

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PRT: SCOWCROFT SECTO
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN USSR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5118
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 24037

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FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958

JGP, 11/8/99

Case No. 98-0049-F

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE HAD LONG AND RATHER EXTRAORDINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TODAY. I'LL GIVE YOU THE FULL BLOW-BY-BLOW WHEN I GET BACK. FOR NOW, LET ME PASS ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DAY AND OUR DISCUSSIONS. WE TALKED ABOUT THE GULF FOR NEARLY SIX HOURS (FOUR WITH SHEVARDNADZE, TWO WITH GORBACHEV). EACH LISTENED, EXPLAINED THEIR CONCERNS, AND NOTICEABLY MOVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE, IN PARTICULAR, CAME CLOSE TO OUR POSITION THAT A UNSC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING FORCE SHOULD BE PASSED THIS MONTH AND BECOME OPERATIVE SIX-EIGHT WEEKS LATER. HE ACTUALLY CALLED GORBACHEV ON THE PHONE AND PUSHED HARD TO HAVE HIM GO ALONG WITH OUR APPROACH. HE WENT OUT TO GORBACHEV'S DACHA TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE ME TO LOBBY HIM FURTHER. GORBACHEV IS CLOSE BUT NOT THERE YET.

2. IN GENERAL, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO BE ACTING

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ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS:

A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST STAY TOGETHER ON THE GULF.

THEY BOTH SAID IT'S ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF TH POLICY, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, AND FUTURES ARE LINKED. (SHEVARDNADZE WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT A FAILURE BY US IN THE GULF WOULD DAMAGE PERESTROIKA. OUR SUCCESS WOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THEM -- AND OUR FAILURE WOULD BE A REAL BLOW TO THEM. GORBACHEV SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.)

B) SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST CLEARLY UNMISTAKEABLY FAIL. THEY

EMPHASIZED THAT HIS AGGRESSION MUST BE REVERSED. ANY HOPE FOR A NEW PEACEFUL ERA DEPENDED ON THIS, AND ON DENYING HIM ANY VICTORY -- NO MATTER HOW SMALL. TO THIS END, WE COULD NOT STAND STILL. WE HAD TO BE ACTIVE NOW IN PURSUING FURTHER STEPS TO REVERSE HIS AGGRESSION. (ACTIVITY THAT DID NOT APPEAR TO MEAN PEACE MISSIONS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS CRITICAL OF THE NAKASONE, BRANDT, AND, YES, PRIMAKOV MISSIONS. FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH PRIMAKOV'S MISSION AND SAID HE, TOO, HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.)

C. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE FELT SANCTIONS MIGHT YET WORK AND

IT'S PREMATURE TO PLAY OUR LAST DIPLOMATIC CARD -- A CARD THAT

LEAVES US NO CHOICE BUT TO USE FORCE IF IT FAILS. WHILE PREPARED TO BE ACTIVE IN PURSUING MORE STEPS IN THE UNSC TO BUILD THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE (CERTAINLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DAY) WERE AMBIVALENT ABOUT A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT AUTHORIZES FORCE OR "ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 660." IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF SETTING A DEADLINE OR EVEN POSING AN ULTIMATUM. IT'S THAT THEY STILL FEEL IT'S TOO EARLY TO DO THAT.

3. I EXPLAINED LONG AND HARD WHY TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD NOT BE ON OUR SIDE. INDEED, I OUTLINED WHY IF WE COULDN'T PASS SUCH A RESOLUTION THIS MONTH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO FOR

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SEVERAL MONTHS -- SOMETHING THAT COULD GET US INTO THE RAINY SEASON, RAMADAN, THE HAJJ, AND ALL THE WAY TO NEXT SUMMER BEFORE THE USE OF FORCE COULD BE CONTEMPLATED.

4. SHEVARDNADZE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT COMPELLING, BECAUSE HE SAW HOW THIS MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES IN THE AREA. I EMPHASIZED THIS POINT AND ALSO SAID IF WE COULDN'T SUSTAIN OUR FORCES OR HAD TO REDUCE THEM IT WOULD CONVINCING SADDAM THAT HE COULD PREVAIL.

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5. AS A RESULT, SHEVARDNADZE BEGAN TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, A POSITION THAT WAS PREMISED ON FURTHER UNSC RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD SHOW INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, HEIGHTEN PRESSURE ON SADDAM AND BASICALLY EXHAUST ALL DIPLOMATIC, NON-MILITARY OPTIONS OVER TIME.

6. TO A LESSER EXTENT GORBACHEV BOUGHT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT BUT I FOUND HIM TORN MORE ABOUT HAVING TO USE FORCE AT ALL. (WHILE I THINK SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT USING FORCE, HE IS MORE INCLINED TO THINK IT WILL HAVE TO BE USED EVENTUALLY.) FOR HIS PART, GORBACHEV'S IMAGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS SUCH THAT HE HAS A HARD TIME RECONCILING THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO USE FORCE IN THIS INITIAL TEST. HE REFLECTED THAT SENTIMENT IN HIS LETTER TO YOU AND HE SAID AS MUCH TO ME TODAY, OBSERVING THAT WE WANT THIS ERA TO BE DIFFERENT FROM THE COLD WAR AND BASED ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF NORMS.

7. I ANSWERED HIM IN TWO WAYS: FIRST, IT'S HARD TO ESTABLISH RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CIVILIZED AND PEACEFUL BEHAVIOR IF A BRUTAL AGGRESSOR WHO QUITE SIMPLY REJECTS THESE NORMS IS ALLOWED TO SUCCEED BECAUSE THE WILL TO USE FORCE IS ABSENT. SECOND, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO PRODUCE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME -- OUR CLEAR PREFERENCE -- WAS TO CONVINCING SADDAM THAT IF HE DIDN'T WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY HE WOULD BE FORCED OUT MILITARILY. ONLY WHEN SADDAM

