NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

OP IMMED /PRIORITY

DE RUEHC = 0088 1800607

O P 290602Z JUN 85 ZEX

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY PRAIA IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 0000

STATE 200088

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SF, WA, AO, US

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AFRICA UPDATE

REF: A) STATE 088886, B) STATE 161556 NOTAL

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL A IS THE MOST RECENT GENERAL SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS UPDATE. THAT CABLE REPORTED THE SITUATION AS OF MARCH 23, FOCUSING ON THE PRESENTATION TO THE MPLA AND THE SAG OF USG IDEAS DESIGNED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND TOUCHING ON THE FORTHCOMING MPC PLAN FOR AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN NAMIBIA. SINCE THAT DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE CHANGED THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE REGION CONSIDERABLY. SPECIFICALLY, THE SAG UNILATERALLY COMPLETED ITS DISENGAGEMENT FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA ON APRIL 17, WAS CAUGHT IN AN ATTEMPTED COMMANDO RAID INTO CABINDA ON MAY 21 (REFTEL B), CARRIED OUT A RAID AGAINST ALLEGED ANC TARGETS IN GABORONE ON JUNE 14, AND INSTALLED A NEW QUOTE INTERIM GOVERNMENT END QUOTE IN NAMIBIA ON JUNE 17.

3. WE CONSIDER COMPLETION OF THE DISENGAGEMENT TO HAVE BEEN A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, CAPPING THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LUSAKA ACCORD IN BRINGING ABOUT AN END TO THE DE FACTO STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE SAG AND ANGOLA. IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED, HOWEVER, ALONG WITH A SERIES OF THREATS OF REINTERVENTION WHICH DISTRACTED THE MPLA AND CAUSED THE [end p1] ANGOLANS TO FOCUS ON THE BELLICOSE NOISES BEING MADE BY THE SAG RATHER THAN ON THE GAINS DERIVED FROM THE DISENGAGEMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE MPLA COMPLAINED THAT THE SADF WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT COMPLETE DUE TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF TROOPS AT THE RUACANA AND CALUEQUE DAMS TO GUARD AGAINST SWAPO SABOTAGE. THE FACTS ARE, AS ALWAYS, MORE COMPLEX IN THAT THE MPLA FOR ITS OWN REASONS HAS AN AMBIGUOUS STANCE ON SUCH MATTERS AS BORDER SECURITY, SWAPO RESTRAINT, AND THE SADF PRESENCE AT THOSE DAMS. IN ANY EVENT, IT HAS BEEN QUICK TO REACH FOR EXCUSES HANDED IT BY THE SAG AS REASONS FOR NOT ADDRESSING KEY DECISIONS.

4. THE CABINDA RAID WAS A DEFINITE SETBACK TO OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. WHILE THE SAG HAS DENIED THAT THE RAID WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE CABINDA GULF OIL COMPANY TERMINAL AT MALONGO, SADF CHIEF OF STAFF VILJOEN ADMITTED SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT THAT THE SAG CONTINUES TO OPERATE QUOTE INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING END QUOTE TEAMS DEEP INSIDE ANGOLA. AN ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT IN THE MOST NARROW TERMS SUCH TEAMS DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE LUSAKA ACCORD SINCE THAT ARRANGEMENT ENCOMPASSES ONLY THE QUOTE AREA IN QUESTION END QUOTE IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. ADDITIONALLY, IN RESPONSE TO USG URGING AFTER THE CABINDA INCIDENT, THE SAG ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD WITHDRAWN ITS TROOPS FROM RUACANA AND CALUEQUE. NEVERTHELESS, THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ARMED SADF UNITS ELSEWHERE INSIDE ANGOLA IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ACCORD, AND WE DEPLORED IT BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY WITH THE SAG.

5. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT THE ATTACK WAS, IN FACT, DIRECTED AGAINST THE GULF OIL FACILITY. WE HAVE TOLD THE SAG PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT WE DO NOT CONSIDER ITS EXPLANATION IN THAT REGARD TO HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY. GIVEN THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AT THE MALONGO FACILITY THERE ARISES THE ADDITIONAL BILATERAL ISSUE OF DANGER TO AMERICAN LIVES ARISING FROM THE SAG ACTION. AS POSTS ARE AWARE, THE USG TAKES ITS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS AREA VERY SERIOUSLY, AND IT HAS BECOME A HOT EMOTIONAL ISSUE HERE IN THE WAKE OF THE TWA AND SAN SALVADOR INCIDENTS. IN RESPONSE TO HEAVY USG PRESSURE, THE SAG PLEDGED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO US NOT TO BE A PARTY TO ANY ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS OR PROPERTY ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

6. IN DEPLORING THE CABINDA RAID WE MADE A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING OUR GOALS TO BE THE REDUCTION OF CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE AND RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE REGION. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THOSE STATEMENTS, THE GABORONE RAID ONLY ADDED TO OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE SAG AND CALLED EVEN MORE INTO QUESTION ITS INTENTIONS. WE DEPLORED THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID IN THE STRONGEST TERMS BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SAG HAD NOT EXHAUSTED THE DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER NON-VIOLENT MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO RESOLVE ITS COMPLAINTS, AND BECAUSE THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO BE COOPERATIVE IN RESOLVING THOSE COMPLAINTS.

7. SAG GOOD FAITH HAD ALREADY BEEN IN DOUBT IN MANY QUARTERS AS A RESULT OF ITS DECISION TO ACCEPT THE BULK OF THE MPC PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA. WHILE THE SAG HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT DOES NOT SEE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER UNSCR 435, THE DECISION TO MOVE [end p2] FORWARD AT THIS POINT IN TIME WAS MOST UNHELPFUL. WE HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT WE CONSIDER ANY AND ALL SAG MOVES IN THIS REGARD TO BE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT STANDING IN RELATION TO A FINAL NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

8. IN THE MIDST OF ALL THIS ACTIVITY NOT CONDUCIVE TO MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, WE HAVE RECEIVED NON-RESPONSES FROM BOTH THE MPLA AND THE SAG TO THE IDEAS WE HAD PUT TO THEM. OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES CONFRONTING THE MPLA DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR (VIZ. NAM MINISTERIAL IN LUANDA IN SEPTEMBER, PARTY CONGRESS IN DECEMBER, AND PROBABLE DRY-SEASON MILITARY OFFENSIVE) HAD LED US EARLIER THIS SPRING TO DOUBT THE MPLA'S CAPACITY TO MAKE THE HARD DECISIONS NECESSARY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE ANGOLAN RESPONSE CONFIRMED THIS ANALYSIS BY AVOIDING THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR IDEAS AND CONCENTRATING ON THE MPC ARRANGEMENT IN NAMIBIA NEVERTHELESS, THEY WERE CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO MEET IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THEM MORE FULLY WHEN THE CABINDA INCIDENT TOOK PLACE. THAT EVENT HAS CAUSED THEM TO STEP BACK FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS TEMPORARILY, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL RESUME THEIR PARTICIPATION AS SOON AS THEY FEEL IT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO DO SO, AND FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DUNEM SAID IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET GIVEN ITS RESPONSE TO THE USG IDEAS. THE SAG RESPONSE ALSO FAILS TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY THE CHOICES IT MUST MAKE AND PROVIDES LITTLE TO WORK WITH IN ACCELERATING THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS.

9. IN LIGHT OF THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WE HAVE DECIDED TO REVIEW THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SAG REGIONAL DECISIONS. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THAT REVIEW, AS WELL AS TO SIGNAL OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THEIR RECENT ACTIONS, WE HAVE CALLED HOME AMBASSADOR NICKEL FOR CONSULTATIONS. OUR STAND IN RECENT U. N. VOTES FURTHER REINFORCES THE SIGNAL OF OUR INTENSE DISPLEASURE.

10. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION VOICES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF OUR POLICY VIS-A-VIS SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA REMAINS VALID AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED. WHILE RECENT SAG ACTIONS HAVE CLEARLY BEEN SELF-DEFEATING AND HAVE GREATLY COMPLICATED OUR LIVES HERE IN WASHINGTON – FOR EXAMPLE IN ARGUING IN CONGRESS AGAINST SANCTIONS – WE STILL SEE OUR INTERESTS BEST SERVED IN A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH PRETORIA FOR OUR POLICY TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, ALL PARTIES MUST WANT A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT AND A REGIONAL CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS, AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THAT IS TRULY THE CASE WITH THE SAG. THE PURPOSE OF AMBASSADOR NICKEL'S CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON IS TO CONSIDER WAYS BY WHICH WE CAN MOVE THE SAG BACK TO A POSITION WHERE IT WILL ONCE AGAIN COOPERATE WITH US AND OTHERS IN REACHING A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. WE REMAIN WILLING TO WORK TO RESTORE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION WITH PRETORIA, BUT WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE SAG THAT WE CANNOT DO SO IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTIONS WHICH WOULD ONLY PROVIDE FURTHER FUEL FOR OUR CRITICS, DESTABILIZE THE REGION, UNDERMINE EVERYONE'S CONFIDENCE IN ITS INTENTIONS, AND REKINDLE SOVIET PROSPECTS REGIONALLY.

11. WE HAVE BEGUN A SERIES OF CAREFUL PROBES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIGNALS WHICH ARE AIMED AT TESTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS. OUR APPROACH IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT SEEKING [end p3] CONFIRMATION THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS IN THE REGION. WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS HAVE LED TO THE CURRENT DIFFICULT PASSAGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE CHOICE BEFORE THE SOUTH AFRICANS IS A TOUGH ONE, BUT LIVING IN ISOLATION CANNOT FOR LONG HAVE MUCH ATTRACTION.

12. THAT SAID, THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORT IS ON THE REGIONAL CONTEXT WHERE WE HAVE SPECIAL LEGITIMACY. INTERNALLY, WE CONCLUDE THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE DOING ABOUT AS MUCH AS WHITE POLITICS WILL TOLERATE. WE INTEND TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON FOR FURTHER, INDEED ACCELERATED, INTERNAL REFORM BUT THIS ISSUE DOES NOT LIE AT THE CENTER OF OUR PRESENT EFFORT TO REOPEN COMMUNICATIONS. BRINGING THE SOUTH AFRICANS BACK TO A COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WILL NOT BE EASY; NOR WILL IT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN ONE STEP. IN DUE COURSE AMBASSADOR NICKEL WILL RETURN TO ADD HIS WEIGHT TO OUR UNDERTAKING. WE HAVE CAUGHT THE ATTENTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LEADERSHIP BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THEY WILL SETTLE DOWN AND RESUME WORK WITH US. WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT THERE IS NO REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS. THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR FURTHER SLIGHTS OR SWIPES.

13. THE DOOR IS OPEN TO THE ANGOLANS TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS WITH US, AND THE TIME IS GOOD FOR THEM TO EXPLOIT THE SOUTH AFRICANS COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH US. WHETHER THEY WILL MOVE IN THE SHORT RUN IS ANOTHER QUESTION. LUANDA IS CONFUSED, OFF BALANCE, UNDER PRESSURE, AND TAKEN WITH ITS FORTHCOMING MILITARY OFFENSIVE AND NAM MEETING. WE WILL BE NUDGING LUANDA BACK ONTO THE SETTLEMENT TRACK, INCREASING OUR ATTENTION AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION CLARIFIES. NEITHER LUANDA NOR CAPE TOWN HAVE A BETTER BET THAN THE SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK WHICH WE HAVE ON OFFER. WE WILL BE PATIENT BUT PERSISTENT.

14. ACTION REQUESTED: ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW ON THE ABOVE, AS AMBASSADOR DEEMS APPROPRIATE, IN EXPLAINING THE USG POSITION TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

15. ADDITIONALLY, WE WILL SHORTLY BE TALKING SELECTIVELY WITH THE PRESS IN ORDER TO EXPRESS OUR UNHAPPINESS WITH THE SAG'S RECENT ACTIONS, TO UNDERSCORE THAT OUR POLICY REMAINS INTACT, AND THE ONLY SENSIBLE COURSE, AND TO SHOW OUR SUPPORT FOR NEIGHBORING STATES FACING THREATS. THE POINTS WE INTEND TO MAKE WITH THE PRESS WILL BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES, WHICH ACTION AND INFO POSTS SHOULD FEEL FREE TO DRAW UPON AS APPROPRIATE:

• OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES OF ADVANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND PROMOTING CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE BASED SOLIDLY ON AMERICAN INTERESTS AND VALUES. RECENT SAG ACTIONS DO NOT CHANGE THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT MAKE THEIR PURSUIT MORE DIFFICULT.

• THE CALLING HOME OF THE AMBASSADOR DOES NOT SIGNAL A CHANGE IN COURSE WE FULLY INTEND TO REMAIN “CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGED” THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA AS THE BEST MEANS OF KEEPING THE U.S. A RELEVANT PLAYER.

• WE HAD HOPED THAT IN THE WAKE OF NKOMATI AND SAG RESTRAINT SHOWN IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS THAT PRETORIA HAD COME TO SHARE OUR VIEW THAT ITS OWN INTERESTS IN PEACEFUL RELATIONS AND A BETTER CLIMATE FOR REFORM AT HOME WERE BEST SERVED BY NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMODATION, RATHER THAN BY [end p4] RESORT TO FORCE. THE PROBLEM WITH RELIANCE ON MILITARY MUSCLE TO ACHIEVE SECURITY FOR SOUTH AFRICA IS THAT IT CREATES TOTAL INSECURITY FOR ITS NEIGHBORS. SOUTH AFRICA MUST UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH CONDUCT WILL TRIGGER MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES, INCLUDING AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

• RECENT SAG ACTIONS RAISE THE MOST SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS, AND AMBASSADOR NICKEL WAS CALLED HOME TO REVIEW THE SITUATION – NOT THE POLICY – IN THAT LIGHT.

• WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE SAG HAS PROFESSED ITS CONTINUED PREFERENCE FOR DEALING WITH SECURITY PROBLEMS BY TALKING RATHER THAN SHOOTING. WE MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ITS RECENT ACTIONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A NEGOTIATED APPROACH AND WITH OUR REGIONAL PEACE EFFORT. THEREFORE THEY ALSO COLLIDE WITH U.S. INTERESTS, AS DEFINED IN A POLICY THAT CARRIES THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF SUPPORT IN THE USG.

• WE SEE AMBASSADOR NICKEL'S TIME IN THE U.S. ESSENTIALLY AS A CHANCE FOR SERIOUS REFLECTION, ALL AROUND, ON THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH WE SEE AS A VITAL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE ARE SEEKING POSITIVE RESULTS, AND EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE SAG WILL RESPOND IN A SIMILAR MANNER.

• WHILE OUR POSITION ON TERRORISM AND CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE IS FIRM AND WELL KNOWN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CABINDA AND GABORONE RAIDS CAN BE JUSTIFIED BY THE SAG AS COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIONS. IN THE CASE OF GABORONE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE SAG EXHAUSTED NON-VIOLENT MEANS AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES TO GET THE BOTSWANA GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH ITS COMPLAINTS.

• THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA HAS SAID IT HAS FURTHER THOUGHTS TO OFFER ON THE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION. OUR INVITATION TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS STANDS, AND WE AWAIT AN ANGOLAN MOVE. IN FACT, IT IS IN LUANDA'S BEST INTERESTS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND CLARIFY ITS POSITION WHILE SOUTH AFRICA IS CONSIDERING ITS OPTIONS.

• WE REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT THERE IS NO OTHER PATH TO PEACE IN THE REGION THAN THE ONE WHICH WE HAVE DEFINED. WE ARE DETERMINED TO MOVE AHEAD AND TO USE OUR FULL INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TO MATCH OUR EFFORTS WITH FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION OF THEIR OWN. SHULTZ <??p1196>BT