
PREM 19/620



PART ends:-

22.4.82

PART | O begins:-

23.4.82

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

| Reference | Date |
|---|---------|
| C (82) 15 | 20.4.82 |
| C (82) 15 CC (82) 19 th Conclusions, Item 1 | 22.4.82 |
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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed_

& Wayland

Date 12 April 2012

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 21 April 1982, columns 271-282

Signed Of Date 12 April 2012

PREM Records Team

P49

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH

22 April 1982

You may like to lave a copy of the just in your Falled Gelder.

A P. C. 23:

Deer John,

British Claim to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies

We spoke about the points John Freeland made about our claim to the Falklands and the Dependencies when he appeared on television on 21 April. He was not in fact speaking from prepared notes, but the Legal Advisers have now prepared the attached brief summary, which could be drawn on. You may find this useful.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes) Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street NOTES ON BRITISH CLAIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES FALKLAND ISLANDS Discovery: Various sightings claimed by navigators of several countries in the sixteenth century, including British navigators, Captain John Davis and Sir Richard Hawkins. First Known Landing: 1690 by the Englishman, Captain John Strong. Visited later by French seal hunters during the first decade of the eighteenth century. Occupation/Settlement: Only inhabited by settlers in second half of eighteenth century, no indigenous population before then. First British settlement 1776. Between 1770 and 1833 the Islands were occupied for varying periods by Spain, Britain and the then Buenos Aires Government. 1833 to Present Day: Islands occupied in 1833 by Captain Onslow, RN. From that date there has been open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration of the Islands by the British. This confers an unassailable British title to the Islands under international law. Self-determination: This is an important principle recognised by Articles 1(2) and 73 of the United Nations Charter. The inhabitants of the Islands, who are a permanent and not a transient population, have repeatedly made clear their wish that the Islands should remain British. THE DEPENDENCIES: (SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS) The Dependencies are legally distinct from the Falkland Islands, but administered by the Falkland Islands. BRITISH TITLE South Georgia: Sighted at least twice between 1675 and 1756. First landing by Captain Cook in 1775 who landed and took formal possession on behalf of the Crown. Visited by many ships of different flags for sealing in the nineteenth century. 1908 annexed by HMG by Letters Patent. Under continuous, British administration since that date. South Sandwich Islands: Discovered by Captain Cook in 1775 and annexed by Letters Patent in 1908. Under continuous British administration since that date. RKGAAL

ARGENTINA'S CLAIM

At no stage in their history have the Dependencies (unlike the Falkland Islands) been occupied by Argentina. First Argentine claim to South Georgia not until 1927 and to the South Sandwich Islands not until 1948. Whatever historical claim Argentina may have to the Falkland Islands cannot apply to the Dependencies. In 1976 Argentina established a research station on Southern Thule (South Sandwich Islands). HMG repeatedly protested to Argentina and asserted our claim to sovereignty over Southern Thule.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS (MR HVRD)
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR FIRMAND
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE

MR GILLMORE

TIMMEDIATE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF

RESIDENT CLERK

(29)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFX

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 230149Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1415 OF 22 APRIL

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO.

INFO SAVING ALL C.G.S IN U S A.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: MEETING WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUMMARY:

1 THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPENT 1 AND 1 HALF HOURS WITH THE COMMITTEE. ALMOST ALL THE MEMBERS WERE PRESENT AND, WHILE THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATION IF POSSIBLE, ONLY SENATOR HELMS WAS EQUIVOCAL ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE ISSUE. SENATORS PERCY AND PELL (CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE) MADE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING STRONGLY BACKING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

PRESS AFTER THE MEETING STRONGLY BACKING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

DETAILS

- 2. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:
- (I) THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ARGENTINA HAD COMMITTED AGGRESSION, DENYING THE RIGHTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE JUST AS COMPLETELY AS THE SOVIET UNION HAD DONE IN AFGHANISTAN.
- (11) IF THE AGGRESSION WERE ALLOWED TO STAND IT COULD HAVE THE MOST DAMAGING IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, WORLD ORDER AND THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.
- (111) THE U K WAS HELL BENT ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IF POSSIBLE AND WE HOPED THAT OUR CURRENT MILITARY PRESSURES, COMBINED WITH THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES APPLIED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHERS, WOULD BRING A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. BUT WE WERE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR RIGHTS AND OUR TASK FORCE WOULD BE USED IF NEED BE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE FORCE WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO INDUCE ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL, THAT WOULD BE THE GREATEST TRIUMPH FOR WHICH WE COULD HOPE.
- (IV) SECRETARY HAIG HAD DEDICATED HIMSELF UNSTINTINGLY TO THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HIS TASK WAS NOT ENDED BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO JUDGE AT WHAT MOMENT FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATION BECAME FRUITLESS.
- 3. IN SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS, THERE WAS UQNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION FROM SENATORS BIDEN, PELL AND TSONGAS (DEMOCRATS) AND BOSCHWITZ AND MATHIAS (REPUBLICANS). ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WERE CLEARLY LOOKING FOR SOME WAY OF AVOIDING A CONFLICT AND A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS WERE MADE, SUCH AS REFERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, A REFERENDUM AMONG THE ISLANDERS (WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGENTINA BUYING OUT THOSE WHO DID NOT WISH TO STAY) AND (FROM SENATOR HELMS) A CHANNEL ISLANDS CONSTITUTION FOR THE FALKLANDS. HELMS SPOKE OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD BRING THE U.S. FACE TO FACE WITH ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE RIO TREATY AND WOULD GIVE COMFORT ONLY TO THE FORCES OF MARXISM WHICH WERE TAKING OVER CENTRAL AMERICA. BUT HE WAS AT PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO ARGENTINIAN AGGRESSION, WAS A CLOSE FRIEND OF BRITAIN AND WAS SIMPLY LOOKING FOR A PRACE FOR OUTCOME.

ARGENTINIAN AGGRESSION, WAS A CLOSE FRIEND OF BRITAIN AND WAS SIMPLY LOOKING FOR A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. 4. SENATOR MATHIAS (CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE) ASKED FOR DETAILED CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UK ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. 5 AT THE END OF THE MEETING SENATOR PERCY, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. TOLD THE PRESS THAT IF ARGENTINA'S USE OF FORCE WAS SUCCESSFUL A DAMAGING PRECEDENT WOULD BE SET AROUND THE WORLD. PERCY PAID TRIBUTE TO HAIG FOR HIS EFFORTS TO SUBSTITUTE DIPLOMACY FOR MILITARY ACTION. HOWEVER, A SHOW OF FORCE WAS NECESSARY AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE SENTIMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THEY WERE SOLIDLY IN SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. WHO HAD RIGHT ON THEIR SIDE. ALL NATIONS SHOULD OBSERVE U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. 6. SENATOR PELL ALSO COMMENDED THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AND SAID THAT IF DIPLOMACY FAILED. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE ON THE SIDE OF THE BRITISH. 7. PELL GAVE ME A COPY OF A LETTER HE HAS SENT TO HAIG ASKING WHETHER US DEFENCE ARTICLES WERE USED BY ARGENTINA IN ITS INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS AND WHETHER SUCH USE WOULD VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT AND WITH WHAT CONSEQUENCES. HENDERSON NNNN and the first of the

F.R. CC Mr Wright Mr Gillman Mr Westen Mr Hulse enly Christopher

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DEDIP SECRET DESKBY 230800Z FM WASHINGTON 230040Z APR 82 TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 1413 OF 22 APRIL 1982.

YOUR TEL NO 796: ASCENSION ISLAND: VULCAN BOMBERS

1. BULLARD RAISED THIS TODAY WITH EAGLEBURGER, WHO SAID AT ONCE (AND CONFIRMED IT AFTER CONSULTING A STATE DEPT LEGAL ADVISER. GUDGEON) THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE REASON WHY THERE SHOULD BE ANY PROBLEM OVER THE USE OF WIDEAWAKE BY VULCANS. HE WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH THE APPROPRIATE QUARTERS IN THE PENTAGON.

HENDERSON

NNNN

(29)

PS MR HVRD' S/MR ONSLOW PS/PUS MR GIFFARD

IMMEDIATE

PS FUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT

MR URE MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D HD/NEWS D HD/UND

MR ADAMS

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/HW3D

ADVANCE COEX

RESIDENT CLERK

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE
BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 221616Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1401 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK MEXICO CITY SANTIAGO SAN JOSE
PORT OF SPAIN TEGUCIGALPA BOGOTA SANTO DOMINGO LA PAZ MONTEVIDEO
KINGSTON ASUNCION QUITO LIMA CARACAS PANAMA CITY BRIDGETOWN
CASTRIES GEORGETOWN NASSAU BRASILIA PRIORITY BELMOPAN

FALKLANDS: OAS

1. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE THE RIO PACT INDEED UNQUOTE WAS PUBLISHED TODAY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES:

ARGENTINA HAS INVOKED THE WRONG TREATY AT THE WRONG TIME
TO PROMOTE THE ILLUSION THAT ALL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS SUPPORT
ITS SEIZURE OF THE FALKLANDS. THEY DON'T, AND SOME THAT DO SERVE
ONLY THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. BY APPEALING TO THE RIO PACT
AGAINST INTRUSION INTO THE HEMISPHERE, THE ARGENTINE GENERALS
CHOOSE THE SEMBLANCE OF DIPLOMACY OVER THE REAL THING.

THEIR TURN TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CAN ONLY PRODUCE A USELESS CONFRONTATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS NEXT WEEK. THE UNITED STATES POINTEDLY ABSTAINED FROM APPROVING THE MEETING: THE JUNTA WOULD BE FOOLISH TO IGNORE THAT SIGNAL. ARGENTINA'S RESISTANCE TO COMPROMISE CAN ONLY INCREASE THE PRESSURES FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO SIDE MORE OPENLY WITH BRITAIN.

THAT PARTISANSHIP WOULD NOT JUST BE AN EXPRESSION OF CULTURAL AFFINITY, AMERICANS NEITHER KNOW NOR CARE VERY MUCH ABOUT WHO HAS THE BETTER CLAIM TO THOSE LONG-DISPUTED ISLANDS, BUT THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT 1,800 FALKLANDERS SHOULD NOT BE ABSORBED INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP THROUGH A COUP DE MAIN THAT AFFRONTS ALL INTERNATIONAL NORMS.

IN FACT, THOSE NORMS ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE VERY FIRST ARTICLE OF THE TREATY ARGENTINA WOULD INVOKE AGAINST BRITAIN. THE RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE (RIO) PACT OF 1947 OPENS WITH THE DECLARATION THAT 19 HEMISPHERE NATIONS QUOTE CONDEMN WAR AND UNDERTAKE IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NOT TO RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR OF THIS TREATY. UNQUOTE

HAVING VIOLATED THAT COMMITMENT, ARGENTINA CHEEKILY ACCUSES BRITAIN OF AN EXTRACONTINENTAL ATTACK ON AN AMERICAN REPUBLIC, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6. THE IMPUDENCE IS COMPOUNDED BY CRUDE HINTS THAT BUENOS AIRES WILL RELY ON SOVIET AID TO SUSTAIN ITS AGGRESSION: FOR THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE RIO PACT WAS TO SHIELD THE HEMISPHERE AGAINST SOVIET INTRUSION.

A VAGUE SENSE OF HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY PREDICTABLY PRODUCED

18 VOTES FOR CONVENING A MINISTERS' CONFERENCE. ONLY COLOMBIA AND
TRINIDAD JOINED THE UNITED STATES IN ABSTAINING. BUT SUPPORT FOR
ARGENTINA IS TEPID, EXCEPT FOR SUCH NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS AS
VENEZUELA AND GUATEMALA - WHICH HAVE STANDING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
IN GUYANA AND BELIZE CONCERNING FRONTIERS FIXED BY BRITAIN.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS RIGHT TO TRY TO SIDETRACK THIS PLOY AND TO KEEP THE BRITISH NAVY TREADING WATER WHILE NEW BRITISH PROPOSALS ARE CONSIDERED. THIS WAR IS BETTER THREATENED THAN FOUGHT, AND IF IT MUST BE FOUGHT, BETTER LATER THAN SOONER. IF THE THREAT OF IT HAS STILL NOT REGISTERED IN BUENOS AIRES, HOWEVER, ONE GOOD WAY TO GIVE DIPLOMACY A FURTHER CHANCE WILL BE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REBUT THIS ARGENTINE CHALLENGE WITH A MORE PRONOUNCED TILT TOWARDS BRITAIN.

THIS DISPUTE DOES NOT REPRESENT A NEW COLONIAL THRUST BY A EUROPEAN POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. NOR IS IT A SOVIET CHALLENGE EXCEPT AS ARGENTINA'S MANEUVERS FACILITATE MOSCOW'S MEDDLING. THE RIO NATIONS SHOULD STAND BY THEIR FIRST PRINCIPLE AND JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONDEMNING ARGENTINA'S RESORT TO FORCE.

HENDERSON

OO STOCKHOLM

GRS 330

UNCLASSIFIED FM FCO 221530Z APR 82 TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN POSTS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 67 OF 22 APRIL.

GUIDANCE TELNO 66: THE RIO TREATY

- 1. THE RIO TREATY OF 1947 PROVIDES THE AMERICAS WITH A REGIONAL SYSTEM OF MILITARY SECURITY, WITH BASIC CONCEPTS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF NATO. IT CAME INTO BEING AS A BUFFER AGAINST THE SPREAD OF COMMUNIST OR OTHER FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION (DEFINED IN ARTICLE 4 AS EXTENDING FROM THE NORTH TO THE SOUTH POLES, INCLUDING AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS. IT ALSO SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES EUROPEAN COLONIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE). IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED BY ALL SIGNATORIES, WHO COMPRISE THE ORIGINAL 21 MEMBERS OF THE OAS PLUS TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (WHO JOINED IN 1967). OAS MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT PARTY TO THE TREATY ARE JAMAICA, BARBADOS, GRENADA, ST VINCENT, ANTIGUA, ST LUCIA AND DOMINICA. CUBA WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE OAS IN 1962. 2. THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY INCLUDE:
- (A) ALL SIGNATORIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE FORCE IN THEIR INTER-NATIONAL RELATIONS (ARTICLE 1)
- (B) ALL SIGNATORIES SHALL SETTLE CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THEM PEACEFULLY (ARTICLE 2)
- (C) 'AN ARMED ATTACK BY ANY STATE AGAINST AN AMERICAN STATE SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL AMERICAN STATES' AND 'MEASURES OF A COLLECTIVE CHARACTER' SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (ARTICLE 3)
- (D) COLLECTIVE MEASURES SHALL ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN THE EVENT OF ANY THREAT TO THE PEACE OF THE CONTINENT (ARTICLE 6)
- (E)'INVASION AFFECTING A REGION WHICH IS UNDER THE EFFECTIVE

JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER STATE' SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS AGGRESSION (ARTICLE 9).

- (F) POSSIBLE FORMS OF ACTION MAY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES: BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS, 'AND USE OF ARMED FORCE' (ARTICLE 8)
- (G) DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY (ARTICLE 17)
- (H) SUCH DECISIONS ARE BINDING ON ALL PARTIES, 'WITH THE SOLE EXCEPTION THAT NO STATE SHALL BE REQUIRED TO USE ARMED FORCE WITHOUT ITS CONSENT' (ARTICLE 20).

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH TO:

BONN STOCKHOLM
BRUSSELS (EEC) NEW YORK (UKMIS) OTTAWA
BRUSSELS (EEC) NEW YORK (BIS)

PARIS WASHINGTON [ALL IMMEDIATE]

ATHENS LUXEMBOURG MOSCOW SANTIAGO BRUSSELS (NATO) ROME CARACAS CANBERRA COPENHAGEN BERNE MEXICO CITY WELLINGTON THE HAGUE DUBLIN BRASILIA NEW DELHI LISBON MADRID MONTEVIDEO

[ALL PRIORITY]

OSLO ASUNCION KUWAIT ACCRA STRASBOURG(UKDEL) LA PAZ CAIRO NAIROBI GENEVA (UKMIS) PANAMA KINSHASA LUSAKA WARSAW QUITO MOGADISHU KINGSTON RIO DE JANEIRO(IO) SAN JOSE PEKING PORT OF SPAIN BOGOTA SANTO DOMINGO TOKYO GEORGETOWN TEGUCIGALPA HAVANA DACCA BRIDGETOWN LIMA AMMAN COLOMBO HONG KONG GIBRALTAR

[ALL ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL INFORMATION DEPT EMERGENCY UNIT ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION GUIDANCE

COPIES TO:
MR FULLER CABINET OFFICE

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UNCLASSIFIED

(29)

BY R HURD PS/MR ONSLOW PS/WA TIMED

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF · D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

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PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

H.M. TSY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

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SIR RARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFIC

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 350

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CARACAS 22230GZ APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE ECO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 22 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

MY TELNO 113 AND YOUR TELNO 82 TO BRASILIA: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND OAS

- 1. UNTIL A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, IT LOOKED AS IF THE HERRERA GOVERNMENT WERE TRYING TO COOL THINGS AND TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PROBABLY TAKING NO ACTION BEFORE SHOOTING OCCURRED. OUR LATEST INFORMATION INDICATES A SHARP CHANGE IN TONE. IT COMES FROM DR MONSANT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SECRETARY OF GOVERNING COPEL PARTY AND DRAWS ON A CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING GIVEN BY VENEZUELAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ZAMBRANO. THE MINISTER, WHO WILL BE IN WASHINGTON BY SATURDAY 24 APRIL, IS LIKELY TO TAKE A VERY HARD LINE AT THE DAS MEETING.
- 2. THE VENEZUELANS EXPECT THE MEETING TO CONCLUDE WITH A VOTE ON EITHER MONDAY OR TUESDAY, BRINGING THE RIO TREATY INTO FORCE. ALTHOUGH MONSART WOULD NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARGENTINE

ON EITHER MONDAY OR TUESDAY, BRINGING THE RIO TREATY INTO FORCE.

ALTHOUGH MONSANT WOULD NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARGENTINE
RESOLUTION, THE VENEZUELAN PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS INDICATED THAT
IT WOULD GET THE NECESSARY TWO THIRDS MAJORITY. ZAMBRANO HIMSELF
WAS TAKING A RESOLUTION, WHICH WOULD CALL FOR A FREEZE ON THE
MOVEMENT OF THE BRITISH FLEET IN ORDER TO GIVE MORE TIME FOR
NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A BACK-UP TO THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION,
IF THAT SHOULD FAIL. MONSANT SAID THAT THE VENEZUELANS WERE
UNIMPRESSED BY THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN THE CASE, WHETHER RELATED
TO THE UNITED NATIONS OR OTHERWISE. THEY WERE WORKING TO PRINCIPLES
OF REGIONAL SOLIDARITY AGAINST WHAT THEY SEE AS, AN EXTRA-CONTINENTAL
AGGRESSION.

3. MONSANT SAID THAT, IF THE RIO TREATY WERE INVOKED, THE

- 3. MONSANT SAID THAT, IF THE RIO TREATY WERE INVOKED, THE VENEZUELANS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO MAKE SOME GESTURE, WHETHER OR NOT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING OR SHOOTING HAD BEGUN. THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE IN THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD, EITHER INVOLVING THE WITH-DRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS ONLY OR A DIPLOMATIC BREAK.
- 4. VENEZUELAN ACTION AGAINST BRITAIN COULD BE PIECEMEAL. IT MIGHT IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD INCLUDE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VENEZUELAN FUNDS IN LONDON, OR IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THE PROVISION OF SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA BUT NOT PERSONNEL).
- THIS ACCOUNT OF VENEZUELAN INTENTIONS IS MORE FAR REACHING
 THAN WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES. BUT MONSANT IS
 CENTRALLY PLACED, FRIENDLY AND WELL KNOWN TO US. HE EXPECTS TO
 JOIN THE WASHINGTON DELEGATION ON MONDAY 26 APRIL.

SECONDE

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS AR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW PS/MR RIBUSEND

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF · D

HD/NEWS D

·HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

KD/ILLOD

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(29)

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Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

H.M. TSY

BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR RARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

2 m

PP MUNIEVIUEU

MONTEVIDEO

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SANTIAGO 222150Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 22 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY, BRASILIA, NASSAU,

BRIDGETOWN, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO,

TEGUCIGALPA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN AND

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 511 TO F C O (NOT TO ALL) AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1397 TO F C O: OAS/FALKLANDS: CHILEAN POSITION

1. DESPITE ROBUST STANCE TAKEN BY CHILEAN DELEGATION IN NEW YORK (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 511), ECHOED INCIDENTALLY IN EL MERCURIO'S LEADING EDITORIAL TODAY, CONTACTS WITH MFA HERE AT VARIOUS LEVELS REVEAL A DISTINCT WEAKENING OF CHILEAN RESOLVE, POSSIBLY AS A RESULT OF ARGENTINE LOBBYING. PHRASES SUCH AS QUOTE NEED TO AVOID GIVING UNNECESSARY OFFENCE TO POWERFUL NEIGHBOURS UNQUOTE DO NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE. LINE CURRENTLY BEING TAKEN BY MFA OFFICIALS CONCERNED IS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT REPORTED IN MEXICO CITY'S TELNO 229 TO F C O: IN THEIR VIEW,

DETNO TAKEN BY MEA UFFICIALS CUNCERNED IS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT REPORTED IN MEXICO CITY'S TELNO 229 TO F C 0 : IN THEIR VIEW. ALL WILL DEPEND ON THE TONE AND NATURE OF ANY ARGENTINE RESOLUTION TABLED AT THE OAS MEETING ON 26 APRIL. MFA HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER MINISTER WILL ATTEND (THEY HAVE NONE AT PRESENT AS PRESIDENT WILL ONLY BE SWEARING IN NEW CABINET AT 1800 LOCAL TIME TODAY) BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW OTHER MEMBER STATES' LEAD. 2. IF NO ARMED CLASH HAS TAKEN PLACE BY 26 APRIL, MFA SAY CHILE WOULD PROBABLY RESIST ANY ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS OF ANY KIND. MFA WERE STUDIOUSLY VAGUE HOWEVER ON WHAT THEIR ATTITUDE MIGHT BE IF REFERENCE WERE MADE IN A RESOLUTION TO THE VALIDITY OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIMS ON THE FALKLANDS. THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER NOT TO HAVE TO PRONCUNCE ON THIS. BUT I EXPECT THEY WILL PROBABLY AGAIN FALL INTO LINE WITH THE REST RATHER THAN RISK BEING LEFT AS ODD MAN OUT. 3. IF HOSTILITIES WERE TO HAVE BROKEN OUT BY THEN, MFA FORESEE GREAT DIFFICULTY FOR CHILE IN RESISTING IMPOSITION OF SOME SORT OF SANCTIONS, BUT HAVE HINTED BROADLY THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED HERE. 4. IN ALL THIS MFA IS IN UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OF BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN STRONGLY PRO-BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE NEED TO AVOID CONTINENTAL ISOLATION ON THE OTHER, ESPECIALLY AS THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBILITY OF INVOKING THE RIO TREATY THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT OF AN ARGENTINE ATTACK LATER ON (MY TELEGRAM NO 140. NOT TO ALL). I GATHER CHILE TOOK FIRST STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION AT TIME OF LAST CHILEAN/ARGENTINE CRISIS IN 1978. 5. F C O PLEASE PASS. HEATH NNNN SENT AT/RECD AT 222158Z AMT/CS

(29)

PSIMP HURD PS/MR ONSLOW PE/NR DIDITION

PS/PUS MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT MR ADAMS

MR URE MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D HD/NEWS D HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD\m:0D

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER MR HAWTIN

H.M. TSY

MR PERETZ MR ILETT MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR RARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY 230830Z FROM MEXICO CITY 222115Z APRIL 82 TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 22 APRIL 82 INFO: WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON TELNO 1397: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TELLO TOLD ME (MY TELNO 299) THAT MEXICO WOULD NOT IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON BRITAIN EVEN IF A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY WERE TO VOTE FOR SUCH SANCTIONS. 2. A MEXICAN PRESS COMMENTATOR HAS POINTED OUT THAT AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE RIO TREATY, THE MEXICAN DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL DECLARATION: QUOTE THE DELEGATION OF MEXICO CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENCE, THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 8 CANNOT BE APPLIED IN AN OBLIGATORY FORM, GIVEN THEIR COERCIVE NATURE, WITHOUT THE THE AUTHORISATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. UNQUOTE.

TICKELL

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(29)

BI PHURD

PS/MR ONSLOW PS/WR REPORTED

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

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HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/IIISD

RESIDENT CLERK

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR MCINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

H.M. TSY

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER SAFU/ CABINET OFFICE

BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR RARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFI

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL FM UKMIS NEW YORK 221845Z APR 82 TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 520 OF 22 APRIL 1982 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UN

1. I GOT MY AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE TO CALL A MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP AT THE UN THIS MORNING (22 APRIL) TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THE MEMBERSHIP UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS AN AUSTRALIAN (AS CHAIRMAN OF THE LAST CHGM) INITIATIVE. THERE WAS A VERY HIGH TURN OUT AND THE MEETING GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASISE TO MY COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES THE DETERMINATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO STAND BY ITS PRINCIPLES AND ACHIEVE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. I ALSO THANKED THE MANY COMMON-WEALTH GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD ISSUED STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION AND IN CONDEMNATION OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION.

2. I STARTED THE MEETING GOING BY EMPHASISING OUR POSITION ON SELF-DETERMINATION AND RESISTANCE TO THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. WHEN I SPELT OUT THE FACT THAT WE MEANT BUSINESS, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD TRY ALL DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF ACHIEVING AN HONOURABLE SOLUTION, THE RESPONSE WAS REALISTIC AND NOT

BUSINESS, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD TRY ALL DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF ACHIEVING
AN HONOURABLE SOLUTION, THE RESPONSE WAS REALISTIC AND NOT
UNFAVOURABLE. NONE OF THOSE PRESENT ARGUED AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE
THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE. THERE WAS HOWEVER SOME CONCERN
GICCERN

THAT WE OUGHT TO EXHAUST ALL THE POSSIBILITIES WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE WE TOOK SUCH STEPS. MY CYPRIOT COLLEAGUE INSISTED THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 BEFORE WE CONSIDERED UNILATERAL STEPS. APART FROM THIS AND OTHER LEGALISTIC POINTS MADE ABOUT OUR RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51, THE ONLY DISQUIET VOICED WAS BY SOME OF THE CARIBBEANS WHO WERE WORRIED ABOUT ARGENTINA'S INVOCATION OF THE RIO TREATY. ST LUCIA THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD TRY TO SHIFT THE DISCUSSION BACK TO THE OAS COUNCIL WHERE ALL THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN MEMBERS WERE REPRESENTED.

3. THIS WAS AN ENCOURAGING MEETING. I WAS NOT FACED WITH CALLS FOR UK WITHDRAWAL AS A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE ARE STILL PERCEIVED AS BEING MORALLY IN THE RIGHT.

PARSONS

NNNN

Day John,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH

22 April, 1982

Type Retter pl.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGES FROM EC GOVERNMENTS (Italian text on Pt 5) (Pt7)

Thank you for your letters of 14 and 16 April enclosing messages to the Prime Minister from the Italian Prime Minister and President Mitterrand. As you will have seen from Athens telegram number 136 of 15 April, a letter from Mr Papandreou, also in reply to the Prime Minister's message of 6 April, is on its way, and it might be helpful if I also let you have our advice on that letter.

None of the three letters seems to us actually to need a reply. As the Prime Minister has already sent personal messages of thanks (on 13 April) to all European Community Heads of State and Government (and Signor Spadolini's letter was actually written before those messages were sent), we think it would be over effusive for the Prime Minister to send yet another round of thank-you letters doing no more than thanking the recipients for what the Prime Minister has already thanked them for. (If the situation changes we may need to consider further personal messages). The Foreign Secretary is a little concerned about the risk of raising the price of our European Community partners' support by an excess of gratitude.

M. Mitterrand's letter is however different from the other two in that he goes beyond the measures of support covered by the Prime Minister's message of 13 April by undertaking to raise with the Japanese the Falklands issue during the French state visit to Japan last week. At a Community briefing in Tokyo, M. Cheysson told the British Embassy that the matter was in fact raised on three occasions during the visit, once by President Mitterrand and twice by him. M. Cheysson has now confirmed this in a letter to the Secretary of State. We think it would therefore be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply to President Mitterrand's letter expressing appreciation for this gesture. I enclose a draft which could be transmitted once signed through the French Embassy here, since that was the original channel of communication.

> Yours eve Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street Registry No.

DRAFT MESSAGE

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret, Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified. To:- President Mitterrand

Prime Minister
Telephone No. Ext.

From

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

As I said in my message of 13 April, I am deeply grateful to you for the part you played in helping to secure common action by the Ten against Argentina following its illegal and unprovoked aggression against the Falkland Islands. If have since received your letter, delivered by M. de Marjerie on 16 April, in which you agreed to take the matter up with the Japanese during your visit to Tokyo. I have seen from Claude Cheysson's letter to Francis Pym that despite your and his repeated efforts, they have up to now proved fairly immovable. But I have no doubt that pressure must be maintained on them (and that we need to get it also from the Americans) on this issue (as indeed on others).

I am most grateful for your and Claude's personal intervention and close interest. As you know, we are in the closest touch with the Americans and continue to hope that the strong pressures from the international Community will have their effect on Argentina. These pressures must be maintained.

An 74

the formed at the tale allered to the tale albertine attention



Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

The Falkland Islands and Dependencies

Thank you for your letter of 21 April about the three telegrams sent to Washington in preparation for Mr Pym's current visit there.

A paper will be distributed today about possible military and other roles for the UN in the Falkland Islands, in accordance with your second paragraph. The FCO Legal Advisers have discussed the texts of the draft agreement with the Attorney General, in accordance with your penultimate paragraph. The Attorney General concluded that there was no point which it was necessary for him to raise on the texts at this stage. He would, however, like to be kept in touch with developments on them and to have the opportunity to comment, if necessary, at subsequent stages. We shall arrange this.

Attached -

majority. It is probable that the United States representative would, on most matters, take a view closer to Britain's than to Argentina's. It follows that decision by majority should be a proceed by unantity or by majority should be a proceed by the proceed by th You asked, in relation to the third telegram to majority. It is probable that the United States representative Argentina's. It follows that decision by majority should usually produce results that would accord with our interests. To proceed by unanimity on the other hand would give Argentina a veto. We therefore prefer decision by majority. And, as you may have seen in Washington telno 1377, Mr Haig is quite clear that this should be the arrangement.

> Most of the second page of your letter was about the Dependencies and their position under the draft agreement. I enclose a short paper prepared by FCO officials in consultation with the MOD and Cabinet Office about British interests in the Dependencies. This draws partly on an earlier paper about hydro-carbon, mineral and fisheries resources in the South Atlantic - ODO(SA)(82)25 of 16 April.

> > /You will see



You will see that the enclosed paper concludes that Britain has certain interests in South Georgia and no concrete interests in the South Sandwich Islands. We think that this shows that the Falkland Islands themselves are what matter most in current and future negotiations.

Linempri

You asked in particular about the method of administration of the Dependencies. The present situation is that the Governor is the only legislative authority for the Dependencies but on the executive side is required to consult the Executive Council. In the absence of the Governor, but so long as his office continues to exist, his functions are exercised either by a person designated by the Queen or by the next senior member of the Executive Council. The latter would normally be the Chief Secretary or the Financial Secretary, but if they were absent it would be the senior of the appointed members of the Council. The British Antarctic Survey Station in South Georgia exercises administrative responsibilities there on behalf of the Governor, who appoint one of the station's staff as Magistrate.

Showing 1 Showing 1

The withdrawal and demilitarisation provisions of the draft agreement brought back by Mr Haig from Buenos Aires, and provisionally agreed with him in London, would apply in their present form to the three areas designated in paragraph 2. Although the draft is not absolutely clear on this, the Argentines certainly and the Americans probably intend that the other provisions too should cover the Dependencies as well as the Falkland Islands. If that were sc, and since the draft strongly implies the abolition of the office of Governor, the effect on the administrative arrangements regarding the Dependencies would probably be that the British Antarctic Survey would continue to exercise \administrative responsibilities in South Georgia, on behalf not of the Governor, but of the Special Interim Authority. The latter would be required to consult the Executive Council including its new Argentine members on all its work regarding the Dependencies. As regards legislative authority for the Dependencies, there would be a gap caused by the demise of the office of Governor. The draft does not state how this gap should be filled. But Argentina would no doubt argue that the Special Interim Authority should fill it.

It would be open to us to try to exclude the Dependencies from the ambit of the proposed agreement. But Argentina would be most unlikely to agree to this, since she has long claimed the Dependencies as well as the Falklands themselves. Alternatively, we could propose that the new Argentine members of the Executive Council should not participate in that work of the Council which concerns the Dependencies and that the Special Interim Authority likewis should have

/no responsibilities



andula

no responsibilities regarding the Dependencies. In the latter case, we would need to propose alternative arrangements for carrying out the functions formerly exercised by the Governor. One factor in considering these alternative courses will be whether the Dependencies are sufficiently important to the UK to justify our giving high priority in the negotiations through Mr Haig to amendments concerning the Dependencies. A judgement will have to be made in comparison with amendments in such fields as Argentine withdrawal, interim administration in the Falklands and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who has not seen these papers, will no doubt wish to make recommendations on these matters after his return from Washington.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and the Attorney General and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Your ever

(J E Holmes) Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE FALKLAND ISLAND DEPENDENCIES

Geography

- 1. South Georgia is a mountainous island 125 miles long and 30 miles wide. Because of the sub-antarctic climate, it cannot sustain human habitation without total support from outside. There are large, sheltered deep-water harbours and a large continental shelf.
- 2. The South Sandwich Islands are each less than 10 miles across. There are no harbours and most of the Islands are inaccessible from the sea.

History

3. South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and what is now the British Antarctic Territory were formally annexed in 1908. There was British administration in South Georgia from 1909 to 1969, when the British Antarctic Survey station took over administrative responsibilities. There has never been any British settlement in the South Sandwich Islands. Since 1976 there has been an illegal Argentine station on Southern Thule, the southernmost of the Islands.

British Legal Title

4. The UK has clear title to South Georgia. But our title to the South Sandwich Islands is not so clear, since there have been no British settlements; the islands might be regarded either as British or as not belonging to any state.

British Interests: South Georgia

5. (a) Fisheries. Although there is a potential annual catch of 50,000 tons of fin fish, stocks need time to recover from Soviet, Polish and

Japanese/

Japanese over-fishing in recent years. A 200 mile fishery zone, a restrictive licensing system and considerable fishery protection resources would be needed. The British fishery industry has shown no interest. Krill is abundant but the market for it, and therefore the prospects for developing an industry, are doubtful.

- (b) Minerals. There are probably no metal or hydrocarbon resources onshore. Hydro-carbon potential offshore cannot be ruled out, but accademic so far geophysical surveys/indicate that the prospects are poor.
- Strategic. Britain's potential military need for (c) South Georgia relates to a situation, like the present one, where we wish to retake the Falklands Such a need could well present from Argentina. itself if the US would not provide a security guarantee of the Falklands under a long term settlement. The harbours at South Georgia could then be useful for acclimatisation, maintenance work, casualty clearing and replenishment. addition the harbours could conceivably be useful to the US if the Cape Horn route became important because of closure for any reason of the Panama Canal or if the Soviet Union were to establish a significant naval presence in the South Atlantic. Denial of the harbours to the Soviet Union is a general Western interest. While access to the harbours, or the establishment of naval facilities in South Georgia, are not likely to be a major Soviet aim, they would be a welcome target of opportunity for strategic reasons and also for access to fisheries.

(d) Scientific. The British Antarctic Survey station is engaged in important long-term research on the marine living resources of the area.

British Interests: South Sandwich Islands

6. There are virtually no fin fish. Krill would be available if a 200 mile fishing zone was established. There are no known minerals and the volcanic nature of the islands suggests that no deposits of economic value are present. The Islands are of no strategic value to the West or the Soviet Union. The Islands are very low in the priorities of the British Antarctic Survey.

British Interests: British Antarctic Territory

The BAS operations in Antarctica use South Georgia only for supplies of water. But South Georgia could become rather more useful to the BAS operations in the Our claim to sovereignty over the British future. Antarctic Territory does not depend on maintaining sovereignty over the Falkland Islands or Dependencies. But Argentina might allege the contrary. could be dealt with in any negotiations by a British statement that any agreement about sovereignty in the Falklands or the dependencies would not affect the situation regarding sovereignty in the Antarctic. a statement should be emphatic and firm, so as also to counter any impression that any change over the Dependencies might signify a diminishing interest in the Antarctic.

CONCLUSIONS

8. British national interests in South Georgia are not very great. For Britain as part of the Western Alliance it is desirable to keep the harbours potentially available to the US and definitely unavailable to the Soviet Union. Britain has no concrete interests in the South Sandwich Islands.

- 9. This suggests that the future of the Dependencies should not be a first consideration in our policy in the present dispute. But we have an interest in ensuring that the British Antarctic Survey can continue their research without threat of military interference during any interim agreement and in the longer term. BAS could operate without HMS Endurance. An interim agreement which demilitarised the Dependencies would thus be satisfactory for the operations of BAS provided that Argentina could be expected not to infringe the demilitarisation provision. It would be desirable in any long term agreement to have a provision that would allow BAS to continue to operate.
- As regards the harbours in South Georgia, demilitarisation under any interim agreement should deter the Soviet Union from a move to occupy them. The United States has favoured demilitarisation in the current negotiations for an interim agreement. negotiations were to take place on the longer term future of the Falkland Islands or the Dependencies, we would need to ask the Americans how much importance they attached to having South Georgia's harbours potentially available to them in future, and to take account of their reply in the negotiations. It would be highly desirable that any new status which might be negotiated for South Georgia should exclude the possibility of Soviet use of the harbours. The Soviet Union would be unlikely, if the US had a stake in any agreement about the future of South Georgia, to occupy the harbours illegally. If South Georgia passed under the sovereignty and administration of Argentina, and the Islands were not demilitarised, the US might wish to have a side agreement with Argentina excluding all but a few of the world's navies from access to the harbours.

Ref: A08197

MR COLES

MI

Falkland Island Population

My minute to you of 21 April about the Falkland Island Company recorded agreement at official level that, since on Mr Needham's latest evidence few Falkland Islanders were expected to want to leave, the Government need do no more than be ready to deal sympathetically with any who turned up in Montevideo needing help for onward travel to the United Kingdom. Since then new evidence (BIS Buenos Aires tel no 26) from a Mrs Mercer who left the Islands on 17 April suggests that many of the islanders are feeling the lack of any guidance, and may be anxious to leave temporarily to avoid being caught in cross fire between British and Argentine forces, but cannot afford to do so by their own means and are therefore disappointed not to have been offered financial assistance by the Government.

- 2. In these circumstances the conclusion of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at official level, with which the Ministry of Defence, Home Office and Treasury agree, is that
 - a. The point has now been reached where, unless clearer guidance is given to the Islanders, the Government could come under increasing criticism both from them and from public opinion here;
 - b. it is not in our interest to encourage a mass exodus from the Islands, and there would be both practical as well as political difficulties if we were to do so:
 - c. we should therefore issue a statement to the effect that we attach importance to the safety of the Islanders, and that, if there are any who would prefer to leave the Islands temporarily until the immediate crisis is past, we will give sympathetic help to ensure that they are not prevented from doing so by lack of means;
 - d. this statement should be quickly publicised, eg on the BBC World Service, since with the approach of the Task Force any movement out of the Islands may soon become impossible.


- 3. Sir Antony Acland believes that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be in agreement with these proposals. If the Prime Minister is content you may wish to authorise the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to take the necessary action forthwith. There are longer-term implications of seeming to encourage departures from the Islands, and she may prefer to have the matter discussed at Chequers on 25 April; but the regular weekly flight to Argentina on 27 April may well be the last for some time; and, though we believe the Argentines to be currently running a more frequent service, they may soon have to stop doing so.
- 4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Defence Secretary and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22 April 1982

1500 02 24962 PRDRME G NO DISTRIBUTIO 41889 PBTH AR APRIL 22ND 1982 MRS. MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM YOUR EXCELLENCY: IT WAS A WISE DECISION TO CUT DOWN THE SPEED OF THE ADVANCING ROYAL FLEET. THE GREAT PRESSURE IT EXERTS ON US COULD BE LESSENED WHILE THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS TALK IN WASHINGTON AND A PEACE. FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TREATY IS NEGOTIATED. THE UN SHOULD ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS FOR THE TIME BEING. AS THIS IS THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY OUT, I URGE YOU TO ORDER THE FLEET TO HUT UP AT CAPE TOWN. LET REASON AND COMMON SENSE PREVAIL. LET US AVOID A WORLD CATASTROPHE RESPECTFULLY YOURS. (PROF) ULISES TORRES. ROSARIO, ARGENTINA. 24962 PRDRME G 41889 PBTH AR MMMM



GPS 1300

DEDIP

SECRET

DESKBY 230700Z

FM WASHINGTON 230140Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1414 OF 22 APRIL 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

DBY 230700Z (LIMITED) ADVANCE COPY IMMEDIATE 9

PS
PS
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY WAXASTER
SIR R. ARMSTRONG - CAS. OFFICE
N°10 D.S.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PUS AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH MR HAIG ON 22 APRIL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUMMARY

- 1. SECRETARY OF STATE HAD OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH HAIG IN RESTRICTED SESSION. ENDERS AND I WERE PRESENT AS NOTE-TAKERS.

 DISCUSSION WAS CONTINUED DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER LUNCH WITH FULL TEAMS.
- PROBABLY FINAL) EFFORT TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HE AGREED WITH MR PYM THAT THE GAP BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH POSITIONS WAS A VERY WIDE ONE, BUT CLEARLY HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME NEW IDEAS WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS A BRIDGE. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, BUT THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT BOTH FOR THE AMERICANS AND FOR OURSELVES THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO HAVE MADE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT. MEANWHILE, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD BEEN LEFT IN NO DOUBT ON WHAT SIDE THE AMERICANS

would be if the talk welland.

THE TEXT BROUGHT BACK FROM BUENOS AIRES REPRESENTED THE ESSENTIAL OF OUR POSITION. IT WAS AGREED THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET TO LOOK AT DETAILED COMMENTS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD PREPARED, AND THAT THE TWO MINISTERS WOULD MEET AGAIN TOMORROW. THERE MAY ALSO BE A CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN.

POSITION IN ARGENTINA

4 HAIG DID NOT THINK MUCH OF GALTIERI'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL. HIS SUCCESSOR MIGHT WELL BE WORSE, BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LAST. THERE WERE NO RELIABLE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN MR PYM HAVING TALKS WITH COSTA MENDEZ. THE JOB COULD ONLY BE DONE IN BUENOS AIRES, BY GETTING EVERYONE CONCERNED (AND ESPECIALLY THE SECOND TIER OF MILITARY LEADERS) IN THE SAME ROOM. THE NAVAL MEMBER OF THE JUNTA WAS THE HAWK (HE HAD A SON IN THE INVASION FORCE) BUT THE REAL THREAT TO GALTIERI CAME FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD ARMY CORPS. PUBLIC OPINION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS NOT FOR WAR: THERE HAD BEEN A MARKED CHANGE IN THIS RESPECT BETWEEN HAIG'S FIRST AND SECOND VISITS.

USE OF FORCE BY BRITAIN

- 5. OVER LUNCH, HAIG, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT MILITARY PRESSURE
 WAS A NECESSARY PART OF THE PACKAGE, SAID THAT MILITARY ACTION NOW
 WOULD PROVOKE A SHARP EMOTIONAL REACTION, INCREASE DIFFICULTIES
 WITH THE OAS, AND PUT AT RISK THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATING ROLE.
 IN PRIVATE, HE SAID THAT WE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO KEEP THE
 PRESSURE UP. HE IMPLIED THAT REAGAN WOULD BE MORE CONCERNED THAN
 HE ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA, AND ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE
 TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ''ABOUT MODERATION'' WHICH HE DIDN'T THINK
 WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN LONDON BUT WHICH WOULDN'T BE PARTICULARLY
 DAMAGING. IF WE COULD DO IT WITHOUT CASUALTIES, THIS COULD BE THE
 BEST OUTCOME.
- 6. MR PYM TOOK THE OCCASION TO SAY HOW APPALLED WE HAD BEEN AT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE INFORMATION ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA WHICH WE HAD GIVEN IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HE WAS SURE THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY INTENDED.
- 7. SOUTH GEORGIA APART, HAIG ASSUMED THAT OUR FORCES COULD ONLY.
 ADOPT A POLICY OF 'LONG TERM STRANGULATION'. MR PYM DID NOT
 RESPOND DIRECTLY BUT DOWN A MADRED ADOUT THE TIME CONTRAINTS

7. SOUTH GEORGIA APART, HAIG ASSUMED THAT OUR FORCES COULD ONLY

PT A POLICY OF ''LONG TERM STRANGULATION''. MR PYM DID NOT

RESPOND DIRECTLY, BUT PUT DOWN A MARKER ABOUT THE TIME CONTRAINTS

UNDER WHICH WE WERE OPERATING.

OAS

8. ENDERS' ASSESSMENT OF THE OAS MEETING ON MONDAY WAS THAT IT WOULD PASS A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR BRITISH FORCES TO STAND OFF EVEN IF NO MILITARY ACTION WERE TAKEN BEFORE THEN. IF IT WERE, A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIKELY TO PASS. HAIG EMPHASISED THAT THE POSITION WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO HOLD IF HE COULD SAY THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO BUENOS AIRES WITH SOME NEW IDEAS.

US PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE

9. MR PYM, POINTING TO THE WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECOGNITION THAT WE HAD GONE AS FAR AS WE COULD, ARGUED STRONGLY FOR GREATER US PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINIANS ON WHICH SIDE THE US WOULD BE IF THE TALKS COLLAPSED. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AT THE RIGHT TIME, BUT THERE WERE PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED. A TRADE EMBARGO WOULD TAKE TIME TO BITE, AND WOULD POLARISE THE HEMISPHERE ON A NORTH/SOUTH BASIS. FINANCIAL MEASURES WOULD BE QUICKER TO TAKE EFFECT, BUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY WEIGHED. HAIG THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS MILITARY PRESSUR WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE, AND SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED HIS PEOPLE TO THINK THE UNTHINKABLE ABOUT THE US FLEET IN THE CARRIBEAN. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, BEFORE THE US SHIFTED ITS POSITION HE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO GO TO BUENOS AIRES AGAIN WITH ''REASONABLE PROPOSALS FROM LONDON'': AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE SOMETHING NEW.

AMERICAN IDEAS

10. HAIG IMPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD LOOKED FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK, BUT FAILED TO COME UP WITH ANYTHING SATISFACTORY. HE RECOGNISED OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PRESENT TEXT, BUT THE PROVISIONS ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD IN PRACTISE SAFEGUARD OUR INTERESTS MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN WAS PERHAPS APPRECIATED IN LONDON. WE WOULD ALSO RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL ON WHAT HAPPENED.

LONDON. WE WOULD ALSO RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTPOL ON WHAT HAPPENED IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. AND A FORMULA MIGHT BE FOUND WHICH GAVE "DUE BUT NOT TOTAL WEIGHT" TO THE VIEWS OF THE ISLANDERS. THO SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE TO CONVINCE THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEIR INFLUENCE WOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. (HAIG EVIDENTLY STILL FINDS PERSUASIVE ARGENTINE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON THEM IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. EXPECIALLY OVER THE RIGHT TO BUY LAND. AND HE SUGGESTED THAT AN ARGENTINE STAKE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY MIGHT HAVE A PART TO PLAY IN A PACKAGE WHICH COULD INCLUDE PRIVATE ASSURANCES). IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT SUCCEED, BY AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE AMERICANS WERE GIVEN A SPECIFIC MEDIATING RESPONSIBILITY DURING THIS PERIOD OF EXTRA TIME. MR PYM SAID THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE WILLING TO LOOK AT NEW IDEAS, BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE IF THEY DEPARTED FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE REGARDED AS FUNDAMENTAL.


US GUARANTEES

11. MR PYM EXPLAINED OUR CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE ARGENTINIAN REINVASION AND, MORE GENERALLY, ABOUT ARGENTINIAN GOOD FAITH IN IMPLEMENTING ANY AGREEMENT. WOULD THE US BE WILLING TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES? IN PRIVATE, MR HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IDEAS ''UP TO THE LIMITS WHERE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY WOULD BE REQUIRED ". OVER LUNCH, NEITHER HE NOR ENDERS SEEMED PREPARED TO ENVISAGE ANYTHING GOING BEYOND THE INTERIM PERIOD. DURING WHICH THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL US PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND (HE MENTIONED A STAFF OF 20 FOR THE US INTERIM COMMISSIONER, WHO WOULD BE A VERY SENIOR DIPLOMAT): IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD KNOW THAT THEY WERE ''STARING DOWN OUR GUN BARREL' IF THEY VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT, AND IT WAS MUCH EASIER FOR THE US THAN FOR BRITISH FORCES TO REACH THE FALKLANDS. ENDERS SAID THAT NO US MILITARY PRESENCE WAS ENVISAGED ON THE ISLAND DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, AS THIS WOULD GIVE THE ARGENTINIANS A PRETEXT FOR ASKING FOR THE SAME.

12. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS QUICKLY TO NO 10 AND TO PRIVATE SECRETARIES TO HOME SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY AND SIR R ARMSTRONG.

HENDERSON

Vinne Marito SECRET AND PERSONAL



22 April 1982

Dear John,

Threat to British Citizens from the Argentine Security Services

Thank you for your letter of 22 April.

The objective of giving publicity to this threat would be to offer at least an oblique warning to British citizens in the area about the risks they could face from terrorist action by the Argentine security services and also to warn the Argentine Government that we were aware of this potential threat.

HM Ambassador at Montevideo considered that we should approach the Uruguayan authorities before taking any action to inspire publicity on this pretext. Otherwise there would be a risk of antagonising them and possibly jeopardising co-operation in other fields.

The Ambassador was accordingly instructed to speak to the Foreign Ministry. Their response was that we should not take the threat from the group concerned (Gadim) seriously; that any warnings might be counterproductive by giving ideas to other groups; and that they doubted whether the Uruguayan police could offer more protection than they already were. Miss Hutchinson added that she was not hopeful that the Uruguayans would take effective action but that they had at least had their attention focussed on the problem at high level.

The Ambassador was also concerned that publicity about this threat could start a mass exodus from Uruguay by both British residents there and by British people normally resident in Argentina who were in Montevideo during the crisis. She doubted whether publicity would effectively reduce the threat.

There can be no guarantee about the results of any inspired publicity. The story may well receive emotional treatment in the press and its effect on the British communities in Argentina and neighbouring countries would be

/unpredictable



unpredictable. Publicity would at least serve to warn them of the threat and give them an opportunity to leave or take precautions. But there must also be a chance that it would lead to serious, and perhaps unnecessary, alarm in the British communities.

If the Argentine Government are intent on such terrorist action, publicity may not dissuade them. But it could none the less inhibit their freedom of action.

In the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's absence, Mr Onslow has considered the pros and cons. He has looked at the evidence

that we should take action to inspire publicity. It would be possible for the FCO News Department to feed a story to one journalist. I enclose the text of the line which could be taken in an unattributable briefing. The story would no doubt then be picked up by the rest of the media and questions put to the FCO. I also enclose the line which News Department could then take both on and off the record.

If the Prime Minister is content, the FCO News Department will take action early on 23 April.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(J E Holmes) Holmes
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street


* - * Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4) OMDayland 12 April 2012

22.W.8Z Cardine Stevens: Is Thomas Itinks that this should be brought to the Jourse of LONG attention of Mr. John Coles, as it does not ment the time of the prime Minister herselt.

WITH COMPLIMENTS

LORD THOMAS OF SWYNNERTON

ou has been sent to mr williams in Ambassador to Buenos Aires) at the



Conversation with Mr Enrique Pinedo

Mr Pinedo came to see me last night at my house at 10.pm. He came on the suggestion of a mutual friend, Mr Julio Nunez. Mr Pinedo explained that he had come to England at his own expense and purely to try to do good in a useful manner. Naturally he had responded to requests to put the Argentinian case when asked by the BBC etc but he was in no sense an official visitor. He was, however, a great friend of Dr Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister, and he confirmed that he would probably be seeing him in New York at the end of this week.

Senor Pinedo is an Argentinian of the old school, a lawyer and rancher. At the same time, his father was several times Minister of the Economy. He expressed admiration for England and was plainly seriously distressed at the prospect of war between our two countries. He talked a good deal, much of it not to the point. I did however have the following clear impressions:

- 1. He did not think that anyone in Argentina cares about the fate of South Georgia and the dependencies;
- He fully accepted that the act of invasion was an act of folly and at the least, the equivalent in social terms of an unprovoked slap in the face to an old friend;
- He spoke slightingly of the intellectual level of the military junta and their naval and air force colleagues;

He seemed to me to be agitated.

I told him as firmly as I could that my impression was that Britain was most willing to negotiate almost anything once control had been re-established - itself surely a concession following the grave breach which he, Mr Pinedo, had already accepted to be so; but that before that control was reestablished, nothing really could be done. I said also that my impression was that all parties were in support of the Government over this. The degree of unity had been one of the most striking aspects of the crisis.

Hugh Thomas

LORD THOMAS

PA 26/4



Copy No | of 2

MO 5/21

22nd April 1982

Dear John.

S gave you an oral account of this that you may the to mad the regt. A. J. C. 23/4.

May I attach the stop press which arrived as I was about to seal the envelope of the attached letter. The following information has just been received (0950 pm) from C in C Fleet at Northwood:

- a. All the survivors have now been successfully picked up.
- b. One helicopter confirmed as written off, but one which could be "salvaged."
- c. Force Commander's initial assessment is that his plan need not be altered but will be delayed with April 25/26 as earliest dates for a landing.
- d. Weather permitting, further recce landings will be made by small boat.
- e. HMS Brilliant (with two Lynx helicopters embarked) has been sailed to join the South Georgia group as a reinforcement she will arrive on Sunday.

John John Mand)

A J Coles Esq



Copy No 1 of 2

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-3030X78222 218 2111/3


MO 5/21

22nd April 1982

OPERATION PARAQUET - SPECIAL FORCES

May I set down in writing the facts as we know them as at 2130 hours concerning the helicopter crash on South Georgia.

- The initial insertion of D. Squadron SAS recce team from HMS Antrim into South Georgia was initially delayed yesterday by adverse weather. The first attempt was made but abandoned in what are described as appalling conditions of high wind and heavy snow. During a temporary and marginal improvement in conditions at 1430 yesterday (our time) the recce team of 16 members of the SAS was successfully inserted by a Wessex helicopter on to the Fortuna Glacier - position marked on the attached map. In a separate operation four members of the SBS were successfully inserted at a point some nine miles east of Grytviken (also marked on the map).
- During this afternoon and evening the weather has rapidly deteriorated with South West winds gusting over 70 knots. At about 5pm this afternoon two Wessex Five helicopters were despatched from HMS Antrim in response to a call from the recce party who were reported as being in an untenable position on the glacier. As the Defence Secretary and CDS reported to the Prime Minister, both Wessex Five helicopters crashed in "whiteout" conditions while attempting to rescue the party.
- We have now had confirmation that there were no casualties and the pilot, air crew and SAS team were unharmed. HMS Antrim will conduct a rescue operation using its Wessex Three helicopter as soon as conditions permit.
- There is no evidence that any of this is known to the Argentinians, nor do we expect, given the distances, terrain and weather involved that it will become known. The numbers within the Ministry of Defence who are aware of this is very
- If we receive news this evening of the successful recovery of the men back to HMS Antrim then I will let you know direct. We have made arrangements for any significant developments during the night to be reported to the MOD Resident Clerk (218 6002) who will report then, amongst others, to the No 10 Duty Clerk.



A J Coles Esq



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO Secretary of the Cabinet

M224

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone: 01-233 8319





Copy No 4 of 5 Copies

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SWIA 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO

Ref. A08194

22 April 1982

You will have seen Antony Acland's letter of 22 April, conveying the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views on, and disagreement with, the decision to send an SSN out of the Falkland Islands Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) in the direction of the Argentine naval force which includes the aircraft carrier.

I have discussed this with the Prime Minister, who has decided that the manoeuvre described in the first paragraph of my letter of 21 April to David Omand should be suspended until further notice, and that instructions should be sent forthwith to the SSN in question not to leave the MEZ on such a manoeuvre, or, if she is already outside the MEZ, to change her course and return within it.

I tried to get hold of you to convey this decision to you in person; as you were not available I spoke to David Omand, and asked him to make sure that the necessary instructions were conveyed to the submarine at the earliest possible moment.

I am sending copies of this letter to Antony Acland, and to John Coles and David Omand.

D. J. WRIGHT

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin GCB MVO DSC

ANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

BIMR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW PS/WR RIPWIND

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF · D

HD/NEWS D

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RESIDENT-CLERK-

(29)

IMMEDIATE

H.M.TSY

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PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

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SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFIC

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

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DESKBY 221600Z

FM PORT OF SPAIN 221335Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 064 OF 22 APRIL INFO OO WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON TELNO 1378: FALKLANDS

1. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT, HAVING TALKED EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH THE TRINIDADIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, HE DID NOT THINK THAT ARGENTINA WOULD GET ITS TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY ON 26 APRIL. MCINTYRE EVIDENTLY EXPECTED MEXICO AND BRAZIL TO VOTE AGAINST AND THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD PICK UP AT LEAST THREE MORE NEGATIVE VOTES THROUGH PRESSURE BETWEEN NOW ANNU MONDAY.

WM IN TALKING WITH INCE ABOUT THE RIO TREATY ! DREW ON THE MATERIAL IN PARA 2.B OF YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 55. (THIS MORNING'S TRINIDAD GUARDIAN PUBLISHES A LETTER FROM ME ALSO MAKING THIS POINT.) INCE, WHO IS LIKELY TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON ON 25 APRIL, SAID THAT HE WAS GOING HOME TO RE-READ THE RIO TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, HE ASKED WHAT YOUR VIEW WAS ON A

SAID THAT HE WAS GOING HOME TO RE-READ THE RIO TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. HE ASKED WHAT YOUR VIEW WAS ON A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND/OR A UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AFTER THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. I SAID I WOULD ENQUIRE: THOUGH IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES I THOUGHT THAT PEACE WAS MAINTAINED IN THE ISLANDS BY TWO OR THREE POLICEMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION CARRIED ON WITH THE HELP OF A HANDFUL OF EXPATRIATE ADMINISTRATORS.

3. SINCE TRINIDAD SEEMS TO BE PLAYING A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE OAS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1372, PARA 4), AND TO BE THE ONLY COMMONWEALTH SIGNATORY OF THE RIO TREATY, I HOPE I MAY BE AUTHORISED TO GIVE INCE SOME IDEA OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE INTERIM SITUATION AFTER AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

LANE

NNNN

JEHO 5:2

188 PER 2011

DAL C TLEASS

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL UK EYES A

Rime Mailer Copy No 2 of 5 copies

No. Pyra instructed File. 6. Foreign and Commonwealth Office

White to send the letter just London SWIA 2AH

below he left by wheelingte. He was not aware of the decina when he sow you at 8. 30 the morning.

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO A.T. C. 4.

22 April 1982

My dear Robert,

The is to be discussed forther.

My.

p.a.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen a copy of your letter of 21 April to David Omand about the proposal by CDS to take an SSN outside the MEZ. He has asked me to say that he was not consulted about this after yesterday morning's meeting of OD(SA), and he does not agree. In effect, as Mr Pym understands it, this proposal increases the risk that an Argentine submarine may be engaged and sunk when it is neither in the MEZ itself nor in the direct path between the British task force and the Falkland Islands (both of which contingencies are of course covered by existing rules of engagement). Needless to say this risk assumes particular relevance in the light of Mr Pym's current visit to Washington. I assume there can be no question of the SSN leaving the MEZ on such a manoeuvre while the visit is in progress. The option of an attack on the Argentine naval force outside the MEZ and in its current patrol area would be a major policy decision which has not yet been considered by Ministers. There was no suggestion at the briefing this morning on SSN operations outside the MEZ either that a decision had been taken or that one was necessary in the near future. The impression left was that this was merely an option for future consideration.

Jun con

cc: A J Coles Esq NUMBER 10

> D Omand Esq MOD



o di

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 April 1982

Falkland Islands: US Assistance

The Prime Minister has seen Washington's unnumbered telegram of 20 April describing a conversation with Senator John Tower about the help which the United Kingdom would require from the United States if Haig's negotiations failed.

With reference to the last sentence, Mrs. Thatcher has commented that she too would be grateful for early consideration of what our attitude on this matter should be. Perhaps you could let me know your thinking as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A.J. COLES

David Omand, Esq., Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

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REPETITION ONLY

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TO MODUK

BT

S E C R E T UK EYES ALPHA

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WASDO 8 FOR SECCOS FROM HBDS

OP CORPORATE

1. ON MON 19 APR WITH MINISTER, NAVAL AND AIR ATTACHES I MET SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. AT THE END OF A PRIVATE DISCUSSION ON THE FALKLAND SITUATION SEN TOWER AFFIRMED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR UK AND HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS SHARED BY THE MAJORITY OF CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING THAT IF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS FAILED WHAT HELP UK WOULD WANT FROM US. I GAVE INTELLIGENCE AND AIR SUPPORT AS WHAT I TAKE TO BE YOUR FIRST PRIORITIES.

2. ALTHOUGH UNPREPARED BY THIS INQUIRY WE MUST EXPECT SIMILAR QUESTIONS FROM OUR US COLLEAGUES IF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES FAIL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION OF WHAT OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE.

BT.

NNNN

| Reference | | | , | | | | | | | | | | ١ | . 9 | |
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Brine Mineste

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP, 0700, 22 APRIL

1- a. 222

Secretary of State's Visit to Washington

- 1. Washington have now provided a full programme for Mr Pym's visit from arrival at 1000 hours, 22 April, to departure at 1945, 23 April. It includes a slot for a possible call on President Reagan as well as meetings with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Haig, Judge Clark, Commonwealth and EC Ambassadors and various press briefings and interviews. Washington have reported on their talks with Mr Haig (since his return to Washington) and Mr Eagleburger. There is general agreement on the format and modalities of the visit and the need to restrain press comment on military matters.
- 2. Senator Moynihan has introduced a resolution calling on the President to impose a trade embargo against Argentina if SCR 502 is not implemented.

UN, OAS AND NAM

- 3. UKMIS New York have commented on proposals for the Secretary of State's visit and described the vote in the OAS as the first setback for us since the crisis began. There are conflicting reports on the likely attendance at and outcome of the OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting on 26 April, but agreement that it would constitute a major defeat for us in UN terms and jeopardise our Third World support if, as appears probable, the Argentines gained a two-thirds majority in favour of economic or other measures against us.
- 4. The Argentines are also pressing hard for an early communiqué by the NAM Coordinating Bureau.

US Press

5. While noting the stength of Latin American support for Argentina as evidenced by the OAS vote and quoting US officials' hopes that Mr Pym's visit will permit further attempts to promote a peaceful solution, there is much discussion of the possibilities now open to us to initiate military action.

USSR

6. Moscow have suggested that one of the aims of the Salyut 7 satellite, launched on 19 April, may be to monitor naval movements in the South Atlantic.

Argentina

7. Noticias Argentinas has reported that Galtieri will visit the Falklands ('archipelago') today. Costa Mendez has denied talking to London or Washington by telephone about the crisis, but will leave Buenos Aires for Washington on Saturday. Military sources have confirmed, without comment, that an Argentine Air Force plane was intercepted over-flying close to the British fleet.

/Chile/Argentina

Reference

Chile/Argentina

8. Santiago report that the Pope is summoning Chilean and Argentine Ambassadors today to urge their Governments to reach a definitive solution to the Beagle dispute by 26/27 April. Mr Heath will be sending an analysis of the implications for us of this development.

Brazil

9. Admiral Aratanha has assured HM Ambassador that no Brazilian ships or aircraft would operate beyond Brazilian territorial waters, implying that both navy and air force would steer clear of possible conflict.

Australia

10. Canberra has reported an inclination on behalf of the Australian Government to send their Ambassador back to Buenos Aires, without publicity (they hope). They claim that this could increase rather than decrease the pressure they can exert on the Argentines in support of our policies.

Evacuation

- 11. BISBA quote an evacuee as claiming that the Islanders feel beleaguered, disappointed at the absence of any offer of financial assistance for evacuation from HMG and worried about being caught in crossfire or held as hostages. 'The majority want out for a temporary period.' The report also paints a sorry picture of the morale of young Argentine conscripts but indicates considerable and sinister military activities.
- 12. The further group of 30 evacuees (mainly ODA personnel) are due to arrive at Gatwick from Rio (BR 666) at 1555 this afternoon.

J Illman Emergency Unit

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- 3 -

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(29)

he hved

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(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

. . DESKBY

OO NEW YORK

... DESKBY 221400Z

GRS 240 CONFIDENTIAL FM DACCA 221045Z APR TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 OF 22 APRIL 1982. AND TO IMMEDIATE NEW YORK,

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 177.

FALKLANDS: NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) .

- 1. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR UN AFFAIRS FF BANGLADESH FOREIGN MINISTRY HC TOLD ME THAT IN RESPONSE TO MY APPROACH BASED ON YOUR TELEGRAM 145 TO ACCRA, BANGLADESH HAS JOINED NAM WORKING GROUP ON ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEIR MISSION HAS BEETNINSTRUCTED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH MISSION AND TO DO WHAT THEY CAN, CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES OF NAM TO WHICH BANGLADESH HAS SUBSCRIBED, TO WORK FOR MORE BALANCED OUTCOME ON LINES WE WOULD PREFER.
- 2. OSMANI SAID THEY HAD ALREADY ARGUED THAT DRAFT IN UKMIS

2. OSMANI SAID THEY HAD ALREADY ARGUED THAT DRAFT IN UKMIS
TELEGRAM 487 TO FCO WAS UNBALANCED. ARGENTINA HAD HAD TO WITHDRA'
IT. CURRENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNED A MORE BALANCED DRAFT AND IN
PARTICULAR A PARAGRAPH CONTAINING REFERENCE TO SCR 502.

BANGLADESH MISSION WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW FROM UKMIS HOW THEY
COULD BEST NEGOTIATE IN LIGHT OF LOCAL SITUATION.

3. OSMANI EMPHASISED THAT APART FROM GENERAL PRINCIPLES
BANGLADESH HAD NO DIRECT INTEREST IN THE FALKLANDS AND THEIR
SOLE PURPOSE WAS TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. HE
COULD NOT OF COURSE SAY HOW SUCCESSFUL THEY WOULD BE.

MILLS

NNN

CO SEA YORK SERVICE COOK SERVICE THINKS COOK

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F0% 131/88

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Primes Ministés Anhylluk 22/4 Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH 22 April, 1982 Dear John, Falkland Islands: Islanders' Savings and Falkland Islands Government Reserves I understand that the Prime Minister remains interested in the savings of the Falkland Islanders. She may like to see a detailed note on the position which has been agreed with the Governor and with the Crown Agents. This shows that, apart from the capital held in Port Stanley by the Government Savings Bank to meet current requirements, the bulk of Islander savings - and also the Falkland Islands Government reserves - are held in London. Private Secretary A J Coles Esq Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street



Falkland Islands: Islanders' Savings and Falkland Islands Government Reserves

Private Savings

- 1. The savings of Falkland Islanders are either deposited with the Falkland Islands Government Savings Bank or privately invested overseas, notably in the UK.
- 2. According to the latest figures, private deposits with the Government Savings Bank (GSB) amount to approximately £3,600,000. Islanders receive 5 per cent interest tax free on deposits and the majority of Islanders hold accounts with the GSB. Apart from the small amount of capital needed by the GSB for current requirements in Port Stanley, £275,000 is on loan to the Falkland Islands Government (at 9% interest over 10 years); and the balance of Savings Bank funds (at present £3,289,000) is held in gilt-edged securities invested in London by the Crown Agents.
- 3. No figures are available for Falkland Islanders' private investments overseas.

Falkland Islands Government reserves

- 4. The official reserves of the Falkland Islands Government are administered by the Crown Agents in the UK. As at 31 March, the investment funds held by the Crown Agents on behalf of the Falkland Islands Government amounted to £1,533,957. In addition, £422,00 is maintained in a current account for the Falkland Islands Government (as well as current accounts for the Falkland Islands Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory).
- 5. A statement provided by the Crown Agents is attached.

STATEMENT

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Investment funds held (31 March)

£4.8m

| Note Security Fund | £351,000 |
|---|---|
| Old Age Pensioners Equalisation Fund | £975,000 |
| Small Reserve Fund (held | £2,957 against general expenditure) |
| Savings Bank (only) | £3,289,000 |
| Development Fund | £177,000 |
| UK Loan 1971 Sinking Fund (repayable 1996) | £28,000 |

Balances held in current account

| Falkland | Islands | main account | £422,000 |
|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| Falkland | Islands | Dependencies account | £598,000 |
| British | Antarctio | Territory account | £235,000 |





COPIED TO:

FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 April, 1982

Hear In Needham

Thank you for calling on 15 April to give me an account of your contacts with the Falkland Islands over the past few days. This was a great help to me in keeping abreast of developments there. I am returning to you the telex messages which you showed me. We are, of course, treating them in strict confidence.

You suggested that you might pass messages back to your employees and their dependants on the Islands about evacuation. This must be a matter for you and your company. We have noted that a large number of Islanders who normally live in Port Stanley have been permitted to leave for the countryside ('the camp') where they will presumably be safer in the event of any hostilities. There is conflicting evidence about how many of the Islanders wish to leave now and it seems no general pattern has yet emerged. Indeed, it is likely to remain essentially a personal decision for individuals. There is no machinery through which the Islanders can express their collective views as long as the Islands remain under Argentine occupation. We remain doubtful in any case whether the Argentine authorities would themselves permit any general evacuation of the Islands by the British inhabitants.

However, I do feel strongly that anyone who wishes to leave should not be prevented from doing so by financial circumstances. We have therefore given some thought to this aspect of the problem. At present we understand that most of those who have left have been deported by the Argentine authorities without charge; nor do we

/ anticipate

5W.



anticipate that there would be problems for Islanders if required to pay for their passage to the Argentine mainland since Falklands Islands currency still appears to be valid on the Islands. We recognise however that there are very real problems for those Islanders who reach Montevideo and wish to continue their journey back to the United Kingdom. We have therefore instructed our Embassy at Montevideo to give sympathetic help under our normal rules to any Islanders who are in this position. They may be sure that no-one will be left stranded there for want of funds.

Equally we understand that most Islanders who might return to the UK would have family, friends or employers (such as your own company) to help them in any temporary settlement problems here. As I told you, the Home Office will adopt a cooperative attitude towards immigration problems for any Falkland Islanders who do not have right of abode in the UK, and the social services would also lend full and sympathetic assistance in meeting the immediate needs of Islanders who arrive here.

I hope you will keep in touch with us about developments on the Islands and anything further you may learn about conditions there and the intentions of the Islanders. I am - as you know determined to stand by them in the difficulties, dangers and anxieties that are facing them in the days ahead.

Louis similes

(agains heliter

C.E. Needham, Esq.





Argerhads

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 April 1982

Falkland Islands: The Australian Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 21 April.

The Prime Minister agrees that a message should be sent to Mr. Fraser and would like it to be in the following terms:

"Dear Malcolm, I have just read the text of your excellent message to Ronald Reagan. I was greatly touched by it. You not only make clear the crucial nature of what is at stake but again demonstrate the staunch and generous way in which you have stood by us since the beginning of the crisis. My warmest thanks for this further act of friendship and support. With sincere good wishes. Margaret Thatcher."

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE

Falkland Islands Company

The Prime Minister has noted your minute of 21 April on the above subject.

The letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Needham has been issued without amendment.

JOHN COLES

22 April 1982

SIC

DPV DALES
2) Prime Minister



BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINIAN PSYCHOLOGY

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I attach a paper on the above in the hight of our discussion yesterday morning.

I shall continue to work on the problem of Argentinian psychology & let you have additions etc when appropriate.

An Appendix, on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile - nearly a rehearsal for the present crisis _ will follow this afternoon

Glugh Thomas April 21, 1982.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINIAN PSYCHOLOGY

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April 21st, 1982 BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINIAN PSYCHOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS The following assumes: 1. that the US will prevent the USSR (including her surrogates such as Cuba) from interfering physically in the South Atlantic - should it be necessary; 2. that the NATO allies (including the US) will cover the rear of Britain and so prevent the USSR from taking advantage in Europe of the temporary withdrawal of British forces to the South Atlantic; 3. that the other countries of Latin American will not do more than give moral support, via rhetoric or minor economic help, to Argentina; and 4. that the British fleet will be within effective striking distance of the Falkland Islands within a week. CONSIDERATIONS: THE ARMY AND THE PERONISTAS The present Argentinian government is military like most governments in that country since 1930. The Army

is not monolithic. The President was, as it were, selected by the other war lords all of whom have to be consulted on all important issues of policy. Several of them would be prepared, or are hoping, to take over from President Galteri. Even within each war lord's staff there are points of view which the officer concerned neglects at his peril.

The Army has now, in this phase, been in control since 1975 when General Videla overthrew Isabel Perón. Videla gave way to General Viola, his own nominee, who was not very successful and in turn gave way to Galteri last year.

The Army considers itself a successful institution since it crushed the two main terrorist groups in something like civil war (the left-wing Peronists, the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary army who are "Maoist-Guerarists"). They did this with brutality and some of both the fascistic anti-semitism and the inhumanity of the terrorists characterised their behaviour - anyway at lower levels of command. Nevertheless the majority of Argentines are probably grateful to the Army for this victory.

Old conservative or liberal statesmen may exist as in other Latin American countries but in Argentina they have no power base though some of these people <u>have</u> come out with expressions of fear that the consequences of an attack on the Falklands <u>could</u> be to push the Argentines into the hands of the Russians.

It is impossible to say what a new Peronist
government would be like, since, like all Fascists, they
are now by nature irrational: "a church of all the
heresies", Mussolini himself described his movement. There
are right-wing Peronists who might seek to keep Argentina
in the western world; but the toughest and most ruthless
are the left - the friends of the Montoneros or the
Montoneros themselves, who, murderous and insensate
though they may be, plainly hope to use the present crisis
to return to the Argentina from which they fled - either
to Cuba or in the case of one notorious assassin-leader
Switzerland. Difficult though it may be to accept,
the Army is better than this considering the long-term
interests of the west as a whole.

The Amgentinian armed forces have not gone to war against a foreign enemy since the Paraguayan war of 1865-70. This fact, combined with both their political power and their cult of the male hero (machismo) may make them specially reckless: they cannot know from practice what modern war is, even though so many officers have been educated in U.S. military schools.

The Argentinian government is not likely to concern itself greatly about loss of life to their own forces. They have no public opinion to worry about on that score though a real military disaster would play into the hands of the Peronists. They have been living in a world of death and violence for a long time. Argentinian machismo is rather a swaggering thing. Galteri might have more chance to survive politically a military disaster too than a withdrawal of a position which he has taken up.

Most Argentinians admire the British way of life, and probably admire Britain more than they do any other country.

I find it difficult to estimate the role of Italians, who make up mow over half of the Argentinian population.

They have been prominent politically during the years of political decline. Peron's real name was Peroni, and other persons of Italian origin have included (as well as Galteri) Lonardi, Illia, Guido, Viola - Italians have been specially important in the armed forces, The first and long-serving leader of the Argentinian Communists (Codovilla) was an Italian by birth. This Italian side of the Amgentinian population must have increased their preoccupation with brava figura, may have brutalised them somewhat and may also have increased their contempt for the dignity of the state. The Italians concerned are probably mostly Neapolitan or Sicilian or Calabrian in origin. This is an exceptionally disagreeable thought since these people are traditionally dishonest, shiftless, cruel and without civic responsibility in Italy. Some of this may have been passed on.

Despite the success of the Junta against the terrorists they have in no way affected the severe intellectual moral and spiritual crisis which (in John Gunther's words) has affected Argentina since 1966.

The word 'Argentinisation' in the Spanish world at least still implies left y right terrorism.

One of the characteristics of the Argentinian army is that once in power they behave as if they are politicians: they become interested in popularity. When things were

which has brought them all to this plight. "Seldom

has Nature lavished gifts upon a people with a more

bountiful hand" Bryce concluded his chapter on Argentina.

Most Argentinians recall the history of their country which is intimately bound up with our own, in a way that we have forgotten (the importance of Trafalgar; the British failure at Buenos Aires 1806; diplomatic help to all new. Latin American republics under Canning; British investment and commerce in the railway age etc).

IV. ARGENTINA AND THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA

The Argentines have not been popular in the rest of their continent since they have been traditionally so arrogant. Their arrogance has continued even now in the days of their economic and political decline. Argentines might speak in Buenos Aires of "going to Latin America", as if Buenos Aires were Paris. Mexicans mimic Argentinians' affected accent.

8. On the other hand there is a sense of belonging to a continent even in Venezuela, and this is a tricky thing to deal with diplomatically. THE PROPOSAL My suggestions for a settlement to try and take into account the above known characteristics of the Argentinian psychology would include the following: the Argentinian forces to withdraw; but no British troops would be returned to the islands -(since the marines were there only to defend the islands against the Argentinians they would presumably not be needed). The Argentinian government could make much of that change from the status quo ante. 3. we undertake (despite the aggression - surely itself a major concession) to negotiate from scratch. 4. An Argentinian Residence in the interior could be established on on the island. This "residence" would be able to fly the Argentinian flag and would act as the quarantor of Argentinian commercial interests. The word "Residence" is chosen because it is more than a consulate (which would be unacceptable to the Argentinians as designating foreign territory) but less than a governorship. The Resident would concern himself with

11. Our people in the islands have been there since 1842 (the date the colony was founded). At that date the ancestors of many South Americans were still in Italy or Spain - so that we must look on the islanders as having as good a right to be there as any recognition of the part played by military government in preventing Marxist presence in Argentina. This is the real issue isn't it? Marxism as we all know is the real evil and Russia and her surrogates the real colonialist. (This point is intended for Reagan supporters as well as Argentinian) Here surely is the real threat to the Monroe doctrine. We understand Argentina's - and other Latin Americans' - feelings about the "continent". But frankly the Falklands cannot be regarded as part of the "continent" in the terms mentioned in the Treaty of Rio.* There are several territories (specify?) in the Americas which are open to more doubt than are the Falklands (Cayenne?). Once we begin to talk of 'imperialism' two surely some strange morals could be drawn by American Indians. Article 4 of the Treaty: "The regions to which the Treaty refers are the North and South American continents and Greenland and an area of Antartica.

12. The self determination issue really is important. In all negotiations leading to independence in the dependent territories, we have given this priority. General Assembly Resolution 1541-XV enshrines the principle (12.12.1960) as does the Civil and Political Rights Covenant (Article 1) of the Economic, Social and Crltural Rights Contract (Article 1): "all peoples have a right of self determination". Prehaps: you could harken back to the events of 1841 when the Argentinian President General Rosas offered to give up their claim to the Falklands in return for our abandonment of the debt of the 1820s contracted via Baring's. VII TIMING OF THE PROPOSAL I presume that it will be possible for the Navy on arrival in the vicinity of the Falklands, to invest the islands further by e.g. extending the blockade to affect military and civilian aircraft; and/or arranging a blockade to cover all merchant shipping. I also presume (on the evidence of press reports etc and conversation with Lord Shackleton) that a similar investment of South Georgia might be easily managed; do not know how easy a re-occupation of South Georgia J 10 . 1

e-entary efforts at the UN. For example rity Council could be asked by us to ask enational Court of Justice for an opinion case.

F FALKLANDS

to mount a landing on the Falklands

essential if this were to occur that be ensured beforehand:

however violent should be brief;

y should characterise victory; and

coposals for negotiations should be

the same time as victory - perhaps

sions than contained in Section III.

Hugh Thomas

APPENDIX I THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE After a brief period of cooperation in the 19th century in order to terminate Spanish domination in South America, Chile and Argentina became and traditionally remained rivals, despite some obvious points of similarity. Both, for example have military governments and both are overtly anti-communist. (President Videla, unlike Pinochet was always careful to condemn subversion in terms of 'nihilism' rather than 'communism'; a phenomenon explained perhaps by the desire for good relations with the USSR already manifested by the presence in Argentina in 1976 of an exhibition called The Soviet Union Today.) Certainly in November 1976 the two countries were on sufficiently good terms for Videla to visit Santiago and to announce with Pinochet a joint declaration and 16 bilateral commercial accords. These were essential to both countries. Chile's economic exchange had fallen from a peak under Popular Unity of \$500 million.* Furthermore a hundred years after the "War of the Pacific" in which Peru and Bolivia had lost vast tracts of land to Chile, the threat of war from Peru at least was a continuing threat, while the advent of the Carter administration firmly set against dictatorships underlined the need for new support from her neighbour. Argentina looked to Chile for new markets in a period in which glut of corn meant falling world prices and relished the use of a free-port in Chile to open up trade with Peru, Colombia and especially Japan. In return for her corn, Argentina was to receive minerals and gas. There was thus, in November 1976, an unusual degree of amity between Chile and Argentina. This peaceful interlude was broken in 1977 by the long awaited results of arbitration on the sovereignty of the Beagle Channel due to be announced in May. * Chile had decided earlier that month to withdraw from the Andean Pact (an economic grouping of countries to the north of Chile).

would, nowever, it was announced, continue. Meanwhile the dispute was to be frozen indefinitely, On 20 February the Argentine 5th Army went on exercises in Patagonia. On 21st Pinochet and Videla signed an agreement envisaging three stages of negotiations, to be carried out by Committees assigned to (1) promote harmony, (2) delineate maritime space and arrange cooperation over natural resources. and (3) find ways of instrumenting the agreement. Yet on 22 February Pinochet made a most provocative announcement saying that the first arbitration decision was final and could not be discussed.

Both countries now did what they could to equip themselves heavily with war material while the Argentinian Defence Minister announced his intention to restore to Argentine sovereignty the three islands occupied by Chileans. The Argentine press made much of remarks made in the 19th century by Comodore Rivadavia about alleged Argentine sovereignty of the Falklands, South Atlantic and Antartica.

Despite this sabre-rattling a joint commission was set up in August in an endeavour to come to agreement. But the Argentinian navy became increasingly hawkish and the government took up generous amounts of commercial air time for propoganda on the theme of national sovereignty and territorial right. South Argentinian cities practiced blackout and the 2nd November now set as deadline for agreement.

At this point Church leaders in both countries spoke out in joint declaration for a peaceful settlement, and senior UN officials with Kurt Waldheim joined them in a last minute effort to avert war. General Pinochet sent yet another (of several) messages to Buckingham Palace expressing thanks for the arbitration verdict.

The problem had already become the appetite for was of military men eager to fight the battles for which both countries had now prepared. Practice blackout of Buenos Aires was prepared to 24 October. Argentina was believed to have troops outnumbering those of Chile by 10 to 1. Yet the 2nd November deadline passed without agreement. In despair, sixteen intellectuals - eight from each country called for independent arbitration but candidates for thepost (declined by the King of Spain) were not easily come by. The Chilean proposal to ask the Pope was rejected by the Argentinians who the next day agreed toaccept a Papal delegate and Cardinal



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FM MONTEVIDEO 211334Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 21 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: URUGUAYAN PUBLIC OPINION

1. IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CRISIS THE URUGUAYANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL STANCE, SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CLAIM BUT NEVERTHELESS REGRETTED ARGENTINA'S USE OF FORCE TO IMPLEMENT IT. FURTHERMORE THEY WERE ALARMED BY THE CONTENT AND DELIVERY OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S SPEECH AT THE PLAZO DE MAYO DEMONSTRATION

ON 10 APRIL.

(A) THE APPROACH OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE FEAR OF HOSTILITIES

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC,

RB) THE FEELING THAT SOME KIND OF JOINT ADMINISTRATION OF THE

FALKLANDS MIGHT PROVIDE A REASONABLE SOLUTION. URUGUAY'S LONG
STANDING DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA OVER THE ISLAND OF MARTIN GARCIA

m

STANDING DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA OVER THE ISLAND OF MARTIN GARCIA WAS SETTLED IN THE TREATY OF THE RIVER PLATE ON THE BASIS OF SHARED RIGHTS OVER THE ISLAND. (C) REPORTS THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES ARE DIVIDED ABOUT THE FUTURE AND IN THE MAIN DO NOT WANT TO BE THE CAUSE OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES. (D) INCREASING REALISATION BY THE PUBLIC OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR URUGUAY OF THE RIO TREATY. (E) THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH COULD AFFECT URUGUAY'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN WHAT IS ALREADY A VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION. WE HAVE HEARD WORRIES ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO CERTAIN JOINT PROJECTS EG SALTO GRANDE IF ARGENTINA CANNOT SERVICE THE LOANS OF HER SHARE OF SUCH PROJECTS. 3. THESE ARE IMPORTANT INDICATIONS COMING FROM A LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY WHICH OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE CLOSEST TO US. HUTCHINSON NNNN SENT/RECD AT 211407Z SF/

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS

PS/MR ONSLOW PS/MR RIFKIND PS/PUS MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

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FM BONN 210945Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 353 OF 21 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. AT THE END OF A CONVERSATION ON NATO MATTERS WITH GOODALL YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 351) DROEGE (UNDER-SECRETARY FOR NATO AND WESTERN EUROPEAN MATTERS IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT) REFERRED TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH LIMMER WAS IN CHARGE OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE SUBJECT HE (DROEGE) ALSO HAD A DIRECT INTEREST IN IT AND HIS SUBORDINATE, SCHENK (RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE UK) WAS A MEMBER. BEARING IN MIND

(29)

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H.M.TSY

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

DOVANCE CON

THE INDICATIONS WE HAVE GLEANED OF SYMPATHY FOR THE ARGENTINE

FOSITION ON THE PART OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL WORKING

GROUP, GOODALL TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY (AFTER PAYING WARM TRIBUTE TO THE

FRG'S SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH POSITION) OF SAYING THAT WE ASSUMED

THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE LOBBYING HARD TO ERODE THE SOLIDARITY OF

THE COMMUNITY'S BACKING FOR THE UK: IT WAS CLEARLY OF GREAT IMPORT—

ANCE THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO BELIEVE THAT THIS

SUPPORT MIGHT BE MORE PRESENTATIONAL THAN REAL OR THAT THE ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS WERE NOT SERIOUSLY INTENDED TO BITE. ANY STRAWS IN THE

WIND OF THIS KIND WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD PICK UP (OR MIGHT FANCY

THEY HAD PICKED UP) WOULD ONLY STRNGTHEN THE IR RELUCTANCE TO BITE

THE BULLET AND ACCEPT A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. THE GERMANS NO DOUBT

HAD THIS CONSIDERATION MUCH IN MIND.

2. DROEGE SAID THAT THIS POINT WAS WELL TAKEN. GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE UK HAD INDEED BEEN INSTINCTIVE AND COMPLETE. IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE ERODED. NEVERTHELESS, GENSCHER IN PARTICULAR HAD STUCK HIS NECK OUT A VERY LONG WAY OVER THE FALKLANDS (EG IN HIS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION) AND THE GERMAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAKE WAS VERY HIGH. WE SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE WAS SOME FEELING OF DISAPPOINTMENT ON GENSCHER'S PART THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE, IN RETURN, TO TAKE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MORE INTO OUR CONFIDENCE ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS AS TO THE HANDLING OF THE CRISIS. THE GERMANS WERE NOT ASKING FOR INFORMATION ABOUT OUR MILITARY PLANNING. BUT THEY FELT IN THE DARK ABOUT THE HAIG NEGOTIATIONS, OUR ATTITUDE TO THEM AND WHAT SORT OF SETTLEMENT MIGHT EMERGE. GOODALL POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IN ORDER TO MEET THESE CONCERNS THAT YOU HAD ARRANGED TO BRIEF GENSCHER AND YOUR OTHER COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY. BUT IN A RAPIDLY MOVING SITUATION, IN WHICH BRITISH MINISTERS WERE CONTINUALLY MEETING TO CONSIDER EVOLVING PROPOSALS AS THEY EMERGED FROM HAIG'S MEDIATION EFFORTS, IT WAS CLEARLY VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP EVEN OUR CLOSEST ALLIES AU COURANT WITH BRITISH THINKING. DROEGE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE GERMANS WOULD WELCOME SOME CONTINUING BILATERAL CHANNEL OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR

WELCOME SOME CONTINUING BILATERAL CHANNEL OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR VIEWS AND INTENTIONS, EITHER THROUGH THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN LONDON OR HERE.

3. IN UNDERTAKING TO REPORT THIS CONCERN. GOODALL REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A STEADFASTLY FIRM FRONT AGAINST ARGENTINA. 4. COMMENT. MY DA REPORTS SIMILAR INDICATIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT ON THE PART OF HIS CONTACTS IN THE GERMAN MOD ABOUT THE LITTLE INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE THEM ON SERVICE CHANNELS ABOUT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. UNLESS WE CAN FIND SOME WAY OF MAKING THE GERMANS FEEL THAT WE ARE TRYING OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM FULLY IN THE PICTURE THAN HITHERTO, THERE IS A RISK THAT THEIR DISAPPOINT-MENT MAY START TO COLOUR THE VIEW OF SOME OFFICIALS OF THE CORRECT-NESS OF THE BRITISH POSITION. I AM SURE THAT SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER WILL REMAIN FIRM IN THEIR SUPPORT, THE FEELING IS THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UK TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS BECOMING DISCERNIBLE IN GERMAN MEDIA. 5. I REALISE THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE THE GERMANS INTO OUR CONFIDENCE ON THE DETAIL OF THESE VERY DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS. I WONDER HOWEVER WHETHER THE PURPOSE MIGHT NOT BE ACHIEVED BY ARRANGING A MORE OR LESS REGULAR BRIEFING OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON EVEN THOUGH WE COULD NOT TELL HIM MUCH MORE THAN WE CAN TELL THE PRESS: IT WOULD SHOW THAT WE WERE TRYING.

TAYLOR

NNNN

(29)

PS MR ONSLOW
PS MR RIFKIND
PS PUS
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FM WASHINGTON 211636Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1378 OF 21 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF MISSION

UKMIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO,

BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA,

MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN AND

MONTEVIDEO

FALKLANDS

- 1. IN CONVERSATION WITH HAIG AND EAGLEBURGER TODAY ABOUT THE RIO TREATY, I DISCOVERED THAT THEY WERE VERY DISCONCERTED BY YESTER-DAY'S VOTE AND VERY CONCERNED ABOUT HOW THE VOTING WOULD GO IN THE MINISTERIAL MEETING NEXT MONDAY. EAGLEBURGER INTERJECTED THAT THIS WAS BY NO MEANS A HIGH US PRIORITY, NEVERTHELESS IT WAS A BIT OF A NUISANCE.
- 2. ACCORDING TO MIDDENDORF'S CALCULATIONS, WHEN THE VOTING CAME AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING THE ONLY CERTAIN NEGATIVE VOTES WOULD BE THOSE OF THE US, TRINIDAD AND COLOMBIA. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT MEXICO AND CHILE WOULD VOTE AGAINST, BUT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN.
- 3. I ASKED ABOUT COSTA RICA AND EL SALVADOR BUT EAGLEBURGER WAS EMPHATIC THAT THE AMERICAN CALCULATION WAS THAT THEY WOULD VOTE WITH THE ARCENTINIANS INDEED THE US VIEW AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE

EMPHATIC THAT THE AMERICAN CALCULATION WAS THAT THEY WOULD VOTE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. INDEED THE US VIEW AT THE MOMENT WAS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD CERTAINLY GET THEIR TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR ACTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY. BETWEEN NOW AND MONDAY HOWEVER THE US WOULD BE WORKING HARD IN ALL AMERICAN CAPITALS.

HENDERSON

[SENT TO ER MODUE CINC, C.M.]

NNNN

Reposition to Saltin Dominion ASUNCION referred for departmental decision.

(29)

IMMEDIATE"

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER

H.M.TSY

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 210930Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 21 APRIL 1982

INFO MADRID, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

TO BERNS

YOUR TELNO 53: FALKLANDS.

- 1. DURING CALL ON 20 APRIL ON PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER I SPOKE ON LINES OF PARAGRAPH 2(A) TO (H) OF TUR AND LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER.
- 2. GONCALVES PEREIRA SAID HE COULD CONFIRM THAT NO ARMS DEALS WITH ARGENTINA WERE IN HAND OR WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. PORTUGUESE TRADE WITH ARGENTINA WAS VERY SMALL, HE THOUGHT AROUND US DOLLARS 7 MILLION IN TOTAL. GASTON THORN HAD POINTED TO EUROPEAN TRADE EMBARGO DURING HIS VISIT TO LISBON LAST WEEK AND HAD ASKED ABOUT PORTUGUESE INTENTIONS.
- 3. I SAID WE CERTAINLY HOPED THAT EVEN THOUGH TRADE WAS SMALL PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER MAKING SOME ANNOUNCEMENT.

 NORWAY HAD JUST ANNOUNCED MEASURES. AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON ARMS SALES WOULD BE HELPFUL. I HANDED OVER LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY

NORWAY HAD JUST ANNOUNCED MEASURES. AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON ARMS SALES WOULD BE HELPFUL. I HANDED OVER LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES BASED ON YOUR TELNO GUIDANCE 59.

4. GONCALVES PEREIRA SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER POSSIBLE PORTUGUESE ACTION BUT SCOPE WAS VERY LIMITED AND 50,000 PORTUGUESE COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA HAD BEEN PROTESTING ANXIOUSLY TO LISBON. HE NOTED THAT COMMUNITY TRADE EMBARGO WOULD EXPIRE ANYWAY ON 17 MAY.

I SAID IT WAS RENEWABLE AND WOULD DOUBTLESS BE CONSIDERED AGAIN IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. I DELIVERED YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO GONCALVES PEREIRA (YOUR TELNO 62) TOGETHER WITH MESSAGE CONCERNING COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING. GONCALVES PEREIRA SAID THAT HE WOULD PARTICULARLY HAVE WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO MEET YOU IN LUXEMBOURG

- (YOUR TELNO 62) TOGETHER WITH MESSAGE TO GONCALVES PEREIRA (YOUR TELNO 62) TOGETHER WITH MESSAGE CONCERNING COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING. GONCALVES PEREIRA SAID THAT HE WOULD PARTICULARLY HAVE WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO MEET YOU IN LUXEMBOURG ON 28/29 APRIL BUT WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENT EANES ON STATE VISIT TO BELGIUM. HIS DEPUTY, DR LEONARDO MATHIAS, WOULD GO TO LUXEMBOURG IN HIS PLACE. GONCALVES PEREIRA ASKED IF I COULD KEEP HIM AS CLOSELY IN TOUCH AS POSSIBLE WITH DEVELOPEMENTS ON THE FALKLANDS.
- 6. MINISTER NOTED THAT CLEARANCE HAD NOW BEEN GIVEN FOR 1100 FLIGHTS THROUGH PORTUGUESE AIR SPACE FOR AIRCARFT EN ROUTE TO ASCENSION ISLAND. HE AGREED THAT OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE COULD CONTINUE TO BE VIA SERVICE CHANNELS, BUT ASKED THAT COPY OF OUR NOTES BE SENT IN FUTURE TO MFA. IF WE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ASK FOR LANDING OF REFUELLING AIRCARFT OR SHIPS, E.G. AT LAJES IN AZORES, MINISTER ASKED THAT I SHOULD WRITE TO HIM. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE GIVEN BUT AT POLITICAL RATHER THAN SERVICE LEVEL.
- 7. GONCALVES PEREIRA AGREED THAT IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE AND THAT BRITAIN WAS ACTING IN SELF-DEFENCE. WE WOULD HAVE PORTUGUESE SUPPORT. HOWEVER I DETECTED A SHADE OF CAUTION.

 MINISTER SAID HE HOPED ROYAL NAVY WOULD STEAM SLOWLY TO ALLOW AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE FOR NEGOTIATION. SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE ADDED HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK.

 I BELIEVE WE MAY NOT GET MORE IN THE WAY OF STATEMENTS E.G.
 ON ARMS AND ECONOMIC MEASURES, FROM THE PORTUGUESE UNTIL AMERICAN POSITION BECOMES CLEARER.
- 8. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MATHIAS HAS PROVED A STAUNCH FRIEND OVER FALKLANDS. I HOPE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO HAVE A WORD WITH HIM IN THE MARGINS OF LUXEMBOURG MEETINGS 28/29 APRIL.

8. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MATHIAS HAS PROVED A STAUNCH FRIEND OVER FALKLANDS. I HOPE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO HAVE A WORD WITH HIM IN THE MARGINS OF LUXEMBOURG MEETINGS 28/29 APRIL.

BYATT

NNNN.

SENT/RECD AT 21/1118Z PJF/JGV

GR 300 CONFIDENTIAL FM SINGAPORE 210240Z APR 82 TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 90 OF 21 APRIL INFO ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, BANGKOK, JAKARTA AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

- 1. LEE KUAN YEW WAS IN A RELAXED, UNBUTTONED MOOD WHEN I DINED WITH HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET (GOH KENG SWEE AND DHANABALAN AMONG THEM) ON SUNDAY, 18 APRIL. HE RANGED WIDELY AND TRENCHANTLY OVER WORLD ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES. PAST AND PRESENT.
- 2. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK HIM FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT (MY TELNO 81). HE REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE DONE LESS : THE ''GILBERT AND SULLIVAN ELEMENTS'' IN THE CRISIS SHOULD NOT CONCEAL THE SERIOUS ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE AT STAKE, BUT THERE WAS NOT, HE FEARED, MUCH MORE THAT HE COULD DO TO HELP. HE WISHED US WELL. AND HOPED OUR ENDEAVOURS WOULD SUCCEED IN AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE. OTHER ANXIETIES AND DANGERS WOULD ARISE IF SO MUCH OF OUR NAVAL POWER WERE DISPERSED FOR ANY EXTENDED PERIOD TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.
- 3. I SAID THAT WE WERE GREATLY ENCOURAGED IN OUR HOPES FOR A QUICK AND PEACEFUL OUTCOME BY THE WIDERANGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WE HAD RECEIVED, AND I RECALLED THAT I HAD SPOKEN TO DHANABALAN TO URGE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT ARMS SALES AND FINANCIAL CREDITS (MY TELNO 82). LEE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT WENT ON TO ANATHEMATISE THE ARGENTINIANS (AND INDEED, MOST OTHER LATIN AMERICANS): A DEBASED HISPANO-CATHOLIC CULTURE, COMBINED WITH ITALIAN IMMIGRATION, HAD PRODUCED A THOROUGHLY NASTY MIX, WITHOUT ANY OF THE SENSE OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BE FOUND IN THE PROTESTANT ETHIC. (HE SWEPT THE PHILIPPINES UP IN THIS, SPEAKING SCATHINGLY ABOUT MARCOS AND FORECASTING A RIGHT-WING MILITARY REGIME AS THE MOST LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO HIM.)
- 4. HIS HEART IS CLEARLY WITH US, BUT HE WILL I THINK HOPE NOT TO HAVE TO MAKE ANY MORE PUBLIC STATEMENTS JUST YET: THE ONE HE HAS ALREADY MADE HAS PUT HIM OUT IN FRONT OF HIS ASEAN PARTNERS WHOSE PUBLIC REACTIONS HE DISMISSED AS "WISHY-WASHY".
- 5. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE CITY OF LONDON WERE ABLE TO CONFER THE FREEDOM ON HIM ON 15 JULY, AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER DURING THAT CONFIDENTIAL

6. PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION CONTINUE TO GIVE GOOD COVERAGE ON THE CRISIS AND, ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER EDITORIAL COMMENT SINCE THAT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 81, SYNDICATED FEATURES AND LOCAL FEATURE WRITERS HAVE GIVEN FAR MORE EMPHASIS TO OUR POINT OF VIEW THAN TO THE ARGENTINIAN. THE ARGENTINE CONSUL-GENERAL HAS CIRCULATED A STATEMENT ON THE ARGENTINE POSITION IN PRETTY STANDARD FORM BUT THIS HAS RECEIVED NO MEDIA ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

HENNINGS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

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Prime Minales

A & C. 2,6.

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SITREP BY FCO: 0730 21 APRIL: OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

1. Haig Initiative

President Reagan confirmed at a Press Conference following his meeting with Haig yesterday that the Secretary of State would travel to Washington on Thursday, 22 April with HMG's response to the Argentine proposals. US Press coverage, reflecting official briefing, had indicated that the Argentine proposals were unlikely to be acceptable to HMG. The US media remain consistently pro-British and there has been helpful activity in Congress and the Senate (Washington tel no. 1368).

2. Washington (tel no. 1370) have made various suggestions for the Secretary of State's programme.

3. Latin America: OAS

Washington have sent their report (tel nos. 1372-4) of the OAS Permanent Council meeting on 20 April which approved by 18 votes to 3 abstentions (US, Colombia, Trinidad/Tobago) a draft Argentine resolution calling for a consultative meeting of Rio Treaty member States on Monday, 26 April.

4. Brasilia tel no. 114 reports on likely Brazilian attitudes; they are unlikely actively to support Argentina in the 26 April meeting. The Peruvian representative at the OAS has been instructed to sound out opinion on Peru's truce proposals (Lima tel no. 103), Caracas (tel no. 114) report further hardening in Venezuelan attitudes.

5. Latin America: Economic Retaliation

There has been a series of telegrams indicating that various Latin American countries (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Uruguay) are unlikely to be anxious to take retaliatory economic action against the EC nor significantly to relieve the effects of EC action on the Argentine economy.

6. Commonwealth

The Canadians have assured us (Ottawa tel no. 227) that their press line on the return of the Canadian Ambassador to BA will make it clear that Canada has not changed their position. The Canadian Ambassador will take a message from Trudeau to Galtieri urging compliance with SCR 502.

7. Evacuation

A further group of 30 Falkland Islanders have left Port Stanley for Montevideo en route for the UK.

A E Huckle

Emergency Unit

0730

FALKLAND ISLANDS

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- Sir B Tovey

Prine Minutes

To note.

Ref. A08183

MR. COLES

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Falkland Islands Company

With his letter to you of 16th April, John Holmes enclosed a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Needham, Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company, in response to suggestions about evacuation which Mr. Needham had put to the Prime Minister on 15th April.

- 2. The evacuation of Islanders who wish to leave has been considered further both within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and interdepartmentally since the weekend. I discussed it yesterday at a meeting I had with Sir Antony Acland, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Michael Palliser, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Sir Brian Cubbon.
- 3. The Government face a dilemma in dealing with Mr. Needham's proposals. If steps were taken on evacuation which positively encouraged large numbers of the Islanders to leave (even if their departure was described as temporary for the period of the emergency), there would be a risk of undermining the Government's position that the wishes of the Islanders on the future of the Falklands should be paramount. The Argentines, though for military reasons they might refuse evacuation so as to retain as many hostages as possible, might equally try for political reasons to encourage the Islanders' departure and attempt to replace those who had left with Argentine nationals, thereby altering the complexion of the Islands' population. On the other hand, if the Government failed to respond to Islanders' requests for assistance over evacuation and hostilities were to break out, there would be a risk of Islanders suffering casualties. In those circumstances, it might be difficult for the Government to defend itself against claims that it had not responded positively to earlier requests for assistance with evacuation.
- 4. Mr. Needham informed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office late on Monday that, after some days of difficulties with communications, he had again succeeded in getting in touch with his Manager on the spot. A party of 30 left

the Islands on 20th April and has arrived in Montevideo. Many of these are contract personnel rather than Islanders. The Argentines were apparently content that these people should leave. But Mr. Needham also said that his Manager's personal impression was that at the present moment there would not be a large response to suggestions that the Islanders might want to leave. Most people would for the time being want to wait and see what happened before making up their minds. The Falklands Islands Company Manager also confirmed reports which have reached the Ministry of Defence that the majority of Islanders had left the Port Stanley area for outlying settlements ("the Camp").

- 5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are keeping in touch with Mr. Needham. But the information conveyed by him probably reduces the need for the Government to take any early positive action over evacuation. A point could be reached (perhaps quite suddenly) when the Islanders' views might change and there might be a movement in favour of early evacuation. But we have not yet reached that point, and it would be a mistake for us at the moment to encourage departures. The British task force could not guarantee the safe evacuation of Islanders in the face of Argentine opposition. Any planning for evacuation would have to be based on the assumption that the Argentines would allow the Islanders to leave and to use Argentine (or other civilian) transport available locally.
- 6. The sense of my meeting was that, in the light of this position, the Government should make it clear that, if any Islanders arrive at Montevideo wanting to travel to the United Kingdom, and are in need of help from the Government, they should get it in accordance with the normal provisions for assisting distressed British subjects but with the rules being interpreted as humanely and flexibly as possible: i. e. up to now we have required those leaving the Islands via Montevideo for the United Kingdom to sign undertakings to repay to Her Majesty's Government the cost of fares, except for those deported by the Argentines. The Home Office said that there would be no problem with immigration procedures once they arrived. Provided that the numbers remain small, absorption on a temporary basis in Britain is unlikely to create difficulties, since most Islanders can be expected to stay with relations. But the Home Office

are making contingency plans for the reception of large numbers of Islanders, should this be necessary. These plans will involve securing the assistance of the Women's Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) for immediate help at the point of arrival, and long-term aid for the minority who may need it, possibly under the "umbrella" of a co-ordinating committee. If evacuation of a large number of Islanders were to become necessary, there is no doubt that the Government would have to make financial provision to pay the air fares to Britain of those arriving in Montevideo and also their return fares to the Falkland Islands in due course. All this is consistent with the statement by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the House on 19th April that sympathetic consideration would be given to the question of temporary evacuation of those Islanders who wish to leave.

the land and appending served.

- 7. I do not know whether the Prime Minister has substantially changed the letter to Mr. Needham enclosed with John Holmes's letter, but there is nothing in the draft which I have seen which needs amendment in the light of the above.
- 8. I do not see any need for this matter to be discussed in OD(SA) for the time being. The Departments are getting on with their contingency arrangements. If these have to be implemented in due course, we should then have to consider whether Ministerial discussion was necessary.
- 9. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General.

MA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

21st April, 1982

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
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DEYOU

FM FCO 210930Z APR 32

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 779 OF 21 APRIL
YOUR TELNO 1360



1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE HAIG ALONE. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS MORNING (APRIL 21) AND TELL HIM BEGIN UNDERLINING STRICTLY FOR HIS OWN INFORMATION CEASE UNDERLINING THAT A FIRM DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO RECOVER SOUTH GEORGIA SHORTLY. THE AIM WILL BE TO ACHIEVE THIS WITH A MINIMUM OF CASUALTIES, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THIS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED.

2. YOU COULD ADD THAT YOU ASSUME THAT HAIG WILL CONSIDER THIS WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS ADVICE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES.

PYM

PERMUN

TOP SECRET DEYOU

SECRET GR 120 DEDIP SECRET FM WASHINGTON 211641Z APR 82 TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELEGRAM NO 1379 OF 21 APRIL FALKLANDS 1. DURING MY TALK WITH HAIG TODAY I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD ANY IMPRESSION OF WHAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE PICKING UP ABOUT OUR NAVAL MOVEMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE GETTING LESS THAN WE BELIEVED. 2. SPECIFICALLY I PRESSED HIM ON WHETHER HE DID NOT BELIEVE, AS THE PENTAGON HAS INDICATED PUBLICLY, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PASSING INTELLIGENCE ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HAIG SHOOK HIS HEAD. 3 I AM NOT SURE THAT A GREAT DEAL SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THIS. IT A FEW DAYS AGO (MY TELEGRAM NO 1333).

SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT CLARK GAVE ME THE OPPOSITE IMPRESSION

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 211627Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1377 OF 21 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FALKLANDS

- 1. IN MY TALK WITH HAIG TODAY HE DESCRIBED THE UTTER IRRATIONALITY AND CHAOTIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THE FIGURE OF 50 PEOPLE WHO SEEMED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO BE INVOLVED IN DECISIONS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD REACH SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT ON ONE OF THE POINTS AT ISSUE WITH ONE OR SEVERAL OF THE JUNTA ONLY TO HAVE A CORPS COMMANDER COME INTO THE ROOM AN HOUR OR SO LATER TO STATE THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE.
- 2. COSTA MENDEZ WAS CERTAINLY WITHOUT INFLUENCE. AS FOR GALTIER!, HE WAS NOT ONLY AN ALCOHOLIC BUT HE WAS INCAPABLE OF RATIONAL THOUGHT. HAIG WAS QUITE CONVINCED THAT WHATEVER HAPPENED HE WOULD NOT LAST LONG AT THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT.
- 3. I SAID THAT THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE A CENTRAL POINT AT ISSUE.
 WAS THERE MUCH POINT IN CONTINUING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PRESENT
 ARGENTINE LEADERS? WERE THEY NOT COMMITTED TO A MILITARY SOLUTION
 AND A MILITARY SUCCESS? HAIG SAID THAT HE CERTAINLY HAD GRAVE
 DOUBTS ON WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POINT IN GOING ON NEGOTIATING WITH
 THEM. HE DID NOT CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY
 CONFIDENT. THE MOOD IN BA WAS VERY UNCERTAIN. ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD
 ME THAT THE PRESENT JUNTA THOUGHT ONLY IN MILITARY TERMS AND DID
 NOT CALCULATE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL PRESSURES, HE DID NOT WISH TO
 SUGGEST THAT THE LATTER WERE NOT IMPORTANT. HE BELIEVED THAT THEY
 WERE VERY RELEVANT.
- 5. I THEN ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD LEFT THE ARGENTINE LEADERS IN NO DOUBT THAT IF TALKS BROKE DOWN BECAUSE OF THEIR INTRANSIGENCE THE USA WOULD RESORT TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD NOT USED THE PHRASE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, BUT HE HAD SAID THREE TIMES TO GALTIERI THAT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE USA WOULD BE ON THE BRITISH SIDE.
- 6. JUST TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THEM HAIG TOLD ME THAT AT THE LAST MINUTE, JUST AS HE WAS LEAVING IN THE AIRPORT, THE ARGENTINES HAD TRIED TO PRESS INTO HIS HAND A NEW FORMULATION ON THE SUBJECT OF SOVEREIGNTY. THIS HAD BEEN MUCH MORE EXTREME AND CATEGORICAL THAN THE TEXT THEY HAD BEEN WORKING ON. HAIG SAID HE HAD REFUSED TO TAKE DELIVERY OF IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE DISCUSSING THE THREE MAIN ISSUES WITH YOU TOMORROW. HE WENT ON TO TELL ME THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL WAS REALLY NOT TOO BAD FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. OUR SUBMARINES COULD DO WHAT THEY LIKED BECAUSE THE ARGENTINIANS HAD NO IDEA WHERE THEY WERE. THE TERMS PROPOSED FROM BA DID PROVIDE FOR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FORTNIGHT AND THAT WAS CERTAINLY AN ACHIEVEMENT.

ON THE SECOND POINT HAIG EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US PRESENCE IN THE INTERIM AUTHORITY THAT WOULD RUN THE ISLAND. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION WHETHER UNANIMITY OR A MAJORITY WAS REQUIRED FOR DECISIONS BY THAT AUTHORITY, HAIG SAID IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE A MAJORITY. THEREFORE THE ARGENTINES COULD NOT VETO ANYTHING AND THE US AND BRITISH WOULD PREVAIL. AT THE SAME TIME HE UNDERSTOOD HOW VERY UNSATISFACTORY IT WAS THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS BODY WOULD BE NO GREATER THAN THAT OF THE ARGENTINIANS. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT ON SUBJECTS LIKE ENTRY BY ARGENTINIANS ONTO THE ISLANDS AND THE ACQUISITION BY THEM OF PROPERTY, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN THE US AND UK GETTING THEIR WAY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE US WERE LAYING UP FOR THEMSELVES A GOOD DEAL OF TROUBLE BUT NEVERTHELESS HE BELIEVED ON THE WHOLE THAT SUCH A TRIPARTITE SYSTEM WOULD BE MANAGEABLE AND SAFEGUARD WHAT WE THOUGHT NECESSARY.

8. AS REGARDS SOVEREIGNTY HE SAID THAT THE WORD 'RIGHTS' HAD BEEN HIS IDEA. HE KNEW THAT WE WANTED 'WISHES' AND THE ARGENTINIANS WANTED 'INTERESTS'. HE THOUGHT THAT 'RIGHTS' WOULD MEET OUR PROBLEM WHILE NOT GOING TOO FAR IN THE ARGENTINIAN DIRECTION. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IT ALSO LOOKED TO ME AS THOUGH THE BA WORDING ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD MEAN THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD BE ABLE TO ASSERT THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS INTENDED TO PASS TO ARGENTINA NOT LATER THAN 1 JANUARY 1983. HAIG DID NOT DENY THIS, BUT HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE COULD BE ROOM FOR ARGUMENT ABOUT IT. I WAS STRUCK, THOUGH, BY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY THE ARGENTINIAN INTENTION IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS WORDING. I SAID THAT THIS WAS OF COURSE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

- HENDERSON

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TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 1376 OF 21/4

YOUR TEL NO 779: FALKLANDS

- 1. HAIG'S IMMEDIATE REACTION, WHEN I TOLD HIM, WAS ONE OF SURPRISE AND CONCERN. HE SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT SOME OF OUR SHIPS WERE HEADING THAT WAY BUT HIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN THAT THEY WERE HOLDING OFF SOME ONE HUNDRED MILES AWAY FROM SOUTH GEORGIA. HE THOUGHT THAT OUR PROPOSED ACTION WOULD AGGRAVATE THE PROBLEM AND MAKE A RETURN TO NEGOTIATION MORE DIFFICULT. HE ASKED WHETHER OUR DECISION WAS FINAL. HE WOULD KEEP THE INFORMATION TO HIMSELF, EXCEPT THAT HE WOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT.
- 2. I EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY, SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS FINAL AND I WAS NOT CONSULTING BUT INFORMING HIM, AND THAT WHAT WE WERE DOING WAS CONSISTENT WITH HIS ADVICE TO US THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP UP OUR MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES.
- 3. HAIG SAID THAT HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND HE THOUGHT THAT SOUTH GEORGIA WAS A PLUM READY TO BE PICKED. BUT HE WAS WORRIED AT THE PRESENCE OF 40 ARGENTINE MARINES THERE AGAINST WHICH, SO HE UNDERSTOOD, WE WOULD ONY HAVE A HUNDRED. HE DID NOT DISAGREE THAT MILITARY PRESSURE WAS NECESSARY BUT HE HAD HOPED THAT ANY MILITARY MOVE BY US WOULD BE HELD UP UNTIL YOUR MEETING WITH HIM HERE AND SOME POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP FROM IT.
- 4. THIS LEAD ME TO ASK WHAT SORT OF FOLLOW-UP HE WAS THINKING OF. ASSUMING THAT WHEN YOU SAW HIM YOU EXPLAINED THE UNACCEPT-ABILITY OF THE VARIOUS ARGENTINIAN PROPOSALS, AND INDICATED THE SORT OF LINE THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR US, WAS HE THINKING OF FLYING BACK TO BUENOS AIRES AGAIN AND HAVING YET ANOUTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATION? HE SAID NO. BUT COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE COMING HERE FOR THE RIO TREATY, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO MEET AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON MONDAY 26 APRIL, AND HE WAS THINKING PERHAPS THERE COULD BE SOME MEETING AT WHICH YOU AND COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE PRESENT. I SAID, SPEAKING FOR MYSELF, THAT I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS QUITE OUT OF THE QUESTION. YOU COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY MEET ACROSS THE TABLE WITH COSTA MENDEZ IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. TO WHICH HAID SAID THAT THE MEETING COULD PERHAPS TAKE PLACE IN SEPARATE ROOMS.
- 5. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE WAS NO POINT WHATEVER IN TALKING TO COSTA MENDEZ. HE COULD NOT DELIVER. HAID SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED. HE WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT HIS NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCES IN BUENOS AIRES, ABOUT WHICH PLEASE SEE M I F T.

Prime Minister



An 21

Cop : M. D.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION ELAND HOUSE

STAG PLACE LONDON SWIE 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

From the Minister

21 April 1982

Dear Miloles,

FALKLAND ISLANDS : ODA OFFICERS

The Prime Minister mentioned to Mr Marten this afternoon the question of whether the ODA-funded teachers who had left the Falkland Islands since the invasion had left of their own volition or had been ordered out. Sir Peter Preston has in fact minuted to the Secretary of State on this subject and I enclose a copy of that minute for your information.

Yours Sincerely Pamela Hillon

(Pamela Hilton) Private Secretary

John Coles Esq 10 Downing Street

cc PS/Secretary of State Sir Peter Preston m

CONFIDENTIAL 2. PS/SECRETARY OF STATE FALKLAND ISLANDS: ODA OFFICERS

1. PS/PUS

cc PS/Mr Marten / PS/Mr Onslow Mr Hurrell o/r Mr Hudson

I understand that at a meeting of Ministers this morning the question arose of the number of ODA officers who had left the Falkland Islands since the invasion and what had induced them to do so. I attach a short note setting out what we know at this stage about those officers who have left.

- 2. As I understand it, the only officers who were required to leave by the Argentine authorities were the Chief Secretary (Mr Baker), the Chief of Police (Mr Lamb) and the Registrar-General (Mr Checkley). The others left of their own volition and no obstacles seem to have been placed in their way. I would emphasise that since the invasion ODA has had no contact at all with any of these people while they were in the Falklands. We have therefore had no opportunity to influence them one way or the other over their decision to leave.
- 3. Of those remaining there is a group of medical staff, including 2 doctors, 2 nurses and a dental officer; an air pilot and a meteorological forecaster; and 4 technicians, including a mechanical supervisor who is I think concerned with the water supply, a building superintendent, an electrician and a plumber. On the face of it these seem more likely to be useful than some of those who have left.

Peter Preston 21 April 1982


CUNTILINTIAL FALKLAND ISLANDS: ODA OFFICERS The term "ODA Officers" covers both Technical Cooperation Officers (TCOs) who are under contract to, and fully funded by, HMG and officers recruited under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS). The OSAS Officers are under contract to the Falkland Islands Government, which pays their local salary; HMG (ODA) pays these officers a supplement to their basic local salary and certain other allowances. 2. At the start of the Argentine occupation there was one TCO outside the Falklands (on a duty visit to Columbia) and one OSAS officer - a matron - on leave in Britain. 3. Since the occupation 20 officers have left the Islands and are either back in Britain or are in transit. These officers include the Chief Secretary, the Chief of Police, the Registrar General, the MET Forecaster, an Air pilot and 12 teachers (all 17 are OSAS officers) plus 3 TCOs. There remain on the Islands 17 OSAS officers and 3 TCOs.

PRIME MINISTER FALKLAND ISLANDS: STATEMENT/PM'S QUESTIONS It is within the Speaker's authority to extend your Question Time, although the present Speaker has never done this - unlike his predecessor. If circumstances arise where Parliament needs a report on a Tuesday or Thursday, but not a major one, we could propose an extension. The argument would be that it is unrealistic for you to refuse to take Falklands questions between 1515 hrs and 1530 hrs on the grounds of a later statement, whether from you or another Minister; that you would therefore be ready to be at the Despatch Box for rather longer than usual, and that you would be giving a substantive answer on the Falklands at the first opportunity. The Speaker would have to be approached by the Leader of the House, preferably with John Silkin as Shadow Leader. If you felt it useful to try this arrangement on any particular day, it should not be too difficult to set it up. And I think that it could be done on this basis over the Falklands without establishing a precedent which could too readily be drawn on for other matters in the future. M. A. PATTISON 21 April, 1982

Argenting (Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH April to manage. Us M A-J-C. 21. 21 April, 1982 Dear John, Falkland Islands: The Australian Prime Minister 8.49.48 Thank you for your letter of 19 April. Mr Fraser's message is such a wholehearted expression of support that it would seem to warrant a special message of thanks from the Prime Minister. Such a message might stand us in good stead should we need further help from the Australians. I enclose a draft in the form of a telegram to Canberra. (J E Holmes) Private Secretary A J Coles Esq Private Secretary 10 Downing Street LONDON

OUT TELEGRAM

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| | 9 | YOUR TELNO 163: FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGA | | | | | | | | |
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| | 15 | | | you have stood by us since the | | | | | | |
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| | 17 | of friends | hip and support | . With sincere good wishes. Margar | | | | | | |
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Falklands and the U.N.

By Roger Fisher

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — Within a few days, young Britons and Argentines may start killing each other. It is high time to get to work on a cease-fire resolution for the contested islands, whether they are called the Malvinas or Falklands.

The unwillingness of both Britain and Argentina to reach agreement while the British fleet sails southward is to be expected. It is not only that mediation is difficult for a Secretary of State who speaks officially, may look coercive, and represents the United States with all its political concerns and inhibitions. So long as Argentina and Britain do not face a fading opportunity to say "yes," the arguments for each to say "no" to any proposal are persuasive: "It is less than we want." "If we act tough, we may get more." "By saying 'no' we keep our options open." And, "If the worst comes to the worst, we can always accept these terms later." Faced with such a choice, why say "yes"?

In addition, Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s shuttle diplomacy, by attracting press and public attention, increases the political rewards for looking tough and the political costs of making concessions. Therefore, so long as each side sees the possibility of avoiding collision later on, the best course is full steam ahead.

In this situation, to ask each government what it is willing or unwilling to do, and to press for commitment, is to engage in a process that rewards stubbornness. To offer each government a series of choices in which the best way to keep options open is to engage in bellicose non-cooperation is almost certain to produce bellicose non-cooperation.

A more promising road is to talk not about declared positions but rather about underlying interests, and to offer each government a new choice in which the best way to keep options open is to engage in peaceful cooperation.

Although the declared positions of Argentina and Britain are directly opposed, their underlying interests are potentially compatible.

Britain wants to avoid rewarding naked military aggression against territory that has been British for 149 years. It would like the concerns of the Falklanders to be taken into account. And the British Government would like to be seen to be acting firmly, wisely, and successfully.

The Argentine Government wants to

The Argentine Government wants to rally the country in support of a long-standing national goal. It, too, wants something that it can call a success.

Each government has a comparable political problem that it defines for itself as "adhering to principle," and for its adversary as "saving face."

In these circumstances, a United Nations resolution could help.

It could provide a framework for quiet work, for participation by Falk-landers themselves, for clarification of interests, and for developing ways of reconciling as well as possible the diverse legitimate interests involved. And it could effectively change the choice that each government faced.

It would be a mistake for a mediator to ask either Argentina or Britain for advance acceptance of a resolution, or to treat seriously advance rejection or threat of veto. However, a draft resolution could be subjected to repeated criticisms and revisions until it became the best that a mediator could recommend to the Security Council.

The first draft of such a resolution should not be difficult. Some points almost write themselves.

The resolution might order the two

governments not to shoot for a fixed number of days; it could reaffirm the Security Council's April 3 resolution requiring the prompt withdrawal of all Argentine forces; it could establish a United Nations officer on the islands to help deal with practical interim problems; by shifting the talks from the London-Buenos Aires shuttle to New York City, it would introduce a more efficient process of polit-

ical mediation; and it could make clear that both countries' claims to sovereignty over the islands would remain unaffected by the resolution or by action taken under it.

Other points would require creativity. Permitting Britain after, say, 10 days to re-establish (by force if necessary) a British presence and flag on one island as a symbol of its claim to them all would give London an interim success to talk about and photograph. Allowing Argentina (if it withdrew its forces) to maintain a civilian presence and flag on some other island as a symbol of its claim to them all would give Buenos Aires, too, an interim success.

But whatever the precise terms, an interim cease-fire resolution would give each government a good excuse for not shooting.

Most important, the United Nations is thus able to confront each government with a simple choice in which defiance means war and compliance provides both peace and the best way to keep options open.

Roger Fisher, professor of law at Harvard University and director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, is the author, with William Ury, of "Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In."

Rough Draft April 18, 1982 The Security Council: Deeply disturbed at the risk of armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom; Convinced that it is in the interest of all parties to settle differences over the Islas Malvinas (or Falkland Islands) by peaceful means and without loss of life; Recalling and reaffirming its resolution of April 3rd; 1. Orders the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to refrain from firing military weapons in the region of the Falkland Islands for a period of days, except to the extent that this Resolution may authorize them to do so; 2. Renews its demand for the prompt withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands; 3. Insists that the government of Argentina shall have completed the withdrawal of its military forces from West Falkland Island within four days from the adoption of this Resolution; 4. Authorizes the government of the United Kingdom, beginning on the fifth day following the adoption of this Resolution, to use such military force, if any, as may reasonably be necessary to establish and maintain a civilian presence and the British flag on West Falkland Island as a symbol of Britain's continuing claim of sovereignty over all the Falkland Islands; 5. Authorizes the government of Argentina, pending a settlement of the dispute and provided that all its military forces are being withdrawn from all the Falkland Islands, to maintain a

Projecting

SAPU(82) 6

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

- 1. The attached paper was issued at 1815 hours on 21 April 1982 and suggests lines to take on the following subjects
 - a. Current negotiations
 - b. Suggestions of a possible role for the UN
 - c. British casualties in Argentine invasions
 - d. Criticism of naval policy after 1981 defence review
 - e. OAS invocation of the Rio Treaty
 - f. Speculation about imminent invasion of South Georgia
- 2. SAPU(82) 1 also contained an item on allegations that the Royal Navy had been weakened and some of that material is repeated in this paper. However, there is also additional material to refute charges made by Keith Speed MP (and contained in yesterday's Evening Standard) and in a letter sent by Portsmouth dockyard union representatives to all MPs (dated 6 April) that due to dockyard closures and shipbuilding plans the Navy could not mount a similar operation in a few years time.

Cabinet Office

21 April 1982

Current Negotiations

1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is travelling to Washington tomorrow to discuss with Mr Haig our reactions to the latest Argentine proposals.

As Mr Pym said in the House of Commons today any negotiation which is to be concluded satisfactorily must deal with such critical points as: the arrangements for Argentine withdrawal; the nature of any interim administration of the Islands; and the framework for the negotiations on the long term solution to the dispute for which Security Council Resolution 502 calls. The latest Argentine proposals—despite Mr Haig's efforts—still failed to satisfy our essential requirements in certain important respects relating to these points. They reflect continuing efforts by Argentina to establish by her aggression and her defiance of the United Nations what could not be established by peaceful means.

Mr Pym will discuss ideas of our own when he meets Mr Haig.

International support for our position continues. European Community foreign ministers yesterday reconfirmed their support, emphasising the importance of securing the implementation of SCR 502, their hope for a peaceful solution and their gratitude to Mr Haig.

Will we use force?

- We are making every endeavour to achieve a peaceful settlement but the use of force cannot be ruled out.

The United Nations' role

2. The first thing we did was go to the Security Council. Repeat that we should not now risk crossing wires while we are still involved in negotiations, through Mr Haig, in seeking a solution on the basis of Security Council Resolution 502.

A role for the Secretary General of the UN?

- Not to be excluded at some future stage. In present circumstances it is difficult to see how Senor Perez de Cuellar could expect to exert more influence or "leverage" than the United States Secretary of State. Any diplomatic activities by the Secretary General would be subject to scrutiny by the Security Council (where the Russians could be expected to make difficulties) and, on sovereignty issues, could be circumscribed by wholly unacceptable General Assembly resolutions.

Invite the UN to play a role in deciding the sovereignty issues?

The General Assembly's record on this has been discouraging. They have insisted on classifying the Falklands as a decolonization issue, supporting the Argentine claim to sovereignty, and ignoring the fundamental rights of the Falkland Islanders to self determination. Successive General Assembly resolutions have ignored the plain fact that it is the Argentines who are the colonialists in seeking to subject an established population to an alien rule against its clearly expressed wishes. The UN's attitude is at least in part explained by the composition of its decolonization Committee (the Committee of 24) which currently includes Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union as well as Latin American countries with a special interest in supporting the Argentine claims. The only western members are Australia and Norway.

UN observers/commissions?

- One of many ideas which could in certain circumstances be helpful.

British casualties during the Argentine invasions

3. Argentines have tried to give impression that they deliberately avoided inflicting British casualties during invasion of Falklands and South Georgia. This is not so; lack of serious casualties due to superior skill of British forces, good defensive positions.

Argentine intentions made quite clear by the accounts given by the Governor and returning Marines. On the Falklands the Argentine invasion began with a pre-emptive attack on the barracks - quite clear that the Marines would have suffered heavy casualties had they been there. (Sunday Times 'Insight' account based on Major Noott's story.) The Governor talked of a three and a half hour firefight at Government House - "We couldn't move outside Government House every time we moved we were shot at" - which only ended after they had inflicted at least twenty casualties on the invaders and the Argentines began to bring up 30mm cannon.

Lt Mills' account yesterday makes it clear that the battle for South Georgia in which one Marine received two bullet wounds was equally severe. The Marines were under constant fire from the invading troops and were also shelled by an Argentine corvette but were in well prepared defensive positions. They surrendered only in the face of overwhelming odds after they had been completely surrounded.

Defence review will weaken Navy?

4. The review of defence expenditure has not weakened Navy. Proof of this is the task force now approaching Falklands. Always planned to retain ability to mount operations outside NATO area — restated in the review White Paper. All elements of the present task force will continue to be available into the 1990s — two aircraft carriers (more modern than HERMES and INVINCIBLE), two assault ships; around 50 modern destroyers and frigates to draw on and even more hunter killer submarines than now. We will continue to spend more on the conventional navy (in real terms) even when Trident programme reaches its peak and there will be more major ships and submarines available in 1985 than today.

We will also retain the naval base facilities - for fuelling, storing, maintenance etc - necessary for an operation of this sort although we are running down our dockyard production and refit capacity (closure of Portsmouth/Chatham/Gibraltar dockyards). We have done away with the need for expensive mid-life modernisations and no longer need all our dockyard capacity although we are retaining the base facilities at Portsmouth and Gibraltar.

Nothing that has happened suggests that our defence policy is wrong and we will still be able to mount such operations in the future if necessary. Therefore no need for any significant changes in our plans although some details and timings are likely to be affected as a result of present operations.

OAS Invokes the Rio Treaty

5. The OAS has voted by 18-0 (with the United States, Colombia and Trinidad abstaining) that foreign ministers of the signatories of the Rio Treaty are to meet in Washington on Monday. This is in no way surprising. The decision does not prejudice decisions at Monday's meeting. Argentina, which is the aggressor, has no case to demand measures under the Rio Treaty, and in any event Security Council Resolution 502 takes precedence over any decision of the OAS.

Imminent Invasion of South Georgia?

6. Cannot divulge the disposition of our forces, but note that speculative press reports this morning appear to derive from an American newspaper story.

12 J

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April, 1982

Dear John,

Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

Following discussion in ODSA this morning, we have drafted three telegrams to Washington, the first setting out our general view of the visit, the second containing a message from me'to W. Haig, and a third containing the list of amendments required by us to the latest proposals. I would be grateful for your agreement that these can be despatched as soon as possible.

There was some discussion in ODSA this morning of the possibility of a UN peace-keeping force on the Islands and it was suggested that a new paragraph should be drafted which could be added to the existing texts. I enclose a draft accordingly. However, Mr Pym thinks that it would be better not to send the text of this to the Americans at this stage but rather to keep it in reserve in case either we run into difficulty over the US security guarantee, or we judge that a new element in the text would be helpful presentationally. We also have in mind that we must be careful not to let the Americans use a UN force suggestion in order to get themselves off the hook of a bilateral security guarantee. I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of ODSA.

(J E Holmes) Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq Private Secretary No 10 Downing Street New paragraph (to precede paragraph 8)

- "(A) The two Governments agree to invite the UN Security Council to arrange for the stationing in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), for the duration of the interim period referred to in paragraph 8(A) of this agreement, of a [peace-keeping force] [observer force] of appropriate size and composition. The function of the force shall be to observe compliance by the two Governments with their obligations under paragraph 3 of this agreement and to report regularly thereon, through the Secretary General of the UN, to the Security Council.
 - (B) The United States Government has indicated that it will support such a request to the Security Council."

A consequential modification would be required to paragraph 5 to make it clear that the Special Interim Authority did not have the same function. One way of doing this would be to add at the end of paragraph 5 the phrase "... other than the obligations in paragraph 3 thereof."

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| | 10 | FALKLAND ISLANDS: MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON | | | | | | | |
| | 11 | 1. My two IFT's contain a personal message from me to Haig | | | | | | | |
| | 12 | and a list of amendments to the Buenos Aires draft which the | | | | | | | |
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Classification and Caveats Page CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE 2. <<<< 1 drafts. I shall have officials with me and if necessary they could 3 be detached to go through texts separately. b. As Haig knows from my message to him of 15 April (my telno 5 730) a point of fundamental importance for Britain is that of the eventual American guarantee of the security of the Islands from 7 any future Argentine aggression. Haig will know how little faith 8 any British Government can have in Argentine good intentions. 9 I shall want to talk to Haig about how best to arrange this and to 10 related it to the other parts of any political solution. 11 c. The Americans will appreciate that as the British military 12 capability in the area develops, it will become all the more 13 important to keep Argentina in the dark about how this might 14 be used. I have enough respect for the Intelligence community 15 to believe that their guesses will sometimes be close to the 16 mark. I know too that there is a different tradition in the 17 United States about discussing these matters in public. 18 Haig himself has underlined the importance of maintaining our 19 military pressure, and he will understand that we do not want to 20 see its effectiveness weakened by unnecessary publicity. There 21 is pressure on us from the press here too, but we are holding the 22 line that we are not going to speculate in public about these 23 matters. 24 3. I shall be telegraphing separately on the rest of the 25 programme (your telno 1370). I attach importance to outside 26 calls of the sort you have suggested and to the press side of 27 the visit, and I do not want the talks with Haig to monopolise 28 the time available. (Officials will, however, be available for 29 talks in the State Department as necessary). 30 111 31 PYM 11 32 NNNN 33 34 NNNN ends Catchword BLANK

telegram

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Classification and Caveats Page CONFIDENTIAL <<<< 1 2. Argentina, despite her being the aggressor. For the second 3 week after signature of the agreement Argentina would have several 4 thousand troops with all their equipment in the Falkland Islands, 5 while the nearest British forces (our submarines) would be 6 several hours distant. Within fifteen days the provision that 7 British forces should return to their usual operating bases or 8 areas would apparently exclude most possible deployments in the 9 South Atlantic. 10 Administration 11 To have nominees of the Argentine Government in the Councils 12 in the Falklands would be undemocratic in the case of the 13 Legislative Council and disproportionate in the case of the 14 Executive Council. In effect, government would be shared 15 between Britain and Argentina at the administrative level, 16 as well as (with the United States) in the Special Interim 17 Authority. British administration would thus be re-established 18 to a far lesser degree than under the earlier draft. 19 Economic sanctions 20 The new draft would have these lifted before the completion 21 of Argentinian withdrawal, thus contradicting the principle 22 that withdrawal in accordance with the UN Resolution is the first 23 requirement. 24 d. Relations with the mainland 25 The latest draft opens up the possibility, if not the probability, 26 of an influx of Argentine people and businesses, combined with 27 strong encouragement to the Islanders to leave. Britain would 28 apparently still have the right to block proposals in this 29 field from the Special Interim Authority, but the latest draft 30 independently concedes the principle of facilitating contacts 111 31 between the Islands and Argentina. 32 11 e. Future negotiations 33 The new text would exclude re-establishment of the status quo 34 NNNN ends Catchword BLANK telegram

ante

Classification and Caveats Page CONFIDENTIAL FLASH 3.

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ante the invasion from the list of possible outcomes of negotiations This does not preserve the fundamental principle that the Islanders must choose their own future. Here too Britain would nominally be free to refuse agreement to any outcome of the negotiations which the Islanders did not accept. But there is a bias in the relevant paragraph which would greatly restrict our freedom to press for any outcome not involving early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

All in all, I think I was right to tell my colleagues in the Ten yesterday that the general effect of the latest draft - even presupposing Argentine goodwill, which in our eyes is far from obvious - would be that Argentine withdrawal would be delayed, the Argentine voice in the administration of the Islands would be disproportionate, Argentine influence and pressure in the Islands would be given free reign, and future negotiations would be organised in a way which could only prejudice the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The result would be that in practice the Islanders would face the choice between absorption into Argentina or abandonment of the islands which have been their home in most cases for a century and a half.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of getting the Argentinians to accept ou amendments. But I thought I should leave you in no doubt about the gap which I see between their present maximum and our own minimum.

I much look forward to our meeting tomorrow and to all that I hope will come out of it - including something useful to you in the OAS context, on which I was grateful for your latest message. ENDS

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| TEL NO | 8 | TELEGRAM NUMBER | | | | | | | |
| | 9 | FALKLAND ISLANDS: MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON MY TWO IPTS | | | | | | | |
| | 10 | | | | | | | | |
| | 11 1. As promised in my personal message to Mr Haig, the | | | | | | | | |
| | 12 | 1. As promised in my personal message to in hargy the | | | | | | | |
| | 13 | Tottowing is the tist of amendments to the buenos arres | | | | | | | |
| | 14 | text winds the firme minister and I consider essentiat. | | | | | | | |
| | 15 | detiver the tist immediately to hi harg. | | | | | | | |
| | 16 | DEGING | | | | | | | |
| | 17 | Paragraph 2.1. Vetete restind and substitute suspend | | | | | | | |
| | 18 | enforcement of . | | | | | | | |
| | 19 | following: 'Within the same time period the United Kingdom naval task | | | | | | | |
| | 20 | | | | | | | | |
| | 21 | | | | | | | | |
| 111 | 22 | | | | | | | | |
| 11 | 23 | any of the co-ordinate points.' Paragraph_2.2.2. a) Re-draft first sentence as follows: 'Within fifteen days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 24 | | | | | | | | |
| | 25 | | | | | | | | |
| | | within | ritteen d | ays from the | date of | this Agreement, Argentina | | | |
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| | | Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES | | | | | | | |
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| | | Telephone nun | nber | | | | | | |
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Classification and Caveats Page SECRET FLASH <<<< 1 2and the United Kingdom shall have removed all their forces, 3 equipment and armaments from the zones'. 4 b) Re-draft second sentence as follows: 5 'Thereafter, the UK naval task force and submarines shall 6 revert to their normal duties.' 7 Paragraph 4 8 Delete 'From the date of this agreement, steps' and substitute 9 'On completion of the steps specified in paragraphs 2, 2.1, 2.2, 10 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above, the two Governments shall take measures 11 to terminate' 12 Second_sentence 13 Delete 'without delay' and insert 'at the same time' and 'shall'. 14 Paragraph_5 15 Add 'Each representative may be supported by a staff of not more 16 than ten persons'. 17 Paragraph_6(A) 18 Delete second sentence and substitute: 19 'The traditional local administration shall be re-established, 20 including the Executive and Legislative Councils, each of which 21 shall be enlarged to include one representative of the Argentine 22 population resident on the Islands to be nominated by the 23 Special Interim Authority.' 24 Paragraph_6(A) 25 Delete third sentence. 26 Paragraph_7(A) 27 Delete and substitute: 28 'Pending a definitive settlement, the Special Interim Authority 29 shall make proposals to the two Governments to facilitate 30 and promote travel, transportation, communications (including 111 31 the movement of persons) and trade between the mainland and the 11 32 Islands. Such proposals shall simultaneously be transmitted to 33 the Executive and Legislative Councils for their views. The 34 NNNN ends Catchword BLANK telegram

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

| 1 | Classification and | Caveats | | | Page | | | |
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| 7 | | nd 'property | . Clarificat | ion is requ | ired | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | such clarification, | | | | | | | |
| 10 | | | 200 | | | | | |
| 11 | Delete and substitu | te: | | | | | | |
| 12 | 'December 31, 1982, | will conclud | de the interim | period dur | ing | | | |
| 13 | | | | | | | | |
| 14 | for the definitive : | status of eac | h of the thre | e groups of | Island | | | |
| 15 | In accordance with | the purposes | and principle | s of the Ch | arter | | | |
| 16 | of the United Nation | ns and bearing | ng in mind rel | evant Gener | al | | | |
| 17 | Assembly Resolutions | s. The negot | iations shall | begin with | in | | | |
| 18 | fifteen days of the | signature of | the present | Agreement'. | | | | |
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| | NNNN ends telegram | ANK | Catchword | | | | | |



MESSAGE FROM MR. BRITTON

To go on Fillelands file with The letter from how Need Grane.

of O.D.A.

The O.D.A. are responsible for employing certain civil servants in the Falkland Islands and he is keen to get a message through to a Mr. Steve Whitley, giving authority for members of his staff to come out at his discretion. He is wanting to know if we would be prepared to pass on the message by telex.

Mr. Britton has indicated to Mr. Malloy that we are not generally using the telex for this purpose but that he would pass on this request to you.

Mr. Malloy understands that there may be some difficulty in paying for tickets in the Islands. He believes that people coming out will have to purchase tickets through LADE.

The ODA undertake to cover the cost of these tickets if we have to pay for them in the Islands.

Mr. Britton did not get involved in a lengthy conversation with Mr. Malloy but will pass any message on to him you consider necessary. If you want to talk to him direct yourself, the number to ring is

01 - 213 - 4797.

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

(29)

PS/M. ONSLOW PS/MR RIFKIND PS/PUS MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT MR ADAMS MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/DEF · D

HD/NEWS D

HD/HKGD .

HD/UND

IMMEDIATE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER MR HAWTIN

H.M. TSY

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIRR ARMSTRONG DID CAS. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

.HD/PLANNING STAFF

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 220130Z TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 1397 OF 21 APRIL 1982, AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK INFO IMMEDIATE NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO.

MY TELNO 1378: FALKLANDS/OAS

- WE HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 26 APRIL WITH A NUMBER OF INFORMED CONTACTS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION AND THE OAS SECRETARIAT.
- 2. IT IS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT IF THE HAIG INITIATIVE IS STILL ALIVE ON MONDAY, THE ARGENTINES WILL SEEK A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THEIR POSITION AND DENOUNCING THE THREAT TO PEACE SUPPOSEDLY POSED BY THE BRITISH FLEET. THEY WOULD WIN OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WILL TRY TO WORK BEHIND THE SCENES TO PREVENT THE DAS FROM DOLLO HODE

A RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WILL TRY TO WORK BEHIND THE SCENES TO PREVENT THE OAS FROM DOING MORE THAN SUPPORTING HAIG'S EFFORTS AND CALLING FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THE AMERICAN DELEGATION DOUBT IF ARGENTINA WOULD BE CONFIDENT ENOUGH OF GETT GENERAL SUPPORT TO PROPOSE, IN THE FACE OF AMERICAN RESISTANCE, A RESOLUTION SEEKING TO IMPOSE GENERAL SANCTIONS AGAINST US IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

- 3. IF, HOWEVER AN ARMED CLASH OCCURRED BEFORE THE MEETING, ARGENTINA WOULD CERTAINLY PROPOSE SANCTIONS. THE EXTENT OF THESE WOULD DECIDE THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT ARGENTINA MIGHT RECEIVE, BUT US OFFICIALS THINK THAT SOME ACTION SUCH AS THE DOWNGRADING OF RELATIONS WITH THE UK WOULD BE LIKELY TO WIN THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED FORMALLY TO MAKE COMPLIANCE MANDATORY ON ALL RIO TREATY SIGNATORIES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MORE RADICAL MEASURES MIGHT BE APPROVED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED THEM LATER.
- 4. APART FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC OR OTHER SANCTIONS, OAS SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA THREATENS TO DILUTE THE POSITION WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IN THE UN AND TO ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINES IN THEIR PRESENT INTRANSIGENCE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE WITH RELIABLE CONTACTS THAT OAS ACTION WOULD CUT ACROSS UN RESPONSIBILITY, BUT GIVEN THE ELEMENT OF 'LATIN SOLIDARITY' THE AMERICANS THINK IT DOUBTFUL IF WE AND THEY WILL BE ABLE TO . DISSUADE MOST RIO SIGNATORIES FROM GIVING GENERAL POLITICAL SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA IF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS UNOBTAINABLE. THERE ARE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE AMERICANS, WHOSE COMMITMENT TO THE RIO TREATY WOULD BE PLACED IN DOUBT IF THEY REFUSED, AS THEY WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO DO, TO GO ALONG WITH THE ACTION APPROVED BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. I AM SURE, THEREFORE, THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE AMERICANS TO LOBBY ENERGETICALLY AGAINST SANCTIONS WITH ANY TEETH: AND, WHILE ACTION MAY WELL BE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF MEMBER STATES, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW ENERGETICALLY INDIVIDUAL OAS MEMBER STATES WOULD BE LIKELY TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT.
- RESORT THE US WOULD HAVE TO USE THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO ROLE IN THIS AFFAIR FOR THE OAS, SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS THE SUPERIOR BODY, HAD PREEMPTED THE GROUND. THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE OCCASIONS IN FUTURE WHEN THEY WOULD WANT TO KEEP A SUBJECT WITHIN THE HEMISPHERE AND THIS PRECEDENT WOULD BE USED AGAINST THEM. IT WOULD ALSO GRAVELY WEAKEN THE INTER AMERICAN SYSTEM. BUT IF THERE WAS NO

RELUCTANT TO DO THIS BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE OCCASIONS IN FUTURE WIN THEY WOULD WANT TO KEEP A SUBJECT WITHIN THE HEMISPHERE AND THIS PRECEDENT WOULD BE USED AGAINST THEM. IT WOULD ALSO GRAVELY WEAKEN THE INTER AMERICAN SYSTEM. BUT IF THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY OF REJECTING A CALL FOR MANDATORY SANCTIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO THIS.

HENDERSON

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The second of th THE CONTROL AND SHOWING RICH CANDER OF AS INC. FOR THE LEGISLES THE PRESIDENCE THINK IT BOUBLOW! IF HE AND THEY WILL BE ALLE TO RESPONSIBILITY, BUT GIVEN THE ELCHENT OF "LATIN FOLIDARITY" ARCUE WITH GOLLABLE CONTACTS THAT DAS POTICA MOLLE CUT ACROSS UN APPENTINES IN THEIR PARCENT FOTOW ISLIENCE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO THE POSITION AS HAVE ESTABLISHED IN THE UN AND TO EDCOURAGE THE OTHER BAMOTIONS, OAS SUPPORT FOR AMERITANA TRADATONO TO DILUTE APART FROM THE CONCEOUSINGS OF POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC, ESCHONISION

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RECYCLUSO OF MISTHER THE GUYL WARRIES CONCEANED ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED AT 18 MESCHALP THAT WORE PATHON MERCHALS FIRM BE APPROVED. FORESTEA TO BUT E CONFLICT PARESTATING OF ALL RIO TREATY SHOWNESS. DICT OF PORTER BE FIRTER IT AND THE CAMPFAIRED DECORDED AND UNITED THE WISHTALF SO CARTILLOAN SEER AS FEE WAS CHILD OF ALLEST HOUSE WITH THE AMENIA OF LEGIT CHARLESTING FROM FEGSIVE, BUT IN CESTICIALS MOUND CERTAINLY PROPOSE SAROTIONS, THE EXTERT OF THESE MODE DE JUG 3. IF, HOMENER AN ARMED CLASH COCUMBED DEFORD THE MEETING, AMERITIAL

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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

(29) DBY 220700Z

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER

H.M. TSY

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ MR ILETT

MR MCINTYRE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D HD/NEWS D

PS/MR ONSLOW

PE/UR RIPHIND

MR GIFFARD

MR GILLMORE

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

PS/PUS

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

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RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SUR RARMSTRONG, DIO, CAR OFFER

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 220700Z
FM WASHINGTON 210045Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1394 OF 21 APRIL 1982,
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

- 1. EAGLEBURGER TOLD MINISTER THIS EVENING THAT HE HAD NOW SEEN DOBRYNIN TWICE ABOUT THE FALKLANDS. THE FIRST TIME WAS TO WARN THE SOVIETS OFF THE GRASS. THE SECOND WAS TO GET THEIR UNCOMPROMISING RESPONSE.
- PROCESS WHICH ADDRESSED THE ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AMPAIGN

 PEING WAGED BY THE SOVIET PRESS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

 IN THE PRESENT CRISIS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO

 DISTORT US EFFORTS TO AVERT ARMED CONFLICT. HE HAD UNDERLINED THAT

 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE WAS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA AND WAS

 NOT AN EAST-WEST ISSUE. THE US WAS SEEKING TO PREVENT FURTHER

 MILITARY ACTION BY EITHER SIDE AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A

 PROCESS WHICH ADDRESSED THE ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND

 SOVERIGHTY. HE HAD CONCLUDED WITH STRONG EMPHASIS THAT INVOLVEMENT

SOVERIGHTY, HE HAD CONCLUDED WITH STRONG EMPHASIS THAT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS FRIENDS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS WOULD 'HOPELESSLY COMPLICATE AND PERHAPS IRREPARABLY DAMAGE' AMERICANS HOPES FOR MOVING FORWARD IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT.

3. DOBRYNIN HAD REJECTED THE AMERICAN ALLEGATIONS. THE WARNING ABOUT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS FRIENDS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS WAS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE. HE ACCUSED THE US OF TRYING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE FACT OF US ACTIVE INTERFERENCE IN THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE CONFLICT. DOBRYNIN FINISHED RATHER LAMELY THAT THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF THE US PRESENTATION WAS SO OBVIOUS THAT IT WAS HARDLY NECESSARY TO DWELL ON IT IN DETAIL. AS EAGLEBURGER HAD DONE, HE HANDED OVER A PIECE OF PAPER SETTING OUT WHAT HE HAD SAID. EAGLEBURGER MADE NO COMMENT.

HENDERSON

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PP MOSCON

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KONFO/016/22 1. CC Mr Moss PUSD 22 4.

Mr Feam PP BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION BUENOS AIRES Capt. Too, Anosmants It of lat office GPS 155 Mr Westsnown New Dept. .UNCLASSIFIED FK WASHINGTON 2202112 2. Form & JADEW 224. TO PRIORITY BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION BUENOS AIRES TELNO 6 OF 21 APRIL 1982, You will see the possible significance AND TO CONSULAR DEPT FCO. FOLLOWING TEL NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DUTY CORS OFFICER WASHINGTON WAS RECEIVED FROM LOS ANGELES: cc Arloles (NOIO) TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 21 APRIL FOR PARKER FROM BACKHOUSE PRITISH NATIONALS IN ARGENTINA 1. YOU WILL WISH TO BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING AND, PERHAPS, TO TAKE ANY ACTION YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY

- 2. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY NICHOLAS SCHIELE, BRITISH, ABOUT THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE CALL FROM HIS MOTHER, MRS NORA GORDON-DAVIES (NEE HALL) WHO LIVES AT BUENOS AIRES WITH HER HUSBAND JOHN GORDON-DAVIES (AN ANGO/ARGENTINIAN)
- 3. YESTERDAY 20 APRIL, MR GORDON-DAVIES LEFT HIS FLAT AT 2790 WINEBERG, 5F, APT C. OLIVOS, 1636 BA, TO GO TO HIS BANK. WHEN, AFTER SOME HOURS, HE HAD NOT RETURNED HIS WIFE MADE ENOUIRIES AND LEARNED UNOFFICIALLY THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY THE POLICE. SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH HIS WHEREABOUTS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SAFETY AND, BECAUSE OF SUBSECUENT MISCHIEVOUS TELEPHONE CALLS, HER OWN SAFETY

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS/MR ONSLOW PS/MR RIPKIND PS/PUS MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT MR ADAMS MR URE

MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF · D HD/NEWS D HD/UND

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MR LITTLER

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DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE SAPU CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER

H.M. TSY

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

RAMSTRONG DIO

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

FROM MEXICO CITY 212030Z APRIL 82 TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN AND MONTEVIDEO

WASHINGTON TELNO 1378: FALKLANDS/OAS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 299 OF 21 APRIL 82

1. I SPOKE TO THE MEXICAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING, AND ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE MEETING OF OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 26 APRIL.

2. MANUEL TELLO SAID THAT THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD NOT BE ATTENDING. NOR, SO FAR AS HE UNDERSTOOD, WOULD ANY OF HIS COLL-EAGUES. THE MEXICAN POSITION WOULD DEPEND ON THE CHARACTER OF THE RESOLUTION TO BE PRODUCED BY ARGENTINA. THE MEXICANS HAD ALREADY TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD MEXICO VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITAIN: NOR WOULD THEY ACT ON SUCH A RESOLUTION IF IT WERE PASSED.

3. TELLO SAID THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THE MEETING THE MEXICANS WOULD BE WORKING FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT 3. TELLO SAID THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THE MEETING THE MEXICANS WOULD BE WORKING FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502 AND 'OTHER EVENTS' SINCE THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS. WHEN I ASKED WHAT OTHER EVENTS HE HAD IN MIND, HE REFERRED TO COMMUNITY SANCTIONS. ON THIS MEXICO WOULD CONTINUE TO 'DEPLORE' THEM IN THE TERMS OF THE ALADI RESOLUTION OF 17 APRIL. HE REPEATED (MY TELNO 291:

"9T TO ALL) THAT THIS RESOLUTION MEANT LITTLE, BUT WAS A MEANS OF SHOWING LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY. HE ADDED THAT THE MEXICANS THOUGHT THAT BEFORE IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON ARGENTINA, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD HAVE RAISED THE MATTER AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ACTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502.

4. TELLO PROMISED TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH.

TICKELL

NNNN

(29)ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS DBY 220800Z PS No.10 DOWNING ST. PS ma. Hurd PS Crashano: PS/CHANCELLOR WOLISHO SIR K COUZENS PB/MR RIPKIND MR LITTLER H.M. TSY PS/PUS MR HAWTIN MR GIFFARD MR PERETZ MR WRIGHT MR ILETT MR ADAMS MR MCINTYRE MR URE MR GILLMORE Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I) HD/DEF · D DIO CABINET OFFICE HD/NEWS D MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE HD/UND MR FULLER SAPUX CABINET OFFICE HD/PLANNING STAFF HD/HKGD CABINET OFFICE SIR M PALLISER, SIR RARMS ROWG DI RESIDENT CLERK (Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet) CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY 220800Z FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 220013Z APRIL 82 TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 515 OF 21 APRIL. YOUR TELNO 145 TO ACCRA: FALKLANDS: NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT. 1. THE ARGENTINES ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS HARD FOR THE EARLY ADOPTION OF A COMMUNIQUE BY THE NAM COORDINATING BUREAU. A DRAFTING GROUP HAS BEEN SET UP UNDER CUBAN CHAIRMANSHIP CONSISTING OF ARGENTINA, BANGLADESH, INDIA, NIGERIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA. THE PRESENT PLAN IS FOR THE COORDINATING BUREAU TO MEET ON 23 APRIL. THE ARGENTINES HAVE APPARENTLY SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY AND INDICATED A READINESS TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO SCR 502, PROVIDED THAT THERE IS A RESOUNDING REAFFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS NAM PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SOVEREIGNTY. WE ARE WORKING HARD ON THE COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS OF THE DRAFTING GROUP, AMONGST WHOM BANGLADESH IS BEING PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. BUT I FEAR THAT THE OUTCOME IS LIKELY TO BE A COMMUNIQUE WHICH LAYS TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON SOVEREIGNTY AND TOO LITTLE ON SCR 502, NON-USE OF

2. THE REPRESENTATIONS POSTS HAVE MADE IN CAPITALS HAVE BEEN MOST HELPFUL AND HAVE LED TO A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS RECEIVING HELPFUL INSTRUCTIONS. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THERE IS ANYTHING

MORE THAT POSTS CAN DO NOW: THE BATTLE IS ONE FOR US TO FIGHT HERE.

3. PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

FORCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

IMMEDIATE

PS/MR ONSLOWADVANCE COPY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

(29)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER

H.M.TSY

MR HAWTIN MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO.

RESIDENT CLERK

HD/PLANNING STAFF

PSIME. Hurd

MR GIFFARD

MR GILLMORE

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

HD/DEF D

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

HD/HKOD ,

MR URE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 212049Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 512 OF 21 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TELNO 1378: FALKLANDS IN THE OAS.

- 1. YESTERDAY'S VOTE IN THE OAS IS SEEN HERE AS A DIPLOMATIC SETBACK FOR US, THE FIRST SERIOUS ONE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. IF THE ARGENTINES SUCCEED ON 26 APRIL IN GETTING A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY IN FAVOUR OF ECONOMIC OR OTHER MEASURES AGAINST THE UK, THIS WILL BE A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR US IN UN TERMS. SUCH A DISPLAY OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA, IN SPITE OF HER RECKLESS USE OF FORCE, WILL GIVE PAUSE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHO ARE AT PRESENT DISPOSED TO FAVOUR OUR SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT BUT WILL HESITATE ABOUT TAKING ON THE WHOLE OF LATIN AMERICA.
- 2. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT WE CAN GIVE EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE AMERICANS NOT TO TREAT THE ISSUE AS ''A BIT OF A NUISANCE'' BUT TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT IN LATIN AMERICA TO DENY THE ARGENTINES THE MAJORITY THEY NEED.
- 3. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE TO HELP. I RATHER DOUBT IT. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR US TO SEND

.

3. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN DO HERE TO HELP. I RATHER DOUBT IT. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR US TO SEND A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO PRESS REPORTS OF THE OAS MEETING ON 26 APRIL AND SETTING OUT THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW, OUR LETTER TO BE CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MY INITIAL REACTION IS THAT SUCH ACTION MIGHT DO US MORE HARM THAN GOOD WITH ANY WAVERERS IN THE OAS: WOULD NOT 'INTERFERENCE' BY THE UK (A NON-MEMBER) IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OAS HAVE THE EFFECT OF CLOSING RANKS? THERE IS THE OTHER RISK THAT HOWEVER INVALID THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION, THE ARGENTINES WOULD RIPOSTE BY ACCUSING US OF BEING OFFSIDE IN INSTIGATING ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE EC AND OTHERS.

4. HOWEVER THE ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE UN CHARTER ARE GOOD AND THE AMERICANS ARE PROBABLY BEST PLACED TO DEPLOY THEM TO DISCOURAGE RIO TREATY STATES FROM VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS. THESE ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE CHARTER AND THEY MIGHT THEREFORE CARRY WEIGHT WITH LEGALISTIC LATINS. 5. THE ARGUMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS SEIZED OF THE ISSUE AND HAS ADOPTED RESOLUTION 502 WHICH BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLES 40 AND 25 IS BINDING ON ALL MEMBER STATES. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE CHARTER. WHILST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS EXERCISING THIS RESPONSIBILITY A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT OR AGENCY SUCH AS THE RIO TREATY OR THE OAS, SHOULD NOT INTERFERE. SECONDLY, ARTICLE 53(1) OF THE CHARTER PROVIDES THAT ''NO ENFORCEMENT ACTION SHALL BE TAKEN UNDER REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR BY REGIONAL AGENCIES WITHOUT THE AUTHORISATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. " WHAT ARGENTINA IS APPARENTLY PLANNING TO PROPOSE ON 26 APRIL IS THE TYPE OF MEASURE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS AUTHORISED TO IMPOSE UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE CHARTER IE ENFORCEMENT. ACCORDINGLY, ADOPTION OF ARGENTINE PROPOSALS UNDER THE RIO TREATY WOULD AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 53 OF THE CHARTER. ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER PROVIDES THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN CHARTER OBLIGATIONS AND THOSE UNDER OTHER TREATIES, THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER "SHALL PREVAIL". FINALLY, WHILST ARTICLES 52 AND 53 OF THE CHARTER ALLOW FOR THE EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL ARRANGE-MENTS AND AGENCIES FOR DEALING WITH MATTERS TO DO WITH THE MAINTENANE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, ARTICLE 52 DOES SO ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY "'ARE APPROPRIATE FOR REGIONAL ACTION". BECAUSE THE UK IS NEITHER A MEMBER OF THE DAS NOR A PARTY TO THE RIO TREATY, THE PRESENT MATTER IS MANIFESTLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE REGIONAL ACTION.

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

(29)

48

PS NR ONSLOW
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIPKIND
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/DEF · D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/HKGD

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

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PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER MR HAWTIN MR PERETZ

H.M.TSY

MR PERETZ MR ILETT MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR. R. ARMSTRONG, DIO Cab. Office

RESIDENT CLERK

HD/PLANNING STAFF

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 380
SECRET
FM BRASILIA 212300Z APR 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 21 APRIL
INFO FLASH MODUK

YOUR TELNO 79: BRITISH TASK FORCE DEPLOYMENT

- 1. AT MY INVITATION, ADMIRAL ARATANHA CALLED ON ME AT HOME THIS EVENING. I SPOKE TO HIM AS PROPOSED.
- 2. ARATANHA SAID WITHOUT HESITATION THAT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT NO BRAZILIAN NAVY SHIPS, WHETHER SURFACE OR SUBMARINE, WOULD OPERATE OUTSIDE BRAZILIAN TERRITORIAL WATER. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE KEPT WELL WITHIN THE 200 MILE LIMIT. HE ADDED THAT BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A SIMILAR RESTRICTION. HE IMPLIED THAT BOTH NAVY AND AIR FORCE WERE DETERMINED TO STEER WELL CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT IN A POSSIBLE CONFLICT.

 3. IN VIEW OF THIS SURPRISINGLY STRAIGHT ANSWER, I THEN

ASKED ARATANHA WHAT WE SHOULD MAKE OF NEWSPAPER STORIES

THAT THE BRAZILIANS WERE CONTEMPLATING SELLING BANDEIRANTE



ATTIM RHAT WE SHOULD PIRKE OF REWSFAFER STORIES THAT THE BRAZILIANS WERE CONTEMPLATING SELLING BANDEIRANTE NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO ARGENTINA. HE REPEATED THAT ALL THREE BRAZILIAN SERVICES WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT. THE ARGENTINES HAD INDEED TAKEN SOUNDINGS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SUCH AIRCRAFT: BUT HE HINTED. WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO. THAT THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD TURN DOWN THIS REQUEST. HE REMARKED THAT THE BRAZILIANS HAD BEEN TRYING TO SELL XINGU AIRCRAFT TO THE ARGENTINES FOR THREE YEARS WITHOUT SUCCESS. IMPLYING THAT THEY WOULD NOT LOOK FAVOURABLY ON A SUDDEN REQUEST FOR BANDEIRANTE AIRCRAFT IN PRESENT TRICKY CIRCUMSTANCES. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, IT WOULD BE PHYSICALLY DIFFICULT TO TRANSFER SUCH AIRCRAFT TO ARGENTINA IN TIME FOR HER TO MAKE ANY USE OF THEM. COMMENT 4. I KNOW ARATANHA WELL ENOUGH TO BE CONFIDENT THAT HE WAS GIVING ME A STRAIGHT ANSWER, THOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW THE FULL STORY ABOUT THE BANDEIRANTES. I CONCLUDE FROM THIS: THAT OUR TASK FORCE NEED HAVE NO WORRY ABOUT ENCOUNTERING A STRAY BRAZILIAN SUBMARINE OUTSIDE PRAZILIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND THAT REPORTS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE SECURED BRAZILIAN (B) AGREEMENT TO THE TRANSFER OF BANDEIRANTE MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ARE OF QUESTIONABLE AUTHENTICITY. ADMIRAL ARATANHA ASKED THAT HIS WARM REGARDS SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE FIRST SEA LORD. HE ALSO MADE WARM MENTION OF HIS MEETING WITH CDS IN 1977. HARDING NNNN SENT AT 212330Z E ANY MORE PAL COS I HAVE THAT

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

ADVANCE COPY

1. Husd PS/MR ONSLOW -PS/MR RIPKIND

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF · D

. HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

-HD/HHOD

RESIDENT CLERK

(29)

PS No.10 DOWNING

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR MCINTYRE

H.M. TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY

SAPU CABINET OFFICE MR FULLER

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 212145Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 146 OF 21 APRIL

FLASH MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDED HOLY SEE

CHILE/ARGENTINA

1. SENIOR CHILEAN AIR FORCE GENERAL TELLS US THE PRESIDENT INFORMED THE JUNTA THIS MORNING THAT THE POPE HAS SUMMONED THE CHILEAN AND ARGENTINE AMBASSADORS TO A PRIVATE AUDIENCE TOMORROW (22 APRIL), IN ORDER TO URGE THEM TO REACH A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE BEAGLE DISPUTE BY 26/27 APRIL. COLONEL VIDELA, UNDER SECRETARY AT THE MFA HERE WILL BE FLYING TO ROME IMMEDIATELY. 2. CHILEANS DO NOT SEEM TO THINK THAT ARGENTINES WILL SHOW SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO ENABLE SOLUTION TO BE REACHED, BUT ARE NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY OF SOME MOVEMENT. IN THE MEANTIME, PINOCHET HAS ASKED THE OTHER COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND NOT TO SANCTION ANY ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS PROVO-CATIVE BY ARGENTINA FOR THE TIME BEING. I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ON IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR US.

3. ON PAST FORM UNLESS POPE ACTUALLY GIVES THEM ULTIMATUM , ARGENTINES CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO KEEP THE CHILEANS AND POPE IN PLAY FOR A WHILE LONGER BY HINTING AT POSSIBILITY OF MINOR CONCESSIONS. 4. GRATEFUL IF MODUK COULD ARRANGE SUITABLE INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (SIC EAA/89F).

HEATH

DISTRIBUTION

HO
MOD
PAYMASTER GENERAL
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
MR. WADE-GERY



10 DOWNING STREET

0

21 April 1982

From the Private Secretary

Dear Film,

Mr. Pym's Visit to Washington

Thank you for your letter of today's date. The Prime Minister has the following comments.

She was grateful that a new paragraph had been produced so quickly on the possibility of a UN peace-keeping force but agrees with Mr. Pym that it should be kept in reserve. Indeed, the Prime Minister would welcome a paper which considered this idea and all its implications in some detail, together with advice on the circumstances in which it might be in our interests to promote it. Perhaps David Wright would consider how this could best be handled in the form of a paper for OD(SA).

The Prime Minister's comments on the three draft telegrams are as follows:

First telegram

The references to "my limited time with Haig" and "I do not want the talks with Haig to monopolise the time available" might, if conveyed in that form to US officials, give a wrong impression about the central importance we attach to the talks with Haig. (I am sure that this is purely a drafting matter and you will know best how to deal with it)

Second telegram

In paragraph 1(a), there would be advantage in adding to the last sentence the phrase "whereas the Argentines would be only about 200 miles away".

As regards paragraph 1(b) perhaps the first sentence could read "to have three nominees of the Argentine Government in each Council would be disproportionate". The Prime Minister realises that the language you produced was before OD(SA) this morning but is inclined to think that it is hard to argue against the procedure of nomination as such. If we do, we shall have to fall back on the alternative of election and it would be even more objectionable to give voting rights to the Argentine population on the Islands.

CONFIDENTIAL / Then,

Ma

Finally, the Prime Minister has asked whether it might not be wise for the Attorney General to examine the texts as they have emerged. Perhaps you could consider this point as well.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

you we will be .

John Holmes, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A J Coles Esq



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO Secretary of the Cabinet

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone: 01-233 8319 AND PERSONAL UK EYES A



Copy No 3 of 4 Copies

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London swia 2As Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A08179

· 21 April 1982

Seen by Mine Newster. A. J. C. 21.

After this morning's meeting of OD(SA) the Chief of the Defence Staff told the Prime Minister that it had been possible to identify the location of the Argentine naval force including the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo in a patrol area between the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands Maritime Exclusion Zone He had ordered one of the SSNs in the MEZ to proceed in the direction of the area in which the Argentine naval force was patrolling. Its distance from the area was about two days' steaming. The object of this manoeuvre was to reduce the time which it would take the submarine to carry out an attack on the Argentine naval force, if Ministers were to decide that it should do so.

This manoeuvre would take the SSN outside the MEZ. Outside the MEZ she would be under "high seas" rules of engagement, and would not be authorised to attack an Argentine surface warship save in self-defence. The Chief of the Defence Staff proposed, however, and the Prime Minister agreed, that any submarine detected by the SSN and not classified nuclear might be presumed to be Argentine and might be attacked.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles and Brian Fall.

ROBERY ARMSTRONG

D B Omand Esq

RESTRICTED FM MADRID 211110Z APR 82 TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 21 APRIL AMD TO PRIORITY MOD (DI3 WEST) INFO GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL), UKMIS NEW YORK.



MY TELS NOS 206 AND 209 : SPAIN AND ARGENTINA

- 1. THE EXTREME RIGHT WING FALANGIST (FRANCOIST) ORGANISATION STAGED A STREET MARCH IN MADRID DURING THE EVENING OF 19 APRIL TO EXPRESS SPANISH SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA OVER THE FALKLANDS. DEMONSTRATORS SET FIRE TO TWO UNION JACKS AND CALLED FOR SPANISH RECOVERY OF GIBRALTAR. OTHER SLOGANS ATTACKED THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND MONARCHY, AND CALLED ON THE LEADING PLOTTERS NOW ON TRIAL FOR LAST YEAR'S ATTEMPTED COUP TO SAVE SPANISH HONOUR, MILITARY MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO RECAPTURE GIBRALTAR. BETWEEN 5,000 -10,000 TURNED OUT (THE ORGANISERS CLAIMED 100,000), A BIG CROWD FOR A POLITICALLY MARGINAL ORGANISATION TO MARSHALL. MANY LOOKED RESPECTABLE AND WELL-DRESSED.
- 2. THE BRITISH COUNCIL PREMISES HERE (AS WELL AS THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN BARCELONA) HAD BEEN DAUBED WITH PRO-ARGENTINA SLOGANS IN ADVANCE OF THE DEMONSTRATION. AFTER THE MAIN DEMONSTRATION, SMALL GROUPS PASSED BY THE EMBASSY AND THE COUNCIL. BUT THE POLICE PROVIDED AMPLE PROTECTION AND PREVENTED THEM FROM LOITERING OR REMAINING IN THE VICINITY. FOR THIS I HAVE THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER (SECOND TUR), WHO MADE CLEAR HIS ATTITUDE.
- 3. THE FALANGE ARE A TINY IF VOCAL MINORITY . NEVERTHELESS. THEIR PUBLIC DEMONSTATION OFSUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA AND LINKAGE OF THE FALKLANDS WITH GIBRALTAR WILL HAVE STRUCK A CHORD WITH MANY SPANIARDS OF LESS EXTREME VIEWS. FOR SPANISH PUBLIC OPINION THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE OVER THE FALKLANDS IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE COLONIAL MOTIVE, AND SYMPATHY WITH THEIR KITH AND KIN IS STRONG. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE STRONG AND VOCAL FEELINGS, WHICH MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE BOUND TO INFLAME.
- 4. MOD PLEASE CONNECT WITH YOUR 201415Z TO DA.

PARSONS

FCO

SED

CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS)

MR LITTLER MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ MR ILETT . . .)

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

TREASURY

COMPTENDED ST.

R

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 April 1982

dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: GUYANA

Mr. Forbes Burnham telephoned the Prime Minister this afternoon.

The Prime Minister thanked him for the help which Guyana had given in connection with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. After our experience in recent weeks we now knew how Guyana felt about the threat from Venezuela. Mr. Burnham said that Guyana would continue to give the United Kingdom full support. He enquired whether the Falklands situation was now any easier. The Prime Minister said that it was not. Invaders were invaders and we had to act accordingly. Mr. Burnham said that some people seemed to find it difficult to recognise that force had been blatantly used. The only possible position of principle was one of complete support for the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister commented that it was not just a matter of United Kingdom interests. If Argentina succeeded, other countries like Guyana could suffer as a consequence. We were dealing with international highway robbery.

Mr. Burnham said that if we required any further specific help he hoped we would let him know. There was a move to set up a non-aligned meeting. Guyana was a member of the governing body and would support the British position in any non-aligned discussion. The Prime Minister thanked him; no-one must gain from unprovoked aggression. Agreeing, Mr. Burnham said that there should be no face-saving device either. Why should we save the face of an aggressor?

The Prime Minister said that she had just had talks with the President of Cameroon and was hopeful that his influence in the non-aligned movement would also be helpful. She was most grateful for Mr. Burnham's help and would not forget it.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LINE TO BE TAKEN BY NEWS DEPARTMENT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

ON THE RECORD

It is true that threatening letters from an Argentine terrorist group called Gadim have been received in Montevideo. It is clearly the responsibility of the British Government to take all threats to British citizens seriously and a close watch is being kept on the situation.

UNATTRIBUTABLE

Experience in recent years has shown that Argentine security services and other Argentine groups are quite capable of mounting widespread terrorist action. Any threats are therefore viewed seriously. But the British Government cannot believe that the Argentine authorities would in practice authorise or connive at acts which would be so damaging to their international standing.

LINE TO BE FED TO THE PRESS BY NEWS DEPARTMENT

Reports have been received from Latin American sources that letters have been sent by an Argentine terrorist group calling itself Gadim (the Armed Group for the Defence of the Falkland Islands) threatening reprisals against British subjects in the event of hostilities between Britain and Argentina. It is difficult to know how seriously to take this threat and other possible threats of terrorist action against British citizens in the area. But in the light of the past record of the Argentine security services and free-lance terrorist groups, such threats cannot be dismissed.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR TERENCE LEWIN GCB MVO DSC DSC

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SWIA 2HB THE

Telephone 01-218 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

Year aire:

At the Prime Minister review the Tubject of leaflets last myst, she might be interested to cast a quick eper over these.

Ahead of the jame for once!

Zit.

- 1. It is assessed that the most effective target audiences for these leaflets would be:
 - a. The conscript soldiers of the garrison
 - b. The Falkland Islanders.
- 2. The Conscript Soldiers. Although intelligence about the morale of the garrison is fragmentary and mainly based on the debriefs of those evacuated on 13 April 1982 it is clear that the majority of the conscript element of the garrison are poorly administered, badly briefed and homesick. The little they know about the British Task Force is likely to have increased their apprehensions and sense of isolation. Leaflets 1 and 2 which are attached are intended for this target audience.
- 3. The Falkland Islanders. Leaflet No 3, attached, is a letter drafted and signed by the Governor Mr Rex Hunt, to the islanders. Its intention is to reassure them. It deliberately is unspecific in nature so that it will remain relevant in a wide range of circumstances. We assess that delivery of this leaflet could also have a morale weakening effect on members of the garrison who see it.



SAFE CONDUCT PASS

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH FORCES

The soldier who bears this pass has signalled his desire to cease lighting. He is to be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention and is to be evacuated from the area of operations as soon as possible. He is to be given food and medical treatment if he requires it and is then to be held in a place of shelter to await repatriation.

J. Mittheward

J F WOODWARD Rear Admiral Commander, British Forces

INSTRUCCIONES A LAS FUERZAS BRITANICAS

El soldado que porta este pase ha senalado su deseo de no seguir peleando. Se le tratará estrictamente de acuerdo a lo estipulado por la Convención de Ginebra y deberá ser evacuado del área de operaciones lo más prento posible. Se le suministrará alimentos y tratamiento médico de ser necesario y después será internado en un lugar de albergue donde esperará su repatriación.

I houselward

J F WOODWARD Rear Admiral, Comandante en Jele de las Fuerzas Britanicas

COMO UTILIZAR ESTE PASE

Si Vd. desea acogerse a las ventajas ofrecidas en este pase, Vd. deberá hacer lo siguiente :

- a. Deshacerse de su arma.
- b. Mantener este pase en posición bien visible.
- c. Avanzar hacia el integrante de las fuerzas británicas más próximo

PASE DE SALVO CONDUCTO



Dirigida a :

General de Brigada Don Mario Benjamin Menendez, Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Argentinas.

Indudablemente Vd. y el que suscribe comprendemos perfectamente la muy seria situación militar ante la cual se encuentran hoy día Vd. y las fuerzas militares bajo su comando. No habrá escapado a su criterio que las fuerzas británicas bajo mi comando han logrado establecer una presencia dominante en el área, y de que no existe posibilidad alguna de que las suyas reciban ayuda o socorro.

Ahora las cosas han llegado al punto que hacen necesario que Vd. ponga en tela de juicio la justificación de continuar la resistencia ante fuerzas tan abrumadoras. Es Vd. que tiene que decidir respecto el bienestar suyo personal, la de sus fuerzas y de la población civil.

Hasta el momento su comportamiento indica claramente que la preservacion de vidas humanas es para Vd. motivo de primerísima importancia, y tengo la certeza de que esta motivación seguirá siendo para Vd. de primordial consideración.

Entiendo perfectamente que antes de hacerme llegar su decisión, o comunicarla a los tropas bajo su comando, Vd. querrá valorar su posición minusciosamente. No obstante, y vistas las dificultades en lo que tiene que ver con las comunicaciones internas dentro de las islas, hago llegar a Vd. una copia de las órdenes impartidas a mis fuerzas, las que van reproducidas al dorso de la presente.

Wittelward

Rear Admiral John Forster Woodward, Royal Navy. Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Britanicas.

Instructions to British Forces The soldier who bears this pass has signalled his desire to cease fighting. He is to be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention and is to be evacuated from the are of operations as soon as possible. We into the desire the conventions as soon as possible.

to cease fighting. He is to be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention and is to be evacuated from the area of operations as soon as possible. He is to be given food and medical treatment if he requires it and is then to be held in a place of shelter to await repatriation.

J F WOODWARD Rear Admiral Commander, British Forces

(Translation of above)

How to Use this Pass (In Spanish)

If you wish to take advantage of the terms offered in this pass you should take the following action:

- a. Lay down your weapon.
- b. Hold this pass in a prominent position.
- c. Move forward to the nearest member of the British Forces.

SAFE CONDUCT PASS (In Spanish)

From: Rear Admiral John Forster Woodward, Royal Navy Commander British Forces

To: Brigadier Mario Benjamin Menendez Commander, Argentine Forces


We are both aware of the serious military situation which now confronts you and your men. The forces under my command have established a dominating presence in this area and there can be no prospect of your garrison being relieved.

Matters have now reached the point where you must consider whether there is any further point in maintaining resistance in the face of such overwhelming odds. Upon your decision rests the well-being of yourself, your troops and the civilian populace. Until now you have behaved in a way which indicates that you have a genuine concern for the preservation of life. I am sure that this consideration will remain pre-eminent in your mind.

Clearly you will wish to consider your position in detail before communicating your decision to me and to your men. However, recognising the difficulties in internal communications within the Islands, I am providing you with a copy of my instructions to my troops. It is reproduced on the reverse of this letter.

!! ISLAS DE CONDENADOS!!

(Islands of the Condemned)



SOLDIERS OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES

You are completely alone. There is no hope whatever of help or relief from your Country. You are condemned to the sad task of defending a remote island. Very soon now, you will feel all the rigours of a cruel and heartless winter and the Argentine Navy is not in any condition to supply the food and reinforcements which you so badly need. Your families live with a tremendous terror that they will never see you again. All this is the perfect truth, as you well know.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR YOUR BEING IN THIS TERRIBLE SITUATION?

Those responsible are the selfish people who have nominated themselves as the leaders of Argentina without taking into consideration the will of the Argentine people and who launched you on an absurd adventure knowing that there was no hope of success whatever. Now, those same leaders are trying to hide their clumsy incompetence behind the recognised courage of the Argentine soldier.

SOLDIERS! YOU HAVE DONE EVERYTHING YOUR COUNTRY COULD DEMAND OF YOU. ONLY THE GENERALS ARE DEMANDING MORE!

It is unjust for you to pay with your lives for the tortuous ambitions of those responsible for this adventure which is regarded so badly by the rest of the world.

Note: This is a literal translation of the Spanish text. We have consulted the translator, a native of the area, and he advises that this form of emotive language is best suited to the aim.



Il Message from His Excellency the Governor

Mr Rex Hunt CMG

The British Task Force is now at hand and blockading the Islands. I am sorry that I cannot be with it in person but am confident that I shall rejoin you shortly.

Your terrible experience under the occupying force will soon be ended. I know that you will continue to be patient and resolute. Do nothing to antagonise the Argentines and stay under cover until the Task Force has liberated you.

My thoughts and feelings are with you all in this final hour of trial before the aggressors are defeated and your freedom is restored.

Best wishes and God bless you.

R. M. HUNT

Governor and Commander-in-Chief

The Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.

(1). At the request of the Foreign Office, the word 'blockade' has been deleted in favour of the phrase 'denying Argentine access to'

MR. PYM'S STATEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS

m

Mr. Pym followed the text which you saw beforehand. His mission to Washington attracted good wishes from many speakers. The general tone was low key but serious, with the Opposition pressing harder for thought to be given to further UN involvement.

Denis Healey went out of his way to praise Mr. Haig's "intellectual, plausible and moral stamina" - no doubt hoping that this would help him to get an appointment during his forthcoming US visit. He sought assurances about the right to settlement here for any islander; suggested that Mr. Pym was giving less prominence than you to the wishes of the islanders; and pressed hard on the possibility of a UN interim administrator. He also returned to the final point in closing remarks. David Steel said that there might be a long term role for the UN, but it would be right to concentrate on the Haig effort now. Julian Amery floated ideas for a wide-ranging South Atlantic community, established to develop the Antarctic continent. This might provide a plausible fig-leaf for Argentine withdrawal. Enoch Powell sought - and received - confirmation that it was still our intention to restore British administration of the Islands. Judith Hart wanted priority to be given to peace as the fleet moved on. Mr. Pym stressed that we had done nothing other than give priority to peace. David Owen said that Mr. Pym should tell the Americans that, if Argentina did not respond to British proposals, then a time must come when we must expect the US to impose economic sanctions. He accepted that, if peaceful approaches failed, there would be a time to try other means.

Nicholas Winterton asked how there could be talk of interim arrangements. As soon as the Argentines evacuated, we would administrate. Ioan Evans asked Mr. Pym to go to the United Nations as well as to see Mr. Haig, and George Foulkes suggested that it was time to meet the Argentine Foreign Secretary face to face, perhaps under US auspices. Patrick Cormack said we could be patient, but we could not tolerate armed or active Argentinian presence. The sovereignty issue should be referred to the ICJ. Mr. Pym said that we had no doubts about sovereignty.

If others had doubts, they should challenge our position.

The Labour Government had put the question on the table at the ICJ, but Argentina had refused to acknowledge jurisdiction.

David Stoddart wanted Mr. Haig warned that Fascist success in the Falklands would encourage Fascists everywhere, like those now making themselves heard in Spain. Mr. Pym replied that he had no doubt the US administration was as aware of the principles at stake as we were. Alan Clark stressed that our rights to South Georgia and to the mineral wealth of Antarctica were in no way determined on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. Andrew Faulds was a lone and unpopular voice arguing that sovereignty would inevitably be transferred at some stage, so that unnecessary confrontation could be avoided by an interim administration under three flags. Winston Churchill stressed the basic issues at stake. A harmless question from Dick Douglas, asking Mr. Pym to see President Reagan as well as Mr. Haig in the search for peace, led Mr. Pym to give a response which included his unfortunate statement that we would continue to exclude military action as long as the negotiations were in play. This was not picked up at the time, and Denis Healey followed with his concluding question.





R E G Jeeps Esq CBE Chairman The Sports Council 16 Upper Woburn Place LONDON WC1H OQP

dra brile:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SWIP 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

21 April 1982

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A. J C. 7

At our meeting last week we discussed briefly the question of sporting contacts with Argentina. I undertook to write to you setting out the Government's policy on such contacts as seen in present circumstances.

You have already provided my officials with some details of forthcoming international events and competitions scheduled over the next few months in which British and Argentinian teams may take part. At present, the Government has no objection to British involvement in international sporting events and competitions involving Argentina and other countries. However, I urge all British sports governing bodies to refrain from bi-lateral competition against Argentinian teams, whether here or in Argentina, and to refrain from arranging further fixtures. The FCO is, in any case, advising all UK nationals against visiting Argentina for any purpose. I enclose a copy of a Parliamentary Question which I am answering in the House this afternoon.

This therefore means that I must formally ask you to ensure that the Sports Council withholds for the time being any grant-aid for governing bodies or individuals that would normally be available to support such visits or matches in the UK or Argentina. You will of course wish to advise governing bodies of my direction, and I should be grateful if at the same time you would advise them of the Government's views outlined in the preceding paragraph and in my written Answer.

The Government is keeping its overall policy towards Argentina under constant review. I cannot therefore rule out the possibility that we may find it necessary to seek a wider sporting boycott of Argentina as part of our more general diplomatic and political response to the invasion of the Falkland Islands. I shall of course let you know immediately of any changes in the Government's attitude so far as sport is affected.

NEIL MACFARLANE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr Tom Pendry (Lab - Stalybridge and Hyde):

To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, what advice has been sought from the various sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom on sporting relations with Argentina following the Argentine invasion and continuing occupation of the Falkland Islands.

Mr Tom Pendry (Lab - Stalybridge and Hyde):

To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, whether, in view of the Argentine invasion and continuing occupation of the Falkland Islands, in violation of United Nations Resolution 502, he will consider the use of sporting sanctions in addition to the other measures already taken by the Government, and accordingly, will seek early meetings with the appropriate sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom.

Mr Tom Pendry (Lab - Stalybridge and Hyde):

To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, what advice he has to offer the various sports governing bodies in the United Kingdom on sporting relations with Argentina following the Argentine invasion and continuing occupation of the Falkland Islands.


MR NEIL MACFARLANE

There are several international sporting events and competitions scheduled to take place over the next few months in which British and Argentinian teams will participate with other countries.

At the moment, the Government sees no objection to British teams participating in such events. I urge British sports governing bodies not to compete bi-laterally against Argentinian teams, whether here or in Argentina, and to refrain from arranging further fixtures. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are advising UK nationals (sporting or otherwise) against visiting Argentina at this time.

Our position is kept under constant review in the light of changing circumstances. I can say no more at this stage, particularly on the possibility of seeking a wider sporting boycott of Argentina. I have written to the Sports Council Chairman explaining the Government's position at this stage and shall be advising the governing bodies accordingly.

1447 1448 1449/81/82 (8)



TODAY SUMMARY APRIL 21 FALKLANDS ARGENTINA Argentine leaders reported as now seeing little hope of a diplomatic settlement following initial UK reaction to their proposals. Junta feels it cannot make any further concessions. OAS to meet on Monday to consider Argentine appeal for military help against UK. Senior ministers will today consider in detail Argentine proposals before Mr Pym leaves for Washington by Concorde Interviewed Julian Amery calls for a major Southern Hemisphere conference to resolve the Falklands issue and other problems. He stresses the argentines must withdraw before any such conference could be convened. Antartic survey member describes being taken prisoner following the surrender of marines on South Georgia. Island councillor John Cheek reports from USA on his trip to rally support for Falklands. Says the response from press and public has been "tremendous". Stresses the islanders case for self determination and says many would rather leave than live under Argentine administration. TASK FORCE Reported as proceeding at full speed. Said to be in position tomorrow to launch an assault on South Georgia. But such military action not seen as likely while diplomatic negotiations continue. DEFENCE WHILE PAPER Defence White Pær to be published next week. BBC Defence. Correspondent says that despite speculation to the contrary there has been no rewriting of the white paper to give more resources and an expanded role to the surface fleet. OTHER NEWS STREET RIOT 22 arrested and five police injured after street disturbance in Notting Hill. DEATH PENALTY Vivian Bendall puts down three ammendments to Criminal Justice Bill which will give MPs the chance to vote again on death penalty. N IRELAND BOMBS Two killed after spate of car bombs in N Ireland. Report on reactions of shopkeepers in Strabane where main square severely damaged. 1.

UN VETO US uses veto to prevent security council condemnation of Israel for the incident in which an Israeli soldier fired on Arab worshippers. OTHER ITEMS British Tourist Board urges the introduction of museum charges to raise cash for museums to market themselves more effectively. Audit report published by Environment Dept show some councils as not adequately checking overtime payments. AUEW is worried that large redundancy payments may be encouraging workers to give up jobs they would do better retaining. PB 2

MY TELNO 1376: FALKLANDS

- 1. HAIG ASKED ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN URGENTLY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO OUR PROPOSED OPERATION, AN EVENT THAT HE WAS SURE WOULD ALTER THE WHOLE SCENE. HIS IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS THE PROBLEM THAT IT WOULD CAUSE FOR THE US IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH ARGENTINA. THE LATTER WOULD REGARD IT AS AN ACT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND LONDON, PARTICULARLY IF YOU WERE ARRIVING AT ABOUT THE TIME THE OPERATION WAS TAKING PLACE, OR IF YOU WERE HERE WHEN IT TOOK PLACE.
- 2. IN ANY EVENT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD KNOW THAT THEY, THE AMERICANS, MUST HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTENDED INVASION. HAIG TOLD ME THAT IN FACT THEY HAD COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE NOW OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TASK FORCE OFF SOUTH GEORGIA. THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS IF THE AMERICANS HAD DONE NOTHING, HAVING RECEIVED INFORMATION OF BRITISH MILITARY INTENTIONS. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THE ARGENTINIAN JUNTA ADVANCE NOTICE OF OUR INTENDED OPERATION. HE WOULD SAY THAT THEY KNEW ABOUT THIS FROM THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. HE WOULD ONLY NOTIFY THEM AT A SUFFICIENTLY LATE TIME SO THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE NO MILITARY THREAT FOR US. IF THE AMERICANS ACTED IN THIS WAY THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW EVEN-HANDEDNESS TO THE ARGENTINIANS AND THIS WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CONTINUE THEIR ROLE AS GO-BETWEEN IN THE NEGOTIATION.
- 3. I EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTION TO WHAT HAIG HAD TOLD ME. IT
 WOULD BE TAKEN EXTREMELY ADVERSELY IN LONDON AS GOING MUCH FURTHER
 THAN THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEGOTIATING NEUTRALLTY REQUIRED. TO
 HAND ON TO THE ARGENTINIANS US INTELLIGENCE ABOUT BRITISH MOVEMENTS
 AND INTENTIONS AT AN EXTREMELY DELICATE MOMENT WAS TO HELP THEM
 AND WAS NOT SIMPLY TO BE NEUTRAL. BUT THERE WAS AN EVEN MORE
 SERIOUS OBJECTION. THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT WELL TUNK SUCH PRIOR
 INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THEIR OWN USE AGAINST OUR INVASION
 FORCE. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY GIVE THE MARINES AND OTHER
 ARGENTINIANS WHO WERE PRESENT IN SOUTH GEORGIAN ADVANCE WARNING.
 THEY MIGHT WELL GIVE THEIR SUBMARINES INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK OUR
 SHIPS. THEY COULD MOUNT A SUICIDE AIR ATTACK UPON OUR NAVAL
 FORCES. AS SOON AS THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN THEM SUCH INFORMATION
 THEY WOULD NO DOUBT BROADCAST SOME INDIGNANT APPEAL TO THE WORLD.

NOT DO AT ALL IF PRIOR WARNING TO THE ARGENTINIANS LEAD TO MILITARY DIFFICULTIES FOR US. WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE TOGETHER A BIT LONGER AND THEY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY WOULD ABANDON THE IDEA OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. BUT THEY ASKED ME WHAT THEY COULD DO TO PRESERVE THEIR NEGOTIATING NEUTRALITY. I SAID THAT I MUST INSIST BEYOND A SHADWO OF A DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE PRIOR NOTICE TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HAIG GACE ME AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE ON THAT POINT. I SAID THAT I THOUGH THAT AS SOON AS OUR INVASION OF SOUTH GEORGIA BECAME PUBLIC AMERICANS WOULD NOT DOUBT SAY THAT THEY CONTINUED TO BELIVE THAT THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE AND THAT THEY HOPED THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD BE REACHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HAIG SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE THIS LINE. I SAID THAT I SHOULD NOT LEAVE HIM IN ANY DOUBT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POPULAR IN THE UK, WHERE IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT WE HAD A RIGHT TO RESTOR THE SITUATION AFTER THE ARGENTINIAN AGGRESSION AND IT WOULD NOT GO DOWN WELL IN LONDON IF THE AMERICANS APPEARED TO THE CRITICISING US IN THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS. HAIG SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THEY WOULD HAVE TO STRIKE AN EVEN-HANDED POSTURE ABOUT THE NON USE OF FORCE.

- 5. WE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS WHETHER THE US WOULD ADMIT TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAD HAD PRIOR NOTICE OF OUR INVASION. I SAID THAT IF THEY FELT IT NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THEY HAD HAD PRIOR NOTICE, THEY SHOULD BASSE THEMSELVES ON THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE AND NOT ON ANYTHING WE HAD TOLD THEM.
- 6. IN ASKING ME TO TELL YOU ALL THIS PERSONALLY ON A SECURE TELEPHONE LINE WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO, HAIG SAID THAT HE HOPED YOU WOULD GIVE THOUGHT TO THE LINE TO TAKE WHEN YOU ARRIVE HERE. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE MORE AWKWARD FOR THE AMERICANS IF OUR INVASION TOOK PLACE WHILE YOU WERE PRESENT IN WASHINGTON: IT WOULD BE LESS AWKWARD IF IT HAD ALREADY OCCURRED. BUT IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE HELPFUL TO WORK OUR CAREFULLY WHAT ATTITUDE TO ADOPT AND FOR THE AMERICANS TO BE TOLD WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF SAYING.

6. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THERE WOULD BE A TREMEMNDOUS TO DO AS A RESULT OF OUR INVASION, BUT NO DOUBT AFTER A DAY OR TWO IT . WOULD QUIETEN DOWN. HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD WHY WE WERE TAKING THIS ACTION. HE REALISED THE DESIRABILITY OF KEEPING UP MILITARY PRESSURE. THIS WAS CERTAINLY ONE WAY OF DOING IT, BUT IT WOULD OF COURSE INCITE STRONG LATIN AMERICAN INDIGNATION. THIS WOULD RAISE PROBLEMS IN THE RIO TREATY WHICH WE SHOULD DISCUSS LATER. 7. HAIG SIAD THAT HE HAD GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE MILITARY EFFICACY OF A LANDING ON THE FALKLAND ISLAND THEMSELVES. BUT HE SAW THE ATTRACTIONS OF WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO IN SOUTH GEROGIA. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THINKS WE ARE RIGHT TO PROCEED ON THESE LINES, THOUGH IT MAKES HIS OWN NEGOTIATING ROLE MORE DIFFICULT. 8. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD HIS PROBLEM BUT I MUST ASK HIM TO REALISE THAT THE MORE HE EXPRESSED OPPOSITION PUBLICLY TO WHAT WE WERE DOING IN SOUTH GEORGIA, THE GREATER WOULD BE THE RESENTMENT IN THE UK HOWEVER MUCH THIS MIGHT HELP HIM WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. 9. AS OUR CONVERSATION WAS ENDING HAIG RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS TRYING TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH HIM. HAIG SUSPECTED THAT THEY MIGHT WELL HAVE GOT WIND OF THE INVASION AND WOULD BE ASKING FOR US INTERVENTION WITH US. 10. I TOLD HAIG THAT OUR DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AND THERE COULD BE NO CONCEIVABLE QUESTION OF ITS GOING BACK BECAUSE OF SOME NEW PROPOSAL BY THE ARGENTINIANS. IN ANY VENT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING WITH COSTA MENDEZ? HE COULD NOT DELIVER. HAIG AGREED ADDING THAT HE WAS A COMPLETE LIAR. HENDERSON NNNN



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10 DOWNING STREET

Prince Mender

The cochanger Tologram 1376 is in the Hor Box. Sobritted beryour

Den Silt



Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Mr Pym's Statement in the House of Commons

As you know, Mr Pym is to make his statement at 3.30 this afternoon. I enclose a draft which reflects his comments on an earlier version but which he has not yet had time to see in its present form. He will do so shortly after 2 o'clock to meet the deadline, and I shall be grateful if you will let me have by telephone any comments which the Prime Minister may have.

Muserar,

(B J P Fall) Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street

BNW

Falkland Islands: Statement in the House of Commons, Wednesday 21 April 1982

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a brief statement on the Falkland Islands.

My Rt Hon Friend told the House yesterday that I would be travelling to Washington tomorrow to discuss with Mr Haig our reactions to the latest Argentine proposals. I know I do so not only with the support of my Cabinet colleagues but of the whole House.

Any negotiation which is concluded satisfactorily must deal with certain critical points: in particular the arrangements for Argentine withdrawal; the nature of any interim administration of the Islands and the framework for the negotiations on the long-term solution to the dispute for which the United Nations Resolution calls. We put to Mr Haig, when he was in London, ideas which we believed would commend themselves to the House, and he subsequently took them to Buenos Aires. The latest Argentine proposals - despite Mr Haig's efforts - still fail to satisfy our essential requirements in certain important respects relating to these points. They reflect continuing efforts by Argentina to establish by her aggression and her defiance of the UN - a defiance continued and aggravated by her reinforcement of her invasion force - what could not be established by peaceful means.

We continue to keep in close touch with our friends. In particular, I was glad that a meeting of Community Foreign Ministers could be arranged yesterday under the auspices of the Belgian Presidency and that my colleagues were able to attend despite the inevitably short notice. I took the opportunity to thank them personally for their support and to explain the situation to them. They reaffirmed their support for us, emphasising the importance of securing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502, their hope for a peaceful solution and their gratitude to Mr Haig for his efforts.

Since I last reported to the House, messages from the Falklands suggest that the Islanders are still able to leave if they wish: a further party of 30 are on their way to Montevideo. Most of those leaving appear not to be permanent residents of the Islands.

The most recent contact with the 15 remaining scientists and wild-life photographers on South Georgia through the British Antarctic Survey was at 4 pm yesterday our time. I am happy to report that all were safe and well and in good heart.

These are some of the main issues I shall be discussing with Mr Haig, and I shall of course have some ideas of our own to put forward. I shall continue to keep the House informed on my return.

105

Mr yre

THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE AND THE ICJ

1. As requested, I <u>submit</u> a detailed answer to a possible Supplementary on previous references of the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies to the ICJ.

P R Fearn Emergency Unit

20 April 1982

cc PS

Mr Chamberlain

Parlimenting Unit.

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required as back grows to

Phr's grastions today.

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SUPPLEMENTARY

HAS HMG EVER TAKEN THE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE?

In 1947, the British Government proposed to Argentina that the dispute over the Falkland Islands Dependencies (which then included South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the area now known as British Antarctic Territory) should be submitted to the ICJ. Argentina refused this proposal. In 1949, the British Government offered to submit to the ICJ the dispute over Argentine and Chilean activities in the then Dependencies (this followed the establishment of a Chilean military base in Grahamland). This proposal was rejected by both Argentina and Chile. In 1951, the British Government again reiterated to Argentina its willingness to take the issue of the Dependencies to the ICJ, and this was again refused by Argentina. In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the ICJ against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by both Argentina and Chile. However, the Court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could only act if there was agreement between the parties recognising the Court's jurisdiction. Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

The British Government have never offered to take the dispute over sovereignty the Falkland Islands to the ICJ.



BACKGROUND NOTE

N. Markany

FALKLANDS

1201

UN AS TEMPORARY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

- 1. On 19 April Mr Healey suggested that the UN provide a temporary Administrator after Argentine forces had left the Falklands. Though similar arrangements were mooted for Trieste and Jerusalem in 1947, the only actual precedent for the UN acting as temporary administering authority is West Irian. In 1961 U Thant initiated discussions leading to agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia to transfer the administration of West Irian to a UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) under the Secretary-General who was to appoint a UN Administrator with discretion to transfer all or part of the administration of the territory to Indonesia at any point after 1 May 1963. This Agreement, which was endorsed by a Resolution of the General Assembly, also contained certain guarantees for the population including provisions for the exercise of the right of self-determination before the end of 1969. UNTEA took over the administration in October 1962 and sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia in May 1963. The 1969 plebiscite pronounced in favour of Indonesia, though its conduct was much criticised.
- 2. In the House of Commons on 14 April Mr Healey also referred to the 1947 crisis in the Dutch East Indies though here the UN did not act as Administering Authority but in its role as mediator. The UN Security Council established a Good Offices Committee leading in 1948 to a truce between Indonesia and the Netherlands which broke down. In January 1949 the Security Council called for the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia and the Good Offices Committee, renamed the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, was asked to assist the parties in implementing the resolution. Round table talks, facilitated by the Commission, agreed on a cease fire and the withdrawal of Dutch troops was supervised by UN military observers. A further round table conference (Netherlands/Indonesia/

UN Commission) in August 1949 drew up a Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty and transfer took place in December 1949. The question of West Irian was held over.

THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY 1150 Fifteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20071 KATHARINE GRAHAM April 20, 1982 Chairman of the Board Dear Prime Minister, I want to thank you very much indeed for seeing me last Friday when you were so preoccupied and busy with the crisis in the Falkland Islands. I enjoyed being able to get your views and understand some of your problems at first hand. It was also nice to see you again, after rather a long interval since I had been in London. I am still puzzled about the Anderson story, although I suppose it must be valid, since the Administration has not denied it. I feel very much for you, as I watch events unfold since we met, and I pray that some sort of accommodation may still be possible. Sincerely,

tay graham

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP 10 Downing Street London, SWl, England

WKDEL STRASBOURG

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 201445Z APR 82

TO FLASH UKDEL STRASBOURG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 25 OF 20 APRIL

YOUR TELNO 36 FALKLANDS DEBATE IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(FOR MARSDEN)

1. PLEASE SPEAK TO MRS CASTLE, MAKING CLEAR THAT YOU ARE TAKING A LINE WHICH HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY MR HURD. WE SEE GREAT IMPORTANCE IN MAINTAINING IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT THE COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WHICH HAS SO FAR BEEN SO EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND COMMISSION. MR HAIG HAS TOLD US THAT THIS HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE ARGENTINES IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM. THE ESSENTIAL THING IS TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES TO COMPLY WITH SCR 502. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TASK FORCE HAS SERVED THIS PURPOSE. IT WILL HAVE AN UNFORTUNATE EFFECT IF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT VOTE IS SEEN TO BE SPLIT BETWEEN TWO RIVAL TEXTS, ONE OF THEM APPEARING TO PUT LESS PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA AND MORE ON THE UK. THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT A TIME FOR THE WILL OF THE UK AND ITS SUPPORTERS IN THE COMMUNITY TO BE THOUGHT TO BE WEAKENING. DIFFERENT POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE PARLIAMENT WILL NATURALLY HAVE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, AND WILL EXPRESS THESE IN DEBATE. BUT SUCH DIFFERENCES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS HAVE NONETHELESS NOT PREVENTED A FAIRLY GENERAL ACROSS-PARTY POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THE E P CAN MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION BY FOLLOWING THE SAME PATTERN AND CONCENTRATING ON ONE SINGLE RESOLUTION.

PYM

DISTRIBUTION: -MINIMAL

ECD(E) S AM D ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION FALKLAND ISLANDS

1

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(29)

PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MRZ RZEFKEND

IMMEDIATE

PS/PUS MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

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MR URE

MR GILLMORE

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H.M. TSY

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

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BIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SL R: ARMSTRONG,

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Altereting - but only

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 26 OF 20 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

SITUATION IN THE FALKLANDS

1. A BRITISH MEMBER OF BISBA VISITED MRS CHRISTEL MERCER AT HER REQUEST AT HER HOTEL ON 18 APRIL. SHE IS AN ENGLISHWOMAN WHOSE AMERICAN HUSBAND HAD BEEN WORKING ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. TOGETHER WITH THEIR TWO SMALL CHILDREN THE MERCERS LEFT THE ISLANDS ON 17 APRIL AND WERE TRANSITING BUENOS AIRES ON THEIR WAY TO THE USA. MRS MERCER WANTED TO TALK TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF HMG AND IN PARTICULAR TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THE ISLANDERS:

(A) THEY NEEDED MORE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUT-

SIDE AND ADVICE WHETHER TO STAY OR LEAVE. PRACTICALLY ALL
THEIR RADIO AND OTHER PRIVATE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT HAD
BEEN CONFISCATED BY THE ARGENTINES AND THE BBC WORLD SERVICE
WAS THEIR ONLY SOURCE OF INFORMATION. IN PARTICULAR THOSE
EMPLOYED BY HMG ON CONTRACT WORK THROUGH ODA WANTED SOME CLEAR
DIRECTIVE ON WHETHER, WHEN AND HOW TO LEAVE.

(B) THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT HMG HAD NOT OFFERED FINANCIAL

- (B) THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT HMG HAD NOT OFFERED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE THEM TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. APPARENTLY THE MAJORITY OF THE FALKLANDERS CANNOT AFFORD TO LEAVE BY THEIR OWN MEANS.
- (C) THEY FEEL EXTREMELY ISOLATED AND ARE WORRIED ABOUT BEING CAUGHT IN CROSS-FIRE BETWEEN BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES. THIS FEELING, SAID MRS. MERCER, REFLECTED COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT WITH GOVERNER HUNT'S REMARKS MADE OVER THE BBC THAT THE FALKLANDERS WOULD PREFER TO STAND FAST EVEN IF IT CAME TO A SHOOT-OUT. THE MAJORITY WOULD WANT OUT FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD.
- 2. MORE GENERALLY THE MERCERS SAID THE LOCAL INHABITANTS OF STANLEY HAD BEEN REDUCED TO ABOUT 200 PEOPLE, MAINLY OFFICIALS AND ELDERLY. THE REMAINDER HAD FLED INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE. SO FAR LOCALS HAD BEEN POLITELY TREATED BY THE ARGENTINES BUT THEY FEAR BEING HELD HOSTAGES IN AN ARMED CONFLICT.
- 3. THE MERCERS ESTIMATED THERE ARE ABOUT EIGHT THOUSAND ARGENTINE TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS, MAINLY YOUNG CONSCRIPTS UNACCUSTOMED TO AND FEELING THE COLD WEATHER. LACK OF FOOD SUPPLIES FROM THE MAINLAND DROVE THE TROOPS TO BEG FOR FOOD FROM THE LOCALS. THE MILD WEATHER (IN FALKLAND TERMS) HAS ENABLED THESE TROOPS TO SLEEP IN TENTS AND IN SHACKS BUT SHOULD THIS CHANGE THE MERCERS CONSIDERED THEIR SITUATION WOULD GET DESPERATE BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT ACCOMMODATION. SANITATION IS ALSO INADEQUATE. THE MERCERS REPORTED ABOUT 200 CASES OF GASTROENTERITIS AND DYSENTERY AMONG THE TROOPS.
- A. THEY BELIEVE MOODY BROCK HAS BEEN MADE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND. THERE ARE SIX HELICOPTERS STATIONED THERE. THE MERCERS DID NOT SEE ANY TANKS BUT COUNTED SIX ARMOURED CARS. THEY DID NOT SEE ANY WORK TO ENLARGE THE EXISTING LANDING STRIP ON EAST FALKLAND BUT REPORTED RUMOURS OF AN ADDITIONAL STRIP BEING BUILT ON WEST FALKLAND. APART FROM A SOLITARY COSTAL PATROL BOAT THE ONLY OTHER SHIP THEY HAD SEEN WAS A FREIGHTER, THE 'BAHIA DEL CUSANOR' (SIC) WHICH ARRIVED LAST WEEK AND HAD BEEN KEPT HEAVILY GUARDED AND STRICTLY OUT OF

WEEK AND HAD BEEN KEPT HEAVILY GUARDED AND STRICTLY CUT OF BOUNDS TO ALL LOCALS. A CONSTANT FLOW OF HERCULES AIRCRAFT WERE BRINGING IN TROOPS AND LIGHT ARTILLERY BUT, TO THE BEST OF THE MERCERS' KNOWLEDGE, NOT FOOD.

5. WE ARE SENDING THIS FULL REPORT OF THE INTERVIEW BECAUSE MRS MERCER IS NOT TRAVELLING TO BRITAIN.

JOY 20.4.

LEE

NNNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 211427Z TWPM/ DGB

GRS 300 UNCLASSIFIED FM WASHINGTON 202207Z APR 82 TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1368 OF 20 APRIL 82



FALKLANDS

- 1. CALLING TODAY ON SENATORS ZORINSKY, BIDEN, MOYNIHAN, SARBANES AND DODD, AND CONGRESSMAN FOLEY, I REFERRED TO THE CRITICISM IN THE UK OF THE US NEUTRAL STANCE. IF THE US GOVERNMENT FELT. AS A GO-BETWEEN, THAT IT COULD NOT TAKE SIDES, THERE WAS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR ANOTHER AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF US OPINION, EG CONGRESS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, TO MAKE ITS VIEWPOINT KNOWN TO THE WORLD. THIS COULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UK AND EUROPE AND ALSO SERVE AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA.
- 2. ALL THE SENATORS SAID THEY WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR VIEW-POINT, ZORINSKY ALONE SAID THAT THE MAIN US AIM SHOULD BE TO KEEP OUT OF THE ISSUE, BUT THEN HE IS FROM NEBRASKA.
- 3. THE UPSHOT WAS THAT ALL THE SENATORS SAID THAT THEY WOULD TRY TO URGE A CALLING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SO THAT THAT COMMITTEE COULD PASS A FIRM RESOLUTION.
- 4. FOLEY'S OFFICE HAVE SINCE BEEN IN TOUCH TO SAY THAT FOLEY HOPES TO BE INTERVIEWED ON BBC TELEVISION TO EXPRESS THE STRENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR CASE, HE WILL ALSO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE (AS MAJORITY WHIP HE IS A MAN OF CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE).
- 5. SENATOR PRESSLER (WHOM I SAW YESTERDAY) HAS INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE CALLING ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS TO REMOVE THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS.

. 5.

6. I HAVE NOW HEARD SENATOR MOYNIHAN PLANS TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE TOMORROW CALLING FOR THE US TO FOLLOW THE EC LEAD IN IMPOSING AN EMBARGO ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS. THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

HENDERSON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

SAPU(82) 5

010

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

- 1. The attached paper containing suggested lines for Ministers to take on the Falkland Islands was issued at 1930 hours on 20 April 1982.
- 2. The material on current negotiations draws on the Prime Minister's answers in the Commons today.
- 3. Although allegations of 'pay cuts' for those in the Task Force have been refuted in detail by the MCD, some sections of the press have persisted in misrepresenting the Government's action as 'penny-pinching' and the attached line to take emphasises that this is not the case.

Cabinet Office

20 April 1982

1. The Haig Mission

Mr Haig forwarded Argentine proposals which fall far short of our requirements in important respects, particularly in as far as they fail to meet the requirement that the wishes of the Islanders should be paramount. This is a stage in the negotiating process which must be continued and we are examining the proposals very closely. We shall put forward our own proposals and Mr Pym is to travel to Washington on Thursday. Remain committed to diplomatic solution if possible. But Argentines should be in no doubt of our capacity and determination to achieve our objectives.

With time so short why is Mr Pym not going to Washington before Thursday?

— As he explained when leaving No 10 last night the Argentine proposals are complex and difficult and as the Prime Minister told the House this afternoon we are formulating our own proposals. If was not therefore practicable to travel to the United States before Thursday.

2. A Role for the UN?

The purpose of current negotiations is to find a solution on the basis of Secruity Council Resolution 502. We are still involved with negotiations through Mr Haig, and should not risk crossing wires at this stage. Our military build—up is full in accordance with the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

3. US Sitting on Fence?

Remain most grateful for Mr Haig's tireless efforts. It is essential that he retains credibility with the Argentines. United States public opinion on the issues involved is quite clear and we remain in no doubt that the United States administration are equally aware of the principles and vital interests at stake in the wake of Argentine aggression.

4. Argentine Calling of OAS Meeting in Washington

It is natural that the OAS should meet. They have already adopted a resolution which conspicuously does not endorse Argentine actions; the Foreign Secretary has sent a message welcoming this. In any event OAS is a regional agency with observe status at the UN; mandatory resolutions of the Security Council (ie SCR 502) would take precedence over OAS resolutions. Member states of the Rio Treaty cannot be obliged to take military action on behalf of another member state particularly if that member state is the aggressor — there is no doubt that the Argentines are defined as aggressors in terms of the Treaty. Signatories of the Treaty undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with provisions of the UN Charter.

5. International Red Cross

The IRC has informed us that Argentines have refused their request to send a delegation to the Falkland Islands to provide humanitarian assistance. We remain in touch with the ICRC.

Local Overseas Allowance for Task Force: Allegations of 'Miserly' MOD LOA is not pay. It is non-taxable additional allowance intended to compensate for higher costs of living overseas. On normal peacetime naval deployments it is based on costs at each post of call. This is not a normal deployment and there will be no shore leave. As most ships will not call at any port they would not be entitled to LOA in any case. Unfair that some ships should get an allowance not available to most of the task force so the Government has decided instead to pay everyone in the Task Force £1.00 per day.

Specific Questions

Penny-pinching?

- No. This will cost more in total than a literal interpretation of peacetime regulations.

But HMS Invincible's allowance has been cut?

- Not really. They jumped the gun slightly and assumed that peacetime rules would apply even though circumstances are very different and there will be no shore leave.

Will troops get the £1 allowance?

- Yes. It is only fair, although under normal rules they would not get LOA.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Falklands

When I gave you late last night the note on the history of regolistion, the attended covering letter should have been given to you at the same time. 2. The FIC.O. deliberately excluded from the history reference to str. Ridday's meeting in July, 1990 because of its somittinity. I imagine that you recall it well but in care not & attack two sats of od nimeter which we relevant. 3. May I add that I think you should be continue in making any

public use of the historical note.

We have to bear in mind the conventions about across to the papers of an earlier administration.

A. J. C. 10.

MR WHITMORE

CABINET

Just to remind you, we to give some guidance of the some guidance of the neglines of guidance or a series of guidance or a serie

Just to remind you, we shall be under immense pressure after Cabinet to give some guidance or make a statement.

It is, of course, true that by then we shall be operating against the announcement of Mr Pym's visit to Washington which will imply a continuation of the negotiations and counter proposals. But a few lines of guidance or a statement which explains the purpose of the meeting and records any outcome that can be recorded would be invaluable. It is helpful to keep the story moving.

Can I leave it to you to raise with the Prime Minister? I will of course feed in the pressure arising from the lobby this afternoon.

B. INGHAM

20 April 1982

PP BIS BUENOS AIRES (VIA BERNE)

GRS 427 UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 191230Z APRIL 82
TO PRIORITY BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION BUENOS AIRES
TELEEGRAM NUMBER 26 OF 20 APRIL
MIPT: BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
1. FOLLOWING IŞ TEXT OF TELEGRAM.

BEGINS: THE BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (INC) REPRESENTS MANY AND IMPORTANT BRITISH AND ARGENTINE COMPANIES WITH INDUSTRIAL, TRADING OR FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. WITHIN ARGENTINA ITS MEMBERS EMPLOY OVER 10,000 PERSONS AND ACCOUNT FOR AN AGGREGATE INVESTMENT OF OVER POUNDS STERLING 500M: THEY ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR GENERATING A BILATERAL FLOW OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE ORDER OF POUNDS STERLING 1,000M PER YEAR. EVER SINCE ITS FOUNDATION IN 1913 THE CHAMBER HAS BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE FURTHERANCE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. AS SUCH IT HAS WITNESSED THE DEVELONMENT OF A FRUITFUL PARTNER-SHIP BETWEEN ARGENTINE AND BRITISH INTERESTS. GENERATIONS OF BRITONS HAVE CHOSEN TO WORK AND LIVE IN ARQENTINA AND IN MANY CASES HAVE SETTLED AND INTEGRATED PERMANENTLY INTO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WHERE THEY FOUND RESNECT AND EVEN ADMIRATION FOR BRITISH VALUES AND WAY OF LIFE AND NEVER AT ANY TIME HAVE REGRETTED THEIR DECISION. OUR CHAMBER IS THEREFORE MOST SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BECAUSE THAT LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP IS NOW AT STAKE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE MANY INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES OF BRITISH ORIGIN OR AFFILIATION PRESENT IN ARGENTINA PUTTING AT RISK A RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED OVER MORE THAN A CENTURY WHICH MAY BE DESTROYED IN ONE DAY BUT WOULD REQUIRE DECADES TO REPAIR. THIS CONCERN EXTENDS ALSO TO WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A LACK OF AWARENESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH RESPECT TO THE SINCERITY AND INTENSITY OF THE FEELINGS OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE TOWARDS THE ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION EVER SINCE IT AROSE 150 YEARS AGO AND THEIR

UNCLASSIFIED

H. Coles No 10. UNCLASSIFIED CALD11 21/1022 11101688 RIGHTINE 201055Z APR 82 FR CM C CMMCEN WHITEHALL TO MOUK UNCLASSIFIED SIG SVC/Z99 (Z99 INSERTED BY DCC NOT TO BE USED IN REPLY) FOLLOWING RECEIVED VIA TELEX BEGINS SURPRISINGLY WE SEE THAT THIRD WORLD WAR IS STARTING I PLEDGE FOR SERENITY IN MES THATCHER TO TRY TO SEE THAT MALVINAS ISMAIDS BELONG TO MY COUNTRY
IN 1833 THE BRITIST TROOPS TOOK THE ISLANDS BY FORCE AND ARGENTINA
WAS WAITING PATIENTLY TILL THIS HOMENT ALL ARGENTINIAN WILL DIE TOGETHER IN ORDER TO DEFEND OUR RIGHTS RICARDO JORGE POLERO CUST OM HOUSE BROKER SAR NIENTO 1055 3230 PASO DE LOS LIBRES DISTRIBUTION Z99 1 CABINET OFFICE U I'D LASSIF I ED

FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, NOT ONLY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT IN THE WIDER WORLD ALSO. ENDS

PYM

S AM D EMERGENCY UNIT

ERD .

STANDARD [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

GRS430
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 201100Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 20 APRIL 1982

FALKLANDS: MILITARISM AND REPRESSION IN ARGENTINA

- 1. WE ARE SENDING A BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT YOU CAN MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, AS APPROPRIATE (CLEARLY NOT ALL ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE FOR ALL COUNTRIES).
- A. MILITARISM HAS DEEP ROOTS IN ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY SEE THEMSELVES AS CREATORS OF THE NATION AND DEFENDERS OF ITS CULTURE AND HAVE NOT HESITATED TO DISPENSE WITH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES WHEN IT SUITED THEM. THE PRESENT REGIME IS A MILITARY JUNTA WHICH SEIZED POWER IN 1976: GENERAL GALTIERI OUSTED GENERAL VIOLA IN 1981. THERE IS NO REAL SIGN OF RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OR OF CIVILIAN RULE.
- B. HUMAN RIGHTS DENIAL OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS HAS LED TO POPULAR FRUSTRATION, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS THE GROWTH OF VIOLENCE FROM BOTH POLITICAL EXTREMES. WITH THE COUNTRY UNDER A STATE OF SIEGE THE SECURITY FORCES, MAINLY IN THE PERIOD 1978-9, ABDUCTED AND TORTURED POLITICAL OPPONENTS: SEVERAL THOUSAND, WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN SEEN AGAIN, ARE REFERRED TO BY ARGENTINES AS 'THE DISAPPEARED': THE UN WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE ESTIMATED THAT THE NUMBER MAY BE AS HIGH AS 9,000. RECENT APPARENT IMPROVEMENTS LARGELY RESULT FROM ELIMINATION OF SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME.

 C. THE MILITARY REGIME'S REJECTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BY INVADING THE FALKLANDS IS MATCHED BY ITS REPUDIATION IN 1977 OF THE AWARD OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, TO WHICH ARGENTINA AND CHILE HAD SUBMITTED THEIR BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE, DESPITE BOTH PART
- OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL, TO WHICH ARGENTINA AND CHILE HAD SUBMITTED THEIR BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE, DESPITE BOTH PARTIES' PRIOR AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THE TRIBUNAL'S FINDINGS. IN FEBRUARY 1982 THEY RENOUNCED THE TREATY WITH CHILE WHICH GUARANTEED THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS.

- D. FOREIGN RELATIONS. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY HAVE NO SCRUPLES ABOUT COOPERATING WITH OTHER REPRESSIVE REGIMES. IN RECENT YEARS THEY HAVE STRENGTHENED TIES WITH BOTH THE USSR AND SOUTH AFRICA. THEIR GRAIN DELIVERIES TO THE USSR UNDERMINED THE US-LED EMBARGO AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THEY ARE NOW THE USSR'S BIGGEST TRADING PARTNER IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. LIKEWISE THEY HAVE DEFIED INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO DISCOURAGE SPORTING LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. UNATTRIBUTABLE: THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN INCREASING MILITARY AND OTHER CONTACTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND SOUTH AFRICA.
- E. EFFECT ON FALKLANDS. ALL THIS UNDERSTANDABLY REINFORCES THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS' DETERMINATION NOT TO SUBMIT TO ARGENTINE RULE, WHICH IS BASED ON COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ORIGIN, LANGUAGE, TRADITIONS AND WAY OF LIFE.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH:

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 April 1982

Falkland Islands: Mexican Position

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Ambassador of Mexico which contains a reply from President Portillo to the Prime Minister's message to him.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

7

10 DOWNING STREET 20 April 1982 From the Private Secretary The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 April enclosing a message from the President of Mexico in response to the Prime Minister's letter of 8 April. His Excellency Dr. Jose Juan de Olloqui

ge OP's Masker

780/8 001147

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. _ T 80 82

London, 20th April, 1982.

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1

Dear Prime Minister

My President, José Lopez Portillo, has instructed me to convey to you the following message in response to your letter to him:


" I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your letter of 8 April in which You state the points of view of Your Government in relation to the dangerous situation risen in the Malvinas Islands and its dependencies, as a result of the occupation by the Argentinian armed forces.

" I would like to respond to it within the same spirit of friendship and understanding mentioned by You.

"Since April 2, I have followed, with deepest concern, the development of the conflict and on April 6, my Government stated its position by condemning the use of force as a means of solving international controversies, and by supporting the United Nations Security Council Resolution 502.

"At the same time, my Government recalled that Mexico has invariably supported the efforts made by Argentina at International Fora, seeking to obtain the acknowledgement of its sovereignity over the Malvinas Islands.

"I am carefully following the efforts that are being made in order to achieve a diplomatic solution to the conflict and to prevent renewed hostilities around the Islands. A bellicose confrontation between Great Britain and Argentina could have deep consequences for the harmony between the countries of the American Continent, as well as endanger the EMBAJADA DE MEXICO world's peace. "I trust that Your Government and that of the Argent inian Republic will make every possible effort to achieve, by means of negotiation, a just and honourable solution. "I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to You, dear Madam, the assurance of my highest consideration and personal friend ship." May I reiterate to you my deepest respect. José Juan de Olloqui Ambassador



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

* PELME, Husd (3)

P. IR ONSLOW PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE * Hd ECT(E) (3)

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

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ADVANCE COPY

RESIDENT CHERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff MOD Siteen and GinCoFleet

IMMEDIATE

GPS 300 CONFIDENTIAL FM UKDEL STRASBOURG 201200Z APR 82 TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 36 OF 20 APRIL INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS INFO ROUTINE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM UKREP UKREP TEL NO 33 OF Q 16 APRIL

FALKLANDS: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

- 1. THE EP DEBATE ON THE FALKLANDS WILL BE ON WEDNESDAY 21 APRIL AT 3.00 PM. IN THE PRESENCE OF TINDEMANS. PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. THE VOTE WILL BE ON THURSDAY.
- 2. THE POSITION SO FAR IS THAT A LIBERAL GROUP DRAFT RESCLUTION (ON WHICH WE COMMENTED PRIVATELY AT AN EARLY STAGE - UKREP TUR) WITH SOME EDG AND CD AMENDMENTS IS GAINING CENTRE/RIGHT SUPPORT. APPROXIMATE TEXT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). IT SEEMS HELPFUL TO US. IF HOWEVER THERE ARE FURTHER POINTS ON IT YOU

34 162).

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

H.M. TSY

WISH US TO MAKE PLEASE TELEPHONE MARSDEN C/O UKDEL STRASBOURG OR ON STRASBOURG 32 49 12.

- 3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEFT-WING GROUPS IS NOT CERTAIN. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE LEFT THE DRAFTING OF A COUNTER-RESOLUTION TO THE BRITISH SOCIALISTS, MRS CASTLE IN PARTICULAR. THE RESULT IS THE TEXT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). THE OPERATIVE SECTION (PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 ONLY) IS UNBALANCED AND UNHELPFUL IN ITS CALL FOR THE HALTING OF UK NAVAL OPERATIONS IN ORDER THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE PLACE. THIS MAY GET FRENCH COMMUNIST AND RADICAL SUPPORT. THE ITALIAN COMMUNISTS SEEM LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE LIBERAL DRAFT.
- 4. WE ARE LOBBYING IN FAVOUR OF A SINGLE TEXT WHICH A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE PARLIAMENT COULD SUPPORT, AND BASED ON THE LIBERAL DRAFT. WE HAVE ALSO CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS THE COI BACKGROUND PAPER AND TRANSLATED VERSIONS OF THE NOTES MUFAXED BY ECD(I).
- 5. CLARKE (UKREP) WILL COVER THE DEBATES ON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY AND CAN BE CONTACTED AS FOR MARSDEN ABOVE. HE WILL BE THE CONTACT POINT FOR THE VISITING FALKLANDERS (TELECON MISS LAMBERT/UKDEL).

CAPE

NNNN

SENT AT 201257Z JM/PJH



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MO 5/21

20th April 1982

1. m. Ma 20.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SSNs

Many thanks for your letter of 16th April: I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up any misunderstandings there may have been about Rules of Engagement.

I think you are aware of the essential distinction between the catalogue of Rules of Engagement which are issued in advance to HM Ships prior to any operation and the selection of some specific set of Rules for implementation. The catalogue is designed to cater for those circumstances which are judged by the Naval Staff as possibly arising during the operations. I language used in the catalogue will be familiar to the Naval officers who have to use it since it is based on long-standing naval instructions which cover the whole range of possible scenarios from fishery protection to nuclear war. By having a catalogue well understood in advance by those concerned it is possible at very short notice to translate Ministerial decisions on the political direction of operations - for example in response to new intelligence - into specific orders immediately understood by those on the spot. The ad hoc meeting of Ministers on 15th April to which you refer was in fact a good example of how the system works. Because the submarine was already conversant with the catalogue of Rules it was possible to implement Ministers wishes on the SSN operation very quickly indeed - a point of equal importance both to Ministers and to the submariners themselves.

The particular catalogue of Rules of Engagement for the SSNs was the subject of discussion in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, at which the FCO is, of course, represented, at an early stage in this emergency, and on 6th April the Chief of the Defence Staff, submitted the Chiefs of Staff view on the catalogue to my Secretary of State - a copy of this minute went to your Defence Department. Following the Defence Secretary's agreement, also copied to Defence Department, the Navy Department signalled the catalogue to the military Commanders concerned and in doing so correctly described it as "a list from which specific rules will be promulgated or may be sought". The first such selection of Rules was made as a result of the OD(SA) 3rd meeting.



Perhaps I can comment here on what you described as textual variations between OD(SA)(82)5 and the Rules of Engagement. Let me assure you that the problem, if there really is one, was not that the results of Ministerial discussion were not being accurately reflected in instructions given; it was rather that the precise naval instructions had been paraphrased in the Secretaries paper, OD(SA)(82)5 in order to bring out clearly in every day language the issue for consideration by Ministers.


The other point I ought to make is the general one that for complex operations (such as Paraquet) it is essential for the Force Commander to have the specific selection of Rules of Engagement (as approved by Ministers) well in advance. This is to give him time to draw up his plans for the operation and brief his subordinate Commanders - the ROE are a vital input into his planning. But of course Ministerial approval of the specific ROE does not imply approval for the operation itself - which is a separate decision. We therefore have the threefold process:

- a. existing catalogue of appropriate Rules, which Force Commanders are thoroughly conversant with;
- b. Ministerial decision on specific Rules for a planned operation;
- c. Ministerial decision on the operation itself.

Please do let me know if there is anything more that we can do to clarify these, admittedly complicated, questions.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

(D B OMAND)



Ref. A08147

PRIME MINISTER

Falklands: Possible Emergency Bill

BACKGROUND

At OD(SA) on 15 April it was provisionally agreed to hold an ad hoc meeting to consider whether early enactment (or Ministerial approval) of an Emergency Bill was likely to be necessary. After OD(SA) today it was decided to cancel the ad hoc meeting and deal with the matter at Cabinet tomorrow.

- 2. The latest version of a possible Bill, as drafted by officials, has been circulated as a Cabinet paper (C(82)13). The question was briefly raised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Trade under Parliamentary Affairs at Cabinet on 14 April (CC(82) 17th Conclusions, Minute 1, Conclusion 2), when the Home Secretary indicated that though not himself enthusiastic about a Bill he was willing to steer one through the House if his colleagues so wished. He has since set out his views in some detail in his minute to you of 16 April. This has now been copied to all Cabinet members, who have been asked to bring it and C(82) 13 to tomorrow's meeting.
- 3. As drafted the Bill would provide a framework under which Regulations could be made if and when necessary, subject to subsequent affirmative resolution in Parliament within seven days in each case. The possible scope of such Regulations is set out in the explanatory memorandum under Clause 1.
- 4. There are two issues for decision: is the proposed draft acceptable in principle? and in what circumstances should it be published and enacted? The Home Secretary does not quarrel with the draft, though he makes clear that there is no Home Office need for a Bill at all. The enthusiasts, at official level, are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department of Trade and Treasury. On timing, the Home Secretary argues against making any move before hostilities begin, on the reasonable grounds that negotiations (which should not be jeopardised) are likely to continue until that point; but he is ready to contemplate rapid enactment thereafter, on the basis that actual Regulations would only be made when needed. Other Departments, at official level, have argued

that to wait until hostilities begin (or until Argentina declares war) might leave an awkward gap of a day or so until enactment was complete; during this gap, the Government might be criticised both for being unable to take certain steps which might seem urgent (eg to regularise the position of civilian crews of vessels like Canberra) and also for being forced (by the Trading with the Enemy Act) to take certain others which might seem too draconian. It should be noted that the Trading with the Enemy Act would be automatically triggered only by a declaration of war, not by hostilities in the absence of a declaration; and that the present draft Bill would retrospectively sanction not implementing in full even if war is declared.

HANDLING

- 5. The Home Secretary should open. You should then seek the views of Departmental Ministers notably the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary,

 Secretary of State for Defence, Secretary of State for Trade and Chancellor of the Exchequer on the two issues:
 - (a) Is this the right Bill, if we have one at all?
 - (b) When, if ever, should it be enacted?
 - 6. On (b), you will also need:
 - the views of the <u>Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary</u> on how long negotiations, which could be undesirably prejudiced by enactment of a Bill, are likely to continue;
 - (ii) the views of the Attorney General on the practical difference between an outbreak of hostilities and a declaration of war;
 - (iii) the views of the <u>Business Managers</u> on what Parliament will expect an accept.

CONCLUSION

- 7. You may be able to sum up as follows:
 - (a) The contents of the draft Bill look about right. But the Home Secretary should invite all members of the Cabinet to let him have any considered comments on the point within, say, one week.

- (b) The Bill should not be published (much less enacted) without a further Ministerial decision, which is unlikely to be taken unless:
 - (i) Argentina declares war; or
 - (ii) extensive hostilities break out; or
 - (iii) any Minister wishes to reopen the matter in the light of new developments.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(sprøred by S., R/ms 5 9 signed on his behalf)

19 April 1982

Prime Minuter

A4. C.4

SITREP BY FCO: 0730, 20 APRIL

Haig Initiative

1. Mr Haig is en route for Washington. The Prime Minister's initial response to the text of the draft agreement sent with his latest message was passed to the US authorities at twenty minutes past midnight.

Argentine Action

- 2. Argentina has requested the holding of a special meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States citing Articles 6 and 12 of the Rio Treaty.
- 3. The Argentine Governor of the International Atomic Energy Authority has requested the Director-General to circulate a letter to all Member States which alleges that nuclear materials for military purposes are being carried by the British fleet. A suggested draft reply is contained in UKMIS Vienna's telegram No.41.
- 4. In response to a request from the International Committee of the Red Cross the Argentine Government considered the despatch of an ICRC mission to the Falkland Islands unnecessary for the time being under the present circumstances."

Andean Pact Countries

5. Representatives of Andean Group countries meeting in Lima at the end of last week published a statement of solidarity with Argentina.

Overflights of Portuguese Territory

6. DS8, Ministry of Defence, expressed concern at a report from our Air Attaché in Lisbon that the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had instructed that future requests for diplomatic clearance of our overflights should be made to them rather than through the usual service channels. DS8 fear that lengthy delays in obtaining clearance may occur. HMA, Lisbon, will be requesting further clearances during the morning.

M. J. Grow Cost.

M W Growcott Emergency Unit

20 April 1982

FILE SW

Agentina

20 April, 1982

Falkland Islands: Views of Inhabitants

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 17 April.

A. J. COLES

F. N. Richards, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office

h

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Distribution: FCO DAILY SITREP

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- Mr Wade-Gery

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- Captain Tod, Assessments Staff

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Defence Situation Centre

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Home Office:


PS/Mr Whitelaw

- Paymaster-General's Office

PS/Mr.Parkinson

Box 500 - Secretariat)
-Box 850 - Secretariat) -via PUSD, Room E.203

Sir B Tovey





- 1. Haig made valiant efforts and has given full details of the Argentine proposals and the position reached in Buenos Aries.
- 2. As has already been indicated the proposals are complex and difficult. Among the many problems they present is that they fail to provide that the Falkland Islanders shall be able to determine their own destiny. The House has always said that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount.
- 3. Argentine proposals are a stage in the process of trying to find a solution and my Rt Hon Friend the Foreign Secretary plans to go to Washington this Thursday to discuss with Mr Haig how to continue this process.

PRIME MINISTER cc. Mr. Whitmore Mr. Gow Mr. Pattison Falkland Islands The answers to two questions you asked this morning are: a) The situation regarding the transfer of property abroad before the invasion was that title could not be transfered to a foreigner without the agreement of the legislative council; b) no Argentinians on the Islands had a right to vote. This right was restricted to British subjects. Where Argentinians married British subjects and became British subjects themselves, they acquired the right to vote. A. S.C. 20 April, 1982

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F.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/20/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.

TAGS: PEFR, AR, UK

SUPJECT: MESSAGE FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

S E C R E T STATE 105593

2. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY FYM.

3. EEGIN TEXT: DEAR FRANCIS:

THANKS VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND FOR THE NEWS THAT YOU WILL BE COMING TO WASHINGTON THURSDAY. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEFING, IF POSSIBLE, YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE CURRENT ARGENTINE PROPOSAL. IF WE COULD RECEIVE THESE IN ADVANCE OF YOUR VISIT, IT WOULD, OF COURSE, ALLOW US TO BE BETTER

FREPARED WHEN YOU GET HERE. AS I ANTICIPATED IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU LAST NIGHT. THE ARGENTINES HAVE TCDAY MOVED TO INVOKE CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE RIC TREATY. WE WILL ABSTAIN AND ARGUE THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME FCR THE OAS TO ENGAGE ITSELF BY CONVOKING THE RIO TREATY. WE WILL ARGUE THAT THE FACT OF THE OAS MEETING TODAY UNDER THE RIO TREATY RUBRIC WILL INEVITABLY

CAST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OAS IN AN UNHELPFUL AND CONFRONTATIONAL LIGHT. I APPRECIATED YOUR COMMENTS IN PARLIAMENT AND LOOK

FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THURSDAY. ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR. END TEXT. HAIG

SECRET/NODIS

STATE 105593

Quine rimister

To norg.

aullun EUPY

- O.T. When (Duty clerk

rockie implication HELEN 18242

ALF SW

20 April, 1982

Falklands: Message from the British Chamber of Commerce in Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 19 April. The Prime Minister is content with the reply you propose.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office VZCZCLIC121

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 4/19/12 TAGS: HAIG (ALEXANDER M., JR.)

SUBJECT: FALKLANDS CRISIS -- MESSAGE TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM

SECRET. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING TO FOREIGN SECRETARY IN RESPONSE TO HIS LATEST MESSAGE (LONDON 08484).

BEGIN TEXT

I CAN AFPRECIATE YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE ARGENTINE POSITION. YOUR OFF-THE-RECORD PRESS GUIDANCE IS ENTIRELY PROPER.

AS YOU KNOW, MY AIM IN BUENCS AIRES WAS TO SQUEEZE AS MUCH AS I HUMANLY COULD OUT OF THE ARGENTINES SO THAT YOU AND WE COULD KNOW WHAT WE ARE REALLY UP AGAINST. AT NC POINT DID I TEL THEM THAT WHAT WAS DEVELOPED IN BUENOS AIRES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU. NOR DID I ASSCCIAATE THE UNITED STATES IN ANY WAY WITH THE POSITION PRODUCED. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DIRECT REPORTS OF THE ARGENTINES PAGREEMENT" WITH US. I LL REFUTE ANY SUCH CLAIMS SWIFTLY AD UNEQUIVOCALLY, AS I WARNED THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER I WOULD DO.

LET ME SUGGEST THAT YOU NOW REFLECT ON THE TEXT. IN IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE YOU BELIEVE CHANGES ARE IMPERATIVE, I SUGGEST YOU WORK UP FORMULATIONS OF YOUR OWN. THIS WILL GIVE US A PRECISE IDEA OF WHERE WE STAND. IT WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF DENYING THE ARGENTINES ANY BASIS FOR SAYING THAT THEY AND THEY ALONE HAVE TAKEN A STEP TOWARD PEACE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WITH THE STAKES SO GREAT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD LIMIT YOUR REFORMULATIONS TO THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL POINTS.

I FURTHER SUGGEST THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER CONSIDER YOUR COMING TO WASHINGTON AS SOON AS YOU HAVE ARRIVED AT A CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE TEXT. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR ME TO COME TO LONDON, BUT I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE NEED A FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION, SO THAT I CN CLARIFY POINTS AND CONVEY MY FEELING OF ARGENTINE ATTITUDES AND ASPIRAICNS. CANNOT REDUCE TO WERITING THE BITTERNESS, RESENTMENT

(BEFOREHAM).

SENSE OF HISTORIC FRUSTRATION I ENCOUNTERED IN BUENOS AIRES. I COULD ALSO GIVE YOU A BETTER SENSE OF THE TRADEOFFS WITHIN THE TEXT, IN PARTICULAR BETWEEN PROSPECTS FOR SCVEREIGHTY AND THOSE FOR AN EXPANDED DE FACTO RCLE IN THE INTERIM.

IF YOU AGREE TO MY IDEA THAT YOU COME TO WASHINGTON, I RECOMMEND YOU NOT ARRIVE AT A DEFINITIVE POSITION BEFORE TAVE TRIED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU DESPITE BEING INVOLVED IN EXCEEDINGLY LONG AND COMPLEX DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES. YOU CERTAINLY WOULD NOT HAVE FOUND IT HELPFUL HAD I SENT EVERY DETAIL IN A CONSTANTLY MOVING SITUATION IN BUTNOS AIRES. COULD I ASK YOU TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION THAT HAS BEEN CREATED BY REPEATED STATEMENTS OUT OF LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN KEEPING THE PRIME MINISTER INFCRMED?

YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN MOST SENSITIVE AND FRUDENT ON THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST ARGENTINA. I DO NOT KNOW IF I CAN HELP AVERT WAR, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT WAR WOULD BECOME INESCAPABLE IF I LOSE MY CREDIBILITY IN BUENOS AIRES. I SEE THAT THE BRITISH FRESS AND SOME POLITICAL SECTORS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY BARSH AND IMPATIENT CONCERNING THE US ROLE. ANOTHER WORD FROM YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER ALONG THE LINE YOU HAVE FREVIOUSLY TAKEN ON THIS DELICATE ISSUE WOULD, I THINK, BE APPROPRIATE.

AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, IT IS IMPERATIVE

YOU MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE. I SEE NO CTHER WAY OF BRINGING THE ARGENTINES TO A FOSITION SATISFACTORY TO YOU. IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT, AS I HARDLY NEED TO SAY TO YOU, THATE BE CLEAR IN OURMINDS AND WITH EACH CTHER CONCERNING THOSE POINTS OF DISAEEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND ARGENTINA, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE, THAT ARE WORTH THE TRAGEDY OF WAR.

AS YOU KNOW, ARGENTINA HAS ASKED FOR AN OAS COUNCIL MEETING TO CONVOKE AN ORGAN OF CONSULTATION UNDER THE RIO TREATY, . THE QUESTION WILL BE CONSIDERED AND, NO DOUBT, DECIDED TOMORROW MORNING APRIL 20. WE PRCPOSE TO ABSTAIN ON THE GROUND THAT THE RIO TREATY WAS NOT DESIGNED TO APPLY TO CASES IN WHICH MEMBERS THEMSELVES TOOK ACTS OF FCRCE, AND IN VIEW OF OUT PEACE EFFORT. WE DO NOT EXPECT A DATE TO BE SET FOR CONVOKING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AS LONG AS OUR PEACE EFFORTS CONTINUE AND THERE IS NO MILITARY ACTION.

PLEASE GET BACK TO ME SHORTLY ON THE IDEA OF AN EARLY VISIT BY YOU TO WASHINGTON, HOPEFULLY NO LATER THAN THURSDAY. SUCH A VISIT WILL AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF DIPLOMATIC STALEMATE, WHILE MILITARY PRESSURES GRCW. IN THE MEANTIME, LET ME ASSURE YOU, AS THE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT YOU CAN INDEED COUNT ON US. WARM REGARDS ALL. TAIG

S L C R E T///NCDIS///

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 April 1982

Dea John.

Falkland Islands: Message from Haig

100 to

You will have seen the latest message from Mr Haig to Mr Pym delivered this morning. Mr Pym believes that we should reply quickly to this. Mr Haig's suggestion that Mr Pym should now go to Washington is in line with Mr Pym's own views of the best next step and he is strongly of the opinion that he should accept. If this is agreed, he would propose to leave London by Concorde on Thursday morning with a view to beginning discussions in Washington on the afternoon of the same day, having sent to the Americans beforehand our comments on the latest text and the amendments we would need to make it acceptable to us.

I enclose a draft message from Mr Pym to Mr Haig in the form of a telegram to Washington along these lines. Mr Pym has agreed this in draft but, as you know, will not return from Brussels until about 3.30 pm this afternoon. I understand that the terms of the reply to Mr Haig may be discussed in the ODSA meeting at noon today.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Defence, Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

Yours ever

A J Coles Esq 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby FLASH

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY FLASH

FM FCO 20 Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER

AND REPEATED FOR INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Please pass the following further message from me to Haig as soon as possible:

Begins. Many thanks for your further message which reached me this morning. It is good to know that your thinking on the next step is close to ours. I agree that we need to study the text which you brought back from Buenos Aires, and we are doing this urgently. The Prime Minister and I also agree that I should come to Washington to discuss the whole problem with you personally. If acceptable to you, I should like to do this on Thursday 22 April: this will I hope give us time to let you have in advance a further indication of the points on which the current text requires amendment.


I quite see your point about the need for you to preserve your position in Buenos Aires so long as your peace-making role continues. I spoke along these lines yesterday in the House of

| NNNN ends telegram | | Catchword | Commons, | |
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| telegram | | | | |
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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| 4 | | when she answers | questions in | the House to | d |
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| 8 | trem | Without going into c | detail, I sha | ll take the l | ine that by |
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 37 OF 20 APRIL 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

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MIPT FROM UKREP

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT LIBERAL RESOLUTION WHICH HAS CONSERV-ATIVE LIBERAL AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED BY THE ARMED ATTACK BY ARGENTINA ON THE FALKLANDS

AND MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE

SOLVED ONLY BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION:

AWARE OF THE VERY SERIOUS DANGERS OF THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE CONFLICT AND OF THE DANGER THAT OTHER TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS COULD RESULT IF THE UNILATERAL ACTION IS ACCEPTED:

CONSIDERING THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS A DOUBLE RESPONSIBILITY OF SOLIDARITY WITH ITS BRITISH PARTNER ON THE ONE HAND AND WITH THE FALKLANDS AS AN ASSOCIATED TERRITORY ON THE OTHER:

TAKING NOTE OF RESOLUTION 532 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUIRING THE END OF HOSTILITIES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES STATIONED ON THE FALKLANDS AND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT:

- (1) CONDEMNS THE ARGENTINE MILITARY INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- (2) UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY WHICH HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE COUNCIL
- (3) REGISTERS ITS AGREEMENT OF THE TOTAL EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND REQUIRES THAT IT BE MAINTAINED UNTIL RESOLUTION 502 HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED

1(4)

(4) ENCOURAGES THE COMMISSION AND THE COUNCIL TO REVIEW THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING FURTHER MEASURES

(5) INSISTS THAT ANY SOLUTION TAKES INTEGRAL ACCOUNT OF THE OPINIONS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLANDS. ENDS

FCO PSE PASS UKREP BRUSSELS

CAPE

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN

TREASURY

MR PERETZ . .)

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

GPS 350
UNCLASSIFIED
FM STRASBOURG 20 140CZ
TO TMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 38 OF 20 APRIL 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS
MY TELNO 36
FROM UKREP



TABLED BY MRS CASTLE AND OTHERS ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST GROUP PURSUANT TO RULE 48 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE ON THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
DEPLORING THE ATTEMPT BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA TO ANNEX
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY FORCE AS A DIVERSIONARY TACTIC TO
DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE POLITICAL BRUTALITIES AND
ECONOMIC FAILURES OF ITS OWN REGIME

RECALLING THAT THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS UNDER NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS WHEN THE UNPROVOKED ATTACK WAS MADE

- 1 CONDEMNS UNRESERVEDLY THE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
- 2 NOTES AND SUPPORTS RESOLUTION 502 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON ARGENTINA WHICH DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SEEK A. DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
- 3 CONGRATULATES THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON ITS PRACTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION THROUGH ITS DECISION TO BAN ALL TRADE WITH THE ARGENTINE AND REQUESTS THE COMMUNITY TO CONTINUE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS UNTIL THE ARGENTINIAN TROOPS WITHDRAW AND A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT IS REACHED:
- 4 BELIEVES THAT THIS DISPUTE MUST BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND THAT ECONOMIC RATHER THAN MILITARY PRESSURE MUST BE USED TO BRING THE AGGRESSOR TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE:
- 5 CALLS FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ITS FORCES BY
 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE HALTING OF UNITED KINGDOM NAVAL
 OPERATIONS IN ORDER THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE PLACE:
- 6 CALLS ON THE UNITED NATIONS TO SEND A PEACEKEEPING AND ADMIN-ISTRATIVE FORCE TO THE FALKLAND ISLES PENDING A SETTLEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS:

7 CALLS ON ALL COUNTRIES WHO SUPPORT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES TO APPLY THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO COMPEL THE MILITARY JUNTA TO WITHDRAW ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND IN PARTICULAR, CALLS ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE AGAINST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY JUNTA BY APPLYING MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS: & INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT TO FORWARD THIS RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. ENDS FCO PSE PASS UKREP BRUSSELS CAPE [PASSED AS REQUESTED] ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION PALKLAND ISLANDS FCO COPIES TO S AM D PS/CHANCELLOR > CABINET OFFICE SIR K COUZENS MR LITTLER TREASURY MR HAWTIN MR PERETZ MR ILETT MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY - 2 -

P.S. TO NO. 10. DOWNING ST.

GRS 470 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 201744Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 20 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY LISBON UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR
(PERSONAL)

YOUR TELNO 121: ANGLO SPANISH RELATIONS

WHEN I RANG THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER TO TELL HIM ABOUT THE ACTION TAKEN BY MR BYATT THIS MORNING WITH THE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDING SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF NATO (LISBON TELNO 64) THE MINISTER INVITED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR OUR HELP IN LISBON. THE MATTER HAD NOW BEEN SORTED OUT. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WOULD INDEED ISSUE A STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT. THE LATTER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SUBMIT THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION TO THEIR ASSEMBLY ON 22 APRIL.

2. WE THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I CONVEYED THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION ABOUT HMG'S POSITION. I AGAIN EMPHASISED THAT THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATIONS WERE THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES AND THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO COUNTER AGGRESSION. I ADDED THAT, AS CALVO SOTELO HAD POINTED OUT. THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN GIBRALTAR. AS RUPEREZ HAD RECENTLY FOUND. THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR WERE AWARE THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO PROSECUTE THEIR AIMS THROUGH THE PATH OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. BUT WHAT CONFIDENCE COULD THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS HAVE IN A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, WITH A BAD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, WHICH HAD ACTUALLY INVADED THEM? PEREZ-LLORCA SAID THAT OF COURSE ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF AGGRESSION VERSUS PEACEFUL MEANS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WERE ENTIRELY ON OUR SIDE. THE TROUBLE FOR THEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN THE COUPLING OF GIBRALTAR AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN PREVIOUS UN RESOLUTIONS. I SAID FRANKLY THAT THE SPANISH POSITION HAD BEEN MORE HELPFUL IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, WHERE THEY HAD AT LEAST GONE ALONG WITH THE CONSENSUS, THOUGH WITH AN EXPLANATION TO COVER THE GIBRALTAR POINT. I HOPED THIS COULD BECOME A PRECEDENT, SO THAT SPAIN WAS ABLE TO DISPLAY SOLIDARITY WITH HER EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND ALLIES.

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3. PEREZ-LLORCA REPEATED THAT HE WAS VERY CONSIOUS OF THIS
ASPECT. HE DID NOT DISSENT WHEN I SAID THAT I HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED
TO MAKE TO HIM A POINT WHICH HE AND I HAD ALREADY AGREED UPON
AT OUR LAST MEETING. THIS WAS THAT, WITH PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN
BRITAIN RUNNING VERY HIGH, THE WAY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT
DEALT WITH THE FALKLANDS AND GIBRALTAR PROBLEMS WOULD
INEVITABLY AFFECT YOUR ROOM FOR MANEOUVRE IN BEING HELPFUL OVER
NATO MATTERS AND SPANISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY. THIS WAS NO
THREAT BUT A SIMPLE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS, NOT LEAST
BECAUSE THE AGREED SCENARIO FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LISBON AGREEMENT NOW MEANT THAT SPAIN WAS LIKELY TO ENTER
NATO WITH THE GIBRALTAR FRONTIER STILL SHUT, IF ONLY FOR SHORT
TIME. I UNDERSTOOD THAT PEREZ-LLORCA HAD TO THINK ABOUT PUBLIC
OPINION IN SPAIN AND PERHAPS EVEN IN ARGENTINA. BUT HE MUST
NOT FORGET WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

4. PEREZ-LLORCA SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO BE EQUALLY FRANK WITH ME. HE WAS EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO PLAY THE WHOLE FALKLANDS AND GIBRALTAR COMPLEX IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE MAIN THRUST OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH INCLUDED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. BUT HE DID NOT ALWAYS FIND IT EASY TO OBTAIN A CONSENSUS ABOUT THIS, EVEN WITHIN HIS OWN MINISTRY. IN CASE OF DIFFICULTY, I SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO APPROACH HIM DIRECT. BY CONTRAST, HE HAD NOT HAD ANY RECENT CONTACT WITH THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR.

5. PLEASE SEE MY IFT.

PARSONS

LIMITED SE D DEF.D SA MD PUSD EM: UNIT PS

PS/MR HULD

PS/LORD BELSTEAD
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR GOODISON
MR GILLMORE

ADDITIONAL DIST:

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FM GEORGETOWN 201445Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 20 APRIL

PRIORITY INFO FOR MODUK, KINSTON (FOR DA), ROUTINE CARACAS
SAVING FOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, BRIDGETOWN (PASSED LOCALLY)

ARMS SALES TO GUYANA

- 1. GUYANESE CHIEF OF STAFF BRIGADIER MCLEAN ASKED ME TO CALL URGENTLY YESTERDAY. FORCE COMMANDER COLONEL GRANGER WAS ALSO PRESENT. MCLEAN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO ALERT US TO A SERIOUS SITUATION AND TO MAKE A SMALL REQUEST.
- 2. I WAS THEN SUBJECTED TO A PRESENTATION BRINGING OUT SEVEN POINTS, NONE OF THEM NEW, WHICH INDICATED TO THE GUYANESE THE LIKELIHOOD OF VENEZUELAN AGGRESSION:-
- (A) ACTS OF ECONOMIC AGGRESSION (EG VENEZUELAN OPPOSITION TO THE UPPER MAZARUNI SCHEME)
- (B) SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF AIR SPACE, IN PARTICULAR THE SORTIE OF A CANBERRA OVER TIMEHRI ETC ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1981. GRANGER ADMITTED THAT RECENTLY THERE HAD ONLY BEEN INCURSIONS OVER THE NORTH WEST SEMICOLON
- (C) HYSTERICAL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN VENEZUELAN PRESS. MCLEAN HANDED ME AN ARTICLE FROM DIARIO DE CARACAS OF 26 NOVEMBER 1981 SEMICOLON
- (D) AQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY SMALL LANDING CRAFT FROM THE US. (THE PRESENTATION ALSO SHOWED F16'S AND HAWKS, BUT THESE WERE PLAYED DOWN FOR MY BENEFIT)
- (E) REFUSAL TO RENEW PORT OF SPAIN PROTOCOL
- (F) REACTIVATION OF TWO JUNGLE BRIGADES
- (G) THE DRAWING UP OF OPERATION MARK 1 PLAN CARABOBO. IT WAS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF CARABOBO WAS ON 24 JUNE JUST AFTER THE PORT OF SPAIN PROTOCOL EXPIRED. MCLEAN SAID THAT EVENTS IN THE FALKLANDS WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED VENEZUELA TO ENFORCE ITS CLAIM BY OCCUPATION AND THEN TRY TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH. I SAID THAT IT REMAINETTO BE SEEN WHAT WOULD HAPPEN OVER THE FALKLANDS. IT MIGHT GIVE THE VENEZUELANS PAUSE. BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT GUYANA HAD NO FLEET TO COME TO HER RESCUE.
- 3. MCLEAN THEN SHOWED ME A COPY OF A CIRCULAR D/SALES(S)4/51/410/1/1/2 DATED 8.2.82 AND SIGNED BEF G SELCH OFFERING SOME SURPLUS 20 MILLIMETRE OERLIKON GUNS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT FOR SALE AT £35,605. HIS SMALL REQUEST WAS THAT THE GDF BE SUPPLIED WITH THESE GUNS WHICH WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE ON THE BRITISH-MADE PATROL PECCARI. COULD WE OFFER EASY TERMS OR PERHAPS A GRANT? I PROMISED TO REPORT TO YOU.
- 4. IN FURTHER TALK GRANGER SAID THAT THE GDP NEEDED ADVICE ON PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE AND TRAINING TO MEET THE VENEZUELAN THREAT AND HAD BEEN WONDERING WHETHER TO INVITE A HIGH LEVEL TEAM FROM MOD FOR THIS PURPOSE. I SAID THAT WE WERE ALWAYS GLAD TO GIVE ADVICE AND HELP TO THE GDF, AND HAD DONE SO EVER SINCE INDEPENDENCE; CONFIDENTIAL

BUT IN VIEW OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PORT OF SPAIN
PROTOCOL AND OF DISCUSSION WHICH WE HOPED WOULD FOLLOW UNDER THE
GENEVA AGREEMENT, THIS DID NOT SEEM TO ME THE RIGHT TIME FOR
AN OSTENTATIOUS BRITISH MILITARY VISIT. BUT MY DA, COLONEL
HOLLOWAY WAS COMING HERE IN EARLY MAY, AND GRANGER COULD PUT ANY
DETAILED REQUESTS TO HIM.

5. I JUDGE THAT MCLEAN (PARA 3 ABOVE) WAS SPEAKING ON PRESIDENT BURNHAM'S INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THAT GRANGER (PARA 4 ABOVE) WAS NOT. OUR REFUSAL TO SELL SECONDHAND ARMOURED CARS TO GUYANA IN EARLY 1980 STILL RANKLES, AND BURNHAM MAY BLAME ME PERSONALLY FOR THE DECISION. THE PRESENT REQUEST TO BUY GUNS IS A TEST OF BRITISH WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT GUYANA WHEN RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY SHE FEELS THREATENED, AND INDEED OF OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE. IF WE PASS THE TEST, WE MAY GET FURTHER REQUESTS. IF WE DO NOT, THE CONCLUSION MAY BE DRAWN BY GDF OFFICERS AS WELL AS BY BURNHAM THAT THEY CANNOT RELY ON US AND MUST TURN ELSEWHERE.

GUNS TO GUYANA SEMICOLON AND FURTHER THAT WE OFFER EASY TERMS
IN THE BRITISH NATIONAL INTEREST (SINCE GUYANA'S PRESENT ECONOMIC
SITUATION DOES NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE THAT PAYMENTS WILL BE MADE
ON TIME). THE GUNS THEMSELVES ARE DEFENSIVE IN CHARACTER, NOT
SUITABLE FOR INTERNAL REPRESSION. THE VENEZUELANS CAN HARDLY
COMPLAIN WHEN THEY ARE BUYING HAWKS FROM US. GUYANA IS GIVING
FORTHRIGHT SUPPORT TO TE BRITISH OVER FALKLANDS AND THIS IS
USEFUL TO US WITHIN THE COMMONNEALTH, THE UN AND THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT. AGREEING TO SELL THE GUNS WILL NOT COMMIT US TO ANY
FURTHER SALES OR SUPPORT, THOUGH AS I HAVE POINTED OUT ABOVE
FURTHER REQUESTS COUND FOLLOW. IF GUYANA FEELS SHE CANNOT TURN
TO US FOR ARMS AND FOR ADVICE SHE MAY TURN ELSEWHERE TO OUR
ALISADVANTAGE.

7. PLEASE INSTRUCT SOON.

MALLET

MCAD
MCAD
SAMD
WIAD
ACDD
NAD
PS | MRONSLOW
PS | MRONSLOW
PS | PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE

WAS NOT ADVANCED

EXTRACT ON FALKLANDS

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER ... AND THE INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, HELD IN NEW DELHI: 20 APRIL 1982

Present:

Mr Sathe

Mr Karray

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Sir John Thomson Mr Wetherell 2) m. due

. Mr. Gewan . N. Giffers

M 2/4

among developing countries. Sir John Thomson observed that the UK had always supported the Indian position on a number 2001-1 of IDA issues, including India's share of 40% of the available funds. Mr Sathe repeated the widespread appreciation for the UK position in India. Falklands 4. Mr Sathe recalled that the Acting British High Commissioner had called on him on 5 April to suggest .that India might (a) consider the temporary withdrawal of her Ambassador from Buenos Aires; (b) cut off her trade relations with Argentine; - A - A Mark Tradition in (c) cut off military supplies to Argentina. He had explained to Mr Samuel that (c) was inapplicable in India's case and that trade between the two countries was so insignificant as to render its suspension meaningless. As far as (a) was concerned, he had undertaken to report to Mrs Gandhi, but had expressed the personal view that the recall of Ambassadors was not part of India's diplomatic . style and that the presence of an Indian Ambassador in Buenos Aires might even be to the UK's advantage. This view had now been confirmed by Mrs Gandhi herself as the Indian position. Mr Sathe said that the High Commissioner would have seen the Indian statement put out on 3 April. He did not think that the Government of India would want to make a further statement in the near future. He noted the negotiations being conducted by Mr Haig and suggested that there was nothing India could say or do while these were going on. He hoped that the problem would be resolved peacefully. But it would take some time to see how this could be achieved. 5. Sir John Thomson . said that recent Argentine moves in the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM in New York suggested that there was indeed something India could do. He spoke as instructed in FCO telno 145 to Accra and left Mr Sathe the attached speaking note. He was not sure that India could afford to keep quiet under the circumstances. It was very important that the NAM should uphold international law. This was the crucial issue in the dispute. There could rarely have been a more clear cut case under international law one in which the wishes of the local population had been repeatedly been expressed. If it was a case of colonization, it was a case of Argentine colonization. Mr Sathe asked whether there was an Argentine population on the Island. Sir John Thomson said that 80% of the Islanders were descended from people who had settled there before 1850. There had been some immigration from the UK since. There were a few US citizens and a very small number /(made

(made up almost exclusively of wives) of people of Argentine origin. He doubted whether the people of Spanish/Argentine origin amounted to more than 2% of the population. It was a very homogeneous population and was 100% English speaking.

- 7. Mr Sathe undertook to speak urgently to Mr Rasgotra (his successor, to whom he was now passing most of his papers) and Mr S K Singh about developments in New York. He accepted that there was not much time left. Sir John Thomson left. Mr Sathe a paper (attached) which set out the UK position on decolonization and self-determination and the text of the main part of Sir Anthony Parsons' statement to the Special Committee on the Non-Use of Force, which, he said, gave a good account of the issue itself and of developments leading to the crisis. It showed what a clear case existed under international law. It was the Argentines who had ignored the appeal of the President of the Security Council, and who had said that they would not accept the Security Council Resolution. The issue raised questions about the expectations and even laws governing the conduct of international relations.
 - Mr Sathe said that he understood that Anglo/Argentine discussions on the Falklands had been taking place since : about 1953. The Argentines had been taking the line that they had wanted to discuss the problem. But they claimed that the UK had not allowed the discussions to get into matters of substance and had even called them off. Argentine patience had therefore worn very thin. Sir John Thomson said that this was not at all the case. The most recent round of Anglo/ Argentine talks had taken place in New York at Ministerial. level in February. There had been representatives of the Falkland Islanders themselves. The Joint Communique agreed at the end of the talks had referred to a cordial and positive atmosphere and to the resolve of both sides to find a solution to the problem. Less than five weeks later, the Argentines had invaded the Falklands. It was true that the taks between the two countries had lasted over a long time and that no solution had been found, but it was untrue to say that the UK had not put forward any serious proposals. For example, the UK had raised the possibility of leasing back the Islands from Argentina. In reply to Mr Sathe's question, he said that the UK position was that the wishes of the Islanders must be respected. These had been expressed through a number of elections. As far as the idea of a leasing back arrangement was concerned, the thought had been that the UK might consider Argentine sovereignty so long as the leasing of the Islands to the UK allowed the Islanders to continue their own chosen way of life. He could not provide a blow by blow account of discussions since the mid-50s. But these had taken place on many occasions at a high level and up to very recently.

Visits To Moscow And Washington

9. Mr Sathe said that the prospect of visits by Mrs Gandhi to the US and Soviet Union had been discussed for a long time. In view of the pressure on her calendar, there had been some



SPEAKING NOTE

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

We understand that Argentina is working for a meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement in New York, which may take place as early as today, 20 April, with a view to achieving agreement on a communiqué which would give a blanket endorsement to Argentina's position on the Falkland crisis. We are concerned that, if allowed to go through, such a communiqué would ignore the origins of the crisis and, therefore, the basis for the Security Council's Resolution 502.

If a meeting of the Coordinating Bureau takes place in New York, we hope that, together with Governments of other non-aligned countries, the Government of India will instruct its representatives in New York to work for a communique consistent with Security Council Resolution 502, which has the force of Taw and enjoys the support of the majority of the international community.

Specifically, we hope that any communique adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement will refer to Security Council Resolution 502; request both parties to comply with it fully; and reflect non-aligned doctrines on adherence to the United Nations Charter, the non-acquisition of territories by force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the exercise of the right to self-determination of peoples, a right explicitly guaranteed by General Assembly Resolution 1514 from which we understand the Argentine draft communique quotes selectively, as well as ignoring Resolution 502.

British High Commission NEW DELHI

- 1. The fundamental element of the British Government's approach to the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands is that the wishes of the Islanders themselves must be paramount. For their part, the Argentines deny that the Islanders have the right to determine their own future and maintain that the issue is one simply of decolonization.
- 2. The Falkland Islands issue is not one of decolonization.
 As normally understood, decolonization has consisted of the withdrawal of an alien administering power and the transition of new states to independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of their people, to whom sovereignty and the powers of sovereignty are transferred. The UN has never countenanced the decolonization of a territory by agreeing to hand over its people to alien rule in the face of their persistent opposition. For Argentina to incorporate the Falkland Islands in its territory on the pretext of decolonization would simply constitute the imposition of colonial status on the Islands by force in violation of all UN agreed norms of conduct in the fields of decolonization and relations between states. It, would offend the principle of self-determination.
- 3. Britain's record of decolonization and our policy towards the inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories, for which we have been and remain responsible, demonstrates a consistent respect for the principle of self-determination, which the United Nations has endorsed and applauded.
- 4. Respect for the principle of self-determination remains a basis for the development of friendly relations between states and is one of the fundamental measures to strengthen international peace and security. This is recognized in a number of important international instruments, including the United Nations Charter itself, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, the Friendly Relations Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 1970, and General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of 1960.

An essential element of this principle is the free and genuine expression of the will of the people, such as has taken place regularly in the Falkland Islands and on which the United Kingdom have regularly reported to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Argentine statements that they would take the Falkland Islanders' interests into account are no substitute for the right of self-determination. In any case, it is the Islanders themselves who are the best judge of their own interests. They have consistently and clearly rejected any measure of Argentine control over their lives. It is the British Government's view that their wishes should be respected.

ZZ WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 290
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 201133Z APRIL 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 770 OF 20 APRIL4
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING FURTHER MESSAGE FROM ME TO HAIG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR FURTHER MESSAGE WHICH REACHED ME THIS MORNING. IT IS GOOD TO KNOW THAT YOUR THINKING ON THE NEXT STEP IS CLOSE TO OURS. I AGREE THAT WE NEED TO STUDY THE TEXT WHICH YOU BROUGHT BACK FROM BUENOS AIRES, AND WE ARE DOING THIS URGENTLY. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ALSO AGREE THAT I SHOULD COME TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE PROBLEM WITH YOU PERSONALLY. IF ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, I SHOULD LIKE TO DO THIS ON THURSDAY 22 APRIL: THIS WILL I HOPE GIVE US TIME TO LET YOU HAVE IN ADVANCE A FURTHER INDICATION OF THE POINTS ON WHICH THE CURRENT TEXT REQUIRES AMENDMENT.

I QUITE SEE YOUR POINT ABOUT THE NEED FOR YOU TO PRESERVE YOUR POSITION IN BUENOS AIRES SO LONG AS YOUR PEACE-MAKING ROLE CONTINUES. I SPOKE ALONG THESE LINES YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND THERE MAY BE A CHANCE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO DO THE SAME WHEN SHE ANSWERS QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE TODAY. SHE MAY ALSO ANNOUNCE MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND I HOPE THAT THIS WILL CAUSE YOU NO DIFFICULTIES.

I AM JUST OFF TO BRUSSELS TO TALK TO MY COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, I SHALL TAKE THE LINE THAT BY TREMENDOUS EXERTIONS YOU HAVE BROUGHT THE ARGENTINIANS SOME DISTANCE FROM THEIR STARTING POINT: THAT THE LATEST TEXT WILL NOT DO, FOR THE REASONS YOU AND I WELL UNDERSTAND: BUT THAT PROVIDED THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE MAINTAINED, IN

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ADDITION TO THE MILITARY THREAT FROM THE BRITISH TASK FORCE, THE CHANCE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT REMAINS.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETING. ENDS.

PYM

FCO S AM D CABINET OFFICE ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

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
PART 8 ends:-

19.4.82

PART____begins:-

20.4.82





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