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Visit by the Prime Minister to  
Norway  
Policy for visit in September 1986.

NORWAY

November 1982

(Briefing in attached folder).

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>22-11-82</del>							
<del>29-11-82</del>							
<del>11-7-83</del>							
<del>26-8-86</del>							
<del>3-9-86</del>							
<del>5-9-86</del>							
<del>10-9-86</del>							
<del>15-9-86</del>							
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PREM 19/1876



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CEPC (4)  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 October 1986

Dear Charles,

Mr Prime Minister  
You might read  
paragraphs 11-13

The Prime Minister's Visit to Norway

I enclose a copy of  
Sir William Bentley's despatch about  
the Prime Minister's recent visit  
to Norway.

of the despatch

CDP

7/x.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd


(C R Budd)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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




THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

1. The programme started in Tromsø, Northern Norway where the Prime Minister accompanied by Mrs Brundtland visited Olavsvern Naval Base and the Tromsø Museum before flying on to Oslo (Paragraphs 1 and 2).
2. The dinner held in the Prime Minister's honour delayed by an unruly demonstration. Both Prime Ministers paid tribute to the long and friendly relationship between Britain and Norway. Mrs Thatcher announced new measures against Acid Rain (Paragraphs 3 and 4).
3. The wreath-laying ceremony followed by successful talks with Mrs Brundtland and stimulating visit to NATO Headquarters (Paragraphs 5 - 7).
4. Audience with The King who then held a lunch for Mrs Thatcher. Talks with Mr Kåre Willoch, former Prime Minister of Norway followed by a well-reported and dynamic press conference. The programme allowed for some brief sightseeing in Oslo before a reception in the Embassy. Mrs Thatcher then returned to London (Paragraphs 8 and 9).





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5. A successful visit despite the well publicised demonstrations. The Prime Minister greatly impressed her hosts and reaffirmed the close friendship of Britain and Norway (Paragraphs 10 - 12).

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
OSLO.

22 September 1986

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

Sir

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

1. The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, paid an official visit to Norway on 11 and 12 September 1986, accompanied by Mr Denis Thatcher. The visit was in response to a long-standing invitation from the former Prime Minister of Norway, Mr Kåre Willoch, who visited Britain as such in 1984. After his Government fell from power in May 1986 the invitation was warmly reiterated by his Labour Party successor, Mrs Gro Harlem Brundtland. I attach a copy of the programme.

2. The Prime Minister and her party flew directly to Tromsø, well north of the Arctic Circle. They were met there in brilliant autumnal sunshine by Mrs Brundtland, her husband, the Governor of Troms county and other representatives of the Norwegian Government. Both Prime Ministers and their parties departed immediately by helicopter for Olavssvern, the maritime forward operating base for NATO in North Norway. Mrs Thatcher was briefed by Lt General Eide (Commander Allied Forces North

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


Norway) and conducted around the underground facilities at the base, including the docks and berths for submarines and fast patrol boats. Mrs Thatcher was impressed by reinforcement and comprehensive mobilisation plans but stressed the importance of making political decisions early enough to get reinforcement in place in time. She suggested that politicians needed to exercise their role just as much as did the military. General Eide emphasised the importance of the part played by the United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force, and commended the Royal Marines as the best trained Arctic warfare troops in NATO (not excluding the Norwegians themselves). This praise was echoed by Mrs Brundtland.

3. The trip back to Tromsø was in four fast patrol boats, allowing the party a striking view of the fjord and the mountains surrounding it. On arrival in Tromsø the party was met by a small but noisy demonstration, largely against the Prime Minister's policies on South Africa and trade unions. An official lunch was held in an old Norwegian house, the Villa Bikuben. Mrs Brundtland, having warmly welcomed the Prime Minister, spoke of the close ties between our two countries but also touched on current points of difference between their Governments. Mrs Thatcher in reply referred to the long history linking the peoples of Great Britain and Norway, including the departure in 1940 for Britain from Tromsø of the King and Government to set up a Government in exile in London, after the Germans had occupied Norway. Her graceful reference to the demonstrators, and their right to express their point of view,

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made a particular impression, both on those at the lunch and on a wider television audience that evening.

4. After lunch the party visited Tromsø Museum, which houses a fine collection of Lappish exhibits, before flying to Oslo. The Prime Minister had invited Mrs Brundtland to travel to Oslo with her in the RAF VC 10 and the two-hour journey gave them an opportunity for informal discussions which I understand were useful and friendly. On arrival in Oslo Mrs Thatcher drove to my Residence (where she stayed the night) in order to prepare for that evening's banquet for 180 guests in her honour at Akershus Castle. Her departure for the dinner was delayed by some 40 minutes due to a demonstration outside Akershus Castle which got out of hand. The demonstration had been organised by an extreme Marxist group who chose as their subjects British policy on South Africa, Acid Rain and Northern Ireland. Danny Morrison, a leader of Sinn Fein, had come to Oslo to exploit the situation and the general ignorance in Norway of the complexities of the Irish problem. He did so with some success and those intent on a clash with the police were encouraged by the failure of the Norwegian authorities to provide anything like enough manpower to cope with the demonstration. It therefore took some time to clear the castle grounds and tear gas had to be used - a rare though not unique event in Norway.

5. After its delayed start the banquet passed off smoothly. In her speech Mrs Brundtland again referred briefly to the major areas



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of difference between the British and Norwegian Governments (Acid Rain and South Africa). But the substance of her speech was devoted to the long, close and friendly relationship between our two countries, with special reference to Britain's military support during the Second World War and subsequently against the Soviet threat. In reply the Prime Minister gave a very well received speech in which she shrugged off the delay caused by the demonstration and humorously capped a number of Mrs Brundtland's remarks, as well as reiterating the close ties between Britain and Norway and their common defence of freedom. She also took the opportunity to announce the new British measures to alleviate the problem of acid rain.

6. On the following day, the Prime Minister's programme started early, with two ceremonies at the cemetery of Vestre Gravlund. Mrs Thatcher laid wreaths at the monuments to the Britons and the Norwegians who lost their lives in the Second World War. It was a simple and dignified act of remembrance which was greatly appreciated (and reported as such in the press). Some fifty war veterans turned up and much to their delight the Prime Minister managed to speak to many of them.

7. The party went on to Mrs Brundtland's office where a tête-à-tête was followed by more formal talks. These covered East/West issues including SDI, Norway's relationship with the European Community, South Africa, Acid Rain and nuclear energy policy and North Sea oil. On the first two and the last of these subjects there was a fair measure of agreement as well as a useful exchange. The talks,

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notable for their frankness, were a success. A particular aspect was the striking impression which the Prime Minister made on her hosts with her forceful exposition of British opposition to comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Whilst it is not to be supposed that the Norwegian Government will significantly alter their policy on South Africa as a result it is good that they should understand our own at first hand. The detail of the discussions has been recorded separately.

8. Mrs Thatcher then visited the NATO Headquarters at Allied Forces North, at Kolsås just outside Oslo. There she received an excellent and succinct briefing and was shown around the war operations centre by CINC North, General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, and his staff. General Howlett said in welcoming the Prime Minister what an encouragement it was that in her busy programme she had taken time to visit two military installations. The Prime Minister replied that she appreciated both the importance of the Headquarter's role and the need for it to acquire adequate warning of an impending attack by the Warsaw Pact.

9. The Prime Minister subsequently had a private audience with His Majesty King Olav V at which she presented him with a picture of HMS Devonshire leaving Tromsø in 1940. The King was greatly touched by this gift which commemorated his departure, with his father King Haakon VII, for England after the fall of Norway. It will hang in the Royal Yacht. His Majesty then entertained the Prime Minister and other members of the delegation to a most

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agreeable lunch, at which he was in his best form. After her return to the Embassy, Mrs Thatcher had a half-hour meeting with Mr Kåre Willoch, the former Conservative Prime Minister and now Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. The two know each other well from previous meetings in Britain and the talks were relaxed and friendly. There followed a press conference at which the Prime Minister expressed her satisfaction and pleasure with the visit and answered questions on a wide number of issues from South Africa to Acid Rain and oil policy. The conference received wide coverage in both the domestic and foreign press and broadcasting media and the Prime Minister impressed everyone by her confident and comprehensive replies to the questions. During the press conference, there was another, yet smaller demonstration but this was successfully controlled by the police who had belatedly learnt the lesson of the previous evening and provided adequate security - as they did throughout the day. There was then just time for Mrs Thatcher, accompanied by her husband, to visit two of Oslo's most famous museums: the Viking Ships and Nansen's polar exploration ship, the Fram. At the former museum there was an impromptu presentation of flowers by two Norwegian well-wishers, upset by the demonstrations of the previous night: this is still receiving wide and favourable publicity here.

10. That evening the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher attended a reception in the Embassy for some four hundred guests including Mrs Brundtland and her husband, the Foreign Minister, and leaders of the main Norwegian political parties as well as leading figures

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in the economic, defence and diplomatic fields. Mrs Thatcher left directly from this reception, accompanied by Mrs Brundtland, for the airport and took off at 8.15 pm for London. There was a final reminder that Norway was not entirely immune from today's barbarities in the shape of a telephone call to a Norwegian newspaper saying that there was a bomb on board: but this was, as could be expected, a hoax.

#### Assessment

11. The visit was only the second official trip to Norway since independence in 1905 by a British Prime Minister, the first having been by Mr Harold Macmillan in 1960. Mrs Thatcher managed in a busy programme not only to see something of this country and NATO's Northern front, but to meet, and talk to or address, a great many influential Norwegians. She and Mrs Brundtland rapidly established a close rapport even though their political perspectives differ: thus, as I had expected, they gave the lie to press speculation that their personalities would clash. The Prime Minister impressed those of her hosts who had not met her before with her surefootedness in the public eye, the firmness and clarity of her views and her eloquence, her flair for improvisation in her public speaking (the banquet speech at Akershus delighted her audience) and her statesmanlike politeness throughout. The latter made an especially positive impression.

12. There is no denying that the violent demonstration before the banquet, and the consequent delay of the Prime Minister's arrival

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there, marred the occasion in some degree. As was inevitable both British and Norwegian press played the disturbance for much more than it was worth. It is also, incidentally, having a significant political effect in Oslo, where it is generally recognised that the precautions ordered by the Government and taken by the security authorities were wholly inadequate (as distinct from the anti-terrorist precautions, which were very good indeed). Heads will roll: it is not yet decided whose. More important for us, there is a widespread revulsion and sense of shame - given expression in numerous letters, telephone calls and verbal apologies to me, my wife and others in this Embassy - that the fracas should have been allowed to interfere with the friendly reception of a distinguished guest and the representative of Norway's oldest, and in many ways closest, friend. However, one aspect which it would be unwise to overlook is that, as well as ignorance in certain Norwegian circles of Northern Ireland and a wider naiveté about South Africa, the demonstrations also reflected widespread concern, even bitterness, at our industrial emissions and their effect on acid precipitation here. Mrs Brundtland made it clear that the latest British measures are welcome and greatly appreciated; but she added her hope that further such steps should be taken and we should be in no doubt that more will be asked of us in the future.

13. That said, it would be a mistake to give undue emphasis to the demonstrations in assessing the Prime Minister's visit. Despite the prominence given to this in the media the substantive

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aspects are much more important and were overwhelmingly positive. As was the intention the visit served to emphasise and underline the long-standing friendship and closeness of Britain and Norway and the common position which we adopt on most issues (despite the fact that Mrs Thatcher turned out to have a Labour hostess rather than a Conservative host). In the longer term perspective, that is the effect which the visit will be seen to have had. I am very grateful to the Prime Minister: I hope that she found her journey interesting, agreeable and worthwhile, and I am confident that it was necessary.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretaries of State for Defence and for the Environment, to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Copenhagen, Helsinki, Reykjavik and Stockholm and to the UK Representatives to the European Communities and NATO.

I am, Sir

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W Bentley', with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

William Bentley

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lib SKW

18 September 1986

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY**

I enclose a copy of a formal record of the Prime Minister's talks with Mrs. Brundtland in Oslo on 12 September prepared by our Embassy. I have amended it extensively. May I please leave it to the department to distribute as (or if) necessary.

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT  
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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MRS. GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND,  
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY: OSLO, 12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Prime Minister

Sir W. Bentley, HM Ambassador

Mr. Wicks

Mr. Powell

Mr. Ingham

Mr. Short, HM Embassy

Mrs. Brundtland

Mr. Frydenlund, Foreign  
Minister

Mr. Oien, Minister of  
Petroleum and Energy

Mr. Hanisch, State Secretary

Ms. Nordbo, State Secretary

Mr. Busch, Ambassador

Mr. Kolby, Assistant Under  
Secretary, MFA

Mr. Wetland,  
Private Secretary

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The Prime Minister noted that both the UK and Norway supported a US/Soviet summit but differed in their attitude to the Strategic Defence Initiative. History underlined the lesson that free societies needed to try to keep ahead technologically of any potential aggressors. It should be easier for them because they lived by the free exchange of ideas which stimulated technological progress. This was what was happening in the United States. She supported the SDI and wished Britain to take part in it, both on principle and because of the technological spin-off. At the same time, it was important to maintain the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in force. She had expressed this view to President Reagan, suggesting that it might be possible to extend the period of notice of termination beyond the present six months.

The Prime Minister continued that she believed that the Soviet Union wanted a summit. She was, however, appalled at the Danilov affair. The Russians appeared to have misunderstood American psychology. The United Kingdom had been working very hard to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the West, for example the visit of Shevardnaze to London earlier

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this year, and Lord Whitelaw's visit to Moscow. The United Kingdom could make a particular contribution as chairman of the Chemical Warfare negotiations. President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl shared the same general approach to the Soviet Union. Allied consultation was good, and the US record on keeping the Alliance informed on arms control negotiations was exemplary. The West should not give the Russians any single point without getting something in return. We should also use the Helsinki accords to encourage freedom of movement.

Mrs. Brundtland said that Norway strongly agreed that the ABM Treaty must be maintained, and that the West should keep ahead in modern technology. But Norway was concerned about heavy concentration of resources in a field where she did not feel confident that the concept would work. Would SDI in fact add to the means of defending the West? Or would it create an increased pressure for new offensive weapons?

Mrs. Brundtland agreed that Soviet behaviour over Danilov had been strange. This was an unwise move in the lead-up to a summit. It was important that a summit should take place. She had told the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not think that, if a summit did not take place, the blame would fall on the West and the United States in particular. This was what the Russians apparently did believe. The more open policies in Moscow in the last two years made it possible to believe that there would be a summit. But it was important that it should produce results. She did not think that President Reagan would allow his eight years as President to conclude without a major step forward on East/West relations and arms control. She was heartened to find that, although the United Kingdom and Norway did not see eye to eye on all details, they took the same overall view on the West's strategy towards the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister referred to the extent to which the Russians themselves were doing research on SDI. This was considerable: they had been working on laser systems longer than the Americans and were modernising their ABM system round

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Moscow, as well as undertaking research into new defensive systems.

Mr. Frydenlund said that the SDI programme was useful as a negotiating card. But if the Americans stuck to it, or it was allowed to stand in the way of progress on arms control, there would be great difficulties in the Alliance. The Prime Minister said that the SDI was certainly more than a negotiating card. Mr. Frydenlund distinguished between research and deployment. The Prime Minister said that the scope for testing under the ABM Treaty was not entirely clear, although the Treaty certainly prevented deployment.

Mrs. Brundtland said that NATO must try to find common ground in interpreting the Treaty.

**NORWAY/EC**

Mrs. Brundtland said that Norway wished to have the closest possible relationship with the EC, without becoming a member. For example, on counter-terrorism, there should be no barriers between the EC and EFTA. The Prime Minister queried whether there was in fact a barrier. If there was, it must come down. The EC was not meant to be restrictive in that sense at all. Rather, it was an example of what could be done to promote free exchange. Mr. Frydenlund agreed that in the last two years the EC had opened up its relations with Norway. Once a year, there was a meeting with the Commission, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister met the Presidency Foreign Ministers to discuss EPC twice a year. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom, as Presidency, would do all it could to promote wider agreement between the EC and EFTA. In GATT, the two organisations should work together against non-tariff barriers. In this regard, it was particularly important to counter Japanese practices. Recent examples were Japanese non-tariff barriers against the import of skis and car safety belts. It was also time to revise the position of NICs, who now received too much preference. Agriculture was a major world problem: there were large surpluses in the United States, Europe and India. She was opposed to the sale of

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surplus EC agricultural produce at bargain prices to the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Brundtland said that she took a special interest in this problem, as leader of the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Commission had been pleased with the declaration of the Tokyo Economic Summit on agriculture.

ACID RAIN

The Prime Minister said that the measures announced by the United Kingdom the previous day were a substantial step forward, although very costly. It was inconsistent to complain about the effects of burning fossil fuel, and in the same breath about the dangers of nuclear energy. Governments had a responsibility to provide energy for their peoples. The Third World in particular would need nuclear energy for its development. The United Kingdom hoped that, following the announcement of their measures, others who were responsible for sulphur emissions would follow suit. This applied especially to Eastern European countries. Mrs. Brundtland said that the British announcement was welcomed. More research was necessary into energy saving. The cost of environmental protection had to be included in the cost of energy. She wondered how far the British measures would take the UK towards achieving the targets set by the 30% Club.

The Prime Minister explained that the UK had in fact already reduced its sulphur emissions by 40% since 1970, but the base year selected by the Community was less favourable to us. Recently there had actually been some increase in emissions because more electricity was being consumed. The three power stations chosen for retro-fitting used the most sulphurous coal and oil. The cost would be added to the cost of electricity.

The Prime Minister continued that the UK would be buying electricity from the French grid and, depending on the results of the Sizewell enquiry, would seek to build more nuclear

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power stations. These measures would help reduce emissions from the United Kingdom further. Every form of energy had some disadvantage. Nevertheless, the overriding responsibility of Government was to provide enough energy to meet demand.

Mrs. Brundtland said that all European countries had reduced their output of sulphur in the 1970s, and subsequently many countries had intensified measures to reduce emissions. Although the latest British announcement was welcome, Norway hoped that the UK would take part in further European measures to meet reduced emission targets. The Prime Minister pointed out that many countries other than the UK were responsible for sulphur emission; for example, Norway itself, and the GDR, were each responsible for more pollution in Norway. The FRG produced the most overall. Mrs. Brundtland said that it was important that the UK had accepted the fact that its power stations were causing damage to the environment. The Prime Minister made it clear that this applied only to lakes and fresh water: in forests, other factors were at work.

#### **SOUTH AFRICA**

Mr. Frydenlund said that the Nordic countries had for some time operated a number of sanctions against South Africa. Since progress there had not been satisfactory, and black opposition to the regime had become more open, the Norwegians foresaw a bloodbath which the West had a responsibility to try to avert. They therefore thought that pressure on the South African Government should be increased. The Norwegian Parliament would vote for comprehensive sanctions when it reopened. The Government knew that this would not have much practical effect, but thought it would have an important psychological effect on the blacks. There was also a political necessity in the Western world to increase pressure on South Africa. Norway assumed that any resolution in the UN Security Council calling for mandatory sanctions would be vetoed. How would the UK react to a resolution recommending voluntary sanctions?



The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain was as much opposed to apartheid as any nation. She explained Britain's opposition to comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In sum, she considered that there was no evidence whatever that sanctions would bring apartheid to an end: rather the reverse, as the Rhodesian experience showed. It would be impossible to make sanctions effective; sanctions in the field of military equipment, which were fully supported by Britain, had been in place for many years but evasion of them was widespread. Insofar as sanctions against South Africa would work, they would cause mass starvation and unemployment. This was why a number of black leaders in South Africa itself, and now also some of the Front Line States, did not support sanctions. Not only was the damage which they would do to the black population morally repugnant, they were unacceptable on other grounds: for example, the only two significant sources of platinum in the world were South Africa and the Soviet Union, and it was unacceptable to give the Soviet Union a monopoly in strategic minerals. Sanctions could lead to the loss of 120,000 jobs in the UK. She was passionate about ending apartheid. But undermining the South African economy would not achieve that. Rather, the West should continue with gestures of disapproval and increase pressure on President Botha, who was a stubborn and difficult man and who presided over a split Cabinet. It should also seek the release of Nelson Mandela, which was a pre-requisite of bringing the ANC into negotiations.

Mr. Frydenlund asked how such a policy would work if the South African Government maintained that the end of apartheid amounted to suicide for them. The Prime Minister reiterated that sanctions would not end apartheid. Mrs Brundtland said that she understood the strength of the Prime Minister's convictions on this. She asked about the likely UK attitude to a resolution in the Security Council on voluntary sanctions. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom would consider the precise terms of any resolution, in concert with her EC partners, when the time came. Many countries



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advocating sanctions would either not suffer from them or would actually stand to gain.

**NORTH SEA OIL**

Mrs Brundtland said that it was not true, as claimed in "The Guardian", that the Norwegians had chosen the week of the Prime Minister's visit in which to announce their decision to reduce exports in order to "slap the United Kingdom in the face". The decision had been timed to precede the Ministers of Petroleum and Energy's meeting with Mr. Peter Walker this week and should be positively helpful to the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister said that this subject could be discussed in a friendly manner between two close allies. Mrs Brundtland said that the Norwegians would bear the cost of their decision, and the UK would take the benefit. The Prime Minister recognised that the positions of the two countries were quite different: total Norwegian production was bound to increase, whereas UK production had levelled off and would go down. The United Kingdom's policies would continue unchanged.

C.D.P

C.D. POWELL

18 September 1986

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BRITISH EMBASSY

Thomas Heftyegate 8, 0264 Oslo 2 Norway  
Telex: 71575 Telephone: Oslo 552400

16 September 1986

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C D Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Charles,

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY: OFFICIAL TALKS

1. As agreed, I enclose a draft record of the talks on 12 September.
2. We all enjoyed your visit to Norway and I hope that you found it agreeable and useful. We were very sorry to learn about the hoax bomb threat, but relieved that it was no more than that.

Yours ever

R G

R G Short

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH MRS GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND,  
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY: OSLO, 12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Prime Minister	Mrs Brundtland
Sir W Bentley, HM Ambassador	Mr Frydenlund, Foreign Minister
Mr Wicks, <del>Principal Private Secretary</del>	Mr Øien, Minister of Petroleum and Energy
Mr Powell, <del>Private Secretary</del>	Mr Hanisch, State Secretary
Mr Ingham, <del>Press Secretary</del>	Ms Nordbø, State Secretary
Mr Short, HM Embassy	Mr Busch, Ambassador
	Mr Kolby, Assistant Under Secretary, MFA
	Mr Wetland, Private Secretary

#### EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. The Prime Minister noted that both the UK and Norway <sup>supported</sup> ~~foresaw the possibility of~~ a US/Soviet summit, structured on NATO's side <sup>on</sup> ~~by~~ the continuation of deterrence. <sup>but</sup> ~~The~~ <sup>difference in their attitude to the strategic offensive initiative.</sup> ~~two countries differed on SDI.~~ In the Prime Minister's view, it was necessary to consider the historical <sup>ahead</sup> ~~perspective.~~ If Hitler had been ~~the head~~ of the Allies in the development of the atom bomb, ~~these discussions would~~ not be taking place in Oslo today. Thanks to the outstanding courage of both British and Norwegian forces, ~~the heavy water bombing raid had succeeded, and the Allies had acquired the atom bomb before the Nazis.~~ Had they not <sup>Having understood the lesson that free societies needed</sup> ~~done so,~~ the world would have been a vastly different place. One of the duties of a free society was to try to keep ahead technically of any potential aggressors. <sup>It should be easier for them because they lived by</sup> ~~This was facilitated in a free society by the free exchange of ideas,~~



which ~~normally~~ stimulated technological progress. This was what was happening in the United States, and the Prime Minister supported it. She wished Britain to take part in SDI, both on principle and because of the technological spin-off.

2. At the same time, it was important to maintain the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in force. There was no system of international law which was as effective as domestic law. The United Nations was not the appropriate forum for such agreements, so that states must have <sup>the</sup> ~~Treaties~~. The Prime Minister had expressed this view to President Reagan, and ~~also stressed to him how~~ important it was to understand the psychology of the Soviet Union. The Russians were not equal to the West in technology, and if they became upset because they were behind the West on SDI, it was important to re-affirm <sup>suggesting that it might be possible</sup> the ABM Treaty and, if possible, to extend the period of notice of termination beyond the present six months. This would help to keep the balance between the two super powers.

<sup>continued that so</sup> 3. The Prime Minister believed that the Soviet Union wanted a summit. She was, however ~~somewhat~~ appalled at the Danilov affair. There was a danger that the Russians had misunderstood American psychology, and she hoped that they would show restraint. The UK had been working very hard to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the West, for example <sup>she</sup> ~~during~~ the visit of Scheverdnaze to London earlier this year, and Lord Whitelaw's visit to Moscow. <sup>the UK could make a particular contribution</sup> One point at which the UK had leverage was



<sup>on</sup> that they were chairman of the Chemical Warfare Commission; <sup>ref. to them</sup> they were able to point out that the UK had destroyed its chemical weapons in 1959, and the US was not developing new CW technology; but this did not apply to the Soviet Union. We could say to the Russians that one agreement which they could negotiate with the West would be the destruction of chemical weapons: otherwise, the only response to new chemical weapons would be nuclear.

4. The Prime Minister believed that President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl shared views very similar to these. <sup>to have general approach to the Soviet Union. Allied</sup>

<sup>good</sup> consultation was very active, and President Reagan had <sup>to US record in helping the Alliance defend an arms control negotiations was exemplary. The West</sup> been good in this regard on both ABM and CW. The West should not give the Russians any single point without

getting something in return. The Soviet Union operated a very effective system of subversion, <sup>was</sup>

<sup>we should also</sup> their nature. The West must use the Helsinki accord to encourage freedom of movement. <sup>NPS.</sup> Mrs Brundtland said that,

<sup>strongly</sup> as regards SDI, Norway was very much in agreement that the ABM Treaty must be maintained, It was essential that the UK should continue to hold this view, especially

while discussion continued in the United States as to whether the Treaty should be abolished. She agreed

<sup>and that</sup> that it was necessary for the West to keep ahead <sup>should</sup> on <sup>in modern</sup>

technology. But Norway was concerned about <sup>the</sup> heavy concentration <sup>of resources in a field</sup> on an area where she did not feel confident that the concept would work. Would SDI in fact <sup>add to</sup> the means of defending the West? Or would it create an increased impetus for <sup>new offensive</sup> strategic weapons?

6. <sup>Soviet</sup> Mrs Brundtland agreed that the Russians behaviour



over Danilov had been strange. This was an unwise move in the lead-up to a summit. It was important that a summit should take place. She had told the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not ~~believe~~<sup>think</sup> that, if a summit did not take place, the blame would fall on the West and the United States in particular. This ~~is~~<sup>was</sup> what the Russians apparently did believe. The more open policies in Moscow in the last two years made it possible to believe that there would be a summit, ~~But~~<sup>She did not take the</sup> it was important that it should produce results, halfway through President Reagan's second term. ~~world allow his eight years as President~~

~~to conclude without a major step forward~~  
~~forward on East-West relations & arms control.~~

7. Mrs Brundtland agreed that, although the UK and Norway ~~she was hesitant to see~~

did not see eye to eye on all details, they took the same ~~view~~<sup>overall</sup>

view on the West's strategy towards the Soviet Union. ~~She~~

~~hoped that it would succeed: it was important to achieve~~

~~some form of arms negotiation agreement.~~

8. ~~The Prime Minister~~ referred to the extent to which

the Russians themselves were researching on SDI. This

was considerable: they had been working on laser systems

longer than the Americans and there ~~was evidence that they~~<sup>modernizing their</sup>

were developing an ABM system outside Moscow, as well as ~~defensive systems~~<sup>round</sup>

undertaking research into new methods of countering

missiles.

9. Even though it might not be possible to conclude a

fundamental agreement with the Russians on arms control,

it was necessary to ~~seek~~<sup>find</sup> a way ahead, and to keep up the

pressure. In particular, the Russians should be encouraged

to emulate the West in allowing their citizens to leave the



country freely.

10. Mr Frydenlund said that the Norwegians doubted whether the Russians would be willing to use the SDI programme as a factor in the negotiations. This might lead to difficulties. The Prime Minister said that she would not <sup>contemplate</sup> ~~dream~~ of using research into SDI as a negotiating card.

Mr Frydenlund distinguished between research and deployment.

The Prime Minister said that it was not clear whether the ABM Treaty prevented testing, although it certainly prevented deployment. Mrs Brundtland said that the NATO Allies must try to find common ground in interpreting the Treaty.

/u.

NORWAY/EC



## NORWAY/EC

11. Mrs Brundtland said that Norway wished to have the closest possible relationship with the EC, without becoming a member. For example, on counter-terrorism, there should be no barrier between the EC and EFTA. The Prime Minister queried whether there was, in fact, a barrier: if there was, it must come down. The EC was not meant to be restrictive in that sense at all. Rather, it was an example of what could be done to promote free trade. <sup>exchange</sup> Mr Frydenlund agreed that in the last two years the EC had opened up its relations with Norway. Once a year, there was a meeting with the Commission, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister <sup>met</sup> ~~lead~~ the Presidency <sup>foreign Minister to discuss</sup> ~~on~~ EPC twice a year. The Prime Minister said that the UK, as Presidency, would do all it could to promote wider agreement between the EC and EFTA. In GATT, the two organisations should work together against non-tariff barriers. In this regard, it was particularly important to counter Japanese practices. Recent examples were Japanese non-tariff barriers against the import of skis and car safety belts. It was also time to revise the position of NICs, who now received too much preference. World <sup>82</sup> Agriculture was a <sup>major world</sup> ~~problem~~: there were large surpluses in the United States, Europe and India. <sup>against EC agriculture</sup> ~~The Prime Minister~~ was opposed to the sale of surplus produce at bargain prices to the Soviet Union.

12. Mrs Brundtland said that she took a special interest in this problem, as leader of the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Commission had been



Tokyo

pleased with the declaration of the Economic Summit  
on this problem.

## ACID RAIN

13. The Prime Minister said that the measures announced by the <sup>UK</sup> ~~British Government~~ the previous day were a substantial step forward, and work on each of the three power stations affected would cost £200 million. The Prime Minister thought it was wrong that people should complain about the effects of burning fossil fuel, and in the same breath about the dangers of nuclear energy. Governments <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ a responsibility to provide energy for their peoples. The Third World in particular, would need nuclear energy for its development. The ~~British~~ <sup>UK</sup> ~~Government~~ hoped that, following the announcement of their measures, others who were responsible for sulphur emissions would follow suit. This applied especially to Eastern European countries. Mrs Brundtland said that the British announcement was welcomed. More research was necessary in <sup>energy saving</sup> to the reduction of expenditure on energy, and of its environmental damage. The cost of taking <sup>environmental</sup> ~~care~~ <sup>into</sup> ~~of~~ the environment had to be included in the cost of energy. <sup>She</sup> Mrs Brundtland wondered how far the British measures would take the UK towards a reduction of 30%; and why it was not now possible for the UK to join the 30% Club.

achieving the targets set by

14. The Prime Minister explained that this was because the UK could not accept the arbitrary selection of 1978 as the base year. The UK had in fact already reduced its sulphur emissions by 40%. <sup>(since 1970, but the base year selected by the community was less favourable to us)</sup> Following this reduction



*Recently the actual increase in emissions*  
 there had been some increase, because more electricity  
*was being produced, and so the Government had taken extra*  
 action to reduce the level once more. The three  
*power stations chosen for retro-fitting*  
 used the most sulphurous coal and  
 oil. The cost would be added to the cost of electricity.

*continued talk to the UK word*  
 18. The Prime Minister referred to the Sizewell enquiry:  
 this had taken ~~3~~ *three* years, and the subsequent report  
 another ~~3~~ *three*. The UK was now about to buy nuclear power  
*by buying electricity from the French grid and, depending*  
 from France, although the UK had led the way on nuclear  
 power. *at the Sizewell enquiry,* If the Sizewell enquiry allowed it, the Government  
*on the results of the Sizewell enquiry,* would seek to build more nuclear power stations. Apart  
*these measures would help reduce emissions from the UK. Every form of energy had some disadvantages*  
 from hydro-electricity there were problems with other  
 forms of energy: for example, both windmills and the  
 seven bore gave rise to environmental difficulties.

Nevertheless, the overriding responsibility of Government  
 was to provide enough energy to meet demand. At the  
 same time, conservation measures could help, and also  
 lower the price of oil.

19. Mrs Brundtland said that all European countries  
 had reduced their output of sulphur in the 1970s, and  
 subsequently many countries had intensified measures  
 to reduce emission. Although the latest British  
 announcement was welcome, Norway hoped that the UK would  
 take part in further European measures to meet reduced  
 emission targets. The Prime Minister pointed out that  
 many countries other than the UK were responsible for  
 sulphur emission; for example, Norway itself, and the  
 GDR, were each responsible for more pollution in Norway.



<sup>overall</sup>  
In sum, <sup>Lib over power ratings</sup> the FRG produced the most. Mrs Brundtland said that it was important that the UK had accepted the fact that ~~they~~ <sup>they</sup> were causing damage to the environment. The Prime Minister made it clear that this applied only to lakes and fresh water: in forests, other factors were at work.

#### SOUTH AFRICA

17. Mr Frydenlund said that the Nordic countries had for some time <sup>operated</sup> ~~had in place~~ a number of sanctions against South Africa. Since progress there had not been satisfactory, and black opposition to the regime had become more open, the Norwegians foresaw a bloodbath which the West had a responsibility to try to avert. They therefore thought that pressure on the South African Government should be increased. The Norwegian Parliament would vote for comprehensive sanctions when it reopened. The Government knew that this would not have much practical effect, but thought it would have an important psychological effect on the blacks. There was also a political necessity in the Western world to increase pressure on South Africa. Norway assumed that any resolution in the UN Security Council calling for mandatory sanctions would be vetoed. How would the UK react to a resolution recommending <sup>voluntary</sup> sanctions?

18. The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain was as much opposed to apartheid as any nation. She explained Britain's opposition to comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In sum, she considered that there was no evidence whatever that sanctions would bring apartheid to an end: rather the reverse, as the Rhodesian experience showed. It would be impossible to make sanctions effective; sanctions in the field of military equipment,

/ which



which were fully supported by Britain, had been in place for many years and had not worked. <sup>but had been evasion of them was widespread</sup> Insofar as sanctions against South Africa would work, they would cause mass starvation and unemployment. This was why a number of black leaders in South Africa, <sup>irish</sup> and now <sup>also a lot</sup> some Front Line States, did not support sanctions. They were <sup>they were</sup> not only morally utterly repugnant, but unacceptable on <sup>other</sup> ~~practical~~ grounds: for example, the only two significant sources of platinum in the world were South Africa and the Soviet Union, and it was unacceptable to give the Soviet Union a monopoly in ~~this~~ strategic minerals. Sanctions would lead to the loss of 120,000 jobs in the UK, and if British investment was withdrawn the white South Africans would be able to buy factories at bargain prices. <sup>she</sup> The Prime Minister was passionate about ending apartheid, as she was about ending some military regimes in Africa. But undermining the South African economy would not end apartheid. Rather, the West should continue with gestures of disapproval and increase pressure on President Botha, who was a stubborn and difficult man and who presided over a split Cabinet. Although the Prime Minister approved neither of Winnie Mandela nor of certain members of the African National Congress (ANC) who <sup>12</sup> had advocated more necklace murders, the West should <sup>also</sup> seek the release of Nelson Mandela. <sup>when</sup> He was an old man and his release was a pre-requisite of bringing the ANC into negotiations, which was necessary even though they did not represent all black South Africans.

19. Mr Frydenlund asked how such a policy would work if the South African Government maintained that the end of apartheid amounted to suicide for them. The Prime Minister reiterated that sanctions would not end apartheid.

They would do to black population morally



*The strength of*  
Mrs Brundtland said that she understood that the Prime Minister was ~~convinced~~ *convinced or* of this. She asked about the likely UK attitude to a ~~recommendatory~~ *on whether or not* resolution in the Security Council. *"* The Prime Minister said that the UK would ~~negotiate~~ *consider* on the ~~terms~~ *issue* of a resolution, in concert with her EC partners, when the time came. She ~~pointed out that~~ *many* countries advocating sanctions would either not suffer *from them* or would actually stand to gain from them.

#### NORTH SEA OIL

20. Mrs Brundtland said that it was not true, as claimed in "The Guardian", that the Norwegians had chosen the week of the Prime Minister's visit in which to announce their decision to reduce exports in order to "slap the UK in the face". The decision had been timed to precede the Minister of Petroleum and Energy's meeting with Mr Peter Walker this week. *"and should actually be helpful to it"* The Prime Minister said that this subject could be discussed in a friendly manner between two close allies. Mrs Brundtland said that the Norwegians would bear the cost of their decision, and the UK would take the benefit. The Prime Minister recognised that the positions of the two countries were quite different: total Norwegian production was bound to increase, whereas UK production had levelled off and would go down. She ~~assured Mrs Brundtland that the UK would not create difficulties about the Norwegian decision.~~ *Re*

*UK's policies would continue unchanged.*



SUBJECT  
cc master.

CONFIDENTIAL



JK VC  
CPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1986

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY  
IN OSLO ON FRIDAY 12 SEPTEMBER 1986 AT 0845

The Prime Minister had formal talks with Mrs Brundtland during her visit to Norway on the morning of Friday 12 September. This followed a long talk during the flight from Tromsø to Oslo the previous day during which they discussed mainly domestic policy issues. Both sets of talks were notably easy and friendly.

The meeting started tête à tête between the Prime Minister and Mrs Brundtland, providing an opportunity for them to go over the issues which both intended to raise subsequently in a plenary session and agree the broad conclusions which they would reach.

A list of those who took part in the plenary session is attached.

East/West Relations

The Prime Minister said that there were two aspects of East/West relations which she would like to raise with Mrs Brundtland. The first concerned the Strategic Defence Initiative on which the British and Norwegian governments had rather different views. Her own view was based on the conviction that the West must always strive to maintain a scientific and technological lead over the Soviet Union. She therefore believed that the United States were right to go ahead with research on the SDI and she was determined that the United Kingdom should be involved with it, not least in the hope of benefiting from possible civil applications of the research. At the same time it was vital to keep strictly to the terms of the ABM Treaty. We had represented this strongly to the United States, while suggesting that it might be possible to extend the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty. This would provide predictability and give added assurance to the Soviet Union that there would not be a sudden break-out to deployment. This concept had been reflected in President Reagan's proposals of last July.

Mrs Brundtland said that she strongly agreed with the Prime Minister about the importance of preserving treaties and also on the value of extending the period of notice for

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JK



withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. But the Norwegian government was not at all convinced that the SDI would work and achieve the aims which had been set for it. They doubted, therefore, whether it made sense to invest so heavily in it. Their main concern was that a decision by the United States to deploy a strategic defence system would only lead the Russians to increase their build-up of offensive weapons. Mr. Frydenlund added that the SDI had served an important purpose in bringing the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. It was a useful negotiating card but should not be regarded as more than that. If the Americans decided to deploy a strategic defence system or, more immediately, if arms control negotiations broke down on the issue of the SDI, there would be a very difficult situation in the Alliance. The Prime Minister stressed that only research was involved at this stage. The Americans were committed not to deploy a strategic defence system without first negotiating under the ABM Treaty.

The Prime Minister went on to raise the prospects for a further US/Soviet summit. She very much hoped there would be such a summit this year. Both sides appeared to want it, although the Daniloff case showed the extent to which the Russians tended to misread the psychology of the United States. We had been working hard behind the scenes to encourage a summit and also to secure progress in arms control negotiations, particularly on chemical weapons. There was a general similarity in the approach of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the main arms control issues. The United States' record on consultation within the Alliance was excellent. She remained optimistic that a summit would take place because she believed that both sides wanted to maintain deterrence at a lower level of weaponry. At the same time it was important to use all our contacts with the Soviet Union to bring pressure to bear on them to implement the Helsinki Agreements.

Mrs Brundtland agreed that Soviet behaviour in the Daniloff case had been very unwise. She feared that it might jeopardise the summit. She had herself recently warned the Soviet Ambassador in Oslo that the Russians should not assume that the Western public opinion would blame the US for failure to hold a summit. Norway did not agree with every position taken by the US Administration but did endorse their general strategic approach in East/West relations. In her own view it was inconceivable that President Reagan would allow eight years of his leadership to end without any arms control agreement in place.

### Europe

Mrs Brundtland spoke of the need to eliminate barriers to cooperation in Europe, not just in trade but also on problems such as terrorism. Mr. Frydenlund added that cooperation between the EC and EFTA had improved markedly in recent years. The Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom would do everything possible to promote cooperation and reduce barriers between the EC and EFTA. We hoped that the EC Foreign Affairs Council would shortly adopt a declaration on this. She was



not aware of any obstacles in the way of cooperation in dealing with terrorism: there ought not to be any.

#### Acid Rain

The Prime Minister gave an account of the decisions recently taken by HMG to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from power stations, on the basis of new scientific evidence and about the harmful effect of such emissions on soil and freshwaters. These measures were of great significance. They were also very costly. They needed to be matched by improved soil management in countries affected by acid deposition, and also by pressure on East European countries to reduce their emissions. The Prime Minister also drew attention to the inconsistency of some of the environmental lobbies in wanting to put limits both on traditional and nuclear power stations.

Mrs Brundtland said that it was important to find ways to bring down the environmental impact of energy use. The cost of doing so should be incorporated in charges for energy use. More investment was needed in energy saving. She welcomed the recent decisions by HMG on power station emissions but was not quite clear how far they took the United Kingdom towards the target of the 30% Club. The Prime Minister said that we could not guarantee to meet that target, not least because it took no account of the very substantial reductions which we had achieved in sulphurous emissions in the period before 1980. We could not go beyond the recent decisions, though we hoped in the longer term to increase the share of nuclear power in meeting our overall energy needs. Mrs Brundtland said that it was a major step forward that the United Kingdom now accepted that environmental damage was caused by power station emissions. Norway was pleased with the decisions made but still hoped that the United Kingdom would subscribe to the 30% target.

#### South Africa

Mr. Frydenlund said that the Norwegian government saw no alternative but to increase pressure on the South African government to give black people their rights by imposing economic sanctions. They therefore intended to impose a general trade boycott. They realised that this would not have much political impact, but believed that blacks in South Africa needed evidence of support for their cause. He recognised that the United Kingdom had already adopted a number of measures and might add others. He also recognised that any attempt to impose mandatory economic sanctions through the United Nations would be vetoed. But how would the United Kingdom view a proposal for a Security Council resolution on voluntary sanctions?

The Prime Minister gave a vigorous account of HMG's views on South Africa on familiar lines. We were as much against apartheid as anyone. We wanted to see Mandela released and the ban on the ANC lifted. But sanctions had never in the past succeeded in changing a country's internal policies and would not improve matters in South Africa, indeed would




probably halt whatever progress there was towards ending apartheid. South Africa was well able to withstand and evade sanctions. Moreover there was nothing moral about depriving blacks of their jobs. South Africa would retaliate, most damagingly against the Front Line States, some of whom realised this and had voiced their opposition to sanctions. Mrs Brundtland concluded rather breathlessly that she recognised the strength and sincerity of the Prime Minister's views.

Oil

Mrs Brundtland referred briefly to the measures recently taken by the Norwegian government to reduce oil exports (but not production). Far from this being an attempt to exert pressure on the United Kingdom, as some newspapers had suggested, it should be seen as helpful to Britain which could be expected to benefit from any resulting move towards higher prices. The Prime Minister commented only that the United Kingdom would continue its present policies.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Environment, Energy, Defence, Trade and Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

yours sincerely,  


C.D. POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



## NORTHERN FLANK

- welcome Norwegian government's declaration of continued support for NATO.
- concern about footnote in recent NATO communique and support for Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
- we remain committed to defence of northern flank
- our defence budget has financial provision for continued amphibious capability. Decisions this autumn on replacements for Intrepid and Fearless.



## OIL

- we are not prepared to dictate to the market or over-rule judgement of companies. So not ready for production cuts.
- enquire after Norwegian position.



## CHERNOBYL

- welcome outcome of Vienna meeting
- ask about contamination in Norway



## BILATERAL QUESTIONS

### Acid rain

- UK <sup>Contributes only</sup> identifies some 13% to identifiable deposition in Norway.
- joint study by Royal Society and Royal Norwegian and Royal Swedish Academies.
- decision reached in E(A): will fit flue gas desulphurisation equipment to all new power stations and retrofit three major ones (covering 6000 MW of existing capacity).

### Dounreay

- excellent safety record. Reactors at Dounreay for 27 years.



- new reprocessing plant subject of local enquiry at which safety is the central issue.
- Environment Minister to discuss further with William Waldegrave in November.

### Svalbard

- detailed discussions are for officials.

### Supply Boats

- UK market traditionally open with 35/40% penetration.
- purpose of OSO initiative to ensure UK operators have a fair chance to compete.



- Norwegians still do better in UK market than UK or other foreign operators in Norwegian market.



## EAST/WEST RELATIONS

- new Gorbachev style. Avalanche of proposals, mainly for propaganda.
- need to show up weakness of Soviet proposals while making constructive ones of our own.
- believe Gorbachev wants summit (though Danilov affair) but only if results.
- important for alliance to remain solid behind Americans.
- your own likely visit to Soviet Union.
- prospects of progress in CDE.
- do not like concept of regional rather than global chemical weapons ban.



- major objective in CSCE remains pressure on Soviet Union on human rights.
- Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.



## EUROPEAN ISSUES

- do our best to give impetus to EC/EFTA co-operation.
- Work for declaration at Foreign Affairs Council. *re it*  
*week*
- encourage Commission to keep EFTA fully informed.
- value Norwegian participation in Eureka.
- keep you informed on POCO, but no scope for Norwegian participation.
- not satisfied that unilateral Norwegian measures at Svalbard justified under the 1920 Treaty of Paris. Like to see contacts at expert level.



## SOUTH AFRICA

- agree on goal, differ on means
- our approach on sanctions
- EC aspect



PARTICIPANTS IN TALKS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME  
MINISTER OF NORWAY ON FRIDAY 12 SEPTEMBER 1986

Britain

Prime Minister  
HM Ambassador  
Mr. N.L. Wicks  
Mr. C.D. Powell  
Mr. B. Ingham  
Mr. R. Short

Norway

Mrs Brundtland  
Mr. Frydenlund (Foreign Minister)  
Mr. Oien (Minister of Petroleum and Energy)  
Mr. Hanisch (State Secretary, Prime Minister's Office)  
Ms. Nordbo (State Secretary, Prime Minister's Office)  
Ambassador Busch  
Mr. Kolby (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  
Mr. Wetland (Private Secretary)



PRESS CONFERENCE - DRAFT OPENING REMARKS

THIS IS MY FIRST VISIT TO NORWAY AND IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY BLESSED WITH MARVELLOUS WEATHER TO DISPLAY THIS MAGNIFICENT COUNTRY AT ITS BEST.

I THINK IT IS REMARKABLE THAT FOR SUCH CLOSE ALLIES THIS IS ONLY THE SECOND VISIT BY A BRITISH PRIME MINISTER - AND THE FIRST FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS:

IT HAS HOWEVER BEEN A THOROUGHLY ENJOYABLE VISIT BECAUSE MRS BRUNDTLAND AND I HAVE GOT ON EXTREMELY WELL FROM OUR VERY FIRST MEETING YESTERDAY.

WE HAVE HAD A LOT OF DISCUSSIONS ON OUR TOURS, DURING THE TWO HOUR FLIGHT DOWN FROM TROMSO YESTERDAY AND AGAIN THIS MORNING. OUR TALKS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN A FREE AND OPEN ATMOSPHERE - IN THE KIND OF WAY THAT FRIENDS AND ALLIES CAN AND SHOULD DISCUSS MATTERS TOGETHER.

BEFORE I TELL YOU ABOUT OUR TALKS I WANT TO MAKE THE POINT THAT MY MAIN PURPOSE IN COMING TO NORWAY - APART FROM TO MEET MRS BRUNDTLAND AND SEE SOME OF THE COUNTRY - WAS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE TO THE NORTH, A MOST IMPORTANT SECTOR OF THE NATO SHIELD. THAT IS WHY I WENT TO TROMSO YESTERDAY AND WHY I HAVE BEEN AT AFNORTH TODAY.

I AM SURE THAT THIS DEMONSTRATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH IS MUCH APPRECIATED BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT.



TURNING NOW TO MY TALKS WITH MRS BRUNDTLAND, THEY HAVE RANGED VERY WIDELY. THERE HAS BEEN A VERY WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. WE HAVE COVERED

- East West Relations
- International economic situation, including the oil market
- EC/Norwegian/EFTA relations
- terrorism
- GATT and international trade
- the environment
- South Africa

SO FAR AS ACID RAIN IS CONCERNED, MRS BRUNDTLAND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE MOVES WE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY AND WHICH I REGARD AS A VERY BIG STEP ON OUR PART. OF COURSE THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE US TO GO FURTHER BUT I MUST POINT OUT THAT WE ARE NOT THE ONLY SOURCE OF POLLUTION AND THAT SINCE 1970 WE HAVE MADE VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF SULPHUR GOING INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.

ON OIL, ~~MRS BRUNDTLAND WENT OUT OF HER WAY TO SAY THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO RESTRICT EXPORTS WAS NOT INTENDED AS A SLAP IN THE FACE FOR BRITAIN, AS SOME BRITISH NEWSPAPERS HAVE SUGGESTED.~~ I TOLD HER I NEVER THOUGHT IT WAS. <sup>MRS. BRUNDTLAND THAT</sup> ~~OUR RESPECTIVE~~ WE BOTH HAVE OUR OWN POLICIES AND WHERE ~~DIFFERING~~ <sup>DIFFER</sup> INTERESTS TOUCH WE NEGOTIATE ABOUT THEM.

ON SOUTH AFRICA I EXPLAINED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO SANCTIONS AND WHY WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD WORK: I SET OUT OUR POSITION VERY FULLY INDEED AND I AM SURE THAT MRS BRUNDTLAND NOW FULLY APPRECIATES OUR ARGUMENTS.



WE ARE, I SHOULD SAY, AT ONE IN AGREEING THAT APARTHEID IS UNACCEPTABLE AND MUST COME TO AN END.

WE ARE ALSO AGREED ON THE NEED:

- FOR A SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR GORBACHEV THIS YEAR
- TO MAINTAIN THE ABM TREATY, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ON SDI
- FOR GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EFTA INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF TRADE BARRIERS
- FOR MORE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
- FOR THE NEED FOR A NEW GATT ROUND WHICH COVERS SERVICES AND AGRICULTURE AS WELL AS TRADE IN GOODS

IT HAS BEEN A TERRIFIC TWO DAYS AND I AM GLAD THAT I HAVE AT LAST GOT TO NORWAY. I AM SURE I SHALL BE BACK TO SEE MORE OF YOUR TRULY MAGNIFICENT COUNTRY:



PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE

This is to be held in the Chancery of the Embassy at 1545 for half an hour. It is expected to be very well attended since some 90 Norwegian journalists have been accredited (you will recall that your brief says Norway is awash with subsidised newspapers).

In view of the wetness of the Norwegians, I would expect this to be a lively session. They will be wanting to score points but they will undoubtedly give you opportunities to make some which win points at home as well as here in Norway.

I think it is also important to note that:

- demonstrations of the orchestrated kind we have seen only underline for the public the international nature of the left and IRA conspiracy; they do not do Norway much good, but they do not do you much harm;
- there is no sympathy in mainland Britain for the Northern Irish and it is at least arguable that your stand on South African sanctions was on balance a political plus;
- in short you are not necessarily batting on a sticky wicket.

As always the British media will be interested in your reaction to events at home - notably in this case the trouble overnight in St. Paul's, Bristol. We are keeping in touch with London, but I see no point in your saying more than you understand that the police carried out an anti-drugs exercise and that the situation is under control and has quietened down.

For the rest, the press conference is predictably in the range of questions:

How you and Mrs. Brundtland got on

The media programmed themselves before the visit to say you wouldn't get on but I think I have eroded this negative impression with my briefing on your talks this morning.



Acid Rain

What you propose to do is too little, too late and would take too long; why don't you do more?

Demonstrations

Do you think they were orchestrated, conceivably by Danny Morrison?

Do you think policing was adequate?

Have you received apologies from the Norwegian Government?

(NB the Norwegian press says the police were unprepared)

Oil

Why won't you cut production?

Is your objection merely doctrinal and what happens in joint fields?

South Africa

Sanctions

Europe

EC/EFTA cooperation

It is possible that the following other points will arise:

Northern Ireland

Here there is a real opportunity to make runs with the Norwegian public;

East/West relations

Will Reagan/Gorbachev have a summit?

When are you going to Moscow?(I have said not before next spring)

Unemployment/Welfare State


Since Mrs. Brundtland's remarks in Tromso have been seen by some as criticism of your policies; (I have said that we also have a welfare state which looks after everyone - too well to judge from the leaders in some British newspapers represented here).

The attached draft opening remarks are deliberately brief in view of your speeches (including the ad libs which we have fed out) and your remarks with Mrs. Brundtland on the roof.



There will be no interviews after the press conference; there is no time, so when you wish to get over a particular point you might make your remarks with television and radio in mind.

I will preside and select the questions.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Bernard Ingham', written in a cursive style.

BERNARD INGHAM

12 September 1986





FROM: R G SHORT  
DATE: 11 SEPTEMBER 1986

cc: Mr Ingham

Private Secretary

NORWEGIAN PRESS COMMENT

... 1. I submit a summary of today's press comment on the Prime Minister's visit.

*Roger Short*

---

R G Short





NORWEGIAN NATIONAL PRESS: SUMMARY: 11 SEPTEMBER

Most leading papers have a comment today on the Prime Minister's visit. The basic message is that Mrs Thatcher is welcome even though there is disagreement among Norwegians about her politics.

AFTENPOSTEN (leading Norwegian newspaper, similar to The Times)

The second editorial in Aftenposten is entitled "A Welcome Guest" and describes the close relationship between Norway and Britain and their common interests. Mrs Thatcher will be welcomed as a Head of Government and there are many subjects for the two Prime Ministers to discuss including Acid Rain, Oil Policy, Foreign and Security Policy as well as the EC.

MORGENBLADET (Conservative)

In its leading editorial Morgenbladet welcomes Mrs Thatcher to Norway. She is described as representing the modernisation of British society: her successes have been to restore some order to the chaos of British industrial relations, to bring inflation under control and to encourage growth in the economy. These achievements are clouded by unemployment and stagnation in some sectors of British industry. Mrs Thatcher also represents the growing Europeanisation of British economic and security policy. Strong support for NATO does not preclude a constructive relationship with the USSR. Morgenbladet concludes by describing Mrs Thatcher as undoubtedly one of the outstanding leaders in the Western World.

ARBEIDERBLADET (Left Wing)

In their leading article Arbeiderbladet recall the visit of Mr Macmillan. Today more differences exist between Mrs Thatcher and Mrs Brundtland than did between Mr Macmillan and his Labour host. But if Norway were only to receive those with whom she agreed, she would be left with the Swedish Prime Minister alone. Mrs Thatcher is welcome as the Prime Minister of a country which has a long constitutional tradition, and fought two world wars: to defend it.

NORWAY'S TRADE AND MARITIME PAPER (NHST) (Economic)

In a half-page article NHST describes the economic problems facing Mrs Thatcher (quoting figures taken from "The Economist"). Unemployment is rising and growth in GNP will barely reach 2%, well under the average for Western industrialised nations. NHST sounds a note of optimism in its praise for Mrs Thatcher's control of the country's finances and reduction of the balance of payments deficit.





#### VERDENS GANG (Right Wing)

In their second leader VG welcome Mrs Thatcher to Norway. She is, they say, a controversial politician whose visit will be met with demonstrations both in Oslo and Tromsø. While VG support the right to demonstrate, they cannot support those who refuse to meet her. On subjects on which the Norwegian view is different the points should be made to Mrs Thatcher and her replies listened to. Like it or not Norway, in many respects, is in the same boat as Britain.

Verdens Gang also has an article on the Sinn Fein leader, Danny Morrison, who describes Mrs Thatcher as the worst English leader since Oliver Cromwell.

#### DAGBLADET (Leftist)

In their leader Dagbladet claim that the visit of Mrs Thatcher would not have taken place if Mrs Brundtland had not inherited the invitation from her predecessor. Mrs Thatcher takes from the poor and gives to the rich and she supports apartheid in South Africa. For these reasons (and because of Acid Rain) she should not have been invited. On the other hand they cite the special relationship with Britain and the fact that she is the democratically elected Prime Minister. They refer to the demonstrations and protests about her visit but conclude: "Although we do not like your politics until your own voters give you the push: Welcome to Norway."

Dagbladet also has a short article on the back page describing how Mr Brundtland will look after Mr Thatcher, visiting with him BP and Norsk Data.





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Indie

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY

THAMES HOUSE SOUTH  
MILLBANK LONDON SW1P 4QJ

01 211 6402

Charles Powell Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1A 2AA

10 September 1986

Dear Charles,

BRIEFING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

Following the Secretary of State's meeting with Mr Oien, I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's visit to Norway tomorrow.

I am copying this to Robert Culshaw at the FCO.

Yours,

*Stephen*

S R SKLAROFF  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister  
This is the  
latest situation  
on the oil  
side

CDP 1079





**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY**

**ADDITIONAL BRIEFING: NORWEGIAN MEASURES TO REDUCE OIL EXPORTS**

Line to Take

1. Understand that our Energy Ministers discussed on Wednesday evening the measures to reduce Norwegian oil exports which your Government had announced to the press earlier in the day. As these involve only refining, and stockpiling products from, royalty oil taken from Norwegian licensees in the last quarter of 1986, they do not require production cuts and do not involve the Treaties and Operating Agreements pertaining to our trans-median-line oilfields (Statfjord and Murchison). They have no effect on the UK licensees and are entirely a matter for the Norwegian Government. (This is not of course to say that we think they are wise).

2. Mr Oien also outlined his thinking on possible subsequent reductions in the production of the trans-median-line fields. My Secretary of State made clear that we would not restrict the production of our own licensees and that any proposals for production cuts at Statfjord and Murchison could raise difficulties under the Treaties between us. It was therefore important that there should be the earliest and fullest consultations if the Norwegian Government was minded to pursue such proposals.





### Background

3. The trans-median-line fields are subject to Treaties which require the approval of both Governments to changes in production programmes. The Operating Agreements for the fields, made pursuant to the Treaties, preclude production cuts being applied selectively to the Norwegian licensees. For the UK to agree to production cuts on its licensees would run contrary to our policy that production levels are for the companies to decide.

4. The Norwegians seem disposed to ignore the requirement under the Operating Agreements which would oblige any production cuts to be shared between the Norwegian and UK licensees. They appear to be under the impression that if they could somehow contrive to oblige the Norwegian licensees to bear all of any cut, we would either approve a change in the production programme under the Treaty, or simply turn a blind eye to their obligation to obtain our approval.

5. This would be a most dangerous precedent. The Norwegians have in the past demonstrated their readiness to ignore or dispute their Treaty obligations on the trans-median-line fields, when this suited them.

**OIL 3**

Department of Energy  
10 September 1986



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cc pg



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

September  
10 December 1986

Dear Charles

Prime Minister's Visit to Norway: 11-12 September

We forwarded briefing for the Prime Minister's visit on 4 September.

Three of the personality notes included in that briefing require slight amendment. They concern:

General Vigleik Eide: promoted Lieutenant General and appointed Commander, North Norway in August 1986.

HM King Olav V: aged 83, not 82 as shown in previous note.

Mr Kare Willoch: has indicated that he will not be a Prime Ministerial candidate if Conservative Party regains power.

/ I enclose eight copies of the revised personality notes  
/ and of the first page of the list of contents of the brief.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



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FM OSLO

TO DESKBY 091400Z FCO

TELNO 226

OF 090944Z SEPTEMBER 86

AND TO SAVING COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI

## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT : THE NORWEGIAN SCENE

## SUMMARY

1. LABOUR GOVERNMENT ENTERING CRITICAL PHASE AS AUSTERITY BUDGET DEBATE APPROACHES. ITS PROPOSALS, WHICH SO FAR MAKE FEW CONCESSIONS TO THE BOURGEOIS OPPOSITION, MAY NOT SECURE A MAJORITY AND SO THE GOVERNMENT MAY FALL. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER COMPROMISES MAY PROVE POSSIBLE.
2. ON DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY, NORWAY'S COMMITMENT TO WESTERN POSITIONS IS BASICALLY SOUND ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN IRRITATING EXCEPTIONS. NORWAY WILL INTRODUCE UNILATERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.
3. POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT ARE THUS HIGHLY UNCERTAIN, BUT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME THE NORWEGIANS WILL BE HIT IN THE POCKET.

## THE DOMESTIC SCENE

4. THE GOVERNMENT ARE ENTERING A CRITICAL PERIOD IN WHICH, IF THEY ARE TO SURVIVE, THEY WILL NEED TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR THE 1987 BUDGET WHICH WILL SECURE A MAJORITY IN THE STORTING AND COUNTER-BALANCE THE COLLAPSE IN OIL REVENUE.
5. IT IS A DAUNTING TASK AND THE OMENS ARE NOT GOOD. AFTER MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF CONFIDENT GROWTH THE NORWEGIAN ECONOMY HAS ENTERED DIFFICULT TIMES. THE COLLAPSE IN THE OIL PRICE COINCIDED WITH AN EXPENSIVE ANNUAL WAGE SETTLEMENT IN APRIL, WHICH FURTHER ERODED NORWAY'S WEAK INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT HAS PLUNGED INTO DEFICIT AND THERE WILL BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS BUDGETARY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES IN 1987. INFLATION IS AGAIN INCREASING. GROWTH HAS REMAINED STRONG BUT AN EARLY DOWN-TURN IS PREDICTED AND SOME OF NORWAY'S TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES ARE ALREADY MEETING CYCLICAL PROBLEMS. MEANWHILE NORWEGIAN COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONTINUE TO BORROW AND SPEND WITH NO THOUGHT FOR TOMORROW.
6. FACED WITH THE NEED FOR TOUGH MEASURES IN THE 1987 BUDGET, THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ADVOCATED INCREASED AND MORE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION AND REDUCED PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, WHILE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARGUE FOR REDUCED PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. THE BUDGET PROPOSALS SO FAR PUT FORWARD BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT CONCILIATORY, INVOLVING A FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION OF THE TAX SYSTEM TO ALLOW

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/FOR



FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ON GROSS INCOME. THE FORMER BOURGEOIS COALITION PARTIES MET ON 6 AND 7 SEPTEMBER AND ANNOUNCED THEIR REJECTION OF THESE PROPOSALS.

7. UNLESS, THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT CHANGE THEIR PROPOSALS SUFFICIENTLY TO SPLIT THE OPPOSITION, THEY MAY FALL DURING THE BUDGET DEBATE THIS AUTUMN. THE COALITION HAS SHOWN NO SIGNS OF DISINTEGRATING SINCE ITS FALL FROM POWER IN APRIL, DESPITE THE CONSERVATIVE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP. MOREOVER, A POLL PUBLISHED ON 6 SEPTEMBER SHOWS THAT SUPPORT FOR LABOUR HAS DROPPED TO 35 PER CENT WHILE SUPPORT FOR THE CONSERVATIVES HAS RISEN TO THE SAME LEVEL, ITS HIGHEST POINT EVER. THIS EROSION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION APPEARS TO REFLECT DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE ADVENT OF A LABOUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROUGHT MATERIAL BENEFITS: FAR FROM IT. MRS BRUNDTLAND HAS SO FAR EXPRESSED HER DETERMINATION TO AVOID COMPROMISING HER SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES AND WERE SHE TO DO SO SHE WOULD BE IN IMMEDIATE TROUBLE WITH THE LEFT WING OF HER OWN LABOUR PARTY AS WELL AS THE SOCIALIST LEFT PARTY, ON WHOSE VOTES SHE RELIES IN THE STORTING. NONETHELESS SHE ANNOUNCED ON 8 SEPTEMBER HER READINESS TO ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COALITION PARTNERS ABOUT TAXATION CHANGES.

#### FOREIGN AND DEFENCE

8. NORWAY'S COMMITMENT TO NATO UNDER THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT REMAINS BASICALLY SOUND. MRS BRUNDTLAND TOLD THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE LAST WEEK THAT NATO WAS THE CORNERSTONE OF NORWEGIAN DEFENCE, AND FOREIGN POLICY IS SAFE IN THE HANDS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, KNUT FRYDENLUND. THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENCE MINISTER, HOLST, HAVE GIVEN MORE CAUSE FOR CONCERN AND IRRITATION, EG OVER NORWAY'S FIRST NATO FOOTNOTE (IN MAY) AND AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE UK/US POLICY ON SHIPS' VISITS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (IN AUGUST). BUT HOLST IS UNLIKELY TO BE ALLOWED TO DO SERIOUS DAMAGE AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAINTAIN ITS BROAD SUPPORT OF NATO POLICIES DESPITE PRESSURE FROM THE LEFT. THE MAJOR NATO EXERCISE, NORTHERN WEDDING, IS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY OFF THE NORWEGIAN COAST AND IN THE MAINLAND (THOUGH MARRED BY A HELICOPTER ACCIDENT IN WHICH 14 US SERVICEMEN WERE KILLED). IT WILL, HOWEVER, BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN IN 1987 THE 3.5 PER CENT INCREASE IN DEFENCE SPENDING WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN RECENT YEARS: THE SEVERE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED ABOVE SEEM LIKELY TO REDUCE THAT FIGURE.

9. CURRENTLY THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY PRE-OCCUPATION IS SOUTH AFRICA. THE GOVERNMENT (SUPPORTED BY THE OPPOSITION) ARE COMMITTED TO A UNILATERAL TRADE BOYCOTT AND WILL INTRODUCE A MEASURE TO THIS EFFECT WHEN THE STORTING REASSEMBLES. THERE IS CONFUSION, FOLLOWING THE NORDIC PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING IN COPENHAGEN IN AUGUST, AS TO WHETHER THE NORDIC STATES WILL CO-OPERATE ON SOUTH AFRICA VIA DENMARK IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

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/OIL



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10. THE OFFSHORE INDUSTRY IS THE IMMEDIATE VICTIM OF THE LOW OIL PRICE (ALTHOUGH IRONICALLY PRODUCTION IS BURGEONING AND EXPECTED TO REACH A RECORD 68 MILLION T.O.E. IN 1986) WITH WORSE TO COME IN 1987 AND BEYOND. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TINKERED WITH THE OFFSHORE TAX REGIME TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE FUTURE ACTIVITY. THEIR IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS THE GIANT TROLL GAS FIELD, DEVELOPMENT OF WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE BULK OF THE WORK FOR THE NORWEGIAN FABRICATION INDUSTRY AT THE END OF THE DECADE. MEANWHILE THE NORWEGIANS CONTINUE TO FLIRT WITH COLLABORATION WITH OPEC TO BOOST THE OIL PRICE BUT ARE FINDING THE PRACTICALITIES MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE RHETORIC.

#### CONCLUSION

11. IN SUM, THE GOVERNMENT NEED TO PERFORM AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT. FOR THEIR PART, THE OPPOSITION ARE WELL PLACED TO MAKE A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE BUDGET DEBATE, BUT HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO DO SO: SOME, THOUGH THEY WILL NOT ADMIT IT PUBLICLY, ARE TEMPTED BY THE PROSPECT OF LEAVING THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT TO FACE THE APPROBRIUM OF IMPOSING THE UNPOPULAR MEASURES WHICH CANNOT NOW BE AVOIDED. TIME WILL TELL WHETHER MRS BRUNDTLAND CAN PERSUADE THE STARTING TO ACCEPT BUDGETARY PROPOSALS WHICH ARE BOTH SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE TO BALANCE THE BOOKS AND SUFFICIENTLY "PROGRESSIVE" TO MEET HER OWN POLITICAL REQUIREMENT. BUT NO-ONE SHOULD DOUBT HER DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED IN THIS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. EITHER WAY, THE FISCAL OUTCOME FOR THE NORWEGIAN VOTER IS LIKELY TO BE FAR FROM PALATABLE.

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PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO NORWAY

You may like to look at the Norway briefs over the weekend. What you say about acid rain depends on the outcome of E(A). We are sending you separate papers on this.

The programme for the visit is at the front of the folder, with some useful explanatory notes.

The main purposes of the visit are to underline our continuing support for the defence of the Northern Flank, to try to correct some signs of wobble in Norwegian attitudes on East/West issues, to get across our point of view on acid rain (and perhaps to announce new UK measures to control it) and to consult on oil matters.

Some two hours have been allocated for talks on the second morning, though Mrs. Brundtland will also travel down in the VC10 with you from Tromso (a flight of two hours).

On defence issues, it is mostly a question of reiterating our commitment to the Northern Flank and underlining it by your visits to the Norwegian Navy in Tromso and HQAFNORTH near Oslo. The Norwegians worry whether we will maintain an amphibious capability when Fearless and Intrepid go out of service in the mid-1990s. There is provision in the defence budget, but no decisions have been taken.

On East/West issues, the present Norwegian Government are rather damper than Mr. Willoch. They are pressing for a Comprehensive Test Ban. They support a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone. They oppose the SDI (and dissented from a recent NATO communique). They have toyed with support for a Chemical Weapons Free Zone in Europe. And there seemed some risk in

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- 2 -

August that they would challenge our Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy on nuclear ships visits (but backed down).

On Europe, their main concern is faster progress to eliminate trade barriers between the EC and EFTA. They may ask to be associated formally with European Political Cooperation: we don't want to be lumbered with this. There is a tricky problem about Svalbard (Spitzbergen), but it does not need to be aired at Prime Minister level.

The Norwegian Government imposes a complete trade boycott against South Africa and supports mandatory sanctions.

But Norway has been consistently helpful on the Falklands.

There may be some shift on Norwegian attitudes towards restraints on oil production (though we shall know more when Mr. Walker meets his Norwegian opposite number on 10 September). Mrs. Brundtland has said that Norway takes a positive view of the attempts by OPEC to stabilise the oil market, and Norway might restrict future production growth. The Norwegians might raise alleged UK discrimination over Offshore Supply Vessels. They should be seen off briskly: their record is far worse, and they have 95% of their own sector (as well as a fair part of ours).

Finally, on acid rain you should be able to inform the Norwegians of the decisions taken by E(A) - though they will continue to argue that we should join the 30% Club.

Finally you may like to glance at a despatch reporting Lord Stockton's 1960 visit to Norway (attached).

C.D.P.

(C.D. POWELL)

5 September 1986

DCABKD

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7-10 June 1960.

## THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

*Sir Peter Scarlett to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 16)*

## SUMMARY

The Prime Minister and Lady Dorothy Macmillan visited Norway as the guests of the Norwegian Government from the 7th to the 10th of June (paragraph 1).

2. The programme included private talks with Norwegian political leaders and a number of public ceremonies (paragraphs 2-7). The visit gave great pleasure to the Norwegian Government and was very well received by all sections of the public (paragraphs 8 and 9).

(No. 72. Confidential)  
Sir,

Oslo,  
June 13, 1960.

I have the honour to report that the Prime Minister, The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, accompanied by Lady Dorothy Macmillan, paid an official visit to Norway from the 7th to the 10th of June. This visit was a return for those made by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Hr. Gerhardsen, to the United Kingdom in 1956 and 1958. On his arrival at Fornebu airport the Prime Minister was met by Hr. Gerhardsen, Hr. Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, by other representatives of the Norwegian Government and the Heads of Commonwealth Missions in Oslo. Some surprise was caused by the presence of M. Gribanov, the Soviet Ambassador, who was the only foreign diplomat present.

2. On the afternoon of his arrival in Oslo Mr. Macmillan called on the Norwegian Foreign Minister and later on the Prime Minister. Hr. Lange rejoined the party at the Prime Minister's Office for discussion of current international problems. These discussions have been recorded separately. In the evening Mr. Macmillan and Lady Dorothy were guests of the Norwegian Government at a dinner given in their honour at the Akershus Fortress. In his speech of welcome Hr. Gerhardsen referred to his pleasure at being able to return the hospitality shown to him and his wife in 1958. He referred with warm appreciation to the political, cultural and economic links which join the two countries and which amounted to a family feeling of kinship. Wartime co-operation, Hr. Gerhardsen continued, has been succeeded by co-operation in NATO and the E.F.T.A. "I feel sure I

speak for the majority of my countrymen when I say that we have confidence in Britain's skill as a leader and in the qualities and abilities of British Statesmen." Mr. Macmillan's reply re-echoed the sentiments of friendship expressed by the Norwegian Prime Minister and he spoke in general terms of the uncertainty of the present international situation and the need to keep stout hearts and cool heads in any eventuality. These were qualities which both peoples fully shared.

3. On the following day Mr. Macmillan placed a wreath on the memorial to Norwegian patriots executed by the Germans at the Akershus Fortress. He was received in audience by His Majesty King Olav and thereafter proceeded to the West Cemetery in Oslo where His Majesty unveiled a statue erected by public subscription in Oslo to the memory of members of the British forces who died in Norway during the war. This memorial is situated opposite the Cross of Remembrance in the cemetery occupied by Commonwealth War Graves. In his speech at the unveiling ceremony His Majesty referred to the sacrifices which Britain had made in the last war, one of the results of which was that Norwegians could again live in freedom in their own country and he expressed deep gratitude to those who had given their lives on Norwegian soil. This speech, and that made by the Prime Minister, were carried on the Norwegian radio.

4. The visitors were then entertained by His Majesty to luncheon at Skaugum, the King's country house outside Oslo. In the evening the Prime Minister was the guest of

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honour at a dinner given by the Norwegian Round Table Club. This Society, founded by King Haakon at the liberation of his country on the model of the Knights of the Round Table in Great Britain, has a jealously guarded membership of genuine patriots whose unswerving loyalty to the Allied cause either in exile or in the Norwegian underground movement satisfied the exacting standard set by the late King himself. In practical terms it consists of leaders of banking and industry, shipping and scholarship, in politics Right wing and in terms of wealth and influence considerable. The only guests on this occasion besides Mr. Macmillan and his personal staff were the President of the Storting, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, the Canadian Ambassador and myself. To this restricted and well-informed audience the Prime Minister was able to speak off the record and from the heart. He gave them of his best. Treating of world problems on the broadest canvas he emphasised his conviction that the enduring warp of Western civilisation were the dual threads of humanism and Christianity. A noble theme indeed and nobly delivered. Mr. Macmillan's hosts were profoundly impressed. They were delighted too by its lighter passages and by the occasional studied understatements. Their immediate applause was full of warmth and admiration, but when the evening ended and Mr. Macmillan took his leave they gave him not only a second round of clapping but three Norwegian cheers. Never having heard Norwegians cheer before, I enquired the reason at the first opportunity. "We clapped the speech", I was told, "we cheered the man".

5. On the 9th of June it had been arranged that the party would spend the day on a launch on the Oslo fjord. Unfortunately the weather was unfavourable and the boat trip had to be curtailed. Instead the Prime Minister was entertained to luncheon in a 17th century farmhouse in the Norwegian Folkemuseum. After the meal entertainment was provided by a party of folk dancers and musicians in traditional costumes. In the afternoon the Prime Minister gave his principal public speech to the Oslo Students' Union in the Assembly Hall of the University. On this occasion Mr. Macmillan agreed to speak on the British Commonwealth with special reference to recent developments in Africa. This is a subject in which Norwegians show considerable interest, especially the students.

Mr. Macmillan's arrival at the University was the scene of a warm demonstration of enthusiasm. I had promised him an audience of 500. The hall was filled to capacity—1,200. In his address Mr. Macmillan traced the development of Empire into Commonwealth, the increasing diversity of the composition and origins of the Commonwealth's members and, at the same time, their sense of unity and their influence for peace, security and economic advancement throughout a great part of the world.

6. In the evening the Prime Minister and Lady Dorothy Macmillan were our guests at a dinner in the Embassy which was attended, among others, by Hr. Gerhardsen, Hr. Lange and Hr. Handal, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, my two Commonwealth colleagues and the United States and French Ambassadors.

7. On the day of his departure Mr. Macmillan held a Press conference and recorded a short interview for Norwegian television. He then visited Allied Headquarters, Northern Europe at Kolsås and was the guest at luncheon of General Sir Horatius and Lady Murray. From this engagement he proceeded directly to Fornebu airport where Hr. Gerhardsen and Hr. Lange were waiting to see him off. M. Gribanov again presented himself. After farewells and a few words to the Press by Mr. Macmillan and Hr. Gerhardsen the Prime Minister's chartered aircraft took off for Gatwick.

8. The visit gave the greatest of pleasure to Mr. Macmillan's hosts and to the Norwegian people in general. The Prime Minister's wise and encouraging words, both in private and in public, gave just that sort of stiffening which Norway, conscious of her small population and comparative remoteness, needs in face of the aggressive tones in which her Soviet neighbour sometimes addresses her. The question of friendship between the countries is in no doubt but the Prime Minister's visit has raised it to a pitch of warmth reminiscent of the immediately post-war days. Press comment was full and uniformly favourable and the programme was front-page news in papers of all political persuasions: even the Communist daily *Friheten* found words of praise for Mr. Macmillan's efforts for peace. It said that his initiatives to this end were more important than those of many social democratic politicians.



In conclusion I would wish to accord my deep gratitude to the Prime Minister and Lady Dorothy for having undertaken the trip. That they should have come at all is a compliment to staunch friends, that they should have come in the busy summer of 1960 is an even greater compliment and appreciated as such by the Norwegians. The uppermost thought in Hr. Gerhardsen's

mind was that they should enjoy themselves as he and his wife had done in England: that they should experience personally the friendship and understanding between Norway and the United Kingdom which had made such a deep impression on them a few years earlier.

I have, &c.

P. W. SCARLETT.



fe. NC  
MR THATCHER

VISIT TO NORWAY

I attach the programme for your visit to Norway. In practice, you have virtually the same programme as the Prime Minister throughout, with only two separate engagements on the second day: visits to Norsk data and to BP Norge. Notes on these companies are in the attached folder. You will want to note that Mr. Bruntland (the Norwegian Prime Minister's husband and - unlike his wife - a conservative) will accompany you on both visits. A note about him is included in the folder.

You will want to note that black tie is required for the visit.

I will let you have further briefing material on the aircraft.

CHARLES POWELL

5 September 1986

VC4AIQ





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 September 1986

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to Norway:  
11-12 September 1986

/ I enclose seven copies of the briefs. The sections on acid rain are provisional, pending developments at E(A) on 10 September. Protocol Department will send you separately an administrative plan for the visit.

On 12 September Mr Thatcher will visit Norsk Data, the Norwegian micro-electronics firm, and BP Petroleum Development (Norway) Ltd. I enclose  
/ background notes on these firms and their Annual Reports for 1985.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street



PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO NORWAY: SPEECHES

You will be expected to make two very short speeches in Norway:

- (i) at lunch in the city of Tromsø on the first day (just 3/4 minutes); and
- (ii) at the Norwegian Government's dinner in Oslo that evening (5/6 minutes). This latter speech will have to say something about environmental problems/acid rain. But we can only settle this after the E(A) discussion on 10 September.

I attach two drafts for you to consider.

CDP.

CDP

3 September 1986

GR att-  
Please type  
speaking copies (v.b. Rec  
are one or two  
and direct). CDP.





10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 September 1986

Prime Minister's Visit to Norway

BF || I enclose drafts of the Prime Minister's speeches in Tromsø and in Oslo in the form in which I am putting them to her. I should nonetheless be grateful for any further embellishments and improvements which the Department has to offer.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C R Budd Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

04



Quater

tract. ScotRail's Public Affairs says it's "a folly of my sis" which led him to 25cc super-scooter;



vice? Tomorrow my Times is folded my Daily Mirror.

one morning at 5 thought it would be a run to the coast in time for breakfast as he might have two-wheeled youth.

no further than from his home in he cautiously fell blue van, travelling It is wise to fall in e vans, particularly may be connected and order. Indeed, van stopped, Boyle hind it, assuming s an obstruction

horror, the van's lights came on and — Boyle was un- the van's driver or assistance, and e a police sergeant ed proceedings by ng all and sundry! answer to Hell's bravely treating the g as a joke; but with g in plaster to the rather limp one.

view

Dr Allen Simpson burgh for Amster- week, he would like a few nineteenth terrestrial globes. ong with an airline (we hear you ask). ct, he is to attend a of the Coronelli a group interested try and development rial and celestial

son, of the History Section at the Royal of Scotland, Chambers d: "Anyone who has ade by either Alex- aldsen, W. & A. K. James Kirkwood & Miller or Robert d give us important n tracing the history manufacturers." At Edinburgh's Georgian n was being built, globe was the equiva- aving say, a micro- in the house today.

Whony Troon

The £25 jaunts to the sun and sea in Spain and Greece have been the very stuff of silly season headlines this summer. The Costa del Clyde only made it to the front pages and the TV screens when a Cal-

Cumbrae lives with the increasing anger at the forced withdrawal of calls by the paddle steamer *Waverley* at the closed Millport pier. The small shops along the Millport front are starting to close up.

visibly poor. "Even the houses round here have got arthritis," said a Millport shop-keeper.

Bute has set up a housing association, pursuing a vigorous rehabilitation policy on Rothesay's back street tenements. The rebuilt bits of the

The traditional room and kitchen is going into the eighties calling itself a "freedom suite." If there is a ray of sunshine around, this is it.

But increasing self-catering brings its problems too. As a Millport trader puts it: "The

the basement is a Heath Robin- son delight — probably the oldest in Britain. The staff are plainly devoted to their charming and friendly building. But sentiment cuts no ice. Argyll and Bute district council's consulting engineers have declared

# Norway's PM faces a political dilemma, and Mrs Thatcher

By FRANK FRAZER, Our Energy Correspondent



Mrs Brundtland: mutual admiration

BRITAIN'S Margaret Thatcher and Norway's Gro Harlem Brundtland will find much in common when they meet as Prime Ministers of their respective countries early this month.

Both are highly-educated and determined women who would have made their marks in other careers had they not decided to enter politics. This has put them at the helm of Europe's two energy-rich countries in a period when the national economies are being buffeted by uncertainties about world oil prices.

There is another common bond between the two. Both are married to staunch supporters of the Conservative cause. But there the political affinity ends.

Mrs Brundtland is as dedicated to the Norwegian brand of socialism as Mrs Thatcher is to governing Britain on non-interventionist Right-wing principles. Mrs Thatcher is sufficiently secure in office to continue getting her way meantime. In Norway's complex political situation, Mrs Brundtland's six-month-old Labour Administration must operate under constant threat of defeat by the combined opposition forces in the Storting, the Norwegian parliament.

There may be no meeting of minds on many issues the two strong-willed political leaders might want to discuss during Mrs Thatcher's visit to Norway starting on September 11. But sources close to the power centres in London and Oslo suggest the two should get on well together — if only because of a mutual admiration for each other.

Mrs Brundtland's approach to politics — and her private life-style — reflect much of what is different between Britain and modern Norwegian society, built on a mixture of formality and liberal attitudes. She is the daughter of Dr Gudmund Harlem, a distinguished Norwegian Minister of Health in the Labour Governments of the 1950s. She enrolled in the Labour youth movement and became active in university politics after deciding to follow her father into medicine.

It was through university politics that she met Arne-Olav Brundtland, a member of a

leading Conservative family in Norway. Their marriage may at first have surprised the families but it raised few eyebrows in the rest of Norway where there is a tradition of politics without acrimony.

Mr Brundtland, who currently works for a foreign policy institute, serves as chairman of the Conservative association for the Oslo constituency where they live. Under the country's system of proportional representation, he sometimes takes a seat as a substitute for an elected Conservative member of the Storting to oppose the policies of his wife's Administration. Of their four grown-up children, two are said to support the Conservatives while the other two support Labour.

After graduating in Norway, Mrs Brundtland went to the US to pick up a doctorate in public health from Harvard. She returned to Norway to work as a doctor until the 1970s when she was invited, under the Norwegian system which permits non-elected Ministers, to take charge of the environmental department.

She first became known internationally for her handling of the North Sea pollution hazards posed by the blow-out at the Ekofisk oilfield. On the domestic scene, she enhanced her reputation by pushing through tough measures to combat atmospheric pollution but also relaxing the regulations against building summer cabins in scenic areas.

She had become an elected member of the Storting by the time the Labour group asked her to take over from Prime Minister Odvar Nordli in 1981. Her party were put into opposition by electoral successes scored by Conservatives and other parties later that year. But she received a second call to office last May when Norway's Conservative-led coalition could not muster support for an austerity package needed to combat the impact on the economy of falling oil prices.

Her minority government faces a rough passage for as long as it must steer a course which avoids the combined opposition of Conservatives and minority parties in a finely balanced Storting. But Mrs

Brundtland has shown she can be tough and resourceful in both her political and private life.

Like many Norwegians, she is an avid sailor. Three years ago, when she and her husband were sailing alone on their ocean-going yacht, he was thrown overboard in a force nine gale and remained attached to the boat by only a slender lifeline. She struggled for three-quarters of an hour to get him back on board. Norwegians, with their wry sense of humour, joke about the prominent Labour politician rescuing a member of the Conservative Party. But they know that any other outcome would have been tragic for a close-knit family.

The couple tried to escape from political pressures for a spell this summer by going off to a remote forest cabin where they cut logs for the winter. But there was an unscheduled visit from a Swedish Minister to discuss a common Scandinavian approach to the South African crisis. It was later necessary to call a hastily arranged news conference. More logs were cut for the benefit of the photographers.

Now, observers of the Norwegian political scene are talking about the autumn hunt, when the seasonal stalking of elk and deer may be overshadowed by the quest for political hides. Opinion suggests Mrs Brundtland's Administration will be most vulnerable in debates on the budget, which is due to be settled by the end of the year. She must also soon decide key issues of oil policy to maintain North Sea development and avoid a massive slump in the business which generates a fifth of Norwegian wealth.

Room for manoeuvre in Norwegian politics tends to be restricted. Party labels cannot be taken as representative of the policies they would imply in other countries. Norway's Labour Administrations traditionally veer right of centre. Even the Conservatives could masquerade as Social Democrats in other parts of Europe.

As she tries to reconcile principles with the compromises needed to stay in power, Mrs Brundtland may find a visit by Mrs Thatcher a refreshing diversion.

## THE PICTISH MAIL

The exciting rise of Friday's Scots celebrates a remarkable artistic achievement of the past decade, reconfident new power. Heavenly Pursuits powerful drama-different sort are Edinburgh-based Marianna Lines, who with our Pictish past in a remarkable

From Hollywood splendid isolation Highlands — we author and conser Tomkies, who, from 40 miles from the writes best-sellers



Friday's not-to-be-



You'll get more

The Scotsman 2 Sept.



Charles

7/11/86

Norway - Briefing.

Do you agree distribution  
as follows:

1. Prime Minister
2. NL Wicks
3. CD Powell
4. B Ingham
5. Sir P. Cradock
6. Press Office
7. Duty Clerk - Trip
8. Duty Clerk - No 10.

Julie

1.9.86.





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You may find  
it helpful to  
see this before  
your visit to  
Norway:

CDP

2/9

Ag




Date 1 September 1986

Our ref

Your ref

Tel ext 2057

The British Council



Promoting cultural, educational  
and technical co-operation between  
Britain and other countries

PS to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

10 Spring Gardens  
London SW1A 2BN  
Telephone 01-930 8466  
Telex 8952201 BRICON G

EM

R3la

incorporated in brief

I enclose notes on the British Council's work in Norway which I hope the Prime Minister will find useful for her forthcoming visit.

John Nickson  
Acting Director  
Press & Information Department




Date 1 September 1986

Our ref

Your ref

Tel ext

The British Council



Denis Thatcher Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

Promoting cultural, educational  
and technical co-operation between  
Britain and other countries

10 Spring Gardens  
London SW1A 2BN  
Telephone 01-930 8466  
Telex 8952201 BRICON G

1 September 1986

Dear Mr Thatcher

I enclose notes on the British Council's work in Norway which I hope you will find useful for your forthcoming visit with the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John Nickson', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John Nickson  
Acting Director  
Press & Information Department



## THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN NORWAY

### NOTE FOR MR DENIS THATCHER

#### 1. BACKGROUND

The Council began operations in Norway in 1946. The cuts in 1954 reduced both resources and space and the library was handed over on permanent loan to the Oslo Municipal Library. The collection was eventually presented to the municipality in 1980. The bilateral Cultural Convention, which provides a framework for the Council's work in Norway, was signed in 1948. Many Council activities in Norway are carried out in partnership with Norwegian organisations on a cost-sharing basis, particularly in the field of the arts.

#### 2. AIM

The aim of the British Council in Norway is to promote an enduring understanding and appreciation of Britain, especially among Norwegians whose attitude to Britain is not significantly affected by war-related experience.

#### 3. BUDGET

##### 3.1 Country Programme: Estimate for 1986/87

###### 3.1.1 Analysis of Country Programme by Funding: (Source: Geographical Analysis Report 2)

	£'000
FCO Grant-in-Aid (100%)	495
ODA Grant-in-Aid (0%)	0
	<hr/>
Total Mixed Money	495
ODA Aid Administration, ex-IUC & ex-TETOC	0
Revenue	29
	<hr/>
Sub Total (Gross Main Country Programme)	524
FCO Agency Funds	20
ODA Agency Funds	-
Other Agency Funds	-
	<hr/>
Total Country Programme	544

###### 3.1.2 Analysis of Country Programme by Expenditure: (Source: Geographical Analysis Report 1)

	£'000
Local Gross Main Budget (see para 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)	295
Apportionment of HQ Services & Overhead Costs	229
	<hr/>
Sub Total (Gross Main Country Programme)	524
Agency Expenditure (see para 3.2.1)	20
	<hr/>
Total Country Programme	544



### 3.2 Local Budget: Estimate for 1986/87

#### 3.2.1 Summary Analysis of Local Budget Expenditure and Revenue by Activity Category: (Source: Activity Analysis Report A)

Activity Category	Gross Main Budget Expenditure	Agency Expenditure	Revenue
	£'000	£'000	£'000
Movement of People: from Britain eg Specialist Visits	31	0	0
Movement of People: to Britain eg Fellowships	102	20	0
Books, Libraries and Information Work	23	0	0
Promotional Activity and General Management	70	0	0
English Language and Literature Activities	4	0	0
Science and Technology Activities	-	-	-
Education and Social Science Activities	1	0	0
Arts Activities	64	0	1
Total	295	20	1

#### 3.2.2 Summary Analysis of Local Budget Expenditure by Subject Area: (Source: Activity Analysis Report C)

Subject Area	Gross Main Budget Expenditure
	£'000
English Language and Literature	33
Science and Technology	50
Arts	109
Other Subjects	103
Total	295

NOTE: There is no subject area analysis of agency expenditure on country budgets.



Representative  
One other London-appointed officer  
4 locally engaged staff.

Representative  
One other London-appointed officer  
4 locally engaged staff.

## 5. MAIN ACTIVITIES

### 5.1 English Language Teaching/English Studies

The Council is mainly concerned with help to the state education system in improving English language teaching and subsidises two British consultants on English language teacher training in the Norwegian Ministry of Church and Education. During 1985/86 a workshop on the use of computers for the teaching of English was supported by the Council.

## 5.2 Science, Technology and Medicine

The Council pays special attention to the joint British/Norwegian interest in the energy resources of the North Sea and in research. Norway's own resources for the training of engineers and technologists are inadequate for the demand and many Norwegians look to Britain to assist in making up the shortfall. During 1985/86 the Director of the Norwegian Science Policy Research Council visited Britain and sponsorship was obtained for the endowment of a scholarship at a British university and an exchange of postgraduate students in engineering between Norway's technical university in Trondheim and a British university.

### 5.3 Education

The Council engages in projects which are of current importance for both countries, for example the relationship between school and employment, the education of the 16-19 age group, special education and the use of British educational software in Norway.

#### 5.4 Information and Books

There is no lending library. The office contains a reference collection for information and advice on study in Britain and on general educational, cultural and scientific matters. The office receives over 5,000 enquiries per annum. The Council also cooperates closely with British and Norwegian publishers in promoting the sale of British books in Norway.

### 5.5 The Arts

Because of high costs the Council usually supports a major event only once every few years and smaller events annually, particularly in towns outside Oslo. The Norwegian contribution in most cases is substantial. The preferred audience are young people interested in contemporary Britain.

## 6. SPECIAL MATTERS OF INTEREST

### 6.1 Norwegian Students in Britain

It is Norway's policy to provide education overseas in those subjects where there is insufficient domestic training capacity. In the academic year 1985/86 Britain was the second most popular destination after USA (total number of Norwegian students studying overseas = 6331 of whom 1760 were in USA, 1294 in Britain and 1285 in Sweden). Those coming to Britain



represented 20.4% of the total. The main subjects in which Norwegian training capacity is insufficient are most aspects of engineering, computer science, business studies and medicine. Britain has done well in engineering (711 Norwegian students of civil engineering in Britain in 1985/86). Places for most of these are negotiated on a group discount basis through the University of Trondheim and the Norwegian Ministry of Education. 8 British universities (Glasgow, UMIST, Newcastle, Salford, Strathclyde, Surrey, Heriot-Watt and Imperial College) have formed a consortium for the purpose of negotiating with the Norwegians. Heriot-Watt receives the greatest number and its engineering degrees have the highest status in Norway. In computer science and business studies USA until recently took almost all Norwegians studying abroad, but the Council is trying to increase the number coming to Britain. In medicine Britain has priced itself out of the market; many Norwegian medical students train in the Federal Republic of Germany.

August 1986



# NORWAY

## STATISTICAL PROFILE 1985/86

### MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

	Numbers of People		Origin of Funds
	1985/86	1984/85	
<b>To Britain</b>			
British Council Fellowships	9	4	BC
FCO Scholarships & Awards Scheme	6	3	FCO
European Young Lawyers Scheme	4	4	BC
Study Visits (normally 2-3 weeks)			
partly funded	40	32	BC
programme arrangements only	21	18	Private
Group study visits	27 (2 groups)	19 (1 group)	Private
Participants in:			
Specialist courses in Britain	25	46	Private
Summer Schools in Britain for teachers of English	8	7	Private
Academic interchange:			
reciprocal scheme	5	6	BC/Norway
Academic Travel Grants	6	7	BC/Norway
Youth Exchanges	91 (2 groups)	28 (3 groups)	BC/Norway
<b>From Britain</b>			
Visiting specialists	30	12	BC
Academic interchange:			
reciprocal scheme	4	6	BC/Norway
Academic Travel Grants	8	10	BC/Norway
Youth Exchanges	89 (3 groups)	94 (3 groups)	BC/Norway

### RESOURCES

Films:			
in stock	24	97	
on short-term loan from London	28	10	
loans	6	24	
Periodical subscriptions	74	84	
Speech records:			
stock	290	290	
loans	14	56	
Music records:			
stock	717	717	
loans	20	82	



## COUNCIL-SPONSORED ARTS EVENTS

Most events were arranged on a cost-sharing basis.

### Drama and Dance Tours

People Show Cabaret, Oslo  
Janet Smith Dancers, Harstad and  
Trondheim  
Fulkerson, Rowe and Higginson,  
Trondheim

### Music Tours

Alan Price and his Band, Oslo  
concert  
Nicholas Braithwaite, conductor,  
North Norway  
Yorkshire Imperial Brass Band,  
Stavanger Brassdagene  
James Blade, percussion seminars,  
Oslo  
The Scholars, Oslo concert  
First House, award-winning  
quartet, Molde International Jazz  
Festival  
Cambridge Buskers, Festival of  
North Norway and Trondheim  
Brodski Quartet, Bergen Chamber  
Music Society  
Barry Guy, bassist, Oslo concerts  
The McGibbon Ensemble, Petter Dass  
Festival, North Norway  
Mark Tucker, conductor, Handel  
concerts, Trondheim  
Capercaillie, Voss Festival  
Barbara Thompson's Paraphernalia,  
Stavanger Festdagene

### Fine Arts

Bob Chaplin, artists exchange with  
Svolvær  
Tony Cragg, sculptors workshop,  
Henie-Onstad Centre, Oslo  
Anish Kapoor, exhibition  
Kunstnernes hus, Oslo  
Ron Hasledon and Sharon Kiveland,  
exhibition Oslo

### Film Festivals

Haugesund International Film  
Festival  
Moss British Week

## BOOK EXHIBITIONS

Prize-winning Fiction (2 showings)



## LIST OF STAFF

### London Appointed

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Title of Post</u>	<u>Post Holder</u>	<u>Date Arrived</u>
D	Representative	Mr P A Thompson	September 1984
F	Assistant Representative	Miss R H Elliott	March 1986

### Locally Engaged

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number of Posts</u>
2	1
3	2 (one filled on a job share basis by 2 people)
4	1

### ADDRESS

The British Council  
Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5  
0160 Oslo 1

Telephone: (02) 42 68 48



File

cc CDP o/r

slw

C.F.

26 August 1986

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY:  
TELEGRAM 191**

The Prime Minister has seen the draft agenda set out in Telno 191 and she has indicated that she is content with it.

**(MARK ADDISON)**

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CJ



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 August 1986

Dear Mark,

Prime Minister's Visit to Norway

In Charles Powell's letter of 5 August he asked for advice on the length and nature of the Prime Minister's speech at the dinner to be given in her honour by the Norwegian Government on 11 September. She will also be expected to speak at the lunch in Tromsø the same day. Both meals will be hosted by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Mrs Brundtland. No speeches will be made at the lunch to be given by King Olav on 12 September.

Both speeches will be short - no more than four to five minutes. The form, following Norwegian tradition, will be that Mrs Brundtland will welcome her guest at the beginning of each meal (the Prime Minister will not be expected to reply at this stage). After the main course, Mrs Brundtland will speak for about three or four minutes. The Prime Minister will then respond.

/We

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We understand that the Norwegians do not expect the speeches to be exclusively political. However, we suggest that the remarks in Tromso should include comment on the importance to the UK of NATO's Northern Flank, as well as some reference to the links between that city and the UK. At the dinner in Oslo, we believe it would be appropriate to mention the longstanding ties between the UK and Norway; our shared interest as members of the Alliance; the importance of links between the EC and EFTA countries; and Anglo-Norwegian cooperation in the North Sea. We are in touch with the Department of Energy and the Department of the Environment about what should be said about the environment. This could be affected by the outcome of the E(A) discussion on Acid Rain which is scheduled for early September.

We shall let you have drafts of both speeches by 1 September.

We have also discussed with the Norwegians a draft agenda for the talks between the Prime Minister and Mrs Brundtland on 12 September. The Norwegian proposals, set out in Oslo telegram 191 (attached), seem to us to cover the main points of mutual interest. The agenda does not specify Acid Rain, and we understand that the Norwegians do not want to give the subject a high profile during the visit. However, discussion of it can be expected under "Bilateral questions". (The Prime Minister is also almost certain to be closely questioned on it at her press conference.) The draft agenda is being submitted in this form to Mrs Brundtland. We should be grateful to know if the Prime Minister is content with it.


*Yours Sincerely,*  
*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

M Addison Esq  
No 10 Downing St

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PM TOWNS

NORMAN

9/11





(PS)

# Confidential

GRS -105

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FM OSLO

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 191

OF 071508Z AUGUST 86

MIPT : FIRST NORWEGIAN DRAFT LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION  
ON 12 SEPTEMBER

## I. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

- EAST/WEST RELATIONS (SUMMIT, RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL, CDE/CSCE)
- SOUTH AFRICA

## II. ALLIED AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION

- NORTHERN ISSUES (STRATEGIC SITUATION AND ALLIED PRESENCE AND REINFORCEMENT)
- EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS (INTERNAL MARKET, TECHNOLOGY, EPC, RELATIONS WITH NORWAY)

## III. OTHER QUESTIONS

- OIL MARKET AND ENERGY QUESTIONS
- CHERNOBYL

## IV. BILATERAL QUESTIONS.

BENTLEY

LIMITED.

WEO

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PJS

MR THOMAS

MR RATFORD.

*Prime Minister* ①

*Centurist with the draft agenda?*

*Andrain will no doubt come up under IV - the Norwegians do not apparently want to give the subject a high profile for the visit.*

*MEA 22/8*

# Confidential



Confidential

GRS -135

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OSLO

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 191

OF 071538Z AUGUST 86

WA7026/3	
RECEIVED	20 AUG 1986
FILED	20/8/86
SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED

26 MIPT : FIRST NORWEGIAN DRAFT LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION  
ON 12 SEPTEMBER

## I. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

- EAST/WEST RELATIONS (SUMMIT, RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL, CDE/CSCE)
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## IV. BILATERAL QUESTIONS.

BENTLEY

LIMITED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LA OY YOUNG

PS/PO S

MR THOMAS

MR RATFORD.

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File 16

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

5 August 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORWAY

BF/

The Prime Minister will no doubt need to make a brief speech at the Norwegian Government's dinner in her honour. I should be grateful for advice on the length and nature of this, and for a draft by 1 September. You will wish to consult the Department of Energy and Department of the Environment about what the Prime Minister should say on environmental matters.

Charles Powell

Robert Culshaw Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ea





file

Copy on  
PM Tours  
April 79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1983

Dear Brian,

Prime Minister's Overseas Travel  
Plans

Thank you for your letter of 8 July. In this reply I shall also deal with Richard Mottram's letter of the same date.

Norway

I am afraid that the alternative dates suggested by Mr Willoch for the Prime Minister's visit pose considerable problems. Mrs. Thatcher is planning another overseas visit for 26-28 September. On 20 October she has to be in the House of Commons and there may be another bilateral meeting on 21 October. The period 14-18 November is very difficult because, owing to her absence from Parliament later in the month (see below), the Prime Minister must answer Parliamentary Questions on 15 and 17 November. She is also holding talks with the Yugoslav Prime Minister on 16 November. On 28 November she will be in India. She returns from there on 30 November and has to leave for Athens early the next week so the dates of 2-3 December for a visit to Norway would not be convenient.

The Prime Minister would of course not wish to inconvenience Mr. Willock but, in the light of the difficulties set out above, wonders whether it would be possible to consider again the dates proposed earlier, namely 18-20 September.

British Forces, Germany

The Prime Minister is basically content with the proposals in Richard Mottram's letter of 8 July and planning can proceed on that basis.

/She has

ND

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-2-

She has considered whether to invite Chancellor Kohl to attend part of her visit to the British Forces but has decided against this. She still hopes, however, that it will be possible to call on Chancellor Kohl in Bonn at the end of her visit to the British Forces for talks and/or a working meal. This proposal may be put to the Germans whenever you wish.

We now wish to proceed quickly with the arrangements for the visit to Norway and the British Forces. I shall not want to bother the Prime Minister with questions about the arrangements during August. We shall therefore need to settle this month the outline programme, the composition of the party, the requirements for speeches, briefing arrangements and any other details which can be dealt with this far in advance.

I should therefore be grateful if you and Richard Mottram can aim to let me have by the end of this week an outline programme with detailed timings together with any requirements which you see for speeches. I shall then consult the Prime Minister about these points and the other matters mentioned above.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours ever*

*John Gals.*

Brian Fall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office


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GRS 80  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM OSLO 080830Z JUL83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 08 JULY 1983

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*MR 11/7*  
*h-u.*  
DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS  
FILE COPY



FCO TELNO 52: VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER

1. THE NORWEGIANS ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP MR WILLOCH'S INVITATION TO VISIT NORWAY. HOWEVER THE DATES PROPOSED ARE NOT, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, THE MOST CONVENIENT FOR MR WILLOCH. HE HAS PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVES:-

26 - 28 SEPTEMBER  
20 - 22 OCTOBER  
14 - 18 NOVEMBER  
28 NOVEMBER  
OR 2 - 3 DECEMBER

2. THE NORWEGIANS UNDERSTAND THAT THESE ALTERNATIVES MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. HIS OFFICE HAVE HINTED THAT, IN THIS EVENT, HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO 18 - 20 SEPTEMBER.

BROWN

LIMITED  
WED  
PS  
SIR. J. BULLARD  
MR. JAMES

COPIES TO:  
MISS NEVILLE JONES  
PLANNING STAFF

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NO 10



SUBJECT



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 228/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 November 1982

cc. Næstet set  
DPS

Dear Prime Minister.

Thank you very much for your letter of 16 November.

I am grateful for your kind invitation to visit Norway. I too found our meeting last March extremely fruitful and very much look forward to another meeting. Our countries are such close friends and allies that the exchanges between us are invaluable.

Unfortunately my programme for the coming months is already very crowded and I am, therefore, unable at present to suggest dates when I might take up your generous offer. I look forward, however, to doing so in due course.

With my warmest best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Maya Datta

His Excellency Mr Kåre Willoch

da





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The Norwegians are obviously  
been that you should visit  
Norway soon.

but it is not a very high  
priority and unless you particularly  
want to do it it seems best to  
send this non-committal reply.

(apparently no British Prime Minister  
in office has ever visited Norway).

A.T.C. 26/11.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 November 1982

*Jon Thun.*

Invitation for the Prime Minister to Visit Norway

In your letter of 22 November you asked for advice on the letter from Mr Willoch inviting the Prime Minister to visit Norway.

Norway is a close friend and was particularly helpful over the Falklands. It would be very desirable to return the visit which Mr Willoch made to London last March. But this is not a priority and in the light of your letter of 18 October to John Holmes saying that the Prime Minister does not want to be committed to further overseas visits in 1983, Mr Pym recommends that the reply to Mr Willoch should say that dates cannot be proposed at present. I enclose a draft letter.

*You are*  
*R B Bone*

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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
Norway 16/8

Visit by PM

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AB

2286 NOV 1982





DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teleletter~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

HE Mr Kåre Willoch<sup>O</sup>  
Prime Minister  
The Royal Norwegian Government

Copies to:

## PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you very much for your letter of 16 November.

I am grateful for your kind invitation to visit Norway. I too found our meeting last March extremely fruitful and very much look forward to another meeting. Our countries are such close friends and allies that the exchanges between us are invaluable.

Unfortunately my programme for the coming months is already very crowded and I am therefore unable at present to suggest dates when I might take up your generous offer. I look forward, however, to doing so in due course.

With my warmest best wishes.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*Handwritten signature*  
26.  
11



RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

22 November 1982

Invitation for the Prime Minister to visit Norway

The Norwegian Ambassador called on me this morning to deliver an invitation, a copy of which is enclosed, from the Norwegian Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher to pay an official visit to Norway.

Mr. Busch pointed out that Mr. Willoch's Government was the first Conservative Government in Norway for 56 years. He also said that no British Prime Minister in office had ever visited Norway. As regards timing, the Norwegian side would show "maximum flexibility".

I undertook to convey the invitation to the Prime Minister and to arrange for a reply in due course.

D/P I should be grateful for early advice and a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr. Willoch's letter.

AJK

R.B. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED



SUBJECT

cc Master  
Ops



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 220 A/82

THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT

THE PRIME MINISTER

Oslo, November 16, 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*

The conversations we held in March this year during my official visit in London were most stimulating and useful to me. I also had fruitful discussions with several members of your Cabinet.

Your kind hospitality could be felt all through the programme and made my stay a very pleasant one.

I hope that we can continue our interesting and open conversations, and I, therefore, take great pleasure in inviting you to pay an official visit to Norway. I would be delighted if you would be accompanied by your husband.

The dates and the details could be arranged through our officials.

Hoping to have the honour of welcoming you soon in Norway, I remain

*Yours sincerely*  
*Kåre Willoch*  
(Kåre Willoch)

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister, First Lord of  
the Treasury and Minister for  
the Civil Service,  
10 Downing Street, London



Inches 1 2 3  
Centimetres 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8


# Colour Chart #13

Blue

Cyan

Green

Yellow



A 1 2 3 4 5 6 M 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 B 17 18 19

Grey Scale #13

