PM
Can I just say a word or two about the Conference. Of course there was no one particular issue in this Conference as there was in Lusaka and therefore it may seem that we haven't achieved as much at this Conference as we did in Lusaka. That is because circumstances were different. We have, nevertheless, discussed a number of very important issues. Of course we all discussed the world economy. It is a matter which dominates our thoughts at the moment and in connection with that we obviously discussed the problems of the developing countries. But I think we were able to get over a number of points to them and they also to us. First, you probably realise from the speeches that it was one of the other Commonwealth countries, Jamaica as a matter of fact, Mr. Seaga, pointed out that words to the effect that our aid in 1979 alone from Britain more than equalled the whole of the aid from the Soviet Bloc. Rather a good point for someone else to get over, but ours, one country, from Britain gave as much aid to developing countries as the whole of the Soviet Bloc. Also they were able to point out that aid is comparatively small compared with the very large oil bills and increasing oil bills that they're having to pay and so often I think the total aid meets about a third of the total oil bill of the developing countries and then to point out that the trade flows are infinitely more important, thirteen or fourteen times more important than the aid flows. These things put it in perspective and a number of them talked about the problem of protectionism which is absolutely vital for the world not to go protectionist because what they really need is a market for their products. There was a great deal of talk about the morality of securing aid and trade for the developing countries. We were also some of us able to say, look we too have problems, we too have problems with unemployment and we too have problems, much as we hate protectionism, we do sometimes have problems with things like textiles and footwear which can cause problems of unemployment at home. I mention those examples because it was really very much a ‘me getting to know their’ problems and ‘us getting to know their’ problems. On the Gleneagles matter, which came up several times in different guises, as you know [end p1] we did not attempt in any way to amend the Gleneagles Agreement. I think to be perfectly honest, there might be slightly different interpretations of the Gleneagles Agreement, although in fact if you look at it with a strict sort of legal cross examination, there is not a great deal of doubt about what it means. But that's reaffirmed in a general way. And on the other main political discussion was of course about Namibia and indeed the whole of Southern Africa. Again on Namibia Lord Carrington had done a great deal of work behind the scenes making contact with the Front Line States and we were able to get the course of action which has been agreed in New York affirmed and it agreed that that was the best way to go ahead, that is on the basis of the United Nations resolution, on the contacts to be made by the Contact Group with the Front Line States, with SWAPO, with the internal parties in Namibia and with South Africa. They realise that was the best way forward. So those were three things which we had very extensive discussions on. There were other similar discussions, very interesting on energy and the usual discussion which we had on the small islands. That's absolutely vital for some of us to sit in on because their problems are very very different from ours but very very real to them and it is an occasion for us to meet and talk about them. On the world economic situation they realise that inflation damages them as well as us because it means that they have to pay much much more for the goods that they import from the Western world. So they agree that we have to get inflation down. Altogether a very interesting, I thought a constructive Conference: now forty-one of us, some new members, and I thought we did a very great deal in getting to understand the other man's viewpoint which would be useful in future Conference and future dealings to come. Now would you like to open the questions?
Q
Can I take you up on that point Prime Minister? You had a reason to discuss all these issues with the other Leaders. What did you learn that you hadn't appreciated before from their points of view? [end p2]
PM
I think we were trying to get across some more of our viewpoints to them. I think I learnt that they had a very much greater understanding of the relationship between the developed and developing world than one would have realised from some of the commentaries. You see so many of the commentaries seem to say it must be more and more and more aid. First, there are a great many speeches about trade, a great many speeches about protectionism. There were a great many speeches that were thoroughly realistic in the light of world problems. Of course they all want more money. Don't we all, in one form or another. But it was against the background of world problems and they weren't expecting everything to be solved suddenly. And of course there were some comments about the thing which I opened with, that really these problems can't be solved as a matter of redistribution of wealth. There just isn't enough to go round. Look we're 55 million, Australia 14 million, Canada with about 20 million. Look, India's over 700 million. We can't do it on that basis. You have to try to create conditions which will help to create more wealth and the potential for that in developing countries is enormous. That is one thing I shall say which will not surprise you. It is always worth coming a very very long way to listen to Harry Lee for three quarters of an hour.
Q
Prime Minister, are you then basically satisfied that you have managed to get through the aid debate without having yourself committed before Cancun … . to say that you've left this fairly much in the air. … . Are you going to deal with aid and similarly that you have stalled off what might have been an embarrassing debate on Namibia?
PM
Well, we didn't stall off a debate on Namibia. We had a debate on Namibia, of course we did, and they said what they felt about it. There's nothing wrong in having a debate on Namibia. It would have been astonishing if we hadn't had a debate on Namibia. At the end of the debate they reaffirmed the way forward that had been enunciated. I think it was 24 September from New York, the Contact Group goes round in the way I have described. First, with constitutional guidelines, and I stress guidelines because we can't negotiate, the Contact Group can't negotiate full details on a Namibian constitution [end p3] and after that then it's hoped there'll be another round on how to implement the process to independence. But it was all accepted, it was accepted really after discussing and arguing it out and that's a very much sounder way than saying, no, I'm sorry this is all sorted out, we can't discuss it. This is how we started. Now we've discussed the whole thing and you reaffirm what we started with. Then what we had at the end was a very much stronger agreement than what we had—and understanding—than what we had at the beginning.
Q
… . (American intentions over Namibia)
PM
I pointed out that I think the Contact Group is more united now than it has been for a very very long time. It's united on the way forward. It believes from American and South African contacts that there is an opportunity for a way forward: it believes from American and South African contacts that South Africa is ready to take further steps towards the independence of Namibia. It therefore is going ahead on the basis that the coming discussions will result in further steps forward towards the independence of Namibia and I believe it's possible to do it by the end of 1982, whether it will be done by the 1982, one is slow to venture opinion but it is possible to do it and we believe that all people want now to make progress.
Q
Are you committed to that deadline, Prime Minister, 1982?
PM
No, no-one can ever be committed to a date. You've been in that business as long as I have.
Q
Prime Minister, one of the great values of these meetings must be the personal contacts one has with people. Could you tell us who you asked to see here. For instance, did you—I think we know the answer—but some of us were rather surprised that you didn't for instance, given your differences with India on the world politics and how to interpret them. You didn't seek to have a long talk with Mrs. Gandhi.
PM
Good heavens, I've just had a four-day visit to India, four to five-day visit to India. [end p4]
Q
Well, that's one example where it looks as if there's no need. But, shall we say, with African countries?
PM
First, don't forget we ran two lunch occasions and had very extensive talks then and obviously I had a long talk with Mr. Mugabe. The others, I had a long talk with Julius NyerereJulius, who was sitting next to me at one of the lunches and I had a long talk with Kenneth KaundaKenneth, with President Moi also because we were all lunching together. It isn't necessary you know to have a bilateral unless there's something specific. And don't forget with many countries the specific thing with us is usually more aid. That was asked for in quite a number of bilaterals.
Q
Can you tell us then about the Mugabe one that we understand went well.
PM
You wouldn't expect it go any how else would you?
Q
Is there anything you can say about it?
PM
No, I don't think so. Obviously I asked Mr. Mugabe how everything was going and got an account of it and then he wanted to put one or two things to me which I will look into.
Q
You expressed yourself rather strongly last night on the consensus. Do those views apply to the Commonwealth Conference as well?
PM
Consensus as you gather, it really arose from the Commonwealth Conference, when I said to someone, why do you constantly use the word consensus in relation to a certain matter? And someone said, very quickly, because you can't get agreement. It's a strange word, it's not consent, it's not agreement. I've never fully understood it. And you can't usually get it when you get down to the nitty gritty. When you get down to the nitty gritty you've got to get agreement.
Q
… . [inaudible] [end p5]
PM
No, no you don't you get down to it, we did it this morning, we had to … a number of things out. Once you get down to specifics you have to agree. When you are dealing with generalities you can perhaps have a bit of latitude because no-one is necessarily going to operate it. So dealing with generalities you can have latitude—when I say no-one is going to operate it, there is no way of operating it in detail. Once you get to detail on practical things you have got to agree. But last night wasn't that sort of use of it really. Last night was a view of certain beliefs and operate on those and then try to persuade people to follow you in your beliefs and agree with you. Or do you say I have no beliefs, I am prepared to compromise every single principle anyone else has ever held? So long as we can agree on the lowest common denominator some say, some say the highest common factor. I won't quarrel on the arithmetic of it.
Q
Are you saying Mr Heath does that?
PM
I was not making any reference to Mr Heath. That consensus point, I first put very, very vigorously at the YC Conference in Bournemouth before I was even Prime Minister. I am a conviction politician it has always been my pride first, I believe in certain things. So did many, many of my predecessors.
Q
In view of generalities Mrs Thatcher can you tell us what you mean?
PM
It is not a practical proposition, obviously the way forward, it is a statement of aspirations.
Q
[inaudible]
PM
I don't think you can ever expect a recipe to come out of a conference of forty-one nations like this just entering into discussion. You are never going to get a recipe which is an agreement. Lots of work has to be done and really quite detailed negotiation. I think its a great mistake to expect a recipe or detailed agreement [end p6] ever to come out of a conference like this and you must not expect it from CANCUN either.
Q
[Inaudible.]
PM
The Melbourne Declaration will be incorporated into the communique. We usually do that you know, because you are always desperately wanting something long before the end, you have got to fill the columns somehow.
Q
Prime Minister would you like to put into perspective how you feel about Mr Muldoon?
PM
Oh, distinctly catalytic, I think. Quite lively, anything else? I am not going to comment about other people's behaviour. I haven't an election campaign.
Q
Prime Minister behind Mr Muldoon 's remarks there does seem to be some serious disenchantment with the way this conference was operated. It seems to be saying, I don't really like the way this club works any more; was he in fact expressing what many others feel in private?
PM
I think he went through a very traumatic experience with that tour in New Zealand. I know it was quite traumatic for all us. When I turned on the news almost every day and you saw what was happening it was just the kind of tour we have never had before. Its the kind of behaviour we have never had before. I think you have got to take that into account too.
Q
Mr Nyerere said that the Springbok tour was a contributory factor …
PM
I think what we saw happening in New Zealand or heard happening in New Zealand had a great impact on those who had invited tours from South Africa, and don't forget there is a very great tradition of hospitality in the rugby world and clubs which have previously some other time played in South Africa are always anxious to return hospitality. You might think it's not a point worth making, it is. And when you take the hospitality you like to return it. …[words missing] [end p7] in Richmond and Torquay. We didn't know about it until we got here and then when we did, in any event, we would have had to operate under the Gleneagles Agreement and ask them not to go ahead with it and pointed out what had happened in New Zealand. I must say I think that did make it easier for us to persuade them and for them to accept our advice. I thought it was the most dramatic experience not only for New Zealand but for us all.
Q
[inaudible.]
PM
I can't, for the simple reason in Rhodesia we were absolutely in charge, we were the colonial power, we were given authority to get on with it, we did, taking other people with us at each and every stage, we sat down and got on with it for fifteen weeks and sat until we concluded. We are one of five of the Contact Group, I am every bit as anxious as everyone at that conference to get the Namibia problem solved, to get it moving to independence. We have to try to bring influence to bear on South Africa as we always have. But I do think that we are likely to get, and I believe in maintaining, a dialogue with South Africa. After all most countries there have trading relations with South Africa, and we are one of them, believe in maintaining a dialogue, and I think the fact that we have maintained a dialogue has possibily contributed to the fact that I believe there is a way forward, window is the modern jargon word now, on the Namibian problem. I do think that when they take the kind of action you and I would wish, namely when they stopped the coloured discrimination in certain areas, then I do think we should applaud it. I remember doing so in a speech New York that they had taken this step forward and they were then going to introduce legislation, and if they did introduce that kind of legislation, non-discriminatory legislation or legislation that would prohibit discrimination in certain areas, that would be very good. I do think that when they do things like that we have to encourage them, because we shall just have to do everything we can.
Question
[inaudible]
PM
No, I think quite apart from one's political point of view, [end p8] I think you will find that the economics of the thing are such that they bring change about. I think you will find that some of the fastest things changed were in industry; they need more and more skilled people and, therefore, you get a breakdown of the interface where it matters namely between the white skilled person and the black person not being trained to have skills. That breaks down and you get much, possibly, very good prospects of advancement there. Indeed I think industry is being conducive to breaking down apartheid. Industrial, economic advance is being conducive to breaking down apartheid in practice.
Question
[inaudible.]
PM
I think that what they were referring to in your remarks wasn't so much the revolutionary aspect but that he is what I would call a great centralist. Everything centrally controlled in considerable detail.
Question
[inaudible.]
PM
I think there is quite a bit of misunderstanding about foreign investment, I mean certainly a foreign investor is not going to invest there if its going to be annexed or likely to be taken over or nationalised or centralised or whatever you call it. I think quite a number of them made the point that they wanted money flows or one sort or another to go there and they shouldn't have any regard to politics. But then others made the point that that just isn't realistic. I didn't make the point, others made the point. We did have one of the most interesting debates on the conference on flows, on financial flows. Of course it was dealing with aid, dealing with financing, recycling. As you know, of the financial flows from the developed world to the less developed world have by far the best record. About 11.2 billions through us, correct—and about 4.8 billions with the United States. We have the very best record getting flows in recycling them out—by far the best record. On private investment we have the second best record in the world and if you take our aid plus our private investment together then we're up to 2.6%; of GDP which is way above the official target. We are also good on the palace target [sic] of 0.15%; to the lesser developed countries, we've already hit it. [end p9]
Q
[inaudible.]
PM
Well, I sometimes wonder, I will tell you why. We don't particularly like targets, I don't particularly like targets. I didn't mind that one because we had already hit it. There is a target of 0.7%; of GNP target for years, it's not yet been hit, and I think a number of people wonder we haven't hit that one, why do you sub-divide into targets? So in fact it seems to be a target, it's become an aim but we already hit it. I tell you there is another thing, I think India and Pakistan don't come within that definition lesser developed countries—not surprising because they have areas of great poverty, they are also highly developed, as you know, in some of their industry, extremely highly developed.
Question
I would just like to ask you about Egypt, Prime Minister, what are the fears and anxieties following the assassination of President Sadat?
PM
I think that there will be a great effort on both sides to get stability, that is to say at the moment is the fulfilment of the agreement. Certainly I think there will be a tremendous effort on both the side of Israel and on the side of Egypt, because the agreement is between two countries, to get the next stage of that agreement which is the return of Sinai in April 1982 fulfilled. Once you have got into a position of uncertainty the first thing I think most politicians would say is lets get some stability because only with a basis of stability and certainty have you got a basis for going forward again. My guess is that both of them would take that view.
Q
[inaudible.]
PM
I think you will find that we were all very conscious that we were not going to get a long way with the European initiative until that return of Sinai in 1982. But in the meantime, we might have hoped to get somewhere on asking both sides to recognise officially the rights of the other on condition that the other one recognised it. It really would be an immense step forward. [end p10] My guess would be, of course, there are sixty days to go before an Egyptian election. I would not like to prophesy. Every effort will be made to try to act in such a way that you get a return to some kind of stability and sense that the things that were to happen in the future about Sinai will happen. You can never get very far in politics, as you know, without return to order, return to stability. It is always rule No. 1 where you have got uncertainty, instability, lack of order it is always rule No.1, return to stability, return to order, absolutely vital. From there you can go on.
Q
Do you know Mr Mubarak, do you have confidence in him?
PM
I have met Mr Mubarak twice, once in Egypt in Cairo and once in England. I have had talks with him.
Q
How do you find him?
PM
Very able. And experienced as well.
Q
Would you give us your views on Mr Heath 's speech?
PM
I have not gone through it in detail. You will understand that I really have had more immediate things to deal with.
Q
Just to go back to Cairo, are you going to his funeral?
PM
I am, when we leave here tonight, on the way for a day in Pakistan, and then I shall return to London which will be on Friday. And Lord Carrington whose gone ahead will be going to the funeral, he's gone ahead, returned to London. And we are assuming that the funeral will be on Saturday—have you heard in the meantime? If not he would already on the way have to deflect [sic] there.
Q
Do you not feel you should go yourself?
PM
I have been away by the time I get back for a fortnight, and it would be very difficult to turn round and go there much as one would like to, much as one would like to. And I have been away for a fortnight, Lord Carrington is on his way back to London and will return there and then leave. [end p11]
Q
Do you see repercussions elsewhere in the Middle East, do you see a problem?
PM
I think what we will do now is to calm things down, that is the most important thing and I think everyone will be very conscious of that. Do you remember, if I can just give an example, when something which creates uncertainty happened? Do you remember when the Iraq/Iran war, how quickly all other countries moved? They were in session at the United Nations and we were in regular contact—all other countries moved to isolate the conflict. I thought it was a great tribute then to the sophistication of international relations and the realisation of what comes on the part of the governments of nations, on the part of everyone who wants peace and stability which, of course, is the overwhelming majority.
Q
Would you like to think about the future of the Commonwealth …
PM
I think a lot of use is being made of it. I thought a very good development was the regional meetings. First because they discuss in more detail and meet more frequently than the big conference and, of course, we see many of them through London and many of them at other international conferences. Part of the value of these big conferences, we have a lot of the smaller ones here who don't belong to any other big forum. They have their say and get their views over, which is why we always have to have time for their debates and it is absolutely vital that we are present at those debates. I think the one sad thing, if I might say, is that you do get so many set speeches. Now set speeches in the conference take up so much time, they come and distribute them to you all and we have really less time for debate and debate is useful so you don't get so much chipping in. Now and then we got it and that is what makes it—that is why the lunches are so valuable because you get six or eight of you round a table and you really can get quite a good discussion or debate there.
Q
How did you get on with your neighbour, Mr Price.
PM
Very well. We are absolutely delighted we got Belize to independence.
Q
…[inaudible] [end p12]
PM
By knowing George C. Pricehe is not alone, I think he found a lot of friends there.
Q
…[inaudible.]
PM
Oh well, that is all set down in the terms on which we agreed on in independence. It is a bit different when you see a person you have a picture in your mind … I thought he was a very able and nice person.
Q
…[inaudible.]
PM
I am foresighted and far-sighted.