AS HE HAD SAID IN A BBC INTERVIEW, EGYPT AND BRITAIN WERE ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH ON MANY ASPECTS OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES. EGYPT VALUED THE POSITION OF HMG AND THE CAIRO/LONDON DIALOGUE FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. EGYPTIANS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE BRITISH STAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 31 MAY.

4. MEANWHILE EGYPT AND THE REGION WERE ENTERING A DIFFICULT PHASE. EGYPT WOULD BE STUBBORN IN CONTINUING HER PEACE PROCESS EFFORTS. SHE HAD INVESTED A GREAT DEAL IN THESE EFFORTS AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY TO PUT AN END TO THEM NOW. HE HOPED THAT HMG WOULD HELP TO CONVINCE THE AMERICANS OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER EFFORTS.

5. AT THE SUMMIT ABDUL MAGID HAD TRIED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL TO SOFTEN THE LANGUAGE AND THE ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ENJOYED GOOD COOPERATION WITH THE SAUDIS AND HAD BEEN ABLE TO CHANGE SOME EXTREME WORDING. AS REGARDS IRAQ, THE EGYPTIANS HAD URGED THE IRAQIS NOT TO NAME NAMES IN PASSAGES DEALING WITH THEIR DISPUTES WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN WORDING CRITICISING THE UNITED STATES, THE EGYPTIANS HAD OBTAINED THE DELETION OF SPECIFIC ATTACKS ON THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION - THOUGH THEY HAD HAD TO ACCEPT WORDING CRITICISING THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PARTICULARLY FOR THEIR VOTE ON JERUSALEM. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT OBTAINED SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 BUT, IN DR ABDUL MAGID'S VIEW, THIS POINT WAS COVERED BY THE REFERENCE TO THE CASABLANCA SUMMIT OF MAY 1989 WHICH EXPLICITLY ENDORSED THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS. SOME CONCERN HAD BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PHRASE RELATING TO THE OCCUPATION OF QUOTE PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNQUOTE. ABDUL MAGID CLAIMED THAT THIS PHRASEOLOGY IMPLIED NO CHANGE OF POSITION AND THAT THE PHRASE ABOUT THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REFERRED TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

6. MOST UNFORTUNATELY AMERICAN DIPLOMACY HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL TO EGYPT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT (DURING THE SUMMIT) OF THE ALLOCATION OF US DOLLARS 400 MILLION EXTRA AID FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWS HAD HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT. EVEN WORSE HAD BEEN THE BADLY DRAFTED NOTE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARIAT STATING THAT THE LEAGUE QUOTE SHOULD UNQUOTE DO THIS AND THAT. STRICTLY

FOR MR HURD'S INFORMATION, THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPLOITED THIS BY ENQUIRING, WITH OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO CAIRO, WHETHER DELEGATIONS WERE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN POWERS. ABDUL MAGID HAD REPLIED THAT HE RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BUT THAT HE WAS ACCUSTOMED TO EXAMINING PROPOSALS ON THEIR MERITS. EGYPT HAD NOT HESITATED TO CRITICISE AMERICA WHEN SHE ATTACKED LIBYA. THE PARALLEL NOTE FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD BEEN FAR LESS CLUMSY IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE. THE AMERICAN MISHANDLING OF THE PROPOSAL TO SEND A UN MISSION TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAD ALSO CAUSED RESENTMENT AS, OF COURSE, HAD THEIR UNWARRANTED VETO. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE AMERICANS TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL IN THE ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY ISRAEL. IT WAS NOT FOR THE AMERICANS TO SUPPORT ISRAELI POSITIONS IN ADVANCE. AMERICAN POSITIONS HAD THEIR OWN VALUE, IRRESPECTIVE OF ISRAELI REACTIONS. ABDUL MAGID ALSO CRITICISED THE AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THEIR PUBLIC WARNING TO AMERICAN CITIZENS ABOUT THEIR SECURITY IN THE AREA. TRAGICALLY, THE CURRENT TREND IN THE REGION WAS TOWARDS RADICALISM, BUT THIS KIND OF AMERICAN WARNING ONLY CONTRIBUTED TO TENSION.

7. DR ABDUL MAGID COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE AMERICANS HAD TREATED THEIR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS IN THIS WAY. WHAT WERE FRIENDS FOR UNLESS ONE DISCUSSED AND CONSULTED WITH THEM IN ADVANCE? THE AMERICANS MUST LEARN THAT THERE WERE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THEIR CLUMSY BEHAVIOUR, PARTICULARLY THEIR HANDLING OF THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. HE CLEARLY HOPED THE BRITISH COULD FIND A WAY OF INFLUENCING THEM. HE MADE AN UNFAVOURABLE CONTRAST BETWEEN AMERICAN BEHAVIOUR AND THAT OF HMG WHICH HAD DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH THE EGYPTIANS THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE IRAQIS AND GIVEN THE EGYPTIANS AN OPPORTUNITY OF USING THEIR INFLUENCE IN BAGHDAD. I SAID WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THIS.

8. TURNING TO JORDAN, DR ABDUL MAGID SAID HE HAD REGISTERED IN BAGHDAD AN ATTITUDE OF GREAT ANXIETY ON THE PART OF THE KING AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY SEEMED TO EXPECT AN ISRAELI ATTACK AND MEANWHILE THE IRAQIS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD RETALIATE. MEANWHILE THE AMERICANS MUST BE MORE SENSITIVE ABOUT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS ON THE PEOPLE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (AND INDIRECTLY ON JORDAN) ALTHOUGH OF COURSE ABDUL MAGID WAS NOT OPPOSING THE EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AS SUCH.

9. AS REGARDS THE SEA-BORNE RAID AGAINST ISRAEL (WHICH ABDUL MAGID IMPLIED WAS THE ACT OF ABUL ABBAS), HE SHARED THE BRITISH VIEW

THAT THIS WAS A MOST UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT. HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT NO SIGN OF THE OPERATION HAD SHOWN UP ON EGYPTIAN RADAR SCREENS. AS I HAD MENTIONED, THE LIBYANS HAD CLAIMED IN CAIRO ON 1 JUNE THAT THE ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN THE RAID WAS COMPLETELY BASELESS. (ABDUL MAGID DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS OR ON MY REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT THE PLO MUST MAKE AN EXPLICIT DENIAL). THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE AMERICA/PLO DIALOGUE WOULD BE SUSPENDED BUT IT WAS VITAL THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BROKEN. HE HOPED THE BRITISH WOULD MAKE THIS POINT IN WASHINGTON. ONCE THIS DIALOGUE WAS BROKEN IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REINSTATE.

10. IN CONCLUSION DR ABDUL MAGID SAID HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE PROCESS AND, MORE IMMEDIATELY, NOT TO ALLOW THE SITUATION TO BECOME MORE RADICALISED AND MORE DIFFICULT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS. I SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO HAVE ABDUL MAGID'S VIEWS AND THAT I KNEW YOU INTENDED TO REINSTATE YOUR VISIT TO CAIRO WHEN THIS BECAME POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE I KNEW YOU FELT OUR ESSENTIAL TASK WAS TO KEEP THE AMERICANS ENGAGED. YOU BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS ULTIMATELY THE RIGHT ANSWER BUT THAT THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY SINCE THE ISRAELIS WOULD INEVITABLY PREVENT IT FROM TAKING PLACE. I THOUGHT THAT, AS THE EGYPTIANS HAD THEMSELVES ADVOCATED IN EARLY 1989, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING WITH THE PERMANENT FIVE.

COMMENT

11. IN MY TWO AND A HALF YEARS IN CAIRO, I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE BLAND AND FUNDAMENTALLY PRO-AMERICAN EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPEAK WITH SUCH DISAPPOINTMENT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL HAVE SAID ALL THIS TO MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE WHOM HE SAW ON 31 MAY. ABDUL MAGID WAS CLEARLY NOT VERY HAPPY WITH HIS EXPERIENCE IN BAGHDAD. HE SAID RATHER MOURNFULLY THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN THE MAIN BENEFICIARY. HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT - TO BE HELD IN EGYPT IN NOVEMBER - WOULD BE BETTER PREPARED. HE PARTICULARLY COMMENDED THE ARAB DECISION (AN OLD EGYPTIAN OBJECTIVE) OF HOLDING REGULAR, ROUTINE ANNUAL SUMMITS IN FUTURE.

12. ABDUL MAGID DID NOT MENTION HIS LIGHTNING VISIT WITH MUBARAK TO DAMASCUS ON 30 MAY (NOR APART FROM THE ABOVE BRIEF REFERENCES) TO GADDAFI'S BRIEF VISIT TO CAIRO ON 1 JUNE, THOUGH THE LATTER IS INCIDENTALLY SOMETHING OF A DIPLOMATIC COUP FOR THE EGYPTIANS. GADDAFI HAS HITHERTO DECLINED TO VISIT THE EGYPTIAN CAPITAL BECAUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

1, 50
MDADAN 9-83

OF THE PRESENCE OF THE ISRAEL EMBASSY HERE.

ADAMS

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
~~NO TO DOWNING ST~~
CABINET OFFICE D10
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

172311
MDADAN 9466

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1280

ADVANCE COPY

OF 312350Z MAY 90
INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, TEL AVIV
INFO PRIORITY JERUSALEM, CAIRO, AMMAN, RIYADH, BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1270 : US/PLO DIALOGUE

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CONDEMNING YESTERDAY'S TERRORIST ATTACK. CONTINUING PESSIMISM WITHIN ADMINISTRATION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE US/PLO DIALOGUE.

DETAIL

2. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TODAY (31 MAY):

QUOTE PRESIDENT BUSH CONDEMNS THE TERRORIST ATTACK YESTERDAY IN ISRAEL, AND IS OUTRAGED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE A COWARDLY ATTEMPT TO TARGET INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES ACTIONS SUCH AS THESE ARE MOST REGRETTABLE, FOR THEY CAN ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT COMMENDS THE ACTION OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN THIS INCIDENT. THE UNITED STATES IS REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE ACTION.

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ATTACK, AND WE ARE LOOKING INTO IT. UNQUOTE

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO HAASS (NSC) AND BURNS (STATE) DURING THE DAY. (NEITHER, AT THAT STAGE, HAD A READOUT OF THE PELLETREAU/BELAWI MEETING OR ARAFAT'S PRESS CONFERENCE). BURNS SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TRIED TO AVOID BOXING THEMSELVES IN BY DECLARING TO STATE PUBLICLY WHAT THEY THOUGHT THE PLO RESPONSE SHOULD BE. BUT THEY WOULD BE PRESSING FOR THREE THINGS FROM ARAFAT: FORTHRIGHT CONDEMNATION OF THE ATTACK, A STATEMENT THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT, AND ACTION TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE ABU ABBAS. HAASS SET OUT MUCH THE SAME REQUIREMENTS BUT SAID THAT THEY WOULD DEMAND ABU ABBAS' EXPULSION FROM THE PLO.

4. NEITHER BURNS NOR HAASS WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT ARAFAT'S RESPONSE WOULD MATCH UP TO THESE REQUIREMENTS. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THEY THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO BREAK OFF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE. THEY CITED

CONFIDENTIAL

172311
MDADAN 9466

NOT ONLY STRONG CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE, BUT ALSO THE
CREDIBILITY OF US POLICY ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND ON TERRORISM.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

16

ADVANCE 16

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/NAD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE D10
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

167555
MDADAN 9349

UNCLASSIFIED
FM BAGHDAD
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 450

OF 310736Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, ME POSTS, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK, ACTOR
INFO SAVING OAU POSTS

ADVANCE COPY

SIC U2H

ARAB SUMMIT - FINAL STATEMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY, IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE SET OUT, OF THE MAIN POINTS IN THE FINAL STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE END OF THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT HELD IN BAGHDAD FROM 28 TO 30 MAY.

YEMEN

2. THE SUMMIT EXPRESSED CONGRATULATIONS TO AND FULL SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. THE CONFERENCE STATED THAT RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, MEANT THAT MORE THAN AT ANY TIME PAST THE ARAB NATION MUST DEPEND ON ITS OWN CAPABILITIES.

4. THE CONFERENCE STRESSED THE NEED FOR ALL KINDS OF MATERIAL, POLITICAL, OFFICIAL AND POPULAR SUPPORT TO ENSURE THE CONTINUANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTIFADA.

JEWISH IMMIGRATION

5. "THE CONFERENCE DEVOTED MUCH ATTENTION TO HANDLING THE GREAT DANGERS ARISING FROM THE DELIBERATE AND ORGANISED OPERATION FOR JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES". IT EXPRESSED ITSELF AS CONVINCED THAT THE IMMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ELSEWHERE INTO PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, WHICH IT DESCRIBED AS ILLEGAL UNDER THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949, CONSTITUTED A NEW ASSAULT ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN

PEOPLE AND A GREATER DANGER TO THE ARAB NATION. THE LATTER VIEW REQUIRED THAT IT MUST BE DEALT WITH COLLECTIVELY: ALL NECESSARY MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB NATION.

6. 'THE CONFERENCE, IN STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE IMMIGRATION OF JEWS INTO PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, CALLS IN PARTICULAR ON THE STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE IMMIGRATION, AND ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO WORK TO PUT A SPEEDY END TO THE ISRAELI PLAN FOR IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT, AND CALLS FOR THE GUARANTEEING OF THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT OF RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTION 194 OF 1949'. THE CONFERENCE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO HALT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, TO REMOVE THOSE ALREADY ESTABLISHED AND TO FIND AN INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM TO SUPERVISE ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN THIS REGARD. 'THE CONFERENCE CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM OFFERING ANY AID OR LOANS TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE SETTLEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS IN PALESTINE OR THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMS THE NECESSITY OF EVALUATING ARAB RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TWO MATTERS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL RIGHTS AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION'.

7. THE CONFERENCE CALLS UPON THE UN TO GUARANTEE THAT JEWISH IMMIGRANTS SHOULD NOT SETTLE PALESTINE OR THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND ALSO CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM TO ENSURE THIS AND FOR WORK TOWARDS THE ISSUING OF AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

8. THE CONFERENCE SAID IT WAS CONVINCED THAT THE GROWING TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A RESULT OF CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF PALESTINE AND THE OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, AMONG OTHER ISRAELI POLICIES. THE CONFERENCE HELD THE US FUNDAMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS AS THE STATE THAT PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH MILITARY CAPABILITY, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL COVER.

9. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED THAT THE HOLDING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES, TO BE ATTENDED BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING THE PLO AS AN EQUAL PARTNER, WAS

NOW AN URGENT NECESSITY. THE PALESTINE CAUSE REPRESENTED THE ESSENCE OF THE ARAB/ZIONIST STRUGGLE.

EASTERN EUROPE

10. "IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE, THE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDED THAT ARAB RELATIONS WITH THESE STATES SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PALESTINE CAUSE AND ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL INTERESTS."

ANGLO /ARAB DIALOGUE

11. THE CONFERENCE EXPRESSED ITS PLEASURE AT THE OUTCOME OF THE MINISTERIAL-LEVEL EURO-ARAB CONFERENCE HELD AT THE END OF LAST YEAR.

US CONGRESS

12. THE CONFERENCE EXPRESSED ITS DISMAY AT THE BIASSED PRO-ISRAELI ATTITUDES THAT STAMPED US CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS, MOST RECENTLY THE RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM. THE CONFERENCE CONSIDERED JERUSALEM AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF PALESTINE AND AS THE CAPITAL OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED THAT THE ARAB STATES WOULD TAKE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ANY STATE CONSIDERING JERUSALEM THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL.

THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

13. THE CONFERENCE CALLED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AGAINST THE PLAN TO WIPE THEM OUT AND EXPEL THEM, BY MEANS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN.

14. THE CONFERENCE CALLED FOR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO FOIL AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO CANCEL GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3379 CONSIDERING ZIONISM A FORM OF RACISM.

THREATS AGAINST IRAQ

15. THE CONFERENCE, AFFIRMING ITS ADHERENCE TO THE CHARTER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, STRONGLY DEPLORED THE BIASSED INFORMATION AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND THREATS, AND MEASURES OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC BOYCOTT, TO WHICH IRAQ WAS SUBJECT. THE

CONFERENCE AFFIRMED ITS SOLIDARITY WITH IRAQ AND WARNED AGAINST THE CONTINUANCE OF THESE CAMPAIGNS, WHICH WERE CALCULATED TO INFRINGE IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY AND HARM ITS SECURITY IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FACILITATE AGGRESSION AGAINST IT.

16. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED IRAQ'S RIGHT TO TAKE ALL MEASURES TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY AND MAKE AVAILABLE ITS DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING POSSESSING ADVANCED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ITEMS AND UTILISING THEM FOR INTERNATIONALLY APPROVED OBJECTIVES.

17. THE CONFERENCE LIKEWISE AFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF IRAQ AND ALL THE ARAB STATES TO RESPOND TO AGGRESSION WITH THE MEANS THEY CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE.

JORDAN

18. THE CONFERENCE STATED THAT ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT POLICY CONSTITUTED A DIRECT THREAT TO JORDAN. IT AFFIRMED ITS FULL ADHERENCE TO THE DEFENCE OF JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE ARAB WORLD. THE CONFERENCE DECIDED THAT SUPPORT SHOULD BE OFFERED TO JORDAN THROUGH BILATERAL CONSULTATION WITH HER.

LIBYA

19. THE CONFERENCE CONDEMNED AMERICAN ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST IT.

AFRICA

20. THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMED ITS SOLIDARITY WITH SUDAN AND SOMALIA.

21. IN WELCOMING THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA AND THE FREEING OF MANDELA, THE CONFERENCE DECLARED SOLIDARITY WITH THE AFRICAN STRUGGLE AND WARNED AGAINST THE DANGERS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN TEL AVIV AND PRETORIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

22. THE CONFERENCE CALLED FOR THE RE-INVIGORATION OF ARAB/AFRICAN COOPERATION THROUGH CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE OAU.

IRAN/IRAQ

23. THE SUMMIT REAFFIRMED ITS RESOLUTION 182 PASSED AT CASABLANCA CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 AND THE AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1988 THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF IRAQ AND ITS SOVERIEGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORY, PARTICULARLY ITS HISTORIC RIGHT TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB.

24. THE CONFERENCE CALLED FOR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR ON BOTH SIDES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 AND THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949, THIS BEING A MATTER SEPARATE IN ITS LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN NATURE.

LEBANON

25. THE CONFERENCE CONDEMNED REPEATED ISRAELI ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON. IT AFFIRMED THAT THE TAIF AGREEMENT WAS THE APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR SECURING THE INTERESTS OF EVERY LEBANESE. THE CONFERENCE REQUESTED THE TRIPARTITE ARAB COMMITTEE TO PURSUE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAIF AGREEMENT.

26. THE CONFERENCE DECIDED TO CALL FOR THE SETTING UP OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUND TO ASSIST LEBANON.

USE OF TECHNOLOGY

27. "GIVEN THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND TO THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE SERVICE OF MAN, THE CONFERENCE AFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE ARAB NATION TO GROWTH AND TO THE UTILISATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ARABS AND MANKIND GENERALLY." ANY MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST AN ARAB COUNTRY CALCULATED TO HINDER THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO IT WOULD DEMAND THE TAKING OF SUPPORTIVE ARAB POSITIONS. THE CONFERENCE CALLED UPON THE ADVANCED COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE ARAB STATES.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

28. THE CONFERENCE DECLARED THAT ANY ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE ON THE BASIS THAT ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE AREA MUST

BE DONE AWAY WITH, NOT JUST ONE KIND: IT MUST ALSO BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA, AND IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE PROVISION OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY,, INCLUDING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

ARAB LEAGUE

29. THE CONFERENCE DECIDED TO ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO COMPLETE MEASURES TO AMEND THE CHARTER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEXT SUMMIT TO BE HELD IN EGYPT.

30. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD ALSO EXAMINE THE CHARTER FOR ARAB FEDERATION SUBMITTED BY LIBYA.

31. THE CONFERENCE DECIDED THAT IN FUTURE ARAB SUMMITS SHOULD BE HELD YEARLY IN NOVEMBER.

CONCLUSION

32. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION, AND OF THE ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC GROUPINGS, THE CONFERENCE DECIDED TO REQUEST THE FOREIGN, ECONOMIC AND DEFENCE MINISTERS OF THE ARAB STATES TO HOLD A MEETING WITHIN TWO MONTHS TO STUDY THESE TWO SUBJECTS.

WALKER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

14

ADVANCE 14

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
NNNN

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL

166555
MDADAN 9277

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1270
OF 302345Z MAY 90
INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, TEL AVIV
INFO PRIORITY JERUSALEM, CAIRO, AMMAN, RIYADH, BAGHDAD
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

US/PLO DIALOGUE

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION DENOUNCE SEABORNE RAID ON ISRAEL AS TERRORIST ATTACK. US/PLO DIALOGUE UNDER SERIOUS THREAT.

DETAIL

2. ASKED ABOUT SEABORNE RAID ON ISRAEL EARLIER TODAY (30 MAY) STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS HORRIFIED AT THE TERRORIST ATTACK. THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PLEASED THAT ALL THE TERRORISTS WERE APPREHENDED OR KILLED IN ACTION, AND THAT NO INNOCENT VICTIMS WERE HARMED. ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE PLF ABU ABBAS FACTION (PLF/AAF) WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK, SPOKESMAN SAID THAT IF THIS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD VIEW THIS AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. PRESSED ON WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE, SHE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT RULE ANYTHING OUT AND HAD NO CONCLUSIONS TO DRAW AT THIS TIME.

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEA IN STATE DEPARTMENT. THEY SAY THAT THEY HAVE NOT REACHED A FINAL DETERMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD THEM THAT, UNDER INITIAL INTERROGATION, THOSE APPREHENDED CONFESSED TO BEING MEMBERS OF THE PLF/AAF, AND SAID THAT THEY WERE TO ATTACK CIVILIAN TARGETS IN THE TEL AVIV AREA. THEY APPARENTLY HAD MAPS OF TEL AVIV. THE ISRAELIS HAVE PROMISED FURTHER INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE. STATE SAY THAT THE ISRAELI INFORMATION, TAKEN WITH THE CLAIM IN THE NAME OF THE PLF/AAF ISSUED IN BAGHDAD, POINTS STRONGLY IN ONE DIRECTION, BUT THEY WILL BE GOING THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE BEFORE REACHING A CONCLUSION.

4. STATE SAY THAT, IF THE ABU ABBAS FACTION WERE FOUND TO BE RESPONSIBLE, PROSPECTS FOR THE US/PLO DIALOGUE WOULD BE BLEAK. THE SCALE OF THE OPERATION MEANT THAT CONSIDERABLE ORGANISATION, MONEY AND TRAINING WERE INVOLVED. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT THIS WAS THE WORK OF A FEW DISSIDENT MEMBERS. GIVEN

ABU ABBAS' POSITION AS A MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE ATTACK INEVITABLY CALLED INTO QUESTION THE PLO'S RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM. THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY MADE A DEMARCHE TO STATE DEPARTMENT TO HALT THE US/PLO DIALOGUE.

5. STATE SAID THAT PELLETREAU WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT TO SEEK THE PLO'S RESPONSE. A FORTHRIGHT DENUNCIATION OF THE ATTACK WAS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM REQUIRED. IF THE PLF/AAF WERE FOUND TO BE RESPONSIBLE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD ALSO BE LOOKING FOR ACTION BY THE PLO AGAINST THEM - PROBABLY EXPULSION. BUT IT MIGHT TAKE A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY WAS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR FOR THEM TO PRESS THE PLO ON THIS.

COMMENT

6. CLEARLY MUCH WILL DEPEND ON ARAFAT'S RESPONSE TO THIS INCIDENT. BUT EVEN IF A PLO CONDEMNATION IS FORTHCOMING, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL COME UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY IN CONGRESS, WHO HAVE OPPOSED THE DIALOGUE FROM THE START, TO BRING IT TO AN END. AS OF TODAY, STATE ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUSTAINING THE US/PLO DIALOGUE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

16

ADVANCE 16

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/NAD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TUNIS

TO DESKBY 271200Z FCO

TELNO 167

OF 271145Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BAGHDAD

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, DUBLIN, PARIS, MOSCOW

TELECON WITH RESIDENT CLERK: PLO AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MIPT

CONTINUED PARA 9 ...

9. HE HAD TO SHOW THE ARAB WORLD HE WAS NOT IN WASHINGTON'S POCKET. THE SUMMIT WAS HIS SUMMIT: HE HAD REQUESTED IT AND IT WAS BEING HELD ON HIS TERMS. THE SITUATION FACING HIM TODAY WAS ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED. HE HAD TO REPLY TO THE AMERICANS: THEY HAVE LOST THEIR OWN SELF-RESPECT, BUT THEY MUST RESPECT HIM. HE WOULD USE THE PLATFORM OF THE SUMMIT TO TEACH THEM WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE ARAB WORLD AND MAKE THEM TAKE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE SERIOUSLY. DID THEY WANT A FIRE TO CONSUME THEIR ARABS ALLIES - THE CINDERS WERE NOW BEING FANNED AND IF THEY DID NOT CHANGE COURSE, THEY WOULD SOON FIND A SITUATION BEYOND ANYONE'S CONTROL.

10. ARAFAT WENT ON TO STRESS THAT HE WAS NOT MAKING THREATS. BUT HE HAD TO REFLECT POPULAR FEELINGS. RECENT EVENTS IN JORDAN, EG EGYPT, ALGERIA - 'EVEN SAUDI ARABIA' (HE CITED A RECENT CONGRONTATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF KASEEM AND THE KING) - WERE WARNINGS. HE BROUGH YASIR ABDERROBH INTO THE CONVERSATION - HE HAD DESPATCHED HIM FROM BAGHDAD TO AMMAN TO BRING THE SITUATION IN THE CAMPS UNDER CONTROL: IT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PROCESS: FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS THE YOUNG PEOPLE WERE IGNORING ORDERS OF THE JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN LEADERS. IT WAS NOT SIMPLY A SITUATION STIRRED UP BY ISLAMISTS: THEY WERE EXPLOITING DEEP POPULAR FEELINGS. THE NEXT TIME ROUND, PLO LEADERS WOULD BE BRUSHED ASIDE. ABDERROBH COMMENTED THAT HIS SPELL IN AMMAN HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OF ANY TASK HE HAD UNDERTAKEN. ARAFAT ADDED THAT EGYPT WAS ALSO A GREAT CONCERN: SEVERAL NASTY INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE: MUBARAK HAD ASKED HIM TO CALL IN AT CAIRO ON HIS WAY TO BAGHDAD, BUT HE COULD NOT HELP HIM. (THE IMPLICATION OF THIS REMARK I TOOK TO BE - SAUVE

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE ROOM COPY

27 MAY 1990 13:25

DESPATCHED

QUI PEUT: HE COULD DO NOTHING FOR MUBARAK AND MUBARAK COULD NOT HELP HIM EITHER.)

11. I LED HIM BACK TO THE BASIC ISSUES, STRESSING THAT HE SHOULD NOT REACT IN A PRICIPITATE MANNER TO UNSC ACTIVITY: THE THREADS WOULD BE PICKED UP IN NEW YORK AND HE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO CONCENTRATE ON PRIVATE DIPLOMACY. AS FOR THE SUMMIT, HE KNEW OUR VIEWS: THE MORE PRECISELY IT WAS TARGETTED THE MORE IT WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT: THE ISSUE WAS SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AND THE SITUATION IN THE TERRITORIES: ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC WOULD PLEASE ONLY THE ISRAELIS AND NEWSPAPER EDITORS. I REMINDED HIM OF HIS REMARKS ABOUT LEADERSHIP AND HIS (REGULAR) CRITICISMS OF HIS FELLOW ARAB LEADERS: NOW WAS THE TIME TO SHOW REAL LEADERSHIP, FORMING, NOT FOLLOWING, PUBLIC OPINION.

COMMENT

12. I HAVE REPORTED THIS CONVERSATION AT SOME LENGTH, TO GIVE THE FLAVOUR AND BECAUSE I FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SUMMARISE WITH CONFIDENCE WHAT ARAFAT'S REAL INTENTIONS WERE.

13. HE HAD SPENT TWO HOURS EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH MR COLLINS, SPEAKING FAIRLY POSITIVELY ABOUT THE AMERICANS, CERTAINLY PREDICTING 'CATASTROPHE' IN THE REGION (HE USUALLY DOES) BUT GIVING AN IMPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE AND SUCCESSFUL PLO DIPLOMACY (THE SUMMIT AND THE UNSC DEBATE).

14. I AM SURE HIS WORST FEAR IS THAT THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WILL BE FORGOTTEN. THE FACT THAT HE IS FOR THE TIME BEING CENTRE STAGE AND MAKING THE NEWS IS SATISFYING - HE LOOKS IN GOOD FORM. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS A VERY EMOTIONAL MAN AND I AM SURE HIS FEELINGS FOR ORDINARY PALESTINIANS IN GAZA ETC ARE GENUINE.

15. HE IS CAUGHT IN A TRAP. UNLESS CASUALTIES RISE AND THE MOOD IN THE ARAB WORLD DETERIORATES, HE FEARS THE WEST WILL QUIETLY ABANDON HIS CAUSE, AT THE SAME TIME HE KNOWS THAT THE PRICE IN HUMAN TERMS GETS HIGHER EACH TIME ROUND. AND I BELIEVE HE IS ENTIRELY GENUINE IN FORESEEING A SITUATION THAT HE CAN NO LONGER CONTROL. HE DESPAIRS OF COMMUNICATING HIS FEARS TO WASHINGTON AND THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO ASK HMG TO COMMUNICATE FOR HIM. HE IS CLEARLY CONFUSED AND WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK THINGS OVER.

DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

155605
MDADA 3810

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TUNIS

TO DESKBY 271200Z FCO

TELNO 166

OF 271145Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BAGHDAD

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, DUBLIN, PARIS, MOSCOW

ADVANCE COPY
*ms*TELECON WITH RESIDENT CLERK: PLO AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY


1. ARAFAT ANGRY WITH AMERICANS. ACCUSING THE US ADMINISTRATION OF RENEGING ON A DEAL STRUCK BEFORE THE UNSC DEBATE AT GENEVA HE THREATENS TO REPLY PUBLICLY TO THEM AT THE ARAB SUMMIT (CONVENING TODAY, 27/5). HE DESCRIBES WITH RESIGNATION A POPULAR MOOD OF ANTI-ISRAELI AND ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT HE CANNOT RESIST MUCH LONGER. I URGE HIM TO GIVE DIPLOMACY A CHANCE AND TO KEEP THE SUMMIT FOCUSSED ON PRACTICAL MEASURES, STRESSING THE POINT THAT AN ANTI-AMERICAN ARAB SUMMIT WOULD DELIGHT ISRAELI HARDLINERS.

DETAIL

2. ARAFAT ASKED ME TO CALL AT SHORT NOTICE LATE IN THE EVENING OF 26/5. WE HAD 50 MINS TOGETHER, MOST WITH ONLY NOTE-TAKERS, BUT YASIR ABDERROBH JOINED TOWARDS THE END. ARAFAT WAS REFLECTIVE: THOUGH SPEAKING WITH DEEP EMOTION HE PICKED HIS WORDS CAREFULLY AND AVOIDED HISTORICALS.

3. HE Began BY SAYING HE HAD AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR HMG. HE WAS SORRY TO INFORM US THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PLAYING A "VERY DIRTY ROLE" OVER THE UNSC DEBATE. THEY HAD BETRAYED HIM PERSONALLY - NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME.

4. HE THEN GAVE HIS ACCOUNT OF RECENT US/PLO NEGOTIATIONS: AT SEVERAL POINTS HE STRESSED THAT THE INITIATIVE HAD COME FROM THE AMERICANS. THIS HAD PLEASED HIM, ESPECIALLY THE FACT THAT US AND PLO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK WERE FOR THE FIRST TIME WORKING SERIOUSLY TOGETHER. THEY HAD FIRST CONTACTED HIM IN TUNIS THROUGH BASSAM ABU SHARIF AND BELAWI TO SAY THAT THEY DID NOT WISH HIM TO APPLY FOR A US VISA BUT THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE A MOVE TO GENEVA AND WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME TO THE DEBATE. THERE HAD BEEN PROFESSIONS - APPARENTLY SINCERE - OF CONCERN ABOUT

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

THE RECENT COURSE OF EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND OTS.

5. NEGOTIATIONS, HE CLAIMED, THEN BEGAN BETWEEN THE TWO PERMANENT MISSIONS. THE AMERICANS MADE A PROPOSAL - A MISSION TO INSPECT AND REPORT HEADED BY THE FINNISH PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCIL AND INCLUDING OTHER UNSC REPRESENTATIVES AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SG.. THEN THEY RETURNED TO SAY THIS WAS NOT SELLABLE TO THE ISRAELIS

THE CANADIANS WERE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE FINNS: ARAFAT ACCEPTED. THEN, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, THE AMERICANS HAD BACKED OFF ALTOGETHER: THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MISSION, SO THE AMERICANS WOULD 'BETRAY' THE PALESTINIANS. HAD THEY NO SELF-RESPECT? HE WOULD NOT BE TREATED IN THIS WAY.

6. ARAFAT THEN SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIANS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL AND THE MOOD IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE CLAIMED THAT IN THE PAST SIX DAYS 29 PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN KILLED AND OVER 2000 WOUNDED. THIS PUT THE MASSACRES OF PEKING AND BUCHAREST INTO PERSPECTIVE. WAS THE WEST, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, CONTENT TO DO NOTHING?

7. I TRIED, WITH LITTLE SUCCESS, TO LEAD HIM ON SPECIFICS. THOUGH I WAS NOT UP TO DATE ON EVENTS IN GENEVA I HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAD MOVED BACK TO NEW YORK AND THE DEBATE SET TO RESUME ON TUESDAY. HMG AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS WERE COMMITTED TO WORKING FOR A PRACTICAL OUTCOME AND WERE USING SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY HAD IN WASHINGTON. I SAID THAT WE EUROPEANS IN TUNIS HAD JUST BEEN BRIEFED ON HIS, ARAFAT'S, LUNCH A FEW HOURS EARLIER WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: THE MOOD THERE HAD SEEMED RATHER GOOD. JUST WHAT HAD CHANGED THE SITUATION SO DRAMATICALLY? ARAFAT EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING A SERIES OF MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO HIM PERSONALLY BY THE AMERICANS: AT GENEVA, FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED FOUR TIMES BY THE EGYPTIANS ON THEIR BEHALF, EACH TIME ASSURING HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE. BUT HE HAD JUST LEARNED THAT HE HAD BEEN TRICKED. HE WOULD NOT SAY WHAT MESSAGE HAD JUST COME THROUGH, NOR HOW. I ADVISED HIM NOT TO REACT HURRIEDLY: WE, THE BRITISH, WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE VOLATILE MOOD IN THE ARAB WORLD: FEELINGS WERE RUNNING HIGH: IT WAS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE USED: HE SHOULD NOT PUT AT RISK THE SUBSTANTIAL GAINS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS.

8. ARAFAT TOOK THIS WELL BUT WENT ON TO EXPLAIN CALMLY AND FRANKLY THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS SITUATION. HE WAS THE LEADER

OF HIS PEOPLE, INDEED ARGUABLY THE NEAREST THE ARAB WORLD HAD TO A POPULAR FIGUREHEAD. HE WOULD NEVER BETRAY HIS PEOPLE AND HE WOULD NOT MISLEAD THEM. HE HAD GONE A VERY LONG WAY DOWN THE AMERICAN ROAD BUT HE COULD SEE A POINT QUITE SOON BEYOND WHICH NO ARAB WOULD FOLLOW HIM. HE WAS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE INTIFADHA TO PERMIT A HIGHER LEVEL OF VIOLENCE: HE WAS USING ALL HIS INFLUENCE TO STOP THEM. WERE WE FOLLOWING EVENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD: DID WE NOT KNOW HOW DANGEROUS THE PUBLIC MOOD WAS? I SAID WE DID AND REFERRED HIM TO YOUR RECENT SPEECH TO THE ANGO- SAUDI SOCIETY AND THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT ON RECENT PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES: IT WAS BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN THAT WE HAD ADVISED ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SUMMIT AND NOT TO RETURN TO THE TIRED RHETORIC OF BLAMING EVERYTHING ON THE AMERICANS. THE PLO HAD GONE A LONG WAY IN OPENING UP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV: OF COURSE WE ALL WISHED FOR EARLIER PROGRESS BUT THE GAINS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS SHOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED FOR SHORT-TERM POPULARITY. AN ANTI-WESTERN ARAB SUMMIT WOULD BE A RETREAT TO THE BAD OLD DAYS. ARAFAT QUICKLY INTERJECTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ANTI-WESTERN - THE ARABS HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH EUROPE: THE ISSUE WAS AMERICA.

9. SEE MY MIFT .

DAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

134331
MDHIAN 1350

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MUSCAT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 175

OF 200800Z MAY 90.

AND TO IMMEDIATE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 171(NOT TO ALL):OMAN/IRAN/LEBANESE HOSTAGES

SUMMARY

1. OMAN FOREIGN MINISTER REPORTS ON CONTACTS WITH IRAN AND RAFSANJANI'S PLEA TO THE WEST TO ENCOURAGE THE RELEASE OF FURTHER HOSTAGES BY A GESTURE TOWARDS THE HIZBULLAH.

DETAIL

2. AS EXPECTED (TUR) , YUSUF ALAWI INVITED ME TO CALL ON HIM YESTERDAY EVENING (19 MAY) BUT HIS MAIN MESSAGE WAS ABOUT HOSTAGES IN LEBANON.

3. HE SAID THAT AT HIS MEETING WITH RAFSANJANI IN TEHRAN ON 11 MAY, THE LATTER HAD DESCRIBED HIS EFFORTS TO FREE THE HOSTAGES IN LEBANON AS A GESTURE TOWARDS THE WEST. HE HAD TRIED HIS BEST AND HAD SUCCEEDED IN THE RELEASE OF TWO AMERICANS, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO THIS INITIATIVE FROM THE AMERICANS. RAFSANJANI NOW FELT THAT HE COULD DO NO MORE. THE HIZBULLAH IN LEBANON FELT ANGRY AND CHEATED. OMAN WANTED TO ENCOURAGE RAFSANJANI TO CONTINUE AND ALAWI HAD ASKED WHAT KIND OF A GESTURE HE EXPECTED. RAFSANJANI HAD REPLIED THAT THE USA SHOULD BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF LEBANESE SHIA HELD BY ISRAEL. HE ASKED WHETHER OMAN COULD HELP HIM BY PERSUADING THE ALLIES OF THE USA TO DO SOMETHING TO CONVINCE THE HIZBULLAH THAT THEIR GESTURE HAD NOT BEEN IN VAIN.

4. ALAWI SAID HE HOPED WE IN BRITAIN AND THE EC AS A WHOLE WOULD LISTEN TO THE IRANIANS' PLEA. IT SEEMED THE ONLY WAY FORWARD ON THE OTHER HOSTAGES. I REFERRED TO BISHOP JOHN BROWN'S EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN THE POSITION OF CERTAIN SHIA BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN KIDNAPPED. ALAWI SAID THERE WERE MANY OTHERS IN ISRAELI HANDS. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR RAFSANJANI'S POSITION AND IRAN'S OPENING TOWARDS THE WEST THAT FURTHER EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE WHICH WOULD GO AT LEAST SOME WAY TO SATISFYING THE HIZBULLAH.

COMMENT

5 . ALAWI IS LEAVING ON 22 MAY FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT PREPARATORY

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13463
MDHIAN 1330

MEETING AND IS ALSO LIKELY TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT THEREAFTER.
HE REMAINS IN CONTACT WITH THE IRANIANS ON OTHER MATTERS (SEE
MIPT- NOT TO ALL) AND WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS WE WOULD WISH
TO HAVE FED BACK.

CLARK

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

142

MAIN

134

.LEBANON KIDNAPPINGS
LIMITED
SCD
NENAD
PUSD
CONSULAR D
NEWS D
INFO D
MED
SECURITY D
ECD(E)
RAD
PLANNERS
PRU

DEFENCE D
WED
SED
PS
PS/LORD BRABAZON
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR BROOMFIELD
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MISS SPENCER
MR MOSS
MR SLATER

ADDITIONAL

B

LEBANON KIDNAPPINGS

NNNN

①
SECRET

Pa ①

SECRET

UK EYES ALPHA

FM UNHIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FOO

TELNO 584

OF 170035Z MAY 93

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

m

MY TELNO 577 : HOSTAGES AND LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RECEIVED REPORTS THAT WAITE IS ALIVE AND WELL. GOES ON TO HINT THE AMERICANS MAY NOT BE PLAYING STRAIGHT.

DETAIL

2. DURING A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 16 MAY I MENTIONED THE QUESTION OF HOSTAGES. HAD HE ANY NEWS? AS HE WOULD REALISE WE WERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOLLOWING THE RECENT RELEASE OF THE TWO U S HOSTAGES.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS. HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT HIS INVARIABLE POSITION WAS TO INSIST THAT HIS RESPONSIBILITY EXTENDED TO ALL HOSTAGES, NOT ONLY THE AMERICAN ONES. HE HAD MADE THIS POINT VIGOROUSLY AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, VELAYATI HAD A HABIT OF SPEAKING ABOUT U S HOSTAGES, NO DOUBT BECAUSE HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO GET AT FROZEN IRANIAN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT HE INVARIABLY CORRECTED HIM.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT WHEN IN EUROPE EARLIER THIS MONTH HE HAD HEARD THAT TERRY WAITE WAS ALIVE AND WELL. NO DOUBT WE HAD HAD THE SAME NEWS. IT WAS THE BEST HE HAD HEARD FOR SOME TIME.

5. I SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD ASK THOSE CONCERNED IN THE SECRETARIAT WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING MORE TO TELL US. PEREZ DE CUELLAR UNDERTOOK TO DO SO. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE AMERICANS' POSITION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT AS WE NO DOUBT KNEW, THE UNITED STATES HAD A PRIVATE CONTACT WITH THE IRANIANS IN THE HAGUE: THEY ALSO EXCHANGED MESSAGES WITH THE IRANIANS THROUGH THE SECRETARIAT.

SECRET

①

6/—


②
SECRET

6. I UNDERLINED THAT WE HAD ALWAYS PLAYED THIS GAME STRAIGHT: OUR PUBLIC POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN: THE AMERICANS SAID THEIR POSITION WAS THE SAME. AT THIS POINT PEREZ DE CUELLAR MURMURED WITH SOME EMBARRASSMENT: "WHO KNOWS? WHO KNOWS?". HE FELT THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON BUT DID NOT ALWAYS KNOW EXACTLY WHAT. HE ADDED THAT THE SIGNALS WERE CONFUSING. HE SOMETIMES WONDERED IF THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE U S ADMINISTRATION KNEW WHAT EACH OTHER WAS DOING.


TICKELL


MAIN
NO DISTRIBUTION
HD/NAD
HD/SCD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/NEWS D
PS
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
MR P J WESTON
MR BEAMISH
MR SLATER
MR GORE BOOTH
MR MCLAREN
PS/NO. 10
NO. 10 PRESS OFFICE
CABINET OFFICE


SECRET
②

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3073 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: CRADOCK TO POWELL 11.5.1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	RDoney 18.11.2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	PREM 19 3073	Date and sign
Extract details:	POWELL TO WALL 9.5.1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION		
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958		RHONEY 18/11/2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED		21 November 2016 (Chayland)
MISSING AT TRANSFER		
NUMBER NOT USED		
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)		
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)		

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM 19</u> PIECE/ITEM <u>3073</u> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <u>HURD TO PM</u> <u>8.5.1990</u>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<u>RHOREY</u> <u>18.11.2016</u>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<u>21 November 2016</u> <u>Wayland</u>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM 3073 (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: POWELL TO WALL 2.5.1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	RETAINED 18.11.2016
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	21 November 2016 C. Wayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <u>PREM19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>3073</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <u>folio 3</u> Letter from Powell to Wail dated 2 May 1990	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	21 November 2016 C. Mayland
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

CONFIDENTIAL

172477
MDADAN 9479

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 010830Z FCO
TELNO 672
OF 010410Z MAY 90
INFO DESKBY 010600Z JEDDA
INFO IMMEDIATE TUNIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, TEL AVIV
INFO IMMEDIATE JERUSALEM, CAIRO
INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

JEDDA FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MY TELNO 665: ISRAELI ACTION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SUMMARY

1. DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PUT TO THE VOTE LATE ON 31 MAY.
AMERICANS VETO. 14 VOTES IN FAVOUR.

DETAIL

2. DURING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE MORNING OF 31 MAY THE YEMENI AMBASSADOR ANNOUNCED THAT THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS WOULD ALL CO-SPONSOR THE ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION, AMENDED BY THE INSERTION OF THE NEW PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH THAT I HAD PROPOSED (PARA 1 OF TUR). THERE SHOULD BE A VOTE BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY. THE U S REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT MEMBERS WOULD RECONVENE IN THE LATE AFTERNOON. IN THE MEANTIME EFFORTS WERE MADE TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO ABSTAIN IF THE RESOLUTION WERE PUT TO THE VOTE. SHORTLY BEFORE THE RESUMED MEETING THE PLO - ACTING, THEY SAID, ON MY ADVICE - OFFERED TO DELAY THE VOTE IF THAT WOULD HELP THE AMERICANS TO AVOID CASTING A VETO. BY THEN THE AMERICANS HAD DECIDED TO VETO IN ANY CASE, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE VOTE SHOULD GO AHEAD.

3. FOLLOWING BRIEF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH HAD BEEN ADJOURNED IN GENEVA ON 26 MAY, WAS RESUMED. AHMED (PAKISTAN) SPOKE BRIEFLY, EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT'S PROPOSALS IN GENEVA FOR THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. BEIN (ISRAEL) MADE AN AGGRESSIVE SPEECH WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY A REWORKING OF THAT MADE BY THE ISRAELI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (NETANYAHU) IN GENEVA (UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 363 REFERS). BEIN GLOSSED OVER THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND CLAIMED THAT ISRAEL HAD THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO ADMINISTER THEM. THIS POINT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PICKED UP AND USED

TO GOOD EFFECT BY MAKSOUD (ARAB LEAGUE). HATANO (JAPAN) MADE A TOUGH SPEECH CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT A NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

4. THE COUNCIL THEN VOTED ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THERE WERE 14 VOTES IN FAVOUR BUT THE AMERICANS EXERCISED THEIR VETO. IN AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE PICKERING (UNITED STATES) REAFFIRMED UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A VISIT TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY A SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE URGED ALL PARTIES TO BE FLEXIBLE AND PERMIT SUCH A MISSION. THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION BECAUSE IT DID NOT FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. VORONTSOV (SOVIET UNION) EXPRESSED SORROW THAT IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BLOCK A SENSIBLE AND MODERATE RESOLUTION. PEOPLE WERE DYING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND IT WAS THE JOB OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DECIDE HOW TO PROTECT THEM. TERZI (PALESTINE) SAID IT WAS UNPARDONABLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS VETO TO PREVENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES. THE UNITED STATES TALKED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS BUT PREVENTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM INVESTIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AL-ALFI (YEMEN) SAID THAT THE NEGATIVE AMERICAN VOTE WOULD INEVITABLY CAUSE A REACTION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE STRESSED THAT THE PROPOSAL TO DISPATCH A SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION HAD BEEN SEEN BY THE ARABS AS ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARDS PROTECTING PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. THE ARABS WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD OTHER PROPOSALS. THEY HOPED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD REQUIRE A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE. THE ISSUE WAS FAR FROM CLOSED.

5. FOR COMMENT SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

172477
MDADAN 9479

DISTRIBUTION

16

ADVANCE 16

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Important information
about the bombings

Appalling
we should... C.D.D.
215.
mt

SECRET /DEDIP

DEDIP
SECRET

M DAMASCUS
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 381

OF 011255Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, JIS CYPRUS

2La-b)

RELEASE OF REED

SUMMARY

1. REED HELD WITH KEENAN AND MCCARTHY UP TO 29 APRIL. DYNAMIC STILL OPAQUE BUT SYRIA PLAYING A SIGNIFICANT ROLE.

TEXT

2. DHM AND I WERE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE BY A US EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO FORMED PART OF THE INITIAL DEBRIEFING TEAM FOR FRANK REED, THE AMERICAN HOSTAGE RELEASED IN BEIRUT ON 30 APRIL.

3. REED TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS AT HIS INITIAL DEBRIEFING IN DAMASCUS THAT HE HAD BEEN HELD SINCE OCTOBER 1988 IN A BUILDING, NEAR THE HAY AL SALAAM MOSQUE IN THE SOUTHERN BEIRUT SUBURB OF BURJ AL BARAJINAH. HE HAD BEEN BLINDFOLDED FOR MOST OF THE TIME, STRAPPED TO HIS BED. HE HAD SHARED CAPTIVITY IN THIS BUILDING WITH JOHN MCCARTHY AND BRIAN KEENAN, BOTH WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN, UP UNTIL HIS DEPARTURE FROM THAT LOCATION ON THE EVENING OF 29 APRIL. ACCORDING TO REED, BOTH KEENAN AND MCCARTHY HAD BEEN BEATEN BUT WERE NOT IN BAD PHYSICAL CONDITION. HE HAD LAST SEEN THESE TWO BRITISH HOSTAGES ON 29 APRIL. KEENAN'S TOUGHNESS AND RESILIENCE HAD IMPRESSED REED. KEENAN WAS INSISTENT THAT HE WANTED NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY HOSTAGE DEALS THAT MIGHT INVOLVE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT; HE WAS AN IRISHMAN FROM THE REPUBLIC AND PROUD OF IT.

4. KEENAN AND MCCARTHY WERE AT THIS LOCATION WHEN REED ARRIVED THERE IN OCTOBER 1988. REED HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN HELD IN A SUBTERRANEAN PRISON, WHICH HE TERMED THE PIT AND HE PRESUMED TO BE IN THE BIQA VALLEY. THE PIT FORMED PART OF A PRISON HOUSE IN WHICH, AT VARIOUS TIMES, REED CLAIMS HE WAS HELD WITH THE FOLLOWING: A SOUTH KOREAN, FATHER JENKO AND A FRENCHMAN (ALL NOW RELEASED) AND SUTHERLAND AND ANDERSON (STILL HELD).

5. IN ALL REED SAYS HE WAS MOVED 15 TIMES TO AND OUT OF THESE LOCATIONS DURING HIS 3 YEARS AND 9 MONTHS OF CAPTIVITY. NEVERTHELESS, HE EMERGED FROM HIS ORDEAL IN GOOD MENTAL AND PHYSICAL SHAPE INSPITE OF LOOKING A BIT PALE AND HAVING LOST WEIGHT. HIS DEBRIEFERS FOUND HIS VOICE FRAIL BUT THAT HE WAS EAGER TO TALK. HOWEVER HIS TESTIMONY BORE SIGNS OF SOME INCONSISTENCIES. AND HIS DEBRIEFERS WERE SURPRISED THAT HE SAW SO MANY OTHER FOREIGN HOSTAGES WHEN HE SPENT SO MUCH OF HIS TIME BLINDFOLDED. HE THOUGHT HE WAS THE LAST HOSTAGE TO BE RELEASED AND YET HE SPOKE OF TERRY WAITE STILL BEING HELD (IN HIS VIEW) IN THE OLD IRANIAN EMBASSY BUILDING IN BEIRUT. HIS DEBRIEFERS AT WIESBADEN WILL FORM A MORE CONSIDERED VIEW OF HIS RELIABILITY.

6. REED EMERGED WITH NO WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM THE CAPTORS, ONLY VERBAL AND OFT-REPEATED VIBES THAT ALL THE CAPTORS WANTED WAS SOMEONE FROM THE US AND OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED TO TALK TO.

SECRET /DEDIP

(1)

DYNAMIC /

SECRET /AEDIP

DYNAMIC

7. US EMBASSY IS STILL UNSURE EXACTLY WHAT THE DYNAMIC AT WORK HERE IS. BUT IT BELIEVES THAT THE RELEASE COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT STRONG IRANIAN COMMITMENT AND PRESSURE ON THE CAPTORS. HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS HAVE PLAYED A KEY FACILITATING ROLE IN TRANSLATING WASHINGTON'S POSITION TO TEHERAN AND IN GIVING THE IRANIANS COVER AND MORAL SUPPORT. EMBASSY DID NOT THINK THAT THE RELEASE COULD HAVE HAPPENED WITHOUT SYRIA. BUT EXACTLY HOW MUCH CREDIT SYRIA SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR STARTING THE PROCESS REMAINED UNCLEAR.

9. REED IS THE SECOND OF THE TWO HOSTAGES WHOM THE SYRIANS ORIGINALLY SAID WOULD BE RELEASED. EMBASSY WAS UNSURE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WANTED ALL RPT ALL THE HOSTAGES RELEASED. ONLY THEN COULD US-IRANIAN RELATIONS IMPROVE. THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE US WOULD NOT LISTEN TO, FAR LESS MEET ANY COUNTER DEMANDS FROM IRAN OR THE KIDNAPPERS UNTIL ALL THE HOSTAGES WERE OUT. THE SYRIANS SUGGESTION THAT THE RELEASE OF 2 HOSTAGES REQUIRED A RECIPROCAL GESTURE FROM WASHINGTON HAD BEEN FIRMLY REJECTED.

COMMENT

9. BOTH SYRIA AND IRAN STAND TO GAIN FROM ENDING THE HOSTAGE SAGA ONCE AND FOR ALL. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, APART FROM PRESIDENT BUSH'S THANKS, THEY APPEAR UNLIKELY TO GET ANY SWEETENERS FROM WASHINGTON UNTIL THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ARE RELEASED. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IRANIAN PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI IS ABLE OR WILLING TO EXERT THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY TO ACHIEVE THIS. HOW THE RELEASE DYNAMIC WILL DEVELOP IS THUS HARD TO PREDICT.

10. DESPITE THE INCONSISTENCIES IN REED'S FIRST DEBRIEF, IT APPEARS THAT 2 OF OUR POSSIBLE 5 (INCLUDING COLLETT) BRITISH HOSTAGES ARE ALIVE AND IN THE HANDS OF A GROUP WHICH MAY BE READY TO CONSIDER THEIR EARLY RELEASE. BIS' CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR HANDLING THEIR RELEASE THROUGH DAMASCUS ARE IN PLACE. WE HOPE YOU WILL STILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY AN AIRCRAFT AT SHORT NOTICE TO PICK THEM UP IF REQUIRED.

11. WE ARE GIVING THIS TELEGRAM A HIGHLY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION SO THAT YOU CAN BE THE JUDGE OF HOW WIDELY ITS CONTENTS SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED. DO YOU WISH US TO BRIEF THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR?

DAVIES

NO DISTRIBUTION
HD. SCD.

HD. NEWAD

HD. MEID.

HD. NEWS A.

HD. PUSA

APHA. AUSA.

PSI

PS/MR. WALDEGRAVE

PS/PUS

MR. TOMKYS

MR. BROOMFIELD

MR. SLATER

MR. GORE-BOOTH

MRS. HANCOCK RESEARCH DEPT.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

99 BOX 500

ASSESSMENT STAFF CABINET OFFICE.

SECRET /AEDIP

(2)

SECRET / DEDIP

GRS 700

SECRET

UK COMMS ONLY

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 020930Z FCO

TELNO 1703

OF 012257Z MAY 93

AND TO DESKBY 020930Z CABINET OFFICE

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JIS CYPRUS

SIC

PERSONAL FOR GREEN, SCD

FROM TORRY

CABINET OFFICE FOR WIGHTMAN, ASSESSMENTS STAFF

DAMASCUS TELNO 031: RELEASE OF REED

1. AMBASSADOR BUSBY, COUNTER TERRORISM AT STATE DEPARTMENT, BRIEFED ME ON 1 MAY ON REED'S RELEASE.
2. HIS ACCOUNT CONFIRMED ALL THE DETAILS IN DAMASCUS TUR BUT ADDED LITTLE TO IT. REED CERTAINLY THOUGHT HE WAS THE LAST US HOSTAGE TO BE RELEASED BUT ALSO THOUGHT THAT KEENAN AND MCCARTHY WERE GOING TO BE RELEASED WITH HIM. BUSBY CONFIRMED THAT REED HAD NEVER SEEN WAITE BUT THOUGHT HIM TO HAVE BEEN HELD AT ONE STAGE IN THE OLD IRANIAN EMBASSY BUILDING.
3. REED SAID THAT MCCARTHY AND KEENAN HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SEVERE BEATINGS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS INCLUDING - ONCE - ON A CHRISTMAS DAY. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN CHAINED TO HIS BED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SIT UP. HE HAD SEEN DAYLIGHT ONLY ONCE IN HIS ENTIRE CAPTIVITY. HE HAD RECEIVED ADEQUATE FRESH FOOD. MCCARTHY AND KEENAN WOULD HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR TREATMENT.
4. REED IS ANXIOUS TO TELEPHONE KEENAN AND MCCARTHY'S FAMILIES. (YOU ARE PASSING US THE MCCARTHY NUMBER). BUSBY HAS NO OBJECTION TO YOUR INFORMING THEM OF WHAT REED HAD TO SAY ABOUT THEIR CONDITION. BUT HE MADE VERY CLEAR THAT THE US (AND REED) WOULD NOT WANT ANY OF THIS TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD IT BE TRACEABLE TO REED. BUSBY WAS STRUCK BY THE CONCERN WHICH BOTH REED AND POLHILL SHARED THAT NOTHING WHICH THEY MIGHT SAY OR DO AFTER THEIR RELEASE SHOULD COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR THE REMAINING HOSTAGES.
5. AS TO THE WAY AHEAD, BUSBY SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD INITIALLY SAID THAT TWO HOSTAGES WOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND, DESPITE A HICCUP JUST PRIOR TO POLHILL'S RELEASE, THAT HAD HAPPENED. THEY WERE NOW TELLING THE ADMINISTRATION THAT, WITH THE HOSTAGE-TAKERS HAVING SHOWN THEIR GOOD FAITH, IT WAS NOW UP TO THE AMERICANS TO DO SOMETHING. WHAT THE IRANIANS WERE LOOKING FOR WAS THE RELEASE OF THE 400-500 SHIITE PRISONERS HELD BY ISRAEL, THE RELEASE OF OBEID, AND THE RETURN OF THE FOUR IRANIAN HOSTAGES (WHOM THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE LONG SINCE THOUGHT TO BE DEAD). BUSBY SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOTH SYRIA AND IRAN WANTED THE US TO ACT AS MIDDLEMAN TO BRING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. BUT THE US WERE UNWILLING TO DO THIS. BUSBY DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY PRESSURE ON OR SUGGESTION BY THE US TO ISRAEL TO ACCEDE TO IRAN'S DEMANDS, DESPITE SOME HEAVY HANDED HINTS BY SOME US SPOKESMEN YESTERDAY THAT RELEASES BY ISRAEL WOULD CAUSE THE US NO PROBLEMS.

SECRET DEDIP

①

6./

SECRET / bcdip

b

6. ACCORDING TO BUSBY, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE NOW STRUGGLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM GOING. SOME THINK THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO SIT STILL WHILE OTHERS THINK THEY SHOULD QUOTE DO SOMETHING UNQUOTE. BUT BUSBY SAID THAT IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR WHAT THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE. HE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT WHATEVER THE ADMINISTRATION DID (IF IT DID ANYTHING) WOULD NOT COMPROMISE ITS BASIC POSITION OF REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE. HE ARGUED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF CREATING CONDITIONS, IN WHICH THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORTED THE HOSTAGE TAKERS CAME TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR POLICIES WERE LEADING NOWHERE AND WERE DAMAGING ONLY THEMSELVES, WAS BEARING FRUIT. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR THE US TO START TRYING TO CUT DEALS AT THIS STAGE. BUSBY WAS CONCERNED THAT, EG, MEMBERS OF THE EC MIGHT RESPOND TO THE TWO RELEASES BY MOVING TO MODIFY SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. BUSBY THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE SIGNAL TO SEND.

7. BUSBY REPEATED THAT THE RECENT TWO RELEASES HAD BEEN THE EASY PART: PROGRESS FROM NOW ON WOULD BE MUCH HARDER. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT EARLY PROGRESS. OVER THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HAD DECIDED TO PUT THE HOSTAGE ISSUE BEHIND THEM, HAVING COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS NO LONGER IN THEIR INTERESTS. IF THAT WERE SO, THERE WAS SOME HOPE THAT FURTHER RELEASES (AND EVENTUALLY THE RELEASE OF ALL WESTERN HOSTAGES) WOULD TAKE PLACE. MEANWHILE, AS WE WOULD HAVE SEEN ON OTHER CHANNELS, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE OF MANOEUVRING OVER THE SWISS AND POSSIBLY THE BELGIAN HOSTAGES.

ACLAND

NO DISTRIBUTION
HD. 3CD.

HD. NENAD

HD. MEID.

HD. NEWS A.

HD. PUSA

APHD. PUSD.

PS

PS/MR. WALDERGAVE

PS/PUS

MR. TOMKYS

MR. BROOMFIELD

MR. SLATER

MR. ROSE-BOTH

MRS. HANCOCK RESEARCH DEPT.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

99 BOX 500

ASSESSMENT STAFF CABINET OFFICE.

SECRET / bcdip

(2)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 952
OF 252325Z APRIL 90
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY NEW YORK

TOMKYS'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO KEEP THE PALESTINIANS ON BOARD UNTIL PEACE PROCESS CAN RESUME. UPGRADING OF US/PLO DIALOGUE UNLIKELY, BUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL OVER PALESTINIAN FAMILY REUNIFICATION, AND MORE TOUGH TALKING ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN PROSPECT.

DETAIL

2. TOMKYS DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS WITH ROSS AND BURNS OF PLANNING STAFF, STATE. ROSS BEGAN BY SURVEYING THE PROSPECTS FOR A GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL. HE DISCOUNTED THE CHANCES OF PERES MAKING A LAST MINUTE BREAKTHROUGH. BUT, EQUALLY, HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT SHAMIR WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT: IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF SHAS, HE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO MOVE ON THE BAKER PROPOSALS. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT LED BY RABIN AND SHAMIR. THIS WAS A CONCEIVABLE OUTCOME, BUT WOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY. IT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BAKER PROPOSALS, ROTATION OF THE PRIME-MINISTERSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. A FURTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A GOVERNMENT LED BY RABIN, WHOM ROSS DESCRIBED AS THE MOST POPULAR POLITICIAN IN ISRAEL, UNTOUCHED BY THE STIGMA OF RECENT MANOEUVRINGS. IF NONE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES CAME TO PASS, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ELECTIONS, CONTESTED, IN ROSS'S VIEW, BY RABIN AND LEVY.

3. ROSS'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE A HALT IN THE PEACE PROCESS OF BETWEEN 2 AND 6 MONTHS. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO KEEP THE PALESTINIANS ON BOARD IN THE MEANTIME. ROSS SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CURRENTLY LOOKING AT WAYS IN WHICH THEY COULD ENCOURAGE THE PALESTINIANS, BOTH IN TUNIS AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, TO STAY CALM AND NOT TO GIVE UP HOPE. ROSS FLOATED THE FOLLOWING IDEAS:

- I) A BAKER SPEECH, IN WHICH HE WOULD REVIEW WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ACHIEVED AND WHY IT HAD FOLLOWED THE ROUTE IT HAD. IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PREPARED TO STAY ENGAGED, AND THE NEED FOR BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB CONCERNS TO BE ADDRESSED IF PROGRESS WAS TO BE MADE.
- II) USE OF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE TO REASSURE THE PLO THAT THE ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTOOD THEIR PROBLEMS AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO STAY ON TRACK.
- III) URGE ON THE ISRAELIS TO SPEED UP PALESTINIAN FAMILY REUNIFICATION. ROSS DESCRIBED THIS AS A SYMBOLIC POINT, BUT ONE WHICH WOULD BE WELL UNDERSTOOD BY PALESTINIANS.
- IV) TAKING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO TASK FOR THEIR RECENT ACTION ON SETTLEMENTS. ROSS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISMAY IN CONGRESS OVER THIS, A FACT WHICH WOULD NOT BE LOST ON THE ISRAELIS.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, BURNS ADMITTED THAT THE ABOVE LIST WAS NOT SUFFICIENT: THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CASTING AROUND FOR FURTHER IDEAS ON HOW TO SUSTAIN PALESTINIAN INTEREST IN THE DIALOGUE. HE THOUGHT THAT ACTION ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION WOULD BE HELPFUL. FREIJ, WHO HAD CALLED ON ROSS EARLIER IN THE MORNING, WAS MUCH EXERCISED ABOUT IT. BURNS THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE AS MANY AS 20,000 REQUESTS OUTSTANDING WHICH THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR HAD HELD UP FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PURSUE THIS BILATERALLY AT FIRST. THEY WANTED TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF GANGING-UP.

5. BURNS WAS GENERALLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT HOW LONG THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP WOULD HOLD THE LINE. HE NOTED THE INDICATIONS OF PFLP/HAMAS COOPERATION AS A WORRYING SIGN. HE THOUGHT THAT, IF THE MOOD IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE TO BECOME MORE REJECTIONIST, ARAFAT WOULD START TO SHIFT HIS OWN POSITION.

6. TOMKYS ASKED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONSIDERING UPGRADING THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. BURNS THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY. HE CLAIMED THAT BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC PRESSURE, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE HARD PRESSED TO SUSTAIN THE DIALOGUE AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL. (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, KELLY SEPARATELY TOLD TOMKYS THAT HE WAS VISITING TUNIS NEXT WEEK BUT WOULD

NOT BE MEETING PLO OFFICIALS.) TOMKYS SAID THAT HMG HAD SOMEWHAT MORE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, AND MIGHT BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO UPGRADE CONTACTS IF THIS WOULD HELP TO KEEP THE PLO ON BOARD FOR THE DIALOGUE. BUT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO JUSTIFY HIGH PROFILE EXCHANGES WITH THE PLO IF ONE COULD POINT TO A GREATER DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS, EG THROUGH FIVE POWER CONSULTATIONS. BURNS WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT TOOK THE POINT. HE NOTED THAT SHEVARDNAZE HAD PROPOSED TO BAKER AT THEIR LAST MEETING THAT THERE SHOULD BE WIDER CONSULTATIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. BAKER HAD SAID THAT FIVE POWER CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE RIGHT NOW. TOMKYS MADE THE SAME POINT TO HAASS (NSC), WHO SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT WANT TO LOOK AT OTHER OPTIONS UNTIL THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS WAS PLAYED OUT.

7. TOMKYS PUT TO BURNS THE SUGGESTION THAT, IF A DIALOGUE WERE TO START IN CAIRO, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SKIP THE DISCUSSION OF ELECTIONS AND GO STRAIGHT TO DISCUSSION OF AN OVERALL SOLUTION. BURNS SAW THE BENEFIT OF THIS, BUT THOUGHT THAT A BID TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME AT THIS STAGE WOULD RISK FRIGHTENING OFF THE ISRAELIS. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER TO TALK TO THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO HAD THE LEGITIMACY OF ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES (PARTLY, NO DOUBT, BECAUSE THEY HOPED THEY WOULD BE LESS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE PLO). NEVERTHELESS, BURNS AGREED THAT THE IDEA WAS WORTH THINKING ABOUT.

COMMENT

8. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, INR, STATE DEPARTMENT - WHO BRIEFED SIR P CRADDOCK ON PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS ON 23 APRIL - SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY MAKERS WERE TOO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES THAT A NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD PICK UP THE BAKER INITIATIVE WHERE THE PREVIOUS COALITION HAD LEFT OFF. INR THOUGHT THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE NEW ISRAELI OPENING BID WOULD BE TO GO BACK TO THE SHAMIR 4 POINT PLAN OF LAST MAY. INR THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BAKER INITIATIVE WERE NOW VERY POOR.

ACLAND

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

035001
MDADAN 5048

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL (AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 17/4)
FM TEL AVIV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 114
OF 170930Z APRIL 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, JERUSALEM,
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CAIRO ACTOR.

BAGHDAD TELNO 306: VISIT OF SENATOR DOLE

SUMMARY

1. DOLE GIVES ISRAELIS TOUGH MESSAGE OF CHANGING US PERCEPTIONS.

DETAIL

2. DOLE AND HIS PARTY HELD TALKS WITH SHAMIR ON 13 APRIL AND WITH LEADING PALESTINIANS ON 14 APRIL. THE VISIT WAS GIVEN EXTENSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE HERE, ALLOWING DOLE TO SPELL OUT PUBLICLY THAT 'ATTITUDES IN AMERICA ARE CHANGING' AS A RESULT OF THE INTIFADA. 'WE SEE LITTLE ARAB CHILDREN BEING SHOT BY ISRAELI SOLDIERS'.

3. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 12 APRIL, DOLE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT TO HIM THAT IRAQ WOULD USE BINARY CW ONLY IN RESPONSE TO AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR STRIKE (PARA 5D OF TUR). DOLE ALSO EMPHASISED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TOLD HIM THAT IRAQ HAD NO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH DOLE, SHAMIR REPEATED ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO HOLD DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ARAB STATES ON THE REDUCTION OF NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. THE LOCAL MEDIA ALSO COVERED REMARKS BY DOLE:

A) SAYING THAT HE WOULD LEAD A CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN TO RESCIND THE RECENT NON-BINDING SENATE RESOLUTION ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM (WASHINGTON TELNO 718), NOW THAT HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST HAD ENABLED HIM TO UNDERSTAND THE RESOLUTION'S IMPLICATIONS. 'WE THINK IT OUGHT TO BE AN UNDIVIDED CITY, BUT WE THINK THE STATUS OUGHT TO BE UP FOR NEGOTIATION'. REPORTS HERE SUGGEST THAT DOLE WILL CLARIFY HIS NEW POSITION IN A SPEECH TO THE SENATE TOMORROW (18 APRIL):

B) MAKING IT CLEAR THAT, ALTHOUGH A FRIEND OF ISRAEL, HE DID NOT WANT ISRAEL TO BE EXCLUDED FROM HIS CALL FOR A 5% ACROSS THE BOARD CUT IN FOREIGN AID (ECONOMIC, NOT MILITARY) TO ALLOW THE US TO HELP EASTERN EUROPE. DOLE REPORTEDLY SUGGESTED IN A U.S. CABLE TV INTERVIEW THAT JEWISH LEADERS WERE TOO SELFISH. 'THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE IN THIS WORLD WHO NEED HELP IN ADDITION TO ISRAEL'.

COMMENT

5. WE SHALL TRY TO GET A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT FROM THE AMERICANS HERE. DOLE'S BLUNT PUBLIC REMARKS ARE TIMELY AND HAVE NATURALLY ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HERE.

ELLIOTT

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

144

MAIN 132

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NAD
SOVIET D
KIEV UNIT
PLANNERS
RMD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
ECD(E) POCO UNIT
NEWS D
HD/INFO D
RESEARCH D
PUSD

SED
SCD
DEFENCE D
HD/CONSULAR D
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
CHIEF CLERK
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR SLATER
MR GREENSTOCK
MR MOSS
MISS R SPENCER

ADDITIONAL 12

ARAB/ISRAEL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 852

ADVANCE COPY

OF 110030Z APRIL 90
INFO PRIORITY TUNIS, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK

TUNIS TELNO 114: ARAB/ISRAEL
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION HOPE THAT, IF PERES FORMS HIS GOVERNMENT, A TRILATERAL MEETING CAN BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF APRIL, WITH CAIRO TALKS BEGINNING SOON THEREAFTER.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO BURNS (DEPUTY HEAD OF PLANNING STAFF, STATE) ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. WHILE NOTING THAT PERES HAS GOT HIS KNESSET SUMS WRONG BEFORE, BURNS THOUGHT THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT HE WOULD WIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE TOMORROW (11 APRIL), HOLD HIS FIRST CABINET MEETING ON 15 APRIL AND BE READY TO MOVE ON THE PEACE PROCESS AT THE END OF PASSOVER. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT PERES WOULD WANT TO SEND SOMEONE, PERHAPS BEILIN OR NOVIK, TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD WELCOME THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW PROGRESS, FINALISE SIDE ASSURANCES AND, IN PARTICULAR, CONFIRM THAT PERES ACCEPTED THAT THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WOULD INCLUDE DEPORTEES AND DUAL ADDRESSEES (THE ISSUE AT WHICH SHAMIR HAD BAULKED).

3. BURNS SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE A FIRST EXCHANGE WITH WHOEVER CAME ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BUSH AND BAKER WOULD LIKE A COMMITMENT FROM PERES TO FREEZE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BURNS THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT PERES WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT, BUT SAID THAT A PRIVATE ASSURANCE WOULD IMPROVE THE US/ISRAELI POLITICAL CLIMATE IN WASHINGTON. IT WOULD ALSO PAVE THE WAY FOR AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON ADDITIONAL US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL FOR ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWS. DESPITE BAKER'S REMARKS ON LINKAGE BETWEEN SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY AND ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, BURNS THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEEK GUARANTEES SIMILAR TO THOSE ON ALL OTHER AID TO ISRAEL - IE THAT MONEY SHOULD NOT BE SPENT EAST OF THE GREEN LINE. TO PRESS FOR SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC WOULD RISK RAISING THE QUESTION OF EAST JERUSALEM ONCE MORE. (COMMENT: BURNS CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT, GIVEN PERES'S INTEREST IN MOVING QUICKLY ON THE PEACE

PROCESS, THIS BUSINESS WITH THE NEW PERES GOVERNMENT COULD BE DESPATCHED SWIFTLY AND SUCCESSFULLY.)

4. WHILE ADMITTING THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN CONGENITALLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PACE OF THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS, BURNS STILL THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONVENE THE TRILATERAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING BEFORE THE END OF APRIL. ASSUMING ALL WENT WELL, THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED THAT THE CAIRO TALKS WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. BAKER WOULD ATTEND THE OPENING (HOPEFULLY IN COMPANY WITH ABDUL MAGUID AND THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER). BURNS THOUGHT THAT AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS, THE CAIRO TALKS WOULD FOCUS ON THREE AREAS: HOW TO GET TO ELECTIONS, THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS, AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS, WHILE SUPERFICIALLY FOCUSED ON ELECTIONS, WOULD INEVITABLY DEAL WITH A NUMBER OF THE CORE ISSUES RELATED TO FINAL STATUS. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SAW ITS ROLE AS KEEPING THE PARTICIPANTS FOCUSED UPON PRACTICAL QUESTIONS, AND PERSUADING THEM THAT THEIR INTERESTS WERE SERVED BY STICKING WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE COMMENTED THAT IF BOTH DELEGATIONS WERE STILL SITTING AT THE TABLE AFTER OPENING STATEMENTS THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BE AN ACHIEVEMENT.

5. BURNS SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT THE OPENING OF THE CAIRO TALKS HAD RECEDED. SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT RAISE IT SPECIFICALLY LAST WEEK, THOUGH HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WISH TO PLAY A ROLE IN AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. BURNS THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD WATCH CLOSELY AND, ONCE THEY DETERMINED THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS GOING TO HAPPEN, COULD MOVE QUICKLY TO PAY THEIR ADMISSION FEE BY NORMALISING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. BURNS HAD NOTHING ELSE TO ADD TO THE BRIEFING YOU HAVE RECEIVED ON THE BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS FROM THE AMERICANS IN LONDON (NOW SUPPLEMENTED BY MOSCOW TELNO 656).

6. KURTZER IS ON LEAVE THIS WEEK. WE WILL PURSUE THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 609 WITH HIM NEXT WEEK.

ACLAND

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE

15

JARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

From: The Rt. Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

ESX (2)

112, EATON SQUARE,
LONDON SW1W 9AE
Tel: 01- 235 1543
01- 235 7409



q.v.?

Rice Amery

me CB 3/4

3 April, 1990

Charles.

In case it may be of interest I attach a copy of a note of a talk I had with the Vice-President of Syria, Rifaat Al Assad, over the weekend (31 March - 1 April).

V. am

Julian.

Julian Amery

Charles Powell, Esq.,



112, EATON SQUARE,
LONDON SW1W 9AE

Tel: 01- 235 1543
01- 235 7409

3 April, 1990

I went to see Rifaat Al Assad at the weekend at Al Banus near Marbella where he has a property. He had been trying for some time to arrange a meeting.

I attach a note of our conversation.

I do not think there is much that we can do to influence the situation. On the other hand if Rifaat were allowed to go back, on his own terms, this might dilute the present Baathist regime in Damascus and perhaps weaken the pro-Soviet mafia that still surrounds Hafiz.

It may be that we should encourage American, Egyptian and Israelis concerned to ask whether it might not be helpful if President Hafiz were to recall Rifaat as a token of a change of heart or policy in Damascus.

✓
I am copying this to No. 10.

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, M.P.

Copy: Charles Powell

NOTE of a meeting between the Vice-President of Syria, Rifaat Al Assad and the Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P. Saturday, 31st March, 1990 at Al Banus near Marbella. 8.00 p.m. - midnight.

I had a meeting with Vice-President Rifaat lasting two hours (interpreted conversation) followed by dinner. He had been asking for a meeting for some time. In the event he did not have anything very new to say. I think, he was simply anxious to keep open the contact.

Rifaat began by saying that he had had high hopes of a major change in Syrian policy in August of last year. These were stillborn. The situation, in his view, had not greatly changed since then but for the improvement in relations between Syria and Egypt. He was inclined to think that these were public relations exercises in both Cairo and Damascus.

In Syria itself the situation was deteriorating for a number of reasons. The economic situation was worse and could not be improved without a major departure from the command economy. The Lebanon was eating up resources and manpower, Jordan's return to parliamentary government was raising awkward questions in Damascus. Soviet support was visibly declining. Moscow was still sending arms but had cut back pretty sharply on other material and moral support and this was becoming visible. Saudi support also seemed to be on the decline. There remained the hope of American support.

Rifaat did not think ex-President Carter's recent initiatives were taken on the instruction of Washington. Carter had always had a good personal relationship with Hafiz Al Assad. He, Carter, regarded Camp David as his greatest achievement and wanted to complete it by arranging a deal between Syria and Israel. No doubt he would have consulted both Egypt and Israel as well as Washington before going to Damascus.

Turning to his own position Rifaat said that he had made it clear (presumably to President Hafiz with whom I think he is in contact) that he would not go back to Damascus unless reinstated in his former command and allowed to bring back with him a number of officers who had followed him into exile. If he were to go back one of his first steps would be to call for an immediate dialogue with Israel.

In his judgement Hafiz Al Assad was in a position not altogether different from Ceausescu and other pro-Soviet leaders in Eastern Europe and Ethiopia. He might want to turn round and adopt a pro-Western profile but it would be difficult for him to do so and carry conviction with the other countries involved.

He, Rifaat, if allowed to return on his own terms, would be in the best position to convince other countries in the area that Hafiz's conversion was genuine. So far, however, there seemed to be no give in this direction from Damascus. In the circumstances he had no option but to wait upon events.

Our conversation at dinner was more general (our earlier meeting had been simply through an interpreter). Rifaat, however, knows the Soviets quite well. He thought they were bound to fall back onto their ^{Soviet} ~~Soviet~~ heartlands where they would still be a formidable military power. They could presumably keep important connections with those "colonial" territories which they would have to abandon.

Rifaat came to see me off next afternoon to say goodbye. He asked about my relations with Yasser Arafat. When I said that I had never met him he said that he had only asked because he had thought that I might want to send him greetings as he was coming to see Rifaat that evening. (I understand that Hafiz Al Assad backs a rival Palestinian group to the PLO so perhaps the PLO are courting Rifaat).

JULIAN AMERY

3.4.90



File SN
ape

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

27 March 1990

AMIR OF QATAR

Thank you for your letter of 27 March enclosing the Amir of Qatar's reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 6 March. I agree that no further reply is needed and that you should tell the Qatari Embassy that the Prime Minister has seen the letter and asked for her thanks to be conveyed to the Amir.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h



cc:ll
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 March 1990

Dear Charles

Amir of Qatar

/ I enclose the Amir of Qatar's reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 6 March. The reply deals almost entirely with the settlement of Soviet Jews in the Occupied Territories, which was the substance of the Prime Minister's letter. HAP

We see no need to reply. If you agree, we shall tell the Qatari Embassy (and Mr Boyce in Doha) that the Prime Minister has seen the letter and asked that her thanks be sent to the Amir.

Yours ever

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

120166
MDADAN 1272

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 690

ADVANCE COPY

OF 232320Z MARCH 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN, RIYADH
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB/ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS
SUMMARY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT PREPARING FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF PEACE PROCESS IF PERES SUCCEEDS IN BUILDING A COALITION. IN EXPECTATION OF THIS, STATE ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO BOLSTER PERES' POSITION. INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO KURTZER (DAS/NEA, STATE) ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. HE THOUGHT THAT PERES HAD A REASONABLE CHANCE OF STRIKING A DEAL WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. STATE'S LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT PERES HOPED TO CONSTRUCT A COALITION WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE DAYS, THUS GIVING HIMSELF AN OPPORTUNITY TO WIN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE THE KNESSET ADJOURNED. IF HE FAILED TO MEET THIS DEADLINE, LIKUD WOULD BE ABLE TO BLOCK HIS EFFORTS TO RECONVENE THE KNESSET, LEAVING THE SHAMIR-LED CARETAKER GOVERNMENT IN POWER UNTIL AT LEAST APRIL.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTED THAT ANY HOPE OF PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS DEPENDED UPON PERES BECOMING PRIME MINISTER. IF HE DID, STATE WOULD BE READY TO MOVE AS SOON AS HE WAS. IN KURTZER'S VIEW IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR OFFICIALS TO MEET FIRST TO FINALISE SIDE ASSURANCES (ON WHICH PERES MIGHT SETTLE FOR LESS THAN WAS NOW ON OFFER), DETAILS OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION ETC. BUT IF PERES FELT A POLITICAL NEED TO MOVE STRAIGHT TO A FOREIGN MINISTERS TRILATERAL, BAKER WOULD PROBABLY ACQUIESCE.

5. KURTZER NOTED THAT A CAIRO MEETING WOULD NOT PRODUCE QUICK RESULTS. PERES WOULD THEN FACE SNIPING FROM LIKUD. HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE PLO ROLE, WHICH WAS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE VISIBLE AS ARAFAT SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEARER HIS OWN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCEEDINGS IN CAIRO. GIVEN THAT PERES WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE LEADING A WEAK GOVERNMENT, STATE WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO BOLSTER HIS POSITION IN THE AWKWARD PHASE BETWEEN THE START OF A DIALOGUE AND VISIBLE SIGNS OF PROGRESS WITH IT.

6. KURTZER SAID THAT STATE WERE WORKING ON WAYS TO EXTEND US SUPPORT FOR PERES TO HELP HIM IN THIS PERIOD. BUT A GESTURE FROM THE ARABS AND/OR THE EC IN RECOGNITION OF THE STEP PERES HAD TAKEN IN OPENING A DIALOGUE WOULD ALSO BE VALUABLE. ON THE ARAB SIDE HE THOUGHT ONLY THE SAUDIS HAD THE STATURE AND THE MODERATE CREDENTIALS TO MAKE A GESTURE BOTH MEANINGFUL AND POSSIBLE. STATE HAD IN MIND SOMETHING LIKE A MEETING IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN PRINCE BANDAR AND THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, A MEETING OF THE ISRAELI AND SAUDI PERM REPS IN NEW YORK, OR A MEETING OF SAUDI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS, PERHAPS OF A TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFIC NATURE UNDER THE UN UMBRELLA. KURTZER TOLD US, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD FLOATED THIS IDEA WITH BANDAR LAST SUMMER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KING'S PROPOSED VISIT, BUT THE KING WAS APPARENTLY UNWILLING. STATE HAD NOT GONE BACK TO THE SAUDIS SINCE THEN.
7. ON THE EC SIDE, KURTZER THOUGHT THAT A GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR PERES, IN THE FORM OF A JOINT STATEMENT OR A MEETING OR VISIT, TOGETHER WITH SOMETHING TANGIBLE SUCH AS A REVERSAL OF THE DECISION TO SUSPEND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.
8. WE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE ARAB PACK IN THIS WAY. KURTZER ACCEPTED THIS BUT HOPED THAT THE QUOTE LOGIC OF THE SITUATION UNQUOTE AND THE FACT THAT PERES RATHER THAN SHAMIR WAS IN CHARGE MIGHT MAKE THEM MORE RECEPTIVE THAN LAST SUMMER.
9. WE ASKED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONSIDERING SIMILAR GESTURES TOWARDS ARAFAT, WHO WAS ALSO LIKELY TO COME UNDER PRESSURE IF THE DIALOGUE APPEARED TO BE GOING NOWHERE. KURTZER SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE A NEED FOR ANY CORRESPONDING MOVE. IT WAS SIMPLY A CASE OF HOW TO SHORE UP A WEAK GOVERNMENT, THE SURVIVAL OF WHICH WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO KEEP THE PEACE PROCESS MOVING. A GESTURE TOWARDS THE PLO, SUCH AS AN UPGRADING OF THE US/PLO DIALOGUE, WAS AN OPTION FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, BUT NOT PART OF THE EXERCISE IN HAND. WELCH (NSC) WHOM WE SPOKE TO LATER, WAS MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEA THAT SOME ACTION TO STRENGTHEN ARAFAT'S POSITION MIGHT ALSO BE NEEDED AT THIS STAGE.
10. KURTZER STRESSED THAT THESE IDEAS HAD ONLY BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE WORKING LEVEL IN STATE AND NSC. THEY WERE NOT YET ADMINISTRATION POLICY. ROSS WAS AWARE OF THEM. KELLY HAD NOT BEEN WHEN HE CALLED AT THE FCO ON 20 MARCH. GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE PROCESS MIGHT MOVE IF PERES WERE SUCCESSFUL, KURTZER WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR EARLY REACTIONS.
- COMMENT
11. THESE IDEAS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FULLY THOUGHT THROUGH,

CONFIDENTIAL

120166
MDADAN 1272

AND AT THIS STAGE APPEAR UNHELPFULLY ONE-SIDED. BUT THE
ADMINISTRATION ARE CLEARLY CASTING AROUND FOR IDEAS TO KEEP THE
DIALOGUE AFLOAT. IF AND WHEN IT GETS GOING. IF WE HAVE IDEAS OF
OUR OWN NOW IS A GOOD TIME TO FEED THEM IN.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE

15 19

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS (b)
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



Zia Muneer
A nice letter from
Qatar.
can 27/1
mt

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

SERIAL No. TSTAI/90
subject cc MASTER
cc OPS

TRANSLATION

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Your Excellency,

I have received with deep appreciation your letter of 6th March, 1990, which was carried to me by H.E. Mr. Peter Morrison, Minister of State at the Department of Energy. At the beginning, I would like to thank you for your friendly gesture of acquainting me with the position of your government on the question of the immigration of Soviet Jews to the Occupied Arab Territories, and its excellent initiative of urging the European Community to issue its statement on this matter on 20th February, 1990.

The balanced constructive position announced by you personally to the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 18th February, 1990, and the E.C. statement of 20th February issued as a result of Britain's initiative have met with our full satisfaction and appreciation and have reflected the consensus of the international community by asserting the principles of exchange of land for peace, illegitimacy of Jewish settlement in the Occupied Arab Territories and inadmissibility of having Soviet Jews practicing their right to emigrate from the Soviet Union at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people to their territory and homeland.

The Ministerial Council of the Arab League, in a resolution on the subject passed in Tunis on 12th March, has welcomed the positive positions adopted by the European Community, the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement, the



- 2 -

Organisation of African Unity, the north European countries and other friendly states concerning the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Palestine and their settlement in the Occupied Arab Territories. The Council also emphasized that this immigration constitutes an aggression against the rights of the Arab Palestinian people to their territory and homeland, a threat to Arab national security and a violation of the principles of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since the right of any person must not be exercised at the expense of another person and a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which requires the occupying authority to refrain from deporting the indigenous population or settling the population of the occupying authority in their territory. The Arab League Council further urged the international community to put an end to this illegitimate immigration and secure all national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right of repatriation in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948.

Your Excellency

You have pointed out in your speech to the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 18th February, that obstacles to a peaceful solution to the Palestinian issue would become much worse if Israel were to find homes for Jews from the Soviet Union by settling them in the Occupied Territories. Indeed, efforts for a peaceful settlement have, in the last few days, gravely foundered due to the intransigence of the Israeli Prime Minister and his adamant refusal to respond positively to the United States proposals which only aim to implement his own plan for elections in the Occupied Arab Territories. There is no doubt that the steps announced by the Israeli government to create more Jewish settlements in the



- 3 -

occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem, is one of the main reasons for this intransigence with a view to procrastinate and gain time so that the Israeli government can carry out its settlement plans. You may agree with me that such serious developments, make it necessary to accelerate the efforts to address the question of Soviet Jewish immigration and, simultaneously, move the peace efforts to their desired end of reaching a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of relevant U.N. resolutions, mainly the Security Council resolutions Nos. 242 and 338. The alternative of failing to do so could only be an explosion of violence and extremism with incalculable consequences.

In pursuance of the principle of constant consultation between us, the basis of which we laid down during our latest meeting in London on 7th February, and in view of our conviction in the constructive and important role which the friendly United Kingdom can play in this connection, because of its distinguished international stature and its position as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, I deemed it fit to brief you of my views on this extremely grave matter, hoping that your government will exert its best efforts for the issuance of a U.N. Security Council resolution responding to the consensus of the international community on the need to ban settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants in the Occupied Arab Territories. I also agree with the view expressed by you during our latest meeting in London concerning the importance of consulting with President George Bush on this matter during your forthcoming visit to the United States. I hope that you will use your good offices to urge the U.S. administration to support the idea of having such a resolution taken by the U.N. Security Council, and to intensify its endeavours with



- 4 -

the parties concerned, especially Israel, to push forward the efforts for a comprehensive peace settlement so that peace and stability could prevail in the Middle East.

While taking this opportunity to express once again my deep pleasure with our latest London meeting and the chance it provided me to know your valuable views on a host of international and regional issues of mutual concern, I would like also to commend the high level which the British-Qatari relations have attained and look forward to more consultation and exchange of views between us to serve the best interests of our two friendly countries.

Please accept Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

Yours sincerely

*Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani
Amir and Prime Minister of
the State of Qatar*

*Diwan Amiri
18th March 1990.*

MIDDLE EAST: Situation
Pt 20



L1813 (2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 March 1990

Dear Charles,

mt
R. S. Shiner
CD
16/1

IOJ Award to John McCarthy

Thank you for your letter of 6 March about the Institute of Journalists' enquiry whether the Prime Minister could attend the award ceremony for John McCarthy at St Brides, Fleet Street, on 17 April. We have discussed arrangements with the Institute of Journalists and Mr Waldegrave has agreed to attend.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL
FM SANTIAGO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 074
OF 131300Z MARCH 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

CHILEAN INAUGURATION : SIR G HOWE'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT
QUAYLE

SEE MY TELNOS 72 AND 73

SUMMARY

1. VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE CONFIRMS THERE ARE NO NEGOTIATIONS
CURRENTLY IN TRAIN WITH SYRIA OR IRAN ON RELEASE OF HOSTAGES.

DETAIL

2. DURING HIS BILATERAL WITH VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE SIR G HOWE
ASKED HIM ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NEGOTIATING ON
HOSTAGES. (CY VANCE'S DISCUSSIONS IN SYRIA AND THE RAFSANJANI PHONE
CALL TO BUSH). QUAYLE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON
HOSTAGES. THE AMERICANS WERE KEEN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE
SYRIANS. THEY OF COURSE WANTED THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES BUT HAD
MADE CLEAR TO ASSAD AND RAFSANJANI, WHO THEY THOUGHT WERE LOOKING
FOR WAYS TO HELP, THAT THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE.
THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED.

WHITE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

142

MAIN

134

.LEBANON KIDNAPPINGS
LIMITED
SCD
NENAD
PUSD
CONSULAR D
NEWS D

DEFENCE D
WED
SED
PS
PS/LORD BRABAZON
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

05 5
MDHIAN 0961

INFO D
MED
SECURITY D
ECD(E)
RESEARCH D
PLANNERS
PRU

PS/PUS
MR BROOMFIELD
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MISS SPENCER
MR MOSS
MR SLATER

ADDITIONAL 8

LEBANON KIDNAPPINGS

NNNN

PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

034546
MDADAN 8653

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 535
OF 070115Z MARCH 90

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION - 7/3/90

ADVANCE COPY
ms

OUR TELNO 529: HOSTAGES

SUMMARY

1. KIMMITT RELAYS PERSONAL ASSURANCE FROM BAKER THAT THE US IS ENGAGED IN NO/NO NEGOTIATIONS OVER HOSTAGES, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT. THE US HAD OUR CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN MIND, AND WOULD TELL US IMMEDIATELY IF THERE WAS ANYTHING MOVING OF SUBSTANCE.

DETAIL

2. KIMMITT TELEPHONED MINISTER (COMMERCIAL) TONIGHT, FOLLOWING OUR APPROACH TO HIS OFFICE EARLIER TODAY (TUR). KIMMITT SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED YOUR CONCERNS TO BAKER. BAKER HAD ASKED KIMMITT THAT THE FOLLOWING ASSURANCES BE PASSED TO YOU:

A) THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ALL THE HOSTAGES IN MIND ALL THE TIME, BOTH IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IN THEIR PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP. THEY WERE NOT/NOT JUST LOOKING OUT FOR THEIR OWN.

B) THE US WAS ENGAGED IN NO NEGOTIATIONS OVER HOSTAGES, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT.

C) SO FAR AS THE ADMINISTRATION COULD TELL, THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE CURRENT FLURRY OF PRESS RUMOURS, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT HAD BEEN GENERATED BY THE PRESS ITSELF.

3. KIMMITT SAID THAT WHAT FITZWATER HAD BEEN TRYING TO CONVEY IN HIS CIRCUMLOCUTIONS LAST WEEK (OUR TELNO 508) WAS THAT ALL KINDS OF PEOPLE CAME TO THE ADMINISTRATION OFFERING INFORMATION ON HOSTAGES. BUT THIS WAS A ONE-WAY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION.

4. KIMMITT CONCLUDED THAT IF ANYTHING OF SUBSTANCE MOVED ON THE HOSTAGE FRONT, THE US WOULD TELL US IMMEDIATELY.

ACLAND

YYYY

CONFIDENTIAL

0346
MDADAN 8653

DISTRIBUTION

9

ADVANCE

9

.US/IRAN
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/MED
HD/SCD

AUS (C) MOD
HD/SEC (O) (C) MOD
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEL AVIV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 072
OF 071530Z MARCH 90
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 69: ARAB/ISRAEL: THE PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. GOVERNMENT CRISIS CONTINUES. NO DECISION TAKEN ON THE BAKER PROPOSALS BY THE INNER CABINET ON 7 MARCH. DISCUSSION DEFERRED TO A FURTHER MEETING ON 11 MARCH. LABOUR RENEW THREATS TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT IF A DECISION IS NOT REACHED THEN.

DETAIL

2. WHEN LABOUR MINISTERS MET ON 6 MARCH, THEY AGREED TO RESIST LIKUD'S LATEST DEMANDS AND TO INSIST THAT THE INNER CABINET AGREE TO THE LATEST BAKER PROPOSALS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. RABIN'S PUBLIC POSTURE WAS ROBUST. LIKUD'S INSINUATION THAT HE AND OTHER LABOUR MINISTERS WHO HAD TAKEN A PROMINENT PART IN THE 1967 WAR HAD GONE SOFT ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM WAS THE PUREST 'HUTZPAH.

3. THE INNER CABINET CONVENED ON 7 MARCH. NO DECISION WAS TAKEN. A FURTHER MEETING WAS ARRANGED FOR 11 MARCH. THE PRESS WERE BRIEFED AS FOLLOWS. SHAMIR OPENED PROCEEDINGS BY REPORTING ON HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BAKER ON 1 MARCH. BAKER HAD INSISTED THAT HE WANTED A QUICK RESPONSE. SHAMIR'S ANSWER HAD BEEN THAT THE MATTER WAS 'A SERIOUS ONE', AND THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY. ARENS THEN DESCRIBED HIS LATEST DISCUSSIONS WITH BAKER. HE ARGUED THAT PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS BY INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM WOULD PREJUDICE THE CITY'S FUTURE STATUS. PERES ASKED WHETHER THE PARTICIPATION OF INHABITANTS OF NABLUS WOULD THUS MEAN THAT LIKUD WOULD RELINQUISH NABLUS. RABIN PROPOSED THAT THE INNER CABINET ADOPT A DECISION ON AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY TO BAKER, LEAVING THE LIKUD AND LABOUR TO AGREE ON A JOINT NEGOTIATING POSITION BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

4. LABOUR MINISTERS CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INNER CABINET MEETING AND SAID THAT IF NO POSITIVE DECISION WAS REACHED ON 11 MARCH THEY WOULD RECOMMEND PULLING OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AT A MEETING OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON 12 MARCH.

5. AFTER THE INNER CABINET MEETING I HAD LUNCH WITH SHAMIR'S POLITICAL ADVISER (ACHIMEIR). HE WAS MORE GLOOMY THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM. HE SAID THAT THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON SHAMIR WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DEBATE IN INNER CABINET MIGHT DRAG ON FOR ANOTHER WEEK. IT WAS PROBABLE, BUT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THAT SHAMIR AND RABIN COULD PATCH UP A FORMULA TO GET THE GOVERNMENT OVER THIS IMMEDIATE HURDLE. BUT HE DOUBTED THAT THE COALITION WOULD GET A LENGTHY REPRIEVE. RABIN SEEMED FINALLY TO BE LOSING PATIENCE. SHAMIR WAS ADAMANT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT GO INTO NEGOTIATION IN CAIRO WITH A DELEGATION WHICH WAS DIVIDED OVER OBJECTIVES. THIS WOULD BE FATAL. (SHAMIR KEPT DRAWING A PARALLEL WITH THE TABA TALKS WHERE THE ISRAELIS HAD BICKERED AMONG THEMSELVES AND COME AWAY WITH NOTHING.) THE MOMENT OF TRUTH COULD COME BEFORE OR DURING THE CAIRO MEETINGS. ONCE THE COALITION BROKE UP ELECTIONS WOULD FOLLOW, EITHER DIRECTLY OR AFTER A SHORT, UNSTABLE PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT BY A COALITION OF LABOUR, THE LEFT WING PARTIES AND THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX. ACHMEIR SAID HE WAS SURE THAT SHAMIR HAD NO STOMACH FOR TRYING TO FORM A NARROW COALITION OF THE RIGHT.

COMMENT

7. ACHIMEIR'S REMARKS ARE PROBABLY A FAITHFUL REFLECTION OF SHAMIR'S VIEWS. THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT INNER CABINET CAN BE BROUGHT TO AGREE TO A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO BAKER ACCOMPANIED BY RESOUNDING STATEMENTS ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM AND ON NOT NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO. BUT THIS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN AND THERE WOULD STILL BE PLENTY OF FURTHER IN-FIGHTING BEFORE A TRIPARTITE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN CAIRO.

FULLER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE

3513

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH


HD/INCHAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3073</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Minute from Powell to Prime Minister dated 7 March 1990 with attached report</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>21 November 2016 C. Wayland</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

CONFIDENTIAL

033766
MDADAN 8617

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 532

OF 062333Z MARCH 90

INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

ms

OUR TELNO 507: PEACE PROCESS
SUMMARY

1. GROWING UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO HAASS (NSC) AND KURTZER (STATE) FOR A REACTION TO LIKUD'S QUESTIONS TO LABOUR AND PRESS REPORTS HERE OF LABOUR'S SUBSEQUENT ULTIMATUM THAT UNLESS LIKUD DROP THEIR QUALIFICATIONS WITHIN 24 HOURS THE COALITION WOULD COME TO AN END.

3. BOTH BELIEVE THAT THE NEXT 24 HOURS WOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE PRESENT ROUND OF THE PEACE PROCESS COULD CONTINUE. NEITHER FELT CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO PREDICT HOW THE SITUATION WITHIN THE ISRAELI COALITION WAS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. NEITHER HAD GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THE ISRAELI COALITION COULD RESOLVE ITS DIFFERENCES AND THAT SHAMIR WOULD FALL IN WITH THE TRILATERAL AND THE CAIRO MEETING. BUT BOTH ALSO BELIEVED THAT IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE. KURTZER NOTED - RATHER WEARILY - THAT ONE NEVER QUITE SEEMED ABLE TO GET A CLEAR YES OR NO FROM THE PRESENT COALITION AND THAT FURTHER DELAY WAS STILL POSSIBLE. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT LABOUR HAD ASKED FOR AN INNER-CABINET MEETING TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION AND THAT LIKUD HAD AGREED TO THIS BUT NOT TO THE INNER-CABINET TAKING MATTERS TO A VOTE.

4. IN THE EVENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT FALLS, BOTH HAASS AND KURTZER AGREED THAT IT MIGHT JUST BE POSSIBLE FOR LABOUR TO FORM AN ADMINISTRATION, IN WHICH CASE THE PEACE PROCESS COULD CONTINUE. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT BE SHORT LIVED BUT MIGHT JUST BE ABLE TO GIVE THE PEACE PROCESS A DECISIVE SHIFT FORWARDS. IF LABOUR WERE UNABLE TO FORM AN ADMINISTRATION, BOTH THOUGHT THAT THE US WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PUBLICLY BLAME LIKUD FOR THE BREAKDOWN. THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT THEN EITHER WAIT TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL DEVELOPED BEFORE TRYING TO PICK UP THE PIECES, OR GO BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD. WHATEVER HAPPENED, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE - IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS - FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO WASH THEIR HANDS COMPLETELY OF

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

033766
MDADAN 8617

THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. WE ASKED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONTEMPLATING THE USE OF THEIR SUBSTANTIAL LEVERAGE OVER ISRAEL TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE. WE NOTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PUBLICLY LINKED THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO CONTINUED AID FOR HOUSING DEVELOPMENT. MIGHT THE ADMINISTRATION TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ISRAELI COALITION BY USING ITS WIDER AID PROGRAMME? BOTH KURTZER AND HAASS SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IN DOMESTIC TERMS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO TRY TO CAJOLE THE ISRAELI COALITION IN THIS WAY. APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH SUCH A THREAT BY CONGRESS.

6. WE ASKED HOW THE ADMINISTRATION ASSESSED THE MOOD OF THE PLO. HAASS SAID THAT THE PLO HAD BEEN SHOWING EXEMPLARY RESTRAINT RECENTLY. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW PATIENCE WHILE THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL CLARIFIED ITSELF.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 125

OF 061010Z MARCH 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM

INFO PRIORITY TUNIS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, GULF POSTS, RIYADH

MIPT: AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. KING HUSSEIN REMAINS SCEPTICAL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AND CONCERNED ABOUT US ATTITUDES.

DETAIL

2. I WENT THROUGH THE MAIN POINTS ARISING FROM YOUR RECENT MEETING WITH BASSAM ABU SHARIF (YOUR TELNO 57 TO TUNIS). THE KING AGREED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN MEETING NOW LOOKED RATHER BETTER. HE ALSO ACCEPTED THE POINT (WHICH HAD BEEN MADE TO MR FULLER AND ME BY HIS POLITICAL ADVISER SOME DAYS AGO) THAT THE FACT THAT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT ALL COULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES NOT INTENDED BY SHAMIR. THE KING SPOKE HIGHLY OF BAS BUT REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT, GIVEN SHAMIR'S OBDURATE STANCE, THE PLO MODERATES COULD FIND THEMSELVES PUSHED ASIDE BY THE RADICALS IF THE DIALOGUE PRODUCED NO RESULTS. HE DETECTED NO GIVE IN SHAMIR'S POSITION OVER TERRITORY FOR PEACE AND OVER LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT.

3. I REFERRED TO RECENT REMARKS BY RABIN AND BY THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF, THE FORMER REJECTING THE QUOTE JORDAN IS PALESTINE UNQUOTE ARGUMENT AND POINTING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF JORDAN'S FUTURE ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THE LATTER DENYING THAT ISRAELI POLICY THREATENED JORDAN. THE KING SAID THAT HE FOUND THESE REMARKS SOMEWHAT REASSURING. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF ISRAELIS WHO TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW.

4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER OUR POSITION AS REGARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (YOUR TELNO 344 TO WASHINGTON). THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS VERY GLAD TO HEAR THAT OUR POSITION OVER THE IC HAD NOT CHANGED. AT THIS POINT, HE REVERTED TO HIS CONCERN

ABOUT WHAT HE SEES AS AN UNHELPFUL SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN POSITION TOWARDS SCR 242 (MY TELNO 105: NOT TO ALL). I AM REPORTING ON THIS SEPARATELY.

5. I ALSO PASSED ON TO THE KING THE INFORMATION GLEANED FROM HM REPRESENTATIVES AT TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM ABOUT ILLEGAL RESIDENTS ON THE WEST BANK (MY TELNO 1 TO TEL AVIV). THE KING SAID THAT HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL. THE CROWN PRINCE COMMENTED THAT THE FIGURE OF 120,000 ILLEGALS WAS CLEARLY AN EXAGGERATION. HE WAS STILL UNSURE ABOUT THE NATIONALITY OF SUCH RESIDENTS.

6. AT THE END OF OUR DISCUS89, 9, 5#3 03-:3 049:3'', I REMINDED THE KING OF MRS THATCHER'S RECENT COMMENT (IN HER ADDRESS TO THE BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS) THAT WE WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. WE REMAINED OF THE VIEW THAT JORDAN HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IF NOT IMMEDIATELY, THEN IN THE FUTURE. THE KING COULD THEREFORE BE SURE THAT HIS IDEAS WOULD BE LISTENED TO VERY CAREFULLY AT CHEQUERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO THE MEETING. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT HE WOULD HAVE ANY NEW IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

17

ADVANCE 17

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO

NNNN



ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TEL AVIV

TO DESKBY 061100Z FCO

TELNO 069

OF 061000Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, ACTOR.

ARAB/ISRAEL: THE PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. LIKUD MINISTERS 'AGREE IN PRINCIPLE' TO THE LATEST BAKER PROPOSALS, BUT SUBJECT TO LABOUR AGREEMENT THAT INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS AND THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT 'CONTROL' THE CAIRO TALKS.

DETAIL

2. AT A LENGTHY NIGHT MEETING ON 5 MARCH (THE SECOND IN 3 DAYS) LIKUD MINISTERS AGREED TO ACCEPT 'THE BAKER FORMULA FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS'. BUT THIS WAS CONDITIONAL ON ESTABLISHING AN AGREED GOVERNMENT POSITION IN THE CAIRO NEGOTIATING TALKS, AND ON LABOUR AGREEING THAT:

A. INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM BE EXCLUDED FROM VOTING IN THE ELECTIONS IN THE OTS OR STANDING AS CANDIDATES.

B. ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE CAIRO TALKS IF THE PLO ATTEMPTED TO 'CONTROL THE PROCESS'.

3. LABOUR MINISTERS ARE TO MEET LATER TODAY (6 MARCH). PERES HAS ALREADY DESCRIBED THE LIKUD DECISION AS AMOUNTING TO A REJECTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID THAT PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION OF JORDANIAN CITIZENS LIVING IN JERUSALEM WOULD HAVE NO IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE CITY, WHICH WOULD REMAIN THE CAPITAL OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE. HE TOO OPPOSED PARTICIPATION IN THE CAIRO TALKS OF A PLO DELEGATION BUT A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE CONTACT AS IT CHOSE WITH THE ARAB WORLD. RABIN HAS SO FAR SAID NOTHING.

4. THE LIKUD MEETINGS TOOK PLACE AGAINST CONTINUING DISPUTES WITHIN BOTH THE MAIN PARTIES. LEVY BOYCOTTED THE SECOND MEETING (AS BEING 'POINTLESS'). HE AND SHARON HAVE REITERATED THREATS TO RECONVENE THE LIKUD CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ON THE LABOUR SIDE THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER

PUBLIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERES AND RABIN. PERES CONTINUED TO DEMAND A FINAL GOVERNMENT DECISION THIS WEEK, RABIN SAID THAT A FEW EXTRA DAYS WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE, AND BY IMPLICATION, ACCUSED PERES OF BEING KEENER TO TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT THAN TO FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.

COMMENT

5. THE LIKUD ARE TRYING TO PUT LABOUR ON THE SPOT AND TO EXPLOIT THEIR INTERNAL DIFFERENCES. THEY ARE FOCUSSED ON GENERAL POINTS OF PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD BE POPULAR WITH THE ELECTORATE (THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, THE PLO ROLE) RATHER THAN ON THE NARROWER ISSUES OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IN CAIRO. ON JERUSALEM THEY ARE PLAYING UP WHAT THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS THE THREATENING TONE OF STATEMENTS OF THE LAST THREE DAYS ON US POLICY BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN. LABOUR'S NEXT MOVE WILL VERY MUCH DEPEND, AS EVER, ON RABIN. THE GUESS IS THAT HE WILL BE MORE POSITIVE THAN PERES AND WILL TRY TO NEGOTIATE TOWARDS AN AGREED GOVERNMENT POSITION FOR THE CAIRO TALKS. IF SO, IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT THE ISSUES WILL NOT BE RESOLVED AT THE MEETING OF THE INNER CABINET ON 7 MARCH. WE COULD BE IN FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS OF DEBATE WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE TWO MAIN PARTIES.

FULLER

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

SUBJECT ULTIMATE
Q3



file ECU
CC: (Foreign)
(Qatar)

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 March 1990

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T49/90

Your Highness

I was very pleased to have the opportunity to see you again in London on 7 February and to exchange views with you on the vital issues of today, including the Middle East.

I mentioned to you when we met that I would be giving a speech to the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 18 February. I took the occasion of the speech to recall that Britain had always believed that a solution to the Palestinian issue should be found on the basis of an exchange of land for peace. I went on to say that the obstacles to such a solution would become much worse if Israel were to find homes for Jews from the Soviet Union by settling them in the Occupied Territories. I added that we had all worked hard to secure the right of the Soviet Jews to emigrate, and that it would be an ironic and unjust reward for all our efforts if the freedom of Soviet Jews to come to Israel were to be at the expense of the rights, the homes and the land of the people of the Occupied Territories.

At our initiative the Foreign Ministers of the European Community also made a statement on this subject on 20 February. I enclose a copy.

Q3

I hope that these clear statements of our position will leave you in no doubt as to where we stand on these issues.


I send Your Highness warm good wishes.

Yours sincerely

Nagant Shalita

His Highness

Shaikh Khalifah Bin Hamad Al Thani, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3073</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Minute from Powell to Prime Minister dated 7 March 1990 with attached report</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	<i>21 November 2016 C. Wayland</i>
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE ON THE EXTENSION OF JEWISH
SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES : 20 FEBRUARY

The Twelve reiterate their view that Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, are illegal under international law. They are seriously concerned at the possibility that immigrants to Israel may be settled in the Occupied Territories. The further call made in recent days for increased Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza only increases this concern. The Twelve deplore the Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories. The Israeli statements on this matter are not conducive to establishing the climate of confidence necessary to make the progress which is urgently needed in the peace process.

As they made clear in their statement of 31 January, the Twelve warmly welcome the liberalisation of Soviet emigration controls, including the freedom of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel and elsewhere. They believe that this sentiment is very widely shared in the international community, on the basis that the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The attainment by Soviet Jews of this right must not, however, be at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

The Twelve urge the Israeli government not to jeopardise the prospects of bringing peace to the region by either allowing or encouraging Jewish immigrants to settle in the Occupied Territories.

EADABC/SI

file Dts



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 March 1990

The Prime Minister has written to the Amir of Qatar as proposed. I enclose her letter and I should be grateful if it can be delivered as soon as possible.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Handwritten signature in red ink.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 126

OF 061150Z MARCH 90

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM

INFO PRIORITY TUNIS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, GULF POSTS, SANAA

INFO PRIORITY ADEN, ACTOR

ADVANCE COPY
M H
erMIPT (NOT TO SANAA AND ADEN): AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN: CONTACTS
WITH OTHER ARAB STATES

SUMMARY

1. GOOD DISCUSSION WITH SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS, BUT NO COMMITMENTS
ON AID.

DETAIL

2. I ASKED THE KING FOR AN ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH
KING FAHD AND WITH THE GULF RULERS.3. HE SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO RIYADH (PRIOR TO THE ACC SUMMIT)
HAD BEEN MUCH BETTER THAN SOME OF HIS EARLIER MEETINGS WITH
KING FAHD. THE TWO RULERS HAD HAD SEVERAL HOURS TETE A TERE AND
THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FRANK.4. ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, KING HUSSEIN HAD POINTED OUT
THAT JORDAN WAS NOT OUT OF THE WOOD YET. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT
HE COULD PRESS ORDINARY PEOPLE ANY FURTHER UNDER THE IMF
PROGRAMME WITHOUT THE RISK OF MORE UNREST. HE HAD POINTED OUT
THAT A LACK OF ARAB SUPPORT MIGHT TRIGGER OFF FURTHER DISTURBANCES
AND STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE FUNDAMENTALISTS ABOUT WHOM KING FAHD
HAD EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN. FAHD HAD APPEARED RECEPTIVE TO
THESE ARGUMENTS BUT ALTHOUGH HE HAD GIVEN GENERAL ASSURANCES OF
SUPPORT, HE HAD MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENT.5. KING HUSSEIN ALSO REMINDED FAHD OF SOME EARLIER UNFULFILLED
COMMITMENTS (NOT SPECIFIED). HE EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT
OVER THE PROPOSED DEPOSIT SCHEME, UNDER WHICH CENTRAL BANKS OF
THE GULF COUNTRIES HAD BEEN PROPOSING TO PLACE UP TO DOLLARS 500M
WITH THE CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO BOLSTER
THE RESERVES. THE SCHEME HAD NOW BEEN WHITTLED DOWN TO, HE

THOUGHT, DOLLARS 300M (ZAID BIN SHAKER CHIPPED IN TO SAY THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY DOLLARS 200M). MOREOVER THE LENDING CENTRAL BANKS HAD BEEN WANTING TO CHARGE ALMOST COMMERCIAL INTEREST RATES AND TO KEEP THE MONEY PHYSICALLY UNDER THEIR OWN CONTROL. THE KING DID NOT SAY WHETHER FAHD HAD UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK AT THIS SCHEME AFRESH BUT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE JORDANIANS NO LONGER HAVE GREAT EXPECTATIONS OF IT.

6. ANOTHER MATTER RAISED BY HUSSEIN WITH FAHD WAS THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE SAUDI OIL PIPELINE (TAPLINE) FROM THE POINT WHERE IT INTERSECTS THE OLD IRAQI (IPC) PIPELINE. THIS, THE KING SAID, WOULD REDUCE JORDAN'S TRANSPORT COSTS FOR OIL SUPPLIED BY IRAQ, WHICH CURRENTLY COMES BY ROAD AND INVOLVES HEAVY WEAR AND TEAR ON BOTH VEHICLES AND HIGHWAY (COMMENT: AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THE IPC PIPELINE HAS BEEN OUT OF COMMISSION FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS, SO THE ABOVE SCHEME WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE HEAVY INVESTMENT TO MAKE IT VIABLE FOR TRANSPORTING CRUDE FROM IRAQ).

7. KING FAHD HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SAUDI ARABIA OF A UNITED YEMEN. HIS MAIN ANXIETY, ACCORDING TO KING HUSSEIN, WAS THAT A UNITED YEMEN WOULD BE DOMINATED BY ADEN. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT PERSONALLY SEE THINGS THIS WAY AND HE HAD OFFERED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT ALI ABDULLAH SALEH AS A FELLOW ACC MEMBER. (IT WAS APPARENTLY THIS DISCUSSION WHICH LED TO AN INVITATION FROM FAHD TO PRESIDENT SALEH AND WHICH, AS A RESULT OF THE LATTER'S ABRUPT DEPARTURE, EFFECTIVELY CURTAILED THE RECENT ACC SUMMIT IN AMMAN.)

8. THE KING SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO KUWAIT (26 FEBRUARY) HAD BEEN EXCELLENT AND THE KUWAITIS HAD SHOWN FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR JORDAN'S POSITION. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, WORRIED ABOUT IRAQ. THE UNDEMARCATED BORDER WAS A SOURCE OF TENSION. SADDAM WAS PRESSING FOR EARLY AGREEMENT. A SECOND ISSUE WAS THE QUESTION OF IRAQI DEBTS TO KUWAIT WHICH SADDAM WAS SEEKING TO HAVE CANCELLED (ALONG WITH THOSE TO SAUDI ARABIA). THE KUWAITIS WERE UNDERSTANDABLY RELUCTANT. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO RAISE THESE ISSUES WITH SADDAM AND IT WAS LARGELY FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAD VISITED BAGHDAD AGAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE GULF (ON 3 MARCH).

9. THE KING HAD NO COMMENTS OF SUBSTANCE ON HIS VISIT TO BAHRAIN, QATAR OR UAE EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THEY HAD GONE SMOOTHLY. HE ADDED THAT IT HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO VISIT OMAN BECAUSE THE SULTAN WAS ENGAGED IN VISITING THE TRIBES. IN ALL THE GULF

STATES (AND IN SAUDI ARABIA) THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL SUPPORT FOR HIS VIEW THAT ANY SUMMIT MEETING WOULD NEED TO COVER ALL MAJOR ISSUES OF CONCERN AND WOULD THUS NEED CAREFUL PREPARATION.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

17

ADVANCE 17

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/PUSD
NEWS D
~~NO 10 DOWNING ST~~
CABINET OFFICE DIO

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 507
OF 011800Z MARCH 90
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB/ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. STATE BELIEVE PEACE PROCESS HAS REACHED A CRITICAL POINT. UNABLE TO PREDICT WHICH WAY SHAMIR WILL JUMP.

DETAIL

2. ON 1 MARCH WE WERE BRIEFED BY STATE (COVEY AND KURTZER, PRINCIPAL UNDER SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY RESPECTIVELY AT NEA) ON THE CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.
3. BOTH THOUGHT THAT THE PROCESS HAD NOW REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE. SECRETARY BAKER FELT STRONGLY THAT HE COULD ONLY CONTINUE TO DEVOTE THE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN IT THUS FAR IF THERE WERE SOME SIGN OF PROGRESS. IT WAS CLEARLY UP TO THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE. BAKER WOULD BE PHONING SHAMIR TODAY (1 MARCH) TO URGE HIM TO AGREE WITHOUT FURTHER ADD TO THE TRILATERAL MEETING AND, BY IMPLICATION, TO THE START OF DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS.
4. STATE SAID THAT IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK ARENS HAD BEEN GIVEN A SPECIFIC AND SIMPLE QUESTION TO RELAY TO SHAMIR - NAMELY COULD ISRAEL NOW AGREE TO A DIALOGUE WITH A TEAM COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA? THIS LANGUAGE HAD BEEN AGREED BY BAKER BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR SHAMIR TO SAY YES. SOME IN STATE THOUGHT THAT THE LOOSE PHRASING WOULD ALLOW SHAMIR TO SAY YES BUT THEN TO MAKE PROBLEMS. BUT IT HAD BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR TO ARENS THAT REPRESENTATIVES FROM EAST JERUSALEM AND DEPORTEES WOULD BE INCLUDED. BAKER HAD HOPED THAT ARENS WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AS EARLY AS LAST WEEK. THE ARENS VISIT TO POLAND HAD PREVENTED THIS. BAKER WAS PRESSING VERY HARD FOR A REPLY THIS WEEK. STATE REALISED THAT THEY HAD LITTLE LEVERAGE OVER THE ISRAELIS. A THREAT TO CUT AID WOULD BE UNREALISTIC. BUT BAKER WOULD AGAIN BE MAKING CLEAR TO SHAMIR THAT IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO PREVARICATE, HE WOULD CALL THE PROCESS OFF AND APPORTION BLAME PUBLICLY AND SQUARELY ON THE ISRAELIS.
5. STATE, HOWEVER, EXPECTED SHAMIR TO WRIGGLE FOR A WHILE YET. HE SEEMED TO BE INTERPRETING HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER DELAY. THEY EXPECTED HIM TO TELL BAKER TODAY THAT HE WAS IN PRINCIPLE AGREEABLE TO THE TRILATERAL BUT STILL NEEDED REASSURANCE ON THE NAMES OF THE DELEGATION. IF HE WERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH, HE MIGHT GET BAKER TO ALLOW A LITTLE MORE TIME. BUT IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SHAMIR MIGHT DECIDE TO SAY NO TO THE TRILATERAL AND ALLOW THE BAKER INITIATIVE TO DIE. HE MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT CRITICISM FROM BAKER WAS SOMETHING HE COULD LIVE WITH IF THE ALTERNATIVE WAS TO SPLIT LIKUD. MEANWHILE, BAKER WAS ANXIOUS TO GET ON. HE WAS HOPING FOR THE TRILATERAL TO TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK, AND FOR THE DIALOGUE ITSELF TO OPEN SHORTLY THEREAFTER. HE WAS TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF ATTENDING THE OPENING OF THE DIALOGUE HIMSELF, BREAKING HIS TRIP TO ATTEND THE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS TO DO SO.

6. STATE HAVE CLEARLY BEEN FOCUSING ALMOST COMPLETELY ON THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN GETTING AGREEMENT TO THE TRILATERAL AND TO LAUNCHING THE DIALOGUE. THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO PROSPECTS FOR THE DIALOGUE ITSELF. BUT THEY DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO US RECENTLY BY CIA THAT THE DIALOGUE COULD BREAK DOWN RELATIVELY QUICKLY. STATE SAID THAT WAS TOO EARLY TO THINK ABOUT WHAT TO DO THEN.

7. ON THE QUESTION OF OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT, STATE SAID THAT THEY DETECTED A GROWING ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE PRESENT INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITHOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. BAKER HAD MADE CLEAR AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH SHEVARNDADZE THAT IF THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO ATTEND THEY SHOULD SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE ISRAELIS. STATE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS TOO HIGH A PRICE TO PAY AT PRESENT. STATE CONFIRMED THAT THEY SAW NO ADVANTAGE IN INVOLVEMENT OF THE FIVE - NOT BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES OVER UK OR FRENCH ATTENDANCE - BUT BECAUSE OF LIKELY OPPOSITION IN WASHINGTON TO CHINESE PARTICIPATION.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTIONADVANCE

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR
HD/PUSD

PAGE 2

PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

NEWS
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK



NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 473
OF 270120Z FEBRUARY 90
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 418: ARAB/ISRAEL:PEACE PROCESS
SUMMARY

1. BAKER ASKS ARENS FOR AN ISRAELI DECISION ON ATTENDANCE AT A TRILATERAL. STATE HOPE FOR AN ANSWER WITHIN THE WEEK. ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE EGYPTIANS ARE ON BOARD.

DETAIL

2. STATE TELL US THAT DURING THEIR MEETING ON 23 FEBRUARY, SECRETARY BAKER TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER ARENS THAT HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS RIGHT FOR A TRILATERAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. BAKER SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO CONVENE A MEETING AND ASKED FOR AN ISRAELI DECISION ON ATTENDANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARENS DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH BAKER'S JUDGEMENT, THOUGH HE RAISED ONCE AGAIN ISRAELI CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE PLO ASSOCIATION WITH THE PROCESS.

HE AGREED TO DISCUSS BAKER'S REQUEST WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT STATE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WILL NOT OCCUR UNTIL ARENS RETURNS FROM POLAND ON 1 MARCH. THEY HOPE FOR A REPLY WITHIN A WEEK.

3. BAKER ALSO TELEPHONED ABDUL MEGUID ON 23 FEBRUARY TO REPORT HIS MEETING WITH ARENS. ABDUL MEGUID APPARENTLY CONFIRMED HIS READINESS TO ATTEND A TRILATERAL.

COMMENT

4. THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR CONFIDENT THAT, BARRING ANY NEW ISRAELI CONDITIONS, THE EGYPTIANS (AND BY IMPLICATION THE PLO) ARE FULLY ON BOARD, AND THAT A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELIS IS ALL THAT IS HOLDING UP THE PROCESS. GIVING EVIDENCE TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON 23 FEBRUARY, BAKER SAID QUOTE THE DISCUSSIONS I HAD WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT WITH RESPECT TO THESE TWO AREAS (IE AGENDA AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION) WENT VERY, VERY WELL. I FORESEE A POSSIBILITY, IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL IS IN A POSITION TO BE EQUALLY FORTHCOMING AND OUTGOING, THAT WE MIGHT HAVE SOME CHANCE OF MAKING A LITTLE PROGRESS..... I AM GOING TO CONTINUE TO REMAIN ENGAGED AS LONG AS I THINK THERE IS SOME HOPE OF MOVING THE PROCESS FORWARD. BUT WE REALLY NEED NOW TO START. WE NEED ACTION. WE HAVE DONE A LOT OF TAKING UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

03715
MDADAI 409

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15 14

ADVANCE

15 14

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR
HD/PUSD
NEWS
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 418

ADVANCE COPY

OF 212345Z FEBRUARY 90
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB/ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. BAKER EXPECTED TO PRESS ISRAELIS FOR A DECISION ON ATTENDANCE AT A TRILATERAL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

DETAIL

2. KURTZER (DAS, NEA, STATE) GAVE US AN UPDATE ON THE PEACE PROCESS TODAY. HE SAID THAT THE PREPARATORY MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS HAD MADE PROGRESS BOTH ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND ON SIDE ASSURANCES. STATE HAD ADVISED BAKER THAT AGREEMENT AT A TRILATERAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING NOW LOOKED FEASIBLE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS WITHOUT ONE. BAKER CURRENTLY HAD BEFORE HIM A RECOMMENDATION THAT HE SHOULD EITHER (A) CALL SHAMIR AND ASK HIM WHETHER HE WAS READY TO AGREE TO A TRILATERAL OR (B) WAIT FOR ARENS'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 23 FEBRUARY AND CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE THROUGH HIM. IN EITHER CASE, THE MESSAGE WOULD BE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED A CLEAR RESPONSE WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME LIMIT (A FEW DAYS) OR ELSE THEY WOULD LOOK FOR A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY, SUCH AS A SPEECH, TO WIND DOWN THE PEACE PROCESS AND EXPLAIN WHY IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO PROCEED. WHICHEVER ALTERNATIVE BAKER TOOK, HE WOULD TAKE PARALLEL ACTION WITH ABDUL MEGUID ON EGYPTIAN READINESS. KURTZER'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT SHAMIR WOULD TRY TO AVOID A DECISION, BUT, WHEN PRESSED, WOULD PROBABLY AGREE.

3. ON THE DETAIL, KURTZER SAID THAT THE PROCESS OF SIDE ASSURANCES WAS FURTHEST ADVANCED. THE ISRAELIS STILL CLAIMED TO BE UNHAPPY WITH WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS WILLING TO OFFER, BUT KNEW THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET MORE. THE PALESTINIANS HAD SOUGHT ASSURANCE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SEE ELECTIONS AS THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT WERE COMMITTED TO PURSUIT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD FORWARDED A DRAFT LETTER TO THE EGYPTIANS, INCORPORATING PREVIOUSLY STATED US POSITIONS ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

4. ON THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, KURTZER CONFIRMED THAT NO LISTS OF NAMES HAD CHANGED HANDS. ALL PARTIES KNEW THAT IT WAS THE INTENTION TO INCLUDE ONE OR MORE DEPORTEES, AND EAST JERUSALEMITES WITH ALTERNATIVE ADDRESSES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IF THE ISRAELIS WERE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THE MEETING, THEY COULD FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES LOOK ON THEM AS RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY HAD ALSO BEEN OFFERED A DISCLAIMER, TO THE EFFECT THAT PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM PARTICULAR AREAS WAS NOT TO BE SEEN AS PREJUDGING THE STATUS OF THESE AREAS. NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THEY HAD A REASONABLE IDEA OF WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. HOW THEY WOULD BE SPECIFIED REMAINED UNCLEAR. KURTZER THOUGHT IT MOST LIKELY THAT A LIST WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED AT THE TRILATERAL AND ANNOUNCED BY THE EGYPTIANS AFTERWARDS. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE. OTHER PARTIES WOULD BE URGED TO DO LIKEWISE.

5. ON THE TIMING OF THE TRILATERAL, KURTZER SAID THAT THE EARLIEST

OCCASION WHEN ALL THREE WERE FREE WAS THE END OF NEXT WEEK. BUT UNLESS BAKER COULD GET A QUICK ANSWER FROM SHAMIR THAT ALREADY LOOKED AMBITIOUS. IF THE TRILATERAL WERE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HOPE TO MOVE QUICKLY TO THE CAIRO MEETING (IF POSSIBLE WITHIN 48 HOURS) IN ORDER TO GIVE AS LITTLE CHANCE AS POSSIBLE FOR THE UNRAVELLING OF AGREEMENT.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE 15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR
HD/PUSD
NEWS
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE D10
RESIDENT CLERK

PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF

The Foreign Secretary is concerned that we are not getting enough high level Ministerial visits to the Gulf States and that this could affect our commercial interests. He would like to raise the matter in Cabinet under Foreign Affairs tomorrow and urge more colleagues to make such visits. Clearly he would hope that you would then come in and very strongly endorse his remarks.

Can I give him the go ahead on this please?

C.D.P.

mt

C. D. POWELL

7 February 1990

c:\foreign\gulf (kk)

PRIME MINISTER

MIDDLE EAST

I had one of my regular lunches with the Israeli Ambassador today. He spun me a long tale of woe about the very negative effect which some of William Waldegrave's statements were having in Israel. He drew my attention in particular to a statement which William had made following a recent meeting with the PLO spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, in which he had spoken of the PLO's "courageous and imaginative diplomacy", and called for the Palestinian diaspora to be represented in any Palestinian delegation for talks with Israel. This had been very badly received indeed in Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister's adviser on counter-terrorism had just published a fully-documented report, which showed that in 1989 the PLO itself had been responsible for 13 terrorist attacks in Israel, 17 cross-border raids and the murder of 125 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The Israeli Government had come close to issuing a public statement denouncing British policy. It had been decided not to go ahead with this, but rather to send the Ambassador to have it out with Mr. Waldegrave personally. The Ambassador wondered whether remarks of this sort, which were actually making it more difficult to get a sensible response within the Israeli coalition to American and Egyptian proposals, really represented British views.

1. Hadn't I said that I had not myself been aware of the comments and did not think you had been either. He might deduce from this that the matter was not the result of deliberate policy decision at the highest level. Nor had they attracted any significant public attention. The Ambassador said that, in a recent Parliamentary Answer, Mr. Waldegrave had told the House that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had "renewed his acquaintance with Mr. Qaddumi in Paris on 22 December" (Mr. Qaddumi is the PLO Foreign Minister). He assumed from the phrasing that this had

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

been a chance encounter. But it was hard to avoid the conclusion that there was a steady policy of raising the level of our contacts with the PLO by stealth. I said there was no doubt that we did believe that Israel ought to talk to a Palestinian delegation, and soon: that represented the only way to make progress with their own proposal for elections in the Occupied Territories. But our position on high level meetings with the PLO remained, to the best of my knowledge, unchanged: we did not believe in meetings for the sake of them.

The Israeli Ambassador said that Mr. Arens was likely to visit London towards the end of March or early April. He wondered whether you would be prepared to see him. I said that I thought in principle you would be ready to do so if a convenient time could be found.

I said we had been disturbed to hear reports that Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union to Israel were being settled in the Occupied Territories. This would not be good recompense for all our efforts to get them out of the Soviet Union. The Israeli Ambassador said he doubted whether there was really a problem. Soviet Jews were refusing to be directed anywhere. 95 per cent of those going to Israel were insisting on settling in urban areas. But he took note of our concern and would let me know if the situation was different to that which he had described to me.

You will want to consider whether you should have a quiet word with the Foreign Secretary about Mr. Waldegrave's pronouncements on the PLO. Things are reasonably quiet in the Middle East at present and we are sitting fairly comfortably. It seems a pity to be stirring up the Israelis unnecessarily, although we should of course continue to urge them to talk to the Palestinians.

C.D.P.

He goes to Bonn tomorrow

C. D. POWELL

5 February 1990

c:\foreign\plo (kk)

C D Power Esq

No. 10



R7/2

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Charles

*We spoke. This is the Foreign
Secretary's speaking note for
Cabinet tomorrow.*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

Bob

7/2

CABINET: HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO THE GULF

SPEAKING NOTE

- Struck by Britain's political reputation and commercial success in Gulf region. £3.2 billion surplus on visible trade with GCC countries and Iraq in 1989.
- Number of reasons for this:
 - Historical links and traditional friendship.
 - UK's political/military role in bringing Iran/Iraq conflict to an end and efforts over Arab/Israel.
 - Growing respect throughout 1980s for UK's international weight and economic performance: seen as reliable partner.
- Cannot take pro-Britishness of current generation of Rulers for granted. Intense competition from eg US, Japan, France. Need to position ourselves for possible mini-oil boom in mid-1990s.
- In Gulf region, politics is about people and personal contact. Confidence in UK and desire to do business with us best nurtured by prestige visits. Have assiduously cultivated Gulf countries through Royal, Ministerial and other high level visits in recent years.
- Some signs of programme faltering. Messrs Walker, King, Wakeham and I are planning to visit Saudi Arabia this year. Smaller Gulf countries losing out: some useful inward visits - but few outward visits planned.
- Believe we should concentrate over next 12-18 months on Defence, Education, Energy (consolidating work already in hand on health, internal security, drug trafficking). FCO have put proposals to a number of other Departments. Understand domestic pressures, including heavy legislative programme. But urge colleagues to consider 7-10 days in region either before or after the (long) summer break.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 232
OF 300150Z JANUARY 90
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, TUNIS, JERUSALEM
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

mb

MY TELNO 228 (NOT TO ALL):

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER: MIDDLE EAST

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HOPED THE US WERE NOT LOSING PATIENCE. WAS THERE ANYTHING WE COULD DO? BAKER SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO ABDAL MAGUID THAT MORNING. ALTHOUGH HE WAS A LITTLE MORE OPTIMISTIC, HE WARNED AGAINST EXPECTING AN EARLY TRILATERAL MEETING. THE PROBLEM REMAINED THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ARAFAT WAS UNDER PRESSURE. HE HOPED WE COULD EMPHASISE TO THE PLO THAT THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE, THEY SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH BEING INVITED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, AND NOT INSIST ON BEING ASKED FOR APPROVAL. THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON SUBSTANCE NOT SYMBOLS. NOW WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO SEND SUCH A MESSAGE: THE US HAD JUST FINALISED THE TEXT OF THEIR LETTER OF ASSURANCE TO THE EGYPTIANS.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MENTIONED CROWN PRINCE HASAN'S CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BAKER SAID THE US HAD MADE THEIR CONCERNS AS CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS AS THEY KNEW HOW. NO US MONEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET REFUGEES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT IN PRACTICE HE HAD TO ADMIT THAT QUOTE MONEY WAS FUNGIBLE UNQUOTE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

150

MAIN 138

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NAD
SOVIET D
KIEV UNIT
PLANNERS
RMD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
ECD(E) POCO UNIT
NEWS
HD/INFO D
RESEARCH D
PUSD
SED

SCD
DEFENCE D
SECPOL D
HD/CONSULAR
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
CHIEF CLERK
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR SLATER
MR RATFORD
MR MOSS
MISS R SPENCER

ADDITIONAL 12

ARAB/ISRAEL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

D51112
MDADAN 2851

Pl. L.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 182
OF 250004Z JANUARY 90
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, TUNIS, AMMAN
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW

ARAB/ISRAEL: PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. ROSS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT CURRENT PROCESS WILL RESULT IN AN ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN MEETING. GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO PERSUADE PLO NOT TO GIVE ISRAEL AN EXCUSE TO WITHDRAW. PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOVIET OBSERVER PRESENCE AT DIALOGUE IF RUSSIANS MEND THEIR FENCES WITH ISRAEL. POSSIBLE UK ROLE HERE TOO.

DETAIL

2. MINISTER CALLED ON ROSS, (DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF, STATE DEPARTMENT) TODAY TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS IN ADVANCE OF YOUR VISIT. ROSS SAID THAT HE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE US HIS APPRECIATION OF PROGRESS SINCE HIS MEETING WITH MR WALDEGRAVE IN DECEMBER.

3. ROSS OPENED BY SAYING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HOPED TO MOVE QUICKLY ONCE THEY HAD OBTAINED ACCEPTANCE FROM ISRAEL AND EGYPT OF THE BAKER FIVE POINTS. BUT THE RESPONSES, WHILE FAVOURABLE, HAD NOT BEEN CLEAN AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT MORE WORK WAS GOING TO BE REQUIRED IN ADVANCE OF A FOREIGN MINISTERS TRILATERAL. ROSS SAID THAT SECRETARY BAKER SAW IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT THE KEY ISSUES SHOULD BE WORKED UPON TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WERE RIPE FOR POLITICAL DECISION AT THE TRILATERAL. A TRILATERAL WHICH WAS A FAILURE WOULD LEAVE A SENSE OF CHAOS.

4. IN EARLY JANUARY THE ADMINISTRATION SENSED THAT THE PARTIES WERE CONTENT NOT TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD: THE ISRAELIS BECAUSE OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS WITHIN LIKUD, THE EGYPTIANS BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THAT THE PLO NEEDED MORE TIME TO DEVELOP THEIR POSITION. THE ADMINISTRATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, THOUGHT THAT, IF THE PROCESS WERE LEFT TO SIMMER, MOMENTUM WOULD BE LOST AND IT WOULD FALL APART. IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN DECIDED PUBLICLY TO RESTATE US COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT, IF IT FAILED, IT WOULD NOT BE FOR LACK OF US EFFORT (MY TELNO 77 REFERS). ROSS SAID THAT,

ON THE BASIS OF LAST WEEK'S MEETINGS, HE THOUGHT THAT THIS MESSAGE HAD HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT AND PROMPTLY. BOTH SIDES WERE FOCUSSED UPON THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE SELECTION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO SEEMED DISPOSED TO AVOID SYMBOLS AND TO ESCHUE ATTITUDES WHICH WOULD BACK THE OTHER INTO A CORNER, THE IMPLICATION BEING THEY WERE TAKING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS SERIOUSLY.

5. ROSS THOUGHT THAT THE PARTIES NOW ACCEPTED THE ESSENTIAL CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS - IE THERE SHOULD BE NO PLO OFFICIALS, NO-ONE WITH A TRACK RECORD IN TERRORISM AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITY OF PARTICIPANTS. WE ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS YET ACCEPTED THAT GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSITY HAD TO MEAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM EAST JERUSALEM AND THE DIASPORA. ROSS SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT REJECTED THE IDEA. SINCE THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT NORMALLY SLOW TO SAY WHAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT, HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO THINK THAT A SUITABLE FORMULA COULD BE FOUND. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE NEED TO TALK TO QUOTE CREDIBLE UNQUOTE PALESTINIANS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD LOOKED AT THE CREDENTIALS OF THOSE PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES WITH WHOM SHAMIR HAD MET OVER THE LAST YEAR. THEY WERE UNIFORMLY NATIONALIST AND IN SOME CASES HAD GONE TO TUNIS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEIR MEETING WITH SHAMIR. ROSS THOUGHT THE US WAS MUCH LESS AT RISK NOW, THAN MIGHT EARLIER HAVE APPEARED POSSIBLE, OF HAVING IN EFFECT TO NOMINATE A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION.

6. ROSS'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND NAMES ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. THE MAIN PRESENT PROBLEM WAS TO GET THE PROCEDURE RIGHT. IF THE PLO INSISTED ON ANNOUNCING THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, OR CLAIMING PUBLICLY THAT THEY HAD CHOSEN IT THEN THE PROCESS WOULD GO NO FURTHER. ROSS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT PRESSURES WITHIN THE PLO TO MAKE SOME PUBLIC CLAIM OF INVOLVEMENT WOULD INCREASE AS THE PROSPECT OF A DIALOGUE APPROACHED, BUT THIS WAS A TIME FOR MAXIMUM DISCIPLINE. HE SAID THAT THE UK HAD A SPECIAL ABILITY TO REINFORCE THIS POINT WITH THE PLO. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO PERSUADE THE PLO THAT THEY SHOULD NOT GIVE THE ISRAELIS AN EXCUSE TO WALK AWAY FROM THEIR OWN INITIATIVE. HE ADDED THAT, IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW, THE PLO WOULD NOT NEED TO HOLD ITS PEACE INDEFINITELY. HE SAW THE CRITICAL THRESHOLD AS BEING THE COMMITMENT BY THE PARTIES TO A DIALOGUE. ONCE THE DIALOGUE HAD BEGUN, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO PULL OUT.

7. ON THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DIALOGUE, ROSS SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE AGENDA.

WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD IN MIND WAS OPENING STATEMENTS BY BOTH PARTIES, WHICH WOULD BE UNCONFINED, FOLLOWED BY DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD COVER HOW TO GET TO ELECTIONS, THE MODALITIES OF ELECTIONS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW.

8. ROSS SAW THE OTHER MAJOR UNRESOLVED QUESTION AS BEING OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE US AND SOVIET UNION PRESENT AT THE DIALOGUE AS OBSERVERS, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION FOR THEM. THEIR ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF A SOVIET PRESENCE WAS THAT THEY WOULD CAUSE MORE TROUBLE IF THEY WERE EXCLUDED. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOT KEEN, BUT HAD NOT RULED THIS OUT, PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION RE-ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN ADVANCE. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS TOUGHER, BUT HE DID NOT FEEL IT WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THEY WOULD WANT TO QUOTE GO TO THE MAT UNQUOTE. ROSS ADMITTED THAT BAKER WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A SOVIET PRESENCE, BUT IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IT.

9. ROSS SAID THAT TARASOV WAS CALLING (AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE) ON HIM TOMORROW. THE LINE THAT HE (ROSS) WOULD TAKE WAS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THEY WERE GETTING CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON A DIALOGUE, BUT THAT THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES ON THE QUESTION OF A SOVIET PRESENCE. THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY A PROBLEM BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL. SECRETARY BAKER WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING IN MOSCOW NEXT MONTH WHAT STEPS THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. ROSS ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ASSIST AT SOME STAGE, BUT THEY WANTED THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS THEIRS, AND THAT ITS SOLUTION WAS IN THEIR HANDS. ROSS THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT TO PICK UP THIS OFFER. IF WE TOO COULD FIND SOME WAY TO REINFORCE THE POINT IT WAS UP TO THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE, THAT WOULD BE ALL TO THE GOOD. (COMMENT: TO JUDGE FROM WHAT VORONTSOV TOLD MR WALDEGRAVE ON 22 JANUARY THE RUSSIANS ARE SOME WAY FROM SEEING THINGS IN THIS LIGHT - MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 106, PARAGRAPH 7).

10. WOOD POINTED OUT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SOMETIMES SEEN IN PLO CIRCLES AS INTRACTABLE BECAUSE OF THEIR ATTITUDES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, SUCH AS THE FAO. ROSS SAID HE REALISED THAT. THE PLO HAD, HOWEVER, TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IN THEIR OWN DIALOGUE WITH THE ORGANISATION AND OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEED TO RETAIN DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY. IT WAS THE ISRAELI SENSE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

051112
MDADAN 2851

THE US PUBLIC SANDS SHIFTING WHICH LAY BEHIND THE
ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO BRING THEM ALONG TOWARDS TALKS.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15

ADVANCE

15

.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR
HD/PUSD
NEWS
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN



PAGE 4
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 January 1990

See Psh.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK

The Prime Minister has sent the enclosed reply to President Mubarak's message of 17 December. I should be grateful if it could be sent to our Embassy in Cairo for delivery as soon as possible.

*Yours sincerely,
Charles Powell*

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TS/90



SUBJECT cc Mante
OPS

CCFCO

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 January 1990

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter of 17 December about recent developments on the Palestinian question.

We have watched with admiration your untiring efforts to bring about a dialogue between the Israeli Government and a representative delegation of Palestinians from inside and outside the Occupied Territories. Like you, I see such a dialogue as crucial to generating momentum in the peace process. I hope that the talks in Washington between the American, Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers will convene soon and lead on quickly to an Israeli/Palestinian meeting in Cairo. We shall continue to do all we can to encourage both sides to address the issues that still divide them.

I wish you every success and hope that you will continue to keep me informed directly or through your excellent Ambassador. The Foreign Secretary looks forward to coming to Cairo to discuss this and other matters with Dr. Abdel Megid later in the year.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak

ca



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 January 1990

David Andrew

Egypt

/ I enclose a message from President Mubarak of Egypt to the Prime Minister, delivered by the Egyptian Charge to David Gore-Booth. It is largely a historical account of developments in the peace process. Its concluding plea for Britain's support in the months ahead was echoed in the remarks of the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the Foreign Secretary when they met in Paris on 22 December.

/ I enclose a draft reply.

Yours ever

R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

From: PM
To: Mr Mohammed Hosni Mubarak
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Thank you for your letter of 17 December about recent developments on the Palestinian question.

We have watched with admiration your ^{unfailing} ~~unfailing~~ efforts during 1988 to bring about a dialogue between the Israeli Government and a representative delegation of Palestinians from inside and outside the Occupied Territories. Like you, we regard the development of such a dialogue as crucial to generating momentum in the peace process. ~~It is important~~ ^{hope} that the talks in Washington between the American, Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers ^{will} convene soon and lead quickly ~~on~~ to an Israeli/Palestinian meeting in Cairo. We shall continue to do all we can to encourage both sides to address the issues that still divide them in a spirit of flexibility and compromise.

^{with you every success & hope that you}
I hope we can keep in touch on this important question during the year that has just begun. As he told Dr Abdel Megid in Paris on 22 December, Douglas Hurd looks forward to coming to Cairo to discuss this and other matters in the summer.

ink Dr. Abdel
Abdel Megid
later in R. Hurd.

will continue to
keep me informed
directly or through
your excellent
Ambassador.

cl

POXKAO/CAS



MIDDLE EAST FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

157571
HIAN 0996

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL
FM AMMAN
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 004
OF 021230Z JANUARY 90
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, JERUSALEM, TUNIS, TEL AVIV, RIYADH
INFO ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, WASHINGTON

MY FIRST IPT (NOT TO ALL):
PEACE PROCESS: VISIT OF YASSER ARAFAT

SUMMARY

1. SUCCESSFUL VISIT WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE STRENGTHENED JORDANIAN/PLO COORDINATION. KING HUSSEIN AGREES TO RECONSIDER SOME STEPS TAKEN AFTER DISENGAGEMENT WITH A VIEW TO HELPING WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. HIS VIEWS ON CONFEDERATION.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 1 JANUARY, I ASKED ABOUT ARAFAT'S VISIT TO AMMAN (19/20 DECEMBER). I SAID THAT ACCOUNTS FROM SOME PALESTINIAN SOURCES OF THIS VISIT APPEARED TO SEE IT AS MARKING A NEW AND WARMER PHASE IN JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN RELATIONS. WAS THIS ALSO THE KING'S OWN VIEW?

3. THE KING REHEARSED, IN STANDARD TERMS, HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE BAKER FIVE POINTS AND THE RISKS WHICH THIS POSED FOR ARAFAT. HE SAID THAT ARAFAT HIMSELF WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED ABOUT HIS PRESENT SITUATION AND WAS LOOKING TO JORDAN FOR SUPPORT. ALSO, AS THE SUFFERING OF THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK INCREASED, ARAFAT WANTED JORDAN TO GIVE THEM AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE. THE KING HAD AGREED TO LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT VARIOUS PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH MIGHT HELP ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF THE WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SET UP FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE CONFIRMED THAT ONE SUCH STEP MIGHT BE TO RECONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE QUOTE TEMPORARY UNQUOTE TWO-YEAR PASSPORTS WHICH HAD BEEN THE STANDARD ISSUE TO WEST BANK PALESTINIANS SINCE DISENGAGEMENT. ANOTHER AREA WOULD BE THE PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSIT ACROSS THE BRIDGES BOTH FOR THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES AND FOR SOME EXPORTS FROM THE WEST BANK, MAINLY AGRICULTURAL. BUT JORDAN COULD NOT AFFORD TO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL

INFLUX OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK.

5. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE KING REPEATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE QUOTE JORDAN IS PALESTINE UNQUOTE THEME BEING INCREASINGLY PROCLAIMED BY CERTAIN ISRAELIS, AND ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER LARGE-SCALE EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT ARAFAT HAD SOUGHT JORDANIAN HELP OVER THE FUNDAMENTALIST MESSAGE BEING PREACHED BY SOME OF THE WEST BANK MOSQUES. SINCE JORDAN CONTINUED TO PAY SALARIES OF THE IMAMS, ARAFAT WAS HOPING THAT SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO CURB THIS PROPAGANDA WHICH WAS CLEARLY GIVING SUPPORT TO THE HAMMAS MOVEMENT. THE KING DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER HE WOULD IN FACT TRY TO TAKE ANY ACTION, AND IF SO, HOW. (COMMENT: IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES COULD DO, ESPECIALLY HAVING RECENTLY LIFTED BANS ON CERTAIN PREACHERS IN JORDANIAN MOSQUES AS PART OF THE BADRAN GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL LIBERALISING PROCESS).

6. I ASKED WHETHER ARAFAT HAD PRESSED ON THE ISSUE OF CONFEDERATION. THE KING CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED IT SEVERAL TIMES AS AN ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE FOR THE PLO. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING ENTIRELY PERSONALLY, I WONDERED WHETHER THE KING MIGHT FIND IT POSSIBLE, AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, TO SOUND A MORE POSITIVE NOTE OVER CONFEDERATION. I WELL UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR HIS CAUTION ON THIS ISSUE AND IT WAS TRUE THAT SHAMIR'S PRESENT POLICIES OFFERED NO INDUCEMENT TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THE JORDANIAN POSITION THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BE SET UP IN ADVANCE OF ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT CONFEDERATION TENDED TO GIVE SHAMIR AN ADDITIONAL PRETEXT FOR INTRANSIGENCE. MIGHT IT BE POSSIBLE AT SOME STAGE TO MAKE CONFEDERATION THE IMMEDIATE GOAL OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN ONE WHICH COULD ONLY COME AFTER THE SETTING UP OF A PALESTINIAN STATE?

7. THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THIS ISSUE: BUT AS I HAD IMPLIED, THE MATTER WAS ENTIRELY ACADEMIC AT PRESENT GIVEN ISRAELI ATTITUDES. THE RISK HE SAW AT PRESENT WAS MORE THAT THE PLO MIGHT BE ENTIRELY REMOVED FROM THE GAME. HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN WAS TO DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT MAKE LESS CLEAR-CUT THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE PLO TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE VERY READY TO MAKE ALL THE NECESSARY CONTINGENCY PLANS WITH THE PLO IN PREPARATION FOR A CONFEDERATION, AND THIS IN ITSELF WOULD NO DOUBT STRENGTHEN THE PLO'S POSITION IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS.

COMMENT

8. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE LATEST MEETING WITH ARAFAT WAS OF SOME IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES. THE FACT THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER SOME OF THE STEPS EG OVER PASSPORTS TAKEN AT THE TIME OF DISENGAGEMENT IS IN ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT, AND ONE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE EVEN SIX MONTHS AGO. MUDAR BADRAN'S INFLUENCE MAY BE PART OF THE EXPLANATION: HE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE THAN EITHER ZAID RIFAI OR ZAID BIN SHAKER WERE. MOST PRESS COMMENT HAS ATTRIBUTED THE DECISION TO REVIEW THESE QUESTIONS TO THE BADRAN GOVERNMENT - WITH A HELPFUL EFFECT ON THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IT RECEIVED IN THE LOWER HOUSE ON 1 JANUARY. BUT THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS: FOR EXAMPLE, THE PARLIAMENT IS NOW ADDING TO THE PRESSURE THAT JORDAN SHOULD SUPPORT THE INTIFADA MORE ACTIVELY. THERE ARE ALSO FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC PRESSURES. THE KING MAY HOPE THAT CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE PLO MAY HELP TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AMONG JORDANIANS OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN WORKING IN THE GULF AND THUS TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF REMITTANCES. BOTH SIDES NOW SEEM MORE AWARE THAT THEY NEED EACH OTHER AND I WOULD EXPECT TO SEE FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT CLOSER COORDINATION, PARTICULARLY IF CURRENT US-SPONSORED EFFORTS RUN INTO THE SAND.

REEVE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

148

MAIN 136

.ARAB/ISRAEL
LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NAD
SOVIET D
PLANNERS
RMD
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
ECD(E) POCO UNIT
NEWS
HD/INFO D
RESEARCH D
PUSD
SED

SCD
DEFENCE D
SECPOL D
HD/CONSULAR
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/PUS
CHIEF CLERK
MR TOMKYS
MR P J WESTON
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR SLATER

PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDITIONAL 12

ARAB/ISRAEL

MR RATFORD
MR MOSS
MISS R SPENCER

NNNN

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

The President

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T2180/89



SUBJECT
CC MASTER
OPS

17th December, 1989

Dear Mrs. Prime Minister,

In keeping with the tradition of regular consultations between us and exchange of views on matters of common concern, I am writing this letter to apprise You of the latest developments of an issue in which Your Government and You personally have shown much interest: the Palestinian Question.

Since the constructive resolutions adopted by the Palestinian National Council at its 19th session at Algiers in November 1988, we have been trying to activate the peace process and give it a new impetus. The United States, which decided to engage in a dialogue with the PLO in support of this trend, submitted a proposal that a number of Palestinian personalities living in the occupied territories be authorized to hold a dialogue with the Israeli Government to discuss the elections proposal. The U.S. side made clear that such authorization did not compromise the role or the legal status of the PLO. Rather, the United States argued that such a step would convince Israeli public opinion in the future of the possibility of direct negotiations with the PLO.

President George Bush discussed this proposal with me during my visit to Washington D.C. on 2nd October 1989.

After consultations with Mr. Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, it was viewed that, for the proposed dialogue to be positive, three requirements are essential.

1. That the PLO should name the Palestinian delegation;
2. That the Palestinian delegation be composed of individuals from inside and outside the occupied territories;

and 3. That the Palestinian delegation will be allowed to raise other issues besides that of elections.

On 6th October 1989, we received from the United States what came afterwards to be known as "the Baker Plan" for Palestinian -Israeli dialogue. We explained to the American side that the PLO, as the legitimate representative that speaks in the name of the Palestinian people, was the party that had the authority to pronounce itself on that proposal.

On 5th November 1989, Israel informed the United States that it had accepted the Baker proposals, linking such acceptance with certain assumptions, most important among which were : That the Palestinian delegation would be composed of personalities living in the occupied territories and accepted by Israel; that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO; that the topic to be discussed during the dialogue would be how to hold elections in the West Bank and Gaza according to the Israeli elections proposal and that Egypt and the United States should publicly support the principles of the Camp David Framework, especially those related to the phases of negotiation.

Having secured Israeli acceptance of the Baker proposals, the United States expected to receive the position of the PLO. The latter found it difficult to develop its position before obtaining specific clarifications from the U.S. Administration. Several points of clarification were put to the United States which handed to Egypt the replies thereto on 16th November.

The answers to the queries were not satisfactory on two points: the right of the PLO to name the Palestinian delegation to the dialogue and whether Israel would be permitted to veto the names of the delegation members. Besides, the PLO was of the opinion that the agenda of the dialogue should be open.

On 27th November, the PLO requested Egypt to convey additional points of clarification to the United States regarding the role of the PLO in the peace process and in naming the Palestinian delegation and the international peace conference. The reply came on the same day, responding to some of the concerns of the PLO.

After receiving this latest reply, the PLO formulated a new version of its position of the Baker proposals, stating that the PLO can accept to deal with the Baker Plan of 6th October in accordance with the decisions of the Palestinian Central Council at its meeting in October 1989. The PLO reiterated its willingness to enter into the proposed dialogue with a delegation representing the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territories, that the agenda of the dialogue be open and without prior conditions, that the dialogue be a preliminary step towards convening the international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of the resolutions of international legitimacy.

The Palestinian position was conveyed to the U.S. Administration on 2nd December. The United States considered the reply as positive in essence. Thus, the two parties have expressed their acceptance of the Baker Plan in principle, though each party linked its acceptance with certain assumptions.

Consequently, the United States has proposed convening a tripartite meeting in Washington between the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Israel and the United States to announce the start of the dialogue. January 1990 is likely to be the date for this meeting.

Needless to say that at the proposed meeting, several thorny, complex and controversial issues will be raised. Nonetheless, we share the

The President




4

PLO the view that the initiation of an Israeli Palestinian dialogue can constitute a positive step on the road to peace. The dialogue can also have an impact on Israeli as well as international public opinion.

You will agree with me that we have to seize the available opportunity and utilize the momentum created to the best advantage of peace. The encouragement of the PLO at this stage is crucial to the success of the dialogue. I am confident that the constructive attitude adopted by Your friendly country, both individually and within the European Community will be further enhanced and reaffirmed in the interest of our common objective of reaching a just and lasting settlement to the Palestinian problem. The recent statement on the Israeli Palestinian dialogue, as contained in the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council, has been received with much appreciation by Arab and Palestinian circles. I would welcome any views You would like to share with us on this issue.

With warmest regards and most sincere wishes.

Sincerely


Mohammad Hosny Mubarak

Her Excellency Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

7/2/89
CONFIDENTIAL



7/2/89
bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 December 1989

EURO-ARAB CONFERENCE, PARIS:
21-22 DECEMBER

Thank you for your letter of 6 December about the proposed meeting of EC and Arab States in Paris on 21-22 December. The Prime Minister agrees that it would be right for the Foreign Secretary to attend.

CHARLES POWELL

J S Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

KL

CONFIDENTIAL

① *cc/c*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 December 1989

Dear Charles,

Yes

Line Minister

Agree with the Foreign Secretary

Euro-Arab Conference, Paris: 21-22 December

President Mitterrand told the European Parliament on 25 October that he intended to convene a meeting of the 12 EC states and the 22 Arab states and organisations in Paris before Christmas to discuss Middle East issues. The French Foreign Ministry were as surprised by this announcement as we and our EC partners, but have since been following up this ambitious goal in the EPC machinery.

stand attend?

COO

6xii

The Presidency have now told us that the Conference will take place in Paris on 21-22 December. It will be an ad hoc event outside the formal institutional framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The first day is to consist of discussion at official level in two working groups, one to consider economic and technical cooperation between the EC and the Arab world, and the other to address the restructuring of the Euro-Arab Dialogue institutions. The second day will consist of a plenary conference at ministerial level to consider reports submitted by the previous day's working groups and to discuss political issues, notably the Arab/Israel dispute. Dumas will host a lunch, and Mitterrand will give a speech in the afternoon after he gets back from East Berlin. The proceedings will probably conclude with a press conference.

This meeting is not a very good idea. However, there is no way of stopping the initiative, which has been welcomed by the Arabs and by a number of our partners, with only the Dutch and ourselves expressing reservations. We would never have suggested such a gathering but in practice it is likely to be pretty harmless.

We have been giving some thought to the level at which we should attend. All other EC member states can be expected to be represented by their Foreign Ministers. The Dutch have said that van den Broek will go. The Egyptian, Bahraini, and Kuwaiti Foreign Ministers have all appealed to the Foreign Secretary to be there.

The peace process is always at a delicate stage and this should not, of itself, affect the level of our attendance. There is the particular problem of possible ministerial representation from Syria and Libya, though it is by no means certain that either country will attend: the Libyans have attacked the meeting as 'an imperialist plot'. But if we allow our policy on bilateral ministerial contact with Syria and Libya to govern absolutely our policy in a multilateral context, we could be painting ourselves into an unnecessary corner on Arab/Israel, where our objective is an international

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



conference attended both by the parties to the dispute (ie including Syria) and the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Generally, we have sought to avoid our poor relations with Syria and Libya spilling over into contacts in multilateral fora. Both countries were, for instance, invited to attend the conference on AIDS in London in January 1988 by the device of having them invited by our co-organiser, the World Health Organisation. A similar arrangement was made for the London Conference on the Ozone Layer last March, when our co-host was the UN Environment Programme.

The Foreign Secretary has accordingly decided that, since his EC colleagues are all likely to be there, he should attend. He would expect to be able to turn the event to advantage by having meetings with key Arab Foreign Ministers, in particular the Saudi and the Iraqi. With the latter he would want to press the case for the release of British prisoners in Baghdad (Ian Richter and the nurse, Daphne Parish).

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST



PRIME MINISTER

MR ROGER COOPER

Mr Roger Cooper is just entering his fifth year in prison in Tehran. His brother is collecting signatures for a jumbo-size Christmas card for him with an innocuous inscription. He is hoping to collect the signatures of as many Members of Parliament as possible and has asked if you would sign too.

I am sure this is worthwhile. We have arranged for him to bring the card to your room in the House immediately after Questions tomorrow, together with a TV crew and a photographer. I hope you will be content with this.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

6 December 1989

I usually send
Christmas cards to
British people so
detained.

mf

c: Cooper (MJ)



10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

I've arranged that
She will sign the card
in her room at the
House at 3.40 - just
after questionnaires but
~~before~~ Cranley Onslow.

If she is content, Terry
will arrange for a TV crew,
one photographer and
one reporter to be present.

Will you do a note?

CTB

December 6th 1989

Dear Prime Minister,

Temporarily retained

18.11.2011

On Thursday December 7th my brother Roger Cooper begins his fifth year in Evin Prison, Tehran. You have already expressed your own and your government's deep concern about his case in a letter to my father, which was sent to him in prison and which to our great surprise and his great pleasure actually reached him.

I am writing to ask whether you might find two minutes tomorrow in what is I am sure a characteristically busy day to sign a jumbo-sized Christmas card which we are sending him, and on which we hope to collect the signatures and good wishes of as many members of Parliament of all parties as possible.

The card carries a simple and non-political message which I hope will give no offence in Iran: This reads:

"Wishing you peace at Christmas, and hoping that the Islamic Republic of Iran will act with clemency and give you back your liberty in the New Year."

I have no doubt these are sentiments you share. It goes without saying that if you feel able to add your name, at such short notice, the card will be brought to you wherever and whenever is most convenient.

Our plans for the day are as follows:


10 a.m. Meeting with Tim Sainsbury at the Foreign Office

11 a.m. - 6.30 p.m. "Remember Roger Cooper" vigil held in Whitehall on the corner of King Charles St. by a dozen to 20 close family and friends.

2.00 - 4. p.m. Roger's daughter Dr. Gisu Cooper and myself will bring the Christmas Card to Room W6 an annexe to the Palace of Westminster which has been booked by Nick Baker whom you recently appointed a junior Whip, and who went to school with Roger and myself. We hope it will be signed by lots of MPs, and may get the TV news programmes interested in filming this.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Cooper



Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher
10 Downing St.

16.40
16.45

C D Powell Esq
No. 10.

SECRET

063252
MDHIAN 7429

SECRET
FM BEIRUT
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 837
OF 040740Z DECEMBER 89

ms

MY TELNO 832: POSSIBLE EVACUATION

1. I EXPLAINED OUR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES TO BOTH HOSS AND HRAOUI, WARNING THAT MINISTERS WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED FOR OUR SECURITY. BOTH EXPRESSED ALARM AT ANY THOUGHT OF WITHDRAWAL. HRAOUI SAID THAT LEBANON HAD DESPERATE NEED FOR HMG'S JUDGEMENT IN ITS PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

2. HOSS ECHOED THESE REMARKS "WE MUST KEEP YOU HERE AT ALL COSTS. YOU CANNOT GO NOW, JUST WHEN WE NEED YOU MOST. SAY WHERE YOU WANT TO GO, AND I PERSONALLY GUARANTEE YOUR SECURITY". HOSS POINTED OUT THAT OUR EVACUATION FROM THE ENCLAVE, IF IT WERE NOT FOLLOWED BY A MOVE TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY WOULD NOT MERELY SEND A SIGNAL TO AOUN: IT WOULD ALSO INDICATE IN THE CLEAREST POSSIBLE WAY OUR LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, AND OF LEBANON ITSELF. IF A TEMPORARY REFUGE WAS NEEDED ONE COULD BE FOUND IN THE COUNTRY.

3. WHEN I CALLED ON JUMBLATT I ASKED WHETHER HE COULD ENSURE OUR SAFETY IF AT ANY TIME WE NEEDED TEMPORARILY TO RE-OCCUPY THE ABAY VILLA FOR A PERIOD. HE REPLIED IMMEDIATELY THAT THIS WAS ONE THING WE NEED NEVER HAVE ANY ANXIETY ABOUT: SO LONG AS WE WERE IN THE CHOUF WE WOULD BE UNDER DRUZE PROTECTION. THE PEOPLE OF ABAY REGARDED US AS THEIR OWN. HE WOULD ENSURE A STRONG 11 BRIGADE GUARD, AND UNDERTAKE TO ENSURE THAT HIS PALESTINIAN GUESTS CAUSED US NO TROUBLE.

4. YOU MAY LIKE TO CONSIDER THIS FURTHER, IF A MOVE NORTH IS NOT FEASIBLE. ABAY IS OUT OF THE WAY OF SHELLING THOUGH EASILY ACCESSIBLE AND ONLY 30 MINUTES FROM THE CENTRE OF BEIRUT WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH LE STAFF LEFT IN RABIEH AND WEST BEIRUT. THE VILLA IS SECLUDED AND RELATIVELY EASY TO SECURE. THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN SETTING UP A TEMPORARY OPERATION THERE, AND IF FURTHER WITHDRAWAL WERE NECESSARY, THERE IS ACCESS TO THE MAIN BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD, WHICH IS STILL BY FAR THE BEST AND MOST DIRECT ROUTE OUT OF THE COUNTRY.,

PAGE 1
SECRET

SECRET

863252
MDHIAN 7429

PROVIDED THERE WERE NO THREAT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION FROM THE
AIR.

RAMSAY
YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

131

MAIN 128

LIMITED
NENAD
SECURITY D
SCD
PUSD
NEWS D
DEFENCE D
PPD
PSD
POD
CONSULAR D
MVD
MED
SED
RMD

LEGAL ADVISERS
TSD
ECD(E)
PLANNERS
PS
PS/LORD BRABAZON
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MR SAINSBURY
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR TOMKYS
MR J WESTON
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR MOSS
MR SLATER

ADDITIONAL 3

ASSESSMENT STAFF CAB OFFICE
MRS HANCOCK RESEARCH D

MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TUNIS

TO DESKBY 031400Z FCO

TELNO 450

OF 031220Z DECEMBER 89

INFO DESKBY 031400Z WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, PARIS, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YK

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, MADRID, ROME, STOCKHOLM, OTHER ME POSTS

TELECON WITH RESIDENT CLERK : PEACE PROCESS

SUMMARY

1. ARAFAT STATES HE HAS ACCEPTED THE BAKER PLAN AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS AGREE. RESPONSE AWAITED FROM WASHINGTON : HE WILL DELAY AN ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THEN. HE APPEALS TO BRITISH MINISTERS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV TO KEEP UP PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AMERICAN REACTION IN DOUBT.

DETAIL

2. ARAFAT ASKED ME TO CALL AT 2115 ON 2 DECEMBER. I STAYED FOR ALMOST AN HOUR. HE WAS ALONE WITH BELAWI.

3. OPENING A FILE HE SHOWED ME A THREE PAGE PAPER IN ARABIC (BY FAX AND HAND TO NENAD) WHICH HE WISHED ME TO TRANSMIT TO LONDON. IT CONTAINED TWO PAPERS WHICH SET OUT "OUR ANSWERS AND OUR POINTS OF VIEW CONCERNING ENQUIRIES BETWEEN US AND THE AMERICANS." THE THIRD PAPER, HE SAID, GAVE THE FINAL OPINION ON THE BAKER PROPOSALS. HE THEN MADE A ROUGH TRANSLATION (IN MIFT, NOT TO ALL).

4. AFTER TRANSLATING THE KEY OPENING PASSAGE HE COMMENTED - "WE ACCEPT, THEN, TO DEAL AND TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE." HE SAID THE TEXT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ABDUL-MEGID AND GIVEN TO PELLETREAU LATE THE NIGHT BEFORE. HE BELIEVED THE EGYPTIANS WERE HAPPY WITH THE TEXT AND SAW IT AS A MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS. PELLETREAU, HE BELIEVED, WAS ALSO CONTENT. HE HAD BRIEFED THE TROIKA AMBASSADORS.

5. HE WAS IN A CALM, THOUGHTFUL MOOD, AND OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO CHAT. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MOST DIFFICULT STEP. HE WAS NOT A DICTATOR. IT HAD TAKEN WEEKS OF ARGUMENT AND DEBATE IN BAGHDAD, CAIRO AND TUNIS. THE PNC HAD ONLY GIVEN A MANDATE TO ATTEND THE

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT TASK TO PERSUADE THE CENTRAL COUNCIL IN BAGHDAD TO GIVE HIM FREEDOM TO CONSIDER THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. HE HAD FINALLY DECIDED THIS WEEK TO USE THE WORD 'ACCEPT', COMMENTING THAT HE RECALLED OUR DISCUSSION ON THIS SIMPLE WORD. HE HAD TIMED THE REPLY TO COINCIDE WITH THE SUMMIT.

6. I SAID I WAS SURE BRITISH MINISTERS WOULD BE PLEASED TO READ OF HIS DECISION. WE KNEW IT WAS BUT A STEP AND THAT THE GOAL REMAINED THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS FOR HIM TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE AND KEEP THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS DIRECTED AT THE ISRAELIS. HE STILL HAD TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF ORDINARY AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS.

7. WE ENGLISH, I OBSERVED, WERE SIMPLE PEOPLE. OUR MINISTERS WOULD BE ASKED WHAT THE PLO HAD SAID. HAD THE PLO ACCEPTED THE BAKER PLAN? HE REPLIED: 'YES, WE HAVE ACCEPTED IT.' I THANKED HIM FOR THIS REPLY AND ASKED WHEN IT WOULD BECOME PUBLIC. HE SAID HE WOULD LEAVE THAT TO THE AMERICANS, MAYBE ON MONDAY. I SAID I WAS CONFIDENT WE WOULD WISH TO SUPPORT AN AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE.

8. HE WENT ON TO STRESS HIS PARAMOUNT CONCERN TO KEEP THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT UNITED. THIS IMPORTANT STEP MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO OPEN UP DIVISIONS AMONG HIS PEOPLE. I REPEATED A REMARK I HAD MADE TO HIM A WEEK OR SO AGO, THAT IT WAS FOR THE STRONG TO MAKE CONCESSIONS: HE MUST CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE HIS STRENGTH, EG. AS SHOWN AT THE RECENT ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL. THIS REMARK DID NOT GO DOWN TOO WELL. WHATEVER THE APPEARANCE, HIS LIFE WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT: ISRAELIS, LIBYANS, SYRIANS AND SOME PALESTINIANS WERE AGAINST HIM. HIS LIFE WAS IN CONSTANT DANGER. HE NEEDED BRITISH SUPPORT.

9. HE THOUGHT CAREFULLY AND SAID HE WISHED ME TO PASS A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND TO 'MY FRIEND WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE' - IT WAS NOW THEIR DUTY TO WORK WITH THOSE SEEKING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO PRESSURE WASHINGTON AND SHAMIR NOT TO LET THE PALESTINIANS DOWN.

10. HE THEN WENT INTO A LONG (AND FAMILIAR) ANALYSIS OF THE TIMES HE HAD BEEN LET DOWN BY WASHINGTON. WAS KISSINGER 'STILL PLAYING HIS DIRTY GAMES BEHIND THE CURTAINS?' HE MENTIONED HIS DOUBTS AGAIN ABOUT CERTAIN US OFFICIALS, BUT HE HAD NO SUCH DOUBTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BAKER, WHOM HE TRUSTED.

11. WE THEN TALKED AGAIN ABOUT THE NATURE OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH DEMOCRACIES. POINTING TO THE TV IN THE CORNER (PLAYING A GYRATING, FORTUNATELY SOUNDLESS TINA TURNER) I URGED HIM TO HAVE A SATELLITE INSTALLED SO HE COULD SEE OUR PARLIAMENT IN ACTION. IT WOULD HELP HIM UNDERSTAND THE NEED OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH LEADERS TO EXPLAIN, INFORM AND LEAD. HE SHOULD ALWAYS BEAR THAT AUDIENCE IN MIND. THEY HAD TO BE WON OVER CONSTANTLY.

12. I ASKED IF HE HAD ANY IDEA OF THE TIME-SCALE FOR THE NEXT MOVES. HE SAID HE DID NOT. RATHER ANGRILY HE SAID HE SAW NO POINT IN A MEETING OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS. THAT WAS QUITE UNNECESSARY. I ADVISED HIM NOT TO TRY AND PLAN TOO MANY STEPS AHEAD. HE SHOULD LET THE AMERICANS ASK THE ISRAELIS QUESTIONS. THE MORE THEY WERE ASKED THE MORE THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ISRAELIS GOVERNMENT WOULD OPEN UP. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SHOULD LET THE ISRAELIS ARGUE ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF JERUSALEM VOTERS. ARAFAT OFFERED AN UP-BEAT ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT ISRAELI POLITICAL SCENE, QUOTING THE HISTADRUT ELECTIONS AND SUGGESTING THAT THE LABOUR PARTY COULD WIN AN ELECTION. I SAID OUR ANALYSIS WAS MUCH LESS OPTIMISTIC. IF AN ELECTION WERE TO BE CALLED, IT HAD TO BE ON THE RIGHT ISSUE, THAT IS ONE WHICH WOULD BRING MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR THOSE WHO WISHED TO TALK TO THE PALESTINIANS. AN ELECTION ON WHETHER TO TALK TO THE PLO WOULD RESULT IN A MAJOR SET-BACK.

13. I SPOKE THE NEXT MORNING TO PELLETREAU AND ASKED IF HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD REGARD THE PLO REPLY AS AN ACCEPTANCE. HE SAID HE HAD SOME DOUBTS. IT WAS ''TOO CUTE''. I TOLD HIM OF ARAFAT'S STATEMENTS TO ME AND HE SAID HE THOUGHT THESE WOULD BE HELPFUL. THE AMERICANS WERE IMPEDED BY NOT BEING ABLE TO TALK TO HIM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. SUBJECT TO ANALYSIS OF THE PLO TEXT I HOPE WE CAN CONSIDER ADVISING THE AMERICANS TO TAKE THE PLO REPLY AS AN ACCEPTANCE.

15. IF THE AMERICANS ACCEPT IT, I HOPE WE CAN MAKE AN EARLY STATEMENT IN SUPPORT. A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN HELPING ARAFAT KEEP THE PLO BEHIND HIM. HE IS BOUND TO COME UNDER ATTACK FROM THE EXTREMISTS.

16. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT THE BBC BE CAREFULLY BRIEFED TO EXPLAIN AND EDUCATE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN OPINION ON THE WIDER ARGUMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

61441
MDAD 6818

DAY

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

15


ADVANCE

1513


.ARAB/ISRAEL
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
HD/NENAD

HD/MED
HD/CONSULAR
HD/PUSD
NEWS
NO 10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE DIO
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NNNN



IT8.7/2-1993
2009.02



IT-8 Target

Printed on Kodak Professional Paper

Charge: R090212