Speeches, etc.

Margaret Thatcher

Radio Interview for BBC Radio 2 Jimmy Young Programme

Document type: Speeches, interviews, etc.
Venue: Broadcasting House, Portland Place, central London
Source: Thatcher Archive: COI transcript
Journalist: Jimmy Young, BBC
Editorial comments: 1100-1200.
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 7760
Themes: Defence (Falklands), Monetary policy, Privatized & state industries, Energy, Law & order, Security services & intelligence, Trade unions, Trade union law reform, Strikes & other union action

J.Y.

You probably will not remember for a moment, but the last time you sat in that chair was in …   . May 11th, 1983.

P.M.

They told me that just as I came in. I could scarcely believe it.

J.Y.

I know. It is a very long time ago, since when, of course, lots of things have happened and none, I suppose, of greater social and economic and perhaps eventually political significance for this country than the pits dispute, so that is what I would like to talk to you about mainly this morning, if I may.

P.M.

It is undoubtedly the main issue before us. [end p1]

J.Y.

Right. Now, for the past twenty-eight weeks we have seen the miners dispute growing steadily more bitter. Arthur Scargill, of course, says: “There is a third hand at the negotiating table!” Now, given that you appointed Mr. MacGregor to the specific job of making the industry leaner and more efficient, isn't that what Mr. Scargill means when he speaks of a third hand at the negotiating table, that hand of course being yours?

P.M.

I do not know what Arthur Scargillhe means. What I do know is that the coal industry is governed by statute. There was a coal industry nationalisation act which provided that the revenue should be sufficient for the outgoings. There have been several Coal Industry Acts since. In those Coal Industry Acts, it is enshrined that uneconomic pits can be closed. The last such Act—1977—passed when Mr. Wedgwood Benn was Secretary of State. So since the coal was nationalized and even long before that, uneconomic pits have been closed and must continue to be closed. But that is only half the equation. We put the money into the new good pits because we are interested in having a good future for coal and for the people who work in it and for their grandchildren.

J.Y.

Right. Good. Coming back to the question, however, one can see what he means, you know, with respect, given the fact that the Government appoints the Chairman of the National Coal Board, the Government decides [end p2] cash limits, thereby the levels of subsidy and so on, so if the Government ultimately controls the purse strings, would it not be natural for people to say “Well, she who plays the piper calls the tune” not unreasonably?

P.M.

We may control the purse strings, but do not believe that Government pays the piper. The taxpayer pays the piper. That is the only place we get it from and most of the people who are providing the money in order to subsidise coal—and last year the subsidy was £1,300 million which is equal to 28½; pence on every gallon of petrol, equal to £2.50 on every retirement pension every week, equal to more than the amount we pay to all our doctors and dentists in the Health Service—the people who provide that subsidy after they have paid the price of coal, after they have paid the price of electricity, they know that uneconomic factories have to close; they know that old uneconomic power stations have to close; they know that uneconomic car factories have to close; textile factories, engineering factories, shipbuilding. They know that you cannot run Britain as a collection of museum pieces. You have got to invest in the future and, if I might just say one more thing, they have not got half such a good deal as this Government and Ian MacGregorMr. MacGregor have provided for the coal miners. It is they who are paying the bill.

J.Y.

In fact aren't we all? But in fact, does it not actually underline what I was saying, because people listening to this will probably ask themselves whether the Government should remain aloof in a [end p3] dispute involving a major nationalised industry. I mean, it is not a dispute at Woolworths or Marks & Spencers, and at the end of the day, since, as you rightly say, it is taxpayers' money that is involved, surely they have a right to expect the Government to be involved?

P.M.

When a new Chairman of the National Coal Board is appointed, he has his responsibilities set out both by statute—and I indicated that if you go back to the Act which actually governs the operation of the Coal Board it is supposed to break even—its revenues and outgoings are supposed to break even—and then, under the 1977 Act, you can close uneconomic pits and indeed, it was also put into the 1965 Act. So he has got to act in accordance with statute which has gone through Parliament. He also has a series of objectives and certainly, it has been the objective of this Government to try to get a flourishing thriving coal industry for two reasons: First, we can have one; we have got the good coal, and we want people to work in good conditions and to have a good future. And secondly, we want our industry to be competitive with those overseas. Unless we can mine coal at cost competitive with overseas countries, then our other industries are going to have to pay more for their coal and more for electricity so they are going to lose clients. We put a tremendous amount into the future because we believe in the future.

J.Y.

I think the point that I wanted to establish and you have agreed, is that taxpayers' money is involved and it is the Government which gives out the taxpayers' money.

Can we move on to Mr. MacGregor? Now people say that you have [end p4] miscalculated in choosing Mr. MacGregor to head up the NCB and certainly, one has to own up and say that Mr. Scargill seems to have had much better of the media battle, as they say. Now, with hindsight, do you think perhaps you should have chosen a person more skilled than Mr. MacGregor in the media presentation of the Coal Board and the Government's case?

P.M.

No, I do not think you can [word missing] an industry on whether you are good at public relations.

J.Y.

It is awfully important though, isn't it?

P.M.

It is very important, but first of all, you have got to get the decisions right and you have got to get the future of the Coal Industry right. When you have got that, certainly you have got to put it across, but you simply cannot run everything as if it were a kind of essay in public relations. I mean, I think you are absolutely marvellous, Jimmy, but my job first is to get the decisions right and then to put them across.

Yes, I did choose Mr. MacGregor. I think you are being very hard on him.

J.Y.

No, I am not being hard on him at all.

P.M.

Can I just go on and say one or two things in his favour? He is a native of this country. There is only one reason why at seventy he should [end p5] take on what is probably the toughest job in British industry, and that is because he is a man who believes in a profitable future for anything in which he works …

J.Y.

Well, certainly he does not need the money; I think everybody knows that. Yes. Right.

P.M.

… a profitable future for those who work in coal. He knows the industry; he has worked in it; and he wants to bring it up to profitability for the self-respect of those who work in it, for the benefit and advantage of all who have to buy coal or electricity; and for its future. And there is no other reason why he should take it on but for that. And do not forget, even in the middle of this coal strike, he went to Chicago and got an order—and order that would have meant 1,000 jobs for Durham coal-miners. And do you know how we have had to fulfil that order in the strike? By buying in from outside.

J.Y.

Can I ask you something which seems to me, as a layman, to be a basic problem? Now, is it not a basic problem that Mr. Scargill sees this as a political strike, changing the nature of society, removing the Government possibly, and so on? I mean, he has never made a secret of that. Mr. MacGregor sees it as an industrial problem and has already admitted, incidentally, he cannot make head nor tail of Mr. Scargill. So when they sit down to have a discussion, aren't they actually talking about two entirely different things? If they are, how can they achieve a settlement? [end p6]

P.M.

Let me put it perhaps slightly differently.

The crunch, I think, was quite clear after twelve days of talks. The pay deal is the best that has ever been offered. Those who retire early have such superb terms: I mean, £39,000 for a man of forty-nine. If you go over that to fifty, a man of fifty who decides to take redundancy gets £20,000 capital plus £78 every week. Those terms are fantastic and the investment is fantastic in the future.

The crunch came: what is the dispute about? The dispute is about whether uneconomic pits shall be closed. As I have indicated, uneconomic pits have always been closed. It is enshrined in legislation. The last Labour Government did it. Every Government has done it. If you are interested in the future, you put your money into the future good pits where people work in good safe conditions and not in the past. This is a demand that has been made in no other industry, which no other industry can meet, and therefore one says: why this demand? Do not say it is to keep communities together. We all want to keep communities together, but you keep communities together not by keeping them in yesterday, but by trying to keep them tomorrow. And, of course, exhausted pits also have to be closed.

Let me make it quite clear: it does not matter who you talk to, it does not matter how long the talks go on, it does not matter how long the strike goes on, it does not matter who comes in to talk, uneconomic pits have always closed. Uneconomic pits will always have to close. [end p7]

J.Y.

Let me just put the other side of that. I mean, you are absolutely right …

P.M.

It is nice to be told that. Thank you very much. It is nice to have something nice said to one.

J.Y.

I am going to give you some figures in a second. Now, in justification of the closure programme, the Government says many more pits were closed under previous Governments, no problem, which is true. The number of collieries in 1963—611. In 1979—225. Manpower down from half a million to 235,000. Isn't the major difference the fact that unemployment is so much worse now than it was years ago that now, when mining jobs go, communities go, because miners just cannot relocate easily and get another job?

P.M.

That also applies to exhausted pits and to pits that are so geologically faulty that people cannot work in them, and the way to try to keep communities is, as the National Coal Board is doing, setting up enterprise schemes to try to bring new jobs there.

Also, can I point out that some will wish to move to new pits where the conditions are so much better, where there is a future for their children and grandchildren. Others will wish to use their redundancy money to start up new businesses, and can I again point out that £1,300 million which is what the taxpayer found for many old uneconomic pits and for the [end p8] industry and for redundancy payments, could, when we got it profitable, be used to start up new small business which has a future, and by putting things in uneconomic pits which ought to be closed, you are ensuring that new small businesses are still-born. That is not a programme for the future.

Yes, one has tremendous sympathy with people who want a job for their self-respect. You do not create jobs by pouring money into uneconomic things. You try to take that money and to encourage them either to start up on their own or you put it into new pits and no single miner has ever been made compulsorily redundant. The redundancy terms are so good, they are queueing up to take them.

J.Y.

It was said here on Monday, Prime Minister, that far from getting any better, this dispute is actually getting worse the longer it goes. What I mean by that is that miners leaders appear to be escalating their demands. For instance, some of the more hard-line leaders are now said to be talking of a one-off payment, a sweetener if you like, of between £1,000 and £2,000 just to go back, plus all the other things like shorter walking hours and so on. Now, doesn't this strike seem to be turning into a gigantic gamble, with the stakes on both side just going higher and higher and higher and where does it all end?

P.M.

No. I would not apply the word “gamble” to this strike as far as Government is concerned. The Government did everything to stop this strike ever happening, by providing the best deal for miners, whether pay, voluntary redundancy or investment in the future, that any government at any time in our country has ever provided, and so, as far as we are [end p9] concerned we just did not want a strike.

Now, 70,000 of those miners voted. They voted 2–1 to stay at work. Many of them are still at work, many were done out of their vote. There are many miners who are not working who find the violence totally repugnant, who would like to have a say in what shall happen to them.

Now, let us turn to the fundamental things. The best deal ever offered to the industry. The miners being unable to express their view in what should be—or has always been in the past—a democratic union. They are the third party whose voice should be heard. And then, other miners who voted with their feet, who regard the rule book as sacrosanct—quite right—they voted, they have honoured the rule book, and they regard themselves as having other loyalties as well as to their union though they honoured their union perfectly in the rule book and they also say: “We have duties to our families and we have duties to the future of this industry”.

J.Y.

And yet, you see, we still have an ongoing strike which some day is going to be settled.

P.M.

Do you know why it is ongoing?

J.Y.

You are going to tell me! [end p10]

P.M.

I am. Because it is kept on by mob violence and by refusal to put the case to a ballot. I hope that no-one is ever going to give in to mob violence or refusal to put the case to a ballot. As I indicated, it does not matter how long the strike goes on, uneconomic pits have always had to be closed, have always been closed and must always be closed if there is to be any future in this industry.

J.Y.

I would like to ask you about violence a little later on. Can I ask you one more question and then break for some music?

Now, three months ago—I mean, I was saying just now that at some time this strike has got to be settled, all strikes are settled—three months ago, Peter Walker was sitting where you are now sitting and he was talking to me about miners drifting back to work. Now, as you well know, according to the Mori Poll in Monday's “Panorama”, more miners than ever before are now supporting the strike, the drift back to work is not happening, certainly not in sufficient numbers to bring the matter to a conclusion, and we read that the Government pins great hopes on the drift back to work, so I suppose the question I have to ask you is: if it is not happening, and if it does not happen, what then is your next move?

P.M.

I cannot say anything in addition to that which I have already said. I believe that in time this excellent offer will indeed have an effect on the minds of those who want to work in this industry in the future. There is going to be a job for everyone of them who wants to work in that [end p11] industry in the future. It will be a better job than a job working in uneconomic pits. That I wish could be put to a ballot and I think it would be far better if everyone concentrated on saying, why are the members of the NUM denieda say in whether or not they want to accept that offer? It does not matter how long this strike goes on, uneconomic pits will have to be closed. But let me make the third point, which is one you have not made:

If this strike does go on—all right, it has been on six months—for a year, for longer than a year, the condition which those pits will be in will close far more faces and far more pits than if those miners went back to work, and they know it. At the moment, fourteen producing faces have been lost. That is equivalent to several coal mines. Seventeen more are in a critical condition. Fifty-nine are causing concern and in addition, there are six faces which have been worked out, where it has not been possible to salvage equipment and, of course, you know Polcemit pit was flooded and it is very doubtful whether it can ever be opened again. So if this strike goes on very much longer, the very strike itself will have closed more faces. It would have been better had it been closed in a reasonable way through the usual consultation processes which always take place.

J.Y.

Just let me be clear about that and then we can break and then come back and do some more. What you are saying is that the strike has gone on six months. You have just said: and indeed, if it goes on for twelve months or indeed if it goes on for longer than that … are you saying you are prepared to go on as long as it is necessary to go on? [end p12]

P.M.

Indeed. What I am saying is that if it goes on as long as that, it will be the strike which closes the pits.

J.Y.

How long is long, for goodness sake?

P.M.

I think you must in fact expect that reasonableness and sense will gradually come to have their effect and in the end, as I have said so many times, if you sit where I do and you have the ideals which I do, in the end you believe that more people are responsible than are not. In the end, you believe that mob violence will be seen for what it is—an attempt to try to get their way when common sense and the ballot will not prevail—and if ever one were to say that that triumphs it is the end of democracy in this country and I believe reasonableness will triumph. I believe that the violence is repugnant not only to the working miners—and my goodness me they are brave and courageous and so are their families. I believe it is utterly repugnant to many of the miners who are on strike, who do not approve of violence and who would like to get back to normal and I do believe those things will tell.

J.Y.

Prime Minister, many things are there which I want to talk to you about between now and 12 o'clock if we may. Let us have a break now. [end p13]

J.Y.

Prime Minister, you made reference just before that break to the threat to democracy. Well, speaking on this programme in July—and other places later it is true to say—David Owen said: “If Arthur Scargill were seen to win, it would have a devastating effect on the whole cause of moderation and realism in trade unionism in this country. His terms are wholly unreasonable. To him, this has always been a political strike and he must not succeed.” However, at the time of the last Coal Board offer to Mr. Scargill, it was freely said by a lot of people that had he accepted that offer, he would already have been looked to be a winner. Now, since he is unlikely to settle for less than he has already been offered, I suppose, don't you think that it looks increasingly that he is actually going to emerge from this strike looking a winner?

P.M.

This strike is being sustained by violence and refusal of the leadership of the NUM to put the offer to a ballot. Now, why don't we concentrate all our efforts on trying to get a ballot? Because as I understand trade unionism, it is not for the power of the leadership, it is for the protection of the membership, and yet the membership are not being allowed to have their say, and those that have had their say have voted two to one to continue to work.

J.Y.

But you see, with respect, Prime Minister, Arthur Scargill is the President of the Miners' Union. You cannot force him to have a ballot, can you? [end p14]

P.M.

No, indeed. I would have thought that the TUC would be very very concerned to see that they do not support a union which has sustained its case by mob violence and refusal to have a ballot. That is not my understanding of trade unionship, and let me make it perfectly clear that if any government or any other unions supported a case sustained by violence and refusal to have a ballot, then it does not say very much for trade unionism and for those great pioneers of trade unionism, and many people will be looking at the future of trade unionism very very seriously indeed. I want responsible trade unionism. But again, let me make it perfectly clear. It does not matter how long this strike goes on, we cannot do anything other than continue to close uneconomic pits—that has always been the case, will continue to be the case and must be the case if you are to have a good future for the coal industry.

What you are saying—and you said it at the beginning—is there really are no more industrial questions in this dispute. We had a debate in the House of Commons at the end of July. We have we got? We agreed that uneconomic pits had to be closed and then they said it is a matter of procedure and then the next day Mr. MacGregor put out a statement that the procedure is exactly the same as it has always been. Right. I believe—I can only make my belief clear again—the overwhelming majority of miners, whether they are working or whether they are on strike, find violence repugnant. They will want to have a ballot and other trade unions understand exactly what is going on. They believe that a trade union is for its members and not to deny them a ballot and other trade unions from experience know you cannot keep uneconomic factories going, shipyards going, power stations going. They have to be closed and you have to have a look to the future. [end p15]

J.Y.

A lot of things to cover, Prime Minister. Now, you mentioned the TUC just then. Now, I have got a flash in front of me which has just come in just this minute and it says—I will read it to you: “The miners President, Arthur Scargill, has made it clear that the Miners Union does not accept the deal reached between dockers and steelworkers in Scotland over coal deliveries to Ravenscraig Steelworks. Mr. Scargill said on arrival in London for a meeting with transport unions that the miners would continue to picket the Ravenscraig Steelworks. His union did not expect other unions to make deals which resulted in other workers crossing the miners' picket line.” Now, it does not look as if much has changed there, does it?

P.M.

No, what they are doing of course is being prepared to sacrifice other workers' jobs on a very large scale and that is what would happen. They have been prepared to sacrifice the whole of the steel industry. They have been prepared to sacrifice jobs in other industries, because they want to compel coal to be mined no matter at what cost. May I make it clear that from our efficient pits we can mine coal at the pithead at £23 a tonne? In the inefficient ones it is up to £100 a tonne.

Do you know the industries which are having to close because electricity which we generate in normal times 80%; from coal? The aluminium smelter at Invergordon had to close. The electricity was too expensive. Paperwork had to close because it is too expensive. Chemical works are on to us constantly about the high cost of electricity. Do you know what keeps it high? It is the high cost of coal mined in this country. Just let me go on. [end p16] I know I am saying quite a lot, but I want to get this across. Those miners who continue are not hesitating to sacrifice and put at the risk the jobs in other industries. Right now, Nick Edwards, Wales, is overseas trying to get inward investment. One of his things has been “Look! Industrial relations are better!” What hope do you think he has got?

The miners are sacrificing the jobs of other people. By the places that are being put out of action, they are sacrificing their own future.

J.Y.

Coming back to what Mr. Scargill has said this very morning, he said will be asking all unions this week to follow the official TUC policy under which all unions have been asked to stop the movement of coal, coke and oil through miners' picket lines at steelworks and power stations.

P.M.

As I remember that particular TUC policy, it involved first, discussion with the TUC and then with the particular union concerned. It was not a direct instruction and I believe in responsible trade unionism and I do not believe that the TUC will lend its very considerable authority and voice to the support of those who use mob violence and those who refuse a ballot against the miners—and do not forget that nearly a third of them are at work, nearly a third—who have honoured every single rule in the rule book, have done everything right and have had regard to the future of their industry and had a ballot and honoured the result. If the TUC were to support mob violence, to support the refusal to have a ballot, then the standing of trade unionism would plummet. I believe in responsible trade unionism. People have got to be represented somehow. [end p17]

J.Y.

Let me ask you about the TUC, because you have mentioned the TUC several times and I think they are very important, especially at this time. It seemed to many people that what Len Murray called “the new realism” was ended by your decision to withdraw trade union rights from workers at GCHQ, Cheltenham. Do you think—or would you accept—that you lost the support of some moderate trade unions and also perhaps lost the opportunity or indeed the possibility shall we say, of now doing exactly what you are talking about, which is appealing to the leaders of the trade union movement for help in getting this thing sorted out?

P.M.

No. GCHQ is an intelligence security agency. They have been treated differently. Provision is made in the law to treat them differently. Unfortunately, there were strikes at GCHQ. Those strikes, as was indicated from the magazine of one of the Civil Service unions, were deliberately aimed at GCHQ and the services it offers, because of their sensitive nature and because of the harm they would do and because they thought that other NATO countries would get on to …   . I was faced with very bad strikes and had them in acutely sensitive areas and you cannot tell what we lost. Therefore, I said: Right, we bring that GCHQ into line with others and it stopped there. Most people understand that.

J.Y.

You say most people understand that. Now, I read the other day that the TUC—rightly or wrongly—had been poised on the brink of this new realism and ready to do business, making offers, no strikes or very nearly into a no strike situation … were then told …   . the phrase used was they were [end p18] told to get lost. Not in so many words by you, but the impression they got was that they were told to get lost and they regarded it as a colossal snub.

P.M.

I am sorry. I simply do not understand the link you are making between this new realism and GCHQ. I have indicated that GCHQ is a security agency. That because of the sensitivity and importance of its work, it was deliberately chosen for selective strikes by one of the Civil Service unions. One day 1,500 were actually out on strike. This is a security and intelligence agency. So we decided when we had to avow—that is recognise—publicly recognise the work of that agency, we would bring that intelligence agency into line with others and say that you shall not have outside trade unions; you must, of course, have a staff association, which is theirs and not mine. Now, that has got nothing to do with a new realism and may I point out that realism is not new—it is as old as life itself—and that is why factories have closed when uneconomic, why power stations, shipyards, textile jobs, engineering jobs have been lost when uneconomic and cannot compete with others. That is a very old realism and I do not understand why you are calling it new.

J.Y.

Well, because Len Murray made reference to it and people made reference to Len Murray 's new realism. But the point of fact is, whatever the pros and cons of the matter, what I am really saying is, whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, by the action at Cheltenham do you think you have lost the ability if you like, to say to TUC leaders now: how about coming to No. 10 Downing St. and helping me sort out this problem? [end p19]

P.M.

Certainly not. This problem is to be sorted between the management and the unions. They have had twelve days of talks; they have come to the single, sole point of difference which is a fundamental challenge by the leadership of the union to the right of the management to manage and for the right to be managed under the Acts passed by Parliament and the objectives given to the Coal Board. Now, that is the sole point at issue. That is the point which will be the same, no matter how many talks and no matter how many talks or with whom. According to new realism, that new realism or that realism will still be there: uneconomic pits have to close. Now, the idea that you should somehow bring in other parties is to me totally wrong. If you are going to have a successful industry, you are only going to get it by the management and the work force cooperating and understanding the economic facts of life. Not by saying: “We will use industrial muscle to compel other industries and other people to buy coal at four times its efficient price.” Who in the National Union of Mineworkers says in order to keep uneconomic factories going we must buy cars at four times their efficient price? … buy suits at four times their efficient price …

J.Y.

Are you saying though, Prime Minister …   .

P.M.

I am being realistic and being hopeful for the future.

J.Y.

But you are saying then that you would not call, let us say, the new [end p20] General Secretary of the TUC, to Downing Street to see whether he could perhaps help in the sorting out of this problem?

P.M.

This strike is only sorted out in one of two ways: by agreement between management and the workforce. They cannot agree for the simple reason that you have got this fundamental challenge by the leadership of the NUM to the right of the National Coal Board to manage and the right to continue as the whole industry has been conducted for a very long time. We are not asking anything new. We are asking to carry on as normal; as every government has carried on. The only difference is this: that this management, with the agreement of this Government, has—carrying on as normal—offered a better deal to the miners and better investment for the future than any other previous government.

J.Y.

If that is the difference on Government and management side, then what is the difference on the NUM side which is making the difference, if you like?

P.M.

What is making the difference is that they have attempted to say that no uneconomic pits shall ever be closed. That is new. As I have indicated, it is even enshrined in legislation by Parliament. It was reaffirmed in its latest legislative form, by the Coal Industry Act of 1977, passed when Mr. Wedgwood Benn was Secretary of State for Energy and it is there that the Secretary of State may make grounds for the closure of uneconomic pits. That is the one under which we operate. That is the [end p21] one under which Alf Robens—the 1965 one actually—but that method is the way in which Alf Robens as Chairman and other Chairmen have operated.

J.Y.

You have mentioned on several occasions violence and intimidation. Let me ask you about it.

Lesley Curtis of the Police Federation last week: “Picketing,” he said, “is worse than the inner city riots of 1981”. He then went on to say—and I quote: “What we are facing now is something more insidious, dangerous and ominous. There has been deliberate and sophisticated organization behind the violence which we have seen in recent months.” He then said: “I again ask the NCB to go to the Courts to enforce the existing legislation on picketing” so the question, I suppose, is why will not the NCB go to the Courts to enforce the existing law on picketing?

P.M.

Now look! Violence is a matter for the criminal law, as you know, not for the civil law. It is a matter for the criminal law. It is a matter of having the evidence and bringing people to court. Now, I think there have been in excess of some 6,000 arrests under the criminal law. Those cases are now being heard. The law, as people have commented, is operating very slowly and so instead of having only voluntary magistrates, there have been appointed some professional magistrates, stipendiary magistrates, who are able to move much faster. There are two sitting. There is a panel of ten and any local court that is getting behind can have one tomorrow or more than that. Now that is the criminal law, a matter for the police and never a matter for anyone else. [end p22]

The Civil Law has been operated, by the British Steel Corporation as you know, when the miners went and sat in one of the cranes at the docks at the steel plant, they got an injunction very quickly, and the hauliers got an injunction very quickly and the law was seen to be effective.

Now, to be effective under civil law, you have to have evidence of who is organizing the picket and then of course you can go to court. I have made it perfectly clear, because people have accused me of stopping them from using the civil law, any management of nationalized industries who wants to operate the civil law would not in fact in any way have a spoke put in their wheel by me.

J.Y.

Well, let me ask you about evidence then. Still on the subject of violence, which we understand Her Majesty the Queen has been very concerned about, and which was condemned by yourself and Neil Kinnock.

P.M.

Are not the overwhelming majority of our people concerned and condemn violence?

J.Y.

But of this violence, Mr. MacGregor has said: “Such violence is an organized conspiracy which requires some sort of central brain.” Indeed, he is further quoted as going on to say: “Miners are being intimidated out by orchestrated criminal action, orchestrated by Mr. Scargill and his friends.” Now if that is indeed the case and can be proved, I suppose one has to ask why has not something been done about that? [end p23]

P.M.

People have been charged with riot and with unlawful assembly and some with conspiracy. Their cases have not yet been heard before the court. This is a matter of concern, I think, to those in charge of the administration of the law. It is a matter of the Lord HailshamLord Chancellor and for the Home Office, which is why they have made it perfectly clear that stipendaries are there to be appointed and they have a power to appoint them. Two are actually sitting and there is a panel of ten, and I asked obviously, how long did it take—you remember we had the case of the Shrewsbury flying pickets—that took quite a long time to come to the courts and as you know, it was dealt with very firmly. How these cases are dealt with must be a case of the evidence before the court, but there are 6,000 cases. 1,000 have been heard and as you know, many convictions. The other 5,000—and there are still arrests being made—it is very interesting that the leadership of the NUM could stop violence at Brighton. Nevertheless, the violence since then has not been stopped. Now, if there is evidence, that is a matter for the police. As you know, I cannot say who shall be prosecuted and who cannot. That is absolutely right.

J.Y.

Prime Minister, if I am to believe “The Guardian”—and I cannot think they would make it up—Mr. MacGregor has actually named as being responsible for criminal action, Mr. Scargill and his friends. [end p24]

P.M.

Look! If there is any evidence, the police will collect it and it is for the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions to decide whether there is enough evidence to raise a court case.

J.Y.

But is this not when people say: “As yes, there is another hand on the table here, saying don't do anything”?

P.M.

Look! You know and I know that in this country governments cannot say—and rightly cannot say—who should or should not be prosecuted, and if ever they could you would have a political law and that would not be a rule of law; it would be totally and utterly wrong. Yes, it is taking a time for these cases. The more serious ones take a longer time, because you have to have commital proceedings. Let me say again the Lord HailshamLord Chancellor has ready any number of stipendary magistrates, professional magistrates, to hear cases, to hear the commital proceedings, to speed this up, and one of the things that we are looking at is the way in which the whole public order law works and we must look at the procedure, because we have not had this sort of mob violence operated in this country for a very long time and we must look at that. Please let me make it clear again, the moment a politician can say or instruct the law “Prosecute or do not prosecute that man”, that would be the end of an independent, impartial rule of law. The police are not on anyone's side except the side of the rule of law. [end p25]

J.Y.

Prime Minister, let us have a break and then we will all have a final few words.

P.M.

I'm sorry. I'm getting a bit … I feel so strongly that the rule of law and justice is something which is marvellous in this country. The police have been marvellous. They must not have political interference. They are on the side of the law.

J.Y.

Right. We will have a break and then we will be back for what will turn out to be something like seven or eight minutes to close. With me in the studio, the Prime Minister. We will back with her very shortly.

J.Y.

We go back to the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher. Just before we leave the miners, Prime Minister, ballots you were talking about earlier on. David Owen, as you well know, has suggested putting through a Bill to force the NUM to hold a ballot. Do you think that would be a good idea, to recall Parliament in fact?

P.M.

No, I do not think it is a good idea. The law that comes into effect on September 25th will refer certainly to any new strike under which, unless there is a secret ballot before the strike the unions would lose their immunity from prosecution—their civil immunity at law. Not prosecution—their civil immunity at law. That comes into effect on September 25th, so it will alter the whole picture as far as any new strike is concerned. [end p26]

J.Y.

But that is only for a national ballot, isn't it?

P.M.

A secret ballot. They have to have a secret ballot, otherwise they lose all their immunity and could be sued for damages—their funds could be sued for damages. So that is already …   .

J.Y.

One final thing before we leave the mining situation completely. I mean, people listening to this—and you made it absolutely clear that there is to be no Government intervention even if it takes another six months or however long—you are going to stay there and sit it out. What happens in this winter if the lights start to go out and things like that? What would happen then?

P.M.

We have heard all sorts of stories. First the stocks of coal were only going to last eight weeks, then twenty-four weeks; then there were going to be power cuts in August, then September, now November. We can carry on for a very very long time and shall. Let me make that perfectly clear. We can carry on for a very long time—and shall—and again, let me make it perfectly clear, the strike, if it carries on for a very very long time, will not only do more damage to the coal industry than anything else could do, it will stop jobs in other industries, or could stop jobs in other industries. At the moment, those who supply the coal industry are having some difficulty but we can and shall carry on for a very very long time, and there are not going to be power cuts this side of Christmas, and I do not believe there are going to be power cuts the other side of Christmas. [end p27]

J.Y.

Let me just be quite clear about that though. If that meant, at some stage—whether it is before Christmas or whether it is February—meant us sitting in the dark, well, we sit in the dark.

P.M.

Look! We have had threats and threats and threats of power cuts. None of those have come about. There will not be any power cuts for a very very long time, if at all—if at all.

J.Y.

Prime Minister, can I just move on—we are running out of time; it is eight minutes to twelve o'clock. Another issue of great importance—the sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano. Now, I understand that later today you are replying to Neil Kinnock 's letter of last week-end. However, there have been demands on all sides for a thorough inquiry or at any rate a White Paper setting out what happened. Now, we know that the ship itself posed a possible threat to our fleet sailing towards the Falklands. We know that David Owen has said as far as he is concerned the truth was not discreditable, it simply needs to be told. We know that the Argentine admirals have said that in your position it is very possible that they would have done exactly the same thing, so I suppose the question I have to ask is, why have you so far refused to accept the whole truth about the sinking of the cruiser does need to be told, because it could have been told at the time, couldn't it? [end p28]

P.M.

No. There are always some things which you can never tell. It would do irreparable harm to the future to tell. There are always are and there always will be.

J.Y.

You are saying that even the letter today …   . all will not be told?

P.M.

There always are some things which never can be told. There are conclusions which are drawn for some things, which Admiral Woodward indicated. That we knew that there was a pincer movement on the part of the aircraft carrier group and the General Belgrano group to close on our forces. The previous day the task force had arrived you will remember and had been attacked. Let me make this clear. Our job as Government, and as people, is to protect our boys. What do you think I would feel like if I were sitting here now and you said to me, “Mrs. Thatcher, how come that you had information the Belgrano on the 25th May were to attack the task force and yet when you had the Belgrano in your sights you did not sink her?”? My goodness, suppose she had got the Invincible or Hermes? Mr. Young, I would do, and every one of my Ministers concerned in the decision, would do exactly the same thing again. It was right. Our job is to protect our boys and let everyone know in this country and anywhere else that when we send people in the Armed Forces under orders to fight for a freedom which we enjoy and we want the rest of the British people to continue to enjoy, that this Government will discharge its responsibility by saying our job is to protect our boys and that is what we did. [end p29]

J.Y.

Don't you think you are underlining what David Owen says actually? I mean, had you gone at the time and said exactly that, like that, you probably would have had a great deal of public sympathy, I would have thought.

P.M.

The overwhelming majority of people accept our job was to protect our boys and that other warships are not sailing around in the vicinity merely to have a nice cruise.

J.Y.

Yes. The only question is, why the secrecy? This is what has boiled over all this time hasn't it?

P.M.

As you know, I try to reveal always as much as I can, but in the end I am responsible for the intelligence and security services and there are some things which can never never be revealed. Haven't you sometimes felt when you have seen things even relating to the last war, why did we tell those things, why? Doesn't it make it more difficult for some people in the future? Hasn't it revealed something which ought never to have been revealed. I will give as much information as I possibly can, but I have a responsibility to the future.

J.Y.

Even in your reply to Neil Kinnock today, then, you will still not be able to reveal everything? [end p30]

P.M.

I cannot reveal everything. It would do irreparable harm to the future. My responsibility is a continuing one and I want everyone to know that I take my responsibility to the Armed Forces and the Leon BrittanHome Secretary does to the Police, extremely seriously, and I do not believe in putting them in difficult positions unless we do everything we can to protect them.

J.Y.

Can I just ask you one final question then, because we really are jolly near to the end of time. The weakness of the pound. Now, reference is made to the soaring dollar and so forth, the almighty dollar, and certainly it is very strong, there is no doubt about that. Do you think that to some extent people who are outside of this country who can bank their currency in whatever they like, look at this country and see 3½ million people out of work, great divisions in Britain, violent confrontation on the picket lines and say to themselves: “Well, sorry about all that, but I do not want to hold pounds thank you very much!”

P.M.

As you know, the strength of the dollar is affecting every other country's currency adversely as well and it is of great concern, partly kept up by interest rates, but it is a very great concern to us. In addition, we have got these industrial disputes which have sent us down against some European currencies, though not as much as could otherwise have happened, and the dockers getting back to normal today has been an enormous help, and if only the coal workers would get back to normal that would be another tremendous boost and we would really be on the plus and on the up. Yes, people are going to look at [end p31] industrial disputes, particularly one which is carried on by industrial muscle, mob violence and refusal to have a ballot. They are. They are going to withhold decisions about whether they come to Britain. They like Britain; they love it; they think that this is totally out of keeping with our character—and it is and most people know it.

J.Y.

Prime Minister, thank you very much for coming. Don't leave it another year and four months before you come in again.

P.M.

I'll try not to. Thank you very much. It has been a great pleasure.